Israel Egypt BrookingsNOV2011

8/3/2019 Israel Egypt BrookingsNOV2011

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Mirette F. Mabrouk is a Nonresident Fellow with the Saban Center and Director of Communications at the Economic Research Forum(ERF).

Mirette F. Mabrouk

INTRODUCTIONThere is an Egyptian proverb that says those who worryabout demons will tend to run into them. Like muchfolk wisdom, it has solid psychological foundations; thelikelihood of a problem rearing its head often appears tobe exacerbated by constantly fretting about it. Ever sinceHosni Mubarak stepped down as president of Egypt onFebruary 11, 2011, the demon named Now What? hasbeen keeping the Israeli government up at night. OnAugust 18, it finally leapt up at them.

That day, a group of armed men attacked Israeli buses,as well as civilian and military vehicles north of Eilat,near the Egyptian border. Eight Israelis, both civiliansand soldiers, were killed. The Israel Defense Forces(IDF) set off in hot pursuit, shooting at the attackersfrom a helicopter. The helicopter crew either failed tonotice, or ignored, that they were shooting over theEgyptian side of the border. In the pursuit, three Egyp-tiansan officer and two enlisted menwere killed andanother three later died of their wounds. Israeli ministerof defense Ehud Barak, while blaming Palestiniangroups for the assault, made comments to the effect thatthe attacks were largely Egypts fault as there had been a

major security collapse in Egypt since the former regimehad been ousted six months earlier.1

The way matters unfolded over the next few days poin-tedly illustrated the answer to a question that had beenasked repeatedly both by international media and theIsraeli government since Hosni Mubaraks ouster: Whatdid Egypts January 25 Revolution mean for Israel? Thesimplest answer is that it is no longer business as usual.

The relationship between Egypt and Israel has changedand both countries will have to navigate new waterscarefully and wisely.

LIFE WITH MUBARAK:EGYPT-ISRAELRELATIONS UNDER THE OLD REGIME

The relationship between Egypt and Israel that existedunder Hosni Mubarak was a complex one that is per-haps best examined in the context of its most friction-inducing factor: the Palestinian issue.

The Palestinian problem tends to produce a deeply vis-ceral reaction in most Arabs. To ignore that fact is toignore generations of regional public protest on thematter and any number of international pulse-takingpolls. James Zogby, of the Arab American Institute,which regularly conducts polls on Arab issues, wrote inSeptember, The importance of Palestine to Arabs isnot exactly news. Our public opinion polls across theMiddle East have consistently demonstrated the centralrole this issue plays in shaping the Arab world view.2

The 1978 Camp David Accords, signed between Egyptand Israel, takes into account the Palestinian issue by

referring to the legitimate rights of the Palestinianpeople, a framework entailing a just resolution to theregional conflict, and, among other things, a withdrawalof Israeli armed forces from Gaza and the West Bank.3Having accomplished a partial withdrawal (to question-able effect) both Egypt and Israel have seen fit to reston their laurels. The years since have seen one succes-sive U.S. president after another run his ship agroundon the cliffs of the so-called peace process. Innumera-

RECALIBRATING A RELATIONSHIP

THE SINAI ATTACKS HAVE BROUGHT TO LIGHT THE NEW DYNAMICS OF THE EGYPT-ISRAELRELATIONSHIP.ITS TIME FOR SOME REASSESSMENT AND READJUSTMENT.

NUMBER 20 NOVEMBER 2011


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RECALIBRATING A RELATIONSHIP|MEMO NUMBER20|2

ble photo ops attest not only to the stagnation of thepeace process, but also to the absence of democracy inEgypt: a procession of U.S. presidents have been photo-graphed with Mubarak, recording iterative, failed at-tempts at peace.

However, as long as Mubarak was in power, Israel couldcontinue to say that it was pursuing a course of peace,since it had the legitimacy of Egypts participation be-

hind it. And Egypt could say that it was doing its part tobring about peace to the region. As a piece of not-so-amateur theatrics, it worked well. However, as the peaceprocess steadily lost credibility, the Egyptian governmentproceeded to look worse in the eye of its citizens. This was especially true during the Israeli bombardment ofGaza in December 2008. Then-Israeli foreign minister Tzipi Livni visited Egypt directly before the attacksstarted, which made it look as if Egypt were complicit.

The image that the Egyptian gov-ernment was not helping the Pales-

tinian was painted many times. Fol-lowing Hamass electoral victory in2006, Egypts involvement in Israe-li-Palestinian peace negotiationsrarely seemed to support the Pales-tinian positions. The Egyptian re-gime didnt like Hamas any morethan the Israelis did. In fact, thatHamas had won a democratic elec-tion clanged several warning bells inCairo, where there was not much official enthusiasm fordemocratic elections of any sort, let alone ones thatushered in an Islamist winner. The Egyptian regime hadbeen busy keeping the Muslim Brotherhood under itsthumb for decades and bearing in mind the success thatthe Brotherhood had had at the polls in 2005, when it won 20 percent of the seats in Parliament, the regimewas keen on keeping it there.

