Report of the Committee on

Halon Alternative Protection Options

Philip J. DiNenno, Chair Hughes Assoc., Inc., MD [SE]

J.eff L. Harrington, Secreta ry Harrmgton Group, Inc., GA [SE]

W. C. (Chuck) Boyte, Royal & SunAlliance, TN [I] Rep. American Insurance Services Group

Michael P. Broadribb, BP Amoco Toledo Refinery, OH [U] JSon S. Casler, bike Corp., MO [M]

alvatore A. Chines, HSB Industrial Risk Insurers, CT [I] Michelle Collins, Nat'l Aeronautics & Space Admin, FL [E] William J. Fries, Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., MA [I]

Rep. The Alliance of American Insurers William A. Froh, U.S. Dept. of Energy, MD [[J] William L Grosshandler, Nat'l Inst. of Standards & Technology,

MD [RT] Elio Guglielmi, North American Fire Guardian Tech. Inc., BC [M] Alankar Guptab Boeing Commercial Airplane Group, WA [U] Howard S. Hammel, E.I. DuPont, DE [M] David H. Kay, U.S. Dept. of the Navy, VA [U] George A. Krabbe, Automatic Suppression Systems Inc., IL [IM]

Rep\ Fire Suppression Systems Assn. Robert L, Langer, Ansul Inc./Tyco, WI [M] Robert C. Merritt, Factory Mutual Research Corp., MA[I ] W. Douglas Register, Great Lakes Chemical Corp., IN [M] Paul E. Rivers, 3M, MN [M] Samuel L. Rogers, Kemper Nat'l Insurance Cos., CO [I] Reva Rubenstein, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, DC [E] Jcoseph A. Senecal, Kidde-Fenwal, Inc./Williams Holdings, MA[M]

lifford R. Sinopoli, II, Baltimore Gas & Electric, MD [U] Rep. Edison Electric Inst.

Louise C. Speitei, Federal Aviation Administration, NJ [E] Tim N. Testerman, Procter & Gamble, OH [U] Klaus Wahle, U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters (G-MSE-4), DC [E] Stephen B. Waters, Fireline Corp., MD [IM]

Rep. Nat'l Assn. of Fire Equipment Distributors Inc. Kenneth W. Zastrow, Underwriters Laboratories Inc., 1L [RT]

Alternates

Charles Bauroth, Liberty Mutual Insurance Group, TX[I] (Alt. to W. J. Fries)

William M. Care),, Underwriters Laboratories lnc., IL [RT] (Alt. to K. W. Zastraw)

Christina F. Francis, Proctor & Gamble, OH [U] (Ah. to T. N. Testerman)

Christopher P. Hanauska, Hughes Assoc., Irrc., MN [SE] (All. to P.J. DiNenno)

Richard L. Hansen, U.S. Coast Guard, CT [E] (Alt. to K. Wahle)

Paul William Lain, U.S. Dept. of Energy, DC [U] (Alt. to W. A. Froh)

Lorne MacGregor, North American Fire Guardian Technology Inc., Canada[M] (Alt. to E. Guglielmi)

J. Douglas Mather, New Mexico Engr Research Inst., NM [RT] (Voting Alt. to NMERI Rep.)

Jonathan S. Meltzer, Kidde-Fenwal Inc./Williams Holdings, MA[M] (Alt. to J. A. Senecal)

Earl D. Neargarth, Fike Corp., MO [M] (Alt. to J. S. Casler)

David A. Pehon, Ansul Inc./Tyro, IL [M] (All. to R. L Langer)

John A. Pignato, Jr., 3M Co., MN [M] (Alt. to P. E. Rivers)

Todd E. Schumann, HSB Industrial Risk Insurers, IL [I] (Alt. to S. A. Chines)

David C. Smith, Factory Mutual Research Corp., MA [I} (Alt. to IL C. Merrit0

AI Thornton, Great Lakes Chemical Corp., TX [M] (Alt. to W. D. Register)

Charles F. Willms, Fire Suppression Systems Assn., NC [IM] (Alt. to G. A. Krabbe)

Joseph A. Wright, Federal Aviation Administration Tech Ctr., NJ [E] (AlL to L. C. Speitel)

Robert E. Yellln, CalProtection, CA [IM] (Ait. to S. B. Waters)

Nonvoting

Anatoly Baratov, AlbRussian Inst. of Fire Protection, Russia Ole Bjarnsholt, Unitor Denmark A/S, Denmark[M] Michael John Holmes, Preussag Fire Protection Ltd, England DouglasJ. Pickersgill, Fire and Safety Systems, Australia Ingeborg Schlosser, VdS Schadenverhutung, Germany [IM] Robert E. Tapscott, Globe Tech Inc., NM

(Member Emeritus) Fernando Vigara, Vimpex - Security Devices, SA, Spain

Staff Liaison: Mark T. Conroy

Committee Scope: This Committee shall have primary responsibility for documents on alternative protection options to Halon 1301 and 1211 fire extinguishing systems. It shall not deal with design, installation, operation, testing, and maintenance of systems employing carbon dioxide, dry chemical, wet chemical, foam, Halon 1301, Halon 1211, Halon 2402, or water as the primary extinguishing media.

This list represents the membership at the time the Committee was balloted on the text of this edition. Since that time, changes in the membership may have occurred. A key to classifications is found at the front of this book.

This portion of the Technical Committee Report of the Committee on Halon Alternative Protection Options is presented for adoption.

This Report on Comments was prepared by the Technical Committee on Halon Alternative Protection Options, and documents its action on the comments received on its Report on Proposals on NFPA 2001, Standard on Clean Agent F'we Extinguishing Systems, 1996 edition, as published in the Report on Proposals for the 1099 Spring Meedng.

This Report on Comments has been submitted to letter ballot of the Technical Committee on Halon Alternative Protection Options , which consists of 29 voting members; of whom 25 voted affirmatively, ~ negatively after circulation of negative ballots (Krabbe, Rivers, Wahle), and 1 ballot was not returned (Mather).

Mr. Chines voted affirmative with the following comment: "Although I voted affirmative on the ballot, I have the following comments. Some of these can be addressed in the next revision of the standard. Log #CC13, Section 1-5.1.3. The exposure times indicated do not realistically allow protection for individuals that cannot escape during the predischarge time delay. Log #CP79, Section A-1-5.1.2.1. Since a 10 minute soak period is considered the norm, the PBPK data should be extended to 10 minutes so that proper agent use can be evaluated. Future revision. Pressure vs. Density curves should be included for all agents for their corresponding fill densities. This data is just as important as the Pressure vs. Temperature curves. Data should be requested from the agent manufacturers so that they have time to obtain the data for the revision."

Mr. Langer voted affirmative with the following comment: "Regarding the change to a 30 percent safety factor; no technical justification was provided for this change other than an increase in HF generation for halocarbon agents on high-energy fires. Since this is not an issue with inerts the change is not justified for inerts. NFPA 12, Carbon Dioxide Systems, continues to use a 20

ercent safety factor. egarding the tee split safety factor issue; no test data has been

supplied to substantiate the statistical analysis for multi hazard systems using 5 or more tees."

Mr. Register voted affirmative with the following comment: "Affirmative vote with the understanding that in Secdon 3-4.2.2.1 the "and" in the first and second sentences will be replaced with "or", i.e., for Class B or for systems which can be activated only manually, the minimum design concentration shall employ a safety factor of 1.3."

Mr. Krabbe voted negatively stadng: "The Fire Suppression Systems Association (FSSA) is opposed to any change to the minimum design concentration that is not supported by any field data or test data to substantiate the need for such a change. Therefore, I voted negative based on the

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Committee actions taken on Comment 2001-30 (Log #33), and Comment 2001-34 (Log #62), for the following reasons: 1. During the original ROC meeting held in December 1998, the Committee rejected all increases to the minimum design concentrations (both for Class A and Class B hazards), as was proposed in 2001-34, on the basis that, "field experience indic.ates that the 20 percent safety factor is appropriate". Also at that meeting, the Committee accepted an editorial comment to paragraph 3-4.2.2.1, 2001.30, without any change to the 20 percent safety factor to be used to determine the minimum design concentration for Class B filel hazards. 2. During the July 15-16, 1999 ROC meeting the Safety Factor Task Group (charged with review of the design concentration issue) reported that the task group did not have any new data to submit to the Committee, except to note that the minimum design concentration had been increased to 30 percent in the proposed new ISO standard on clean agents. It should be noted that the ISO task force, on design concentrations, also did not offer any data to the effect that the 20 percent safety factor was not working in practice. 3. On the other hand, FSSA presented to the Committee documented success stories on real world clean agent systems, protecting Class A and Class B hazards, that were involved in fire incidents. These systems, reportedly designed using a 20 percent safety factor, were completely successful in providing prompt fire suppression. There were no documented reports of system failures of any kind. 4. Marine Requirement.s: The Committee action to increase the minimum design concentration to 30 percent for "Class B hazards and manually actuated systems", as specified in 2001-30, is in direct conflict with the new Chapter 5 on Marine Systems. The provisions in Chapter 5 take precedent over similar provisions in Chapters 1-4 of this standard. In this case, Chapter 5 specifies that the minimum design concentration for Class B fuels shall be determined following the procedures described in the International Maritime Orgamzanon (IMO) MSC/Circ.848. The IMO regulations state that for marine systems the min. design concentration should be at least 20 percent above the rain. extinguishing concentration. Thus for marine use, where high intensity Class B fuel hazards are normally anticipated, and where life safety is a prime concern, a minimum design concentration factor of 20 percent is permitted, not a 50 percent factor as proposed in 2001-30. Why then should a 30percent factor be required for commercial/industrial Class B fuel hazards when it is not required for mariae systems? 5. Several clean agent equipment manufacturers have submitted their systems for fire testing per IMO MSG/Circ.848 in order to obtain marine approval,;. At least one of these systems was tested using desi .gn concentrations 20 percent above the extinguishing concentrauon and successfully passed all of the Class B fire test requirements. The results of these large-scale, high-intensity fire tests have demonstrated that a minimum 20 percent factor is adequate for protection of Class B fuel hazards. 6. Historically NFPA 12, Standard on Carbon Dioxide Extinguishing Systems, can be considered the first clean agent. NFPA 12, paragraph 2-3.2 and Table 2-3.2.1 specify that the min. CO s total flooding design concentration, for the majority of Class B fuels, use a safety factor of 20 percent. These CO s design concentration values have been used successfully for total flooding protection of Class B fuel hazards for over 35 years. 7. In summary, the Committee actions taken on Comment 2001- 30 and 2001-34 are not justified, and have created a hodgepodge of requirements with respect to design concentrations and discharge times. In addition, none of theseproposed changes to NFPA 2001 harmonize with the proposed ISO clean agent standard or the IMO rrarine regulations."

Mr. Rivers voted negatively stating: "Below are my comments relative to the letter ballot on Comment 2001-14 (Log #CC1) and 2001-15 (Log #CC13): I have consistently been opposed to the continued trend relaxing the toxicity criteria in the standard and wish to remain on record as opposing this trend. I agree, at least in part, with a 29 May 99 Great Lakes Chemical submittal to the Committee concerning 2001-14. This dealt with the undefined halocarbon concentrations between the NOAEL and the LOAEL and the notion of allowing agent use above the LOAEL in any case. I too have concern about the uncertainty of the untested area between NOAEL and LOAEL for a given agent. Further, there is no need for the use of an agent above its LOAEL, since suitable alternatives are available to the fire protection engineer that do not exceed those limits. Similarly, the new criteria included in Comment 2001-15 was allowed for inert gas systems to be designed up to 62 percent agen¢ concentration (down to 8 percent Os) with the realization that people can be present. Recall the 22 May 1997 New London Report submitted at the Sparks meeting when referring to lethal hypoxic levels stated the following in part: "Lethality occurs quickly, if respiration continues (even one breath) at levels below 8 percent oxygen." In this case, our peer reviewers are not merely talking about an adverse effect. They are talking about a lethal limit. This Committee started out the decade with a more conservative standard in mind, one I do not believe we should have abandoned. I have also consistendy opposed and remain opposed to inclusion of an egress time criteria in the standard as now has been included, based on the fact that these criteria can neither be enforced as a matter of law nor can they be designed into a clean agent system. A survey of the United States fire marshals commissioned by 3M was submitted to the Committee prior to the A99-ROP meeting to support my position. There are other important inclusions in the standard that need to be moved forward, such as safety factor changes, further recognition of the Class C phenomena and clarification of issues related to thermal decomposition. They add value and give the fire protection engineer needed guidance in system design. SdlI, 1 am inclined to case a negative vote this cycle for the trend stated above."

Mr. Wahle voted negatively stating: "2001-63 (Log #12), Section 5-4.7 conflicts with U.S. Coast Guard

~ iping regulations which require uninsulated metallic material to ave a melting point over 1700°F. [46CFR 56.50-1(a)]."

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(Log #63) 2001- 1 - (Notice): Accept SUBMII~I~ER: Robert E. Tapscott, NMERI COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: N/A RECOMMENDATION: Revise the Notice to read:

"Information on referenced publications can be found in Chapter 5 6 and Appendix C, D." SUBSTANTIATION: Editorial. References are actually in Chapter 6 and Appendix D. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log #64) 2001- 2 - (1-1): Accept in Principle SUBMITTER: Robert E. Tapscott, NMERI COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 2001-1 RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read:

"It does not cover fire extinguishing agents that use carbon dioxide. Halon 1301, Halon 1211, Halon 2402, or water as the nrimarv extimtuishint~ media, which are addressed in other NFPA documents." SUBSTANTIATION: IG 541 contains carbon dioxide. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept in Principle.

Revise text to read: "It does not cover fire extinguishing agents that use carbon

dioxide. Ha!oa 1211, Halv~ 2a.02, or water as the primary exdn~uishin~ media, which are addressed in other NFPA documents. ' ; COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Halon 1211 and Halon 2402 are not addressed in other NFPA systems standards.

(Log #65) 2001- B - (Table 1-4.1.2): Reject SUBMITTER: Robert E. Tapscott, NMERI COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 2001-1 RECOMMENDATION: Change "Trifiuoroidide" to "Trifluoromethane" after HFC-23. SUBSTANTIATION: Editorial. Typographical error. COMMITTEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Trifluoromethane is currently after HFC-23 in Table 1-4.1.2.

(Log #66) 2001- 4- (Table 14.1.2): Accept SUBMITTER: Robert E. Tapscott, NMERI COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 2001-10 RECOMMENDATION: Remove (99.9%) after Argon and Nitrogen (IG-01 and IG-100). SUBSTANTIATION: Not needed. Moreover, it implies that IG- 01 and IG-100 refers to only gases with 99.9% Argon and Nitrogen. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log #CC1 ) 2001- 5 - (1-5.1.2.1): Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Halon Alternative Protection Options COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 2001-14 RECOMMENDATION: Replace the wording to read:

Unnecessary exposure to all halocarbon agents (even at NOAEL concentrations) and their decomposition products shall be avoided. The requirement for predischarge alarms and the time delays are intended to prevent human exposure to the agents. The following additional provisions shall apply in order to account for failure of these safeguards:

1. Halocarbon systems for spaces that are normally occupied, designed to concentrations up to the NOAEL, shall be permitted.

2. Halocarbon systems for spaces that are normally occupied, designed to concentrations above NOAEL up to the LOAEL, shall be permitted, given that means be provided to limit exposure to no longer than X minutes (where X is the time required to achieve the blood concentration of the agent that was attained in the test animal when exposed at the LOAEL agent concentration in air, as estimated by the U.S. EPA approved and peer reviewed PBPK model or its equivalent, equals the LOAEL).

$. In spaces that are not normally occupied, and are protected by a halocarbon agent system designed to concentrations above the

LOAEL, and where personnel could possibly be exposed, means shall be provided to limit specific exposure times using the U.S. EPA approved and peer reviewed PBPK model or equivalent.

4. In the absence of the information needed to fulfill the conditions listed above, the following provisions shall apply:.

(a) Where egress takes longer than 30 seconds but less than 60 seconds, the halocarbon agent shall not be used in a concentration exceeding the LOAEL;

(b) Concentrations exceeding the LOAEL are only permitted in areas not normally occupied by personnel provided that any personnel in the area can escape within 30 seconds. No unprotectedpersonnel shall enter the area during agent discharge. SUBSTANTIATION: Clarification. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log #CC10) 2001- 6- (1-5.1.1): Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Halon Alternative Protection Options COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 2001-1 RECOMMENDATION: Revise 1-5.1.1 to read as follows:

1-5.1.1" Any agent that is to be recognized by this standard . . . . v . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I . . . . r . . . . r . . . . shall first be evaluated in a manner equivalent to the process used by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's SNAP Program. , SUBSTANTIATION: All proposed agents should first be processed through the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's SNAP Program. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log #30) 2001- 7- (1-5.1.2.1): Reject SUBM1TTER: Carol Weisner, US Environmental Protection Agency COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 2001-14 RECOMMENDATION: No change recommended in current proposal, but EPA submits report of peer review panel referenced m the proposal. SUBSTANTIATION: NFPA 2001 Committee requested that EPA obtain peer review of PBPK model described in this proposal.

Note: Supporting material is available for review atNFPA Headquarters. COMMITTEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: No recommended change to the text. This submittal is for information only.

(Log #117) 2001- 8- (1-5.1.2.1): Reject SUBMITTER: James B. Murphy, Ansul Inc. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 2001-14 RECOMMENDATION: Delete text:

accouat for faiParc of t!~esc ~c~uards: !. H~oczr~o= z)~tcr:-.= for s~cs 5:at :.-c :.orm~! 7

oc:'.:p!ed...continue deleting until end of 1-5.1.2.1. SUBSTANTIATION: Numerous public papers show significant health threats from toxic byproducts (HF) from small, intermediate, and large scale fire tests (see HOTWC Conference Proceedings.) The peak information of HF occurs in the first 5 minutes. The acid gases will be significant impairment to safe egress (threat to eyes) and to life in general. Additionally, obscuration caused by halocarbon discharge may prevent prompt exposure (see Loss Prevention Counsel Report LPR6: July 1996). COMMITTEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Points raised in substantiation don't relate to the text added in ROP Proposal 2001-14 (Log #Log 26).

(Log #73) 2001- 9 - (Table 1-5.1.2.1 (New)): Accept in Principle SUBMITTER: Mark L. Robin, Great Lakes Chemical Corp. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 2001-14 RECOMMENDATION: Add Table 1-5.1.2.1 as follows:

A~ent X HFC-227ea 5 min

where x: time interval at which the blood level equals the LOAEL.

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SUBSTANTIATION: PBPK data requi red for inclusion in Section 1-5.1.2.1 to replace p l acehoh te r "X'. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept in Principle.

I Add as new co lumn to AA-5.1.2. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Provides exposure limits.

(Log #113) 2001- 10 - (1-5.1.2.1 and A-1-5.1.2.1 (New)): Reject S U B M r Y r E ~ Paul E. Rivers, 3M Chemicals COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 2001-14 RECOMMENDATION: Replace the wording in Paragraph 1-5.1.2.1 in its entirety with p roposed wording and add a new Paragraph A-1-5.1.2.1 as follows:

1-5.1.2.1" Unnecessa ry exoosure to all ha locarbon clean a~ents and their decomnos i t ion n roduc t s shall be avoided. Halocarbon ~,gelnts for which the desi~,n concent ra t ion i~ equal to or less tha, ll the NOAEL shall be ne rmi t t ed for use in normal ly occunied areas. Halocarbon a~ents for ~;hich the des ign concent ra t ion is ~reater than the NOAEL shall no t be oermi t ted for use in occut3ied areas. O the r m e t h o d s for h u m a n exoosure analysis tha t may exist shall be oe rmi t t ed to be considered.

Excention: For Class B hazards, up to the LOAEL shall be oe rmi t t ed in normal lv occuoied areas where a ore-discharge a larm ~md t ime delav are orovided. T he t ime delav shall be set to ensore that the occuoants of the enclosure u n d e r considera t ion have t ime to evacuate nr ior to the stalg of d ischarge ~;pncenWations.

Add the following pa ragraph to the appendix: A-1-5.1.2.1 The following provisions may be cons idered to ~ive

the end user ~uidance when oe r fo rming "what if ' hazard analysis which takes into accoun t failure of the safeguards desimaed to limit h u m a n exoosure. These are:

1. Halocarbon systems for soaces tha t are normal ly ocgupiecl, des igned to concent ra t ions uo to the LOAEL could be nermit ted. given that the m e a n s be nrovided to limit ¢xposure to no longer than X minu te s (where X i~..the t ime interval at which the bloo~ level for a ~ v e n ha locarbon , as est imated I?y the US PEA-approved PBPK model or its eauivalent , equals the LOAEL.

2. In spaces tha t are no t rlormallv occupied, and proteO;e~l by a ha locarbon system des iened to concentrations above the LOAEL. and where oe r sonne l could oossiblv be exoosed, m e a n s could be orovided t o l i m i t soecific exposure t imes us ing the US EPA- anoroved PBPK model or its eauivalent . SUBSTANTIATION: An EPA-and USAF sponsored PBPK mode l was first submi t t ed for peer review in 1995 and publ i shed in 1996. At tha t t ime, no valid scientific data was available to suppor t the mode l o ther t han work carried out by the pharmaceut ica l industry in suppor t of CFC rep lacements for me t e r ed dose inhalers. These involved as m u c h as ten t imes lower levels o f exposure by vo lume t han could be reasonable expected in fire protec t ion applications.

By Augus t 1997, EPA ~ad USAF co-sponsored a series of low level h u m a n exposures in an a t t empt to validate the model . T he stated purpose of the s tudy in the repor t was to collect PBPK mode l validation data f rom Halon 1301, HFC-134a and HFC-227ea in h u m a n s . The chemical exposure concent ra t ions were des igned to be well below the pub l i shed lowest observable adverse effect level (LOAEL). The goal w ~ to p roduce chemical exposures sufficient for chemical quantif icat ion in h u m a n expired breath a n d venous blood wi thout adverse effects in volunteers.

In the event, the initial results obta ined did no t provide the comfor t required, a l though it was general ly accepted tha t the test protocol was "flawed". U n d e r a duty of care, EPA and the pharmaceut ica l industry commiss ioned a series of tests to reassure the public of the safety of CFC..alternatives in MDI applications. It was no t for the purpose of validating the PBPK model , as the exposure levels were no,: directly related to fire protect ion applications. Such and extrapolat ion could be in te rpre ted as a scientific "leap of faith". And, since the PBPK model has no t peer reviewed, to validate its use in the body of this d o c u m e n t is no t appropria te .

Internationally, criteria for de t e rmin ing safe limits for ha locarbons remains the NOAEL and LOAEL in venues such as IMO and ISO. Use o f ha locarbon agents above the NOAEL requires mechanica l lock-off of the system or r ende r ing the system to manua l - only m o d e when the space is occupied. Further , a proposal accepted in the ISO gaseous alternatives s t andard increase the m i n i m u m safety factor applied to 30 pe rcen t f rom 20 percent .

Given these condi t ions on end use, a n d the above history, appl icat ion o f PBPK mode l provisions u p o n failure to p reven t exposure is p remature . However, inclus ion of the analytical m e t h o d as informat ional material for gu idance purposes may be appropr ia te until peer review acceptance exists. COMMITTEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Sett ing egress t imes is a long established practice and was used for many years for ha lon 1301 systems.

(Log #74) 2001- 11 - (1-5.1.2.2): Reject SUBMITTER: Mark L. Robin, Great Lakes Chemical Corp. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 2001-15 RECOMMENDATION: Delete Paragraph 1-5.1.2.2 in its entirety. SUBSTANTIATION: S tandard is inconsistent . Paragraph 1-5.1.2.2 indicator impai red func t ion at 16 percent , yet 1-5.1.3 implie~ tha t levels as low as 8 pe r cen t 'O 2 are allowed. COMMITTEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: No new data to suppor t below 16 pe rcen t oxygen is acceptable.

(Log #29) 2001- 12 - (1-5.1.3): Accept in Principle SUBMrFrER: Carol Weisner, US Environmenta l Protect ion Agency COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 2001-15 RECOMMENDATION: Replace the cur ren t text, inc luding the Exception, with the following text:

"Unnecessary exposure to iner t gas agen t systems resul t ing in low oxygen a tmosphe re s shall be avoided. The r e q u i r e m e n t for pro- discharge a larms and t ime delays is i n t ended to prevent h u m a n exposure to agents . The following addi t ional provisions shall apply in order to accoun t for failure o f these safeguards:

4. Iner t gas systems des igned to concent ra t ions below 53 pe rcen t (cor responding to an oxygen concent ra t ion of 10 percent , sea level eauivalent~ shall be permit ted, given that:

- the space is normal ly occupied, and m e a n s shall be provided to l imit exposure to no longer than 3

minu tes . 5. Iner t gas systems des igned to concent ra t ions between 53 and

62 pe rcen t (cor responding to between 10 and 8 pe rcen t oxygen, s¢;~ level equivalent) shall be permit ted, given that:

- the space is normal ly unoccupied , a n d - where pe r sonne l could possibly be exposed, m e a n s shall be

provided to limit the exposure to less t han 30 seconds. 6. Iner t gas systems des igned to concent ra t ions above 62 percen t

( co r respond ing to 8 pe rcen t oxygen or below, sea level equivalent) , may only be used in unoccup i ed areas where pe r sonne l shall n o t be exposed to such oxygen deplet ion.

Refer to Section 3-6. Pressure Adjus tment . for a tmosoher ic correct ion factors." SUBSTANTIATION: EPA responds to c o m m e n t on proposal conce rn ing the lowest safe oxygen concen t ra t ion in relat ion to varying altitude.

Note: Suppor t ing material is available for review at NFPA Headquar t e r s . COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept in Principle. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: See Commi t t ee Commi t t ee Action on C o m m e n t 2001-15 (Log #CC13).

