ISSN 2502-0722Issue 16 / October 2016

Project Supervisors

Rahimah AbdulrahimExecutive Director, The Habibie CenterHadi KuntjaraDeputy Director for Operations, The Habibie Center

Managing Editor

Ray Hervandi

Thinking ASEAN Team

A. Ibrahim AlmuttaqiAgustha Lumban TobingAskabea FadhillaFina AstrianaMuhamad ArifRahma SimamoraTongki Ari WibowoWirya Adiwena

A Note From the Editor

Articles

Law of the Sea Ruling Reveals China’s Dangerous Nationalism

An Anatomy of the Refugee Issue in Southeast Asia

An Update From Malaysia:New Parties, Old Politics

Infographic:Refugees in Numbers

ASEAN Round-Up

Singapore Withholds Stimulus Even as GDP Tumbles Most Since 2012

Indonesia Remains Global Investment Sweet Spot

‘I Will Kill All the Drug Lords’

Contents

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A note from the editorDear readers:

Welcome to the October 2016 issue of the monthly Thinking ASEAN.

As the year comes to a close, the remaining issues will feature articles that look back at important events that have reverberated in Southeast Asia. There is much ground to cover, and this month’s issue will touch upon the international ruling on the South China Sea and China’s response to it, the lingering refugee issue, and recent developments in Malaysia’s party system.

Huy Duong, non-resident fellow at the Center for International Studies at the University of Social Sciences and Humanities in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam, opens this month’s issue with a rebuttal of China’s nationalist response to the international ruling on the South China Sea. The article points out that the shrill response out of China is ahistoric and ignores the possibility that China could claim the Spratlys and the EEZ around them.

In the second article, Wirya Adiwena, who heads our International Relations program at the Habibie Center in Jakarta, takes a look at the refugee issue in Southeast Asia and associated challenges. He finds historical echoes of the problem in the region and reviews what ASEAN is committed to doing vis-à-vis refugees.

The article by Choong Pui Yee, a PhD candidate at Monash University, Malaysia who focuses on social and political affairs in Malaysia, gives us an update on the recent reconfiguration of Malaysia’s political party system. Despite the rise of new political parties, however, the prospect of Malaysia breaking out of its race- and religion-based politics remains little changed.

We close this month’s issue with a look at the figures surrounding the refugee issue in Southeast Asia. Our Round-Up section highlights articles on Singapore’s decision to withhold stimulus, international investors’ taking another look at Indonesia, and a longread article probing President Duterte’s obsession with eliminating the drug problem in the Philippines.

We look forward to hearing your input on Thinking ASEAN, so don’t hesitate to drop me a line at thinkingasean@habibiecenter.or.id if you have comments, suggestions or prospective submissions.

Happy reading!

Best regards from Jakarta,

Ray HervandiManaging Editor

Thinking ASEAN is a monthly publication that aims to provide insightful, cogent and engaging perspectives on issues central to contemporary Southeast Asia and the ASEAN member states. It is a product of The Habibie Center, with the generous support of the Republic of Korea’s Mission to ASEAN.

The content of Thinking ASEAN does not reflect the official opinion of The Habibie Center or institutions related to the publication. The Habibie Center was founded by Indonesian President Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie in 1999 as an independent, non-governmental and non-profit organization to promote the democratization and modernization of the country.

Responsibility for the information and views expressed in Thinking ASEAN lies entirely with the author(s). For comments, suggestions and prospective contributions, the Managing Editor of Thinking ASEAN can be reached at thinkingasean@habibiecenter.or.id.

2Issue 16 / October 2016

Law of the Sea Ruling Reveals China’s Dangerous NationalismHuy Duong is a non-resident senior fellow at the Center for International Studies (SCIS) at the University of Social Sciences and Humanities in Ho Chi Minh City.

A relief at Borobudur Temple in Indonesia, depicting voyage on a ship.Source: Wikimedia Commons

The recent ruling by the United Nation Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) Arbitration Tribunal on a case brought by the Philippines against the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has been welcomed by many governments that are concerned about rising tensions in the South China Sea. However, within China it has provoked outpourings

of defiance.

As expected, the Chinese government reasserted its staunch position of non-recognition of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction and non-acceptance of the ruling. Its military started new war games and announced air patrols in the South China Sea. An admiral warned1 the United States that its freedom of navigation operations could “play out disastrously,” while another one vowed that China will never stop halfway its controversial construction on the Spratly reefs, adding that2 “The Chinese navy is prepared to react to any infringement of rights or aggression.”

Likewise, “the People’s Liberation Army is ready,” one source with ties to the Chinese military told Reuters.3 “We should go in and give them a bloody nose like Deng Xiaoping did to Vietnam in 1979.” As if not to be outdone in patriotic fervor, the China National Nuclear Corporation announced that it would build nuclear power stations in the South China Sea, explaining that4 “Marine nuclear power platform construction will be used to support China’s effective control in the South China Sea.”