Hamass takeover of Gaza in 2007 made Egypts distastefor the group more salient. Egypt has always had some-thing of a complicated relationship with Gaza. The areawas under Egyptian administration from 1948 until the1967 War, when Israel gained control of the territory.When the Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty was signed in 1979,

Gaza remained under Israeli occupation. There is acommon misconception that the network of tunnels thatrun from Gaza to Egypt was not built until 2007, whenIsrael blockaded Gaza following Hamass takeover ofGaza. In fact, those tunnels were first active in 19992000, but it was only after 2007 that both the Israelis andthe Egyptians began to take notice.4 Following the June2007 takeover of Gaza by Hamas, Israel blockaded theGaza Strip to put pressure on the group. The tunnels

enabled vital supplies of food and medicines, but theyalso saw a brisk traffic in weapons that created prob-lems for Israel and, in a more complicated manner, forEgypt. The weapons smuggled out of Sinai allegedlyfound their way to Palestinians, to the obvious distressof the Israelis. Correspondingly, weapons smuggledinto Sinaiaccording to the Egyptian government were used to train and arm anti-regime militants andterrorists.5

Egyptians were not pleased that their governmenthelped Israel enforce the blockade of Gaza. Thingsreached an unpleasant climax in January 2010, when theEgyptian army clashed with demonstrators on the Pal-estinian side of the Gaza border. The demonstratorspelted the Egyptians with rocks and were met with teargas. It didnt help public perceptions that Egypt wasconstructing an underground steel barrier to block offthe tunnels. Comparisons with what was known as the

Israeli-built Apartheid Wall wereinevitable. The cherry on top was the

armys clash with international activ-ists who had accompanied a convoythat had originally set out from theUnited Kingdom. The convoy wasled by British member of ParliamentGeorge Galloway, who was uncere-moniously deported from Egypt onJanuary 9, 2010.6

Undemocratic or not, the regime stillhad to nominally explain to its people why it was de-priving beleaguered Palestinians of aid and, worse still,colluding with the Israelis. The state press went intooverdrive, attempting to justify the situation. AbdelMonem Said Aly, then head of the state-run AhramCentre for Strategic and Political Studies and laterChairman of the Board of Al-Ahram (until he was re-placed in late March 2011, following the January 25revolution,) laid out the reasons for Egypts concerns:

The geographic link generates risks and chal-lenges for Egyptian security, the safety of theEgyptian-Israeli peace treaty, the economicprosperity of Sinai and, of no less importance,the relationship between Hamas and the Mus-

lim Brothers in Egypt.

Three additional security risks from Gaza wereadded in the last few years. The first involvedsmuggling of arms into Sinai and contributingto the training of terrorists who carried outdeadly operations in Taba, Sharm al-Sheikhand Dahab on the Gulf of Aqaba coast. Thesecond was the demographic invasion of Sinai

As long as Mubarak was in pow-er, Israel could continue to say thatit was pursuing a course of peace,

since it had the legitimacy ofEgypts participation behind it.

And Egypt could say that it wasdoing its part to bring about peace.


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by three quarters of a million Palestinians inJanuary 2008. This alerted Egyptians to the pos-sibility of a Palestinian takeover of Sinai, wheth-er under pressure from Israel or by Hamasplanning to create strategic depth for its verysmall territory. The third, a much more strategicsecurity risk, involves Hamas becoming part ofa much larger coalition of radicals that are tar-geting Egypt for having changed its posture to

one of peace and moderation.7

Bittersweet relief for the Egyptian government came inthe form of a young Egyptian soldier, who unwittinglysacrificed his life to the greater good of the regime. He was shot and killedalmost certainly by a Palestiniansniperduring the border clashes, and the governmentused anger at his death to turn public opinion against thePalestinians.

This emotional and political seesawsums up Egyptian-Israeli relations

that existed under the Mubarak re-gime. There was a great deal ofpragmatic cooperation, but theEgyptian public generally perceivedthis cooperation to be at their ex-pense and that of their Palestinianbrethren. The Egyptian-Israeli part-nership benefitted both countries instrategic and financial terms: the tworeceived military and financial aid, particularly from theUnited States. Western publics and policymakers also viewed the Mubarak regime favorably because it was areliable partner for Israel and often followed the Westslead on the world stage. However, the domestic costswere high for Egypt. As the countrys foreign policy be-came increasingly quiescent, it had to take a back seat tonew players on the field. Countries like Turkey and eventiny Qatar began to wield the regional influence that hadonce been Egypts prerogative. At home, an increasinglydissatisfied public was both angry and ashamed at a for-eign policy that embarrassed many and pleased few. Andthat was laid directly at the door shared by the Mubarakregime and the Israeli government.

