Neoplatonic Exegeses of Plato's Cosmogony ( Timaeus 27C-28C)

John F. Phillips

Journal of the History of Philosophy, Volume 35, Number 2, April 1997,pp. 173-197 (Article)

Published by The Johns Hopkins University PressDOI: 10.1353/hph.1997.0037

For additional information about this article

Access provided by RMIT University Library (10 Oct 2013 10:35 GMT)

http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/hph/summary/v035/35.2phillips.html

Neoplatonic Exegeses of Plato's Cosmogony (Timaeus 27C-28C) J O H N F. P H I L L I P S

AMONG THE MANY CONTROVERSIES to which the long history of interpretat ion of Plato's Timaeus has given rise, that concerning the eternity of the cosmos is one of the most endur ing and complex, and the source of almost continuous debate f rom the time of Xenocrates to the present. The importance to all Platonists o f a doctrinally consistent answer to the question of whether or not the universe had a beginning in time is made amply clear in the statement attr ibuted to Iamblichus by Proclus (In Tim. I 219, 90) that proper understand- ing of the creation of the world is crucial for the entire theory of Nature. Iamblichus here refers obliquely to the or thodox Platonist position that the universe is not a temporal being subject to decay and destruction. The princi- pal problem for all of them, of course, was that, taken literally, Plato's account of the creation in the Timaeus, particularly the passage 27C-a8C, appears to be an unequivocal affirmation of a temporal beginning to the cosmos. Espe- cially troublesome was Plato's use of the verb y~yovev in Timaeus 28b 7, which seems to be an explicit claim for an &QX1] in time. That this passage did indeed refer to a temporal beginning was a point that was made repeatedly and forcefully by the chief opponents of the Platonists on this issue, the Peripa- tetics, who, following Aristotle, read the Timaeus creation account literally.' To counter such opposition, and to enhance their respective positions in their own internecine struggles centered on this question, various Platonists took ever more subtle interpretive approaches, some of the most contentious involv- ing explanations of how Plato's use of y~yovev in 28B 7 could be seen to be compatible with the or thodox position that the creation of the universe was nontemporal . Most notable in this regard is the list, compiled by the Middle Platonist Calvenus Taurus in the second century A.D., of all the possible

' For the argument of Alexander Aphrodisias, see Simplicius In De Caelo I ao, pp. ~96ff. Reimer.

[173]

174 J O U R N A L OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 3 5 : 2 APRIL 1 9 9 7

n o n t e m p o r a l i s t senses o f t h e w o r d ' c r e a t e d ' (yewl~6v) which the bes t e f fo r t s o f t he P la ton ic e x e g e t i c a l t r a d i t i o n h a d p r o d u c e d . A c c o r d i n g to t he C h r i s t i a n N e o p l a t o n i s t J o h n P h i l o p o n u s , T a u r u s i den t i f i e d f o u r such mean ings2 :

M1) Tha t which is not actually created, but is of the same genus as things that are created (zb ~d] yev61xevov Ix~v, ~v 6~ ~ cdJx~, 6v y~vet xo~g yev'q~o~g).

M~) Tha t which is conceptually composite, even if it has never in fact been combined (~6 ~mvo~q o~v0e~ov, xa~ et M1 ovwe0,fi).

M3) Tha t which is perpetual ly in the process of becoming (6e~ ~v t 0 y~veo0ctt).

M4) Tha t which has the cause of its existence in a higher source external to it (~b etvctt c t ~ &D.ox60ev ~o'r~v • ~aQh ~o~ 0eo~).

T h i s list o f m e a n i n g s was fo r c e n t u r i e s t he s t a n d a r d r e s o u r c e fo r P la ton i s t e x e g e s e s o f Timaeus 2 7 C - 2 8 C , wi th the d i f f e r e n t schools a r g u i n g fo r o n e o r m o r e o f t h e m as t he sense o r senses in which Pla to ' s use o f the t e r m was to be u n d e r s t o o d . O f t h e s e m a n y a n d v a r i e d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s , s all o f wh ich w e r e a t t e m p t s to r e a d a n o n t e m p o r a l i s t a c c o u n t in to wha t is ce r t a in ly o n a pr ima

facie r e a d i n g a t e m p o r a l i s t d e s c r i p t i o n o f t he c r e a t i o n o f t he un ive r se , I wish to c o n s i d e r s eve ra l wh ich i n c o r p o r a t e o n e o r m o r e o f the m e a n i n g s o n T a u r u s ' list, spec i f ica l ly M2, wh ich h o l d s tha t the u n i v e r s e is c r e a t e d in t he sense o f b e i n g a c o m p o s i t e o f m a t t e r a n d f o r m ; M 3, wha t Ma t th i a s Baltes4 t e r m s the "phys ica l i s t " i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , a c c o r d i n g to which t h e r e was no m o m e n t w h e n t h e c o s m o s c a m e to be; it is r a t h e r p e r p e t u a l l y b e c o m i n g , or , to give it t he c o m m o n e x p r e s s i o n o f an t iqu i ty , it has its b e i n g in its b e c o m i n g ; a n d M 4, t h e

2De Aet. Mundi VI 8, pp. 145, 13--147, 6 Rabe. Taurus' list was later expanded by Porphyry (ibid. VI 8, p. 148, 7ft.). These attempts to establish nontemporalist definitions of yevrlx6v were in part inspired by Aristotle's own list of meanings in De Caelo 28ob15ff. Cf. Proclus In Tim. I 28o, l Diehl, and Philoponus, ibid. VI 8, p. 145, 15ff. For discussions of Taurus' list, see R. Sorabji, Time, Creation and the Continuum: Theories in Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages (Ithaca, 1983), 274ff.; P. P. Matter, Zum Einfluss des Platonischen "Timaios" auf das Denken Plotins (Winterthur, 1964), 188ff.; J. Dillon, The Middle Platonists: A Study of Platonism from 8o B.C. to A.D. 22o (London, 1977), 242ff.

nOne of the earliest Platonic responses to this dilemma, identified with Speusippus and Xenocrates, and, later, with Crantor, asserts that Plato attributes a temporal beginning to the cosmos only "for the sake of instruction" (6L6ctoxctks XdtQtv) or "for the sake of clarity" (octqrrlves ikve• his true belief being that the cosmos is eternal and never subject to becoming. Plato proffers his creation account, then, only as a methodological tool and is motivated by the idea that the nature of the universe can best be explained by analyzing it theoretically into its constituent parts.

4 Baltes's book, Die Weltentstehung des Platonischen Timaios nach den Antiken Interpreten (Leiden, 1976), is an excellent study of the history of this controversy in antiquity and includes sections on each of the Neoplatonists considered here. But due to the scope of his study, his treatment of the Neoplatonic exegeses is necessarily selective. A more thorough look at the peculiarly Neoplatonic interpretations of what was certainly one of the central problems of textual exegesis in later antiquity will give us clearer insight into the reception of the Platonic tradition in Neoplatonism as well as the doctrinal relationships among the Neoplatonists themselves.

N E O P L A T O N I C E X E G E S E S OF P L A T O ' S C O S M O G O N Y 175

"metaphysical-ontological" in terpre ta t ion, which maintains that Plato is saying that the universe has an &Q~(~I, not in the sense o f a beginning in time, but as a pr inciple or p r io r cause on which the cosmos is entirely d e p e n d e n t for its existence.5 My focus will be on the views o f the p r imary exponen t s o f or tho- dox Platonist exegesis in late antiquity, the Neoplatonists , in par t icular Plotinus, Porphyry , and Proclus, and how their in terpre ta t ions o f Timaeus

2 7 C - 2 8 C are to be unde r s tood in the context o f the Platonic tradition. Such an examina t ion is worthwhile for a n u m b e r o f reasons, the most impor t an t be ing that, first, very little a t tent ion has been paid to the Neopla tonic response to the cont roversy s u r r o u n d i n g this passage of the Timaeus and, second, what little c o m m e n t a r y there has been on these phi losophers is on certain critical doctr inal mat te rs mis taken or misleading.

Any a t t empt to recover the outlines o f these Neoplatonic exegeses mus t begin with the work o f Proclus, the sole m e m b e r o f the g r o u p whose c o m m e n - tary on the Timaeus is extant and who is the principal source for o u r knowl- edge o f the lost commenta r i e s o f Porphyry and Iamblichus. I t will be neces- sary, there fore , to begin with a detailed analysis o f his exegesis o f Timaeus

27C-28C , which can then serve as the basis f rom which to assess the ideas o f his Neopla tonic predecessors . In the process, however, we shall discover that Proclus ' account presents p rob lems o f its own.

At the outset o f his discussion o f Plato's investigation in Timaeus 28B into the quest ion o f whe the r the universe has existed always with no beg inn ing of genera t ion or whe the r it came to be f rom some arche (In Tim. I 276, 8ft.), Proclus notes that the way in which Plato posed the question is mean t to sug- gest that the universe is actually nei ther o f these ontological ex t remes , but belongs to a level o f being in te rmedia te between them, par tak ing to some deg ree in both, i.e., the universe both has some beginning o f genera t ion and exists always. Fur ther , he says, that it is such an in te rmedia te be ing becomes clear la ter on in 34 B where Plato shows that the universe is created (yevTIx6v) only with respect to its body, while it is uncrea ted (&y~arqxov) insofar as it is also a god. And as an in te rmedia te being, he continues, the universe resembles soul (277, 18ff.; cf. 235, 21ft.). 6

5 See also the analysis of these interpretations in Sorabji, Time, Creation and the Continuum, 268ff. As evidence for their view, proponents of the physicalist interpretation referred to the phrase x~ ~6 ytyv6~tevov ix~v dte~, 6v i5~ oa36~xoxe in Tim. 97D6. But J. Whittaker, "Timaeus 27D5ff.," Phoenix 23 0969): 181-85, has given good reasons to believe that this is a corruption of the original text, &e~ having been added in later antiquity to support the nonliteral interpretation of creation begun by Xenocrates.