Reportedly5, WeChat and the microblogs used daily by the majority of Chinese people have been flooded with two pictures. One is a letter that calls on veterans to enroll in the army again, with a similar comment, “If there is a war, I will be back to the front upon the call.” The other picture is a map of Chinese territory that marks out the nine-dash line, with the caption that “This is Chinese territory, not an inch of it can be lost.” Similarly, “We do not claim an inch of land that does not belong to us, but we won’t give up any patch that is ours,” proclaimed the front page of the People’s Daily.

Many Chinese contend that this arbitration case was a plot by the United States, Japan—the then president of the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea who appointed four out of the five judges is Japanese—and the Philippines to rob China of its sovereign territory as well as “historic rights” over 80 percent of the South China Sea. China’s deputy foreign minister6 went as far as to accuse the judges of having been influenced by money. However, a reading of the ruling shows that much of this sense of grievance is misguided.

No Ruling on Territory

First, on the question of territory, the Tribunal has not actually made any statement against a single inch of Chinese territory, or any territory belonging to any other country for that matter, which is consistent with the fact that it did not have jurisdiction to resolve territorial disputes. The attribution that it made to the Philippines is regarding the 200-nautical-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), a concept defined in UNCLOS that is distinct from territory. Although it also made decisions on reefs and cays that are below high tide, in international law these are not “islands” and hence not territory over which any country can claim sovereignty. In short, the Tribunal did not touch any part of the earth that can legally be any country’s territory. All the claimants, namely, Brunei, China, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam, can still contest all the insular territories that they could before this legal case.

Claims to insular territories in the Spratlys and at Scarborough

Shoal are not affected by the ruling. Sources: Author’s compilation

It is worth noting that Malaysia and Vietnam, which also claim sovereignty over whole or part of the Spratlys, are not up in arms and claiming that the Tribunal has somehow wronged their territorial sovereignties.

Why, then, is China up in arms about territorial sovereignty? The first reason is that it is making claims that are completely at odds with the norms of international law, specifically, claims to parts of the sea over which no country can legally declare sovereignty. The second reason is that its government is trying to misrepresent the ruling, which is about the EEZ, as being about territorial

sovereignty. This is to both support its view that the Tribunal did not have the jurisdiction to rule on the case and to whip up nationalistic feelings, taking advantage of a pervasive belief that foreigners stole Chinese territory when the nation was weak.

Ruling Is on EEZ and Historic Rights

And what exactly did the Tribunal decide about the EEZ? First, when a country signs up to UNCLOS, that action extinguishes its claims to historic rights in other countries’ EEZs. Significantly, this extinction does not include claims to insular territories and the maritime zones belonging to them. Second, none of the territories in the Spratly archipelago satisfies the requirements of UNCLOS for being entitled to EEZs. These decisions apply to both the Philippines and China.

Regarding the Tribunal’s decision on historic rights in other countries’ EEZs, the China’s venting nationalist sentiments seem unaware of the fact that the Tribunal’s decision is actually consistent with China’s position on the nine-dash line from when that line was first drawn up until at least a few decades ago.

While some might believe that China has “historic rights” over the waters enclosed by that line, that is simply manufactured history—recently manufactured at that. While he was president of the Republic of China (Taiwan), Ma Ying-jeou stated that when China’s Kuomintang government first adopted that line in 1947, it was intended to be a claim to the islands it enclosed, and not a claim of rights over the waters and the seabed. The PRC then maintained that original position through its adoption of the Vienna conventions on the territorial sea and the continental shelf in the 1950s. Tellingly, when, in the 1960s and 1970s, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and South Vietnam staked their claims to various portions of the continental shelf in the southern part of the South China Sea, portions that extend to well inside the nine-dash line, neither the PRC nor the ROC protested.

Throughout the negotiations of UNCLOS III, which concluded in 1982, China was a strong supporter of the 200-nautical mile EEZ regime for coastal countries, and it never raised the notion of historic rights over the waters and the seabed inside the nine-dash Line. Some Chinese scholars7 recognize this and suggest that by that period, China had forgotten about its historic rights. Given that at its birth the nine-dash Line was not a claim to rights over maritime space, and up to the UNCLOS III negotiations, China had never asserted such rights, it would be more accurate to say that China had not yet invented them, rather than to claim it had forgotten about them.

It was not until 1992 that China made its first claim to the continental shelf in the southern part of the South China Sea, when it signed a contract authorizing Crestone, an

American company, to explore for oil in the Vanguard Bank area. The year 1992 was thus the year that the notion of China’s “historic rights” to the seabed inside the nine-dash Line was first conceived. Evidence purporting to show a “history that goes back to ancient times” of those rights was manufactured after that 1992 conception.