While the Mubarak regime was largely impervious to

public opinion, it invariably had its finger on the nationspulse and understood well the importance of safetyvalves. The Palestinian issue was, in large part, one suchacceptable safety valve. The regime often allowed dem-onstrations in support of Palestine (while keepingcrowds firmly in check). If the regime had realized thatthose demonstrations would wind up being dummy runsfor the ones that eventually brought the whole systemtumbling to the ground in January of this year, it un-

doubtedly would have reconsidered. As it turned out,Egyptians were used to turning out to support Palestineand, almost by default, voice their displeasure at bothIsraels actions and their own regimes perceived com-plicity. Those demonstrations, attended by otherwisedisparate groups united in their displeasure at Israelitreatment of the Palestinians, provided training in orga-nizational logistics which would later prove useful intoppling a regime.

AFTER THE REVOLUTION

The Egyptians killed as a result of the August 18 inci-dent were not the first Egyptian casualties at the handsof Israeli troops at the border, but they were the firstones in an Egypt where Egyptian life seemed to matter.

Under former management, the deaths of the Egyptiansoldiers would have been regrettablemostly to those nearest and dearestto them. As news, it would have

made the opposition press, where itwould have gotten play but no tangi-ble results, and it would have beenburied in an inside page in the state-owned papers. For most countries,such incidents would have been anaffront to national dignity. But whol-ly undemocratic and generally indif-ferent to public opinion, the Egyp-

tian regime was largely impervious to such matters and,additionally, was able to effectively muffle dissent byanyone who felt differently. But on rare occasions there

had been official responses to such incidents. In 2004,three Egyptian policemen near Rafah, on the Egyptianside of the border, were accidentally shot and killed byIsraeli guards. Then-Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharonexpressed his deepest apologies while Egyptian for-eign minister Ahmed Abul Gheit demanded an investi-gation.8 The aggrieved Egyptian reaction and the cor-respondingly contrite Israeli one might have had some-thing to do with the fact that anti-Israeli sentiment washigh at the time in Egypt: the previous month, localpapers had covered the story of a thirteen-year-old Pal-estinian girl, who had been repeatedly shot by an Israeliofficer near a checkpoint in Gaza. It would have beenan unwise and unnecessary move on the Egyptian gov-ernments part to ignore public opinion entirely.9

In August 2011, moments after news agencies pub-lished accounts of the deaths, Egyptian social mediabegan to vibrate ceaselessly with news and commentaryon the matter. The deaths of Egyptian soldiers by Israe-lis touched a raw nerve. Once an independent Multina-tional Forces Overseas (MFO) report confirmed the

While the Mubarak regime waslargely impervious to public opi-nion, it invariably had its fingeron the nations pulse and unders-tood well the importance of safety

valves.


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following day that the Israelis had shot the soldiers onthe Egyptian side of the border, public opinion couldnot be turned back. A crowd of several thousand dem-onstrated in front of the Israeli embassy, demanding theexpulsion of the Israeli ambassador from Egypt (whowas out of the country at the time) and the recall of theEgyptian envoy to Israel. A young Egyptian scaled the walls of the building that housed the Israeli embassy,pulled off the Israeli flag, replaced it with an Egyptian

one, and promptly became known as FlagmananEgyptian hero.

The furor provided many of the new players on theEgyptian political scene an opportunity to show thatthey represented the people. It gave them a chance totake a stand on an issue that is a known commodity.Most importantly, since the only people who were ac-tually in a position to do anything, the Supreme Councilof the Armed Forces (SCAF), were unlikely to alter thestatus quo in the immediate future,these individuals could demand justice

and honor, knowing that there wouldbe no tangible results, and thus nodownsides.

The first political players to react werethe presidential candidates, possiblybecause individuals move faster thanpolitical parties, which have to dealwith a vast machinery. The candidates vied to lambaste Israel, call for theredemption of national honor, and, in some cases, forthe annulment of the peace treaty.

Amre Moussa, former Egyptian foreign minister andformer secretary general of the Arab League, who is thecurrent frontrunner in presidential polls, was the first tocomment. Israel and any other [country] must under-stand that the day our sons get killed without a strongand an appropriate response, is gone and will not comeback, Moussa posted on his Twitter account.

Those are strong words for a former top diplomat, par-ticularly when one takes into account that Moussa wassecretary-general of a conspicuously inert Arab League when Israel pounded both Lebanon and Gaza in 2006

and 2008, respectively. Moussa recently came under fire when Wikileaks released a cable revealing that he hadapproved the deal on natural gas exports to Israel. It wasimportant, therefore, that he appear to be on the rightside of the argument, this time.

Known simply as the gas deal and a major source ofpublic resentment in Egypt, the Egypt-Israel gas ar-rangement was the subject of a major corruption inquiry

launched in April, in which the former minister of pe-troleum, Sameh Fahmy and Egyptian businessman andMubarak crony, Hussein Salem, have been implicated.At a hearing in mid-September, Amr Arnaouty, a mem-ber of the Administrative Supervisory Authority, testi-fied that the government, then led by Prime Minister Atef Ebeid, had assigned East Mediterranean Gas(EMG), an Egyptian-Israeli companyin which Salemis a major shareholderto sell gas (1.7 billion cubic

meters annually) to the State of Israel in 2000. The fif-teen-year contract was signed in 2005, with prices to beset between a minimum of $0.75 and a maximum of$1.25 per million British thermal units (Btu), unlessBrent Crude reached $35 per barrel, in which case theprice would rise to $1.50.10 By the time gas exports ac-tually started, in 2008, international prices had tripled,with the direct cost of exporting the gas weighing in at$2.56 per million Btu. The prosecution alleges that thedeal cost Egypt $714 million in lost revenue.11