6The same explanation for the intermediate nature of the universe is picked up again later (29a, 25ff. ) and elaborated, where the fact that the cosmos possesses a body which is completely yeVrlX6V while also possessing divine soul and intellect, which are dty~vqxct, induces Proclus to proffer an explanation as to why we might not just as well say that the universe is uncreated as that

176 J O U R N A L OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 3 5 : 2 A P R I L 1997

This concept o f the intermediate status o f the cosmos is shaped by two key formal principles which are to be found in the Elements of Theology. First, it is clearly Proclus' view that Plato in Tiraaeus 28B is applying a precept stated in Proposit ion 29 of his Elements: since all procession is th rough like terms, be- tween two terms which are in themselves unlike and so represent opposite extremes there must be something intermediate exhibiting characteristics o f both o f the extreme terms. So intermediate between wholly eternal beings and wholly created beings,7 which have their existence in some part o f time (a concept the meaning of which will become clear later), there is necessari ly-- necessarily, that is, if procession is to take p lace - -a class o f beings which are in one respect eternal but in another measured by time (Prop. lo6), i.e., they both exist always and come to be (Prop. lo7). 8

Secondly, those propositions in the Elements which concern the nature o f soul reveal what Proclus means when he says in his analysis of Timaeus ~8B that soul and the cosmos are similar as intermediate beings. Souls which are participated by bodies are intermediate between indivisible and divisible prin- ciples (Prop. 19o ) by virtue o f the fact that they are eternal in substance (o~3os but temporal in activity (~v~oyetet) (Prop. 191). Participated souls thus to a degree belong to both spheres but to neither completely, surpassing what wholly comes to be in that they are part o f the realm of things eternal, but inferior to what is wholly eternal in that they are also part o f the realm of things which come to be (yewlxdt).

T h e same strata o f these spheres of being which Proclus has in mind in his commenta ry on the Timaeus and in the Elements are summarized in De Provi- dentia 9, P. 1 15 (Boese):

There are therefore certain entities that have their essence [substantiam] in eternity, while others have it in time--by the former I mean those entities whose activity [op- eratio] is eternal along with their essence, and by the latter those entities whose essence /s not, but perpetually becomes, albeit in infinite time--; still other entities are interme- diate between these two kinds; their essence is stable and superior to becoming, but their activity is perpetually becoming and is measured by both eternity and time . . . . It remains then to make this intermediate kind eternal in essence but temporal in activity.

it is created. His answer is that the entire cosmos is "characterized" wholly by its form and not its underlying nature. For the same reason, he continues, we say that Socrates is mortal even though he has an immortal soul, since the ~Oov in him is mortal.

7As we shall see shortly in our discussion of De Providentia 9, P. 115 Boese (below, 18off.), Proclus means by wholly eternal beings those beings which are eternal in both essence and activity and by wholly created beings those which have both their essence and activities in becoming.

8Cf. also Prop. 55, where Proclus asserts that the twofold distinction between eternals and beings which come to be in a part of time (i.e., the latter are both in process and bound by temporal limits) makes necessary a mediate order of beings which are like eternals in one of these respects but unlike them in the other.

N E O P L A T O N I C E X E G E S E S OF P L A T O ' S C O S M O G O N Y 177

And so we say that these three levels of entities have been demonstrated for you: the intellectual, the psychic, and the corporeal. I mean by intellectual what is entirely in eternity and entirely being and intelligent; by corporeal, what perpetually becomes either in infinite time or in some part of time; by psychic, what is eternal according to its essence, but employing temporal activities.

Let us summarize the natures o f these three entium ordines as described by Proclus:

a) Intellectual order: eternal substantia (= o+os eternal operatio (= ~v~0yetc 0

b) Psychic order: eternal substantia operatio always becoming (in time)9

c) Corporeal order: substantia always becoming (either in infinite time or in some part of time) operatio always becoming (in time)

Here again soul is said to mediate between the intellectual and corporeal orders , par taking as it does in both eternity and time. Soul is infer ior to eternals insofar as with respect to its activity it comes to be in time and is there- fore a y~vqx6v, but it enjoys primacy among y~v~l~ insofar as it participates time only in this one respect (cf. E.T. Prop. x9e). Moreover, in its always (&rs coming to be it imitates the eternal o rde r in a way that o ther yrv~lx6t (with the except ion o f the cosmos) do not (cf. E.T. Prop. 55). In o ther words, soul's activity is not limited by time, as are beings which are generated, as Proclus puts it, in some par t o f time, but is perpetual . In light of this Proclus distin- guishes two senses o f perpetui ty (&~St6~Vlg): (a) one which is eternal (c~cbvtog), a perpetua l steadfastness having its existence concentra ted in a simultaneous whole and ent i re in itself; and (b) the o ther in time, a perpetual becoming, diffused and unfo lded in temporal extension 0rctOdrctoLg), and composed of parts each existing separately in succession.'~

T h e first o f these forms o f perpetui ty is p rope r to soul, while the second, tempora l perpetui ty , pertains to the cosmos in its creation. At first glance this dif ferent ia t ion may be puzzling, for, as we have seen, Proclus is at pains to show that the cosmos is like soul both in its being intermediate between being and becoming and insofar as its becoming is in limitless time (~tzt~tpov Xp6vov)

oCf. E.T., Prop. Lo6: the principle intermediate between eternity and temporality must be eternal in essence and temporal in activity. It follows from this (Prop. 1o7) that what is eternal in one respect and temporal in another is both a Being and a coming-to-be.

'~ R. Dodds, Elementatio theologica (Oxford, 1963), 299, notes that the idea of temporal perpetuity as a "mean term" was suggested by Timaeus 37 D.

178 J O U R N A L OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 3 5 : 2 A P R I L 1997

rather than in some part of time. But there are crucial differences between the two which justify Proclus' distinction with regard to their perpetuity. As the schema of De Providentia shows, soul's participation in becoming is restricted to its activity, which appears to consist in the creative act of the perpetual ensouling of body (cf. dt~L ct~6 VvXo L E.T. Prop. 196 ) and it is self-generating. The cosmos, by contrast, while possessing both a divine and immortal soul and Intellect, is "characterized" by its physical form H and thus receives its essence from another, higher source. Unlike soul, then, the hypostasis of the cosmos is coextensive with time and it is entirely dependent for its existence upon the everlasting creative activity of its creator; its being consists entirely in its becom- ing. As the Demiurge must always create, so there must be that which is always being created (6Tl~tOVQyo~itevov de~: In Tim. I 288, 16ff.) and ordered (xool~o~p.evov &e~: In Tim. I 279, 22) as an image (eiS0~.ov: u8o, 29) of the creator, this process, again, taking place in limitless time and, in keeping with the Neoplatonic theory of cosmic creation, without preconceived plan or inten- tion. So the temporal perpetuity of the cosmos is its continually receiving ema- nations from above (~mvct6~tevov). 1-5 deL ,/tyv6~tevov, then, means for Proclus that which comes to be by a cause external to it (In Tim. I 279, 24f.) and is in a process of everlasting creation through the unending activity of that cause.

This relationship to its higher cause makes the cosmos a special sort of YeWl~6V to which the concepts of the natural sciences do not apply. We noted previously that the resemblance of the intermediate souls to the eternals is at least in part predicated on the ancient notion, found in Timaeus 37 D, that the temporal perpetuity of the intermediate souls is an image of the eternity of the eternals. In general Proclus employs the same explanation to account for the manner in which the cosmos is the image (e[6~.ov) of the Demiurge. In doing so, Proclus both seeks to counter those who might tend to treat the perpetual coming-to-be of the cosmos according to Aristotelian categories and explains away a seeming contradiction in Plato's use of different tenses of the verb ytyv~o0(xL in reference to the cosmos in Timaeus 28B-C. In a long excursus in his commentary on the Timaeu~ (In Tim. I 281, 15ff.-~82), he maintains that the complete dependence of the cosmos on Being for its illumination guarantees that if it were separated from its eternal cause it would be rendered ipsofacto incomplete, as would all things in the process of coming to be. But this everlasting dependence on its source does not render it less complete ( o ~ . . . &~eX~oxepov) than those beings whose process of generation runs its course over a limited segment of time and which there- fore have reached, over time, their ~Xog of becoming. For, insofar as in its perpetual becoming it has no temporal termini, the cosmos in its coming to be

llI~ Tim. I 291 , 25ff.; cf. also 282, lff. and 293, 1off.

NEOPLATONIC EXEGESES OF PLATO'S COSMOGONY 179

does not proceed f rom incomplet ion to complet ion according to the Aristote- lian theory o f natural process; it is ra ther "whole at once, perfect, and per- petually comes to be, because its perpetui ty [T6 ~tes and its perfect ion are in the wholeness o f t ime" (In Tim. I 281, 22f.). 1' T h e cosmos thus has a begin- ning and an end, not in some port ion of time, but in all time, by which Proclus means that its beginning and end are not two temporal ly discrete moments , but are one and the same in the fullness o f time. It constitutes no contradict ion, then, to say, as Plato does, both that the cosmos "has come to be" (u and that it "is coming to be" (~,~v~xett) since it is at once perpe tu- ally beginning and perpetual ly complete, so that the two are one. Put an- o ther way, the cosmos has become what it is always becoming. In its perpet- ual becoming, then, it is everlastingly complete, and in this it imitates the perfect ion o f its maker (294, 2xf.). Its dtQ)~r I and ~ , o ~ are, however, concep- tually distinct: on the one hand, the cosmos has a beginning and so "perpetu- ally becomes" due to its corporeal nature; on the other, it reaches a x~kog o f genera t ion and so "has become" due to its creating Intellect (282, 13-15). 13 Al though Proclus thus emphasizes the independence o f the genesis o f the cosmos f rom the Aristotelian categories as they apply to natural processes, he here employs these same categories in a man n e r which fits the unique mode o f genera t ion he is describing, for it is clear that the cosmic body and the creator-Intel lect represen t in a formal sense, respectively, the material and final causes o f the coming-to-be o f the cosmos. And he feels that this inter- pretat ion is consonant with Aristotle's assertion (Meteor. 339a26) that the movemen t o f the heavens is "always in complet ion" (&e~ ~v ~ . e t : 29o, 27ff.; cf. 282, 2of., 294, ]8f.). Thus , instead of contradict ing Aristotle, Proclus purpor t s to be in te rpre t ing him.

