JHP - Biebricher 2008 - Genealogy and Governmentality

7/22/2019 JHP - Biebricher 2008 - Genealogy and Governmentality

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Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2008 DOI: 10.1163/187226308X336001

Journal of the Philosophy of History 2 (2008) 363396 www.brill.nl/jph

Genealogy and Governmentality*

Tomas Biebricher

Department of Political Science, University of Florida

Abstract

Te essay aims at an assessment of whether and to what extent the history of gov-ernmentality can be considered to be a genealogy. o this effect a generic accountof core tenets of Foucauldian genealogy is developed. Te three core tenets high-

lighted are (1) a radically contingent view of history that is (2) expressed in a dis-tinct style and (3) highlights the impact of power on this history. After a briefdiscussion of the concept of governmentality and a descriptive summary of itshistory, this generic account is used as a measuring device to be applied to the his-tory of governmentality. While both, the concept of governmentality and also itshistory retain certain links to genealogical precepts, my overall conclusion is thatparticularly the history of governmentality (and not necessarily Foucaults more

programmatic statements about it) departs from these precepts in significant ways.Not only is there a notable difference in style that cannot be accounted for entirelyby the fact that this history is produced in the medium of lectures. Aside from arather abstract consideration of the importance of societal struggles, revolts andother forms of resistance, there is also little reference to the role of these phenom-ena in the concrete dynamics of governmental shifts that are depicted in the his-torical narrative. Finally, in contrast to the historical contingency espoused bygenealogy and the programmatic statements about governmentality, the actual

Te Author: Tomas Biebricher is a Visiting Assistant Professor at the Department ofPolitical Science at the University of Florida in Gainesville. Currently he is working on abook manuscript that discusses Foucaults analytics of state in the context of Neo-Marxist,Neo-Institutionalist and Neo-Pluralist approaches to the state.*) An earlier version of this paper was presented during a workshop session on genealogy,hosted by the Society for the Philosophy of History at the American Philosophical Associa-

tion Meeting 2008 (Pacific Division) in Pasadena, CA. I would like to thank the panelmembers as well as the audience for a fruitful discussion and Mark Bevir and Martin Saar,in particular, for their valuable comments and suggestions. I would also like to thank LesTiele and Anne Wolf for their help with the final version of the manuscript.
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364 . Biebricher / Journal of the Philosophy of History 2 (2008) 363396

history of the latter can be plausibly, albeit unsympathetically, read in a rather

teleological fashion according to which the transformations of governmentalityamount to the unfolding of an initially implicit notion of governing that is subse-quently realised in ever more consistent ways.In the final section of the essay I turn towards the field of governmentality studies,arguing that some of the more problematic tendencies in this research traditioncan be traced back to Foucaults own account. In particular, the monolithic con-ceptualisation of governmentality and the implicit presentism of an excessive focus

on Neoliberalism found in many of the studies in governmentality can be linkedback to problems in Foucaults own history of governmenality.Te paper concludes with suggestions for a future research agenda for the govern-mentality studies that point beyond Foucaults own account and its respectivelimitations.

Keywords

Foucault, genealogy, governmentality, governmentality studies, history

If one were to list a few keywords associated with the name of MichelFoucault, governmentality and genealogy would likely rank among themost prominent. Still, the conceptual relation between these two terms hasnot received much attention from Foucault scholars. Tere are, to be sure,

notable exceptions that aim at what could be a called a comprehensivemapping of Foucaults project(s) and thus offer hypotheses regarding howits genealogical phase relates to the relatively brief period at the end of the1970s when Foucault investigates historically variable governmentalities.1

Although these accounts rightfully emphasize the shifts in Foucaultsunderstanding of power, it is implicitly assumed by most authors that hishistorical-strategic analytics of state still adhere to the same historiograph-ical precepts postulated in the classic genealogical works. Te main differ-ence, accordingly, would be an enlarged scope of Foucaults analytics thatnow come to include matters of state and subject (trans-) formation as wellas a different ontology of power. In this essay I address the question, towhat extent the history of governmentality can be accurately referred to asa genealogy.

1) See . Lemke, Eine Kritik der politischen Vernunft (Hamburg: Argument, 1997); . Lemke,Der Kopf des Knigs Recht, Disziplin und Regierung bei Foucault, Berliner Journal frSoziologie, 3 (1999), 415434.


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. Biebricher / Journal of the Philosophy of History 2 (2008) 363396 365

In the first section, a number of central theoretical/methodological

tenets of Foucaultian genealogy will be identified. Using these as a yard-stick, in the following section I will take a look at the history of govern-mentality and offer an assessment regarding the extent to which thathistory actually is a genealogy. In the final section, I draw out some broaderimplications of the (in-)congruence of genealogy and governmentality per-taining to the field of Governmentality Studies.

Addressing the link between the two concepts involves a number of dif-ficulties, but as I will try to show, these are not insuperable. As scholarsattest, Foucaults genealogical method is rather diffi cult to pin down. Firstof all, Foucaults own use of the term is inconsistent. Furthermore, thelocus classicus of Foucaults meta-reflection on genealogy, Nietzsche, Geneal-ogy, History, is a textual veil dance. Here Foucaults discussion of Nietzschesgenealogical stance, departs significantly from that which can be inferred

from Nietzsches own texts.2

It is Foucault who peers out from behindNietzsches mask. In short, it is extremely diffi cult to give precise contoursto Foucaults concept of genealogy. Nevertheless, I will propose a genericaccount for the heuristic purpose of formulating an immanent critique ofFoucaults history of governmentality. Tis history is in many ways pro-foundly un-genealogical. As I will demonstrate in the final section of thispaper, the one-sided realisation of the critical-analytical potential of gov-

ernmentality in many works produced in the field of the GovernmentalityStudies can be traced back to this tendency. What is at stake in addressingthe relation between genealogy and governmentality is more than theuncontroversial assertion that Foucaults thought evolves and shifts overtime. It concerns the possibility of writing history in a way that enables usto find out who we are, in our present actuality,3as Foucault once put it

in a reference to Kant but also that we do not have to be that way.

1. What is Genealogy?

Te question how to define genealogy is one that has preoccupied manycommentators over the course of the last hundred years. It is impossible to

2) M. Saar, Genealogie als Kritik, Eine Geschichte des Subjekts nach Nietzsche und Foucault(Frankfurt: Campus, 2007), 198.3) M. Foucault, Foucault Live. Collected Interviews 19611984, ed. Sylvere Lotringer (New

York: Semiotexte, 1989), 407.


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review the many outstanding studies done on the nature of genealogy in

Foucault, let alone the Nietzschean version. In my attempt to offer ageneric working definition of Foucaultian genealogy I will confine myselfto some of his own characterisations of genealogy and the work of somerecent commentators, most notably Saar and Dean.4In contrast to Fou-caults own frequent resort to a form of negative theology, I will begin byoutlining a couple of positive traits of genealogy, particularly relying onFoucaults own work and the elaborations by Saar. In a second step, I willattempt to sharpen the core contours of genealogy with a discussion ofwhat it is not and what it is directed against, drawing, again, on Foucaultsown work and the comments by Dean. Te latter is a crucial interlocutorfor my argument not only because he provides a pointed delimitation ofgenealogy from other modes of writing history, but also because he is oneof the most adamant advocates of an interpretation of governmentality as

being genealogical in character.Genealogy, trivially, is a way of writing history that is driven by a certainunderstanding of history. My working definition will focus on three inter-related aspects of this mode of historiography. Genealogy is imbued with aview of history as a complex multi-dimensional process that is character-ised by contingency and discontinuity (1). Tis discontinuity is partly aneffect of the impact of power, i.e. historical phenomena are related to inces-

sant struggles between varying parties and these struggles are sedimented insystems of meaning and representation (2). Te genealogist writes thechronicles of these struggles. However, knowing about the entwinement ofpower and truth, she views aspirations of historical accuracy and reasonableargument aiming at objectivity with suspicion, instead relying on highlyrhetorical textual strategies in order to produce hypothetical ante-histories of

the present written from a self-consciously partisan perspective (3).(1) Even before the genealogical turn, Foucaults archaeology of epis-temes and discourses emphasized the discontinuous character of the historyof systems of knowledge that did not follow the course of a Popperian logicof inquiry or any other overarching pattern. Tis outlook on history as asite of fragmentation and contingency is confirmed in Nietzsche, Genealogy,History: genealogy disturbs what was previously considered immobile; it

fragments what was thought unified; it shows the heterogeneity of what

4) See Saar, Genealogie als Kritik; M. Dean, Governmentality. Power and Rule in ModernSociety(London: Sage, 1999).