Simply put, these outpourings of nationalistic sentiments over “historic rights” over the maritime space inside the nine-dash Line are a result of the popular but mistaken belief that China has been claiming and exercising those rights since at least 1947.Apart from the fact that manufactured history bears no legal weight, once a country has voluntarily signed a treaty with most of the rest of the world, and has benefited from that treaty, it should not be able to tear it up and invent something else that it thinks is more commensurate with the growth of its navy.

With the Tribunal’s view on “historic rights,” its decision that none of the Spratlys features is entitled to an exclusive economic zone is crucial. Without this decision, even with the “historic rights” argument quashed, China would still be able to maintain a veneer of validity for its excessive maritime claims by arguing that the Spratlys belong to it and they are entitled to 200 nautical miles EEZ. Ironically, the outpourings of nationalist sentiments latch on to “territory” and “history,” but ignore this decision completely.

International Law in the Back Seat

It is interesting that very few of the scholars of the most populous country in the world have offered the Chinese public an alternative view8. When Beijing’s official line is so strident, it would be professional suicide for a scholar to buck it. Thus, most Chinese analysis only repeats the official narrative and further fans the flames of nationalism. When a country so totally and so stridently pursues its own version of international law, its claim that its position and conduct are consistent with international law in the abstract is exposed as mere rhetoric. Considered together with a rising tide of Chinese power and nationalism, it is a serious worry that even China’s international lawyers show contempt for the ruling of an international arbitration tribunal.

For now, nationalism is in the driver’s seat of China’s power and there is no sign in the country’s reaction towards the legal case to suggest that the use of that power to pursue its national interests, especially in the South China Sea but also elsewhere, will be tempered by a sense of fairness that draws from international law, or by respect for international norms.

Endnotes1. “The South China Sea: My nationalism, and don’t you forget it,” The Economist, 23 July 2016, http://www.

economist.com/news/china/21702527-xi-jinping-tries-contain-public-fury-over-south-china-sea-my-nationalism-and-dont-you

2. Calum Macleod,“Beijing warns of disaster in disputed seas,” The Times, 20 June 2016, http://www.thetimes.co.uk/edition/world/beijing-warns-of-disaster-in-disputed-seas-whp0jx2xb

3. Ben Blanchard and Benjamin Kang Lim,” ‘Give them a bloody nose’: Xi pressed for stronger South China Sea response”, Reuters, 31 July 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-southchinasea-ruling-china-insight-idUSKCN10B10G

4. Ian Johnston,“ China to build nuclear power stations on disputed islands in South China Sea,” Independent, 15 July 2016, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/china-south-china-sea-spratly-islands-disputed-nuclear-power-philippines-vietnam-japan-a7139421.html

5. Luo Xi,” The South China Sea Case and China’s New Nationalism,” The Diplomat, 19 July 2016, http://thediplomat.com/2016/07/the-south-china-sea-case-and-chinas-new-nationalism/

6. Bill Birtles,” South China Sea: Hague judges may have been influenced by money, Chinese official says,” ABC, 13 July 2016, http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-07-13/china-reasserts-claims-over-south-china-sea-after-hague-ruling/7625114?utm_source=fark&utm_medium=website&utm_content=link

7. Zheng Wang,”China and UNCLOS: An Inconvenient History,” The Diplomat, 11 July 2016, http://thediplomat.com/2016/07/china-and-unclos-an-inconvenient-history/

8. Julian G. Ku,”China’s Legal Scholars Are Less Credible After South China Sea Ruling,” Foreign Policy, 14 July 2016, http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/07/14/south-china-sea-lawyers-unclos-beijing-legal-tribunal/

4Issue 16 / October 2016

An Anatomy of the Refugee Issue in Southeast AsiaWirya Adiwena is Head of the International Relations program at the Habibie Center, Jakarta, Indonesia.

A camp for internally displaced people near Sittwe, Myanmar.Source: Mathias Eick, EU/ECHO

The world is facing a dramatic increase in refugees. According to United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) data, 65.3 million people have been forcibly displaced around the world by the end of 2015. This is the highest number of refugees recorded since World War II and there are no definite signs of a reversal.

Amid this global development, the issue receives considerably less attention in Southeast Asia. International spotlight turned on the region during the 2015 refugee crisis when Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand refused entry to around 25,000 Rohingya and Bangladeshi refugees, leaving them afloat all along the Strait of Malacca and the Andaman Sea for a time.

This tragedy, however, is only part of a wider set of circumstances besetting refugees in Southeast Asia. With that background, this article will sketch out the current challenges facing refugees in Southeast Asia and the region’s refugee regime as an effort to bring more attention to the treatment of this complex issue in the region.

Refugees in Southeast Asia

Southeast Asia has a refugee problem. In 2014, UNCHR counted 2.7 million “people of concern” in the region—the term includes refugees and asylum seekers, stateless persons, and internally displaced persons. Of this figure, 523,592 were counted as refugees and asylum seekers—with 500,000 coming from Myanmar—and 1.4 million were stateless people.