Hot on Moussas heels was Magdy

Hetata, former chief of staff of thearmed forces. Hetata not only de-manded an apology from Israel, butalso the expulsion of the Israeliambassador, a lawsuit against thestate of Israel, an investigation intothe affair, and a retooling of thepeace treaty. He also demanded thatthe files of previous similar deathsbe reopenedsomething that could

cause further embarrassment to the former regime, theIsraeli government, and any new Egyptian government,which would feel it had to act on the information.

Though they disagree on almost every domestic policy,the Islamist and the Nasserite presidential candidatesoddly found common ground in their moderate posi-tions on Israel. While Abd al-Moneim Abul Fotouh, aformer leader in the Muslim Brotherhood, and HamdinSabahi both called for apologies, and cessation of gasexports, they did not go as far as the others. Those fa-miliar with the views held by Sabahian ardent Nasse-rite, who has always opposed normalization with theState of Israelwere surprised at how relatively tem-pered his response was. He stopped short of calling for

the annulment of the peace treaty, instead saying thathe would put the agreement up for referendum.12

Perhaps the most surprising reaction came from Mo-hamed Selim al-Awwa, a noted and well-respected Is-lamist whose pro-Palestine views are a matter of publicrecord. Awwa was against any escalation of the crisis,firmly quashing any calls for war or the expulsion of theambassador. He also specifically said that any attack on

Though they disagree on almostevery domestic policy, the Islamist

and the Nasserite presidentialcandidates oddly found common

ground in their moderate positionson Israel.


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the Israeli embassy was both illegal and a moral and reli-gious sin.

The political parties, meanwhile, came to a quick con-sensus: Israel must apologize, there had to be an investi-gation, and, ideally, the Israeli ambassador had to be ex-pelled (and the Egyptian envoy recalled). Initially mostparties called for at least a reassessment of both the gasdeal and the peace treaty; however, those positions were

generally moderated once the SCAF made it clear theseissues were not up for discussion. Individual announce-ments aside, there wasnt a single party in the countrythat didnt voice its anger and a demand that the gov-ernment do something.

So the government did something.

Prime Minister Essam Sharaf (whose appointment wasthe direct result of public pressure on the SCAF, andwho was practically baptized in Tahrir Square by activistsand demonstrators when he paid the

square a visit the day he was ap-pointed) unsheathed his onlinesword. Our glorious revolutiontook place so that Egyptians couldregain their dignity at home andabroad. What was tolerated in pre-revolution Egypt will not be in post-revolution Egypt, he wrote on hisFacebook page.

The Egyptian cabinet produced an-nouncements both on state television and on its websitedeploring what had happened in language that wouldhave been unthinkable under Mubarak and hinted atexpelling the ambassador. The cabinet largely took itscue from public opinion. This is probably what the newEgyptian government is going to look like, an Israeligovernment official told the Los Angeles Times. Theyhave to follow the beat of the street. For Israel, thatmeans more tumultuous times.13

However, it isnt the cabinet that runs the country butthe SCAFthe military council that has ruled Egyptsince it pushed Mubarak aside. As soon as the numberof demonstrators outside the Israeli embassy swelled

over a thousand, a SCAF general promptly called in to apopular talk show to clarify the situation. He said thatthe Israeli military had already offered an apology aboutwhat had happened, that there would be an official in-vestigation into the incident, and that under no circums-tances was either Egypt or Israel interested in this situa-tion escalating to war.

In this case, the backtracking that followed on bothsides was impressive in its promptness and enthusiasm.

Both Israeli president Shimon Peres and defense minis-ter Ehud Barak expressed regret over the incident. This,of course, was not the same as an official apology, but it was not to be sneezed at, considering that Israel hasrefused to apologize to Turkeyformerly its strongestally in the regionover its killing of nine Turkish na-

tionals intending to break the Gaza blockade last year.Indeed, considering that Israel has rarely apologized forthe inadvertent deaths of any Egyptian soldiers over thepast thirty years of peace, or for mistreatment of Egyp-tian prisoners of war during the 1956 and 1967 wars(despite admitting to atrocities),14 it was quite a shuffleforward. Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu carefullyavoided apportioning any more blame to Egypt. Aftersome waffling, Barak confirmed that there would, in-deed, be a joint investigation (as opposed to an Israelione).

This was followed by Egyptian for-eign minister Mohamed Amrs state-ment that recalling Egypts envoy toIsrael was never on the table.15 Theofficial statement released, in fact,makes no mention of any such recall.