(Log #54) 2001- 13 - (1-5.1.3): Accept in Principle SUBMITTER: Joseph A. Senecal , Kidde-Fenwal, Inc. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 2001-15 RECOMMENDATION: Revise wording as follows:

"Unnecessary exposure to a tmospheres having low oxygen partial pressures developed upon discharge of an iner t gas agen t fire suppress ion system shall be avoided. The r e q u i r e m e n t of the use o f a pre-discharge a la rm and t ime delay is i n t ended to afford adequate t ime for egress of occupants f rom a pro tec ted enclosure. The following addi t ional provisions shall apply in order to account for failure o f these safeguards where the local barometr ic pressure is nominal ly one a tmosphe re (96 to 106 kPa)."

Followed by i tems 1, 2, a n d 3 of Log #27. T h e n add:

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N F P A 2001 - - F99 R O C

"Where the local barometric pressure is less than one atmosphere (less than 96 kPa) further consideration must be taken of resultant oxygen partial pressure achieved upon discharge of an inert gas suppression system. The occupancy egress time shall be in accordance with the recommendations of the U.S. EPA as advised by their Expert Panel on Inert Gas Agents." SUBSTANTIATION: The proposal to permit exposures up to three minutes to atmospheres where the oxygen concentration is as low as 10.0 Vol. % is not adequately justified. While it appears that such exposure has been deemed by a suitable expert panel to be valid for cases where the ambient pressure is one standard atmosphere (760 mm Hg = 101.3 kPa at sea level) there has been no information offered to substantiate that the proposed exposures are also safe where the ambient pressure is significantly below 760 mm Hg, say in Denver or Albuquerque where the altitude is approximately 5200 ft above sea level and the ambient pressure is approximately 615 mm Hg (82 kPa). The reason this is significant is that oxygen transfer rates and arterial blood oxygen partial pressure established by pulmonary function are regulated by the alveolar oxygen pardal pressure (not mole fraction concentration) which is typically 100 mm Hg (13 kPa) when the ambient oxygen partial pressure is 159 mm Hg (21 kPa) in dry atmospheric air. (See J.B. West, Respiratory Physiology- the essentials, Williams & Wilkins, 5th ed., esp. Ch. 5 and 6). At 10 percent oxygen at 760 mm Hg total pressure the degree of oxygen saturation of blood is at the critical point of the oxygen dissociation curve. Further reduction of oxygen partial pressure in the lung moves the degree of oxygen saturation in the blood down the steep part of the curve. All this may have been considered by the expert panel. If so, verification of such is required. If not, then the exposure times need to be reevaluated for with respect to variation in local barometric pressure. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept in Principle. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: See Committee Action and Statement on Comment 2001-15 (Log #CC13).

(Log #85) 2001- 14- (1-5.1.3): Reject SUBMITrER: Mark L. Robin, Great Lakes Chemical Corp. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 2001-15 RECOMMENDATION: Delete Report on Proposals text in its entirety and replace with current text in NFPA 2001, 1996 edition. SUBSTANTIATION: The safety of exposures to 10 percent 0 2 at ambient pressures significantly below 760 mm Hg (e.g., in Denver) has not been demonstrated. COMMITTEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: See Committee Action and Statement on Comment 2001-15 (Log #CC13).

(Log #CC13) 2001- 15 - (1-5.1.3): Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Halon Alternative Protection Options COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 2001-15 RECOMMENDATION: Revise 1-5.1.3 to read as follows:

1-5.1.3" Inert Gas Clean Agents. Unnecessary exposure to inert gas agent systems resulting in low oxygen atmospheres shall be avoided. The requirement for pre-discharge alarms and time delays is intended to prevent human exposure to agents. The following additional provisions shall apply in order to account for failure of these safeguards:

1. Inert gas systems designed to concentrations below 43 percent (corresponding to an oxygen concentration of 12 percent, sea level equivalent of oxygen) shall be permitted given that:

- the space is normally occupied, and - means shall be provided to limit exposure to no longer than 5

minutes.

2. Inert gas systems designed to concentrations between 43 and 52 percent (corresponding to between 12 and 10 percent oxygen, sea level equivalent of oxygen) shall be permitted, given that:

- the space is normally occupied, and - means shall be provided to limit exposure to no longer than 3

minutes. 3. Inert gas systems designed to concentrations between 52 and

62 (corresponding to between 10 and 8 percent oxygen, sea level equivalent of oxygen) shall be permitted given that:

- the space is normally unoccupied, and - where personnel could possibly be exposed, means shall be

provided to limit the exposure to less than 30 seconds. 4. Inert gas systems designed to concentration above 62 percent

(corresponding to 8 percent oxygen or below, sea level equivalent of oxygen) may only be used in unoccupied areas where personnel shall not be exposed to such oxygen depletion.

Refer to Section 3-6, Pressure Adjustment, for atmospheric correction factors. SUBSTANTIATION: Final recommendation of the EPA expert panel on the physiological effects of inert gas alternative fire protection agents causing hypoxic atmospheres.

"Inert gas systems may be designed to an oxygen level of 10 percent, if employees can egress the area within three minutes, but may be designed only to the 12 percent oxygen level, if it takes longer than three minutes to egress the area.

If the possibility exists for the oxygen level to drop below 8 percent, employees must be evacuated prior to such oxygen depletion.

A design concentration of 8 - 10 percent may only be used in normally unoccupied areas, as long as any employee who could possible be exposed can egress within 30 seconds. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log #67) 2001- 16- (Table 2-1.2(b)): Accept SUBM/TTER: Robert E. Tapscott, NMERI COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 2001-1 RECOMMENDATION: Revise text in Table 2-1.2(b) as follows:

IG-01 IG-100 N 2 minimum 99.9% Ar minimum 99.9%

SUBSTANTIATION: These may contain 99.9% or more active agent. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log #CC8) 2001- 17- (Table 2-2.1.1(a)): Accept SUBMrrTER: Technical Committee on Halon Alternative Protection Options COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 2001-22 RECOMMENDATION: Change the information for IG-100 of Table 2-2.1 (a) to read as shown below: SUBSTANTIATION: Table 2-2.1.1(a) does not currendy address IG-100. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log #68) 2001- 18- (Table 2-2.1.1): Accept SUBMITrER: Robert E. Tapscott, NMERI COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 2001-1 RECOMMENDATION: Editorially c~aange pressure expressed in kPa to correct valves as needed. "" SUBSTANTIATION: Many of the converted pressures are incorrect. For example, 2371 psig = 16,347 kPa not 16,341 kPa. 1 psig = 6.894757 kPa. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

IG-100 Table 2-2.1.I(a) Minimum Desi~

2404 t~si~ ¢16.586kPa)

3236nsi~ t22.31 ikIral

Working Pressure for Inert Gas Clean A~ent Sy 2799osi¢ 2404usi¢

~19.3O6~a) (16.58bkffal 3773nsiu 3236nsi~

(26.014kPa) (22.311 kPa)

tern Piping 1000usi~

¢ts95~ff~ lO00Dsi~

(6,895kPa)

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N F P A 2 0 0 1 ~ F 9 9 R O C

(Log #69) 2001- 19 - (Table 2-2.1.1): Accept SUBMITTER: Robert E. Tapscott, NMERI COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 2001-1 RECOMMENDATION: Correct conversions to kPa. Some are very far off. For example, 2650 psig is 18,271 kPa not 18,972 kPa. SUBSTANTIATION: Editorial. Conversion factor is 1 psig = 6.894757 kP~. COMMITTEE ACTION: ~_ccept.

(Log #61) 2001- 20 - (Table 2-2.1.1(a)): Accept SUBMITTER: Nobuo Yamada, Koatsu Co. Ltd. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 2001-23 RECOMMENDATION: Change the underlined information for IG-100 of Table 2-2.1.1 for internal pressure used for calculations as shown belo~.

(Log #23) 2001- 22 - (Table 2-2.1.1(b)): Accept SUBMITTER: Lorne MacGregor, North American Fire Guardian Technology, Inc. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 2001-23 RECOMMENDATION: Add the following data for HCFC Blend A to Table 2-2.1.1(b)

p~gent Container Maximum Fill Density 56.2 Ib/ft 3 ent Container Charging Pressure at 70°F 600 psig

A~ent Container Pressure at 130°F 850 psig nimum Piping Pressure at 70°F 680 psig

SUBSTANTIATION: This data extends the data for HCFC Blend A for 600 psig systems. The first three data items are derived from the isometric diagram already accepted. The "Minimum Piping Design Pressure" is calculated to be slightly in excess of 0.8 times the "Agent Container Pressure at 130°F (55°C). COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

Table 2-2.1.1 Internal Pressures Used for Calculations Normal Charging Pressure Internal Pressure @ 130°F (55°C)

IG4)l charged to 2371 psig (16,341 kPa)

IG-100 chaNed to 3236 psig (22.311 kPa)

IG-100 char~ed to 2404 psi[{ (16,580 kPa)

Piping upstream of pressure reducer 2650 psig (18,972 kPa)

3773 psig (26.014 kPa)

2799 psig (19,300 kPa) I

Piping downstream ofpressure reducer 975 psig (6723 kPa)

1000 psig (6.895 kPa}

1000 psi[{ (6,895 kPa)

SUBSTANTIATION: Put 1G-100(240) in the place of IG-100(150). The Storage Container Characteristics are specified by Koatsu

Co., Ltd. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log #5) 2001- 21 - (Table 2-2.1.1(b)): Accept SUBMITTER: Charles F Willms, Fire Suppression Systems Assn. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 2001-23 RECOMMENDATION: Revise data in Table 2-2.1.1 (b) as shown below, dated September 25, 1998.

(Log #86) 2001- 23- (Table 2-2.1.1(b)): Accept SUBMITTER: Mark L. Robin, Great Lakes Chemical Corp. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 2001-23 RECOMMENDATION: Change "super pressurized" to superpressurized" (one word).

SUBSTANTIATION: Editorial. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

Table 2-2.1.1(b) Minimum Design Working Pressure for Haloearbon Clean Ap[ent S~stem Piping Agent Agent Container

Maximum Fill Density 62 lb/fP

HFG-227ea 72 lb/fP 72 lb/ft"

FG-3-1-10 80 lb/ft" HCFC Blend A 56.2 lb/ft 5

54 lb / fe HFC-23 49 Ib/fP

74 lb / fe 74 lb/fP 54 lb/fP 56 lb/fP 74 lb/ft ~ 75. Ib/fP 74~ Ib/ft ~

* Super pressurized with Nitrogen ** Not super pressurized with Nitrogen.

H C ~ 1 2 4 HCFC-124 HFC-125 HFC-125 HFC-236fa HFC-236fa HFC-236fa

Agent Container Agent Container Charging Pressure at Pressure at

70°17 (21°C) I$0°F (55°C) 150 Pill [* 247 psi~ g60 psi I ,* 520 psig 600 psi,. [* 1,025 psilg 360 psi~* 450 psi[{ 360 psis* 540 psi[{ ~ " 2.182 osi~

__ 354 psig 580 nsi~ 615 osi~

1045 osi~ 360 osi~ 600 nsi~

1100 osi~

Minimum Piping Designpressure at

70°F (2I°C) 198 psil~ 416 psig 820 psi~ 360 psi~ 432 psi~g

1.412 psig

464 nsi~ • v

492 nsig 836 Dsi~ 280 osi~ 480 nsi~ 880 osiff

SUBSTANTIATION: "Ihe revisions are editorial changes that were submitted, discussed, and accepted by the full Technical Committee, March 11-13, 1998 Report on Proposals meeting. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

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(Log #4) 2001- 24 - (2-2.1.1(c)): Accept SUBMITTER: Claarles F. Willms, Fire Suppression Systems Assn. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 2001-23

I RECOMMENDATION: Delete wordingas follows: ( c ) , ~ F o r h~oca =ar2on claean agents usewTable 2t~2.]1.1 (b )~ r~c~I faa

SUBSTANTIATION: Changes are editorial. When the "Exception" to 2-2.1.1 (c) was deleted, a portion of the text that formed part of the "Exception" was inadvertendy left in. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log #31) 2001- 25 - (3-4.1 and 3-4.2): Accept in Principle in Part SUBMITrER: William L. Grosshandler, NatT Institute of Standards and Technology COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 2001-1 RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read:

3-4.1.2~ The flame extinguishing concentration for Class A fuels shall be determined by test as part of a listing program. $ A,.!.~* As a minimum, the listing program shall conform to UL 1058, Standard for Halogenated Extinguishing System Units, and UL

~ re.ce~ure cnti~e~ Fire Extinguishment/Area Coverage Fire Test rocedure for Engineered and pre-Engineered Clean Agent

Extinguishing System Units, or its equivalent. 3-4.1.3 The inerting concentration shall be determined by test. Note that appendix material in the 1996 edition numbered

A-3-4.2.2.3 needs to be renumbered to A-3-4.1.2 to reflect above numbering changes.

3-4.2.2.2* The minimum design concentration for a Class A surface fire hazard shall be as determined in 3-4.1.2 but shall not be less than the extinguishing concentration as determined in

SUBSTANTIATION: Two paragraphs have been combined into one since they both deal with the same topic (Class A fuels). A specific liquid fuel (in this case, heptane) must be listed to know the correct minimum design concentration. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept in Principle in Part.

Revise text to read: 3-4.1.2~ The flame extinguishing concentration for Class A fuels

shall be determined by test as part of a listing program. ~ !.1.~* As a minimum the listing program shall conform to UL 2166, Standard for Halocarbon Clean Agent Extinguishing System Units or UL 2127, Standard for Inert Gas Clean Agent Extinguishing System Units, or equivalent.

3-4.1.3 The inerting concentration shall be determined by test. Note that appendix material in the 1996 edition numbered

A-3-4.2.2.3 needs to be renumbered to A-3-4.1.2 to reflect above numbering changes. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: No substantiation provided to relate Class A to Class B fires.

(Log #CC5) 2001- 26 - (3-4.1.1, 3-4.1.2, 3-4.1.4, 3-5.1, 8-5.2, 3-5.4 and 3-6): Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Halon Alternative Protection Options COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 2001-1

] RECOMMENDATION: Add flow chart-to read as follows: Flow chart for determination of the agent final design quantity.

1. Determine hazard features: • Fuel type

Extinguishing Conc. (EC) per Sec. 34.1.1 or 3-4.1.2, or Inerting Cone. (IC) per Sec. 3-4.1.4 • Enclosure volume • Enclosure temperature * Enclosure barometric pressuire

$ 2. Determine the agent minimum design concentration (MDC) by:

I • Multiply by the safety factor(SF) • MDC = (EC or IC) SF

$ 3. Determine the agent minimum design quantity (MDQ): ] • Halocarbons per Sec. 3-5.1 I • Inert Gases per Sec. 3-5.2

$ 4. Determine whether designs factors (DF) apply. See [ 3-5.3. Detrmine individual DF(i)s and sum them: I • DF = ]~ DF(i)

$ 5. Determine the agent adjusted minimum design quantity [ AMDQ) by: I AMDO_= = MDO= (1 + DF)

$ 6. Determine the pressure correction factor(PCF) per Sec. | 3-5.3.3 I

$ 7. Determine the final design quantity (FDQ) as: • FDQ = AMDQ × PCF

SUBSTANTIATION: Clarification. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log #87) 2001- 27- (3-4.1.1): Accept SUBMITrER= Mark L. Robin, Great Lakes Chemical Corp. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 2001-1 RECOMMENDATION: Add to 3-4.1.1 "described in Appendix B'. SUBSTANTIATION: The cup burner standard method is designated in Appendix B. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log #88) 2001- 28 - (3-4.1.3, 3-4.2.2.4): Accept in Principle SUBMITTER: Mark L. Robin, Great Lakes Chemical Corp. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 2001-1, 2001-33 RECOMMENDATION: Change to:

"As a minimum, the listing program shall conform to UL 2166, Standard for Halocarbon Clean Agent Extinguishin~ System Units or UL 2127, Standard for Inert Gas Clean Agent Exunguishing System Units, or equivalent." SUBSTANTIATION: UL 1058 applies to old halon agents. Current listing programs in the U.S. will be based on UL 2127 and UL 2166. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept in Principle. COMMITrEE STATEMENT: See Committee Action and Statement on Comment 2001-25 (Log #31).

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(Log #CCA) 2001- 29 - (3-4.2.1.2 Adjusted minimum, design quanti~, Agent concentration, Design factor, Final Design quantity, Minimum design quantity, Safety factor, 34.2.2.1, 3-4.2.2.2, and 3-5.4): Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Halon Alternative Protection Options COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 2001-30 RECOMMENDATION: Add definitions to read as follows;

Adjusted minimum desigm quantity (AMDQ). The adjusted minimum design quantity is the minimum design quantity of agent which has been adjusted in consideration of design factors.

Agent concentration. Agent concentration, as used in this standard, is the portion of agent in an agent-air mixture expressed in volume percent.

Design factor (DF). A design factor is a fraction of the agent minimum design quantity (MDQ) added thereto deemed appropriate due to a specR'ic feature of the protection application or design of the suppressions system.

Final Design quantity (FDQ). The design quantity is that quantity of agent determined from the agent minimum design quantity as adjusted to account for design factors and pressure adjustlTlent.

Minimum design quantity (MDQ). The minimum design quantity is that quantity of agent required to achieve the minimum design concentration as calculated using the method in 3-5.1 or 3-5.2, as appropriate.

Safety factor (SF). The safety factor is a multiplier of the agent flame extinguishing or inerting concentration to determine the agent minimum design concentration.

54.2.1.2 Minimum design concentration for inerting. The minimum design concentration used to inert the atmosphere of an enclosure where the hazard is a flammable liquid or gas shall be the inerting concentration times a safety factor of 1.1.

3-4.2.2.1 Minimum design concentration, Class B hazard or an only manually actuated system. The minimum design concentration for a Class B hazard or an only manually actuated system shall be the extinguishing concentration, as determined in 54.1.1, times a safety factor of 1.3.

3-4.2.2.2 Minimum design concentration, Class A hazard. The minimum design concentration for a Class A surface fire hazard shall be the extinguishing concentration, as determined in 3-4.1.1, times a safety factory of 1.2.

3-5.4 Design Factors. Renumber material as adopted by the committee as 3-5.3. SUBSTANTIATION: Added definitions for terms used in the standard. Clarification. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log #33) 2001- 30 - (3-4.2.2.1): Aczept in Principle SUBMITrER: William L. Grosshandler, Nat'l. Institute of Standards and Technology COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 2001-32 RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read:

"3-4.2.2.1 The minimum design concentration for a Class B fuel hazard shall be the extinguishing concentration, as determined in

~.!.2 3-4.1.1. times 1.2 (this adds a 20 percent safety factor). Where mixtures or blends...". SUBSTANTIATION: Editorial correction. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept in Principle.

Revise 5-4.2.2.1 to read as follows: 54.2.2.1 Minimum design concentration, Class B hazard or an

only manually actuated system. The minimum design concentration for a Class B hazard or an only manually actuated system shall be the extinguishing concentration, as determined in 3-4.1.1, times a safety factor of 1.3. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: A Class "B" fire is a more demanding fire than a Class "A" fire and necessitates a higher safety factor. Systems that are manually actuated only could allow for a delayed actuation compared to automatic actuation and therefore the higher safety factor would compensate for the longer preburn.

(Log #89) 2001- 31 - (3-4.2.2.1): Accept in Principle SUBMITTER: Mark L. Robin, Great Lakes Chemical Corp. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 2001-28 RECOMMENDATION: Replace "3-4.1.2" with "3-4.1.1". Also renumber Section as 3-4.2.1.3. SUBSTANTIATION: 3-4.2.1 describes Class B requirements; the

in 3-4.1.1. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept in Principle. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: See Committee Action and Statement on Comment 2001-30 (Log #33).

(Log #91) 2001- 32 - (54.2.2.1): Accept in Principle SUBMITTER: Mark L. Robin, Great Lakes Chemical Corp. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 2001-32 RECOMMENDATION: Change "3-4.1.2" to "3-4.1.1". SUBSTANTIATION: Editorial. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept in Principle. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: See Committee Action and Statement on Comment 2001-30 (Log #33).

(Log #32) 2001- 33 - (54.2.2.1 and 54.2.2.2): Accept in Principle SUBMITrER: William L. Grosshandler, Nat'l. Institute of Standards and Technology COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 2001-28 RECOMMENDATION: Delete text referring to 5-4.2.2.1 and 3-4.2.2.2. SUBSTANTIATION: Changes to the subject paragraphs are handled in 2001-1 and 2001-32. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept in Principle. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: See Committee Action and Statement on Comment 2001-30 (Log #33).

(Log #62) 2001- 34 - (3-4.2.2.1 and 3-4.2.2.2): Reject SUBMITTER: Christopher P. Hanauska, Hughes Associates, Inc. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 2001-28 RECOMMENDATION: Change the safety factor for Class B hazards and Class A hazards to 1.3.

3-4.2.2.1 Minimum design concentration, Class B hazard. The minimum design concentration for a Class B fuel hazard shall be the extinguishing concentration, as determined in 3-4.1.2, times a safety factor of ~ 1.3.

3-4.2.2.2 Minimum design concena-ation, Class ~rA hazard. The minimum design concentration for a Class A surface fire hazard shall be the extinguishing concentration, as determined in 3-4.1.1, times a safety factor of 1--.-_2r 1.3.

Also add the following paragraph to appendix material for both A-3-4.2.2 and A-3-4.2.2.2:

"The increase in the safety factor from 20 percent to 30 percent since the 1996 edition of the standard does not apply for existing systems. The increase in the safety factor for new systems is intended to increase the reliability of performance (complete extinguishment of the fire) of the new systems. Analysis performed since the previous edition indicates that increased reliability is possible with the higher safety factor. This does not imply that any particular system designed with a 20 percent safety factor will not function properly." SUBSTANTIATION: The problems that would be addressed by adopting this comment include the following:

1. The proposed revisions to the document include the requirement to explicitly address design factors. In general, these design factors cannot be quantified and the values must be decided upon subjectively. While, good practice may still require examination of the issues associated with the design factors, the need to quandfy them and add more agent for the design is greatly reduced.

2. Analysis carried out by the VDS indicates that system reliability can be positively impacted by an increase in the safety factor above 20 percent. However, this effect becomes negligible above safety factors of 35 to 40 percent. The ISO is adopting a minimum safety factor of 30 percent, in part due to this analysis.

3. Significant debate and discussion have occurred concerning the setting of the extinguishment concentrations. Test methods

587

N F P A 2 0 0 1 ~ F 9 9 R O C

have been developed and refined. While the new test me thods provide an increased degree of certainty in establishing ex t inguish ing concentrat ions , they do no t accoun t for every possible fuel type, conf igurat ion, or possible reignit ion source. An increase in the safety factor would make the effectiveness of the ul t imate des ign concent ra t ion less sensitive to the m e t h o d of establishing the ex t inguish ing concent ra t ion . COMMITTEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Field exper ience indicates tha t the 20 pe rcen t safety factor for Class A fuels is appropria te . See Commi t t ee Action on C o m m e n t 2001-$0 (Log #53) for Class B fuels.

(Log #90) 2001- 55 - (5-4.2.2.2): Accept SUBMITTER: Mark L. Robin , Great Lakes Chemical Corp. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 2001-28

I RECOMMENI}ATION: Replace "Class B" with "Class A". Replace "3-4.1.1" with "3-4.1.2". Also r e n u m b e r Section as 3-4.2.1.4. S U B S T A N T I A T I O N : Technica l correctness. COMMI'I~I'EE ACTION: Accept.

(Log #92) 2001- 36 - (3-4.2.2.2): Accept SUBMITTER: Mark L. Robin , Grea t Lakes Chemical Corp. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 2001-1

] RECOMMENDATION: Replace "3-4.1.1" with "3-4.1.2". S U B S T A N T I A T I O N : Editorial for technical correctness. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log #104) 2001- 3 7 - (3-4.2.2.3): Reject SUBMITTER: Rober t L. Langer , Ansul Inc. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 2001-33 RECOMMENDATION: Delete the p roposed pa rag raph 3-4.2.2.3:

S U B S T A N T I A T I O N : T h e r e is no establ ished s t andard test

~ rocedure for energized electrical equ ipment . Data submi t t ed is ased on one specific test p rocedure ; o ther tests us ing di f ferent

test p rocedures have shown different results. This material does no t be long in the body of the s tandard unti l an acceptable test p rocedure is established. COMMITTEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Delet ion would provide no m i n i m u m criteria for Class C hazards.

(Log #34) 2001- 38 - (3-4.2.2.4, A-3-4.2.2.3, Tables A-3-4.2.2.3(a) a n d (b)): Accept in Principle S U B M I T r E R : William L. Grosshandle r , Nat'l. Insti tute of S tandards a n d Techno logy COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 2001-33 RECOMMENDATION: Delete pa ragraph 3-4.2.2.4*.

Revise text to read: "A-3-4.2.2.3 Energized electrical e q u i p m e n t that migh t provide...

to de te rmine the quanti t ies. . . . . . . . . . . . . ,1[" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . l

T ¢ f h n i q u c s for ewaluating the impac t of a con t inuous source of electrical energy on the a m o u n t of-clean agen t necessary to extinLruish a fire a n d nreven t reflash are be ing investigated by several laboratories. I~ut s tandardized tests have not vet been established. Examnles of m e t h o d s develoned to s imulate over- currents arid hea t ing a long an electrical conduc tor ~l'e ~ v e n in a repor t bv Hughes A~ssociates Inc.. Balt imore. MD (Ex t ingu i shmen t T¢,I~ of Cont inuous ly Energized Class C Fires Using HFt~-227ea. ), and are briefly descr ibed he re . "

"The first tesL., following discharge to check for refiash (r.~r.z

agent , "..~.c fc l lc : ; 'ng rc=ultz ;;'cre rcpor tcd." Delete Tables A-$-4.2.2.$(a) a n d (b). "In the second test method. . , thereaf ter to check reflash t . . . .

. . . . . I- . . . . . "~ !n " HFC 227ca z.: "..~c c::tSmgu!z~'=g

S~-IBS'TSMT~I:I?-~TIS~I~'q~e materialVi'n'~/.2.2.4 is covered in 3-4.2.2.2 as modif ied in c o m m e n t regard ing 2001-1.