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was imagined consistent with itself.5 Drawing on Nietzsche, Foucault

highlights the extent to which this intention involves a rejection of anynotion of Ursprung, i.e. a singular starting point of history, pristine anduncontaminated by contingency. Instead, genealogy will cultivate thedetails and accidents that accompany every beginning.6Te genealogicalhistory is one that pays close attention to small causes that produce mas-sive effects, although Foucault would admittedly balk at the vocabulary ofcausality used here. Still, genealogys intuitions are shared to some extentby more conventional schools of thought concerned with history and pol-itics. Notions of path-dependency and critical junctures widely used inHistorical Institutionalism, for example, express similar views on a processof history in which contingent and often miniscule factors become signifi-cant in changing the trajectory of institutions or discourses defying anyoverarching logic that could be discerned a priori.7

Tere are a number of intricately related effects that accrue to this kindof historiography. If the present is the outcome of contingent multi-dimen-sional processes then it becomes more and more diffi cult to view it asnecessary. Tus, genealogy sheds a thoroughly destabilizing light on thehistory of the present, in which present patterns of thought and action,identities and institutions are denaturalised. o be sure, genealogy sharessome of its denaturalising effects with other historically oriented approaches

in political theory such as Marxism. Any persuasive attempt to demon-strate that the past has been profoundly different from the present, likeMarxs elaboration on the different forms of property in Te German Ideol-ogy,leaves the present bereft of its implicit status as being virtually withoutalternative. If the past is different from the present, then the present can beseen as a future past that is potentially quite different from that future.

Tis general denaturalising effect of many historical approaches is radi-calised in genealogys insistence on a discontinuous history that does notlend itself to the totalising claims of some Marxist schools regardingthe overall logic of the course of history. After all, even if the present isno longer deemed natural in the sense of its partaking in an immutable

5) M. Foucault, Nietzsche, Genealogy, History in L. Cahoone (ed.), From Modernism to

Postmodernism(Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), 365.6) Foucault, Nietzsche, Genealogy, History, 364.7) See P. Pierson, Politics in ime. History, Institutions, and Social Analysis(Princeton: PUPress, 2004).


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cosmic order it could still be seen as the necessary outcome of an historical

process presumed intelligible for the historian. But Foucaults interest isexactly the opposite, namely to find out to what extent that which is givento us in the present is not necessary and could be different. Foucault him-self has expressed this overall thrust in the following way: Tese thingshave been made, they can be unmade, as long as we know how it was thatthey were made.8Exposing phenomena in their utter historicity, conse-quently, can be an operation that could almost be described as emancipa-tory despite the reservations Foucault might have about notions ofliberation etc. in the sense that it opens up a space of concrete freedom,that is of possible transformation.9It is important, though, to emphasizethe rather circumscribed meaning of emancipation in this statement, if itis not to assimilate Foucault unduly to the thought of Marcuse and otherCritical Teorists. Foucaults genealogy harbours little chiliastic hope for a

liberation from power, oppression or exploitation in general. Tought,action and identities are always subject to forms of power and domination.Te hope of the genealogist is a more modest one claiming that thingssimply do not have to be the way they are and can be changed. In thatsense it aims at the liberation of our imagination from being held captiveby the status quo.10

(2) Te second aspect of genealogy I want to highlight is closely related

to the first one, but it still deserves to be mentioned separately given itswide-ranging implications. Tere are a number of tenets that set genealogyapart from the archaeological framework of the late 1960s, however, theintroduction of an analytics of power is easily the most important one.Obviously, a comprehensive discussion of Foucaults notion of power lies farbeyond the scope of this paper. For the present purposes a number of basic

points will have to suffi ce. Foucault pointedly states that genealogy is con-cerned with the endlessly repeated play of dominations, assuming thatthe forces operating in history are not controlled by destiny [. . .] butrespond to haphazard conflicts.11 Smoldering even underneath a legally

8) M. Foucault, Critical Teory/Intellectual History in M. Kelly (ed.), Critique andPower. Recasting the Foucault/Habermas Debate. (Cambridge: MI Press, 1994), 127. 9) Foucault, Critical Teory/Intellectual History, 127.10) See D. Owen, Criticism and Captivity: On Genealogy and Critical Teory, European

Journal of Philosophy, 10 (2002), 231245.11) Foucault, Nietzsche, Genealogy, History, 371.


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pacified surface of societal relations lies the incessant dynamic of struggles

and conflicts. Te frameworks of meaning, from the legal system to vary-ing forms of thought, to the very notion of truth carry the mark of power,i.e. past confrontations are encapsulated in them and they are the site andobject of present struggles. Writing history, thus, involves deciphering thelink between changes in discourses and dispositifs as well as the dynamic ofsocietal struggles lurking behind the former. It is not the least the a priorierratic logic of a play of overpowering and resistance that makes for thediscontinuous character of history, which is full of substitutions, displace-ments, disguised conquests, and systematic reversals.12While Foucaultthinks that the random play of forces can retrospectively be made intelli-gible as crystallizing into more global strategies, from the participant per-spective these processes are open-ended and thus feed into the contingencyof history in general.

(3) Finally, genealogys distinct profile comes to the fore when the posi-tion of the historian and the concrete mode of depicting this discontinu-ous and power-laden history are taken into consideration. Te genealogistposits knowledge, truth and any other system of signification as standingin a circular relation with power. Consequently, she self-consciously aban-dons traditional claims to objectivity and reasonable argument in heraccount, knowing that her view of history is one perspective among others,

all of which are more or less partisan in character. Tus, instead of pretend-ing to be able to rise above the complex of power/knowledge the genealo-gist embraces her embeddedness in power relations. Tis means that themode of argument will have to be shifted away from conventional truthclaims towards a hypothetical and strongly rhetorical account of historythat often presents itself in the form of what if?.13It is with reference to

this somewhat unique textual form of genealogy that Foucault makes thefollowing statements in an illuminating interview with Duccio romba-dori that are worth quoting at length:

Te problem of the truth of what I say is a very diffi cult one for me; in fact,its the central problem. [. . .] what I say in my books can be verified or invali-dated in the same way as any other book of history. In spite of that, the people

who read me [. . .] often tell me with a laugh, You know very well that what

12) Foucault, Nietzsche, Genealogy, History, 369.13) Saar, Genealogie als Kritik, 222.


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you say is really just fiction. I always reply, Of course, theres no question of

it being anything else but fiction.14

Foucaults historical depictions in Discipline and Punish are provocationsand challenges aimed at the reader: if this narrative of punishing, its linkto pedagogy, medicine, the legal system and religious confessional prac-tices were really true, what would you do?15o be sure, a more measuredaccount would have to introduce qualifiers, caveats and nuance, but the

point of genealogy cannot be historical accuracy if it does not want to riskrelapsing into a framework in which truth can be disentangled from power.Instead. Foucaults genealogies are heavily loaded with rhetorical devicesfrom hyperbole to suggestive analogies and the verbalisation of nounsthat are to convey a sense of urgency while at the same time cloaking them-selves in a matter-of-fact scientific language. Tis sets genealogies apart

from both outright fiction and unveiled political manifestos.16

As Martin Saar has pointed out, genealogies presuppose readers thathave suffi cient reflexivity, sensitivity and even courage to let themselves beaffected by these narratives and the creeping uneasiness that they canpotentially unleash.17Tus, genealogies are not critical in the sense of giv-ing individuals good reasons, be they moral or economic in nature, whythey should engage in resistance. Te genealogist has to hope that her idio-

syncratic arrangement of historical materials and the ominous air producedthrough rhetorical devices contributes to the individual experiencing agiven state of affairs as subjectively unbearable.18 Given the historicallycontingent character of identities etc. that is affi rmed in genealogical

14) M. Foucault, Power. Essential Works of Foucault 19541984, ed. James Faubion (New

York: New Press, 1994), 242. See also Foucault, Foucault Live, 261 and . Biebricher,Habermas, Foucault and Nietzsche: A Double Misunderstanding, Foucault Studies, 3(2005), 126, available online atwww.foucault-studies.com.15) See D. C. Hoy, Introduction in D.C. Hoy (ed.), Foucault: A Critical Reader (Oxford/New York: Blackwell, 1986 and F. Jameson, Postmodernism, or. Te Cultural Logic ofLate Capitalism, New Left Review, 146 (1984), 5393 on the ambivalent effect of suchclaustrophobic accounts on the mobilisation of individuals to resist.16) H. White, Te Historiography of Anti-Humanism in B. Smart (ed.), Foucault. Criti-

cal Assessments Vol. III (London/New York: Routledge, 1994).17) Saar, Genealogie als Kritik, 313.18) Practicing criticism is a matter of making facile gestures diffi cult. Foucault, FoucaultLive, 155.
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accounts, the potential refusal to endure unbearable conditions any longer

can result in an attempt of transformation.Now that I have introduced what I consider three core tenets of geneal-

ogy I will add a couple of explicit negative delimitations that can be inferredfrom those core tenets in order to sharpen the genealogical profile.