The region’s data reflect the wider trend in the Asia Pacific. By the end of 2015, the region, UNCHR says, hosted 3.8 million refugees, 2.9 million internally displaces persons, and 1.5 million stateless people. The majority of these people come from Afghanistan and Myanmar.

In Southeast Asia, the two largest refugee-receiving or asylum-providing countries are Thailand and Malaysia. In Thailand, around 560,000 refugees and asylum seekers have registered with the UNHCR by January 2016, with 106,300 from Myanmar. The counterpart figure in Malaysia is around 150,700 refugees and asylum seekers by June 2016. Of this total figure, 136,350 are from Myanmar, comprising some 53,140 Rohingyas, 42,480 Chins, 11,140 Myanmar Muslims, 5,620 Rakhines and

Arakanese, and other ethnicities of the country.

However, these figures only tell the fate of the registered or documented ones—the ones acknowledged as refugees or asylum seekers. Both Thailand and Malaysia are also home to many more undocumented refugees and asylum seekers, but the nature of the process of seeking refuge or asylum makes it hard to come up with exact numbers. In the case of Malaysia, in particular, some undocumented refugees have lived in the country for up to four generations without ever having proper documents. Unlike their counterparts in Thailand who often live in camps, refugees in Malaysia are urban in nature, living in refugee communities spread around Malaysia’s big cities.

However, the main problem with refugees in Southeast Asia is not just about the substantial figures, but the lack of acknowledgment of their status as refugees. Few countries in Asia are signatories to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. Some ASEAN member states, however, have adopted the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) and/or the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).1 The CAT and the ICCPR do not bind their signatories to any specific commitment toward refugees, but according to one heterodox interpretation of refugee law, they provide a framework for “universally applicable duty of non-refoulement owed to refugees by all states.”2

Table Southeast Asia’s signatory and non-signatory countries

With the international framework to address the refugee issue missing in Southeast Asia, many ASEAN documents and meetings skirt around, or even refuse to use, the term “refugee.” Instead, the preferred term is “irregular migration” and “illegal migration.” Worse, discussions of the issue often appear with human trafficking—raising the probability of confusing the two different, if sometimes

interrelated problems.

Historical Precedents

The current troubled relationship between Southeast Asia and refugees has a precedent. The Rohingya refugees are not the first case of large refugee influx that the region must deal with. Refugees first became a regional issue with the arrival of refugees as a result of the Vietnam War.

After the South Vietnamese government fell in 1975, hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese journeyed to other countries in Southeast Asia, with Malaysia becoming a principal first stop for a while.3 Malaysia initially placed these refugees in camps supervised by the Malaysian Red Crescent Society and the UNHCR.

However, starting 1979, the number of Vietnamese leaving their country by boats started to increase, and they began to arrive in Thailand and Malaysia at an increasing rate. This development led to an international conference in Geneva in July 1979, which concluded that Southeast Asian countries would provide temporary asylum in exchange for resettlement of Vietnamese refugees in the West.4

Unfortunately, by the late 1980s, the refugee camps were increasingly crowded again although the flow of refugees had decreased. The reason is the more selective criteria5 western countries imposed to reduce resettlements and stanch the seemingly unrestrained flow of refugees. By May 1989, over 20,000 refugees were recorded in Malaysia and its government resumed the policy of turning away boatful of refugees.

In response, a second Geneva conference on Indochinese refugees held in June 1989 resulted in a Comprehensive Plan of Action that 75 countries adopted. Under this regime, the previously automatic resettlement system was replaced with temporary asylum by introducing individual screening for refugee status by government officials and with the UNHCR monitoring. According to Human Rights Watch, during this period, “Persons found not to be refugees would be returned voluntarily or by force.”6

However, despite this arrangement, Human Rights Watch also notes that Malaysia continued to turn away boats. Meanwhile, Courtland Robinson notes differently, saying that although “Malaysia never restored asylum,” the number declined because “the Vietnamese simply stopped coming.” Although the camps for Vietnamese refugees were all closed by the mid-1990s, the legacy of this experience still reverberates in Malaysia—and arguably in the rest of Southeast Asia.

Today, the lack of adoption of the term “refugee” does not only makes it difficult for ASEAN member states to discuss the issue, it also creates a limbo for refugee protection. At the moment, reports suggest that Rohingya

6Issue 16 / October 2016

refugees still live in persecution-like conditions in asylum countries. Recently, shocking news unveiled what might be mass graves of Rohingya refugees in borderlands between Malaysia and Thailand. Additionally, news about the wrongful treatment of refugees by security forces in Malaysia and Thailand have surfaced regularly.7

Moreover, in the particular case of Malaysia, the lack of acknowledgment of refugee status bereft them of government protection. Refugees living in Malaysia are often subject to harsh treatment from the government under the pretext that they are immigrants who arrived and live illegally in the country regardless whether they came to Malaysia to flee persecution or not. At least 34,923 immigrants were caned between 2002 and 2008, according to the Malaysia’s prison department records.8 Since there is no differentiation of status between refugees and illegal immigrants, it is quite likely that refugees were part of the group that faced punishment.