The fatal flaw in A-$-4.2.2.$ is the inclus ion of test results tha t have no t u n d e r g o n e peer review. NFPA shou ld no t pu t itself in the posi t ion o f inc lud ing unsubs tan t i a t ed da ta for a test m e t h o d that is still be ing developed. (Compare this act ion to the care tha t has gone into the cup bu rne r table.) Data f r om other studies indicate that substantially more agen t may be requ i red when an electrical energy source is present , contrary to the da ta in the table. If data are p resen ted for a specific agent , however, the des igner or author i ty having jur isdic t ion may be t e m p t e d to use the n u m b e r s as gospel. The 4alue of the append ix is to give the reader a start ing poin t f rom which addit ional tests m i g h t be conducted . Th e revised text still does this. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept in Principle.

Revise text to read as follows: A-3-4.2.2.3 Examples of m e t h o d s developed to s imulate over-

cur rents and hea t ing a long an electrical conduc to r are conta ined in two reports one by H u g h e s Associates Inc., Balt imore, MD as follows:

The first test. des igned to reolicate an overcurrent event, is called the "Ohmic Heat ing" test. In this test. a l eng th of nower c~ble was overloaded electrically by connec t ion to an arc wel~ler, restjItin¢ in internal over-heating of the cable which leads to pyrolysis of the insulat ion material. A small nilot f lame was applied to the Salople after the conductors were hea ted and smoke was issuing f rom the cen te r of the cable. A shor t o r e - b u m was allowed to reach a fully develoned fire. and t hen the clean agen t was discharged. Current was appl ied t h r o u g h o u t the discharge, and Cglatinueg[ fOr anoroxJmatelv I0 minu te s following discharge to check for reflash (none was observed). In tests us ing HFC-227ea as the ex t inguish ing agent, the following results were r¢ported;

In the second test me thod , called the "Conductive Heat ing" test. the lower 4 in. (101 m m ) of a 10.25 in. (260 m m ) long samole of 350 m c m d iamete r nower cable was c lamped vertically-inside a ril][ heater , ensu r ing f i rm contact between the inside of the hea te r an d the coot)er conductor . The hea te r was set to 890°C. a n d the samnle was heated until the t emnera tu re at the ton of the sample, reached 310°C. The samole_ was then igni ted by a small pilot flame, and the ensu ing fire was allowed to fully develop befgre agen t discharge. The hea te r was enert, ized t h r o u g h o u t the discharge, and for l0 minu te s thereaf ter to check for refla.~h (none was observed). In tests usin~ HFC-227ea as the ex t inguish ing agent, the followin~ results were I-eportcd:

588

N F P A 2 0 0 1 ~ F 9 9 R O C

Table A-3-7.1 Ohmic Heating Suppression Test Results

Current Number Concentration of Tests (see note~

8 awg. Cross-Linked Polyethylene. arranged in a horizontal bundle of 5 cables with only the center cable p9wered.

350 A 4 5.8% HFC-227ea i 5.0% HFC-227ea

Yes Yes

i~wg. Cross-Linked Polyethylene cable, arranged in a vertical bundle of 5 cables with only the center cable pQwered.

350 A 4 ~,8% HFG-227ea i 5.0% HFC-227ea

Yes Yes

12 awg. S ITW-A. 3 conf[uctors per cable, arranged in a horizontal bundle (~[ ~i cables with 4 of the 18 conductors powered.

3 5.8% HFC-227ea 2 5.5% HFC-227ea i 5.0% HFC-227ea

8 awg. PVC cable, arranged in a 325 A _3 5.8% HFG-227ea

Yes Yes Yes

Yes horizontal bundle of 7 cables with the ceriter cable powered.

18 awg. 3 conductors per cable. polyethylene insulation on conductors. with chrome PVC jacket ~round twisted conductors. 4 cable horizontal bundle, with 12 conductors powered.

29 A 4 5.8% HFG-227ea y ~ - In one test the gas did not completely

extinguish the fire.

]§ awg. 12 conductors per cable. rl¢oprede over rubber insulation, single horizontal cable. 9 conductors Dowered.

56 A _3 5.8% HFC-227ea

1.~ awg. polyethylene insulated coaxial ¢~ble with the outerjacket and braided conductor removed (i.e.. center core of the coaxial cable onlvL arranged in a horizontal bundle of 4 cables, all 4 conductors powered. (Note: in this series. the polyethvl(rie insulation melted and formed a pool fire. A tray was installed under the wire bundle so that the glowing wires were in contact with the molten pool of polyethylene.)

J. 5.7% HFC-227ea No i 5.8% HFC-227ea No 2 6.5% HFC-227ea No 4 6.8% HFC-227ea Yes _3 7.2% HFC-227ea Yes

Note: In all cases wllere tile fire was extinguished, the time to extinguishment from beginning of agent discharge was between 3 arld 15 seconds.

Table A-3-7.1 Conductive Heating Suppression Test Results

Sample Number of Concentration ~ L l J f l g 3 ~ B ~ Average Time to Tests Extin~u ishment

350 mcm copper cable, i 5.2% HFC-227ea Yes 20 seg, l-I.vp_ alon insulation with 2 5.8% HFC-227ea Ye_.__~s 1.1 sec. cotton braid sheathing and i 5.~% HFC-227ea Ye_...ss 7 sec. saturant. 2 6,0% ]-IFG-227ea Yes 10 sec. (Lucent KS-5482L 350 mcm copper cable. 3 5.8% HFC-227ea Yes 9 sec.

i Hypalon insulation. 1 5.9% HFC-227ea Yes 11 see. ~ ) 9 2 1 1 6.0% HFC-227ea Yes 10 sec.

589

N F P A 2 0 0 1 m F 9 9 R O C

A n d a s econd repor t by Modula r Protect ion Corpora t ion (update on the evaluation of selected NFPA agents for suppress ing Class "C" energized fires).

The obiective o f the tests conduc ted bv Modular Protect ion Coroora t ion was to investigate the effectiveness of new clean a~ents to extinmaish Class "C" energized fire o f nolvmeric materials imaited by hea t flux. Snecific tests were conduc ted to de t e rmine the -

fo l lowing: M i n i m u m a~en t concen t ra t ion reou i red to ext inguish (~l~S~ "C; energized fires a n d m i n i m u m a~ent concen t ra t ion reoui red to n reven t ref lash/ re i~ai t ion .

"(he clean a~en t s selected f o r t e s t i n ~ were: FC-2-1.8 (3ML FG-3-1- l0 (3M). HF(~-23 IDuPont ) . HFC-227ea (Great Lakes) . a n d HFC- 236fa (DuPont) .

T h e criteria used for conduc t in~ tests on the above clean a~ents were:

Pre-burn 60 S e c o n ~ Discharge t ime _<10 Seconds Flame ex t i n t mi shmen t <30 Seconds N9 reflash/rei_maition >-10 Seconds

Each c lean agen t was tested for: m i n i m u m concent ra t ion reou i red for f lame e x t i n g u i s h m e n t and m i n i m u m concent ra t ion reoui red to n reven t reflash/reit- ,ait ion for a oer iod un to ten minu te s after ~lame extintrulsl~ment. T h e test-nrotocol used to conduc t the clean agen t tests are disnlaved belo~.

(Log #94) 2001- 39 - (5-5.1): Accept in Principle SUBMITTER: Mark L. Robin , Great Lakes Chemical Corp. C O M M E N T ON PROPOSAL NO: 2001-34 R E C O M M E N D A T I O N : Revise def ini t ion o f S to:

"S = specific vo lume of the supe rhea t ed vapor at 1 arm an d the t empera tu re T, i b / f t 3 ( l g / m $ ) ". S U B S T A N T I A T I O N : Technica l correctness. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept in Principle.

Revise defini t ion of S to: "S = specific vo lume of the supe rhea t ed a g e n t vapor at 1 a tm and

the t empera tu re T, f t 3 / l b (mO/kg) ". COMMI 'VrEE STATEMENT: Editorial.

(Log #93) 2001- 40 - (3-5.1 and Table 3-5.1(a)): Accept SLIBMITTER: Mark L. Robin , Great Lakes Chemical Corp. C O M M E N T ON PROPOSAL NO: 2001-1 R E C O M M E N D A T I O N : Delete equat ion (2), s - k 1 + k 2 T, a n d move to notes to the individual total f looding tables, a n d delete defini t ions of K, a n d K 2 a n d move to f lood tables. Also, delete Table 3-5.1(a) a n d move in format ion to f lood tables. S U B S T A N T I A T I O N : Equa t ion (2) is a fit o f specific vo lume data inc luded in the f lood tables a n d hence is an es t imat ion. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept .

Fuel Sample /Wi~ Confil~mration 4-in. Ion~, 24-gauge, n i c h r o m e wire inser ted m cen te r of PMMA block (3 in. x 1 in. x 5 / 8 in.)

12-in. long, 20-gauge, n i c h r o m e wire wrapped a r o u n d PMMA block (3 in. x 2 in. x 1 / 4 in.)

Test Protocol Table A-3-4.2.2.3(a)

Energy (W) A~ent Tests Conducted 4 8 FC-2-1-8 10

FC-3-1-10 8 HFC-23 7 HFC-227ea 7 HFC-236fa 13

192 FC-2-1-8 6 FG-3-1-10 12 HFC-23 5 HFG-227ea 7 HFC-236fa 8

The results o f the clean agen t tests to de t e rmine concent ra t ions reoui red to extintruish and to orevent re f lash/ re i~ni t ion at energy lgvels o f 48 watts and 192 watts are disnlaved below:

Table A-3-4.2.2.3(b)

Prevent Energy Ext inguish Ref l a sh /Re ign i t ion Level (rain. cone. , (rain. cone. ,

Ah~nt (W) % b~' vol.) % b~' vol.) FC-2-1-8 48 7.0 7.5

192 9.0 12.0 FC-3-1-10 48 5.5 8.0

192 6.5 9.5 HFC-23 48 13.0 16.0

192 14.0 20.0 HFC-227ea 48 6.5 8.0

192 8.0 9.0 HFG-236fa 48 6.3 6.5

192 6.5 9.0

Each clean agen t was tested for: M i n i m u m concent ra t ion requ i red for f lame e x t i n g u i s h m e n t a n d m i n i m u m concent ra t ion requ i red to prevent re f l ash / re ign i t ion for a per iod up to ten minu te s after f lame ex t ingu i shment . T he results o f tests conduc ted

a t energy levels of 48 watts and 192 watts are discussed. Each clean agen t was tested for: M i n i m u m concent ra t ion requ i red for f lame e x t i n g u i s h m e n t a n d m i n i m u m concent ra t ion requ i red to prevent re f l ash / re ign i t ion for a per iod up to ten mi nu t e s after f lame ex t ingu i shment . T h e results of tests conduc ted at energy levels of 48 watts a n d 192 watts are discussed. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: T he two re fe renced reports provide the best available in format ion for fires involving a con t inuous source of electrical energy.

COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Addit ionally editorially correct the K 2 value (°F) for IG-54 to read 0.02143. Also, the equat ion in i tem 4 o f Table 3-5.1(r) shou ld read s=9.8579 + 0.02143t.

(Log #100) 2001- 41 - (Table 3-5.1(aa)): Accept SUBMITTER: Mark L. Robin, Great Lakes Chemical Corp. C O M M E N T ON PROPOSAL NO: 2001-39

] R E C O M M E N D A T I O N : Delete first row for -40°E S U B S T A N T I A T I O N : Boil ing po in t of FC-21e is -34°F, below this T there is no supe rhea t ed vapor at 1 a tom a n d hen ce there is no S value; technical correctness. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept .

(Log #95) 2001-42 - (Tables 3-5.1(b)-(bb)): Accept SUBMITTER: Mark L. Robin, Great Lakes Chemical Corp. C O M M E N T ON PROPOSAL NO: 2001-1 R E C O M M E N D A T I O N : Change defini t ion of S to Specific volume of supe rhea t ed agen t vapor at one a tmosphe re and t empera tu re L S U B S T A N T I A T I O N : Technica l correctness. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept .

(Log #101) 2001- 43 - (Table 3-5.1 (bb)) : Accept SUBMI'VI'ER: Mark L. Robin, Great Lakes Chemical Corp. C O M M E N T ON PROPOSAL NO: 2001-39

] R E C O M M E N D A T I O N : Delete row for t = -40°C. S U B S T A N T I A T I O N : S unde f ined below be of material. Technica l correctness. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

590

N F P A 2 0 0 1 D F 9 9 R O C

(Log #21) 2001- 44 - (Table 3-5.1(e) Note 2): Accept SUBMITTER: Lorne MacGregor, North American Fire Guardian Technology, Inc. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 2001-39

I RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read: "Kilograms required per cubic f~.v.e.~t meter to produce indicated

c~=c concentration." SUBSTANTIATION: Editorial, this corrects obvious editorial errors. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

3. There is no large scale test data to support this proposal. 4. This proposal should not be in the standard since there is no

data supplied for inert gas systems. 5. The minimum 20 percent safety factor, added to the

extinguishing concentration, has demonstrated that it is,sufficient to compensate for minor statistical variations. COMMITTEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The Committee believes that there is data substantial full scale tests to substantiate the validity of the design factors in Table 3-5.3.2.

(Log #96) 2001- 45 - (Table 3-5.1(o) ): Accept SUBMITTER: Mark L. Robin, Great Lakes Chemical Corp. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 2001-43

I RECOMMENDATION: Change "kg/cu m" to "kg/m 3". SUBSTANTIATION: Editorial. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log #97) 2001- 46 - (Table 3-5.1(r)): Accept SUBMITTER: Mark L. Robin, Great Lakes Chemical Corp. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 2001-46

I RECOMMENDATION: Change '~X (ft3/ft3)" to Wagent/Venclosure ". SUBSTANTIATION: Consistency with other Tables (editorial). COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log #98) 2001- 47 - (Table 3-5.1(u) ): Accept SUBMITTER: Mark L. Robin, Great Lakes Chemical Corp. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 2001-1

[ RECOMMENDATION: In Note 2, change "kg/m" to "kg/m 3". SUBSTANTIATION: Editorial. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log #99) 2001- 48- (Table 3-5.1(z)): Accept SUBMI'Iq'EP¢ Mark L. Robin, Great Lakes Chemical Corp. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 2001-35

I RECOMMENDATION: Delete Table 3-5.1(z) in its entirety, place information in individual flood tables. SUBSTANTIATION: Editorial. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log #102) 2001- 49- (3-5.2): Accept SUBMITTER: Mark L. Robin, Great Lakes Chemical Corp. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 2001-1 RECOMMENDATION: Delete definitions of k, and K2, move to flood tables. Change S to read "Specific volume of inert gas at 1 atmosphere and temperature T, lft 3/Ib (m 3/kg) ' . SUBSTANTIATION: Technical correctness. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log #7) 2001- 50 - (3-5.3 and A-3-5.3.2): Reject SUBMITTER: Charles F. Willms, Fire Suppression Systems Assn. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 2001-51 RECOMMENDATION: 1. Delete proposal 2001-51 (Log #CP28) in its entirety.

2. Revert back to the text in the 1996 edition for 3-5.3. SUBSTANTIATION: 1. There are no field reports or data, on actual installed systems, indicating that a real world problem exists with agent distribution.

2. The proposal is a theoretical statistical analysis based on limited data acquired during approval tests conducted on some halocarbon systems.

(Log #106) 2001- 51 - (3-5.3.2): Reject SUBMITTER: Robert L. I_anger, Ansul Inc. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 2001-51 RECOMMENDATION: Delete the proposed Section 3-5.3.2*, Multiple Tee Design Factors, along with Appendix material A-3-5.3.2 in its entirety. SUBSTANTIATION: Testing for agency listing/approval as well as many full discharge tests of multi-nozzle multi-room systems has not shown this to be a problem. A statistical analysis without substantial test data should not be the basis to require an increase in agent quantity. COMMITTEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The Committee believes that there is data.

(Log #CC2) 2001- 52 - (3-5.3.2, A-3-5.3.2.1, A-3-5.3.1, and A-3-5.3.3): Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Halon Alternative Protection Options COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 2001-51

I RECOMMENDATION: 1. Revise 3-5.3.2 to read as follows: 3-5.3.2 Tee Design Factor. Where a single agent supply is used to

protect multiple hazards, a design factor from Table 3-5.3.2 shall be applied.

3-5.3.2.1 For the application of Table 3-5.3.2, the design factor tee count shall be determined for each hazard the system protects as follows:

1. starting from thepoin t where the pipe system enters the hazard, the number of tees in the flow path returning to the agent supply shall be included (do not include tees used in a manifold) in the design factor tee count for the hazard,

2. any tee within the hazard that supplies agent to another hazard shall be included in the design factor tee count for the hazard. The hazard with the greatest design factor tee count shall be used in Table 3-5.3.2 to determine the design factor.

Exception: for systems that pass a discharge test, this design factor does not need to apply.

Table 3-5.3.2 Design Factor Halocarbon Design Inert Gas

Tee Count Factor Design Factor

0-4 0.00 0.00 5 0.01 0.00 6 0.02 0.00 7 0.03 0.00 8 0.04 0.00 9 0.05 0.01 10 0.06 0.01 11 0.07 0.02 12 0.07 0.02 13 0.08 0.03 14 0.09 0.03 15 0.09 0.04 16 0.10 0.04 17 0.11 0.05 18 0.11 0.05 19 0.12 0.06

A-3-5.3.2.1 This design factor is meant to compensate for the uncertainty in the quantity of agent flowing through a pipe as the agent passes through an increasing number of tees. The listing tests generally incorporate systems with a very limited number of tees (2 to 4). If the number of tees in a system is greater then this, additional agent is required to compensate for the uncertainty at the tee splits to ensure that a sufficient quantity of agent is

591

N F P A 2 0 0 1 - - F 9 9 R O C

delivered to each hazard. Tees that deliver agent only to nozzles within a hazard are not counted for this design factor because it is believed mixing within the hazard will compensate for any discrepancy.

The design factor for the inert gasses is less then the halocarbons because it is believed that the flow of inert gasses can be more accurately predicted and inert gasses are less sensitive to pipe variability.

The following two examples illustrate the method for determining the design factor tee count. These examples may not represent good design practice.

Example 1

Hazard 1 2 3

Design Factor Tee Count 9 (tees A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, 1) 8 (tees C, D, E, F, G, H, I, A) 1 (tee C)

Therefore, if the system used a halocarbon agent the design factor is 0.05 and if the system used an inert gas agent the design factor would be 0.01.

Hazard 1 o -

o - A

Hazard 2 o - B

o - C

o - D

o - E

Hazard 3 o - F

o - G

o---H

o - I

- -o o - 1

,I o Hazard 1

+ +

t 2. Renumber A-3-5.3.1 to A-3-5.3.3. g. Add the following to the new A-3-5.3.3: A-3-5.g.$ The increase in safety factor and for manually actuated

systems and systems protecting Class B hazards, from the 1996 edition, is intended to account for the tlncertmnty in minimum design concentration associated with these types of systems and hazards.

The presence of hot metal surfaces, large fire sizes, increased fuel temperatures and other variables associated with longer pre burn times may increased the minimum extinguishing concentration for these types of fires. In addition the increased safety factor will serve to reduce decomposition product formation for halocarbon agents in the presence of larger fires expected in manually operated systems and Class B hazards.

There have been no reported system failures associated with these types of fires in fueled installations, and successful extinguishment events have been reported for systems designed and installed in accordance with previous editions of this standard.

This change is intended to enhance the overall effectiveness of new clean agent systems and is based on theoretical and laboratory experience. This change in safety factor does not apply to existing systems. There is no field experience that indicates that any existing system designed with a 20 percent safety factor will not perform as intended.

4. Renumber 3-6 as 5-5.3.3. SUBSTANTIATION: Added material for Tee Design Factor. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

Example 2

Hazard Design Factor Tee Count 1 5 (tees B, C, D, E, F) 2 3 (tees B, E, H) 3 2 (tees E, F)

For Hazard 1, the branch consisting of tees H, I, J, F is not used because the other branch has a greater tee count.

Therefore, if the system used a halocarbon agent the design factor is 0.01 and if the system used an inert gas agent the design factor would be 0.00.

(Log #CC11) 2001- 53 - (3-8.1.2.1, 3-8.1.2.2): Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Halon Alternative Protection Options COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 2001-54 RECOMMENDATION: 1. Revise 5-8.1.2.1 to read as follows:

3-8.1.2.1" For halocarbon agents, the discharge time required to achieve 95 percent of the minimum design concentration for flame extinguishment based on a 20 percent safety factor shall not exceed 10 seconds, or as otherwise required by the authority having jurisdiction.

2. Revise 3-8.1.2.2 to read as follows: 3-8.1.2.2" For inert gas agents, the discharge time required to "

achieve 95 percent of the minimum design concentration for flame extinguishment based on a 20 percent safety factor shall not exceed 60 seconds, or as otherwise required by the authority having

~jurisdiction. SUBSTANTIATION: Clarification. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

592

N F P A 2 0 0 1 - - F 9 9 R O C

(Log #2) 2001- 54 - (4-7.2.3): Accept in Principle SUBMITTER: Kenne th N. Schneider , Cont inenta l Fire & Security, Inc. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 2001-59 RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read:

" A l l total f looding systems shall have the enclosure examined and tested to locate and ther~ effectively seal any significant air leaks that could result in a failure of the enclosure to hold the specified agen t concent ra t ion for the specified ho ld ing period. T he cur ren t preferred m e t h o d is us ing a blower door fan test un i t and smoke pencil, u==t:~ti; 'e . . . . . . . . . ...... ~ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ¢ . . . . . . . . : . . . . . t. . . . . . . . . . . Ouanti tat ive results shall be . . . . . . . . l # . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

obtained to indicate the snecified agen t concent ra t ion for the specified dura t ion of pr,atectjon is in compl iance with 3-7. us ing an annroved blower fan un i t or o ther m e a n s as at)proved by the author i ty having iurisdiction. (For guidance , refer to Append ix B of this s tandard) ." S U B S T A N T I A T I O N : A total f looding system's ability to hold concent ra t ion for the dura t ion of protec t ion is highly d e p e n d e n t on the enclosure be ing sealed sufficiently. Examin ing a n d sealing significant air leaks shou ld be substant ia ted by manda to ry quantitative test ing which will relate enc losu re integrity (sealing) to a predictable re tent ion d m e as def ined by 3-7. Paragraph 4-7.2.3 does no t m a n d a t e a quantitative test. Wi thout a quantitative test the dura t ion of protec t ion would never be conclusively known and the system may fail to pe r fo rm properly u n d e r a fire condit ion. T h e blower fan unit , which predicts a re tent ion t ime does an excel lent job, in favor o f a worst case distr ibution of leaks, and as such shou ld be m a n d a t e d ra ther than ~ an examina t ion and test to locate leaks. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept in Principle.

Revise text to read: "All total f looding systems shall have the enclosure examined and

tested to locate and t he n effectively seal any significant air leaks that could result in a failure of the enclosure to ho ld the specified agen t concent ra t ion for the specified ho ld ing period. T h e cur ren t prefer red m e t h o d is us ing a blower door fan test un i t a n d smoke

encil. f f q ' . : = . . x * - ' ~ ' - v c :'c='.:It~ arc recc.rdcd "~czc c.2":!d hc uzcf'-! r c~mpari=an at fu ture t.mE. Quanti tat ive results shall be

obta ined and recorded to indicate that the soecified agen t concent ra t ion for the soecified dura t ion o f orotec t ion is in comnl iance with 3-7. us ing an annroved blower fan uni t or o ther means as approved by the author i ty having jurisdict ion. (For guidance, refer to Append ix B of this s tandard) ." C O M M I T T E E STATEMENT: Accepted c o m m e n t with editorial changes .

(Log #8) 2001- 55 - (5-1.2): Accept SUBMITTER: Charles F. Willms, Fire Suppress ion Systems Assn. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO" 2001-62 RECOMMENDATION: Add new paragraph 5-1.2 titled "Special Definitions" to read as shown:

5-1.2 Special Definitions. Control Room and Electronic E q u i p m e n t Spaces. A space

con ta in ing electronic or electrical equ ipmen t , such as that found in control rooms or electronic e q u i p m e n t rooms, where only Class A surfaces fires or Class C electrical hazards are present .

Mar ine Systems. Systems installed on ships, barges, offshore i platforms, motor boats, and pleasure craft.

Machinery Space. A space conta in ing the ma in and auxiliary propuls ion machinery .

P u m p Room. A space that conta ins mechanica l e q u i p m e n t for handl ing , pumping , or t ransfer r ing f lammable or combust ib le liquids as a fuel. S U B S T A N T I A T I O N : Harmonize with defini t ions f rom NFPA 12 p roposed new Chapter 6 on Marine CO 2 Systems. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log #9) 2001- 56 - (5-2.1(e) (New)): Accept SUBMITTER: Charles F. Willms, Fire Suppress ion Systems Assn. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 2001-62 RECOMMENDATION: Add new i tem (e) in 5-2.1 to read:

(e) control rooms and electronic e q u i p m e n t spaces. S U B S T A N T I A T I O N : Addit ional hazard a d d e d to show that clean agents are also used to protect these type of mar ine applications. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log #103) 2001- 57- (5-2.3): Accept SUBMITTER: Mark L. Robin, Great Lakes Chemical Corp. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 2001-61 RECOMMENDATION: Insert "products a n d combus t ion products" between "decomposi t ion" a n d "on" in the first sentence . S U B S T A N T I A T I O N : Accounts for possible hazard due to combus t i on products . COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept .

(Log #38) 2001- 58 - (5-3.1 Exception): Accept SUBMITrER: J o h n P. Goudreau , Ansul Inc. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 2001-61 RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read:

Exception: Engine rooms < 6,000 ft3 (170 m 3) which are accessed for m a i n t e n a n c e only. S U B S T A N T I A T I O N : Editorial. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept .

(Log #10) 2001- 59 - (5-4.2.1.2): Accept in Principle SUBMITTER: Charles F. Willms, Fire Suppress ion Systems Assn. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 2001-62 RECOMMENDATION: Revise 54.2.1.2 to read as follows:

5-4.2.1.2 When the ha!c.c.arb~r, agen t containers are ]oqated outside a protec ted space, they shall be s tored in a r oo m which shall be si tuated in a safe and readily accessible locat ion, and shall be effectively ventilated so tha t the agen t containers are no t exposed to ambien t t empera tu res ill excess of I~,0°F. ?m 7 a.r.L~qce to ..uch = =t~rc r~.~m ~h=l! bc f r em the vpee. deck and in any caac ~..11 t.^ :-.~ . . . . .~ . . . . c , t . . . . . . . . . . .~ . . . . . C o m m o n bu lkheads and decks located between clean aeen t conta iner storage rooms

v

aIad protected soaces shall be nro tec ted with A-60 class structural insulation. Agent conta iner s torage rooms mus t be accessible without having to oass t h rough the snace being protected. Access doors shall open outwards, and bulkheads and decks, inc luding doors and o ther means of closing any open ing therein, which form the boundar ies between such rooms and adjoining spaces, shall be gas tight. S U B S T A N T I A T I O N : Not all cylinder storage rooms can have access to an open deck. Bulkhead insulat ion and t empera tu re r equ i r emen t s were added to agree with existing r equ i r emen t s f o u n d in 46 CFR (95.15-20) and USCG circular #NVC 6-72 change 1. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept in Principle.

Revise 5-4.2.1.2 to read as follows: 5-4.2.1.2 W h e n the hala.czrEa.n agen t containers are located

outside a protec ted space, they shall be s tored in a r oo m which shall be si tuated in a safe and readily accessible locat ion, and shall be effectively ventilated so 1;hat the agen t coIltainers ar~ n o t exnosed to ambien t t emoera tu res in excess of I$0°F. A ~ . c.~t~'zce

~hall be !~dependemt c f the . . . . . . . . v . . . . . . . . . ~ . . . . . v . . . . C o m m o n bulkheads and decks located between clean agen t conta iner storage rooms and protected snaces shall be nro tec ted with A-60 class structural h~sulation as def ined bv 46 C I ~ 72. A~ent conta iner storage rooills .~..u=t shall be accessible wi thout havin~ to nass t h r o u g h the space being protected.Access doors shall open outwards, a n d bu lkheads and decks, inc lud ing doors and o ther m e a n s of closing any open ing therein, which fo rm the boundar ies between such rooms a n d adjo in ing spaces, shall be gas tight. C O M M I T T E E STATEMENT: C h a n g e d mus t to shall an d a d d e d appropr ia te reference.

593

N F P A 2 0 0 1 ~ F 9 9 R O C

(Log #37) 2001- 60 - (5-4.2.1.2): Accept in Principle SUBMITTER: John P. Goudreau, Ansul Inc. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 2001-61 RECOMMENDATION: Delete paragraph and substitute the following:

"When a~ent containers are located outside a nrotected snace. tdaey shall be stored in a room which shall be situated in a safe and readily accessible location, and shall be effectively ventilated so ~ He agent containers are not exnosed to ambient temneratures ila excess of I$0°F. Common bulkheads and decks located between a~ent container storage rooms and orotected snaces shall be pro~gqt;~d with A-60 class st~ctural insulation, A~ent container storage rooms must be accessible without havin~ to nass through ~ e space bein~ nrotected." SUBSTANTIA-TION: Deletion of word "halocarbon" makes in generic to both halocarbons and inert gases. Deletes requirement that entrances to store rooms be from the open deck (see ROP Log #14). Incorporates language that is in keeping with common shipboard practice, and as adopted by the marine chapter of NFPA 12. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept in Principle. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: See Committee Action and Statement on Comment 2001-59 (Log #10).

(Log #11) 2001- 61 - (5-4.5): Reject SUBMITTER: Charles F. Willms, Fire Suppression Systems Assn. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 2001-62 RECOMMENDATION: Revise 5-4.5 to read as follows:

"In addition to the requirements of 2-1.3.4 containers shall be secured with a minimum of two brackets, tc prc'.'e~t m~vcme~t frcm ;'c~zcl m~.'5~.~ a==d ;'bra*-2~.~." SUBSTANTIATION: Explanatory material should not be in the body of the standard. COMMITTEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Provides useful information to the user of the standard.

(Log #39) 2001- 62 - (5-4.6 Exception (New)): Accept SUBMITTER: John P. Goudreau, Ansul Inc. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 2001-61 RECOMMENDATION: Add an Exception as follows:

F~xcepfion: Closed sections of pipe and valves and fittings within ¢]0s¢d S¢¢tigns of Dine. need only be nrotected at,-ainst corrosion on the outside. SUBSTANTIATION: Closed sections of pipe, valves and fittings that are not continuously exposed to atmosphere, do not present a corrosion problem. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log #12) 2001- 63- (5-4.7): Accept SUBMITTER: Charles F. Willms, Fire Suppression Systems Assn. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 2001-62 RECOMMENDATION: Change 1700°F (927°C) to 1600°F (871°C). SUBSTANTIATION: Some commonly used brass alloys have published melting points between 1600°F and 1700°F and should not be excluded from use.

Note: Supporting material is available for review at NFPA Headquarters. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

SUBSTANTIATION: Accommodates the use of pneumatic detection systems, commonly referred to as HAD's (heat actuated detection). COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log #41) 2001- 65 - (5-5.2.2): Accept SUBMITTER: John P. Goudreau, Ansul Inc. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 2001-61

] RECOMMENDATION: Change 5 2A to read 5-5.2.4. SUBSTANTIATION: Paragraph 5-2.4 does not exist. Believe the noted paragraph to be the correct reference. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log #42) 2001- 66 - (5-5.2.4 Exception): Accept SUBMITYER: John P. Goudreau, Ansul Inc. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 2001-61

I RECOMMENDATION: Change Exception to read as follows: e~'Exception:~. Systems protecting spaces of 6000 ft 3 (170 m 3) etc.,

SUBSTANTIATION: Editorial. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log #43) 2001- 67- (5-6): Accept SUBMITTER: John P. Goudrean, Ansul Inc. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 2001-61

I RECOMMENDATION: Change to read as follows: 5-6 Additional Requirements for Systems Protecting Class B

Hazards Greater than 6000 ft 3 with Stored Cylinders within the Protected Space. SUBSTANTIATION: Small systems protecting primarily Class A and /o r C hazards (such as control rooms and radio rooms) do not represent the same "sudden and severe" fire hazards as those posed by Class B hazards. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Editorially add "in acccordance with NFPA 72" to Paragraph 5-6.7.

(Log #13) 2001- 68 - (5-6.3, A-5-6.3): Accept SUBMITTER: Charles F. Willms, Fire Suppression Systems Assn. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 2001-62

[ RECOMMENDATION: Delete 5-6.3 and A-5-6.3 in their entirety. SUBSTANTIATION: 1. These requirements are not specified in USCG approved marine carbon dioxide or marine Halon 1301 systems.

2. Regardless of what is in the SOLAS regulations, it is not practical to required duplicated pneumatic/hydraulic circuits between containers.

3. Monitoring pressure on some types of pneumatic or hydraulic pressure sources can be erroneous. For example, if carbon dioxide pilot cylinders are used, the pressure in the cylinder will be the same regardless of agent loss, as long as liquid carbon dioxide remains in the cylinder; thus giving a false indication that the pilot cylinder is full.

4. To the best of our knowledge the U.S. Navy does not use or require redundancy of pneumatic lines aboard their vessels, for similar applications. We also understand that the Navy systems have had a history of satisfactory performance. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log #40) 2001- 64- (5-5.2.1): Accept SUBMITI'ER: John P. Goudrean, Ansul lnc. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 2001-61 RECOMMENDATION: Change the first sentence as follows:

~!'.hz Electrical detection etc., etc."

(Log #14) 2001- 69 - (5-7.1 Exception): Accept SUBMITTER: Charles F. Willms, Fire Suppression Systems Assn. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 2001-62

[ RECOMMENDATION: Delete the Exception in its entirety. SUBSTANTIATION: The requirement is already stated in this

P ~ i ' E E ACTION: Accept.

594

N F P A 2 0 0 1 - - F 9 9 R O C

(Log #45) 2001- 70 - (5-8.1): Accept SUBMITTER: John P. Coudreau, Ansul Inc. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 2001-61

I RECOMMENDATION: Change to read as follows: "For combinations of filels, the design concentration shall be

derived from the flame extinguishment value for the fuel requiring the greatest concenta-ation ~!~all bc u~cd." SUBSTANTIATION: Editorial. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log #44) 2001- 71 - (5-8.2): Accept SUBMITTER: John P. Goudreau, Ansul Inc. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 2001-61

I RECOMMENDATION: Change to read as follows: "For a particular fuel, the design concentration referred to in 5-

~A.2.2 5-8,3 shall be used". SUBSTANTIATION: Paragraph 5-3.4.2.2 does not exist. Believe the noted paragraph to be the correct reference. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log #50) 2001- 72 - (5-8.3.1, 5-10, and A-5-8.3.3): Accept SUBMITTER: John P. Goudreau, Ansul Inc. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 2001-61 RECOMMENDATION: Replace !.~.~O ~.~SC,/Circulzr 776 with IMO MSC/Circular 848. SUBSTANTIATION: MSC/Circular 778 has been superseded by MSC/Circular 848. o COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log #47) 2001- 73- (5-8.4): Accept in Principle SUBMITTER: John P. Goudreau, Ansul Inc. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 2001-61 RECOMMENDATION: Change to read as follows:

"The quantity of agent shall be based on the net volume of the space, a[ld shall b~ in accordance with the requirements of IMO Circular #848 "Annex". oaraeranh 5." SUBSTANTIATION: "['his additional verbiage provides the method to be used in determining the net volume of a protected space.

Note: Supporting mar.erial is available for review at NFPA Headquarters. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept in Principle.

Accept comment and extract reference into appendix. 1. The Maritime Safety Committee, at its sixty-seventh session (2

to 6 December 1996), approved Guidelines for the approval of equivalent fixed gas fire-extinguishing systems, as referred to in SOLAS 74, for machinery spaces and cargo pump-rooms, as MSC/Circ.776.

2. The Sub-Committee on Fire Protection, at its forty-second session (8 to 12 December 1997), recognized the need of technical improvement to the Guidelines contained in MSC/Circ. 776 to assLst in their proper implementation and, to that effect, prepared amendments to the Guidelines.

3. The Committee, at its sixty-ninth section (11 to 20 May 1998), approved revised Guidelines for the approval of equivalent fixed gas fire-extinguishing systems, as referred to in SOl_AS 74, for machinery spaces and ,argo pump-rooms, as set out in the annex, to supersede the Guidelines attached to MSC/Circ.776.

4. Member Governments are invited to apply the annexed Guidelines when approving equivalent fixed gas fire-extinguishing systems for use in machinery spaces of category A and cargo pump-rooms.

5. The quantity of extinguishing agent for the protected space should be calculated al the minimum expected ambient temperature using the design concentration based on the net volume of the protected space, including the casing.

5.1 The net volume of a protected space is that part of the gross volume of the space which is accessible to the free extinguishing agent gas.

5.2 When calculating the net volume of a protected space, the net volume should include the volume of the bilge, the volume if

the casing and the volume of free air contained in air receivers that in the event of a fire is released into the protected space.

5.3 The objects that occupy volume in the protected space should be subtracted from the gross volume of the space. They include but are not necessarily limited to:

auxiliary machinery; boilers; condensers; evaporators; main engines; reduction gears; tank; and trunks. 5.4 Subsequent modifications to the protected space that alter

the net volume of the space shall require the quantity of extinguishing agent to be adjusted to meet the requirements of this paragraph and paragraph 6.

6. No fire suppression agent should be used which is carcinogenic, mutagenic, or teratogenic at concentrations expected during use. No agent should be used in concentrations greater than the cardiac sensitization NOAEL (No Observed Adverse Effect Level), without the use of controls as provided in SOLAS regulations II-2/5.2.5.1 and 5.2.5.2. In no case should an agent be used above its LOAEL (Lowest Observed Adverse Effects Level) nor ALC (Approximate Lethal Concentration) calculated on the net volume of the protected space at the maximum expected ambient temperature. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Adding IMO material to the appendix makes the document user friendly.

(Log #55) 2001- 74- (5-11.1.1): Reject SUBMITTER: Joseph A. Senecal, Kidde-Fenwal, Inc. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 2001-68 RECOMMENDATION: Revise wording to read:

"The discharge time for inert gas systems shall not exceed 60 seconds to achieve 95 percent of the design concentration or as otherwise required by the authority having jurisdiction." SUBSTANTIATION: The proposal of a discharge time of 120 sec to achieve 85 percent of the design concentration is not consistent with the requirements of 3-8.1.2.2 which requires that 95 percent of the inert gas agent be discharged within 60 sec. The discharge of inert gases follows an exponential decay time profile: M = MoO- exp(-t/T) where M is the mass discharged in time t, Mo is the total mass discharged and T is the time constant. The time constant for the 85 percent/60 second requirement is 20 sec; the time constant for the proposed 85 percent/120 second requirement is 63 sec. In other words, the time required to reach an equivalent level of protection in the 85 percent/120 second scenario is three times longer.

The 85 percent/120 second is taken directly fi-om SOLAS requirements for carbon dioxide systems (SOLAS Chapter II-2, Part A, Regulation 5, Part 2.4, page 163 of the 1992 edition). SOLAS further requires that the minimum quantity of carbon dioxide be as follows:

(a) Cargo spa~zes; 30 percent of the gross volume; (b) Machinery spaces; 35 or 40 percent of the gross volume

(depending on criteria). Since the extinguishing concentration of carbon dioxide for

hydrocarbon fuels (machinery spaces) is 22-23 percent by the cup burner method, the safety factor for the SOLAS requirement is 56- 77 percent. The proposed discharge time for an inert gas agent should be similar to that for carbon dioxide only if the agent safety factor is also equivalent. COMMITTEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITrEE STATEMENT: A two minute discharge is verified by full scale fire tests.

(Log #48) 2001- 75 - (5-11.3.1): Accept SUBMITTER: John P. Goudreau, Ansul Inc. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 2001-68

I RECOMMENDATION: Remove the first paragraph. Renumber the removed paragraph to read [~-9.1.2.3. SUBSTANTIATION: Removed paragraph is unrelated to "Inspection and Tests" and belongs in requirements for "Discharge Time". COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

595

N F P A 2 0 0 1 - - F 9 9 R O C

(Log #75) 2001- 76 - (5-11.3.1): Reject SUBMITTER: Mark L. Robin, Great Lakes Chemical Corp. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 2001-68, 2001-69 RECOMMENDATION: Change "120 seconds" to "60 seconds". SUBSTANTIATION: 120 seconds discharge is in conflict with Paragraph 3-8.1.2.2 which specifies 60 seconds maximum discharge time. Data previously presented to this committee demonstrated inconsistent performance of an inert gas agent at long discharge times and was the basis for the current choice of a 60 second discharge. COMMITTEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: See Committee Action and Statement on Comment 2001-74 (Log #55).

COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Also delete last row of Table A-1-4.1(b) (Vapor Pressure) and all rows with all N/A's.

(Log #76) 2001- 82 - (Table A-l-4.1 (a)): Accept SUBMITTER: Mark L. Robin, Great Lakes Chemical Corp. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 2001-73

] RECOMMENDATION: Add data for FC-218. SUBSTANTIATION: Required information not in current table. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log #15) 2001- 77- (5-11.4): Accept SUBMITTER: Charles F. Willms, Fire Suppression Systems Assn. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 2001-62 RECOMMENDATION: Revise 5-11.4 as follows:

5-11.4 The installing contractor shall provide ~ "~:~-uc*-:o~a! ; 'dc~ "lluz~-a'dng instructions for the operational features and inspection procedures specific to the clean agent system installed on the vessel. SUBSTANTIATION: A requirement to provide a customized instructional video is both impractical and expensive. Historically, manuals have been supplied for CO 2 and Halon 1301 Marine Systems and should suffice for clean agent systems. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log #16) 2001- 78 - (5-12): Accept SUBMITTER: Charles F. Willms, Fire Suppression Systems Assn. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 2001-62 RECOMMENDATION: In the first sentence change the word "listing" to the word "system". SUBSTANTIATION: Editorial. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log #77) 2001- 83 - (Tables A-1-4.1(a) and (b)): Accept" SUBMITTER: Mark L. Robin, Great Lakes Chemical Corp. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 2001-11, 2001-73

I RECOMMENDATION: Revise text: "Under vapor pressure, indicate whether psia or prig."

SUBSTANTIATION: Editorial. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Add "(psia)" after "Vapor Pressure. Adjust HFC Blend A.

(Log #51 ) 2001- 84- (A-1-5.1.2): Accept SUBMITTER: Louise C. Speitel, Fed. Aviation Admin. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 2001-80 RECOMMENDATION: Revise text:

A-I-~.I Table A-1-5.1.2.(.~. Table is missing from the Report on Proposals. The text describes Table At-5.1.2 should read Table A-1-5.1.2(a).

SUBSTANTIATION: None. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

Note: Check table designations and references to tables in text.

(Log #17) 2001- 79 - (5-12.1): Reject SUBMITTER: Charles F. Willms, Fire Suppression Systems Assn. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 2001-61 RECOMMENDATION: Delete 5-12.1 in its entirety. (Revert to requirements in 4-7.2.2.12). SUBSTANTIATION: The leak test described in 4-7.2.2.12 is sufficient. In addition, the pipe fittings and pressure rating requirements are specified in Section 2-2. Therefore, a high pressure strength test should not be necessary. COMMITTEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: It's already done. See ROP 2001-70 (Log #60).

(Log #71) 2001- 80 - (Table A-l-4): Accept SUBMITTER: Robert E. Tapscott, NMERI COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 2001-1

] RECOMMENDATION: Revise text: " 3 1 g. ~ 1 l/~. ~ 3 " ] 1 lb/ft . . . . . . . . 16.01835 kg/m .

SUBSTANTIATION: 1 lb/ft 3 = 16.01846 kg/m 3 which rounds to 16.0185 kg/m 3. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log #78) 2001- 85 - (A-1-5.1.2): Reject SUBMITTER: Mark L. Robin, Great Lakes Chemical Corp. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 2001-80 RECOMMENDATION: Delete (in second paragraph) sentence beginning "to keep oxygen..." SUBSTANTIATION: Inconsistent with allowance of inert agents at concentrations corresponding to 8-10 percent 0 2 . COMMITTEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: See Committee Action and Statement on Comment 2001-11 (Log #74).

(Log #79) 2001- 86 - (A-1-5.1.2): Accept in Principle SUBMITTER: Mark L. Robin, Great Lakes Chemical Corp. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 2001-80 RECOMMENDATION: Add new text and Table as shown below:

"The dangerous toxic load (DTL) has been developed by Meldrum based upon an examination of HF exposure data for mice, which show the greatest sensitivity to HF exposure of all mammals, and corresponds to HF levels at which severe distress would be expected for all exposed personnel. According to the DTL analysis the product of the HF exposure level in ppm multiplied by the exposure time in minutes is 12,000 ppm.min. Table A-1-5.1.2(c) provides DTL values for exposures up to 60 minutes."

(Log #70) 2001- 81 - (Table A-I-4.1): Accept SUBMITTER: Robert E. Tapscott, NMERI COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 2001-72

] RECOMMENDATION: Check conversions on the Table. SUBSTANTIATION: A quick check shows several error, for example,

-37.0°C = -34.6°F not -34.4°F. -28.3°C = -38.9°F not -37.0°F, etc.

Table A-1-5.1.2(c) DTL for Hydrogen Fluoride Time (min) DTL, ppm HF

1 12,000 2 6,000 3 4,000 5 2,400

10 1,200 20 600 30 400 60 200

596

N F P A 2 0 0 1 m F 9 9 R O C

Meld, M., Toxicology of Substances in Relation to Major Hazards: Hydrogen Fluoride, HMSO, London, 1993. SUBSTANTIATION: Provides updated toxicological data on HF. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept i n Principle.

Revise 1-5.1.2.1 to react as follows: An unnecessary exposure to halocarbon clean agents, even at

NOAEL concentrations, and halocarbon decomposition products shall be avoided. The requirement for pre-discharge alarms and time delays are intended to prevent human exposure to agents. The following addition:d provisions shall apply in order to account for failure of these safeguards:

1. Halocarbon systems for spaces that are normally occupied and designed to concentrations up to the NOAEL (see Table A) sh2.all be permitted.

. Halocarbon systems for spaces that are normally occupied, designed to concentrations above the NOAEL and up to the LOAEL (see Table A), shall be permitted, given that means be provided to limit exposure to no longer than the time specified in Tables B-E corresponding to the given design concentration.

3. In spaces that are not normally occupied, and protected by a halocarbon system designed to concentrations above the LOAEL (see Table A), and where personnel could possibly be exposed, means shall be provided to limit exposure times using Tables B-E.

A-1-5.1.2 The time ~xlue, estimated by the US EPA-approved and peer-reviewed PBPK model or its equivalent, is that required for the human arterial blood level for a given halocarbon to equal the arterial blood level of a dog exposed to the LOAEL for 5 minutes.

A-1-5.1.2 For example, if a system is' designed to achieve a maximum concentration of 12.0 percent HFC-125, then means shall be provided such that personnel are exposed for no longer than 1.67 minutes. Examples of suitable exposure limiting mechanisms include self-contalned breathing apparatuses and )lanned and rehearsed evacuation routes.

Table A. Toxicity Information for Halocarbon Clean Agents

FC-3-1-10 HCFC Blend A HCFC-124 H FC-125 HFC-227ea HFC-23 HFC-236fa

N o Lowest Observable Observable

Adverse Adverse Effect Level Effect Level

(NOAEL) (LOAEL) 40% >40%

10.0% >10.0% 1.0% 2.5% 7.5% 10.0% 9.0% >10.5% 50% >50% 10% 15%

Table B. Time for Safe Human Exposure at Stated Concentrations for HFC-125.

HFC-125 concentration

% v/v

7.5 8.0 8.5 9.0 9.5 10.0 10.5 11.0 11.5 12.0 12.5 13.0

PPM

75,000 80,000 85,000 90,000 95,000 100,000 105,000 110,000 115,000 120,000 125,000 130,000

Human Exposure Time in Minutes

5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 1.67 0.59 0.54

13.5 135,000 0.49 Footnote: Data derived from the US El~A-approved and

~ eer-reviewed PBPK model or its equivalent. ootnote: Based on LOAEL in Dogs of 10.0 percent.

Table C. Time for Safe Human Exposure at Stated Concentrations for HFC-227ea.

HFC-227ea concentration

% v/v

9.0 9.5 10.0 10.5 11.0 11.5 12.0

Footnote: Data de

PPM

90,000 95,000 100,000 105,000 110,000 115,000 120,000

Human Exposure Time in Minutes

5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 1.13 0.60 0.49

A-approved and peer-reviewed PBPK model or its equivalent. Footnote: Based on LOAEL in Dogs of 10.5 percent.

Table D. Time for Safe Human Exposure at Stated Concentrations for HFC-2$6fa.

HFC-236fa concentration

% v/v PPM

100,000 105,000

Human Exposure Time in Minutes

10.0 5.00 10.5 5.00 11.0 110,000 5.00 11.5 115,000 5.00 12.0 120,000 5.00 12.5 125,000 5.00 13.0 130,000 1.65 13.5 135,000 0.92 14.0 140,000 0.79 14.5 145,000 0.64 15.0 150,000 0.49

peer-reviewed PBPK model or its equivalent. Footnote: Based on LOAEL in Dogs of 15.0 percent.

Table E. Time for Safe Human Exposure at Stated Concentrations for FIC-13II.

FIC-1311 concentration

% v/v

0.2 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50

PPM

2000 2500 3000 3500 4000. 4500 5000

Human Exposure Time in Minutes

5.00 5.00 5.00 4.30 0.85 0.49 0.35

Footnote: Data derived from the US E] 'A-approved and

~ eer-reviewed PBPK model or its equivalent. ootnote: Based on LOAEL in Dogs of 0.4 percent.

4. In the absence of the information needed to fulfill the conditions listed above, the following provisions shall apply

- - Where egress takes longer than 30 seconds but less than one minute, the halocarbon agent shall not be used in a concentration exceeding its LOAEL;

- - Concentrations exceeding the LOAEL are permitted only in areas not normally occupied by personnel provided that any personnel in the area can escape within 30 seconds. No unprotected personnel shall enter the area during agent discharge.

For Section A-1-5.1.2

Change text to that shown below. New text is indicated in underlined. Text to be omitted is indicated as strikeout.

597

N F P A 2 0 0 1 ~ F 9 9 R O C

A-1-5.1.2 Table A-1-5.1.2 provides in format ion on the toxicological a n d physiological effects o f ha locarbon agents covered by this s tandard . T h e No Observed Adverse Effect Level (NOAEL) is the h ighes t concen t ra t ion at which no adverse

~ hysiological or toxicological effect has been observed. The owest Observed Adverse Effect Level (LOAEL) is the lowest

concent ra t ion at which an adverse physiological or toxicological effect has b e e n observed.