It seemed friction in the relationshiphad reduced: the SCAF, the govern-ment, and the political parties hadsettled on a moderate tone. The

Egyptian masses, however, still demanded a tougherresponse. On September 9, following peaceful daytimedemonstrations in Tahrir Square calling for a swifterresolution to promised political reforms, an unrulycrowd made its way down to the Israeli embassy in Gi-za. Over the course of several hours, the crowd pro-ceeded to knock down a wall erected by the army toprotect the embassy. Its unclear how it started, but thesituation deterioratedapparently through the involvement of a group of ultra-violent football thugs,still angry about their run-in with the security forces at afootball match the week before. Over the next twelvehours or so, the situation rapidly got worse, and crowdsstormed the building, ultimately breaking into the peri-

pheral offices of the embassy. While most of the em-bassy staff, including the ambassador, had been airliftedout earlier, six Israeli security personnel remainedlocked inside the building. According to Prime MinisterNetanyahu, Israel placed frantic calls to both PresidentObama and SCAF members, and a group of Egyptiancommandos was sent in to rescue the Israeli personnel.Down in the street, the security forces finally resortedto tear gas and live ammunition. Three people were

This is probably what the newEgyptian government is going tolook like, an Israeli government

official told the Los AngelesTimes. They have to follow the

beat of the street.


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killed, over a hundred people were arrested, and anotherfour hundred injured.

Condemnation of the violence and the embassy storm-ing was almost universal in Egypt, although almost allthe parties laid the blame at the feet of the SCAFs ina-bility to respond appropriately to the border shootings. The general attitude was that violence was an entirelyunacceptable response, and not merely because it

handed Israel the moral upper hand. One particularlysurprising response came from the Salafi group al-Daoaal-Salafiya. The groups statement termed the stormingirresponsible actions and said it weakened Egyptsposition vis--vis Israel and any amendment of the peacetreaty. Another reference to the treaty turned up in astatement by the Socialist Party of Egypt, which blamedthe SCAF, again, and said that any attempt to liberateEgypt from shameful agreements with Israel and itssponsor, the United States, would require a long strug-gle.16 There would be no more violence.

Nor, apparently, would there be anyblunders by government officials,even if they happened to be theprime minister. On September 15,Prime Minister Essam Sharaf saidgrandly, in an interview with a Tur-kish television channel, that, TheCamp David agreement is not a sa-cred thing and is always open todiscussion with what would benefitthe region and the case of fair peace ... and we couldmake a change if needed.17 That was, however, the lasttime that suggestion emanated from the prime ministersoffice.

What happened on October 12 is perhaps indicative ofthe new balance of the Egypt-Israel relationship. Israelformally apologized to Egypt for the deaths of the sixsoldiers. The apology, announced by Defense MinisterEhud Barak expressed deep regret and apology andoffered condolences to the families of the dead. Five weeks later, Egypt proved to Israeland anyone elsepaying attentionthat it was still a regional force to bedealt with. On October 18, Hamas released Israeli sol-dier Gilad Shalit after five years of captivity. The Egyp-

tian-brokered deal saw 1,027 Palestinian prisoners re-leased as part of swap. Shalits release on its own wouldhave been significant. But it was doubly so after the rev-olution because Mubarak and his security head envoy,Omar Suleiman, had been unable to pull this off for fiveyears.

There have been hiccups in the relationship, of course.In June, Egyptian authorities arrested Ilan Grappel, a

young man with dual Israeli-U.S. citizenship, on chargesof spying for Israel. Grappel claimed that he had been working for a legal aid organization in Egypt but hadmade no secret of his dual nationality. He was releasedto the Israelis on October 27 in exchange for twenty-five Egyptians incarcerated in Israel, among them threeminors.

TOAMEND ORNOT TOAMEND:THE FUTUREOF THE CAMP DAVIDTREATY

How the Egyptian people, or indeed political parties,apparently, felt about the State of Israel was one thing.How they viewed they should deal with it was another.And apparently, dealing with the State of Israel is a factof life, no matter how distasteful. As Egyptians wouldsay, one just had to squirt some lemon over it (to maskthe unpleasant taste) and just get on with it.

It was never likely that all those de-monstrators outside the Israeli em-

bassy would bring about an outcomethat the SCAF didnt want. MajorGeneral Hamdy Badin, chief of mili-tary police, told journalist Yasmineal-Rashidi, that it was out of thequestion that such a decision wouldbe made. To ask an ambassador toleave or to recall our own ambassa-dor would escalate a situation in away that we are not ready for and do

not want. We will not be asking the ambassador toleave, we will not be recalling our own envoy, and we

will not be asking the embassy to remove the flag.18

The military understands what the publics emotionalresponse may ignore: that a war with Israel is both im-possible and impossibly costly. The Egyptian militaryand the Israeli government have things in common:both are deeply worried about Hamas and both valuethe financial and technical support from the UnitedStates that a sustained peace brings. As long as the mili-tary remains powerful in Egypt (and it is likely that it will continue to hold the reins, one way or another,even after the elections that are starting on November28) there will be no wars with Israelprovided thereare no further escalations.

Yet, in the wake of the August 18 incident, the peacetreaty between Israel and Egypt proved mutable, notonly in rhetoric, but in practice. Although the peacetreaty specifically limits Egyptian deployment in theSinai to 750 soldiers, without tanks or artillery, Israelhas agreed to allow the deployment of thousands of

The military understands what thepublics emotional response mayignore: that a war with Israel isboth impossible and impossibly

costly.