Such, then, is an outl ine o f Proclus' exegesis of Timaeus 27C-a8C. His ac- count in his commenta ry on the Timaeus, together with others which supple- ment it, brings to light three major issues o f particular concern to him and o ther Neoplatonists in their exegeses and the problems both he and m o d e r n in terpre ters have had in unders tand ing and relating the Neoplatonic re- sponse to them: (1) the question of the precise sense or senses in which we are to unders t and Plato's use o f ~,~yovev in 28B 7, (2) the problem of arr iving at a clear and consistent explanat ion o f which beings are to be classified as belong- ing to the realm of the intermediates, and (3) the relevance to the Neoplatonic exegeses o f the concept o f the eternal activity o f the creator o f the cosmos. As

~* The concept of the "wholeness of time" is derived from Tirnae~ 38B where Plato says that time was generated with the heaven, and this is not a portion of time but the wholeness of time. Cf. Proclus In Tim. I 281, 23ff., 294, ~9ff., and Plotinus Enn. 1.5.7.3o.

,3 On the Proclan senses of tkQXT ] and x~kog when pertaining to the cosmos, see Beierwaltes, Proklos. Grundziige seiner Metaphysik (Frankfurt, 1979), 139.

180 J O U R N A L OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 3 5 : ~ A P R I L ~997

we look at these issues in m o r e depth , it will become obvious that Proclus ' analysis, valuable as it is as a source o f so much o f what we know about the cont roversy over this passage in later antiquity, is in some respects problemat ic or even inaccurate and the re fo re requires closer examinat ion before we pass j u d g m e n t on its reliability as an historical record. And the same scrutiny mus t be appl ied to m o d e r n assessments o f the Neopla tonic exegeses.

1 . T H E C O S M O S AS yf.V~156~ a. Proclus

At the beg inn ing o f his discussion o f Timaeus 28B Proclus presents what had before h im been oppos ing views on the question of whe ther or not the cosmos was created. T h e first is that o f Cran to r and his followers who, he says, held that the cosmos was ),eVVl'c6g insofar as it or iginated f rom an external cause and was the re fo re nei ther self-created nor se l f -determined (i.e., it was yevBTbg ~o.T' O.tT(~(lV)'4; the o the r is the stance which he at tr ibutes to Plotinus, Por- phyry, and Iambl ichus that Plato refers to the cosmos as a crea ted be ing because it is a c o m p o u n d (o13v0e-cov), its der ivat ion f rom ano the r cause be ing a sense which ~ o ~ . . . ovvv~dQXetv (In Tim. I 277, 8ft.). Proclus then elabo- rates his own posit ion on the mat ter :

We say that these [~a~a; by which I take him to mean either (a) both the positions of Crantor and his followers on the one hand and Plotinus, Porphyry, and Iamblichus on the other, or (b) the two meanings of yeVVl~6V he has just outlined] are the most accurate of all, and that the universe is generated [yev'q~6v] both as a compound and as requiring other causes for its existence [• e[vat yevvl~bv ~bv • • tbg 013v0e~ov • ~bg (xk~.tov a ~ . ~ v e~g xb e~vat 8e6p.evov]. (In Tim. I 277, 14-16)

Now, essential to a grasp o f Proclus ' point here is an under s t and ing o f what he means by the word ovvvzcdtQXetv. T h e r e are two possibilities, each with its own p r o p o n e n t a m o n g m o d e r n commenta tors . On the one hand, we can with Baltes'5 take the words ~ o 1 3 ~ . . . o~vvz~dtQXetv to mean that M 4 is "connected" ( " zusammenhangen" ) to M~, so that the one mean ing implies the other . Ac- cord ing to Baltes, Proclus is not contrast ing the Neoplatonists ' position to that o f C ran to r and his followers, but is ra ther g roup ing both o f these schools o f t hough t toge ther as, in general , opponen t s o f the temporal is t exegesis o f Plu- tarch and Atticus (cf. 276, 31 ff.). T h e advantage of so translat ing ovvvz~d~;tetv is that the first sentence o f Proclus ' own exegesis thereby follows m o r e natu- rally: the Neoplatonists , Proclus is saying, are correct, for M2 and M 4 taken toge ther are sufficient to explain the na ture o f the genera t ion o f the cosmos in

,4 On Crantor, cf. Plutarch Moral. aol3A; Phiioponus De Aet. Mundi p. 147, 13ff.; Baltes, Die Weltentstehung, 83-95.

,sDie Weltentstehung, Teil I, 143f. and Teil II, p. 9-

N E O P L A T O N I C EXEGESES OF PLATO'S COSMOGONY 181

the Timaeus. Or, on the o t h e r hand , we can with J o h n Dillon '6 take these words to m e a n tha t M 4 is "p resen t as a o v v a ~ t o v , " o r s econda ry reason, to M2, such that, a c c o r d i n g to the Neopla tonis ts , M 4 is only a s econda ry sense o f yevq-~6v as Plato uses it, M2 be ing the p r i m a r y sense. A po in t in favor o f this t rans la t ion is tha t it agrees with wha t J o h n Ph i loponus tells us abou t the view o f P o r p h y r y , tha t he c la imed the p r i m a r y m e a n i n g o f yevqz6v to be " the c o m p o u n d o f ma t t e r a n d fo rm." ' 7 For Dillon, Proclus ' p u r p o s e in the passage q u o t e d above is no t to m a k e a b r o a d s t a t emen t abou t the doc t r ina l oppos i t ion be tween the tempora l i s t s a n d non tempora l i s t s , bu t m o r e specifically to express his p re fe r - ence fo r the Neop la ton ic def in i t ion over tha t o f C r a n t o r and his followers.

Regard less o f which t rans la t ion for ovvv~dQ)~tv is accurate , Dillon is cer- tainly co r rec t tha t Proc lus ' in ten t is to cont ras t C ran to r ' s posi t ion with tha t o f the Neopla tonis ts . H e presents the core a r g u m e n t o f the long excursus tha t follows this passage at 99o, ~7ff.: it is no t e n o u g h , he asserts, to say tha t the cosmos is c rea ted because it der ives f r o m an ex te rna l cause, fo r even Intel lect comes f r o m a c a u s e - - t h e first c a u s e - - b u t it and o t h e r intelligible beings de- p e n d e n t u p o n the O n e are none the less u n g e n e r a t e d . This seems on the face o f it to be an o u t r i g h t re ject ion o f C ran to r ' s view. But Dillon incor rec t ly conc ludes f r o m tha t s t a t emen t tha t Proclus has t h e r e f o r e p r e s e n t e d a "some- wha t e l abora ted" vers ion o f the posi t ion o f I ambl ichus et al.'8 For if Proclus m e a n t by ovvv~dQ~etv wha t Dillon says tha t he does, then clearly he is no t at all advoca t i ng his fellow Neopla tonis t s ' posi t ion as an al ternat ive to tha t o f C r a n t o r and his followers. T h e def ini t ion o f yrvq~6v that Proclus does en- do r se is o n e tha t s u p p l e m e n t s M 4 with bo th M2 and M3, so that no t only is the cosmos g e n e r a t e d in the sense o f be ing d e p e n d e n t on a p r io r cause, bu t also "as s o m e t h i n g which at once pe rpe tua l ly becomes and has b e c o m e " a n d as wha t "comes to be as a o~3vO~og.",0 A l t h o u g h cer ta inly he could no t accept ,

~61amblichi Chalcidensis. In Platonis Dialogos Commentariorum Fragmenta (Leiden, 1973) , 303 . ,7 ~:~t 5/~ /I ~.~tg ~5~ q~'qp~, "co~vvv, 6"~t • "~6 xvQ&0g ~q~' /l~t~v 6Et~(Obv yem]~bv ~Qooa-

yoQev6~ewov, "rov't~errtv "c6 o'6v0E'rov ~ ~.Tig xai, ~[6ovg... : DeAet. Mundi VI lo, p. 154 , 23ff.; cf. also VI, p. 122f.; VI 8, p. 149, 16ff.; VI 14, p. 164, 12ff.; VI 17, p. 172. Philoponus says nothing about Plotinus and Iamblichus.

,s Part of the problem with Dillon's analysis is his misreading of this passage as meaning that Proclus is endorsing M2 and M 3 inplace of M 4. He fails, I think, to appreciate the full sense of d~.r in the phrase o130' 6~t 6a-~' a ~ a g &~.cbg, by which Proclus means that M 4 alone will not distinguish the generated cosmos from the ungenerated eternals; M2 and M 3 are needed in addition.

~9 Dillon, lamblichi Chalcidensis, 3o6, notes that Proclus in In Tim. I 291, 2ft. refers to M2 and M 3 as meanings that are cn3vbQo~tot (= something like "connected"). Although this is not exactly what Proclus says there (what he is saying is that ~b y~yovtw is cr6vbQo~tov with ~6 ytyv6~tevov in Plato), some such relationship between M~ and M 3 is what he is getting at. On the virtual synonymity between M 3 and M4, see 279, 24f. Of course, M 4 implies M 3 only in the case of generated beings, this implication being the means by which we are to distinguish the application of M 4 to generated beings from its application to the eternals.