For ha locarbons covered in this s tandard , the NOAEL and LOAEL are based on the toxicological effect known as cardiac sensitization. Cardiac sensit izat ion occurs when a chemical causes an incr¢i~ed sensitivity o f the hear t to adrenal ine , a natural ly occurr in~ subs tance n r o d u c e d by the body dur in~ t imes o f stress. l eading to the s u d d e n onse t o f irre~,ular hea r t beats, and nossiblv hea r t a-ttack. Cardiac sensit ization is m e a s u r e d in does after they have been exnosed to a ha loca rbon agen t for 5 minutes . At the 5- minu te t ime neriod, an external dose o f adrena l ine (ePinephr ine) is admin i s te red a n d an effect is recorded, if the dog exner iences cardiac sensitization. T h e cardiac sensit ization potential as measu red in dogs is a h ighlv conservative indicator of the potential in h u m a n s . The conservative na tu re o f the cardiac sensit ization test s tems f rom several factors, the two mos t ne r t inen t beinff: (1) very h igh doses of adrena l lne are given to t he ' dogs du r ing title test ing p rocedure (doses are m o r e than 10 t imes h i~her tha t the h ighes t levels secre ted by h u m a n s u n d e r m a x i m u m stressl and (2l four to t en t imes m o r e ha loca rbon is r euu i red to cause cardiac sensit ization in the absence o f externally admin is te red adrenal ine. even in artificially created si tuations of stress or fr ight in the dog test~

Because the cardiac sensit ization notential is m e a s u r e d in dogs. a m e a n s of nrovidin~ h u m a n relevance to the concent ra t ion at which this carcli~c sensit izat ion occurs (LOAEL) has been establ ishe~ t h r o u g h the use o f physiologically based, oharmacokine t i c (PBPK) model ing . A PBPK mode l is a compute r i zed tool tha t describes rime-related asoects o f a chemica l ' s d is t r ibut ion in a bioloc, ical system. The PBPK model mathemat ica l ly describes the un take of the ha locarbon into the body a n d the s u b s e n u e n t dis t r ibut ion of the ha lo~lcbon to the areas of the body where adverse effects can Occur. FgF example , the m9~¢1 describes the b rea th ing rate and qpte~q of the ha locarbon f rom the exposure a t mosphe re into the lungs. From there, the mode l u s e s the blood flow ba th ing the | ¢ngs t9 ~lCscribe the m o v e m e n t of the ha locarbon f rom the lung space into the arterial blood tha t direcdv feeds the hearg ~ d vital organs of the body. It is the ability o f the model to describe the ha locarbon concen t ra t ion in h u m a n arterial blood that provides it pr imary utility in relat in~ the dog cardiac serlsi~igation test results to a h u m a n who is un in ten t iona l ly exposed to the halocarbo~h The concent ra t ion of ha loca rbon in the dog arterial blood at the d m e the cardiac sensit izat ion event occurs ( f -minu te exposure) is the critical arterial blood concen t ra t ion and this blood pa rame te r is the link to the h u m a n system. Once this critical arterial blood concent ra t ion has been m e a s u r e d in dogs. the EPA-annroved PBPK model s imulates how long it will take the h u m a n arterial b lood ¢oncent ra t iop to reach the critical arterial blood concent ra t ion fas d e t e r m i n e d in the dog test) du r i ng h u m a n inhalat ion o f any Darticular concent ra t ion of the ha locarbon agent. As long as the s imula ted h u m a n arterial concent ra t ion remains below the critical arterial blood concent ra t ion , the exnosure is cons idered safe. Inha led halocarborl concen t ra t ions tha t p r o d u c e h u m a n arterial blood concent ra t ions eoual to or grea ter than the critical arterial blood concent ra t ion a r e cons idered uqsaf¢ as they r ep resen t inhaled concent ra t ion which ootentlallv yield arterial b lood concent ra t ions where cardiac sens i t i za t ioneven t s occur in the doa test. Us ing these critical arterial blood concentrat ion~ of halocar-bons as t h e c e i l i n g for allowable h u m a n arterial concent ra t ions , any n u m b e r of ha loca rhon exnosure scenar ios can be evaluated u s i n g t h i s mode l i ng aDnroach.

For examnle , in the dog cardiac sensit ization test on Halon 1~01. a measureci dog arterial blood concent ra t ion o f 25.7 m g / L is measu red at the effect concent ra t ion (LOAEL) of 7.5 pe rcen t after at 5-minute exoosure to Ha lon 1501 and an external in t ravenous adrena l ine injection. T h e PBPK model nredicL~ the t ime at which the h u m a n arterial blood concent ra t ion reaches ~5,7 m g / L for given inha led Halon 1BOI concentrat ions . Using this ann roach the - . .

model also nredicts that at some inha led ha locarbon concentra t ions , the critical arterial blood concent ra t ion is never reached, and thus. cardiac sensit ization will no t occur. Accordingly, in the tables in Section 1-5.1.2. the t ime is arbitrarily t runca ted at 5 minutes , because the dogs were exposed for 5 minu te s in the oric, inal cardiac sensit izat ion test ing protocols.

The reou i rement - fo r ore-discharge a larms and t ime delays are i n t ended to nrevent h u m a n exposure to agents du r in g firefighting. Hgw~vcr. in the unlikely c i rcumstance tha t an accidental discharge mav occur, restrict ions on the use of certain ha locarbon agents covered in this s tandard for '.:'=: "n norm~!)" e c c u f e d ~.~_~e= are based on thg availability of PBPK mode l i ng informat ion. For those ha locarbon a~ents, in which m o d e l i n g in format ion is available, m e a n s shall be Drovided to limit the exposure to those concent ra t ions and t imes specified in the tables in Sect ion 1-5.1.2, aS these concent ra t ions and t imes are those which have been predictgcL to l imit the h u m a n arterial b lood concen t ra t ion to below the critical arterial b lood concen t ra t ion associated with cardiac sensit ization, a c.~mp.x~:on o f "..~.e actual agcn=

NOAEL er ;-:here the n e e d e d da ta are unavailable, the agents are restricted based on whe the r the protec ted space is normally occupied or unoccupied , and how ouicklv em'ess f rom the area

=

can be effected. Normally occuoied areas are those in t ended for h u m a n occuoancv. Normal ly unoccup i ed areas are those in which pe rsonne l can be n re sen t f rom t ime to t ime. Therefore . a comnar i son of t h e cardiac sensit ization values to the i n t en d ed des ign ~;qil¢¢otcation would de t e rmine the suitability o f a ha loca rbon for use in normal ly occuoied or u n o c c u n i e d areas. [To keep oxygen concent ra t ions above 16 percen t (sea level

! equivalent) , the poin t at which onse t of impai red pe rsonne l f u n c d o n occurs, no ha logena t ed fire ex t inguish ing agents addressed in this s t andard shou ld be used at a concent ra t ion greater than 24 percen t in a normal ly occupied area_]

Add the following sen tence at the end o f the first pa rag raph of A- 1-5.1.2:

"An appropr ia te protocol measures the effect in a stepwise m a n n e r such tha t the interval between the LOAEL an d NOAEL is siffuciently small to be acceptable to the c o m p e t e n t regulatory authority. T h e U.S. EPA includes in its SNAP evaluation this aspect (of the rigor) of the test protocol."

Section A-l-5.1.2 Keep in t roductory Text: These decompos i t ion products have a sharp, acrid odor, even in

m inu t e concent ra t ions o f only a few parts per mill ion. This characterist ic provides a built-in warn ing system for the agent , bu t at the same t ime creates a noxious , irri tating a t m o s p h e r e for those who mus t enter the hazard following a fire.

Delete the following section: Table At -5 .1 .2 ( b ) p r o v i d e s in format ion on the toxicological

effects o f Hydrogen Fluoride. The emergency response p lann ing guidel ines ERPGs for Hydrogen Fluoride represen t ceiling exposure levels for the genera l public a n d are applicable to emergency exposure periods o f 10 minu te s a n d one hour . Three ERPGs were developed for each exposure period.

ERPG-3 is the m a x i m u m ai rborne c o n c e n t r a t i o n below which it is believed nearly all individuals could be exposed for the stated per iod without exper ienc ing or developing life th rea ten ing hea l th effects.

ERPG-2 is the m a x i m u m a i rborne concen t ra t ion below which it is believed nearly all individuals could be exposed for the stated per iod wi thout exper ienc ing or deve loping irreversible or o ther serious heal th effects or symptoms tha t could impair an individuals ability to take protective action.

ERPG1 is the m a x i m u m a i rborne concen t ra t ion below which it is believed near ly all individuals could be exposed for the stated )eriod without exper ienc ing o ther t han mild, t ransient adverse

hea l th effects or wi thout perceiving a clearly de f ined objectionable odor .

598

N F P A 2 0 0 1 ~ F 9 9 R O C

Table A-l-5.1.2(b) Toxicity Infotrmation for Hydrogen Fluoride

10 Minute 1 Hour ERPG-3 170 ppm 50 ppm ERPG-2 50 ppm 20 ppm ERPG-1 2 ppm 2 ppm

(ROP 2001-80)

Replace with the following text: A. Background and Toxicology of Hydrogen Fluoride

Hydrogen fluoride (HF) vapor can be produced in fires as a breakdown product of fluorocarbon fire extinguishing agents and in the combustion of fiuoropolymers.

The significant toxicological effects of HF exposure occur at the site of contact. By the inhalation route, significant deposition is predicted to occur in the most anterior (front part) region of the nose and extending back to the lower respiratory tract (airways and lungs) if sufficient exposure concentrations are achieved. The damage induced at the site of contact with HF is characterized by extensive tissue damage and cell death (necrosis) with inflammation. One day after a single, one hour exposure of rats to HF concentrations of 950 to 2600 ppm, tissue injury was limited exclusively to the anterior section, o f the nose (DuPont, 1990). No effects were seen in the trachea or lungs.

At high concentrations of HF (about 200 ppm), human breathing pattern would be expected to change primarily from nose-breathing to primarily mouth-breathing. This change in breathing pattern will determine the deposition pattern of HF into the respiratory tract, either upper respiratory tract (nose breathing) or lower respiratory tract (mouth breathing). In studies conducted by Dalby (1996), rats were exposed by nose-only or mouth-only breathing. In the mouth-breathing only model, rats were exposed to various concentrations of HF through a tube placed in the trachea thereby by-passing the upper respirator), tract. This exposure method is considered to be a conservauve

i approach for estimating a "worst case" exposure in which a person would not breath through the nose but inhale through the mouth thereby maximizing the deposition of HF into the lower respiratory tract.

In the nose-breathing model, 2 or 10 minute exposures of ra t s to about 6400 or 1700 ppm produced similar effects, i.e., no mortality but significant cell damage in the nose. In contrast, marked differences in toxicity were evident in the mouth-breathing model. Indeed, mortality was evident following a lO-minute exposure to a concentcation of about 1800 ppm and a 2-minute exposure to about 8601) ppm. Significant inflammation of the lower respiratory tract was also evident. Similarly, a 2 minute exposure to about 4903 ppm produced mortality and significant nasal damage. However, at a lower concentrations (950 ppm) following a lO-minute exposure or 1600 ppm following a 2-minute exposure, no mortality mid only minimal irritation were observed.

Numerous other toxicology studies have been conducted in experimental animals ~'or longer durations, e.g.,15, 50 or 60 minutes. In nearly all of these studies, the effects of HF were generally similar across all species, i.e., severe irritation of the respiratory tract as the cuncentration of HF was increased.

In humans, there appears to be an irritation threshold at about $ ppm where irritation of the upper airways and eyes occurs. In prolonged exposure at about 5 ppm, redness of the skin has also resulted. In controlled human exposure studies, humans are reported to have tolerated mild nasal irritation (subjective response) at 32 ppm tor several minutes (Machle et al., 1934). Exposure of humans to about 3 ppm for an hour produced slight eye and upper respiratory tract irritation. Even with an increase in exposure concentraticn (up to 122 ppm) and a decrease in exposure duration to about 1 minute, skin, eye and respiratory tract irritation occurs (Machle and Kitzmiller, 1935).

Meldrum (1998) propos~ed the concept of the dangerous toxic load (DTL) as a means of predicting the effects of, for example, HF in humans. These authors developed the argument that the toxic effects of certain chemicals tend to follow Haber's

law (C X t = k) *. The available data on the human response to inhalation of HF was considered insufficient to provide a basis for establishing a DTL. Therefore, it was necessary to use the available animal lethality data to establish a model for the response in humans. The DTL is based on an estimate of lpercent lethality m an exposed population of animals. Based on the analysis of animal lethality data, the author determined that the DTLfor HF is 12,000 ppm-min. Although this approach appears reasonable and consistent with mortality data in experimental animals, the predictive nature of this relationship for non-lethal effects in humans has not been demonstrated.

"C = concentration; t = time; k = constant

B. Potential Human Health Effects and Risk-Analysis in Fire Scenarios

It is important for a risk analysis to distinguish between normally healthy individuals, e.g. fire fighters, and those with compromised health. Exposure to higher concentrations of HI? would be expected to be tolerated more in healthy individuals, whereas, at equal concentrations, escape-impairing effects may occur in those with compromised health. Therefore, an assumption in the following discussion is that the effects described at the various concentrations and durations are for the healthy individual.

Inflammation (irritation) of tissues represents a conflnum from "no irritation" to "severe, deep penetrating" irritation. Use of terms slight, mild, moderate and severe in conjunction with irritation represents an attempt to quantify this effect. However, given the large variability and sensitivity o f the human population, dVferences in the degree of irritation from exposure to HF are expected to occur. For example, some individuals may experience mild irritation to a concentration that results in moderate irritation in another individual.

i At concentrations of <50 ppm for up to 10 minutes, irritation of upper respiratory tract and the eyes would be expected

t o occur. At these low concentrations, escape-impairing effects would not be expected in the healthy individual. As HF concentrations increase to 50-100 ppm, an increase in irritation is expected. For short duration, 10-30 minutes, irritation of the skin, eyes and respiratory tract would occur. At 100 ppm for 30-60 minutes, escape impairing effects would begin to occur, and continued exposure at 200 ppm and greater for an hour could be lethal in the absence of medical intervention. As the concentration of HF increases, the severity of irritation increases, and the potential for delayed systemic effects also increases. At about 100-200 ppm of HF, humans would also be expected to shift their breathing pattern to mouth breathing. Therefore, deeper lung irritation is expected. At greater concentrations (>200 ppm), respiratory discomfort, pulmonary (deep lung) irritation and systemic effects are possible. Continued exposure at these higher concentrations may be lethal in the absence of medical treatment.

Generation of HF from fluorocarbon fire extinguishing agents represents a potential hazard. In the foregoin~ discussion, the durauon of exposure was indicated for 10 to 60 minutes. In fire conditions in which HF would be generated, the actual exposure duration would be expected to be less than 10 minutes, and in most cases less than 5-minutes. As Dalby (1996) showed, exposing mouth-breathing rats to HF concentrations of about 600 ppm for 2 minutes was without effect. Similarly, exposing mouth- breathing rats to a HF concentration of about 300 ppm for 10 minutes did not result in any mortality or respiratory effects. Therefore, one could surmise that humans exposed to similar concentrations for less than 10 minutes would be able to survive such concentrations. However, caution needs to be employed in over-interpreting these data. Although the toxicity data would suggest that humans could survive these large concentrations for less than 10 minutes, those individuals with compromised lung function or those with cardiopulmonary disease may be more susceptible to the effects of HF. Furthermore, even in the healthy individual, irritation of the upper respiratory tract and eyes would be expected, and escape could be impaired.

599

N F P A 2 0 0 1 - - F 9 9 R O C

Potential H u m a n Heal th Effects o f Hydrogen Fluoride In Heal thy Individuals

2-Minutes E x n o s u r e s

• < 50 ppm - Slight eye and nasal irritation • 50 - 100 ppm - Mild eye and upper respiratory

tract irritation • 100 - 200 ppm - Moderate eye and upper

respiratory tract irritation; slight skin irritation

• > 200 ppm - Moderate irritation of all body surfaces; increasing concentration may be escape- impairing

5-Minute E x n o s u r e s

• <50 ppm • 5 0 - 1 0 0 p p m

• 100-200 ppm

• > 200 ppm

L~l lam~a~am~

• < 50 ppm

• 5 0 - 1 0 0 p p m

• 1 0 0 - 2 0 0 p p m

• > 200 ppm

- Mild eye and nasal irritation - Increasing eye and nasal irritation; slight skin irritation - Moderate irritation of skin, eyes and respiratory tract - Definite irritation of tissue surfaces; will cause escape impairing at increasing concentrations

- Definite eye, skin and upper respiratory tract irritation - Moderate irritation of all body surfaces - Moderate irritation of all body surfaces; escape impairing effects likely - Escape impairing effects will occur; increasing concentrations may be lethal without medical intervention

Occupational exposure limits have been established for HF. The limit set by the American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH); Threshold Limit Value (TLV®) represents exposure of normally healthy workers for an 8-hr workday or 40-hr workweek. For HF, the limit established is 3 ppm, and represents a ceiling limit, i.e., and the airborne concentration that should not be exceeded at any time during the workday. This limit is intended to prevent irritation and possible s~,stemic effects with repeated, long-term exposure. This and similar time-weighted average limits are not considered relevant for fire extinguishing use of fluorocarbons during emergency situations. However, these limits may need to be considered in clean-up procedures where high levels of HF were generated.

In contrast to the ACGIH TLV®, the American Industrial Hyl~iene Association (AIHA) Emergency Response Planning Gmdeline (ERPG) represents limits established for emergency release of chemicals. These limits are established to also account for sensitive populations, e.g. those with compromised health. The ERPG limits are designed to assist emergency response personnel in planning for catastrophic releases of chemicals. They are not developed to be used as "safe" limits for routine operations. However, in the case of fire extinguishing use and generation of HF, these limits are more relevant than time- weighted average limits such as the TLV®. The ERPG limits consist of three levels for use in emergency planning, and are typically one-hour values; 10-minute values have also been established for HF. For the 1-hour limits, the ERPG 1 (2 ppm) is based on odor perception and is below the concentration at which mild sensory irritation has been reported (3 ppm). ERPG 2 (20 ppm) is the most important guideline value set and is the concentration at which mitigating steps should be taken (such as evacuation, sheltering, donning masks). This level should not impede escape or cause irreversible health effects and is based mainly on the human irritation data obtained by Machle et al. (1934) and Largent (1960). ERPG 3 (50 ppm) is based on animal data and is the maximum non-lethal level for nearly all individuals. This level could be lethal to some susceptible people. The 10 minute values established for HF and used in emergency planning in fires where HF vapor is generated are ERPG-3 = 170 ppm; ERPG-2 = 50 ppm; ERPG-1 = 2 ppm.

REFERENCES American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists,

6500 Glenway Ave., Bldg. D-7, Cincinnati, Ohio 45211-4438 (513) 742-2020

American Industrial Hygiene Association, 2700 Prosperity Avenue, Suite 250, Fairfax, Va. 22031 Tel (703)849-8888, Fax (703)207-3561

Dalby, W. (1996). Evaluation of the toxicity of hydrogen fluoride at short exposure times. Stonybrook Laboratories, Inc., 311 Pennington-Rocky Hill Road, Pennington, NJ, sponsored by the Petroleum Environmental Research Forum (PERF), PERF Project No. 92-90.

DuPont (1990). Acute inhalation of hydrogen fluoride in rats. Haskell Laboratory Report HLR 865r90.

Largent, E.J. (1960). The metabolism of fluorides in man. Arch Ind. Health 21:318-323.

Machle, W., Tharnann, F., Kitzmiller, K., and Cholak, J., (1934). The effects of the inhalation of hydrogen fluoride. I. The response following exposure to high concentrations. J. Ind. Hyg. Toxicol. 16:129-145.

Machle, W. and Kitzmiller, K. 12. (1935). The effects of the inhalation of hydrogen fluoride. II. The response following exposure to low concentrations. Ind. Hyg. 17:223-229.

Meldrum, M. (1993). Toxicology of substances in relation to major hazards: Hydrogen fluoride. Health and Safety Executive (HSE) Information Centre, Sheffield S37HQ, England. Delete remaining text:

"The amount of agent that can be expected to decompose in extinguishing a fire depends to a large extent on the size of the fire, the particular clean agent, the concentration of the agent, and the length of time the agent is in contact with the flame or heated surface...."etc. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Provided clear concise information on the toxic threat of the extinguishing agent's decomposition products for short term exposure expected during fire scenarios.

(Log #CC12) 2001- 87 - (Table A-1-5.1.2): Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Halon Alternative Protection Options COMMENT O N P R O P O S A L NO: 2001-80 RECOMMENDATION: Remove the Halon 1301 row from the table. SUBSTANTIATION: Halon 1301 is not covered by this standard and therefore this information could be confusing to the user. COMMITrEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log #52) 2001- 88 - (A-1-5.1.2 and Table A-1-5.1.2(b)): Accept SUBMITI'ER: Louise C. Speitel, Fed. Aviation Admin. COMMENT O N P R O P O S A L NO: 2001-80 R E C O M M E N D A T I O N : Revise Table A-1-5.1.2(b) as follows:

Table A-1-5.1.2(b) Toxicity Information for Hydrogen Fluoride

10 Minute ] Hour ERPG-g 170 ppm 50 ppm ERPG-2 0K ~pm 50 ppm 20 ppm ERPG-1 2 ppm 2 ppm

SUBSTANTIATION: The ERPG-2 value had change from 95 ppm to 50 ppm, prior to the final ballot and publication by the American Industrial Hygienists Association. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log #56) 200l- 89 - (Table A-2-1.4.1): Accept SUBMITTER: Nobuo Yamada, Koatsu Co. Ltd. COMMENT O N P R O P O S A L NO: 2001-91

I RECOMMENDATION: Change the information for IC,-100 of Table A-2-1.4.1 as shown underlined on the following page:

600

N F P A 2 0 0 1 - - F 9 9 R O C

Table A-2-1.4.1 Storage Container Characteristics

IG-01 IG-100 (24.0) Maximum fill clensi~ for conditions

listed below ( lb/f t s)

Minimum container design level working pressure (psig)

Total pressure level at 70°F (psig)

I C ~ 1 0 0 ( 1 8 0 ) IG-541

N /A N/A N/A N/A

2120 ~879 2161 2015

2370 3~36 2404 2175

NOTE: Total pressure level at 70°F is calculated from filling condition: IG-100 (240): 3460 psig (~3.9 Mpa) and 95°F (35°C) IG-100 (180): 2560 psig (17.7 Mpa) and 95°F (35°C)

SUBSTANTIATION: Put IC.-I00(240) in the place of IC.-100(150). The Storage Container Characteristics are specified by Koatsu

Co., Ltd. Note: Supporting material is available for review at NFPA

Headquarters. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log #CC7) 2001- 90 - (Figure A-2q.4.1(a) and Figure A-2-1.4.1(b)): Accept SUBMITTER: Techni,zal Committee on Halon Alternative Protection Options COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 2001-85 RECOMMENDATION: Revise Figure A-2-1.4.1 (a) for FC-2-1-8 (for 360 psig containers) as follows:

1000

9O0

800

. 700

• ~ 600

o ~. 40o

300

2o0

lOO

o -40

J /

/ / r

~ 70 I o s ~ 3

I

-20 0 20 40

. . . . . . . . . . . . . , , , , , 60 80 100 120 140 160 180

Temperature (°F)

Figure A-2-l.4(a) Isometric digram for Figure FC-2-1-8 (.for 360 psig containers).

Revise Figure A-2-1.4.1 (a) for FC2-1-8 (for 2.SMPa containers) as follows

7.0

~.o t1~ 5.0 / J

g- 4.0

2.0 ~

0.0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -40.0 -20.0 0.0 20.0 40.0 60.0 80.0

Temperature (°C)

F'tgure A-2-l.4(b) Isometric digram for Figure FC-2-1-8 (for 2.5 MPa containers).

SUBSTANTIATION: Provides more accurate information supplied by the manufacturer, adding updated supplemental technical information. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log #57) 2001-91 -(Figures A-2-1.4.1(w) and (x)): Accept SUBM1TrER: Nobuo Yamada, Koatsu Co. Ltd. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 2001-95 RECOMMENDATION: Change the Figures A-2-1.4.1 (w) and A-2-1.4.1 (x) for IC,-100. The suggested figures are shown below and on the following page:

5OO0

4500 1

4000

3,500'

3OOO I

o

15oo

5oo -3o

I - [G-100 ~ / /

/ , ~ IG-100~L .-'~-'~ ''-''-(180) ~

-10 10 30 50 70 90 110 130 150 170 1~) Temperature (°F)

F'tgure A-2-1.4.1(w) Isometric diagram of IG-100, English. (degree Fahrenheit).

601

N F P A 2001 - - F99 R O C

o

r. I f v ~

J / - J

tG-lOO 0 8 ~ . . . ~ " -

(Log #6) 2001- 93 - (Table A-2-2.1.1(a) and Table A-2-2.1.1(b)): Accept SUBMITTER: Charles F. Willms, Fire Suppression Systems Assn. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 2001-23

I RECOMMENDATION: Line up headings in Table A-2-2.1.1 (a) and heading in Table A-2-2.1.1(b), dated September 25, 1998.

(Note: There are no changes to any of the values in the heading or in the body of the Table). SUBSTANTIATION: The revisions to the Tables are editorial in nature. The values in the headings must line up with headings "Grade", "Type" and "SE" in order to be clear to the end user. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

-40 -30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 Temperature ( *C)

Figure A-2-1.4.1(x) Isometric diagram of IG-100, Metric. (degree Celsius).

SUBSTANTIATION: Put IG-100(240) in the place of IC¢100(150). The Storage Container Characteristics are specified by Koatsu

Co., Ltd. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log #58) 2001- 94 - (Table A-2-2.1.1(j) ): Reject SUBMITTER: Nobuo Yamada, Koatsu Co. Ltd. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 2001-99 RECOMMENDATION: Change the Table A-2-2.1.1 (j) for IG-100. The suggested Table is shown on the following page: SUBSTANTIATION: Put IG-100(240) in the place of IG-100(150).

The Storage Container Characteristics are specified by Koatsu Co., Ltd. COMMITTEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Replaced by two tables. See ROP 2001-23 (Log #30).