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soldiers, with helicopters, armored cars, and the tanks ofthe battalion it had allowed in when Egypts military wasconducting its Sinai clean-up in July. Those tanks willstay in Sinai although Israel has so far not indicated thatany more will be allowed in. The Sinai has always been adifficult territory to govern and, in the wake of the revo-lution and the resulting security gap, tribal and extremistfactions have been battling for supremacy. In late July,the Egyptian military signaled the end of its patience by

initiating Operation Eagle: it sent in over 1,000 men,arrested over twenty extremists, made peace with manyof the tribes, and promised development and jobs. Partof the Egypt-Israel relationship is based on Egypt effec-tively protected Israels borders, and it does Israel nogood to cripple its neighbor in that regard. WithoutEgypt, Israel cannot effectively control or secure its Sinaiborders and it knows it.

Though it is extremely unlikely thatany Egyptian government will eversuggest annulment of the Israel-

Egypt peace treaty, Israel shouldface up to the fact that there is highEgyptian interest in amending it. The amendments will probably re-late to security concernsin line with Article IV, paragraph 1particularly in regard to the allowedEgyptian troop deployment in theSinai.19 By permitting Egypt to violate the treaty in itsrecent deployments, Israel has already indicated that itunderstands that the status quo isnt particularly benefi-cial for anybody.

Some in Israel seem to have recognized this. Sort of. InAugust 27, The Economistquoted Barak as saying, Some-times you have to subordinate strategic considerations totactical needs.20 Following Baraks announcement, thespeaker of the Knesset, Reuven Rivlin, noted that it wasall very well for the prime minister and defense ministerto run around making statements but that the Knessetsapproval was needed before making any changes to po-litical agreements.21 There have been no further an-nouncements as of early November.

In fact, it could have been extremely advantageous to

Israel had its government sought to amend the treatybefore the Egyptian election season. Indicating such awillingness could have prevented Egyptian political par-ties from using the treaty as part of their campaign plat-form. The Israeli government would have also found itvastly easier to negotiate with the SCAFwhich is high-ly pragmatic and concerned primarily with internal secu-ritythan with a newly-elected government, the makeupof which is an unknown factor and which will assuredly

be more answerable to the popular, anti-Israel outlookof the Egyptian public.

It appears, however, that the Netanyahu governmenthas no intention of renegotiating the peace treaty. Theday after Sharafs Turkish interview, where he said thatthe treaty was not sacred, the director-general ofIsraels Foreign Ministry, Rafi Barak, summoned Egyp-tian ambassador Yasser Reda to express Israels irrita-

tion over the recurrent calls from senior Egyptian offi-cials over the need for modification to the peace treatyand other anti-Israeli statements.22 During the thirty-minute interview at the foreign ministry headquarters inJerusalem, Barak told Reda that from Israels perspec-tive, there are no intentions whatsoever to reopen thepeace treaty and the step cannot be taken unilaterally.23

While it is certainly true that such a step cannot be tak-en by either party on its own, it is toIsraels advantage to consider indicat-ing that an amended treaty is an op-

tion. Negotiation is always more ad-vantageous when it is on ones ownterms. Until a new Egyptian govern-ment is elected (which could be mid-2013, according to the latest SCAFtimeline) Israel would be dealing withthe armyan entity that will take anall-encompassing view of the situa-

tion. It will bear in mind that impossibility of war, thedesirability of a cooperative neighborwhich, if notprecisely a friend is most definitely an allyand of con-tinued international (read U.S.) financial and militaryaid.

POST-REVOLUTIONARYEGYPTIAN-ISRAELIRELATIONS

In light of the January 25 Revolution, Israel no longerhas the luxury, or the security, of dealing with a handfulof Egyptian leaders. While the move toward democracyin Egypt is likely to be a slow and painful grind, Israel isstill going to have to deal with a government more ac-countable to its people. And considering that any newgovernment is going to struggle with the prodigious

social and economic burdens left by the former regime,a populist foreign policy may be considered an easycrowd-pleaser. While it is unlikely that public opinionwill decide foreign policy, it will no longer be possibleto discount it. As a result, Israel is going to have to re-think its own policies, particularly in respect to the Pal-estinians and its closest neighbors. Considering thedomestic problems that Israel is currently strugglingwith, and particularly in light of the prominence of reli-

Though it is extremely unlikelythat any Egyptian government will

ever suggest annulment of theIsrael-Egypt peace treaty, Israel

should face up to the fact that thereis high Egyptian interest in

amending it.


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gious movements and the strength and apparent vehe-mence of belief of its settler population, it will be espe-cially hard for this Israeli government to start learningnew sheet music.