Conclusion

Much like the rest of the world, the picture is bleak for refugees in Southeast Asia but there is a way forward. While ASEAN does not have an established refugee regime, it does put increasing focus on irregular migration and addressing human trafficking. Currently, ASEAN member states attempting to regulate refugees under the wider umbrella of irregular migration through a number of initiatives. The region has the Bali Process on People Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons and Related Transnational Crimes (2002), the Regional Roundtable on Irregular Movements by Sea in the Asia Pacific, and ASEAN Declaration on Trafficking in Persons (2004) and the Protection and Promotion of Rights of Migrant Workers (2007).

It also holds regular Senior Official Meetings (SOM) that bring together the region’s Directors General of Immigration and Heads of Consular Affairs to share updates and best practices around immigration issues and border management. ASEAN has also recently published a Regional Review on Laws, Policies and Practices within ASEAN related to the identification, management, and treatment of victims of trafficking, especially women and children.9

These initiatives provide a way to promote issues related to refugees, such as the provision of healthcare for refugees and the assurance of education for their children. It also provides the opportunity to address human trafficking that often involves refugees.

At the same time, we need to highlight that this framework is not sufficient to ensure protection for refugees. In this context, it would seem that refugees who live in ASEAN will continue to stay between a rock and a hard place for the years to come.

Endnotes

1. Savitri Taylor. 2016. “Refugee protection in the Asia Pacific region”. Retrieved from http://www.refugeelegalaidinformation.org/refugee-protection-asia-pacific-region on September 29, 2016

2. James Hathaway. 2005. The Rights of Refugees under International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005) p. 365

3. Human Rights Watch. 2000. “Malaysia’s treatment of undocumented Rohingya”. Retrieved from https://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/malaysia/maybr008-02.htm#P446_99927 September 1 2016.

4. Ibid

5. Courtland W. Robinson. 2004. “The Comprehensive Plan for Action for Indochinese Refugees, 1989 - 1997: Sharing the Burden and Passing the Buck.” Journal of Refugee Studies 17, no. 3 p. 320

6. Human Rights Watch. 2000. “Malaysia’s treatment of undocumented Rohingya”. Retrieved from https://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/malaysia/maybr008-02.htm#P446_99927 September 1 2016.

7. See, for example, The Independent. 2015. “Mass graves of Rohingya Muslim migrants found in abandoned jungle camps in Malaysia”. Retrieved from http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/mass-graves-of-muslim-migrants-found-in-abandoned-jungle-camps-in-malaysia-10272861.html on September 15, 2016

8. US Department of State. 2011. “2010 Human Rights Report: Malaysia”. Retrieved from http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2010/eap/154391.htm on September 2, 2016

9. ASEAN. 2016. “Regional Review on Laws, Policies and Practices within ASEAN relating to the identification, management and treatment of victims of trafficking especially women and children”, Retrieved from http://asean.org/storage/2016/09/ACWC-Regional-Review.pdf October 1, 2016

An Update From Malaysia: New Parties, Old PoliticsChoong Pui Yee is a PhD Candidate at Monash University Malaysia. Her research focuses on social and political affairs in Malaysia, social movements and religious mobilization.

A Bersih 4.0 rally by a coalition of Malaysian non-government organizations for free, clean, and fair elections.

Source: Wikimedia Commons

Malaysian politics has been nothing short of exciting with the recent expansion of its opposition parties. Last year, a falling-out among the elites of the Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS) led to the formation of a new party. This year, former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad, who is determined to oust Prime Minister Najib Razak, formed

another new party. This article attempts to survey the recent developments in Malaysian politics and argue that despite the many changes, Malaysian politics may not be evolving all that much.

The Latest on Malaysia’s Political Scene

To begin, it is crucial to review some of Malaysia’s key political players. Since 2013, the opposition coalition, the Pakatan Rakyat, or the People’s Alliance (PR), has positioned itself as a formidable challenger to the ruling Barisan Nasional, or the National Front (BN). Comprising PAS, the Democratic Action Party (DAP), and the People’s Justice Party (PKR), the PR succeeded in denying the BN its customary two-thirds majority in parliament in the 2013 general election. Soon afterwards, however, cracks begin to surface in the new coalition, from alleged scandals of key party leaders1 to public discord2 over policy matters.