(Log #59) 2001- 92 - (Table A-2-2.1.1): Accept SUBMITTER: Nobuo Yamada, Koatsu Co. Ltd. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 2001-98 RECOMMENDATION: Change the underlined information for IG-100 of the table which shows the minimum claculated pressures as shown below

Clean Agent

IG-01

IG-100

IG-55

Initial Cha~ging Pressure 2370 psig (16,341 kPa) Upstream of the pressure reducer Downstream of the pressure reducer

3236 Dsi~ (22.311 kPa~ = v

Uostream of the oressure reducer Downstream of the pressure reducer

2404 psig (16,580 kPa) Upstream of the pressure reducer Downstream of the pressure reducer

2222 psig (15,521 kPa) Upstream of the pressure reducer Downstream of the pressure reducer

Calculated Pressure (up to and includlnl~ )

2650 psig (18,972 kPa) 975 psig (6723 kPa)

3773 osi~ (26.014 kPa~ | ,000 psig (6.895 kPa~

2799 prig (19,300 kPa) 1000 psig (6,895 kPa)

2475 psig (15,318 kPa) 950 psig (6550 kPa)

SUBSTANTIATION: Put IG-100(240) in the place of IG-100(150). The Storage Container Characteristics are specified by Koatsu

Co., Ltd. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log #60) 2001- 95 - (Table A-2-2.3.1): Accept SUBMITTER: Nobuo Yamada, Koatsu Co. Ltd. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 2001-100 RECOMMENDATION: Change the underlined information for IG-100 of Table A-2-2.3.1 for the piping system fittings as shown on the following page: SUBSTANTIATION: Put IG-100(240) in the place of IG-100(150).

The Storage Container Characteristics are specified by Koatsu Co., Ltd. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

602

N F P A 2 0 0 1 - - F 9 9 R O C

Table A-2-2.1.1 (i) Pipin~ Requirements Threaded A-106C, SMI_.S A-53B/A-106B, SMLS A-53B, ERW A-5 SA/A-106A, SMLS A-53A, ERW A-53F, FW

Welded A-106C, SMLS A-53B/Ad 06B, SMLS A-53B, ERW A-53A/A-106A, SMLS A-53A, ERW A-53F, FW

Sch. 40 Do Not Use Do Not Use Do Not Use Do Not Use Do Not Use Do Not Use

1 /2 in . - I in., NPS 1/2 in. - 3 /4 in., NPS

1/2 in., NPS Do Not Use Do Not Use Do Not Use

for IG-100 @ 3236 psi[~ ($773 psi[~)

Sch. 80 Sch. 120 1/2 in. - 3 /4 in., NPS Do Not Use

1 /2 in., NPS Do Not Use Do Not Use Do Not Use Do Not Use Do Not Use Do Not Use Do Not Use Do Not Use Do Not Use

Sch. 160 1/2 in. - 8 in., NPS 1/2 in. - 2 in., NPS 1/2 in. - 1 in., NPS 1/2 in. - 1 in., NPS

Do Not Use Do Not Use

1 /2 in. - 2 1 /2 in., NPS 4 in., NPS 1/2 in. - 8 in., NPS 1/2 in. - 1 1 /4 in., NPS Do Not Use 1 /2 in. - 6 in., NPS

1/2 in. - 1 in., NPS Do Not Use 1 /2 in. - 3 in., NPS 1/2 in. - 1 in., NPS Do Not Use 1 /2 in. - 2 in., NPS

1/2 in., NPS Do Not Use 1 /2 in. - 1 in., NPS Do Not Use Do Not Use Do Not Use

Table A-2-2.3.1

Clean Agent

IG-O1

IG-IO0

Initial Charging Pressure (up to and including)

2370 psig (16,341 kPa) Upstream of the pressure reducer Downstream of the pressure reducer

3236.0si~ (22.311 kPa) ])_p_str-eam of the oressure reducer Downstream of tile nressure reducer

IG-IO0

IG-55

2410 psig (16,580 kPa) Upstream of the pressure reducer Downstream of the pressure reducer

2222 psig (15,521 kPa) Upstream of the pressure reducer Downstream of the pressure reducer

Pipinl~ Sy-stem Fittinl~,s

Acceptable Fittlnl~rs $000-1b forged steel Class 300 malleable iron or ductile iron 1000-1b rated ductile iron or forged steel Class 600 flanged joints

$000-1b forged steel 6000-1b fgrged steel Class 300 malleable iron or ductile iron 1000-1b rated ductile iron or forged steel Class 600 flan~ed ioints

3000-1b forged steel Class 300 malleable iron or ductile iron 1000-1b rated ductile iron or forged steel Class 600 f langedjo ln t s

3000-1b forged steel Class 300 malleable iron or ductile iron 1000-1b rated ductile iron or forged steel Class 600 flan~ed joints

Maximum Pipe Size All

3 in. NPS > 3 in. NPS

All

1 in. NPS > 1 in. NPS > 3 in. NPS > 3 in. NPS

ddl

All 3 in. NPS

> 3 in. NPS All

All 3 in. NPS

> 3 in. NPS All

(Log #72) 2001- 96 - (Table A-2-2.3.1): Accept SUBMITTER: Robert E. Tapscott, NMERI COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 2001-100

I RECOMMENDATION: Correct conversions between psi and kPa. For example, 2006 psig = 13,831 kPa no t 13,836 kPa. Also, Pa rather than kPa given in one place. SUBSTANTIATION: Editorial corrections. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log #1 ) 2001- 97 - (A-5-2): Accept in Principle SUBMITTER: T homasJ . Wysocki, Guardian Services, Inc. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 2001-102 RECOMMENDATION: Revise A-3-2 to read:

A-3-2 System Flow Calculations. Liouefled Comnressed Gas Flow Calculations. Analyzing the

behavior of two-phase agents in pipelines is a complex subject with numerous solutions. There are two calculation methods that are commonly used by rite protect ion professionals. The first is based on ¢nhancemevltS to the work of Hesson 1 in 1953 and the other is based on modificatioJas to the HFLOW method 2 completed in 1994. S.:~ce ~he !ztter i~ more F.re'=le=~y ".:=ed f~r e~gmeerc'd ~ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . :, ...;n *....4: . . . . . . . .~ e . . , Only those calculation methods that have been peer reviewed and found acceptable and have been listed by fire testing organizations, should be used for design purposes.

Modified HFLOW (Lalculation Method. This me thod is based on major modifications of a calculation me thod called HFLOW developed by the Je t Propulsion Laboratory in Eliot et al 1984.

The revised me thod is capable of predict ing the two-phase flow characteristics of clean agents based on their thermodynamics properties. This me thod can calculate the flow characteristics of fire supp.ression agents across the wide range of real engineer ing systems m reasonable t ime scales.

Assumptions and Limitations. Several basic assumptions are made to simplify the methodology:

1. The condit ions in the cylinder (pressure, temperature , and composit ion) are solely functions of the initial condit ions and the outage fraction (fraction of the initial charge mass having left the cylinder). This assumption effectively ignores the impact of the increased kinetic energy of the fluid leaving the cylinder on the cylinder energy balance.

2. Quasi-steady flow exists. The average flow rate over a small t ime interval step is equal to the flow rate that would exist if the cylinder conditions were he ld steady dur ing that time step.

3. The heat transferred from the pipe walls to the flowing fluid is assumed to be insignificant.

4. The flow through the pipe network is homogeneous . Liquid and vapor flow through the piping is at the same velocity evenly dispersed.

Calculation can not be done without adequate manufacturer 's hardware data. This data includes dip tube and manifold equivalent lengths and nozzle discharge coefficients. This model in its p resent form has been demonst ra ted to predict the discharge time based on nozzle liquid run out with reasonable accuracy within limits that constrain the flow regime and flow splits.

The model has only been tested against two tee orientations, bull- head and horizontal side flow. There are limitations, particularly due to the availability of exper iment data on the largest flow splits that the model can handle. For both types of tees, the maximum flow split is on the order of 90 percent /10-percent .

Required input data include cylinder volume, valve, dip tube equivalent lengths, agent mass and temperature, pipe length and diameter, elevation, fittings, nozzle area, and discharge coefficient.

603

NFPA 2001 - - F99 ROC

Output data for each node (pipe, cylinder, or nozzle) include pressure, temperature, componen t fraction, phase distribution, mass flow rate, and velocity.

Due to its complexity, this method does not lend itself to hand calculation.

Modified Hesson Calculation Methodology. This two phase flow method was first developed by Hesson for calculating pressure drop along a pipe line flowing carbon dioxide. Hesson adapted Bernoulli's eauation for ease of use with comoressible, two-ohase flOW, t~ ,~-: . . . . t-~.~^,-g 3 . . . . . .~ . . . . . n .... : . . . . . . . . ,4 ,,.h:,~ :~ trv.t~, "z vcr 7 dy.~e=nic. It was refined bv H.V. Williamson and Tom

Wvsocki 3 for use with Halon 1301 and other clean agents. Assumptions and Limitations. ~.~.~cn "t c=='ac iv, a~pl;-" ~.c Hcz~v,n

ha~ left the nozz!cz. Th!z ze~m.c prcm!~-c !z uzcd tc ccm~utc prczzurc ~ecczz'vn for a :~r 'e W of v.vv phace clan agent

£ . . . . . I . . ~ 1 . . . . . .1 ^ . ~ . . . . . K . ~ . . . . : . . . . . . . . I . . ~ ^ . . . 1 ^ . 1 . . . . . . . . . .

Alt.~,c::~ c'.:'mber~e, mc ~..:'0 .~..e~.~d doe~ !end !~e~ t~ a.~d ca!c'-!at'.'.r..

The "two phase" flow method models three basic flow conditions for a liquefied comoressed ~ discharge from a storage container:

1. the initial transient discharge dur ing which agent flows from the container and cools the Dine:

~. a auasi-steadv state flow dur ing which the agent is assumed to ~ain ta in a constant enthalpy (adiabatic) condition with constant mass flow rate:

3. tl~e fipal transient discharge during which the two ohase liouid a~d vaoor flow is replaced bv an essentiaUv vaoor discharge as the storage container empties.

The pressure drop during the ouasl-steadv state flow is based on the work of Hesson. The transient conditions are modeled using s~andard thermodynamics, During testing of the two phase ~e t~odology with Halon 1301. mechanical senaration of the liauid and vaoor ohases due to centriDetal forces was observed. This effect has been noted for every liauefied compressed uas tested to date. The effect is not nredicted by thermodynamics but was inferred from test data and confirmed using ultra-high s t eed nhotom'anhv (1973. HT Research Institute). To accurately Dredlct the uuantitv of agent discharge f rom each nozzle in a system, epapirical corrections based on the deuree of flow solit, orientation of the tee junction, comoonen t fraction and ohase distribution are developed-for the soecific liouefied comoressed gas.

The oressure droo calculation for the uuasi-steadv state flow using Hesson's ada-ntion of Bernoulli 's eauation can be done bv hand. The calculation of transient conditions and the calculation of mechanical separation effects at tees and their effect on nressure droo and auantitv of agent discharged from each nozzle in an uobalanced system reouires many complex iterations. Manual ¢;alculadon of these effects is not practical, Therefore a listed aod approved computer program must be used for a comolete calculation.

Required input data includes cylinder volume, agent mass and temperature, valve and did tube eouivalent lengths, pipe lengths. ~;levation changes, fittings, and pre-discharge pipe temperature. Most orom-ams oermit the user to soecifv either the reouired flow rate or agent ~uantitv for each nozzle or the "as-built" system condition. If flow rate or agent auantitv is snecified, the orogram will calculate the reuuired t~ioe and nozzle diameters. If an "as- built" condition including Dine and nozzle diameters is soecified the prom-am calculates system flow rates. In either case. Dressure drop, discharge time, and quant iw discharged from each nozzle is re tor ted.

Inert Gas Flow Calculations. Inert gases oresent a nroblem in single ohase comoressible flow. Many fluid dynamics handbooks

provide formulas for comnressible gas flow which may be suitable for relatively simole t ide networks with short lengths of nine. These f o r m u l ~ are i~ad¢quate to calculate systems using ionger Dine lengths with comolex configurations. Wvsocki and _ . v

Christensen 4 used the work of Hesson arid adaoted it for use with single nhase compressible gases.

Inert gas discharge from a cylinder into a nine and nozzle network involves three stages:

1. The initial transient phase as the gas flows into the Dine and fills the nine un to the nozzles. There~is a marked variat]o-n between the time at which various nozzles in an unbalanced nine

. -

network be~qn discharging agent. 2. Full flow during which all nozzles discharge agent. This is a

v

dynamic condition during which the flow rates, agent temDeratures, and nressure conditions constantly change.

3. Final transient condition during which the storage container and pipeline emoties. Comolex changes in flow rates at the individual nozzles take olace.

Flow in these systems is neither adiabatic nor isothermal (the two classical limits). The complexity of the calculation for large. uribalanced pipe networks reaulres use of a listed or approved computer program.

Common Limitations. Regardless of the method used for flow calculations, certain

lipoits are established during the listing and anDroval nrocess for the flow calculation. Tvoical limits include:

1. Limit arc degree of sulit at tees 2. Limits on the orientation of tees 3. Limits on a~ent arrival time.

v

4. Limits on agent "run out" or "end of liauid" time differences between nozzles

5. Minimum pressure limits 6. Minimum flow density 7, Maximum and min imum storage container fill density 8. Additional limits specific to the flow calculation program. The results of the calculation must be checked to verify that limits

h~ve not been exceeded. Comnuterized calculations generally report warning or error messages if the system falls outside nrom'am limits.

l"Pressure Droo For Two Phase Carbon Dioxide Flowing In Pine Lines". I.C. Hesson. Master of Science Thesis in CH.E. Illinois Institute of Technology. fan. 1953.

2DiNenno. P.I. E, W. Forssell. M.I. Ferreira. C.P. Hananska. and B.A. lohnson. "Modeling of the Flow Pronerties and Discharge of Halon Reolacement Agents". Process Safety Prowress (Vol. 14. No. 1. lanuarv 1995).

gWvsocki. T.I.. "Single Point Flow Calculations for Liouefied Compressed Gas Fire Extinguishing Agents ' . Halon n o t i o n s Technical Working Conference Proceedings. Albuuueruue. New Mexico. 1996.

4Wvsocki. T.I. and B.C. Christensen. "Inert Gas Fire Sunoression Systems Using IG541 ( I n e ~ e n ) Solving the Hydraulic Calculation Problem". Halon no t ions Technical Working Conference Proceedings. Albuoueruue. New Mexico. 1996. SUBSTAN~TIATION: The information in the proposed wording is inaccurate with respect to the description of the "Hesson" method as applied to Halons and Halon alternatives. Also there is no information on the methodology used for flow calculations of inert gases.

The fourth sentence of paragraph 1 should be deleted because it is arguably inaccurate. The HFLOW method is not "more prevalently used for engineered clean agent systems." Further this sentence adds nothing to the technical content of the standard - - rather it appears to be a "marketing claim" for the HFLOW methodology. Delete this senmce.

The section on the "Hesson" method is rewritten to reflect the actual methodology formerly detailed in NFPA 12A and currently

,used for listed and approved calculations of liquefied compressed gases recognized in NFPA 2001. The original proposal contains a numbe r of inaccuracies and misleading statements. For example, "steady state flow is assumed" - - currently used calculations using the "Hesson" pressure drop formulas recognize the dynamic state of flow. A current reference which details the considerations of the "two phase" method is included.

604

NFPA 2001 - - F99 ROC

The final pa rag raph of the original proposal points out tha t "all the factors necessary for this complex calculat ion are no t available to the fire protect ion layman" and references some of these factors. In fact, the "fire pro tec t ion layman" would be ha rd pressed to f ind all the factors n e e d e d for accurate calculations with ei ther the HFLOW m e t h o d or the "two ohase" m e t h o d . The hea t t ransfer formulas used in the "two-phase" calculation have indeed been publ ished. We have no t seen all of the empirical factors (for example, nozzle flow coefficients) used in H F L O W calculations publ i shed and made avail.able to the fire protec t ion layman - - those s ta tements in this pa rag raph which are accurate apply to bo th HFLOW and "two phase" calculations. Fur the r it is mis leading to state tha t the two phase m e t h o d lends itself to h a n d calculat ions - - while Hesson ' s basic pressure drop calculation can be done by hand , a comple te calculation o f an unba l anced system is beyond the scope of "band calculations." The pa ragraph conta ins too m a n y inaccuracies and adds confus ion to the already l imited u n d e r s t a n d i n g of flow calculation methodology.

Flow calculation of iner t gases was no t addressed in the proposal . In format ion on these calculations is inc luded together with an appropr ia te reference which may be consul ted for more detai led ln tormat lon .

C o m m o n l imitat ions oil flow calculations are added for easy reference. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept in Principle.

Revise A-$-~ to read as modified: A-~-2 System Flow Cah:ulations. Liouefied Comoressed Gas Flow Calculations. Analyzing the

behavior of tWO-l~hase agents in pipel ines is a complex subject with n u m e r o u s solutions. The re are two calculat ion me t hods tha t are common ly used by fire protec t ion professionals. T he first is based on e n h a n c e m e n t s to the work of Hesson ~ in 195~ and the other is based on modi f l cadous to the HFLOW m e t h o d ~ comple ted in 1994. Since "2~.c !"-tier ": ..-ncrc prc' .x!cn~y uzed fc.r cng'neercd. _, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . : . . . . : . ~ . ^ .1: . . . . . . . . 4 ¢ : _ . Onl those

I ~ . . . . I - . . . . . . . . . . . . " . . . . . . . I ^ ~ I ¢ ^ . . calculauon me thods tha~ . . . . . . . . . . v . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . nd . . . . . . . ~"^ a n d have been listed t.y ~. . . . . . . : . . . . . . :__,:__. approved shou ld be used for des ign purposes .

Modified HFLOW Calculat ion Method. This m e t h o d is based on major modif icat ions of a calculat ion m e t h o d called HFLOW developed by t h e J e t Propuls ion Laboratory in Eliot et al 1984.

' The revised m e t h o d is capable of predic t ing the two-phase flow characteristics of c lean agents based on their t he rmodynamics propert ies. This m e t h o d can calculate the flow characteristics of fire suppress ion agents across the wide range of real eng inee r ing systems in reasonable t ime scales.

Assumpt ions and Limitat ions. Several basic assumpt ions are m a d e to simplify the methodology:

1. The condi t ions in the cylinder (pressure, t empera ture , and composi t ion) are solely funct ions of the initial condi t ions and the outage fraction (fraction o f the initial charge mass having left the cylinder). This a s sumpt ion effectively ignores the impact of the increased kinetic energy of the fluid leaving the cylinder on the cylinder energy balance.

2. Quasi-steady flow e.,dsts. The average flow rate over a small t ime interval step is equal to the flow rate tha t would exist if the cylinder condi t ions were he ld steady du r i ng that t ime step.

5. The hea~ t ransferred f rom the pipe walls to the flowing fluid is often a s sumed to be insignificant.

4. T h e flow t h r o u g h the pipe network is h o m o g e n e o u s . Liquid a n d vapor flow th rough the piping is at the same velocity evenly dispersed.

Calculation can no t be d o n e wi thout adequate manufac tu re r ' s hardware data. This da ta includes dip tube and manifo ld equivalent lengths and nozzle discharge coefficients. Th.:z rr,.e.dc! in !~ ~re~ent fern: ~ '~ ~ . . . . a . . . . . , .~,~a • . . . . a:~, , , ~ .a:~,. . . . . u . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . j . , ~ . u . . . . . . . . ~ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , t" .......... 1

due to. the a-'a!!ab:.!i W c.f cx 'pcHmcnt ~ata c.n fi~c !argca~ tic.;': ap!i'.~

.qc.;;" ap!k !z an ~:c order c f 90 percent / tO ~crccnt. Required inpu t da ta include cylinder volume, valve, dip tube

equivalent lengths, agen t mass and tempera ture , pipe length and diameter , elevation, fittings, nozzle area, a n d discharge coefficient. O u t p u t da ta for each node (pipe, cylinder, or nozzle) include pressure, t empera ture , c o m p o n e n t fraction, phase dis tr ibut ion, mass flow rate, a n d velocity.

Due to its complexity, this m e t h o d does no t lend itself to h a n d calculat ion.

Modified Hesson Calculat ion Methodology. This two phase flow m e t h o d was first developed by Hesson for calculating pressure drop a long a pipe line flowing carbon dioxide. Hesson ad an t ed Bernoull i 's eouat ion for ease of use with comoressible, two-phase flow. In th~ : : . . c thcdc!e~7 : tca~ a=atc tic.'.': ~= -L~c'amc~, ;':h'!c "n . . . . h : . . . . . . . .4 . . . . :_ It was ref ined bv H.V. Will iamson an d To m . . . . . J • . . . . ! ~ 1 " . . . . . . .

Wvsocki s for use with Halon 1501 and o ther clean agents. ^ ' . . . . . . . . . . Assumpt ions and Limitations. When :t ~.-mc tc. aFp! 7 ,h~ u . . . . .

haa left the nc.zz!c=. Th 'z aamc prer=.~ac "a u~cd tc. ccm.~ute prcaaurc rcccaa 'an fc.r a ":ar'ct 7 c.f t;*:c ~h-..zc clan agent

All +l.. . . . . . . . . . . c- . . . . . . . . . . . . . . n . . . . . s fc.r ~h'a cc.m..plcx c~cu l=6on arc n e t

nct; ':ork arc n~ : a'.='lab:e n a t =re ".b.c ad~'aat..mcn= fc.r tic.:': ap! '~

- ' a - - ' I " . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . 1 . . . . ~ I - - - - . . . . . . I . . . . . . : . . . . . . . . k ¢ ^ . , 4 ^ ~ : . . . . . . . . . . .

.*2~hough cu:v..bc~c.mc ~ k i : r..c~.c.~ ~c.ca !cn~ itzc!f tc. ~'~d ca! c'a!a*- ~. n.

Th~ "two nhase" flow m e t h o d mode l s th ree basic flow condi t ions for a l iquefied ¢ompressed gas d ischarge f rom a storatxe container:

1, the initial t rans ien t discharge du r ing which a~ent flows f rom the conta iner and cools the nine:

2, ~, quasi-stea~dy state flpw d u r i n g which the; agen t is a s su m ed to :ma in ta in a cons tan t en tha lnv (adiabatic) condi t ion with cons tan t mass flow rate:

3, the final t ransient d ischarge du r ing which the two ohase liouid and vapor flow is renlaced by an essentially vapor discharge as the s torage conta iner emodes .

The pressure drpp du r ing the quasi-steady state flow is based on the wprl~ of Hesson. Th¢ t rans ien t condi t ions are mode l ed us ing s tandard thermodynamics . Dur in~ testin~ of the two nhase me thodo logy with Haion 1501. mechanica l separa t ion of the liouid and vapor phases due to centripetal forces was observed. This effect has beeq no ted for everv-liouefied comnressed gas tested to date. The effect is no t nredicted-by the rmodynamics but was inferr¢~t f rom test data and conf i rmed usin~ Ultra-high soeed nho to~ranhv (197~. HT Research Insti tute). To accurately nredic t the quant i ty of agen t discharge f rom each nozzle in a svstem~ empirical correct, ions based on the degree of flow solit, or ientat ion of the tee Junction. c o m p o n e n t fract ion and nhase distr ibution are developed-for the soecific l iouefied comnressed gas.

The oressure droo calculation for the ouasi-steadv state flow us ing ~es son ' s ~,0apdon 9f Bernoull i 's eouat ion can be d o n e bv band, T h e calculation of t rans ien t condi-tions a n d the calculation of mechanica l separat ion effects at tees and ttleir effect on _ nressure d ron and uuant i tv of agen t d ischarged f rom each nozzle in an UOI)a]anced system reouires manv comnlex iterations. Manual calculation of these effects is no t oractical. There fo re a listed an d approved compu te r p rogram mus t be used for a comDlete calculat ion.

Requi red inpu t data includes cylinder volume, agen t mass an d tempera ture , valve and did tube eouivalent lengths, pipe l e n ~ h s . elevation changes, fittings-, and ore-discharge Dine tempera ture . Most n rograms hermi t the user to soecifv ei ther the requi red flow rate or agen t ouant i tv for each nozzle o r the ;ras-built" system condit ion, i f fl0w rate or agen t ouant i tv is specified, the n ro~ram will calculate the refluired Dine and nozzle diameters . If an "as- built" condi t ion inc luding n ine and nozzle d iameters is snecified the pro t-ram (;alculates svstem flow rates. In e i ther case. pressure drop, discharge t ime. and quant i ty d ischarged f rom each 'nozzle is reported.

I~er~ Gas Flow Calculations. Iner t ~ases n re sen t a t)roblem in single phase compress ible flow. Many fluid dynamics h an d b o o k s provide formulas for coropressible gas flow which may be suitable for relatively s imple n ine networks with shor t lengths of nine. These formulas are inadeouate to calculate systems us ing longer pipe lengths with comnlex configurat ions. Wvsocki and

605

N F P A 2 0 0 1 - - F 9 9 R O C

Chris tensen 4 used t-be work of Hesson and adan ted it for use with single phase comnress ib le ~ases.

Inert-~as discharge f rom a cvllnder into a oloe and nozzle network involves three sta~es:

1. The initial t rans ien t ohase as the ~as flows into the n ine and fills the nine uo to the nozzles. T he re is a marked variation between the t ime at which various nozzles in an u n b a l a n c e d n ine network be~in d ischarg ing a~ent.

2. Full flow dur in~ which all nozzles discharge a~ent. This is a dynamic condi t ion dur in~ which the flow rates, agen t t empera tures , and pressure condi t ions constant lv-chan~¢,

3. Final, t rans ient condi t ion dur in~ which the storage conta iner and oioel ine emnties . Comnlex changes in flow rates at the - .

individual nozzles take nlace. Flow in these systems is ne i the r adiabatic nor i so thermal ( the two

classical limits). T h e comolexi tv of the calculation for large. unba l anced n ine n e t w o r k s r e u u i r e s use of a listed or aooroved c o m p u t e r p rogram.

C o m m o n Limitat ions, Regardless of the m e t h o d used for flow calculations, certain

limits are establ ished d u r i n e the listin~ and anoroval nrocess for tb~ t]qw ~;~tculation. Tvoical limits include:

1. Limit pa-c de~ree of split at tees 2. LiIIfi~ on the or ientat ion of tees $. Limits on a~ent arrival t ime. 4. Limits on a~en t " run out" or "end of liouid" t ime differences

between nozzles ~, ]Minimum pressure limits 6. M i n i m u m flow densi ty 7, M a x i m u m a n d m i n i m u m storage conta iner fill densi ty 8. Addit ional limits soecific to the flow calculat ion n roe ram. T h e results of the calculation m u s t be checked to verify tha t limits

have no t been exceeded, Comnute r i zed calculations ~eneral lv r epo r t warn ing or error messages if the system falls outside p r o g r a m limits.