182 J O U R N A L OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 3 5 :2 A P R I L 1997

for the reason stated above, any view which claimed that Plato used ?~yovev in the sense o f M 4 alone, he did not the re fore reject M 4 as one o f the possible meanings o f the word, nor did he, as the Neoplatonists before him did, rele- gate it to the status o f secondary meaning; indeed, his comments in the pas- sage quo ted indicate that he favored M2 and M4 on equal grounds. It makes more sense to read this discussion as Proclus' at tempt, not to a rgue for one position over another , but to meld the compet ing views into a single, consis- tent in terpre ta t ion which gives p rominence to nei ther alone. Like most Platonists, he was well aware that the te rm yewl*dg had by his time taken on a n u m b e r o f d i f fe ren t meanings and was there fore quite careful to delimit exactly the p r o p e r senses in which it is applicable to the cosmos. Beings gener- ated in t ime have, as he terms it, "all the geneses" (T6 IX~V xet~& ZQ6vov yeV~l~bV ~doctg tXet xhg yev~oetg), by which he means that (a) they derive f rom a cause, (b) they are compounds , and (c) they have a generative nature (i.e., they are genera ted in some part o f time). T h e cosmos differs f rom such beings in possessing only the first two o f these kinds o f genesis (with (b) implying its perpetua l becoming). Its perpetua l becoming places it on an ontological level above beings temporal ly created. Hence the cosmos is yt'vq~6g in the senses cor responding to M2, M 3, and M 4, with none o f these meanings being in any way pr imary. ~~

It should be added that what J o h n Philoponus says regarding both Proclus and Porphyry suppor ts this analysis o f Proclus' views. Several times in his polemic against Proclus, Phi loponus mentions the in terpreta t ion which Proclus attributes to Plotinus, Porphyry, and Iamblichus, but on each occasion he identifies it with Porphyry alone. ' ' On the o ther hand, he credits Proclus with a quite d i f fe ren t view, that he accepted a combination o f M 3 and M 4, presumably as complementa ry senses, and does not include him at all among those who a rgued for M~. ~ So by implication Philoponus separates Proclus f rom Porphyry (and the re fo re f rom Plotinus and Iamblichus) on this point. We may the re fo re conclude that, if we are to accept Dillon's r ende r ing o f ovw0~dQXe~v, then Proclus is not simply following his Neoplatonic forbears in his in terpre ta t ion o f the sense o f yewlT6v in T i m a e u s 28B 7, but adopts a nota- bly i ndependen t approach. ' s

'~ In Tim. I 279, 3o-28~, ~2. 2~De Aet. Mundi VI, p. a22, ~7ff.; VI 8, p. 149, 16ff.; VI 14, p. 164, l~ff.; VI 17, p. 172. 22 VI 7, P- ~38, 24ff.; 15, pp. a66, 26-168, ~.; ~7, P. 171, 24-172, 5; ~9, PP. ~38, 6-24 o, 9; cf.

also VI, p. a2z, 2off. and VI 8, p. 147, ~5ff. 2~There was nothing unusual in giving such compound senses to ~,evvlx6v. Similar positions

can be found in the long tradition of orthodox Platonist exegesis of the Timaeus. We know that Taurus himself accepted a combination of Ms and M 4 on his list; and Proclus tells us that Albinus took a position virtually identical to his own (In Tim. I e19, 2ff.).

NEOPLATONIC EXEGESES OF PLATO'S COSMOGONY 18 3

b. Porphyry

We have seen that, a c c o r d i n g to Proclus, P o r p h y r y accep ted M2 as the pri- m a r y def in i t ion o f y~'tovev as it occurs in Timaeus 28B 7. As is the case with all the Neopla tonis t s , P o r p h y r y ' s s tance on this ques t ion is g r o u n d e d in a strict h i e r a r chy o f crea t ion. T h e mos t in teres t ing and historically significant o f Por- phy ry ' s discussions o f this h i e ra rchy comes in Sententiae 14 (p. 6 Lamberz ) :

Every generated thing has the cause of its generation from something external to it, if, that is to say, nothing comes to be without a cause. But of generated things, those that possess their being through composition [&& ovv0~oe0~g] would be for this reason dissoluble and perishable, while those that, being simple and incomposite [&~.& • &o6v0exct], possess their being in the simplicity of their existence, being indissoluble and imperishable, are said to be generated not by virtue of their being composite [t 0 evbvOexa e[vctt], but by their being dependent on some cause [ ~ &Tt' et[z~ov xtvbg &vrlpxClo0ett]. So bodies are generated in two senses, both as being dependent on a cause which brings them into existence and as being composite [• ebg &zt' ct~rs r t~ct Xr ~ctoctYoa3ovlg xct~ dog o6v0exet], while soul and intellect are generated solely in the sense o f being dependent on a cause [tbg &st' ct[x~ctg r ~t6vov], and not in the sense of being composite. Therefore some things are generated insofar as they are both dissoluble and perishable, while others are, on the one hand, un- generated insofar as they are incomposite and thus indissoluble and imperishable, and, on the other, generated insofar as they are dependent on a cause. ~4

T o apprec ia t e the i m p o r t a n c e o f wha t P o r p h y r y asserts here , it will be he lp fu l to c o m p a r e it to wha t Proclus has to say abou t the gene ra t i on o f soul (In Tim.

I I 117, 1 l f f . ) :

Creation as it pertains to soul is not temporal creation (for he [Plato] showed in the Phaedrus that soul is uncreated and indestructible), but is the procession of its essence from the noetic causes. For of things that are, some are noetic and uncreated [voTlx& • &y~wlxct ], others perceptible and created [et[oOTlr& • yevrlT6], and there are others between these two kinds Ix& ~exct~3] that are noetic and created [VO~lX& • y~WlX& ]. Entities of the first kind are entirely incomposite [&oa3vOexcq and without parts and therefore uncreated [&y~rqxa]; those of the second kind are composite [~r6vOexct] and partitive and therefore created [ytw'qx&]; those intermediate between these kinds are noetic and created, being both without parts and partitive in their nature, and both simple and composite [&~.& ~e • o'6v0exct] in another manner.

At first glance, the two passages seem to be perfec t ly compat ib le accoun t s o f the g e n e r a t i o n o f soul.~5 Proc lus ' s t a t ement tha t we a re to u n d e r s t a n d the

,4 Denis O'Brien, Plotinus on the Origin of Matter (Naples, 1991), 36, note 7, correctly maintains that Porphyry here is rejecting the principle that "indestructible" implies "ungenerated," al- though this is by no means his primary point.

�9 s As the following discussion indicates, I am not overlooking the problems involved in Por- phyry's identifying the mode of generation of soul with that of intellect. Elsewhere (e.g., Sent. 5 and In Tim. frgs. XXXI, pp. 2of. and LXI, pp. 45 f. Sodano) he makes it clear that soul is inter- mediate between intellect and bodies and thus partakes of everlasting becoming, so that it must be

184 J O U R N A L OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 3 5 " 2 A P R I L 1997

creat ion o f soul as the procession of its essence f rom the noetic causes is consistent with Porphyry 's assertion in that soul and intellect are genera ted solely insofar as they are d e p e n d e n t for their existence on a cause; that is, both are saying that soul is a y~wqxov in the sense of M 4. But, as we have already seen, this cannot be correct in the case o f Proclus, for the same objection to employing M 4 exclusively as the sense in which the cosmos is to be unders tood as genera ted applies he re in the case o f the generat ion of soul: dependence on a pr ior cause simpliciter will not suffice to define any being as generated, since even the ungene ra t ed intelligibles are so dependent . And a closer look at Proclus' account bears this out. As is always the case in Proclus' descriptions o f the intermediates, we are to take the opposing sets o f their propert ies as parallel and propor t iona te to one another ; what he is saying here, then, is that soul, as an in termedia te being, is genera ted also in the sense of being compos- ite [cr6v0~zcz] and partitive, just as it is ungenera ted insofar as it is simple and without parts. So Proclus defines the generat ion o f the soul, here as always in his exegesis classified as an intermediate , by employing both M2 and M 4. Porphyry 's use o f the word "solely" (Ix6vov), however, leaves little doubt that he rejects any such combinat ion o f meanings. Indeed, he makes it explicit that soul and intellect are ~,~vqxa "not by virtue o f of their being composite, but by their being d e p e n d e n t on some cause." But perhaps this is to be explained by the fact that Porphyry is for some reason here ranking soul above the interme- diates and with eternal intellect as a being which is to be unders tood as gener- ated only in an ext remely restricted sense o f that term. Yet it is precisely because he is speaking o f the eternals that we should realize that Porphyry in this passage is repudia t ing one o f the basic principles o f o r thodox Platonism of which Proclus was a s trong p roponen t : whereas for P roc lus - - and we may take as fu r the r evidence the passage quoted above- -s imple dependence on a h igher cause does not de te rmine the eternals as genera ted beings insofar as "incomposite" always implies "ungenera ted ," Porphyry in this passage recog- nizes a class o f beings that are in all respects incomposites and the re fo re intelligible and nonetheless are genera ted exclusively in the sense o f M 4. T h u s intelligible reality, a l though comprising eternal Beings, is said by Porphyry to be subject to genesis, albeit in a strictly limited sense. We shall have more to say about this he t e rodox approach shortly, for, as we are about to see, it is not original to Porphyry .

As for Porphyry 's objection to the meaning of yeWlX6V put forward by

regarded as generated in the sense of M 3 as well as of M 4 and not, as he claims here, in the sense of M 4 exclusively. This anomaly should be seen as part of the larger question of whether or not Porphyry confused soul with intellect, on which see Andrew Smith, Porphyry's Place in the Neoplatonic Tradition: A Study in Post-Plotinian Neoplatonism (The Hague, 1974), 47-5 o.

N E O P L A T O N I C EXEGESES OF PLATO'S COSMOGONY 18 5

Crantor and his followers, he may well have claimed that by so defining the word in its application to the cosmos, they were inappropriately situating the cosmos on the same ontic level as soul and intellect. What is not clear, how- ever, is precisely how Porphyry classified soul in the hierarchy of creation and, if soul is an intermediate, in what relation it stands to the cosmos, for, on the basis of what is said in the passage quoted above and elsewhere, 26 the cosmos does not belong strictly to the level occupied by soul nor strictly to the level of perceptibles. We shall return to this ambiguity in Porphyry's exegesis later.

c. Plotinus

That Proclus links Plotinus with Porphyry and Iamblichus in the dispute over the meaning of yevlqz6v should be the cause for considerable puzzlement, for, although there is no extended discussion of Timaeus 28B in the Enneads, it is clear from several passages that, to the extent that similarities can be found, his views on this issue are more in line with those of Proclus than those of Porphyry and Iamblichus. There are three passages of particular significance:

(1) Enneads II.4.5.24ff.: "For they [the intelligibles] are created [yev~lxdt] in that they have a beginning [6OX~lV], but uncreated because they do not have a beginning in time, but always come from something else, not as always coming to be [ytv6~teva dte~], as in the case of the cosmos, but as always being [6v~a dteC], as in the case of the cosmos There."