Te most obvious antipodes of genealogy are linear and/or teleologicalaccounts of history: in Foucaults own words, genealogy rejects [. . .] indef-inite teleologies.19 Linear accounts of history would be found in Con-dorcet, Auguste Comte, E.B. ylor or James Frazer who envision a steadycourse of progress discernable in history. oday, linear models of historyhave few adherents so there is no need to dwell on this case for too long.eleological accounts are more interesting because a range of differentapproaches can be subsumed under this category. One obvious candidateis Hegels philosophy of history that assumes the long-winded unfolding of

the world spirit and its ultimate return to itself to be the telos of history.eleological accounts come in many forms; often they borrow the eschato-logical structure of the great spiritual narratives of the Judaeo-Christiantradition like Marxism does. It should be clear from what has been saidabout the core tenets of genealogy that it is incommensurable with suchaccounts due to its stress on contingency. Furthermore, as already men-tioned, a Rankean attempt to describe how things really were, that is,

objectively, is also anathema to genealogy. Attaining a view of history thatis untroubled by the hermeneutical situatedness of the observer and unper-turbed by the web of power relations, out of which knowledge emerges, isincompatible with genealogys view on history as a succession of strugglesand an incessant play of forces that does not leave the historian unaffected.

Dean adds more specificity to these somewhat global claims when he

derives a strong anti-presentist orientation of genealogy from its core ele-ments. He states that genealogy aims at a view of history that counters anarcissistic fixation on the present, which can take the form of Hegelianand contemporary liberal notions of an end of history (Fukuyama) thatsupposedly has been reached. According to Dean, genealogys anti-presentiststance also extends to the mirror image of these visions of the present asthe culmination point of an ascending history, i.e. the interpretation of the

present as the apocalyptic low point of a dystopian process of history. Te

19) Foucault, Nietzsche, Genealogy, History, 361.


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darker writings of the Critical Teory tradition that view the present

through the lens of a totally administered society (Adorno) as well as theshrill warnings of Postmodernists such as Lyotard supposedly fall underthis category.20 While it is a point of contention, whether genealogy isgenerally anti-presentist, the exact opposite,21or at least shares some char-acteristics with the latter group, e.g. the somewhat alarmist rhetoric, theoverall point that Dean attributes to Foucaultian genealogy is persuasive:we have to approach the present with the proviso that we do not allowourselves the facile, rather theatrical declaration that his moment in whichwe exist is one of total perdition, in the abyss of darkness, or a triumphantdaybreak, etc. It is a time like any other, or rather, a time which is never quitelike any other.22Te very last part of this statement can be used to lendsupport to one final precept that Dean derives from the core tenets ofgenealogy: Nothing, in this sense, could be more remote from the ethos

of genealogy than to imagine that we can somehow do away with an anal-ysis of the specificity of political and governmental reason and discourse byidentifying an ideal type abstracted from the variety of current philoso-phies of government in advanced liberal democracies.23Tus, in contrastto Max Webers attempt to employ ideal types as analytical tools, genealogyis wary of such abstractions even for heuristic purposes, it seems andinstead favours an almost empiricist orientation24towards the specifics of

given arrangements of governing and of power more generally. As thequote implies, Dean believes that these precepts apply to and are adheredto by the history of governmentality as well. It is now time to take a closerlook at that history.

2. What is Governmentality and How Genealogical is its History?Despite the fact that I will try to show in the following that the history ofgovernmentality departs from a genealogical historiography in significant

20) Dean, Governmentality, 423.21) See J. Habermas, Te Philosophical Discourse of Modernity. welve Lectures (Cambridge:MI Press, 1990), 276.22) Foucault, Critical Teory/Intellectual History, 126 (my emphasis).23) Dean, Governmentality, 58.24) Foucaults description of genealogy as gray, meticulous, and patiently documentarycomes to mind here. Foucault, Nietzsche, Genealogy, History, 360.


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ways it is important to note that this is not to imply that there are no cor-

respondences and, indeed, congruities between the two kinds of historiog-raphy. In fact, I would argue that some of the more interesting insights ofgovernmentality are derived from a continued adherence to some genea-logical intuitions such as the absence of a power centre. Tis leads thescholar of governmentality to view the state as a precarious entity thatalways exists in the context of other institutions and discourses and is,consequently, deprived of the almost metaphysical stature it acquires inrivalling state theoretical frameworks. Still, as I will try to show below,these and other analytical potentials are jeopardized by the way Foucaultlets his history of governmentality unfold.

I will proceed in the following way. First, the concept of governmental-ity will be summarised and subsequently I will try to provide a highlydescriptive account of the content of the history of governmentality. I will

then spell out, what the grammar of this historical narrative would haveto look like in order to be considered genealogical and finally show that toa considerable extent this is not the case.

Given that it is a neologism, analyses of governmentality often beginwith a consideration of its semantic/etymological dimension. In fact, thestandard interpretation of it being a composite term consisting of govern-ment and mentality has been questioned increasingly in recent years

to the effect that it has been largely discarded and replaced by an interpre-tation which derives the word from the adjective gouvernmental thatcontrasts with sovereign.25However, I would consider this reinterpreta-tion as only having minor consequences since the main purchase to begotten out of the notion of a governing mentality was that these wererelatively stable frameworks of practices of governing that corresponded to

certain patterns of reflection (mentality) or even broader to a certainrationality. Equating a governmentality with a governing rationality inthat sense still seems adequate so the ramifications of the reinterpretationremain rather limited.

Governing, in the way the term is used by Foucault, stands in closesemantic proximity to the notion of conduct;26 it is the regulation of

25) M. Senellart, Course Context in M. Foucault, Security, erritory, Population. Lecturesat the Collge de France 197778 (New York: Palgrave, 2007), 369402.26) M. Foucault, Security, erritory, Population. Lectures at the Collge de France 197778(New York: Palgrave, 2007), 1203.


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conduct by the more or less rational application of the appropriate techni-

cal means.27In Foucaults own words that are worth quoting extensively,it is the interface of two types of practices:

. . . [one has to] take into account the points where the technologies of domi-nation of individuals over one another have recourse to processes by whichthe individual acts upon himself. And conversely, [one] has to take intoaccount the points where the techniques of the self are integrated into struc-

tures of coercion and domination. Te contact point, where the individualsare driven by others is tied to the way they conduct themselves, is what we cancall, I think government. Governing people, in the broad meaning of theword, governing people is not a way to force people to do what the governorwants; it is always a versatile equilibrium, with complementarity and conflictsbetween techniques which assure coercion and processes through which theself is constructed or modified by himself.28

One important aspect of the governmentality concept that can be inferredfrom this quote is the link between practices of governing others and prac-tices of the self. According to Foucault, particular governmentalities cor-respond with more or less fitting individual and/or collective identities.Tus, Neoliberalism as a governmentality supposedly corresponds to thehomo oeconomicus as a hegemonic practice of self, i.e. a rational utility-maximizing individual that comes to assume the position of an entrepre-neur investing in herself. What also becomes clear in this formulation isFoucaults attempt to distance the governmental form of power fromnotions of repression, war, and most importantly, from discipline. Govern-ment presupposes a minimal relational fluidity that grants at least in prin-ciple the possibility of counter-conduct [contre-conduite]29on behalf of

the governed. In principle, this provides a possibility to genealogys require-ment to link historical developments to societal struggles.

Aside from these specifications, the scope of the concept is in need offurther determination, since governing, as Foucault acknowledges himself,is a term that can apply to a large variety of contexts and relations. Souls

27)B. Hindess, Discourses of Power(Cambridge: Blackwell, 1996), 106.28) M. Foucault, About the Beginning of the Hermeneutics of the Self (ranscription oftwo Lectures in Dartmouth on Nov. 14th and 17th 1980, ed. By Mark Blasius), PoliticalTeory, 1993, 198227, 203.29) Foucault, Security, erritory, Population, 201.