Assuming that Egypt and Israel can both see their wayto being a little adaptable, there is much room for ma-neuver. To start with, the SCAF is unlikely to relinquishmuch power soon, regardless of the elections scheduled

to begin this November. There is no doubt that the mili-tary leadership has Egypts interests at heart, and it has a vested interest in keeping the peace with Israel and inmaintaining its privileged economic status and a friendlyrelationship with Washington. A solid relationship withIsrael is integral to those requirements. Eventually, how-ever, an increasing amount of power will pass to anelected civilian government, which will in all likelih-oodif the response of the political parties followingthe storming of the Israeli embassy is any indicatorbejust as pragmatic about the benefitsof the peace treaty.

The direct Israel-Egypt relationshiphas changed because of the January25 Revolution. In addition, Israelmust understand that its treatmentof the Palestinians, and its actions orinactions on the peace front, is nowlikely to have indirect bearings on itsrelationship with its neighbor, with very real consequences. As DanielLevy puts it, Quite simply, Israel cannot have a strategyfor managing its regional posture without having a Pales-tinian strategy. Unfortunately, he notes, Today it nolonger has one.24

It should be noted that the vast majority of Egyptianshave no real interest in Israel either way: the sentiment isdirectly related to the countrys treatment of Palestinians,and if that were to improve, then anti-Israeli sentiment islikely to subside. For reference, one can look back to theheady days of the Yitzhak Rabin government, when itlooked as if peace were on the horizon. The lull in hos-tile activity towards Palestinians meant that there was acorresponding lull in hostile sentiment toward Israel.Israelis were even permitted to turn up as sympathetic

characters in Egyptian soap operas, an unofficial litmustest of public opinion.

EGYPTS RETURN TO REGIONAL INFLUENCE

One important development to watch is Egypts rela-tionship with Turkey. Turkey has used the Arab Spring,its economic power, and an anti-Israel rhetoric to carve

out for itself a regional leadership role that once be-longed to Egypt. Having shaken off a self-serving dicta-tor, Egypt is likely to want that throne back. It will notdo for a regional leader to be seen as less determined orprincipled than Turkey, and this will mean that Egyptwill not be able to bend over backwards to accommo-date Israel any longer.

Concurrent with the August Egyptian-Israeli border

incident, the more-than year long-spat between Turkeyand Israel reached its climax. On September 2, in re-sponse to Israels refusal to apologize for the May 2010flotilla confrontation, Turkey promptly announced thatit was expelling the Israeli ambassador and downgrad-ing military and diplomatic relations. It was an act thatbrought the Egyptian reaction sharply into focus. TheEgyptian independent daily Al-Masry Al-Youms head-line threw tact to the wind: Turkey Teaches Egypt aLesson and Expels the Israeli Ambassador.25 With

Israels increased regional isolation,and as long as Arab publics lap up

anti-Israeli rhetoric and actions, anEgypt seeking a leading regional rolemay be forced to be more aggressivethan it would be otherwise inclined.

Turkish premier Recep Tayyip Erdo-gans September 13 visit to Cairo forthe Arab League meeting was anoth-er irritant to the SCAF. Two daysbefore the visit, huge billboards of

Erdogan, with his hand on his heart standing in frontof Egyptian and Turkish flags, popped up all over Cai-ro. When he arrived at the airport, he received a wel-come more fitting for a rock star than a head of state.Erdogan has been much admired in Egypt: for appar-ently making his country a player on the global stage,for proving that Islam and democracy are not incom-patible at home, and for what is perceived to be astrong stance against Israel. His expulsion of the Israeliambassador resonated with Egyptians in the wake ofthe border shooting. Lost in the excitement was the factthat Turkey had been waiting fifteen months for anapology to the Mavi Marmara incident and the expul-sion was an end-of-the-line action. Its easier to be he-roic when one is done being pragmatic.

Nor did he come empty-handed. The Turkish delega-tion included 280 businessmen, who signed about $1billion worth in contracts in a single day, according toTurkish foreign minister Ahmet Davutoglu.

Israel must be paying very close attention to the newrelationship between Egypt and Turkey, two of themost populous and militarily powerful nations in the

Turkey has used the Arab Spring,its economic power, and an anti-

Israel rhetoric to carve out for itselfa regional leadership role that once

belonged to Egypt.


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region. Both have been strategic partners with Israel, butthose relationships are no longer as close.

There was enormous fuss surrounding Erdogans speechat the Arab League meeting, and it echoed that whichaccompanied Obamas, at Cairo University, two yearsago. While he struck all the right notes, with his empha-sis on democratic reform and backing of Palestinianstatehood, it remains to be seen whether he will prove as

much of a disappointment to Egyptians and Arabs asObama has been.

SOWHERE DOES THE UNITED STATESCOME IN?

The U.S. administration has been consistently behindthe curve during the political upheavals of the region. Tobe fair, it has not been an easy scenario to foretell. How-ever, a democratic Egypt, with strong institutions and arespect for human and civil rights enshrined in a new

constitution, is in Americas interest. Indeed, it is vitalfor the stability of the region. Support for this nascentdemocracy will not necessarily be easy, given that thecountry is currently governed by a military that does notparticularly appear to believe in, or value, civilian rule.Yet, the United States will need to step carefully to avoidantagonizing the military, an institution that is an impor-tant domestic and regional player, but that sees its powerthreatened by the encroaching reality of democracy.