However, the most spectacular split in the PR occurred not among its party members, but within PAS. This Islamist party has never shied away from its ambition to promote Islamic hegemony in Malaysia. Its ideals are a thorn in the side of a PR that includes parties representing non-Muslim Malaysians, as they usually find it difficult to accommodate PAS’ ambition. To the non-Muslims—and some within the party—PAS was most disturbing when it pushed for the application of hudud laws. This subset of Islamic law includes the amputation of a person’s limbs as punishment for certain serious crimes.

Unsurprisingly, PAS is not monolithic: its membership consists of a hard-line faction called the ulama and a moderate group known as the Erdoğans. The first is an Arabic word for Islamic clerics, while the second refers to Turkey’s Islamist president. Given Malaysia’s multireligious population, the Erdoğans are aware of the importance of a middle ground. Their failure to convince the ulama hardliners to drop the pursuit of Islamic hegemony in Malaysia led to the eventual split of PAS.

8Issue 16 / October 2016

In 2015, the two wings of PAS parted ways. Mohammad Sabu, PAS’ then deputy president, a few other top party leaders left PAS and formed a new party that took the name Parti Amanah Negara (Amanah). In response, the PR’s other members ditched PAS and together with the newly founded Amanah rebranded themselves the Pakatan Harapan, or the Alliance of Hope (PH).

The now ideologically more uniform PAS has drawn itself closer to the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), the leading party of the BN, claiming that their friendly relationship is primarily driven by similar interests in defending Islam in Malaysia. Falling short from a formal merger, the two largest Malay-Islamist parties have given all the cues that they are willing to be partners in politics.

More recently, Mahathir and his associates formed the Parti Pribumi Bersatu Malaysia (Bersatu). Membership in the party is exclusive to Malays and other indigenous peoples of the country. While critics have criticized the communal nature of the party, Mahathir justifies it with the claim that the majority of Malaysians are comfortable with UMNO-type racialism.3 Even though Bersatu and the PH share the goal of defeating the incumbent BN, it is unlikely that the coalition will extend Bersatu an invitation for joining because of Mahathir.

Electoral Politics

Although the newly founded parties will not necessarily compete in all constituencies of Malaysia, they will split the Malay vote. Judging from the objectives of these parties, they are not that much different from each other as they all broadly champion Malay rights and Islamic values, while claiming that they will not neglect the welfare of the minorities.

Perhaps, the main distinction is how Islamic and how Malay-centric these parties actually are. But this is only one aspect. The choice of candidates is another crucial factor that may sway the Malays. For instance, one could be a loyal supporter of a particular party but if the fielded candidate is not deemed impressive or experienced enough, it is possible that one would be more inclined to vote for another party as the general objectives are somewhat similar. Thus, the emergence of these new parties will most likely lower the chance for any party to secure a strong mandate, unless they are willing to strategize together and to compromise.

Another likely scenario is that these new parties are unlikely to make headways in Sabah and Sarawak. Rural areas in East Malaysia are known to be fixed deposits of BN votes because the ruling coalition has the necessary networks and machinery to penetrate into the villages. It is also not uncommon that community leaders or village heads are co-opted by the incumbent.

Unlike urban voters, rural voters are also crippled by their lack of exposure and interests to the wider policies or development in the country. Their consideration may be more insular as compare to urban or semi-urban voters. Instead of policies or national issues, they may have a higher tendency to only focus on their own immediate interests such as development in their own community or what is in store for them. Therefore, the legitimacy deficit of the ruling party or the prime minister may not be that much of a deal to these voters.

In terms of urban seats, East Malaysia has always been rather wary of political parties or candidates that they are not unfamiliar with, especially those that come from the Malay peninsula. Just like the rural seats, it would be difficult for these new parties to woo the urban voters in East Malaysia.

On the other end are the non-Muslims, the middle class and the new voters. Gauging from the past electoral records and the sentiment from the ground, it is perhaps not too audacious to contend that a majority of the Chinese voters have largely abandoned the incumbent and most likely would continue to vote against it. So long as Amanah sticks to the PH, they could stand a chance to secure the Chinese voters as they could ride on DAP, whose support derives mainly from Chinese voters. Conversely, if any of these parties were to raise the specter of an Islamic state in Malaysia or espouse the right-wing narrative of the country, they will only push the ethnic Chinese away.

Even so, regardless of the entrenched communal politics in Malaysia, to solely focus our analysis through a communal lens will give us a myopic view. One must take note that contemporary Malaysia has a large middle class and new voters who transcend racial and religious markers. A majority of these group of voters reside in urban and semi-urban areas where race-based or religious-based issues may not necessarily be that much of a concern. They are also more wired and exposed than rural voters and may not be as insular by focusing on communal issues per se.

Instead, economic concerns will be a more crucial factor of their voting pattern, especially with the steady rise of costs of living and the generally gloomy economic prospects. Still, this could cut both ways. Voters may vote in protest of the incumbent to register their grievances, but there are those who do not wish to rock the boat and would rather retain the status quo than to have any drastic changes because any significant changes may destabilize the economy further.