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and children, among other things, can be governed, but Foucault wants

to focus on government in its political form30 and explicitly acknowl-edges that the neologism of governmentality serves as a heuristic tool totackle the problem of the state and population.31As we will see below,this form of government only emerges relatively recently at a particularpoint in the history of the Western world, although its precursors andunderpinnings date back to ancient times.

One of the most important characteristics of the concept is its hybridcharacter that cuts across time-honoured dualisms such as the one betweentheory and practice. What Foucault aims to analyse is not the real practiceof government. In other words, it is not an empirical policy analysis. Govern-mentalities are reflected practices. Tey amount to the self-consciousnessof governing32as Foucault puts it only half-jokingly. Along the lines ofearlier inquiries, Foucault is interested in the way that political govern-

ment can actually emerge as an (autonomous) object of reflection. Tus,Foucault describes the freedom of Liberalism as being both ideology andtechnique of government33and, more generally, states:

One is not assessing things in terms of an absolute against which they [prac-tices] could be evaluated as constituting more or less perfect forms of ratio-nality, but rather examining how forms of rationality inscribe themselves in

practices or systems of practices, and what role they play within them,because it is true that practices do not exist without a certain regime ofrationality.34

and one may add that, conversely, knowledge is always already insertedinto practices. Supposedly, it is therefore neither an empirical analysis ofthe observable practices of government, nor is it just an intellectual history

of governmental reflection or analysis of the gap between reflection andpractice that Foucault is trying to provide. Tomas Lemke has arguedthat Foucault sees rationalities as part of a reality that is characterised

30) Foucault, Security, erritory, Population, 89.31) Foucault, Security, erritory, Population, 116.32) M. Foucault, Geschichte der Gouvernementalitt II. Die Geburt der Biopolitik(Frankfurt:Suhrkamp, 2004), 14. All translations from German are mine.33) Foucault, Geschichte der Gouvernementalitt II,78.34) Foucault, Power, 229.


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by the permanent failure of programs.35It is these reflected practices of

governing that Foucault wants to employ as a heuristic tool to approachand analyse the state, invoking the analogy to his disciplinary framework:

Is there an encompassing point of view with regard to the state, as there waswith regard to local and definite institutions? [. . .] Can we talk of some-thing like a Governmentality, that would be to the state what the techniquesof segregation were for psychiatry, what techniques of discipline were to the

penal system, and what biopolitics was to the medical institutions?36

Te methodological punch line to the governmentality project then con-sists in an emphasis on practices as a starting point. Foucault states explic-itly that he wants to set aside the conventional conceptual vocabularyemployed in the analysis of the state such as sovereignty, people, civil soci-ety, and, most importantly, the state itself. Instead he wants to investigatehow these universals37are constituted and reconstituted through the con-crete governing practices and the accompanying forms of reflection. Insteadof treating the state (and other concepts) as an unproblematic given thatcan serve as the explanans in an analysis, Foucault treats the state as a com-posite reality,38the coherence and homogeneity of which do not exist bynature but have to be produced and reproduced with boundaries that are

shifting and varying modi operandi that are unstable. It is Foucaults mostfundamental claim, that these dynamics, the states survival and its bound-aries, are intelligible only through the lens of the tactics of governmental-ity,39or, as he puts it echoing a Nietzschean formulation: Te state is [. . .]no soulless monster but the correlate of a particular way of governing.40

Accordingly, Foucault attempts to develop an approach to the state thatis decidedly anti-essentialist. It is, furthermore, steeped in history and situ-ates the state in the context of other institutions and discourses as well asmore or less corresponding identities.41

35) . Lemke, Foucault, Governmentality, and Critique, Rethinking Marxism, 14 (2002),964.36) Foucault, Security, erritory, Population, 118, 120.37) Foucault, Geschichte der Gouvernementalitt II, 15.38) Foucault, Security, erritory, Population, 109.39) Foucault, Security, erritory, Population, 109.40) Foucault, Geschichte der Gouvernementalitt II, 19.41) For a more detailed account of Foucaults analytics of state in the context of other theo-


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With this brief summary of the concept in mind we can now turn to

the substantive contents of the history of governmentality. Although mycritical claims are not concerned with the contents per se, an overviewof the historical narrative will make the historiographical analysis morecomprehensible.

Having spent the first couple of lectures distinguishing between differ-ent types or modes of power (sovereignty, discipline and security) in thecontext of occasional historical references, the chronological starting pointof the history of governmentality is only reached in the fifth lecture onFebruary 8th 1978. Here Foucault introduces the term pastoral power42that he traces back to the beginnings of the Judaeo-Christian tradition.Tis form of power that captures the meaning of government through themetaphor of shepherd and flock is notably absent from the Greek tradi-tion43and initially encompasses the way in which the monotheistic God

governs the world and, analogously, the way the spiritual shepherd governsthe souls of his flock. Foucault emphasizes both the fact that this form ofgovernment has people and their souls as an object in contrast to a ter-ritory and that it yields a twofold effect: It is both individualizing andtotalising,44or, to use the Latin expression Foucault refers to occasionally,the shepherd is responsible for each and everyone, omnes et singulatim. Tetheme of a shepherds responsibility for the (spiritual) salvation of the

members of his flock and the respective forms of individualizing and total-ising power/knowledge provide the underpinning of, or, prelude45 togovernmentality proper, as it unfolds in the 16th Century.

Foucault argues that the 16th Century witnesses both a crisis of pastoralpower as well as its extension/transformation in the context of an intensi-fied and broad search for forms of conduct of conduct. Te upshot of this

is twofold. Te promise of spiritual salvation over time is transposed intoa secularised responsibility for the welfare of the flock and, more immedi-ately, politics and the state increasingly come to be seen as specific entitiesendowed with a reality of their own. Tis latter development starts with

ries of the state see . Biebricher, Governmentality and State Teory (unpublished paperpresented at the WPSA Conference 2007 in Las Vegas).42) Foucault, Security, erritory, Population, 123.43) Foucault, Power, 2013.44) Foucault, Power, 225.45) Foucault, Security, erritory, Population, 184.


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the heresies of Machiavelli, who takes a first step towards the autonomisa-

tion of the state and political government. In Foucaults view Machiavellisinterlocutor is not only Cicero, more importantly it is Aquinas who pro-vides the most recent conceptualisation of political government in analogyto the way God governs the world and, echoing Aristotle, the patriarchgoverns the family.46Machiavelli and those who will later argue against hisspecific approach to politics, are not concerned with nature and its laws ingeneral they are concerned with what the state is.47For the first time inhistory the political state is no longer seen as either a part of a cosmologicalcontinuum or as an extension of ethical doctrines the political emergesas an autonomous sphere with its own specific exigencies.

According to Foucault, Machiavelli himself deserves credit for this rup-ture of the various continuums, however, it is only the plethora of hiscritical interlocutors who will aspire to formulate a new art of govern-

ment48

that overcomes Machiavellis focus on the monarch and contains ashift towards the notion of state sovereignty understood independently ofthe prince as a person, while agreeing with Machiavelli on the distinctnature of the political sphere. Still, the family of these governmentalitiesthat Foucault subsumes under the label of Reason of State initially remainwithin the gravitational field of Machiavelli to the extent that their his-torically first concrete manifestation, Mercantilism, underscores the cen-

trality of the sovereign: Te objective of Mercantilism is the might of thesovereign.49Tis first concrete effort of a Reason of State governmentalityis epitomized by the police state that goes together with a growing admin-istrative apparatus that not only implements laws and decrees but, equallyas important, generates necessary knowledge about the state and, increas-ingly, the regularities of the population. If the state is that which is to be

maintained under all circumstances, even if it means breaking the law in astate of emergency, then it is essential to gather knowledge that is instru-mental in capturing and assessing the powers of the state, what is neededto maintain and further them, and what is detrimental and therefore needsto be prevented. Tus, the governmentality of Reason of State triggers thebirth of statistics, the task of which is to generate such knowledge.

46) Foucault, Power, 315.47) Foucault, Power, 315.48) Foucault, Security, erritory, Population, 88.49) Foucault, Security, erritory, Population, 102.