(2) Enneads III.7.6.49ff.: "The phrase 'He was good' brings us back to the notion of the All; he [Plato] implies that because of the transcendent All it has no temporal origin. So also the universe has no temporal beginning since the cause of its existence provides it with its 'prior'."

(3) Enneads II.9. 3.11ft.: "Necessarily, then, all things are always in fixed relation of succession with each other, while those other [than the One] are generated by virtue of their being from external causes. Those things that are said to be generated were not generated [at some point in time], but were and will be in the process of coming to be."27

These passages, brief as they are, nonetheless reveal a remarkably complex schematization of created beings that is in many respects markedly different from that of Plotinus' Neoplatonist successors:

�9 6 For example, according to Proclus, In Tim. 1 382, 12ff. (= frg. XLVII Sodano), Porphyry distinguished the generation of the cosmos from the generation of body insofar as there are different principles for eoch. Yet in Sent. 14 the sense of "generated" pertaining to intellect and soul would certainly not apply to the cosmos either. Perhaps Porphyry differentiated the level occupied by soul from that occupied by the cosmos along the lines discussed by Proclus in in Tim. I 235, lff. I f so, then both may have fur ther subdivided the intermediates.

27Cf. also III. l . l ; Ill .2.1; III.7.4.24f.

186 J O U R N A L OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 3 5 : 2 A P R I L 1997

(1) All beings below the One are generated (yevTIx&) insofar as they all have ~tQXct6 above them.

(~) Of these yev~l~&, (a) some are temporal insofar as their &9X(t6 are in the form of temporal causes and (b) the rest are atemporal insofar as their &QX~t6 are not in time, but are paradigmatic principles outside of time, upon which they are eternally dependen t and which, in their eternal activity, they eternally imitate. These latter beings are thus both yewp;dt and ~ty~v'qz~t and in this respect correspond to the Porphyrean and Proclan intermediates.

(3) Of (2b) atemporal yevrl~dt, (i) there are those (the intelligibles) for which their eternal dependence on their &QX~I (= ~6 ~v) is to be unders tood as their eternal Being (6vTct ~te6) and (ii) there are others (e.g., the cosmos) for which their perpetual dependence on their &QXfi (= vo~g) is to be unders tood as their perpetual becoming (ytv6~tevct ~te0.

Plotinus' categorization reflects a very careful, a l though extraordinari ly innovative formulat ion of the relationship between the T i m a e u s exegesis and his own theory of hypostasization. To be sure, concepts which will be funda- mental to later Neoplatonic interpretations are present here, in particular the ideas (1) that dependence on an external cause is not sufficient to distinguish the cosmos as a yewlT6v from superior beings which are also so dependen t but exist eternally; (2) that there are levels of intermediate beings which exhibit characteristics of the levels above and below them and are therefore to be classified as in some respects &,/Ocvl~et and in others yev'qTdt; (3) that what separates the cosmos from the eternals is its perpetual becoming, a l though it is th rough this that the cosmos imitates the eternal being of the intelligibles; (4) that therefore we must distinguish between the eternality of the intelligibles and the perpetuity of the cosmos; (5) that acceptance of the creatio c o n t i n u a of the cosmos precludes acceptance of a theory of its temporal creation~8; and (6) that the sense o f y~yovev in T i m a e u s ~8B incorporates some combination of di f ferent meanings on Taurus ' list. As for the last point, in II.4.5.~4ff. Plotinus clearly commits himself to a definition of y~yovev that combines M 3 and M4: the cosmos' derivation directly from Nous and not f rom the One determines it as a being perpetually generated. Moreover, despite what Proclus says, there is no evidence in these passages or elsewhere that he claimed oa3v0exov to be the primary definition of yeVrlX6V; indeed, if anything Plotinus' emphasis is on M 4 as the primary sense in which we are to under- stand the cosmos as created. It may well be that Plotinus, as did Proclus and others after him, saw in Taurus ' M 3 the implication that all beings in a perpet-

�9 s In both II.4. 5 and III.2.1 Plotinus makes the standard Platonic distinction in the senses of the word 6QX fi as either (1) a beginning in time or (2) a principle of timeless becoming. On this distinction in Platonic interpretations of the term, see Baltes, Die Weltentstehung, ~ 1 I.

N E O P L A T O N I C E X E G E S E S OF P L A T O ' S C O S M O G O N Y 18 7

ual process o f becoming are necessarily compounds ; that is, like Proclus he r e g a r d e d T a u r u s ' M2 and M 3 as mutual ly implicative. Even so, Proclus ' inclu- sion o f Plotinus in the P o r p h y r e a n camp with its emphasis on M2 is puzzl ing and it is difficult to surmise which treatises o f the Enneads he might have had in mind in mak ing this connection.

In two i m p o r t a n t respects, however, Plotinus' classification diverges signifi- cantly f r o m the Middle Platonic and later Neoplatonic exegeses. First o f all, in II .4. 5 h e - - a n d here he was jo ined by Po rphyry alone a m o n g later P la ton is t s - - m a d e the e ternal intelligibles m e m b e r s o f the class o f beings that are crea ted (yevrlX6t), i f only in a qualified sense29; and it is to this classification that we are to trace the source for Porphyry ' s Sententiae 14. T o reiterate, for Proclus, be ing d e p e n d e n t u p o n a h igher principle and being &y~vTIx~x are fully compat i - ble at t r ibutes o f the eternals; t he re fo re M 4 is insufficient in itself to different i - ate yevTIxdt f rom ~y~WlXCt. For Plotinus and Porphyry , on the o ther hand , M 4 a lone is sufficient to def ine as created all incomposi te beings thus d e p e n d e n t on a h igher cause, that is, the intelligibles. I f we c o m p a r e II .4. 5 with Proclus ' discussion o f the d i f fe ren t senses o f M 4 applicable to the cosmos, soul, and the beings super io r to soul in I n Tim. I ~35, 92ff., for example , it becomes evident that Proclus ' claim that what is above soul does not come to be f r o m an exter ior cause, as does the cosmos, bu t / s f r o m such a cause, is virtually a res ta tement o f Plotinus ' contras t between the intelligibles and the cosmos and the relation- ship o f each to its h igher principle described here.SO T h e crucial d i f fe rence be tween the two, however , lies in what each infers f rom this fact. For Proclus, der ivat ion f r o m an external cause does not the re fo re in itself d e t e r m i n e a be ing as e i ther crea ted or uncrea ted , so that a l though all beings der ive f rom the One, those that t ranscend the rea lm o f becoming are nonetheless ungene ra t ed ; in Plotinus ' mind such derivat ion does in fact at least in one

,9 Much the same point has been made by O'Brien in several published pieces; see "Piotinus and the Gnostics on the Generation of Matter," in Neoplatonism and Early Christian Thought: Essays m Honor ofA. H. Armstrong, ed. H.J. Biumenthal and R. A. Markus (London, 198 a), a 11 and note 17, Plotinus on the Origin of Matter, Chapter 3, and Th~odic(e plotinienne, th~odic~e gnostique (Leiden, a993), 36ff. and 61ff. Both II.9. 3 and II.4. 5 are key passages for O'Brien, the latter especially in his arguments in the last two works cited above against both H.-R. Schwyzer and K. Corrigan concerning the questions whether or in what sense(s) matter is generated. O'Brien rightly main- tains that Schwyzer and Corrigan have misunderstood this crucial passage, but proper apprecia- tion of Plotinus' meaning here requires our taking into account that he is speaking the traditional language of exegesis of the Timaeus. However, O'Brien does recognize that Plotinus is referring to the generation of the ideas as well as of intelligible matter (Plotinus, 37 and Th~odic~e 61) and that he is distinguishing between the timelessness of intelligible matter and that of the matter of the sensible world (Plotinus, 38, note t6 and Th(odic~e, 6t, note 2). Cf. also Lloyd P. Gerson, Plotinus (London, 1994), 263, note 23,

30... x0t[ ~t~tv ~6 ~tq6 a~xflg [sc. ap~JXflg ] oa3 y(,vexctt Ix~v dt.~' ct~,T~0tg, ~oxt 5~ dt.~x' a~T(,ctg (In Tim. I 235, 24-25).

1 8 8 J O U R N A L OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 3 5 : 2 A P R I L 1997

respec t cons t i tu te as c rea ted even those beings that are b e y o n d all m o d e s o f becoming . A n d P o r p h y r y evident ly a g r e e d with his teacher .