Right-Wing Politics?

Electoral politics aside, the emergence of these new parties has the potential to reenergize right-wing politics. Prior to the emergence of Bersatu and Amanah, PAS and UMNO

had a long history competing against each other as the model Islamic party. To rally the support that they needed, both parties have raised the race and religion cards. While it may have helped them to maintain or secure power, doing so has concurrently moved the political landscape towards a more right-wing trajectory. The unintended side effect of campaigning on Malay supremacy and subsequently Islamic hegemony has inevitably spurred polarization.

Similarly, the decades of politicking between PAS and UMNO have conflated Malay supremacy and Islamic hegemony in Malaysia. As Islam was politicized for political expediency, it has also relegated non-Muslims’ interests to the periphery and further widened the gap between Muslims and non-Muslims. To the very conservative Muslim supporters, these two notions are not separate, and those voters tend to have very little tolerance of anyone who dares to quibble about it, even if it is framed as a legal debate.

However, while religious minorities in Malaysia would respect Islam as the religion of the country, they are unwilling to accommodate Islamic hegemony. As such, the competition between political Islam and secular democracy will remain a factor in Malaysian politics.

It may be unfair to paint a broad stroke by alleging that these new parties will campaign as their predecessors did. However, let’s not forget they are nevertheless descendants of PAS and UMNO. For political expediency or even sheer relevance to their adherents, they have to play the race and the religion cards. While Bersatu has acknowledged the necessity for its racialist nature, Amanah still largely projects itself as an Islamic party albeit a moderate one. The puzzle is: how far to the right or the center are they willing to go for electoral success?

Democratization or Further Authoritarianism?

Alternatively, one could argue that such development should be viewed positively as it is a step towards democratization. If it is of any consolation, the public now has more options. But is it true? More importantly, is it a good enough reason to celebrate?

Before one celebrates this as a step forward, it is important to remember that democracy is supposed to be messy. It does not necessarily provide the outcome that one wishes. Instead, in some unfortunate instances, it may contribute to the rise of snakeoil salesmen like what we see with Donald Trump in the United States. In Malaysia, despite the emergence of these so called new parties, at its crux, the public is presented with the same key players. Instead of fresh propositions, these parties are merely advocating the causes of their predecessors albeit at a lighter shade. What remains constant is their determination to topple the incumbent.

On the contrary, such developments may in fact propel greater authoritarianism in Malaysia. Lest we forget that the BN is a regime based on parties for whom survival is paramount. One should not be deluded into thinking that the regime would practice or value democratic ideals for their own sake. The recent gerrymandering exercise by the Election Commission is one fine example.4 When threatened, the incumbent is more likely to resort to undemocratic measures to ensure victory. Therefore, additional players in the political scene may seem like a step forward towards democracy on one level, but it also provides reason to strengthen the opposite on the other.

Same Old, Same Old

As we peeled off the cacophony of these noises, the unsettling truth is that there is really little change to the domestic political landscape of Malaysia. Notwithstanding the buzz surrounding these newly formed parties, as long as political elites from both sides of the divide could not or would not shed Malaysia’s religious and communal template, the society would have to continue to struggle with race- and religion-based politics and to negotiate the delicate balance between political Islam and secular democracy.

Granted the political climate in Malaysia has been more vibrant as the public is more emboldened to voice out their demands or even to criticize the regime. Yet, these moments of excitement usually peak during the election period or when there is a mass rally, especially those organized by Bersih. The public participates and votes as it believes that participation will make a difference. Unfortunately, after the immediate euphoria, there has always been a lack of substantial breakthrough. What remains constant is the unceasing politicking that has no concrete effects to the lives or whatsoever to the lives of the day-to-day people, aside from rousing sentiments.

Unlike career politicians who are more prepared to reckon that change takes time, ordinary citizens could get jaded more easily. If they are constantly being wooed with empty promises by political parties, they will soon be adversely conditioned. Worse, in the long run, whatever seemingly promising development may no longer excite them. And as these noises fade to the background, so will their political interests.

In the end, the same old players make the headlines. Likewise, it is the same old politics.

Endnotes

1. Lo Tern Chern and N. Tricia. 2016. MCA: Too many questions over bungalow dea, The Star Online. http://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2016/03/21/mca-too-many-

12Issue 16 / October 2016

questions-over-bungalow-deal/ (Accessed 26 September 2016)

2. Bridget Welsh. 2014. Selangor a Pakatan Rakyat Family Fight, Malaysiakini, https://www.malaysiakini.com/news/271859 (Accessed 26 September 2016)

3. Mahathir explains why his new party is race based.2016, Free Malaysia Today, http://www.freemalaysiatoday.com/category/nation/2016/08/17/mahathir-explains-why-his-new-party-is-race-based/ Accessed 26 September 2016)