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Foucault characterizes the fully developed police state as twofold. Accord-

ing to the assumptions of Reason of State the outward dimension of a stateconceptualised as a realm of unceasing competition between a multiplicityof states in contrast to the late Medieval notion of an Empire that would overtime incorporate rivalling principalities under the banner of a unified Chris-tendom. Te intrinsic volatility of foreign relations can only be temporarilystabilized in a fragile balance of power between individual states and/or alli-ances along the lines of the Realist tradition in International Relations the-ory.50Tus, while the state by necessity is limited in its external reach and thepower it can project beyond its borders, the opposite is true with regard toits internal relations, in which the depth and breadth of interventions (pre-ventative and punitive) by the police is in principle unlimited. Only throughthe workings of this police state, which is characterised by discretionary anddisciplinary micro-management51of nothing less than everything that con-

cerns the state and what does not? does a new entity come into discursiveexistence that is pivotal to the further development and transformation ofgoverning rationalities. Tis entity is the population and through its discov-ery52a landmark shift in the history of governmentality is brought about.

Having to concern itself with the subjects of a state in their actions andinteractions, the police over time accumulates knowledge about regulari-ties, causal mechanisms etc. on the level of what will be called the popula-

tion. Tis vast and expanding knowledge will enable the transition to aliberal governnmentality, the way being paved by the doctrines of thePhysiocrats of the 18th Century, who formulate the first internal critiqueof the police state. Te key to their understanding of how to govern issimple and at the same time fundamental: Tings are not flexible [les cho-ses ne sont flexibles].53What this captures is the assumption that, analo-

gous to the state and politics becoming a distinct reality in Machiavelli,society/the population exhibit what Foucault will refer to as a distinct natu-rality that cannot be indefinitely shaped, overhauled and/or manipulated

50) Foucault, Security, erritory, Population, 285310.51) One lives in a world of decrees, a world of discipline. Foucault, Geschichte der Gouver-nementalitt II, 489.52) For a critical discussion of this discovery see B. Curtis, Foucault on Governmentalityand Population: Te Impossible Discovery, Canadian Journal of Sociology, 27 (2002),505533.53) Foucault, Security, erritory, Population, 344.


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through government. Te conclusion that the Physiocrats draw still falls

short of the more radical transformation reason of state governmentalityundergoes under Liberalism. Quesnay and his followers call for an eco-nomic sovereign who aims at a maximum of knowledge about the eco-nomically relevant processes within society (the famous ordre naturel ),assuming that the economic sphere is transparent in principle.54Tis claimwill later be disputed by liberal thinkers. However, what both Physiocratsand Liberals will agree on is a more laissez-faire approach to the govern-ment of the economy, the specifics being, of course, slightly different.Quesnays economic sovereign grants economic freedom since a poten-tially dangerous contingency resulting from this freedom is always alreadycircumscribed and reined in by the sovereigns exhaustive knowledge aboutthe aggregate ebbs and flows of the economy. For liberal thinkers, it is thevery inability of the sovereign to pierce through the opacity of the eco-

nomic sphere as a whole, that mandates a shift towards the actions ofindividual economic agents as a governing technique.Liberalism, in Foucaults governmentality-centred view, plays the role of

an internal limitation of domestic government. Earlier governmentalitieshad been subjected to a limiting critique before, most notably throughtheories of public and natural law, that called for certain constraints withregard to the scope of government. However, Liberalism is not an external

critical standard to determine whether a government abuses its power and/or disrespects divine law. Its thought revolves around the question, how tomake sure that there is not too much governing. Te reason, however, isnot because it would be normatively wrong but because it would be prag-matically unwise and ineffi cient.55Te intellectual device used to resolvethe question is the budding discipline of Political Economy with its respec-

tive theories about exchange, markets and interests. For the early liberaltheorists, most notably Adam Ferguson, civil society, which Foucault viewsas a correlate of liberal governmentality exhibits a similar kind of naturalitythat was claimed for the political and economic realm by other theorists(see above); and thus its government ought to obey a similar maxim for-mulated by Walpole: Quieta non movere (What stands still shall not bemoved). Tey argue that civil society is a self-sustaining sphere that dis-

plays the famous spontaneous order arising out of decentralized decisions

54) See Foucault, Geschichte der Gouvernementalitt II, 391.55) See Foucault, Geschichte der Gouvernementalitt II, 29.


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and not necessarily through deliberate design. Government only disturbs

this mutually beneficial order if it tries to intervene through decrees etc.,at the most, it is the interest of individual agents that may be subject ofcareful manipulation in the context of liberal government.56

Te question, whether there is a natural aspect to both this societalorder and the freedom of individuals will be a matter of major contentionin the further history of Liberalism. o the extent that the response to it isnegative, it signals the transition from Liberalism to Neoliberalism, whichis analysed in its ordo-liberal version developed by the German FreiburgSchool as well as the American version developed at the University of Chi-cago in lectures four to ten in the Birth of Biopolitics. Since the followingsection will make extensive reference to Foucaults analysis of Neoliberal-ism, I will restrict myself to a concise summary of the basics of his inter-pretation. As hinted above, one of the two key transformations that

Foucault attributes to Neoliberalism concerns the self-sustaining nature ofa free economic society. In contrast to the claims of Liberalism FreiburgSchool theorists such as Eucken and Mller-Armack emphasize the artifi-cial character of such a society, that is only maintained through constantintervention turning Neoliberalism almost into the opposite of Laissez-Faire Economics in this regard. What matters to the Freiburg School is notthe question of whether or not to intervene, but rather what the mode of

economic intervention ought to be. It is their contention that only theframework of the economic realm [Rahmen] can and must be constantlymanipulated to produce and reproduce a market society , while directintervention particularly through a central state sets the society on a pathtowards creeping fascism as seen in the economic history of Germany fromthe 1870s to the 1930s. Similarly, freedom is not a natural condition

of economic agents and therefore, Neoliberalism amounts to the organi-sation of conditions that enable one to be free57 an idea that Foucaulttook to be of fundamental importance for an analysis of the way we arebeing governed. Te second novelty of the model of a Soziale Marktwirt-schaft developed in the aftermath of World War II is premised upon itsspecific historical context. Given the necessity to rebuild a German statefrom scratch, Foucault claims that Neoliberalism no longer attempts

to delineate a sphere that ought to be protected from the intrusions of a

56) See Foucault, Geschichte der Gouvernementalitt II, 406.57) See Foucault, Geschichte der Gouvernementalitt II, 98.


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state in potentially limitless entropy. Instead, it is now a state under the

auspices of the market, and not the other way around.58Te post-warGerman state is considered to derive its very legitimation from its ability tofunction in accordance and in furtherance of the market. Schematicallyspeaking, it no longer commands any primacy vis--vis the market.

Te shift from an attempt to constrain an entropy of the state to anentropy of the economy, or, to be more precise, economic rationalities, isalso on display in the Chigago Neoliberalism, where theories of HumanCapital developed by Gary Becker and others try to broaden the scope ofeconomic analysis not only to encompass political government but alsofamily relations or crime. Te individual here comes to be conceptualisedas entrepreneur of herself, or, Homo Oeconomicus, capable of a rational order-ing of preferences and the ability to pursue behavioural strategies deemedmost promising to maximize or at least satisfice the expected utility.

On the basis of this descriptive sketch of the history of governmentalitywe can now attempt to analyze the grammar of this history.As mentioned above, for heuristic purposes, I will preface my criticisms

with a counterfactually genealogical history of governmentality. If the lat-ter were a genealogy it would have to emphasize the discontinuous andcontingent processes that are associated with the various shifts in govern-mentalities that Foucault describes. In other words, these dynamics must

not be intelligible a priori and conversely, the history of governmentalitymust not be reduced to the ante-history of the present as the positive ornegative culmination point of history. Closely related to this is the gene-alogical requirement explicated by Dean not to treat governmentalities asinstantiations of ideal types. Instead, their historical specificity has to beemphasized. Furthermore, the processes associated with the dynamics of

governmentality would have to be described with reference to societalstruggles, the unpredictable logic of which would figure prominently inaccounting for the contingency of those processes. Finally, the history ofgovnermentality would have to be presented in a style that is reminiscentof the textual strategies of Discipline and Punish etc. One would expectdaring and provocative juxtapositions, hyperbole and an idiosyncraticexposition of the historical material that challenges and discomforts the

reader, prompting her to reassess herself and the political world around her

58) See Foucault, Geschichte der Gouvernementalitt II, 168.