Secondly , because fo r h im der iva t ion f r o m a cause was no t in itself suffi- c ient to d i f f e ren t i a t e yevrl'c6 f r o m &y~vqza, Proclus, w h e n i n t e rp r e t i ng the sense in which Plato says tha t the cosmos is yeV~l~6g in the Timaeus, was in effect a r g u i n g tha t M2 a n d / o r M 3 mus t be a d d e d as def inient ia c o m p l e m e n - tary to M4, since only by so a u g m e n t i n g M 4 could the cosmos be adequa te ly d i s t ingu i shed as a g e n e r a t e d be ing f r o m the u n g e n e r a t e d eternals . Plotinus, we now see, a p p r o a c h e s these m e a n i n g s qui te d i f ferent ly . For h i m M 4 is to be u n d e r s t o o d in two ways w h e n r e f e r r i n g to beings g e n e r a t e d a t empora l ly : (1) as de r iva t ion f r o m the u l t imate source, the O n e o r (9) as de r iva t ion f r o m vo~g.s~ Sense (l) a m o u n t s to an ex tens ion o f the possible appl icat ions o f yevrl~6v to inc lude the e te rna l intelligibles, whose only con t ingency is u p o n the O n e , while sense (~) indicates e i ther (a) tha t T a u r u s ' M 3 is to be r e g a r d e d as coextensive with M 4 - - t o be d e p e n d e n t on vo~3g as &0;0] jus t is to be pe rpe tua l ly generated,3~ jus t as to be direct ly d e p e n d e n t on the O n e jus t is to exist e t e r n a l l y - - o r (b) M 3 is s o m e t h i n g like a mode o f M 4. I f Plot inus m e a n t the lat ter , t h e n b o t h e te rna l be ing and p e r p e t u a l b e c o m i n g - - a n d , we w o u l d as- sume, the p r o p e r t y o f hav ing a t e m p o r a l o r i g i n - - a r e va ry ing instances o r m a n n e r s o f d e p e n d e n c e on an an te r io r principle.33 While it is t rue tha t Plot inus is c o n c e r n e d he re pr incipal ly with the gene ra t i on o f intelligible mat- ter, he express ly inc ludes all cons t i tuents o f the intelligible wor ld in this stra- t u m o f his schema, evident ly seeing n o t h i n g prob lemat ic in classing the intelli- gibles with the cosmos as YeWlXdt, d i s t inguish ing t h e m ontological ly r a t h e r by thei r respect ive i m m e d i a t e dtpXed, which a re fo r h im wha t we are to look to in d e t e r m i n i n g the m o d e o f their gene ra t i on as e i ther tha t o f an ent i ty which possesses e te rna l be ing o r tha t o f an ent i ty subject to p e r p e t u a l becoming . I n d o i n g so, he d i spenses with the long-es tabl ished pract ice a m o n g Platonists o f d i f f e r en t i a t i ng c rea ted f r o m u n c r e a t e d beings by e x a m i n i n g the na tu res o f

s, Such I take to be the meaning of r in 11.4.5.27: we may understand timeless dependence on a prior cause in two ways, either (a) as eternal being or (2) as perpetual becoming. Whatever precise sense we are to give to this passage, it is clear enough that Plotinus is establishing a close relationship between M 3 and M 4.

s2 1 am assuming that Intellect is to be considered the ct0Xr I of the universe in this context insofar as Plotinus, like Proclus, adhered to the concept that the creatio continua of the world is the image of the eternity of the intelligible world; cf. III.3. 7. loft. and III.2.15; see also II.4.4.8.

33Gerson, Plotinus, 264, note 2 3, sees in this passage three distinct senses of y~veotg: (t) "having an dtQ;O] eternally," (2) "having an dt0X~ ] in time," and (3) "that of undergoing change." (l) is equivalent to Taurus' M4, while (3) is his version of M 3, the ereatio continua (ytv6~t~va die0 of the universe. While such a distinction in meanings holds true for most other Platonists (although Gerson would do well to emphasize that his (1) and (e) indicate an equivocation in the use of the term dtQX/I by Plotinus, a common characteristic of Platonist exegeses), Plotinus certainly appears in II.4. 5 to be conflating (3) with (1) in one of the two manners I suggest here.

N E O P L A T O N I C EXEGESES OF PLATO'S COSMOGONY 18 9

the entities themselves, and instead looks first to the distinctive natures of their principles.a4

These aspects of Plotinus' interpretation are more than just minor points of divergence from the fundamental principles of received doctrine and from what was to become, after Porphyry, a standard Neoplatonic ontological classi- fication.35 Given their importance, it is surprising to find Proclus silent con- cerning what for him, if he was aware of it, would have been a most egregious departure from what he must have considered conventional Platonic exegesis, Plotinus' and Porphyry's inclusion of the intelligibles within the class of gener- ated beings.a6 The absence in Proclus' account of any criticism of either Plotinus or Porphyrya7 on this point, as well as his unwarranted association of Plotinus with Porphyry and Iamblichus on the question of the meaning of y~yovev in Timaeus 28B7, are more than a little curious. We might well ques- tion how extensively he consulted the works of his predecessors in determin- ing their positions on any of the issues surrounding the interpretation of that passage.

d. Albinus

We should note here another problem regarding Porphyry's and Proclus' treatment of the Middle Platonist Albinus. Proclus includes him among a group of "older exegetes" (o[ ~ttl~ctt6~eOot "c(ov ~TIYrll:63v ) who interpreted Plato to be saying in the Timaeus that the cosmos was in one sense created and in another uncreated and adds that, according to Albinus, by ascribing these two terms to the cosmos Plato meant that it both exists always and has a principle of generation (~,ev~oet0g ~:Xovxog &QZClV: In Tim. I ~19, 2ff.). The latter terminology is to be understood as referring, not to generation in time, but to the cosmos' possession of a principle (k6yog) of generation by virtue of the fact that it is a compound (o'6v0eotv) of many dissimilar parts and any compound must be dependent upon a higher cause for its existence. So in Proclus' assessment Albinus found the cosmos' derivation from an external cause implied in its nature as a compound, thus combining M2 and M 4 on

s4 Note again that in each of the passages discussed here Plotinus' emphasis is clearly on Taurus' M4, not, as we would expect from what Proclus says, on M2.

35 It should be added that one effect of Plotinus' classification, in stark contrast to those of Porphyry and Produs, is that it assigns the cosmos a very precise and clearly demarcated status relative to the other intermediates and to beings temporally created.

s6 For Proclus, the use of the terminology of generation in the context of divine beings is always just a figurative way of describing their differentiation from their causes (In Tim. I 28o, 19ff.).

a7 It is of course possible that Proclus consulted Porphyry's Timaeus commentary exclusively and that Porphyry did not there introduce this controversial notion. It is, however, difficult to imagine Porphyry expunging so important an idea from his interpretation of Plato's cosmogony.

19o J O U R N A L OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 35:2 A P R I L 1997

T a u r u s ' list.ss But a d i f fe ren t version o f his position is found in ano the r work which until relatively recently had been at t r ibuted to Albinus, the Didaskalikos

(14.3): " W h e n e v e r he [Plato] says that the cosmos is genera ted , we mus t not u n d e r s t a n d h im to mean that there ever was a t ime when the cosmos did not exist, bu t r a the r that it is perpe tua l ly in the process of coming to be and reveals some m o r e original cause o f its own existence." T h e au tho r o f the Didaskalikos, then, seems to limit the non t empora l senses o f yev~T6g vis-a-vis

the cosmos to pe rpe tua l genesis and d e p e n d e n c e on a more ul t imate cause, that is, a combina t ion o f M 3 and M 4 f r o m T a u r u s ' list; there is no re fe rence to the re levance of the composi te na ture o f the universe. Several scholars, most recently J o h n Dillon, have cited this discrepancy as evidence against the view that Albinus is the au tho r o f the Dida, kalikos. Even if we assume that Proclus was d rawing f r o m a Timaeus c o m m e n t a r y by Albinus or f rom the lectures o f his mas te r Gaius, and not the Didaskalikos, Dillon concludes, the d iscrepancy is too grea t to ignore.s9 This a r g u m e n t has considerable p resumpt ive weight, but its p r o p o n e n t s have over looked one possible way o f explaining away the a p p a r e n t distinction between the two texts: Albinus (or pe rhaps Gaius) may have closely associated the pe rpe tua l becoming o f the cosmos with its na ture as a c o m p o u n d or with its d e p e n d e n c e on a h igher cause. T h a t is to say, he may have assimilated M 3 to M2 or M 4, or to both, the reasons for this assimilation most likely having been set out at length only in a more extensive Timaeus

c o m m e n t a r y or in the lectures o f Gaius, r a the r than in an ep i tome such as the Didaskalikos. We have a l ready noted that Proclus in his own account closely l inked these th ree meanings and so it would have been quite na tura l for him, as it could well have been for Albinus, to assume that, whenever he describes the senses in which the cosmos can be r ega rded as y~vTIT6g, re fe rence to any would carry for his readers the implication o f one or ano the r o f the others. T o be sure, i f we were to excerp t Proclus ' in t roductory r emarks in In Tim. I 277 f r o m thei r p r o p e r context , m u c h as Proclus h imsel f does in his commen t s on Albinus, then we would be left with the e r roneous impress ion that Proclus endo r sed M2 and M 4 exclusively, a l though we know f rom our analysis o f his subsequent discussion that the claim for e i ther implies a claim for M 3 as well.

Let us look at ano t he r example , one which parallels in a n u m b e r o f ways the case o f Proclus: J o h n Phi loponus ' account o f Proclus ' own definit ion o f

38 See also in Baltes, Die Weltentstehung, 96ff., the discussion of Albinus, in particular the comments on In Tim. ~ t8, 2ff. in which Baltes points to similarities in the positions of Albinus and Porphyry.

a9Cf. Alcinous: The Handbook of Platonism (Oxford, t993), Introduction, x-xi and la3ff., where Dillon sides with Giusta and Whittaker in the controversy over the authorship of the D/das- kalikos. Cf. also Dillon, Middle Platonists, a87. On the possibility that Albinus wrote a Timaeus commentary and that Proclus had access to it, see also Baltes, Die Weltentstehung, loo.