~-"Pressure Drop For Two Phase Carbon Dioxide Fiowin~ In Pipe l~ines". I.C. Hesson. Master of Science Thesis in CH.E. Illinois [Institute of Technolotw. lan. 1955.

~DiNenno, P . I . E . W . Forssell. M.I. Ferreira. C.P. Hanauska . and [LA. J o h n s o n . "Modelin~ of the Flow Proner t ies a n d Discharge of Ha lon R e p l a c e m e n t A~ents". Process Safety Proexess (Vol. 14. No. 1. l anuarv 1995L

£Wvsocki. T.I.. "Sinele Point Flow Calculat ions for Liouefied Comnres sed C, as Fi re Extin~,uishin~ A~ents". Ha lon Ont ions Technica l Workin~ Confe rence Proceedines . Albuoueroue . New Mexico. 1996.

iWvsocki. T.I. and B.C. Chr is tensen . "Inert Gas Fire Suunress ion Systems Usin~ 1G541 (lner~en~ Solvin~ the Hydraul ic Calculat ion Problem". Ha lon Oot ions Technical Workin~ Confe rence ~ r o c e e d i n ~ . Albuquerque . New Mexico. 1996. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Editorial. Changes made to submi t t ed material .

(b) The system discharge t ime predic ted by the flow calculat ion m e t h o d shou ld agree with the actual system discharge t ime -~St.%in a range e f '. or 1O percen t by-10 pe rcen t to +10 percent of the predic ted value or b~ 1 second, whichever is greater.

(c) The average nozzle p re s su re s predicted by the flow calculat ion m e t h o d shou ld agree with the actual nozzle pressures • : . ' i t h : . n a ~ n g e c f '. cr 10 pe rcen t by -10 percen t to +10 nercen t of the predic ted value. S U B S T A N T I A T I O N : The wording above serves two purposes:

1. Unequivocally identifies what the percentages are to be based u p o n (the measu red n u m b e r or the predic ted n u m b e r ) to de te rmine pass/fail .

2. Adds the r equ i r emen t that the s t andard deviation of the percentage of "error" for the agen t quanti ty mus t be limited. This is in response to concerns tha t widening the pass fail criteria to + or - 10 pe rcen t is too liberal. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept in Principle.

Revise A-3-2.1 as follows: A-3-2.1 A listed or approved calculat ion m e t h o d shou ld predict

a g e n t mass d ischarged per nozzle, average nozzle pressure, an d system discharge t ime within the following m i n i m u m limits of accuracy:

(a) The mass of agen t predic ted to discharge f rom a nozzle by the flow calculat ion m e t h o d shou ld agree with the mass of agent measu red f rom the nozzle by-10 pe rcen t to +10 pe rcen t (predicted to actual) of the predicted value. Therefore , ~he ~.~_2cu!a~vn

m ~ - ^ + I ~ m . . . . . . * . . . . . . AI . . . . . + - I ; . * +'I+. . . . . . . . . . +~ . . . . . C

++ +" . . . . . r +~^~ 1,~ . . . . . . + A s tandar~ devlatlon" " l age . . . . ,, . . . . . . . . . . . v . . . . . . . . o f the + percentage differences between measu red and predicted nozzle agen t ouantit ies, relative to zero. shall no t be greater than 5 oercent . The . s t anda rd deviation is calculated by ( . Information will be provided by Chris Hananska)

(b) The system discharge t ime predic ted by the flow calculation m e t h o d shou ld agree with the actual system discharge t ime ; ; - ~ ' n

. . . . . . ¢ 1 1 % . . . . . . + f ~ . , 1 / I . . . . . . + + ^ , 1 / x . . . . . . * ^ ~ + h ~

predicted value or I?y +/-1 second, for ha loca rbon systems or +/- 10 seconds for iner t gas systems whichever is greater.

(c) The average nozzle p ressures predic ted by the flow calculat ion m e t h o d shou ld agree with the actual nozzle pressures ....+t.:_ = . ~ - ~ ~. ; . . . . pcrcee.t by -10 pe rcen t to +10 ne rcen t of ~h~ predic ted value. C O M M I T T E E STATEMENT: Added in fo rmat ion for s tandard deviation calculation and criteria for iner t gas systems.

(Log #CCt) 2001- 99 - (Table A-3-4.2.1): Accept SUBMITTERz Technica l Commi t t ee on Halon Alternative Protect ion Opt ions C O M M E N T ON PROPOSAL NO: 2001-106 R E C O M M E N D A T I O N : Revise Table A-3-4.2.1 to read as shown on the following page: S U B S T A N T I A T I O N : Upda ted data in Table. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept .

(Log #53) 2001- 98 - (A-3-2.1): Accept in Principle SUBMITTER: Chr i s topher P. Hanauska , H u g h e s Associates, Inc. C O M M E N T ON PROPOSAL NO: 2001-105 R E C O M M E N D A T I O N : Revise A-3-2.1 as follows:

A-3-2+1 A listed or approved calculat ion m e t h o d shou ld predic t agen t mass d ischarged per nozzle, average nozzle pressure, and system discharge t ime within the following m i n i m u m limits of a c cu racy:

(a) The mass o f agen t predic ted to discharge f rom a nozzle by the flow calculation m e t h o d shou ld agree with the mass of agen t

[ A ¢1 measu red f rom the nozzle by -10 pe rcen t to +10 pe rcen t x p r e ~ c t e ~ I ~ W l . g I~ I I te =cruz.., Of the predic ted value . . . . cr~.cre, t . .c c:.cu.=t2on

met.Sod zhc.u!-, a no t ~'.'cr predic t the mcazu:-cd mazz of agen t by more +.F.z~q 5 pe rcen t n~r "-rider F r c x c t tF.c mc-~urcd .q'~:: c f . . . . . b7 . . . . . t.^~ ~ . . . . . . . A s tandard deviation of the vercenta~e dif ferences between measu red and nredic ted nozzle a~ent tmantit ies, relative to zero. shall no t be greater than 5 nercent .

(Log #CC9) 2001- 100 - (Table A-3-4.2.1): Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Commi t t ee on Halon Alternative Protect ion Opt ions C O M M E N T ON PROPOSAL NO: 2001-106

I R E C O M M E N D A T I O N : Change the informat ion for IG-100 of Table A-3-4.2.1 to read as shown on the following page: S U B S T A N T I A T I O N : ] 'able A-~4.2.1 does no t current ly address IG-100. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept .

606

N F P A 2 0 0 1 - - F 9 9 R O C

Table A-3-4.2.1 Inerting Concentrations for Various Agents

Fuel i-Butane

1-Chloro-1, 1-difluoro- ethane (HCFC-].42b) 1,l-Difluoroethane (HFC-152a)

Difluorometha~e (HFC-32)

Ethane

Voi% Inertlng

Agent Concentration Reference HFG-227ea 11.3 Robin

HCFC-Blend A 18.4 Moore(a) IC.-IO0 40 Zabetakis

HFC-227ea 2.6 Robin

HFC-227ea 8.6 Robin HCFA-BlendA 13.6 Moore(a)

HFC-227ea 3.5 Robin HCFC-Blend A 8.6 Moore /a /

IG-100 44 Zabetakis

Ethylene Oxide Hexane Methane

Pentane

Propane

(This value may be deleted)

HFG-227ea 13.6 Robin IC,-100 42 Zabetakis FG218 8.9 Skates

H FC-125 14.7 Senecal HFC-227ea 8.0 Robin

HFC-23 20.2 Senencal HCFC-Blend A 18.3 Moore(a)

1G-1 O0 37 Zabetakis IG-541 43.0 Tamanini

HFC-227ea 11.6 Robin IG-1 O0 42 Zabetakls FC-218 11.2 Skaggs

FC-$-I-10 10.3 Senecal FC-3-1-10 9.9 Skaggs FC-5-1-14 7.3 Senecal FIG-1311 6.5 Moore (b) HFC-125 15.7 Senecal

H FG-227ea 11.6 Robin HFC-23 20.2 Senecal HFC-23 20.4 Skagg

HCFC-Blend A 18.6 Moore(a) IG-541 49.0 Tamanini IG-100 42 Zabetakes

Table A-3-4.2.1 lnerting Concentrations for Various Agents

Propane

HCFC 18,5 Blend A 6 ~

FIC-1311 6~g

Moore Right .~Aeere Wrong

Right c, . . . . Wron~

--- Wrong Zabetakis Right

Skaggs Right i

IG 100 42.0

HFC-227ea 11.7

(Log #80) 2001- 101 - (A-3-4.2.2): Reject SUBMITTER: Mark L. Robin, Great Lakes Chemical Corp. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 2001-108 RECOMMENDATION: Delete Section A-3-4.2.2." SUBSTANTIATION: Standard contains a separate appendix detailing the cup burner method (Appendix B). COMMITTEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: See Committee Action and Statement on Comment 2001-102 (Log #118).

(Log #CC15) 2001- 101a- (A-3-4.2.2): Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Halon Alternative Protection Options COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 2001:108

] RECOMMENDATION: Replace . . . . . . . .~ ,~.~ p _ _ g _ _ p t . . . _ ~ . I A-5-4.2.2 with the follo,Mng~

Cup burner testing in the past has involved a variety of techniques, apparatus, and investigators. A standard cup burner test procedure with defined apparatus has now been established and is outlined in Appendix B.

Table A-3-4.2.2 presents cup burner flame extinguishing concentrations for n-heptane.

Revise Table A-3-4.2.2 as shown on the following page: SUBSTANTIATION: Cup burner values for n-Heptance are provided as a baseline. COMMITYEE ACTION: Accept.

607

N F P A 2001 - - F99 R O C

Table A-3-4.2.2 n-Heptane Cup Burner Extini~uishment Concentrations

F•lt8 Cup Burner Value 6.5

FC-3-1-10 5.5 FIC-1311* 3.2 HCFC Blend A, 9.9 HCFC-124 6.6 HFC-125 8.7 HFC-227ea 6.5 HFG-23 12.9 HFC-236fa 6.3 IG-01 42 IG-100* 31 IG-541 31 IG-55 35 *Not derived from standardized cupburner method.

(Log #118) 2001- 102 - (Ao:3-4.2.2): Reject SUBMITTER: Robert L. Langer, Ansul Inc. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 2001-108 RECOMMENDATION: Replace proposed last paragraph under A-3-4.2.2 with the following:

Cup burner testing in the past has involved a variety of techniques, apparatus, and investigators. A standard cup burner test procedure with defined apparatus has now been established and is outlined in Appendix B.

Table A-3-4.2.2 presents cup burner flame extinguishing concentrations for agents in this standard using the test procedures and apparatus described in Appendix B.

Remove all cup burner data not determined in accordance with new Appendix B. Replace cup burner values in Table A-S-4.2.2 for IC,-541 with values as shown:

Fuel Acetone AV Gas Ethanol Heptane Isopropyl Alcohol Methanol Tolune

IG-541 Concentratlo n

31.96% 35.38% 36.90% 30.53% 28.77% 45.04% 23.76%

SUBSTANTIATION: Data in the proposed table has not been generated to the accepted proposed standard. All values are arithmetic average of data submitted to the cup burner sub- committee. That data represents pre-burn times that are inconsistent with the proposed method (pre-burn times exceeding 90 seconds.) Some of the data obtained for blend inert gas agents was obtained using non-homogeneous mix of gas. Standard states multicomponent extinguishants shall be provided premixed. New data submitted for IG-541 was developed using cup burner procedure outlined in new Appendix B.

Note: Supporting material available upon request for review at NFPA headquarters. COMMITTEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: See Committee Action and Statement on Comment 2001-101a (Log #CC15).

(Log #28) 2001- 103 - (Table A-3-4.2.2): Reject SUBMITrER: Joseph A. Senecal, Kidde-Fenwal, Inc. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 2001-109 RECOMMENDATION: Replace existing values supplies by Fenwal in Table A-S-4.2.2 (if this Table is retained in document).

Submitted herewith are newly developed data on the cup burner extinguishing concentrations for gaseous extinguishing agents in current commercial use. These data were obtained using the cup burner procedure as given in the recently prepared international standard ISO/14520.1 Gaseous Fire Extinguishing Systems, Part I: General Requirements, Annex B. All Fenwal data appearing in Table A-~,-4.2.2 of the 1996 edition of NFPA 2001 should be deleted. The data presented in the table below should be inserted in its place.

The method originally used to determine agent extinguishing concentration in the Fenwal cup burner apparatus relied on comparison of gas flows determined using rotameters which had been calibrated for air and corrected for agent vapor density. Gas viscosity effects were neglected. It is now appreciated that gas viscosity effects resulted in significant shifting of the density- corrected rotameter calibrations for the C$ and CA halocarbons. the data presented below was developed using calibrated gas analyzers. In the case of halocarbon agents, multiple calibration gas mixtures were prepared for each agent-air combination. These were used to prepare calibration charts of the output signals from a thermal conductivity type analyzer, a Nova Analytical Systems Model 336. The model Nova 336 is pre-calibrated by the manufacturer for carbon dioxide measurement. The concentrations of the inert gases were determined as follows: (a) they were calculated from corrected rotameter readings, (b) in the case of carbon dioxide the Nova 336 was used according to the manufacturer's instructions and (c) in the case of nitrogen, argon and IC.-541 by back calculation from measured oxygen concentrations in the agent-alr mixtures made using a Nova Model 375 flue gas analyzer. The results obtained for the inert gases and HFG-23 from corrected rotameters and gas analyzers were in excellent agreement.

Tests were carries out at room temperature. The cup burner chimney had a diameter of 85 ram. All tests were conducted using an air flow rate of 40 + 1 liter per minute. A4gent-air mixture was sampled continuously by the gas analyzer during each test. The gas sample was taken at the point where the gas mixture enters the base of the cup burner apparatus. The gas analyzer output consisted of both a digital indicator and a 0-1 VDC signals which were monitored on a strip chart recorder during testing.

The haloearbon agents were tested as supplied from their respective manufacturers. Nitrogen, argon and carbon dioxide were obtained from a commercial supplier, Northeast Air Gas. Mixtures of IG-541 (52 percent nitrogen, 40 percent argon, 8 percent carbon dioxide) were prepared from the component gases by the partial pressure method using calibrated test gauges. Cup burner evaluations were conducted on two separately prepared IG- 541 mixtures. The extinguishing concentrations obtained in the two evaluations were identical. Halon 1301 was obtained from our laboratory supply reserved for use as a reference in extinguishing tests.

The results of the several determinations are reported as follows:

Cup Burner Extinguishing Concentration ISO Method

Fuel: Heptane Test Temperature: 20 5: 2°C

Concentration at Agent Extinguishment

Vol. % IG-1 (Nitrogen) 30.2 +0.4 IG-01 (Argon) 40.8 + 0.4 IG-541 (Inergen) 31.9 5:0.4 Halon 1301 3.2 + 0.1 HFC-23 (FE-13) 12.3 + 0.2 HFC-125 (FE-25) 8.7 + 0.2 HFC-227ea (FM-200 6.6 5:0.1 FC-3110 (CEA-410) 5.3 + 0.1 HFC-236fa (FE-36) 5.9 5:0.1

SUBSTANTIATION: Old data in error due to calibration error in some cases. COMMITTEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: See Committee Action and Statement on Comment 2001-101a (Log #CC15).

(Log #81) 2001- 104 - (Table A-3-4.2.2): Reject SUBMITrER: Mark L. Robin, Great Lakes Chemical Corp. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 2001-108 RECOMMENDATION: Delete Table A-3-4.2.2 values which are from non-standard apparatuses. SUBSTANTIATION: NFPA 2001 now contains a standardized cup burner procedure and hence only values obtained according to this standard are relevant. COMMITTEE ACTION: Reject. COMMI'Iq'EE STATEMENT: See Committee Action and Statement on Comment 2001-101a (Log #CC15).

608

N F P A 2 0 0 1 ~ F 9 9 R O C

(Log #3) 2001- 105 - (A-$-4.2.2.3): Accept in Principle SUBMITTER: Richard L. Niemann, Modular Protection Corp. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 2001-111 RECOMMENDATION: Suggest Appendix A, paragraph A-8-4.2.2.3 be revised to include Class "C" tests conductedby Modular Protection Corporation on selected NFPA 2001 clean agents. The Class "C" test results were presented in a Poster Presentation at the 1998 Halon Options Technical Working Conference Sheraton Old Town Hotel, Albuquerque, New Mexico during May 12 - 14, 1998.

Proposed revision to Appendix A, paragraph A-3-4.2.2.3 should read:

A-3-4.2.2.3 Energized electTical equipment that might provide a prolonged ignition source should be deenergized prior or during a~ent discharge.

f electrical equipment cannot be deenergized, consideration should be given to use of extended agent discharge, higher initial concentration, and the possibility of the formation of combustion and decomposition products. Additional testing may be needed on suppression of energized electrical equipment fires to determine their quantities.

Some examples of test methods on electrically energized equipment fire that may be useful are given in the following paragraphs:

A-3-4.2.2.3.1 "Extinguishment Tests of Continuously Energized Class C Fires Using HFG.227ea (FM-200~" orenared by Hughes Associates. Inc. [I-nser~ paragraphs numbers $. 4, and 5, Renumber Table A-3-4.2.2.3(a) and Table A-3-4.2.2.3(b~ to Table A-3-4.2.2.3.1 (a) and Table A-3-4.2.2.3.1(b).]

A-3-4.2.2.3.2 "Uodate on the Evaluation of Selected NFPA A~ents for Suooressing (flass "C" Energized Fires" oreoared by Modular Protection Corporation.

The objective-of the tests conducted by Modular Protection Corooration was to investieate the effectiveness of new clean a~ents to extinguish Class "C" energized fire of nolvmeric materials ignited by heat flux. Specific tests were conducted to det¢rr0Jne the following: Minimum agent concentration required to extinguish Class "C" energized fires and minimum agent concentration reouired to orevent reflash/reimqition.

The clean agents selected for testing were: FC-2-1.8 (3ML FG-3-1-10 (3ML HFC-23 (DuPo~lO. HFG-227ea-(Grcat Lakes). and HFC-~$6fa (DuPon0,

The criteria used for conducting tests on the above clean agents w~r~;

Pre-burn 60 Seconds Discharge time _<10 Seconds Flame extinguishment <$0 Seconds No reflash/reit, nition --210 Seconds

Each clean agent was tested for: minimum concentration rcq~ir¢~ for flame extint, uishment and minimum concentration required to nrevent reflash/reignition for a neriod uo to ten minutes after flame extintmishment. The test nrotocol used to conduct the clean agent tests are displayed below:.

The results of the clean agent tests to determine concentrations required to extinguish and to orevent reflash/reignition at e n e r ~ levels of 48 watts and 192 watts are dlsolaved below:. SUBSTANTIATION: The proposed revision to Appendix A-5-4.2.2.3 will provide users of NFPA 2001 with information on Class "C" energtzed fire tests other than those conducted by Hughes Associates. In addition, the Modular Protection Corporation Class "C" energized fire test includes other halocarbon clean agents approved by NFPA 2001 for total flooding in addition to HFC-227ea. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept in Principle. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: See Committee Action and Statement on Comment 2001-38 (Log #34).

(Log #35) 2001- 106- (A-3-4.2.2.3): Reject SUBMITTER: William L. Grosshandler, Nat'l. Institute of Standards and Technology COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 2001-111 RECOMMENDATION: Delete all material proposed. ' SUBSTANTIATION: Deep-seated energized fires are likely to require additional agent. No data are presented to indicate that the proposed tests will produce required concentrations in excess of heptane cup burner values, ff included in the standard, we are simply recommending an additional unnecessary and expensive test. Until a test method has been developed that can really emulate a deep-seated plastic fire, or until enough data are

Table A-3-4.2.2.3.2(a) Test Protocol

1

Fuel Sample/Wire Confil~luration

4-in. long, 24-gauge, nichrome wire inserted in center of PMMA block (3 in. x 1 in. x 5/8 in.) 12-in. long, 20-gauge, nichrome wire wrapped around PMMA block (3 in. x 2 in. x 1/4 in.)

Agent Tests Conducted

48 FC-2-1-8 10 FC-3-1-10 8 HFC-23 7 HFG227ea 7 HFC-236fa 13

192 FC-2-1-8 6 FC-3-1-10 12 HFC-23 5 HFC-227ea 7 HFC-236fa 8

Table A-3-4.2.2.3.2 (b) Energy Prevent Level Extinguish Reflash/Reignition

Agent (W) (rain. conc., % by vol.) ,(rain. conc., % by vol.) FC-2-1-8 48 7.0 7.5

192 9 . 0 12.0 FC-3-1-10 48 5.5 8.0

192 6.5 9.5 HFC-23 48 13.0 16.0

192 14.0 20.0 HFC-227ea 48 6.5 8.0

192 8.0 9.0 HFC-236fa 48 6.3 6.5

192 6.5 9.0

609

N F P A 2001 ~ F99 R O C

available from the proposed method to show that a measurable increase in agent is required, a more appropriate way is to call out the minimum concentration as discussed in my comment on proposal 2001-1 as shown belo~.

5-4.1.2~ The flame extinguishing concentration for Class A fuels shall be determined by test as part of a listing program. ~ A..!,~* As a minimum, the listing program shall conform to UL 1058, Standard for Halogenated Extinguishing System Units, and UL procedure cnt 'ded Fire Extinguishment/Area Coverage Fire Test Procedure for Engineered and pre-Engineered Clean Agent Extinguishing System Units, or its equivalent.

3-4.2.2.2* The minimum design concentration for a Class A surface fire hazard shall be as determined in 3-4.1.2 but shall not be less than the extinguishing concentration as determined in 3-4.1.1 for hentane limes 1.2 (this adds a 20 oercent safetv factor). -~ . . . . on . . . . . . .

COMMITTEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Material currently reflects the recognized third party approval.

(Log #107) 2001- 107- (A-$-4.2.2.3): Accept SUBMITTER: Robert L. Langer, Ansul Inc. COMMENT O N PROPOSAL NO: 2001-111 RECOMMENDATION: Reword Item 2 of proposed text as follows:

2. Test Enclosure. These Class A tests shall be conducted in a draft free room with a volume of at least ~5 r.. 3 100 m 3 and a .,~--',~im'-~ minimum height of A m 3.5 m and each wall at least 4 m long. Provisions shall be made for relief venting if required.

Figure 2 Chamber plan view change 3.43 m (11.25 it) dimensions to 4 m (13.12 ft) SUBSTANTIATION: To provide consistency with the UL proposed standards 2127 and 2166; and ISO/TC21/SC8 Gaseous cAgent Fire Extinguishing Systems.

OMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log #108) 2001- 108- (A-3-4.2.2.3): Accept SUBMITTER: Robert L. Langer, Ansul Inc. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 2001-111 RECOMMENDATION: Revise second paragraph in Item 4.1.6 as follows:

"During the post-discharge period, the oxygen concentration shall not a14- fall below 0.5 percent by volume...". SUBSTANTIATION: Editorial. COMMITI'EE ACTION: Accept.

(Log #109) 2001- 109- (A-3-4.2.2.3): Accept in Principle SUBMITTER: Robert L. Langer, Ansul Inc. COMMENT O N PROPOSAL NO: 2001-111 RECOMMENDATION: Revise Item 4.2,1 as follows:

(c) agent concentration (±5 percent) (Inert was concentration to be calculated based on oxygen concentration)

(d) agent ~i~c~argc *:-..,~ SUBSTANTIATION: Agent concentration not measured with inert agents, oxygen concentration is used to determine concentration of agent.

Discharge time is recorded under 4.2.2, it is not continuously recorded during the test. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept in Principle.

Revise Item 4.2.1 as follows: (c) agent concentration (_+5 percent) ('Inert Eas concentration

can be calculated based on oxveen concentration) (d) a-cnt dizc~ar~c 5mc " -

CO~d]~TTEE STATEMENT: Editorially changed to "can be calculated".

(Log #110) 2001- 110- (A-3-4.2.2.3): Accept SUBMYUrER: Robert L. Langer, Ansul Inc. COMMENT ON P ROP O SAL NO: 2001-111 R E C O M M E N D A T I O N : Revise Item 4.2.2(d) as follows:

"Time of beginning tog_[ discharge of agent. SUBSTANTIATION: Editorial. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log #116) 2001- 111 - (A-3-4.2.2.3): Accept in Principle SUBMITTER: Jonathan S. Meltzer, Kidde-Fenwal Inc. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 2001-111 RECOMMENDATION: Revise Section A-3.4.2.2.3 Extinguishment Test (non-cellulosic) Class A Surface Fires. Table 1 Plastic Fuel Properties as follows: SUBSTANTIATION: The information given in Table 1 is incorrect and should be updated with more recent information supplied by Hughes Associates Inc. The revised Table 1 was submitted by Hughes Associates to UL and appears in the UL2166 August 1998 draft. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept in Principle.

I Revise Section A-3.4,2,2.3 Extinguishment Test (non-cellulosic) Class A Surface Fires. Table 1 Plastic Fuel Properties as follows: COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Editorially corrected the effective heat of combustion for polypropylene.