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in the light of Foucaults hypothetical historicisations.59Let me address

these points in reverse order, starting with the question of style.While questions of style are very much open to interpretation, the dif-

ferences in style between Discipline and Punish and the history of govern-mentality are nothing less than striking. Te latter seems to foreshadow theeven more dense, detached and dry style of the final two volumes of theHistory of Sexuality,60which are the only books by Foucault published afterTe Will to Knowledge. Obviously, a caveat is required at this point. Tehistory of governmentality is a collection of lectures, which is a differentgenre from a book proper, arguably directed at a different audience withdifferent purposes in mind. Tus, one would probably expect this differ-ence to have an impact on the style employed and it might be argued thatthe fact that the style is different in itself does not make a strong case for adeparture from the substantive tenets of genealogy. Only if there existed a

book on governmentality that lacked a particular style would this argumenthold any water. Still, it is important to keep in mind that Foucault gavepublic lectures that did in fact resemble the style of Discipline and Punishin the daring hypotheses developed and the urgent and somewhat unset-tling tone in which they were conveyed to the audience. Te Order of Dis-course is probably the strongest case in point in this regard. But while theyalso take place in the medium of the spoken word, the governmentality

lectures might be said to serve a very different purpose that supposedlyleaves a mark on their style as well. Here, Foucault reports to his studentson the weekly progress of his thought process and accordingly these lec-tures have a more searching and preliminary character, which is under-scored repeatedly by himself.

However, taking a look at some of the other lecture classes Foucault

held at the Collge de France, it becomes clear that the somewhat academicstyle of the governmentality lectures cannot be attributed exclusively to thespecificities of the medium. Abnormal and even more so Society Must BeDefended display some remarkable similarities to the genealogical style inDiscipline and Punish. Furthermore, to the extent that part of the genea-logical style is a provocative rearrangement of the historic material which,

59) Saar, Genealogie als Kritik, 159.60) See Foucaults symptomatic motto at the very beginning of the lecture class: . . . I willtherefore propose only one imperative, but it will be categorical and unconditional: Neverengage in polemics. Foucault, Security, erritory, Population, 4.


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in conjunction with highly idiosyncratic interpretations of canonical

thinkers leads to the hypothetical assertion of novel historical trajectories,Society Must Be Defended can arguably pass that test while the governmen-tality lectures are at best borderline cases. In the former, Foucault offerswhat could be seen as a genealogy of genealogical thought and this unusualangle leads him to intriguing interpretations of Hobbes, Machiavelli andthe obscure aristocratic historian Boulainvilliers among others. Foucault isled to apodictic and provocative claims about Nietzsches Hypothesisconcerning incessant struggles as the substrate of society and finally man-ages to connect this social ontology with both the Bio-Politics of Nazismas well as the Stalinist form of state terrorism directed against the classenemy. Te restrictions of space do not permit me to back up this impres-sionist synopsis with an extensive textual analysis, but from what has beenmentioned here it should be clear that these lectures at least are promising

candidates for being considered genealogical in style and composition.Tus, the medium in itself cannot account for the rather un-genealogicalstyle of the governmentality lectures, the storyline of which is also hardlyas unusual as the one in Society Must Be Defended. Te fact that there aresome unconventional elements to be found in it such as the notion ofPastoral Power notwithstanding, a history of governing practices that spanfrom Reason of State, Mercantilism and the Physiocratic doctrines to Lib-

eralism and two versions of contemporary Neoliberalism does not neces-sarily appear as too counter-intuitive. One might still argue that the historyof governmentality is a case of creative writing of history,61but if genealogycannot be detached from specific formal and textual strategies62then thegovernmentality lectures can hardly be labelled genealogical in this respect.

As a matter of fact, below I will return to the question of textual strategies

briefly to show that the specific rhetoric Foucault uses in these lecturessometimes leads to effects that go strongly against the genealogical grain.o what extent then is the history of governmentality also a history of

societal struggles. According to the core genealogical tenets, reference tothese struggles would have to figure prominently in this narrative. While,again, this can be confirmed with regard to Society Must Be Defended, mat-ters are far more ambiguous in the case of the governmentality lectures.

When Foucault discusses how the writing of a history of governmentality

61) Saar, Genealogie als Kritik, 232.62) Saar, Genealogie als Kritik, 16.


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would have to proceed it seems that the play of overpowering and resis-

tance has to inhabit a crucial place. As mentioned above, Foucault con-ceives of the reflected practices of governing as constantly failing programs.One of the main reasons why they are realised incompletely and thenbecome subject to appropriation from various actors to the effect of asignificant change of the original direction in their overall thrust lies inthat play of power and resistance.63After all, the state is not monolithicbut inhabited by a multitude of (para-) state actors with differing interests,using different systems of rationality as frames of reference and havingvarying power resources (Korpi) at their disposal. Moreover, the institu-tionalisation of governing practices confronts the obstacle of more or lesscompliant individual and collective actors outside the state. Tus, thereshould be ample room for the conceptual link between the dynamic ofgovernmentalities and the struggles between these various actors to be

fleshed out empirically in the history of governmentality. However, themore Foucault leaves the programmatic level of what a history of govern-mentality would have to take into account and actually lays out this his-tory, the more these struggles vanish from view.

o be sure, the theme is not entirely absent from the lectures: Foucaultspends some time discussing what he calls revolts of conduct in responseto certain aspects of the pastorate.64However, this is virtually the only time

that forms of counter-conduct are addressed at greater length and evenhere the analysis remains vague to the extent that it is unclear how theserevolts affect the dynamic of governmentalities or pastoral power for thatmatter. So, while Foucault keeps insisting that the point of view of pasto-ral power, of this analysis of structures of power, enables us, I think, to takeup these things and analyze them, no longer in the form of reflection and

transcription, but in the form of strategies and tactics,65

this postulate israrely adhered to in the course of the governmentality lectures.66As I willtry to show momentarily, the relative absence of this dimension of geneal-ogy also feeds into the considerable departure of the governmentality frame-work from the final core tenet of genealogy, i.e. the radical contingency of

63) Foucault, Security, erritory, Population, 1178.64) Foucault, Security, erritory, Population, 194216.65) Foucault, Security, erritory, Population, 216.66) For some reference to societal struggles and tactics see Foucault, Security, erritory, Pop-ulation, 118120, 148.


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historical processes that requires a decidedly anti-presentist stance in the

writing of such a history.If it is true that Foucault does not rely on a connection between govern-

mental dynamic and societal struggles then the question remains how theshift in governmentalities over time can be accounted for.67Is this a processfull of ruptures, displacements or contingencies as a genealogical approachwould suggest? In my view, the history of governmentality presents us witha far more continuous picture that even verges on an historical process, inwhich an inherent telos can be watched unfolding over time. Being awarethat this is a rather strong claim, I will nevertheless have to restrict myselfto a limited number of textual examples and some arguments to illustrateit.68As will be remembered, Foucault views the new arts of governing ofthe 16th Century as attempts to break with both the cosmological views of

Aquinas as well as Machiavellis focus on the person of the sovereign. Tus,

the task of the Reason of State governmentality that appears in this contextis to find the best way to govern in order to maintain the state. Te ensuinghistory of governmentality can be seen as a process of trial and error toachieve this goal culminating in the (neo-) liberal governmentalities. Mer-cantilism manifests a first attempt but it is still too focused on the personalpower of the sovereign. Te Police State that comes to accompany thereason of state governmentalities still assumes that society and economy

can be micro-managed like a household. Similarly, the Physiocrats, whileendorsing laissez-faire policies to some extent, still credit the sovereignwith an ability to oversee the aggregate flows within the economy. It is onlywith the transition to Liberalism and Neoliberalism that the reflected prac-tices of governing accomplish to move beyond the household as a blue-print of governing (through) the economy by accepting the very opacity of

the latter and the resulting limitations of direct governmental interventionthat requires a shift of governance from the state to the free individualsthemselves. Is this a history of contingent ruptures mediated through

67) Tis touches on a complex question present throughout the various phases of Foucaultsoeuvre, namely whether and to what extent it is possible to make causal claims about his-torical events and developments. In other words, what does it mean to account for some-

thing? I will return to this issue below.68) For an excellent and more detailed textual analysis that I build on in my argument seeD. Dupont / F. Pearce, Foucault contra Foucault: Rereading the Governmentality Papers,Teoretical Criminology, 5 (2001), 123158.