NEOPLATONIC EXEGESES OF PLATO'S COSMOGONY 191

yeWlT6g. W h e n e v e r P h i l o p o n u s speaks o f Proclus ' def ini t ion o f the word , he asserts on ly tha t Proclus accep ted a combina t ion o f senses M 3 and M 4 and n o w h e r e states o r implies tha t M2 is pa r t o f tha t definition.4O T h e r e is a s imple exp lana t ion fo r this d i sc repancy : in wri t ing against Proclus ' a ccoun t o f the "e te rn i ty" o f the wor ld Ph i loponus d id no t consul t Proclus ' exegesis in his Timaeus c o m m e n t a r y , bu t a n o t h e r lost treatise ent i t led de Aeternitate M u n d i

contra Christianos, in which d i f f e r en t conce rns mos t likely led Proclus to e m p h a - size d i f f e r e n t senses o f the g e n e r a t i o n o f the universe.4~ I n s o f a r as Proclus held tha t M 3 a n d M 4 imply M2, the re would be no con t rad ic t ion in the accoun t s in his Timaeus c o m m e n t a r y and this lost work. A n d the re is indica t ion that, were P h i l o p o n u s h imse l f aware o f the d i sc repancy , he wou ld no t have seen a n e e d to c o m m e n t on it, since like Proclus he would have u n d e r s t o o d tha t to say tha t the cosmos is g e n e r a t e d in the sense o f be ing in a p e r p e t u a l state o f c o m i n g to be o r in the sense o f de r iv ing f r o m a supe r io r cause is in ef fec t no m o r e n o r less t han to say that it is g e n e r a t e d in the sense o f be ing a c o m p o u n d , a nd converse ly ; a full e n u m e r a t i o n o f these m e a n i n g s wou ld there- fo re have b e e n unnecessa ry , especially in an ep i t ome o r prrc is o f a n o t h e r ph i l o sophe r ' s views.42 For very similar reasons, then, it is qui te plausible tha t Proc lus ' s t a tements r e g a r d i n g Albinus are no t at all inconsis tent with the posi- t ion o f the a u t h o r o f the Didaskalikos. I f so, then we m u s t conc lude tha t a d i v e r g e n c e be tween the two accoun t s does not , as Dillon main ta ins it does, cons t i tu te an a r g u m e n t against Albinus ' a u t h o r s h i p o f the Didaskalikos.43

2. THE INTERMEDIATES

T h e Neopla ton i s t s cou ld look to bo th the descr ip t ion o f the gene ra t i on o f Soul in Timaeus 34Bff . a n d the a r g u m e n t tha t soul is se l f -moved and u n g e n e r a t e d in Phaedrus 945Cff . fo r ev idence that Plato gave p r i m a r y place to souls a m o n g

40 CL above, ~82, n. 22 and references cited there. 41Phiioponus' information concerning Proclus' definition of y~eotg in the Timaeus seems to

have come for the most part from what may have been a separate work (Philoponus refers to it as a kryog) entitled "Inquiry into Aristotle's Objections to the Timaeus of Plato" (~:xs xr~v ~t0bg xbv Flkrxttwog T~l~atov a3~' A0toxoT~kovg hvxetpTl~t~vt0v; cf. VI 15, p. 167, 3 f. and 29, p. 238, 3ff.).

4~ Philoponus says in VI 29, p. 238, 24ff. that according to Proclus M 3 and M 4 are implicative of one another; thus in those passages where he links Proclus with M 3 alone (e.g., in VI 7, P. 138, 94ff. and VI 15, p. 166, 26ff.) he is implicitly linking him with M 4 as well. And the same, we may surmise, may be true of M2.

43 The apparent discrepancy was for Whittaker, "Parisinus Graecus 1962 and Albinus," Phoe- n/x 28 (1974) (reprinted in Studies in Platonism and Patristic Thought [London, 1984], 453), not so important an issue, for, as he quite rightly points out, "even if these doctrines [sc. those discussed in the Didaskalikos and by Proclus] had been identical, this alone (in view of the commonplace nature in the relevant period of the nonliteral interpretation of the Timaeus ) would in no way prove, or even render it probable, that Albinus was the author of the Didaskalikos."

199 J O U R N A L OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 35:2 A P R I L 199 7

the intermediates.44 Being self-generated and bodiless, soul is the last of the eternals and the first of the generated beings and so partakes of both levels of existence but belongs to neither completely. As such, it takes ontological prece- dence to the cosmos, whose dependence on an external cause for its existence renders it subject to perpetual generation.45 But there are problems with this classification, and the lines of demarcation between the various levels are sometimes not drawn with consistent clarity. Post-Plotinian Neoptatonists ap- pear to have had some ambivalence about which of the ontological levels are to be classified as intermediates. It has already been noted that in his Sententiae Porphyry apparently contradicts himself in ranking soul both with intellect as an intelligible and as intermediate between the incomposite essence of vo~,g and the composite nature of bodies. Further complicating the issue, in his commentary on the Timaeus he also distinguished between two sorts of inter- mediates, one which is at once being and becoming and is proper to the "plane of the souls," and another which is conversely becoming and being and refers to the "summit of created beings"--by which he seems to mean the World Soul, which is created insofar as its nature is divided among bodies but un- created as being wholly bodiless itself (In Tim. I 257, 2-8). Nowhere does he make clear where the cosmos is to fit into this schema, although there is little doubt that he regards it as intermediate by nature.

For his part, Proclus divides his discussion of the ontological status of the cosmos into two sections, concentrating first on the cosmos as a corporeal entity (~6 or under which perspective it seems to belong more properly to the realm of the "simply generated," that is, to the sphere of the perceptibles (x& ctto0T]~r than to the level of mediaries.46 Only later (276ff.) does he consider its aspect as ungenerated and divine, and there, as we have seen, its intermediate nature is unqualifiedly affirmed. Depending upon which of these aspects of the cosmos' nature is emphasized, then, the cosmos may either be regarded as a constituent of the corporeal order or be classed

44 Cf. Proclus In Tim. I 235, 13ff. and 256, 33ff. 45 See Proclus' a rgument in In Tim. I 235, 8ff. T h e ontological status of the cosmos relative to

that o f the soul seems to have been a matter o f some debate among later Platonists and their critics. Plutarch, De Procr. An. lo12D-lo13C , in an a t tempt to clear up whatever misunders tand- ings might arise f rom what he unders tands to be Crantor 's view that soul is a mixture o f intelligi- ble na ture and the opinable nature of perceptibles, cautions that we must not confuse soul with the cosmos, since, a l though the cosmos also possesses both intelligible and corporeal elements, it is tangible and visible, while soul is above sense perception. Numenius and Harpocrat ion may have gone fu r the r than most in making the cosmos a third god. Cf. also Plotinus, Enn. IV.8.7, and Proclus, In Tim. II 153f.

46Cf. In Tim. I 253, 4 - 1 6 and 256, 13-22. We should recall here Proclus' a rgument in 291, 25ff. to justify the practice o f characterizing the universe by its body (see above, note 6).

N E O P L A T O N I C E X E G E S E S OF P L A T O ' S C O S M O G O N Y 193

with soul as an intermediate being.47 The difficulty with such imprecision of categorization becomes most acute when we attempt to find a place for the cosmos in the Proclan classification of De Providentia 9. For with respect to its bodily nature it would appear to belong within the corporeal order, specifi- cally among those beings whose substantia is infinitely generated; but it cannot, because of its divine provenance, be a part of that order simpliciter. Yet it is difficult to see how Proclus could justify its inclusion within the order of inter- mediates (souls) whose substantia is eternal, although this is exactly what he does in his Timaeus commentary.48 But whatever the problems with the classifi- cation of these intermediates individually, Proclus makes it quite clear that soul has more in common with the eternal being of the class of entities above it than with the perpetual becoming of the universe and that this subdivision within the class of intermediates is warranted by the fact that soul, and not the cosmos, is self-caused.

3. E T E R N A L A C T I V I T Y OF T H E D E M I U R G E

a. Porphyry, Iamblichus, and Proclus

From the time of Philo it was common practice for Platonists to correlate M 3 with the well-known argument, found in both Plato and Aristotle, that the activity of the creator of the universe must be eternal.49 The Neoplatonists also employ this argument as a kind of correlate to M 4 and this informs their interpretation of the Paradigm-image relationship between the Demiurge and the universe described by Plato in the Timaeus. The basic formulation of the Neoplatonic version of the argument is that if the Demiurge is perfect in both goodness and power, then he necessarily creates what is good eternally, and if he creates what is good eternally, then his creation and image, the cosmos, must perpetually become good.5o Within this logical framework the Neo-

47 According to Proclus, such was the attitude of Plato himself; cf. In Tim. I 292, 7 ft. 48 According to In Tim. I 291, 3off., the bodily aspect of the cosmos is its form (e~fog), while its

divine aspect is its underlying nature (a3no• tp6ot~). If the latter is to be identified with the o~of.ct of the cosmos, then Proclus is saying that the substance of the cosmos is eternal.

49 Aristotle, De Phil. 19C Ross, and Plato, Laws 9olA-9o3 A. For Proclus, see De Prov. #7; Cf. also Bakes, Die Weltentstehung, 92, and Sorabji, Time, Creation and the Continuum, 25of. and 28o.

50 Cf. Proclus In Tim. I 367, 2off. Philoponus, De Aet. Mundi IV t t, p. 82, 1 ft., attributes a very similar argument to Produs which emphasizes that if the Demiurge is not eternally active, then he was at some time only potentially a demiurge and is therefore imperfect. Proclus is no doubt drawing this form of the argument from Porphyry and Iamblichus. According to Proclus, Por- phyry made the related-assertion that if god always creates (6rllx~ovQy~), then he has the demiurgic power by nature (o61aq~v~ov); if not, he has this power as an addition (~x6• (In Tim. I 393, 11-12 [Porphyry In Tim. frg. 5 l, p. 36, a2ff. Sodano]). Porphyry and Iamblichus apparently used the argument to prove that the Demiurge did not, as some of their opponents had claimed, bring order out of an initial state of disorder.