Fuel PMMA Polypropylene ABS

Table 1 Plastic Fuel Pro )erties 25 k W / m z Exposure in Cone Calorinieter - ASTME 1354

180 Second Average Densit), l~nidon Time Heat Release Rate

Color (~/cm ~) (see) Tolerance kW/m Z Tolerance Black 1.19 77 +_.30% 286 25% Natural (White) 0.905 91 +_.30% 225 25% Natural (Cream) 1.04 115 +_30% 484 25%

Effective Heat of Combustion M~3/k~ Tolerance

.3 ±15% 39.8 +_15% 29.1 ±15%

Fuel PMMA Polypropylene

ABS

Table 1 Plastic Fuel Pro erties 25 k W / m z Exposure in Cone Calorinieter - ASTME 1354

180 Second Average Densi ty I{~nition Time Heat Release Rate

Color " ( ~ / c m ~) (sec) Tolerance k W / m z Tolerance Black 1.19 "77 ±30% 286 25% Natural (White) 0.905 91 +_.30% 225 25%

Natural (Cream) 1.04 115 +_30% 484 25%

Effective Heat o f Combust ion M ] / k g Tolerance

23.3 4-15% gO,6 +15%

29.1 +-15%

610

N F P A 2 0 0 1 - - F 9 9 R O C

(Log #85) 2001- 112 - (Table A-3-4.2.2.3): Accept in Principle SUBMITTER: Mark L. Robin, Great Lakes Chemical Corp. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 2001-111 RECOMMENDATION: Change Table to:

Fuel Density [ g / ( m $ ) ] Ignition time at 180s average HRR 25 kw/m 2 at 25 kw/m 2

PMMA 1.190 77 + 50% 286 + 25% PP 0.905 91 + 30% 225 5: 25% ABS 1.04 115 + 50% 404 + 25%

SUBSTANTIATION: Better reflects properties of commercial available materials and affords compliance with UL 2127, UL 2166. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept in Principle. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: See Committee Action and Statement on Comment 2001-111 (Log #116).

(Log #114) 2001- 113 - (A-3-4.2.2.4): Accept in Principle SUBMITTER: Jonathan S. Meltzer, Kidde-Fenwal Inc. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 2001-33 RECOMMENDATION: Revise Secdon A-5.4.2.2.4 Fire Extinguishment/Area Coverage for Test Procedure for Engineered and Pre-Engineered Clean Agent Extinguishing System Umts Number 5 Test as follows:

Modify the wording presented in the exception to read as follows: Exception: The test enclosure(s) for the maximum height,

flammable liquid and wood crib fire extinguishment tests need not have the maximum covei~tge area but should be at least 10 ft (2.0 m-)- 13.1 ft (4.0 m) wide by . . . . t~, . . . . . . ~ --x, 13.1 ft (4.0 m) long and 3351 fi5 fl00 mS)in volume. SUBSTANTIATION: This section is intended to give description of UL test~procedure. The additional text makes this section consistent with new requirements specified in UL2166 August 1998 draft. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept in Principle.

Revise Section A-3.4.2.2.4 Fire Extinguishment/Area Coverage for Test Procedure for Engineered and Pre-Engineered Clean Agent Extinguishing System Units Number 5 Test as follows:

Modify the wording presented in the exception to read as follows: ; Exception: The test enclosure(s) for the maximum height, 'flammable liquid and wood crib fire extinguishment tests need not have the maximum coverage area but should be at least .~n c... ~.~t~ m-)-15.1 ft (4.0 m) wide by !0 ff (2.0 ..~.) 15.1 ft (4.0 m) long ~._~.~ ~ 5 ! ~ 5 and 3531 ft5 (100 m 3)in volume. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Editorial correction.

(Log #115) 2001- 114- (A-3-4.2.2.4) Accept SUBMITTER: Jonathan s. Meltzer, Kidde-Fenwal Inc_ COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 2001-33 RECOMMENDATION: Revise Section A-3.4.2.2.4 Fire Extinguishment/Area Coverage for Test Procedure for Engineered and Pre-Engineered Clean Agent Extinguishing System Units Number 10 Flammable Liquid Extinguishment Test as follows:

Modify the first sentence with the following revised wording: Steel test cans having a nominal thickness of 0.216 in. (5.5 ram).

e.tr. Schedule 40 nine. and 5.0 to 5.5 in. (76.2 mm to 88.9 mm) in v - .

diameter and at least 4 in. (102 mm) high, containin$ either heptane, or heptane and water, are to be placed within 2 in. (50.8 mm) of the comers of the test enclosure(s) and directly behind the baffle (see below), and located vertically within 12 in. (305 ram) of the top or bottom of the enclosure, or both top and bottom if the enclosure permits such [placement... SUBSTANTIATION: This section is intended to give description of UL test procedure. The additional text makes this section consistent with new requirements specified in UL2166 August 1998 draft. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log #82) 2001- 115- (A-3-5.3.2): Accept SUBMITTER: Mark L. Robin, Great Lakes Chemical Corp. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 2001-112

I RECOMMENDATION: Replace "5 percent" with ~10 percent". SUBSTANTIATION: Renders NFPA 2001 compliant with UL 2127 and UL 2166. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log #111) 2001- 116- (A-3-5.3.2): Reject SUBMITTER: Robert L. I.anger, Ansul Inc. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 2001-112 RECOMMENDATION: Delete the proposed Section A-$-5.3.2 in its entirety. SUBSTANTIATION: Testing for agency listing/approval as well as many full discharge tests of multi-nozzle multi-room systems has not shown this to be a problem. A statistical analysis without substantial test data should not be the basis to require an increase in agent quantity. COMMITTEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: See Committee Action and Statement on Comment 2001-51 (Log #106).

(Log #CC14) 2001- 117- (A-~-5.5.3): Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Halon Alternative Protection Options COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 2001-52 RECOMMENDATION: Revise third paragraph sentence to read as follows:

"Obstructions such as ducts, cable, trays, large conduits, light fLxtures, etc., have the potential to disrupt the flow pattern of the agent from the nozzle." SUBSTANTIATION: Clarification. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log #24) 2001- 118 - (A-~-7): Accept in Principle SUBMITTER: Lorne MacGregor, North American Fire Guardian Technology, Inc. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 2001-35, 2001-115 RECOMMENDATION: Delete all the text added by 2001-115 (Log # 5 ) . SUBSTANTIATION: The exact text, as it appears in the Report on Proposals, was not available when proposals were being considered by the committee. This text is inappropriate: to quote Dan Moore's comment on the letter ballot on the proposals:

"Proposed Section A-3-T should not be included in NFPS (sic) Standard 2001 for the following reasons: o* n The subnisdion (sic) constitutes a "fire performance report"

a particular product; a category which has never been included in the standard.

• It is an implied endorsement of that product to the exclusion of others in the standard.

• It begs other manufacturers to submit data according to thei r chosen parameters and test methods. The end result being a voluminous standard containing non-comparable information. Also, this would set a precedent for including other fire performance reports such subjects as decomposition, room pressurization, deep seated extinguishment, etc.

• This information can be made available to interested parties via industry publications and seminars."

This testing seems to be of limited value for evaluating fires caused by, and sustained by, energized electrical equipment as all fires had to be initiated with a pilot flame these tests are not representative of electrically caused fires. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept in Principle. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: See Committee Action and Statement on Comment 2001-58 (Log #54).

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N F P A 2 0 0 1 - - F 9 9 R O C

(Log #105) 2001- 119 - (A-3-7): Accept in Principle SUBMITTER: Robert L. I_anger, Ansul Inc. COMMENT O N P R O P O S A L N O : 2001-$3 R E C O M M E N D A T I O N : Delete the proposed new wording to A-5-7:

Also, delete Table A-3-7.1 Ohmic Heating Suppression Test Results and Table A-3-7.1 Conductive Heating Suppression Test Results. SUBSTANTIATION: The test procedure used to generate the data is not an accepted industry standard. Data submitted is based on one manufacturers product using one test method; other tests using different test procedures have shown different results. This opens the door to putting other test reports in the standard. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept in Principle. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: See Committee Action and Statement on Comment 2001-38 (Log #34).

(Log #84) 2001- 120 - (A-3-8.1.2): Accept in Principle SUBMITTER: Mark L. Robin, Great Lakes Chemical Corp. COMMENT O N P R O P O S A L N O : 2001-114, 2001-115 R E C O M M E N D A T I O N : Revise text as follows:

A. In paragraph 4, strike second sentence and add the following after "This decomposition issue is not unique to these agents."

"The thermal decompositionproducts resulting from the extinguishment of fires with Halon 1 $01 have been investigated by numerous authors (1-2) and it has been well established that the most important thermal decomposition products of Halon 1501 from the standpoint of potential toxicity to humans or potential corrosion of equipment are the halogen acids HF and HBr. Concentrations ranging from a few ppm to over 7000 ppm HF and HBr have been reported, depending upon the exact nature of the fire scenario (S).

1. C.L. Ford, Halon 1501 Computer/Fire Test Program: Interim Report, 1972.

2. R.R+ Cholin, FireJournal, Sept 1972. 5. R.S. Sheinson, et al, HF and HBr Production from Full Scale

CFsBr (Halon 1301) Fire Suppression Tests, J. Fire & Fiamm., 12, 229 (1981).

B. In seventh paragraph, strike second sentence. C. In tenth paragraph, strike the first sentence and move the

second and third sentences to the end of paragraph 9; replace paragraph 10 with the following text:

"While the above results are based on Class B fuels, fires involving Class A combustibles produce lower HF concentrations. Skaggs and Moore (1) have pointed out that for typical computer rooms and office spaces, the analysis of DiNenno, et al (2) employing fire growth models and test data indicate that the thermal decomposition produce concentrations from he halogenated agents would be comparable to that from Halon 1301. Figure 1 shows the average HF concentration resulting from the extinguishment of Class A fires (magi~etic tape, waste paper, PC boards, PVC cables) under conditions typical of those expected in telecommunication and EDP facilities with 7% v/v HFC-227ea. Also shown in Figure 1 is the mammalian LC50 for mammals, derived from Sax (2), and the DTL of Meldrum. Peatross and Forsell (4) in their analysis of the test results concluded that "from an examination of the HF exposures, it is obvious that this type of fire does not pose a toxic threat."

1. S.R. Skaggs and T. Moore, Toxicological Properties of Halon Replacements, 208th AC~ Meeting, Washington, DC, 1994.

2. P. DiNenno, Engineering Evaluation and Comparison of Halon Alternatives and Replacements, 1995 International CFC & Halon Replacement Conference, Washington, DC, 1993.

3. N.I. Sax, Dangerous Properties of Industrial Materials, 6th ed., Van Nostran Rheinhold, New York, 1984.

4. M.J. Peatross and E.W. Forsell, Comparison of Thermal Decomposition Product Testing of Halon 1301 Alternative Agents, 1996 Halon Options Technical Working Conf., 1996.

6000

IO00

00 ~0 ~ ~ 4O r+o .,.J rr.mo, o ~ "rim,., It¢+nl

Figure 1 Hazard assessment of HF concentration.

S U B S T A N T I A T I O N : A. Additional relevant information on decomposition provides

B. Does not agree with text following wherein a relationship between the fire size to room volume ratio and the amount of HF produced is discussed. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept in Principle.

Replace introductory text with the following: 1. The optimum discharge time is a function of many variables.

Five variables are very important:

(a) Limitation of decomposition products (b) Limitation of fire damage and its effects (c) Enhanced agent mixing (d) Limitation of compartment overpressure, and (e) Secondary nozzle effects.

With regard to the potential threat to life or assets associated with a fire event, it is essential that the end user understand that both the products of combustion and decomposition products formed from the suppression agent contribute to the total threat.

Essentially all fires will produce carbon monoxide and carbon dioxide, and the contribution of these products to the toxic threat posed by the fire event is well known. In the case of large fires, the high temperatures encountered can by themselves lead to life and asset threatening conditions. In addition, most fires produce smoke, and it is well documented that damage to sensitive assets can occur at very low levels of smoke. Depending upon the particular fuel involved, numerous toxic products of combustion can be produced in a fire event, for example HCI, HBr, HF, HCN, CO and other toxic products.

The halogenated hydrocarbon fire extinguishing agents described in this standard will break down into their decomposition products as they are exposed to a fire. It is essential that the end user understand this process as the selection of the discharge time, and other design factors, will be impacted by the amount of decomposition products the protected hazard can tolerate.

The concentration of thermal decomposition products produced from a halogenated fire suppression agent is dependent upon several factors. The size of the fire at the time of system activation and the discharge time of the suppression agent play major roles in determining the amount of decomposition products formed. The smaller the fire, the less energy (heat) is available to cause thermal decomposition of the suppression agent, and hence the lower the concentration of thermal decomposition products. The size of the fire at the time of system activation is dependent upon the fire growth rate, the detector sensitivity and the system discharge delay time. The first factor is primarily a function of the fuel' type and geometry, whereas the latter two are adjustable characteristics of the fire protection system. The discharge time affects the production of thermal decomposition products, as it determines the exposure time to the fire of sub-extinguishing concentrations of the fire suppression agent Suppression systems have traditionally employed a combination of rapid detection and rapid discharge to limit both the production of thermal decomposition products and damage to assets by providing rapid flame extinguishment.

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N F P A 2 0 0 1 ~ F 9 9 R O C

The enclosure volume also affects the concentration of thermal decomposition products produced, since larger volumes, i.e., smaller fire size to room volume ratios, will lead to dilution of decomposition products. Additional factors affecting the concentration of thermal decomposition products include vaporization and mixing of the agent, the preburn time, the presence of hot surfaces or deep-seated fires, and the suppression ag~hnt concentration.

is decomposition issue is not unique to the new clean halogenated agents. The thermal decomposition products resulting from the extinguishment of fires with Halon 1301 have been investigated by numerous authors [1-2], and it is well established that the most important Halon 1301 thermal decomposition products from the standpoint of potential toxicity to humans or

oFtential corrosion of electronic equipment are the halogen acids and HBr. Concentrations of acid halides produced from Halon

1301 ranging from a few ppm to over 7000 ppm HF and HBr have been reported, depending upon the exact nature of the fire

I scenario[3]. Smaller amounts of additional decomposition products can be produced, depending upon the particular conditions of the fire. Under certain conditions, thermal decomposition of Halon 1301 in a fire event has been reported to

r produce small amounts (,f carbonyl fluoride (COF~), carbonyl : bromide (COBra) and bromine (Br~), in addition to relatively large amounts of HF and HBr. Note that all of these products are subject to relatively rapid hydrolysis to form the acid halides HF and HBr [12], and hence these acids co~asdtute the product of primary concern from the standpoint of potential toxicity or corrosion.

As was the case for Halon 1301, the thermal decomposition products of primary con(ern for the halogenated agents described in this standard are the zssociated halogen acids, HF in the case of HFCs and PFCs, HF and HCI in the case of HCFC agents, and HF and HI in the case of I-containing agents. As was the case for Halon 1301, smaller amounts of other decomposition products can be produced, depending upon the particular conditions of the fire. In a fire event, HFC or PFC agents can potentially produce small amounts of (COFz). HCFC agents can potentially produce carbonyI fluoride (COF2), carbonyl chloride (COCl~) and elemental chlorine (Cl~), and I-containing compounds can potentially produce carbonyl fluoride (COFe) and elemental iodine (I~). All of these products are subject to relatively rapid

vcdrolysis [12] to produce the associated halogen acid (HF or I or HI), and hence as indicated above, from the standpoint of

potential toxicity to humans or potential corrosion of electronic equipment the halogen acids are the decomposition products of concern.

The dependence of decomposition product formation on the discharge time and fire size has been extensively evaluated (Sheinson et al 1994, Brockway 1994, Moore et al 1993, Back et al 1994, ForsseU and DiNenno 1995, DiNenno et al 1993, Purser 1998, Dierdorf et al 1993). Figure A-3-8.1.2 (a) is a plot of peak HF concentration as a function of the fire size to room volume ratio. The data encompass room scales of 1.2 m s to 972 m s. The 526 m Sresults are from USCG testing; the 972 m s results are based on NRL testing. These fires include diesel and heptane pool and spray fires. The design concentration in all cases except HCFC blend A (at 8.6 percent) are at least 20 percent abow! the cup burner value. For fires where the extinguishment times were greater than 17 seconds, the extinguishment time is noted in brackets. Note that excessively high extinguishment times (3 60 seconds) generally an indication of inadequate agent concenuations, yield qualitatively high HF concentrations. In addition,'Halon 1301 will yield bromine and hydrogen bromide in addition to HF.

The quantity of HF folmed in the tests is approximately three to eight times higher for all of the halocarbon agents tested relative to Halon 1301 (which also forms bromine and hydrogen bromide). It is important to note that .'ts pointed out by Peatross and Forsell [4], in many of these large fire scenarios the levels of combustion products (e.g., CO) and the high temperatures involved make it unlikely that a person could survive laige fires such as these, irrespective of the HF exposure. The iodine-containing agent CFsI was not tested in the USCG or NRL studies, but other data available on CFsI indicate that its production of HF is comparable to that of Halon 1301; in addition elemental iodine (I2) is formed from CFsl.

There may be differences between the various HFC/HCFC compounds tested, but it is not clear from these data whether such differences occur. In all the data reported, the fire-sources, heptane or diesel pans of varying sizes, were baffled to prevent direct interaction with the agent.

While the above results are based upon Class B fuels, fires involving some Class A combustibles produce lower HF concentrations. For example, hazards such as those in electronic data processing and telecommunication facilities often result in fire

sizes of less than 10kW at detection [5]; in many cases in the telecommunication industry, detection at fire sizes of 1 kW is desired [6]. Skaggs and Moore [7] have pointed out that for typical computer rooms and office spaces, the analysis of DiNenno, et. al., [8] employing fire growth models and test data indicate that thermal decomposition product concentrations from the halogenated agents would be comparable to that from Halon 1301.

Tests by Hughes Associates, Inc., [9] evaluated the thermal decomposition products resulting from the extinguishment of Class A fires typical of those encountered in telecommunication and electronic data processing (EDP) facilities by HFC-227ea. The test fuels included shredded paper, PC boards, PVC coated wire cables, and magnetic tape, representing the most common fuel sources expected to burn in a computer room environment. All fires were extinguished with the minimum design concentration of 7 percent HFG-227ea. A-g-8.1.2(b) [4] shows the HF concentration resulting from these tests. Also shown in A-3- 8.1.2(b) is the approximate mammalian LCs0 [10] and the Dangerous Toxic Load (DTL) for humans based upon the analysis of Meldrum [11]. As seen in A-3-8.1.2(b), the HF levels produced in the computer room were below both the estimated mammalian LCs0 and DTL curves. Peatross and Forsell [4] in their analysis of the test results, concluded that "from an examination of the HF exposures, it is evident that this type of fire does not pose a toxic threat". Also shown in A-3-8.1.2(b) are HF levels produced upon extinguishment of Class B fires of various sizes. In the case of these large Class B fires, HF levels in some cases can be seen to exceed the human DTL. It is important to note that as pointed out by Peatross and Forsell [4], in many of these large fire scenarios the levels of combustion products (e.g., CO) and the high temperatures involved make it unlikely that a person could survive large fires such as these, irrespective of the HF exposure.

2. Section A-3-8.1.2 continues with discussion of inerts (no changes proposed)

"Some agents, such as the inert gases...". 3. Note the changes in Figure A-3-8.1.2(b) as follows:

8000 *PVC v~re ~ncle + PC board

5000 ¢* Magneic tape (dosed) • Paper (top lit) ~Pape¢ (bottom lit)

4000 -LC~o [ --DTL ] ¢-1 MW heptane: USCG

3000 [ ~2,5 MW heptane: NRL ] t~S MW heptane: USCG [ 08.5 MW heptane: NRL

2000

1000

0 0 10 20 30 40 50 60

Exposure 11nle (min)

Figure A-g-8.1.2(b) Hazard assessment of HF connections. Extinguishment of Typical EDP and Class B hazards with

7 percent HFC-227ea.

4. References 1. C.L Ford, Halon 1301 Computer Fire Test Program: Interim

Report, 1972. 2. R.R. Cholin, Testing the Per[ormance of Halon 1301 on Real

Computer Installations, Fire Journal, Sept. 1972. 3. R.Sheinson, et. al.,J. Fire & Flamm., 12, 229 (1981). 4. M.J. Peatross and E.W. Forsell, A Comparison of Thermal

Decomposition Product Testing of Halon 1301 Alternative Agents, 1996 Halon Options Technical Working Conference, Albuquerque, NM, 1996.

5. Meacham, 1974 6. NIST 1998 Fire Detection Workshop. 7. S.IL Skaggs and T. Moore, Toxicolog#al Properties of Halon

Replacements, 208th ACS National Meeting, Washington, DC, 1994; S.R. Skaggs and T. Moore, Toxicology ofHalogenated Halon Substitutes, Fire Safety Without Halon Cmfference, Zurich, Switzerland, September 1994.

8. P. DiNenno, Engineering Evaluation and Comparison of Halon Alternatives and Replacements, 1993 International CFC & Halon Alternatives Conference, Washington, DC, 1993.

613

NFPA 2001-- F99 ROC

9. Hughes Associates, Inc., Hazard Assessment of Therrmzl Decomposition Products of FM-200 TM in Electronics and Data Processing Facilities, Hughes Associates, 1995.

10. N.I. Sax, Dangerous Properties of Industrial Materials, 6 ~ ed., Van Nostran Rheinhold, New York, 1984.

11. M. Meldrum, Toxicology of Substances in Relation to Major Hazards: Hydrogen Fluorid~ HMSO, London, 1993.

12. F.A. Cotton and G. Wilkinson, Advanced Inorganic Chemistry, JohnWiley & Sons, New York, 1980, p. 364. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Provided clear concise information on decomposition products with references for additional information.

(Log #CC3) 2001- 121 - (A-4-8): Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Halon Alternative Protection Options COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 2001-60 RECOMMENDATION: Add an asterisk to 4-8*.

Add Appendix material to read as follows: A-4-8 Safety. Safety should be a prime concern during installation, service,

maintenance, testing, handling and recharging of clean agent systems and agent containers.

One of the major causes of personnel injury and property damage is attributed to the improper handling of agent containers by unu'ained and unqualified personnel. In the interest of safety, and in order to minimize the potential for personnel injury and property damage, the following guidelines should be adhered to:

(a) If any work is to be performed on the fire suppression system, qualified fire service personnel, trained and experienced in the type of equipment installed, should be engaged to do the work.

(b) Personnel involved with fire suppression system cylinders must be thoroughly trained in the safe handling of the containers as well as in the proper procedures for installation, removal, handling, shipping and filling; and connection and removal of other critical devices, such as discharge hoses, control heads, discharge heads, initiators and anti-recoil devices.

(c) The procedures and cautions outlined on the cylinder nameplates, and in the Operation and Maintenance Manuals, Owner's Manuals, Service Manuals, and Service Bulletins, that are provided by the Equipment Manufacturer for the specific equipment installed, must be followed.

(d) Most fire suppression system cylinders are furnished with valve outlet anti-recoil devices and in some cases cylinder valve protection caps. DO NOT disconnect cylinders fTom the system piping, or move or ship the cylinders, if the anti-recoil devices or protection caps are missing. Obtain these parts from the distributor of the manufacturer's equipment, or the equipment manufacturer. These devices are provided for safety reasons and must be installed at all times, except when the cylinders are connected into the system piping or being filled.

(e) All control heads, pressure operated heads, initiators, d i scha~e heads, or other type actuation devices ,ust be removed before disconnecting the cylinders from the system piping; and anti-recoil devices a n d / o r protection caps immediately installed before moving or shipping the cylinders. Most fire suppression system equipment varies from manufacturee to manufacturer, therfore it is important to follow the instructions and procedures provided in the equipment manufacturer's manuals. These actions should only be undertaken by qualified fire suppression system service personnel.

(f) Safety is of prime concern! Never assume that a cylinder is empty. Treat all cylinders as if they are fully charged. Most fire suppression system cylinders are equipped with high flow rate valves that are capable of producing high discharge thrusts out of the valve outlet if not handled properly. Remember, pressurized cylinders are extremely hazardous. Failure to follow the equipment manufacturer 's instructions and the guidelines contained herein may result in serious bodily injury, death, and property damage. SUBSTANTIATION: Added safety information for handling cylinders. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log #49) 2001- 122- (A-5-2.2): Accept SUBMITTER: John P. Goudreau, Ansul Inc. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 2001-61 RECOMMENDATION: Replace c!za~ r.gc~t with agents (occurs in two places).

SUBSTANTIATION: Systems used for the protection of general cargo type fires are designed to "control" rather than "extinguish" fires. Due to by-products of decomposition, halocarbons were never permitted to be used for this purpose. Because there are no by-products of decomposition associated with inert gases, they should be permitted as a suitable alternative to carbon dioxide. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log #18) 2001- 123- (A-5-8.3.~,): Accept SUBMITTER: Charles F. Wdlms, Fire Suppression Systems Assn. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 2001-62 RECOMMENDATION: In the first sentence replace "UL 1058" with "UL 2127 and UL 2166". SUBSTANTIATION: UL 2127 and UL 2166 are the new proposed UL Standards for inert gas clean agent and halocarbon clean agent extinguishing system units. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log #112) 2001- 124 - (Appendix B): Accept SUBMITTER: Robert L. Langer, Ansul Inc. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 2001-121 RECOMMENDATION: Add the following title to the new Appendix B:

Appendix B Cup Burner Test Procedure SUBSTANTIATION: Appendix as proposed and accepted did not have a title. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log #56) 2001- 125 - (B-5-2, B-5-$): Accept SUBMITTER: William L. Grosshandler, Nat'l. Institute of Standards and Technology COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 2001-121

I RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read: "B-3.2 Chimney...height of 525+ 25 533 m m ~ 10 nun' . "B-5.$ ...fuel temperature to 25 +_ I°C 22 ± A.°C or...".

SUBSTANTIATION: The NFPA standard should conform to the ISO 14520 to the maximum extent possible. The revisions reflect that goal without compromising the intent of NFPA 2001. COMMITrEE ACTION: Accept.

(Log #22) 2001- 126- (B-7-1): Reject SUBMITTER: Lorne MacGregor, North American Fire Guardian Technology, Inc. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 2001-121 RECOMMENDATION: Delete paragraph as shown below:

SiY~STANTIATION: Very small errors in the 0 2 concentration lead to much larger errors in the calculated agent concentration thus making this an imprecise way to determine agent concentration.

Example:; 0 2 concentration in supply air 21 _+ 0.2% 0 2 in chimney 18:t:0.2% nominal agent concentration 14.3% high agent concentration 16.0% low agent concentration 12.5% difference high to low 24.8% of nominal

concentration An approximately I percent error in determining 0 2

concentrations leads to about a 12.5 percent error (+) in agent concentration. COMMITTEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: While small errors may occur in determining 02 , the error in final agent concentration is not anticipated.

614