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struggles? It seems to me that this history could alternatively be read in a

rather teleological fashion. Te initial governmentalities still mistake theirtask and misread the means to achieve it but over time come to approxi-mate the ideal of a specific model of political governance more and more,with Neoliberalism being the crowning achievement. Te dynamics, then,are first and foremost accounted for internally in the sense that subsequentgovernmentalities learn from their predecessors and thus move step bystep towards the most effi cient way of governing. Te physiocrats learnfrom the shortcomings of the Mercantilists to conceptualise the economyin a more dynamic manner and the transition from the ever more encroach-ing and exceedingly ineffi cient micro-management of the Police State tothe hands-off approach of Liberalism is reminiscent of the pendulum ofdialectics where negation succeeds the negation. In sum, the history ofgovernmentality at times verges on a teleological history in which the earli-

est beginnings of the budding new arts of government already pointtowards their own implicit end goal, i.e. contemporary Neoliberalism, inwhich they finally come to full fruition.

Let me present a couple of arguments to support this anti-genealogicalreading of the history of governmentality. First of all, there is the textualevidence that is closely interwoven with the question of style. Foucaulttends to turn governmentalities into actors that behave in certain ways and

at times seem to want to realize their own implicit telos. Consider the fol-lowing passages referring to the arts of government that provide an excel-lent example in my view:

. . . the art of government was caught between an excessively large, abstract,and rigid framework of sovereignty on the one hand, and, on the other, amodel of the family that was too narrow, weak and insubstantial. [. . .] and bythe same token it was blocked by this idea of economy [. . .] With the house-hold and father on the one hand, and the state and sovereignty on the other,the art of government could not find its own dimension.69

Tis rhetoric suggests that governmentality pursues the telos of findingits own dimension while being blocked by erroneous self-conceptions,

namely the notion of sovereignty and the household. As it happens, bothof these blockades are finally overcome under Neoliberalism and the

69) Foucault, Security, erritory, Population, 103 (my emphasis).


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accompanying governmentalisation of the state.70 Moreover, Foucault

discusses the Reason of State governmentality in the following way: I thinkraison dEtat really did define an art of government in which there wasimplicit reference to the population, but precisely population had not yetentered into the reflexive prism.71Tus, the succeeding Police State willexplicate what is already implicit in Reason of State, i.e. the notion of apopulation.

Tere are two additional factors that lend indirect support to this some-what unsympathetic interpretation of the history of governmentality, bothof which have been mentioned before. First of all, it is, of course, thealready discussed absence of an empirical linking between governmentaldynamics and societal struggles that feeds into the impression of thosedynamics amounting to an internal unfolding process that takes place in asocial vacuum. Te other factor is Foucaults reluctance to conceptualise

any of the governmental shifts in terms of causal relations. While Foucaultis right to be suspicious of simplistic models of historical causes and effects,his theoretical asceticism will only allow him to talk about polygonalconstellations that can be made intelligible not explained through amethod he refers to as eventalisation. Tis way of lightening the weightof causality72 reinforces the impression of free-floating governing ratio-nalities, the link of which to other societal processes remains vague if not

obscure. In the absence of such links the alternative storyline of an internalprocess gains ground almost by default.

What all of this amounts to, is a historiography that is a far cry from theanti-presentist commitments of genealogy. In fact, the Neo-Liberal presentand the accompanying radical governmentalisation of the state can be seenas the vanishing point of the history of governmentality that is present

from the beginning, if only implicitly. After all, this presentism is evenperceivable in the very definition of governmentality or at least one ofthe three that Foucault puts forward: Finally, by governmentality I thinkwe should understand the process, or rather, the result of the process bywhich the state of justice of the Middle Ages became the administrativestate in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and was gradually govern-

70) Foucault, Security, erritory, Population, 109.71) Foucault, Security, erritory, Population, 278.72) Foucault, Power, 227; see also Foucault, Geschichte der Gouvernementalitt II, 57.


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mentalized .73Given Foucaults elaboration in the same lecture that what

is important for our modernity, that is to say for our present, is [. . .] whatI would call the governmentalization of the state,74it is hard to avoid theimpression that the end of the history of governmentality is reached, or atleast, is within close reach. It is this narcissism of the present that geneal-ogy wanted to counter in treating the present as a time like any other, orrather, a time which is never quite like any other.75As will be remem-bered, Deans emphasis on the anti-presentism of genealogy was closelylinked to a refusal of historical reasoning based on ideal-types. However,even in this last regard, governmentalitys adherence to genealogical pre-cepts is questionable. Consider Foucaults conceptualisation of the relationbetween pastoral power and political power:

First of all, between the pastoral power of the Church and political power

there will, of course, be a series of conjunctions, supports, relays, and con-flicts, on which I will not dwell because they are well known, such that theintertwining of pastoral and political power will in fact be a historical realitythroughout the West. However, the fundamental point is that despite these con-

junctions, this intertwining, and the supports and relays, I think pastoral power,its form, type of functioning, and internal technology, remains absolutely specific

and different from political power, at least until the eighteenth century.76

I take this to mean that in historical reality the two types of power werealways intertwined in some way but Foucault insists that there is a certainspecificity to pastoral power, which effectively turns the latter concept intoan ideal type.

My final point ties the various issues discussed here together. Considerhow Foucault describes the relation between Reason of State on the one

hand and the new arts of government and Liberalism on the other: . . . afterone has gained a good understanding regarding the functioning of Liberal-ism, which is opposed to Reason of State, or rather, fundamentally modi-fies it, without necessarily questioning its foundations . . .77In other words,Liberalism can be seen as a modification of Reason of State. Foucault,

73) Foucault, Security, erritory, Population, 1089.74) Foucault, Security, erritory, Population, 109.75) Foucault, Critical Teory/Intellectual History, 126.76) Foucault, Security, erritory, Population, 154 (my emphasis).77) Foucault, Geschichte der Gouvernementalitt II, 43.


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finally, suggests that the art of governing of the 18th Century be consid-

ered a doubling, or, rather, an internal differentiation of Reason of State. It[the art of governing] is a principle of its [Reason of State] maintenance, itscomplete development, its perfection.78In my view, these statements can beread in two ways that are not mutually exclusive. Reason of State, first ofall, could easily be considered an ideal type according to these and otherformulations, with Mercantilism ,Te New Arts of Government, Liberal-ism etc. being empirical manifestations that more and more come toapproximate the ideal type, which, as such, never existed.79Alternatively,the second quote in particular suggests that more recent governmentalitiescomplete the telos inherent in earlier ones to the effect that even the newarts of government of the 18th Century, which Foucault takes to providethe template of contemporary (Neo-) Liberal governmentality are a perfec-tion of Reason of State. Echoing the famous formulation of Clausewitz

that Foucault also found so intriguing, one could say that Neoliberalism isthe extension of Reason of State with other means.Given these more or less considerable departures of the history of gov-

ernmentality from genealogy, the final task of this paper is to assess theimpact of these departures on the contemporary application of the frame-work in the Governmentality Studies.

3. Governmentality in the Governmentality Studies

Te field of Governmentality Studies is inhabited by a diverse group ofscholars from various disciplinary backgrounds, many of which wouldprobably express uneasiness about being subsumed under that label.80Temany different ways in which the concept of governmentality is used and

the varying contexts to which it is applied makes for an intellectual move-ment that is characterised by high degree of heterogeneity. While com-mentators have argued over the assessment of this heterogeneity, i.e.whether it stands for a healthy and vibrant inter- or even post-disciplinary

78) See Foucault, Geschichte der Gouvernementalitt II, 50 (my emphasis).79) In fact, Foucault calls Mercantilism explicitly the the first effort to realize the newart of government on the level of political practices. Foucault, Security, erritory, Popula-tion, 102.80) Dean, Governmentality, 4.