194 J O U R N A L OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 35:2 A P R I L 1997

platonists employed various strategies to demonst ra te the creatio cont inua of the cosmos. We find them arguing both (1) that because the Demiurge 's cre- ative activity is eternal , that upon which it is active must always be active as well,5' and (2) that because the Demiurge, as Paradigm, exists eternally and is eternally active, then its image, the universe, must have some share in that e ternal activity.5~ Porphyry , and Iamblichus and Proclus af ter him, cons t rued the universe's share in eterni ty as its perpetual generat ion "over all time"; the cosmos fulfills its role as image o f what/s always by its becoming always.53 Hence it is not, like its creator , good by its nature, but is everlastingly being made good in the image o f that eternal goodness.

b. Plo t inus

Plotinus' distinctive t rea tment o f the Paradigm-image a rgumen t deserves sepa- rate comment . In the Enneads the creatio cont inua of the cosmos derives ulti- mately f rom the eternal activity o f Intellect, but only mediately, the immedia te cause o f its perpe tua l becoming being ra ther the direct effect o f Intellect's activity, the perpe tua l efflux o f reason-principles (k6yot) f rom the intelligible world into the material world. We find this idea expressed very clearly at the beginning o f his treatise O n Providence ( I I I .2 .1-2) , where Plotinus explains in some detail the sense in which we are to unders tand that Intellect is the cause o f the cosmos. Intellect, as the " t rue and first cosmos," is the archetype and para- digm of the visible cosmos and it is by virtue o f this relationship that the visible cosmos "perpetual ly comes into existence" (a37tooxdv~og &e(~: III.1.26ff.).54 Plotinus thus subscribes to the a rgument at t r ibuted by Proclus to Porphyry and Iamblichus that the creatio cont inua of the cosmos is the image o f the eternal being o f the Demiurge , a l though its neverending genesis is not directly the ou tcome of the eternal creative activity o f Intellect, but is due immediately to the creative power o f rational principles which themselves perpetual ly flow out (d~ &too0e~) f rom Intellect into the world, constantly generat ing o rd e r and harmony.55 Later in the same treatise he illustrates this process by means o f an

5, Cf. Philoponus De Aet. Mundi IV 1 t, p. 82, 15ff. on Proclus. 5, Philoponus, ibid. VI 27, p. 224, a8-225, 1~, finds this tactic in Proclus who, he says, took it

from Porphyry. The later Neoplatonists also associated the Demiurge's eternal creative activity with his perfectly good will; cf. Iamblichus In Tim. frg. 37, P. 141 Dillon (= Proclus In Tim. I 382, 12ff.).

53 Cf. Proclus In Tim. I 366, 13 ft. (= Porphyry In Tim. frg. 46 Sodano). Proclus In Tim. I 253 , 14-254, 18, traces the idea of generation over all time to Aristotle, who wished to distinguish the perpetuity of the cosmos from eternity (cf. De Gen. et Corr. 336b 25ff. ).

54 In a peculiar turn of phrase, Plotinus refers to the cosmos in I!.3.17.17 as "an image always being made an image" (~• ~e~ e~•

5s But ci r. Proclus In Tim. I 195, 22ff., who attributes to Iamblichus the notion that the memory of children indicates the perpetual creation of the reason principles (k6yot).

N E O P L A T O N I C E X E G E S E S OF P L A T O ' S C O S M O G O N Y 195

analogy designed to illustrate how many individual things can come f rom a single creative principle (III.3. 7. lOft.):

And individual things proceed from this principle while it remains within; they come from it as from a single root which remains static in itself, but they flower out into a divided multiplicity, each one bearing an image of that higher reality, but when they reach this lower world one comes to be in one place and one in another, and some are close to the root and others advance farther and split up to the point of becom- ing, so to speak, branches and twigs and fruits and leaves; and those that are closer to the root remain for ever, and the others come into being for ever [~?s &es the fruits and leaves; and those which come into being for ever have in them the rational forming principles of those above them, as if they wanted to be little trees. (Arm- strong's translation)

For Plotinus, then, all things subject to genesis at the level below the intelligi- bles are perpetual ly genera ted as though in imitation of the eternal existence of those entities closer to the "root" o f Being (cf. III.2.15). T h e cosmos is like a leaf which is perpetual ly being fo rmed at the end o f a branch due to the eternal generat ive powers ex tending f rom the plant's single root. Speaking elsewhere o f the relat ionship o f time to becoming (III.7. 4.18ff.), he says that those things which come to be can never cease to "be about to be," since they are "always acquiring" (~tt• &el) being; and the cosmos, in its circular motion, is "continually drawing being to itself," "hur ry ing to everlasting exis- tence by means o f the fu ture ." In this way Plotinus somewhat peculiarly ex- presses his allegiance to the long-accepted Platonic view, found also in Proclus, that the being o f the universe is its becoming and that the creatio continua of all genera ted beings is the necessary consequence o f the universe's unqualif ied dependence upon its archetype/cause. O f course, Plotinus, and Proclus af ter him, eschew what for o ther Platonists, with their far d i f ferent concept ion o f Providence, is an unques t ioned implication o f this view, that the universe is u n d e r the supervision o f a creator who governs according to his perfect ly good will.

Plotinus' well-known different ia t ion between the two levels o f Providence, the hal lmark o f which is his a rgumen t against the notion that the cosmos was created according to some rational plan, is tied directly to his in terpreta t ion o f the creatio continua. In his a t tempt in the treatise On the Forms and the Good (VI.7) to explain away what appears to be an account of the purposive creat ion o f the material cosmos in Plato's Timaeus, he invokes the phrase 7tyv6~tevov &el o f Timaeus 28A1 as evidence that Plato had rejected the idea that the creator used reasoning and deliberat ion in the generat ion of the cosmos, a rguing that there can be no reasoning (~.oyto~t6g) concerning anything to which the term "perpetua l" (&e~) applies (VI.7.3.5ff.). His thinking here is that deliberation about how best to create the cosmos would require on the part o f the crea tor a

196 J O U R N A L OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 3 5 : 2 APRIL 199 7

re -cogn i t ion o f how things were be fo re the c o n t e m p l a t e d creat ion, a state o f affairs impossible fo r a D e m i u r g e whose e ternal activity, as Plot inus u n d e r - s tands it, is to be c o n s t r u e d as everlast ingly c o n t i n u o u s genera t ion . Essentially the same r e a s o n i n g lies b e h i n d the o p e n i n g chap te rs o f his treatise O n Provi -

dence56 c o n s i d e r e d above: de l ibera t ion abou t p r o d u c t i o n implies tha t the p o w e r to p r o d u c e is s o m e t h i n g acqu i red by the c ra f t sman , i.e., s o m e t h i n g l ea rned , while the rec iproca l re la t ionship which Plato establishes be tween the D e m i u r g e and the universe , the f o r m e r always c rea t ing and the lat ter always be ing c rea ted , can only obta in if the c r a f t sman has the p o w e r o f p r o d u c t i o n as pa r t o f his na tu re , i.e., if he can create wi thou t th ink ing abou t it ( I I I . 2 . 1 - 2 ) . T h u s the s t a n d a r d Platonic a ccoun t o f the creatio continua is a p p r o p r i a t e d by Plot inus as a conclusive a r g u m e n t for a t t r ibu t ion o f a h ighe r level o f Provi- d e n c e to Intellect.57

I t is no t at all su rp r i s ing to f ind these Neopla tonis t s m o d i f y i n g and refin- ing aspects o f the received t radi t ion o f exegesis o f the Timeaus while s taying f i rmly within its b r o a d bounda r i e s ; such modif ica t ions and r e f inemen t s were themselves an inevitable and vital pa r t o f tha t t radi t ion. Yet even t h o u g h in the i r exegeses the Neopla tonis t s fo r the mos t pa r t s tayed well within the ma ins t r eam, the will ingness on the pa r t o f P o r p h y r y and Proclus to e x p a n d T a u r u s ' list o f m e a n i n g s o f y~v~]Tog and their conce r t ed a t t emp t to oppose , cor rec t , o r e x p a n d on C r a n t o r and o the r s in the t radi t ion reveal some e f fo r t to b r i n g cer ta in e l ement s o f the t radi t ion in line with Neop la ton ic doc t r ine . A n d it is p e r h a p s to be e x p e c t e d that, o f all the Neoplatonis ts , the mos t extens ive a n d r e m a r k a b l e innova t ions in the t radi t ion are to be f o u n d in Plotinus, who, a l t h o u g h p r o v i d i n g no e x t e n d e d exegesis o f the Timaeus c o s m o g o n y , exploi ts var ious f ea tu res o f o t h e r Platonists ' s trategies fo r his own purposes , a n d in

56 Cf. also references to the perpetual creative activity in the universe in Ill.2.13-14. 57 Although there is nothing in the Timaeus that would even suggest a conceptual association

between the creatio continua and Plato's doctrine of Providence, Plotinus is well within the Platonist tradition in bringing the question of Providence into prominent play in his interpretation of the creation of the cosmos in the Timaeus. A number of Middle Platonist texts bear witness to this (cf. Apuleius De Plat. 2o5-~o6 and Ps. Plut. De Fato 573A-C), particularly in relation to interpretation of the Demiurge's speech in Timaeus 41A-B. A good case in point is Philo, who like Plotinus sees the creatio continua as the result of God's Providence and for whom, again in a manner with at least a formal resemblance to Plotinus', God's limitless providential activity is by necessity mediated by a Logos whose activity in the material cosmos is the extention of God's eternally creative activity. In contrast to Plotinus, however, Philo held that God creates by eternally thinking the noetic cosmos, situated in the Logos, and in this creative act simultaneously creates the material cosmos out of a preexistent disorderly matter, thereby initiating time. Moreover, he believed that creation is the result of God's deliberation. Cf. D. Runia, Philo of Alexandria and the "Timaeus" of Plato (Leiden, 1986), t54 and 441ff. Given the significance he attaches to the proper conception of divine Providence, it is small wonder that Plotinus felt it necessary to put his own signature on what was by his time a well-established relationship of originally independent ideas.

NEOPLATONIC EXEGESES OF PLATO'S COSMOGONY 197

doing so makes it amply clear that he was quite knowledgeable about the fine points of the debate.

We are left to ponder how it could be that Proclus both failed either to recognize or at least to acknowledge the heterodoxy of Plotinus and Porphyry in their rejection of the principle that all incomposites are ungenerated, and apparently completely misrepresented Plotinus' interpretation of Timaeus 28B 7. It is certainly worth noting that these are likely not the only examples of errors in Proclan doxography.58 Such mistakes or omissions may reveal more about the accuracy of Proclus' source or sources--often Iamblichus--than about his own scholarly diligence. In any case, it behooves us henceforth to regard with a more critical eye Proclus' accounts of his predecessors' exegeses of the Timaeu~.59

University of Tennessee at Chattanooga

58 See the comments of Whittaker, "The Historical Background of Proclus' Doctrine of the AYOYI-IOZTATA," in DeJamblique g~ Proclus. Entretiens sur I' Antiquit~ classique XXI (Vandoevres- Geneva, 1975) , 2ooff.

59 An earlier version of this paper was presented to a session of the Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy. My thanks to the referees of this journal for their helpful comments.