4. Malaysia Opposition Accuses government of gerrymandering. 2016. The Asian Correspondent, https://asiancorrespondent.com/2016/09/malaysian-opposition-accuses-government-gerrymandering/ (Accessed 26 September 2016)

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14Issue 16 / October 2016

ASEAN ROUND-UP

16Issue 16 / October 2016

Singapore Withholds Stimulus Even as GDP Tumbles Most Since 2012Bloomberg Asia, October 14th

Singapore’s central bank refrained from easing monetary policy, even as the export-dependent economy contracted the most in four years in the face of weak global demand. The Monetary Authority of Singapore, which uses the currency as its main policy tool, said Friday it will maintain a policy of zero-percent appreciation in the exchange rate, in line with expectations of 21 of 24 economists surveyed by Bloomberg. The central bank eased its stance twice in 2015 and again in April this year. Gross domestic product declined an annualized 4.1 percent in the third quarter from the previous three months, the trade ministry said in a separate report.

Read more: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-10-14/singapore-holds-off-monetary-easing-as-economy-contracts

Singapore’s economic contraction is partly caused by the recent slowdown in global trade growth. Other ASEAN economies that are dependent on exports, like Malaysia and Thailand, are also feeling the effects of lower trade growth and thus lower commodity prices. If and when a recession strikes due to an unseen adverse shock, it is an open question whether ASEAN economies have the fiscal and monetary capacity to mitigate its effects.

Indonesia Remains Global Investment Sweet SpotThe Jakarta Post, October 14th

As the global economy continues to be volatile, more and more investors are seeking opportunities in emerging markets, with Indonesia regarded as one of the countries that holds all the aces.

The 2016 Global Investment Trends Monitor report, issued by the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) on Oct. 6, puts Indonesia in ninth position on its list of top prospective host countries for foreign direct investment (FDI) from 2016 to 2018, up from the 14th position in 2014.

Read more: http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2016/10/14/indonesia-remains-global-investment-sweet-spot.html

Indonesia’s national development agency estimates that Indonesia’s infrastructure projects will cost up to Rp5.5 quadrillion by 2019, and even that isn’t enough to pay for all of the country’s infrastructure deficits. As nice as it may be for Indonesia (and Malaysia) to be chosen as a top destination for foreign investment, it is important to maintain long-term stability. It was the sudden stop of foreign investments in 1997 that pushed Southeast Asia over the cliff and it was a reversal of capital flows in 2013 that made the Indonesia rupiah plunge.

WANT TO KNOW MOREABOUT ASEAN?VISIT THCASEAN.ORG

‘I Will Kill All the Drug Lords’The Atlantic, September 20th

In the Philippines, the end of Ferdinand Marcos’s 20-year dictatorship in 1986 was a tumultuous time. The new government of Corazon Aquino was being challenged on all fronts: from the Right, by ambitious military factions plotting coups; from the Left, by peasant guerrillas and angry protesters demanding radical reforms. In those days, I was working as a journalist in Manila, finally able to cover the country’s problems with corruption, crime, economic stagnation, and insurgency without fear of censors.

In 1987 and 1988, I made several trips to Davao, a sprawling city on Mindanao’s southeastern coast, to report on the convulsions rocking that city. Back then, Davao was known not so much for its balmy breezes, rich fisheries, and expansive plantations, but for a brutal campaign against a communist insurgency, sparked by widespread military abuses during the Marcos regime and longstanding problems of poverty and inequality. The breakdown in law and order had also made it a fertile breeding ground for crime. “Each day, some two to three people were killed and thrown in a ditch,” one longtime resident said. Agdao, the city’s biggest slum, was famously called “Nicaragdao.” The streets were gridded with checkpoints manned by nervous soldiers, their Armalites at the ready. But that didn’t deter unknown gunmen from shooting criminals and policemen, often in broad daylight. In 1985, Asiaweek branded Davao “Murder City.”

Read more: http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/09/rodrigo-duterte-philippines-manila-drugs-davao/500756/

ASEAN ROUND-UP

Duterte’s vow and current progress in killing drug offenders suggest a worrying trend. Although we can make the argument in favor of killing drug offenders as an effective way of reducing drug-related crimes, the extra-judicial killing of many people must inevitably cause the deaths of non-offenders and even police officers, violating any standard of human rights. The silence of other ASEAN leaders, again, shows the tragic consequences of non-intervention.

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The Habibie Center was founded by Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie and family in 1999 as an independent, non-governmental,

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The ASEAN Studies Program was established on February 24, 2010, to become a center of excellence on ASEAN related issues, which can assist in the development of the ASEAN Community by

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Cover:Five tigers, a Hang Trong painting, a genre of Vietnamese woodcut

painting that originated from the area of Hàng Trống and Hàng Nón streets in the central Hoàn Kiếm District of Hanoi, Vietnam.

Photo Credit: Wikimedia Commons