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involves their interpellation as a rational homo oeconomicus carefully plan-

ning their individual retirement scheme and investing smartly into theirspecific skill sets. While there is no doubt that this captures an aspect ofcontemporary life that is of profound importance, it marginalizes otheraspects of contemporary identities that are arguably of equal significance.Tus, while there may be a responsibilisation taking place, simultaneouslywe have been witnessing an irresponsibilisation of individuals as consum-ers and borrowers that is part and parcel of contemporary capitalism. Ben-

jamin Barber has recently referred to an ethos of infantility that encourageslibidinal desires of instant gratification through consumption and leaves astaggering number of households in personal debt.83 Recently, this hasbecome exacerbated by the subprime-mortgage crisis, which is in partexplained by the systematic encouragement of highly irresponsible behav-iour of (future) home-owners with regard to mortgages and loans. Tese

tensions within what may be called contemporary Neoliberalism requiremore emphasis, not the least because these fault lines and the resultinginstability suggest the continued presence of transformative potentials. Afinal aspect of this call for more heterogeneity would be an exploration ofvarieties of Neoliberalism analogous to the Varieties of Capitalism (Hall/Soskice), which would emphasize the differences between the specificmake-up of Neoliberalism in different national or regional contexts and

thus contribute to a governmentality paradigm better equipped to captureand account for the important differences that exist between Neoliberal-ism in the United States and France, for example.84

My point in raising these issues is that to some extent these flaws arerooted in Foucaults own history of governmentality, although this claim isin need of specification. As has been shown, in principle, Foucaults view

of governmentality as an endless number of failing programs that areappropriated for all kinds of purposes by a multiplicity of actors lends itself

83) B. Barber, Consumed: How Markets Corrupt Children, Infantilize Adults and SwallowCitizens Whole (New York: Horton & Company, 2007).84) See Barry Hindess on this point, whose position remains somewhat ambiguous in stat-ing that there are as many liberalisms as there are procedures for identifying contexts inwhich the governmental promotion of free interaction is to be preferred, but simultane-

ously insisting that this international neo-liberalism is the most powerful, and consequentlyalso the most dangerous, liberalism of our time B. Hindess, Liberalism whats in aname in W. Larner / W. Walters (eds.), Global Governmentality. Governing internationalspaces(London/New York: Routledge, 2004), 2339, 36 (my emphasis).


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well to an emphasis on heterogeneity and openness.85However, as I have

argued in the preceding section the way that the project is carried out inthe lectures does not necessarily adhere to these assumptions. Specifically,the absence of a more pronounced reference to societal struggles and formsof resistance in accounting for governmental dynamics is highly conduciveto the reified reading that governmentality oftentimes receives in therespective studies.

My final point is closely related to what has been argued so far and justtransposes the themes of diversity and hetereogeneity from the synchronicto the diachronic dimension. In a recent paper Mark Bevir has posed thesomewhat provocative question, what happens after Neo-Liberalism , or,in other words, whether we are still governed by a predominantly neolib-eral governmentality.86Concurring with Bevir on this point, I would arguethat there is a tendency within the Governmentality Studies to be a little

too content with an affi rmative response taking its diagnostic clues froman assessment made by Foucault thirty years ago. Bevir argues instead that,at the very least, Neoliberalism has undergone considerable changes sincethe days of Margaret Tatcher, for example through a shift in emphasisaway from the individual towards community under the Labor govern-ment of ony Blair.87Given a range of diverse phenomena from the con-solidation and centralisation of power in the United States administration

in pursuit of a unified executive, the growing disenchantment over Neo-liberalism in Australia, one of its former strongholds, or the resurgence ofmatters of territory in the light of concerns over (illegal) immigration bothin the United States and Europe, one might even wonder whether we havereached an era of post-Neo-Liberal governmentality. What is at stake hereis not only the issue of different periodizations. Clinging too much to the

85) Furthermore, Foucaults distinction between various types of power that exist simulta-neously as well as his explicit differentiation between Freiburg- and Chicago-School Neo-liberalism point into the direction of a more diversified understanding of contemporarygovernmentality.86) M. Bevir, After NeoLiberalism? Institutionalism and the Tird Way (unpublishedpaper presented at the WPSA Conference 2007 in Las Vegas). See also M. Bevir, NewLabor: A Critique(London: Routledge, 2005).87) Others point to a reorientation in neoliberal governance in response to various diffi cul-ties involved in governing at arms length. See M. Flinders, Public/Private: Te Boundar-ies of the State in Colin Hay et al. (eds.), Te State. Teories and Issues (New York: Palgrave,2006), 223247.


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established diagnosis of Neo- or Advanced Liberalism may bar important

transformations from being recognized by scholars of governmentality.Obviously, such a theoretical lock-in implies highly problematic conse-quences for any political project aiming at change but also for a morenuanced and informed understanding of the present. Again, this excessivefocus on Neoliberalism which characterises many works in the Govern-mentality Studies can be traced back to the presentist tendencies that canbe located within Foucaults own history of governmentality. o the extentthat Neoliberalism appears as an inherent telos in the latter, the former justfollows in Foucaults own footsteps. In my view, it is imperative to movebeyond the diagnoses offered by Foucault at the onset of what is arguablya period of hegemonic Neoliberalism and to question them on the basis ofdevelopments having taken place in the meantime. Just as Neo-Marxistshave questioned, revised and elaborated on concrete historical diagnoses

by Marx, governmentality scholars have to think beyond the confines ofFoucaults own history of governmentality. Tis history has to be expandednot the least to stay true to the imperative that Foucault found to be atthe core of the Enlightenment ethos animating his own studies as well,i.e. finding out what difference does today introduce with respect toyesterday.88

Conclusion

In this essay I have attempted to give an assessment of whether and to whatextent the history of governmentality can be considered to be a genealogy.o this effect I have offered a generic account of core tenets of Foucauldiangenealogy focusing on a radically contingent view of history that is

expressed in a distinct style and highlights the impact of power on this his-tory. I have used this account as a measuring device to be applied to thegovernmentality framework. While the concept of governmentality andalso its history retain certain links to genealogical precepts, my overall con-clusion is that particularly the history of governmentality (and not neces-sarily Foucaults more programmatic statements about it) departs from

88) M. Foucault, What is Enlightenment in P. Rabinow (ed.) Te Foucault Reader (NewYork: Pantheon, 1984), 3250, 34.


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these precepts in significant ways. Not only is there a notable difference in

style that cannot be accounted for entirely by the fact that this history isproduced in the medium of lectures. Aside from a rather abstract consid-eration of the importance of societal struggles, revolts and other forms ofresistance, there is also little reference to the role of these phenomena inthe concrete dynamics of governmental shifts that are depicted in the his-torical narrative. Finally, in contrast to the historical contingency espousedby genealogy and the programmatic statements about governmentality, theactual history of the latter can be plausibly, albeit unsympathetically, readin a rather teleological fashion according to which the transformations ofgovernmentality amount to the unfolding of an initially implicit notion ofgoverning that is subsequently realised in ever more consistent ways.

Let me close with some thoughts regarding what is at stake in myattempt to pitch genealogy against the history of governmentality. First of

all, it is important to note that, while emphasising the ways in which thetwo approaches are incongruent I do not mean to imply that they areincommensurate and have to be assessed entirely on their own terms. Teview of a radically fragmented oeuvre is often espoused by commentatorsbecause it is believed to apply the lessons from Foucaults own reservationsabout the author. Furthermore, it gives due weight to the intellectualdynamic which inarguably is on display in his thought. However, this per-

spective fails to consider the many continuities that do exist throughoutthe various phases of his work. Te continuities between genealogy andgovernmentality pointed out by Saar, Dean, Lemke and others are a casein point. My point is not to deny those links but to place them in thecontext of arguably even more fundamental discontinuities between theframeworks.

In contrasting them, my main aim is not to make a philological pointabout how to understand the dynamics pertaining to Foucaults oeuvre.Rather, this juxtaposition is used as a heuristic device to expose some short-comings of the history of governmentality through what could be referredto as a semi-immanent critique of governmentality from a genealogicalperspective. However, I would not want to derive a call for a genealogy ofgovernmentality from this. As I mentioned in the beginning, beyond some

core tenets, there is far too much controversy surrounding the contours ofgenealogy to make this a promising theoretical project quite apart fromthe fact that it is not clear what this would mean with reference to the


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question of style and other issues such as the changes in Foucaults view of

power away from Nietzsches Hypothesis.Rather, this critique should be viewed as providing a contribution to the

research agenda of contemporary scholars of governmentality. wo mainpoints that the critique would suggest are, first, the desirability of filling inthe blanks of the history of governmentality regarding the link betweengovernmental shifts and mechanisms of power and struggle. Of course,this is a complex task, not the least since it involves addressing the questionof historical causality. Still, in my view, it could placate at least some ofthe concerns that the history of governmentality raises in this respect.Secondly, developing a more heterogeneous account of contemporarygovernmentalit(ies), both synchronic and diachronic, would address theteleological as well as the presentist aspects of Foucaults account. Whatboth of these demands imply is that Foucaults characterisation of his own

works as game openings89

ought to be taken seriously: they do not requireemul

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