Of course, funding is an enormously pliable tool. It canbe handed over to encourage and it may be withheld tomake a point. Egypt and Israel are the two largest reci-

pients of U.S. military aid. To date, the U.S has generallyonly threatened to cut off aid to Egypt and has beeneven more timid in the case of Israel. Sabers that arentrattled occasionally are merely wall decorations. If theUnited States is going to have any credibility in its role asregional peacemaker, then it needs to find a way to po-litely coerce when polite requests are ignored.

In addition to funding, encouraging investment is anexcellent way to prove support. Particularly in Egyptscurrent uncertain economic environment, encouragingAmerican companies to do business in Egypt would letpeople know that the United States is not simply anarbiter of Israeli interests. It is also vital to find a way toundo the damage caused by Obamas speech at theUnited Nations on September 21, when he spoke of the

importance of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, whilemaking it clear that the United States would use itsSecurity Council veto to block a Palestinian request forstatehood. The speech was widely viewed by Arabs assurprising in its lack of sensitivity to Palestinian suffer-ing, and it was generally considered to be the latest nailin the coffin of the United States as a broker in thepeace talks.

Ultimately, the United States should be more receptivethan proactive at the moment. It has not had a particu-larly good record of predicting needs or trends in the

regionunderstandably so, since it has only ever hadto deal with dictatorships in recent history. Simply say-ing that it is on hand to provide technical or financialsupportin the form of investment as well as grantswould be an excellent idea.

Adaptability is a challenge to any successful nation. Ifone cannot take the status quo for granted, then onemust adapt the current state of affairs to ones needs.Perhaps one of the more interesting byproducts of therevolution is that it is likely to reintroduce an art thathad been missing for too long from the region: the artof diplomacy. Finesse, it appears, might end up trump-ing brutal force after all.


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1 Anshel Pfeffer and Revital Levy-Stein, Netanyahu: We Will Respond Firmly When Israelis are Hurt, Haaretz, August 18, 2011.2 James Zogby, On a Collision Course With Arab Opinion, Arab American Institute Washington Watch, September 19, 2011.3 Text of Camp David Accords available at.4 One report puts the first tunnel at 1999, Alexandra Robinson, Gaza's Tunnels: An Inside Perspective, The Palestine Chronicle, July24, 2011, available at ; According to the Israel Security Agency,the use of tunnels in Gaza began in September 2000, Hamas Use of Gaza Strip-based Subterranean Route, Israel Security Agency,available at .5 Abdel Monem Said Aly, The Egyptian Paradox in Gaza, Bitterlemons-International, January 8, 2009.6 Abigail Hauslohner, In the Siege of Gaza, Egypt Walks a Delicate Line, Time, January 11, 2010.7 Abdel Monem Said Aly, The Egyptian paradox in Gaza.8 Conal Urquhart, Israeli Troops Kill Egyptian Police, The Guardian, November 19, 2004.9 Khaled Amayreh, Sharons Rampage,Al-Ahram Weekly, October 1420, 2004.10 Fatma Abo Shanab, Cabinet Took the Decision to Export Gas to Israel, Says Witness,AlMasry AlYoum, September 15, 201111 Tamsin Carlise, Corruption Inquiry Focus on Egyptian Gas Contract, The National, April 26, 201112 Zeinab Al-Gundy, Sinai Crisis: Presidential Candidates, Parties and Movements React,Ahram Online, August 25, 2011.13 Jeffrey Fleishman and Edmund Sanders, Israel Apologizes for Egyptian Soldiers Deaths, Los Angeles Times, August 21, 2011.14 Zeinab Al-Gundy, Sinai Crisis: Presidential Candidates, Parties and Movements React.15 Stephen Farrell and Isabel Kershner, Egypt Disavows Threat to Recall Envoy to Israel,New York Times, August 22, 2011.16 Zeinab Al-Gundy, Egyptian Parties Criticise Attack on Israel Embassy, as Well as SCAF,Ahram Online, September 12, 2011.17 Peace with Israel Not Sacred, Says Egypt PM, Hurriyet Daily News, September 16, 2011.18 Yasmine El-Rashidi, Egypts Israel Problem,NYR blog, September 2, 201119

Article IV, paragraph 1 states: In order to provide maximum security for both Parties on the basis of reciprocity, agreed securityarrangements will be established including limited force zones in Egyptian and Israeli territory, and United Nations forces and observ-ers, described in detail as to nature and timing in Annex I, and other security arrangements the Parties may agree upon.20 Springtime in the Sinai, The Economist, August 27, 2011.21 Israel to allow more Egyptian forces into Sinai, Israel Hayom, August 26, 2011.22 Ronen Medzini, "Foreign Ministry summons Egyptian envoy," Ynetnews, September 16, 2011, available at.23 Ibid.24 Daniel Levy, Can Tahrir Square Come to Tel Aviv? The Nation, September 12, 2011.25 Lead story,Al-Masry Al-Youm, September 2, 2011.

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