Isle of Man Government · Isle of Man Government Marine Administration Oaseirys Lhuingys ... The...

Isle of Man Government

Marine Administration Oaseirys Lhuingys

Casualty Investigation Report SA70BALTIC EIDEREngine

Room Fire5th August 2001

BALTIC EIDER - Fire CA 70

Summary Shortly after 1000hrs on August 5th 2001, the Isle of Man registered ship Baltic Eider suffered an engine room fire whilst at sea off the North West coast of Denmark bound from Felixstowe to Helsinki. The fire was caused by fuel oil spraying from a main engine fuel injection pump where a threaded plug had worked loose and blown-out. The hot fuel oil was ignited when it came into contact with hot main engine surfaces. The amount of oil issuing from the fuel pump was sufficient to fuel a major fire in the engine room which was manned at the time. Once all personnel were out of the space and accounted for, CO2 fire extinguishing medium was released and the fire extinguished. No ship’s personnel were injured in the incident and the effects of the fire were limited to the machinery space. The ship’s main engines were disabled by the fire and the vessel was taken under tow to Cuxhaven in Germany and later to Hamburg for repairs. The damage resulting from the fire to the main engine room, main engines, cables and switchboard was extensive.

Baltic Eider Fire Investigation


Baltic Eider at Cuxhaven



Introduction Baltic Eider is a cargo Ro-Ro vessel, 157m in length, built at Hyundai Heavy Industries, Ulsan Shipyard, South Korea and delivered in 1989 with a Gross Tonnage of 20,865. The vessel is equipped with two Wartsila medium speed diesel main engines driving a single screw via hydraulic clutches and a single gearbox. The main engines are both Hyundai Wartsila type R46 of different sizes, the port engine is a 9 cylinder unit delivering 8145kW MCR whilst the starboard engine is a smaller 6 cylinder unit delivering 5430 kW MCR. For electrical services the vessel has three 6 cylinder Yanmar T260L-ET diesel generator sets rated at 1MW each and one shaft alternator rated at 2.25 MW . Main engine units are numbered from aft to forward. Number 1 unit for each engine is therefore at the shaft-end and not the free-end of the engine as normal marine practice would dictate. The machinery spaces are arranged in a typical Ro-Ro layout below the cargo decks, with the main engine room forward of and separated from the generator room by a steel division. The engine control room (ECR) is housed within the main engine room and its aft bulkhead adjoins the generator room. The machinery space casings lead up through the port and starboard side cargo decks to two funnels aft of the accommodation block. Hull decks are named upwards from the ‘tank top’ to ‘main deck’, ‘upper deck’, and the uppermost deck as the ‘shelter deck’. Accommodation decks above the shelter deck are identified by letters : ‘A’ deck and ‘B’ deck with the ‘Nav. Bridge’ deck above. The vessel has a bulk CO2 fixed gas fire extinguishing system covering the cargo areas and machinery spaces. The vessel was built to Lloyd’s Register Classification rules and remains classed with Lloyd’s Register. She was registered in London on delivery and transferred to the Isle of Man register in 1991. Her name has remained unchanged. The vessel operates on a regular trade between Felixstowe in the UK and Helsinki and Hamina in Finland. The ship is operated by Andrew Weir Shipping Limited of London and is manned by Bibby International Services (Isle of Man) Ltd. At the time of the incident the Officers and Cook were British or Irish and the ratings were Russian Nationals. The company runs a cadet training programme from which two cadets were on board at the time of the fire. There were in addition, one passenger and one supernumerary on board. The majority of officers and ratings were regulars on the ship and had sailed together for some years.



Ship Details Name: Baltic Eider IMO No. 8801917 Classification Society Lloyd’s Register Class +100A1, Ice Class 1A Super, +LMC, UMS Vessel Type Cargo Ro-Ro Owner H&P Reedereiverwaltungs GmbH & Co. KG Operator Andrew Weir Shipping Ltd Date Keel Laid 15th December 1988 Date of Delivery 1st December 1989 Builder Hyundai Heavy Industries, South Korea Gross Tonnage 20865 Deadweight 13866 metric tonnes Registered Length 148.23 m Breadth Moulded 25.00 m Depth Moulded 22.60 m Draught Moulded 8.50 m Main Engines Wartsila 9R46 and 6R46 Engine Power 13575 kW



Fig 1 - Engine Room Layout - upper platform level



Evidence and Investigation 1. The fire was first notified to the Isle of Man Marine Administration by the master

of the vessel at 1745 hrs on Sunday 5th August 2001 local time (UTC+2), approximately 7½ hours after the incident. At this time the fire was extinguished and the vessel safely anchored off the North West coast of Denmark.

2. Interviews were held with the ship’s officers in Cuxhaven with the full co-operation of the ship’s operators, Andrew Weir Shipping. The reconstruction of events is made both from the recollections of the personnel involved and from the physical evidence found on the ship.

3. Times recorded have been taken from the recording of events by the navigating officer of the watch. No other times are available as the engine room data log had run out of paper before the incident. The time of the fire is taken as 10.12 hrs ship’s time (UTC+2).

4. All times are recorded as ship’s time which is maintained at UTC+2 hours.

5. Investigation into the cause of the fire revealed an erosion plug missing from No.4 fuel injection pump on the starboard main engine. The oil issuing from the fuel pump as a result of the loss of this plug is the most likely source of the fire in the engine room

6. The draft report has been submitted to the operators of the vessel and the ship’s senior officers for comment. Subsequent to this draft report, it has been confirmed that the engine manufacturers Wartsila have modified the fuel injection pump erosion plugs to facilitate securing wire and increased the tightening torque from 200Nm to 300Nm.



Factual Narrative

1. All of the officers joined the vessel in Felixstowe on 14th July 2001, for a tour of duty of approximately 4-6 weeks.

2. The Master, Chief Mate, Chief Engineer, Second Engineer, Third Engineer and Electrician are regular officers on the ship, serving back-to-back with their counterparts from the other regular team. The remaining officers had sailed on the vessel previously and as such were familiar with the ship and her trade.

3. Two cadets joined the ship at Felixstowe on the 4th of August 2001. The Deck cadet had previous experience of the ship, whereas the Engineer Cadet was new to the vessel and this was his second trip to sea.

4. Baltic Eider sailed from Felixstowe at 13.17 hrs on Saturday 4th August 2001 and was full away on passage for Helsinki at 1400 hours.

5. On the morning of 5th August 2001, the ship was proceeding en-passage, travelling at 19 knots off the North West coast of Denmark. The Third Mate was the navigational officer of the watch (OOW). The machinery space was operating on bridge control with the space manned by engineers carrying out their daily duties. Both main engines were in operation with electrical power supplied by No. 2 auxiliary generator. The weather was clear, with a light breeze (Force 3) from the South West.

6. Prior to the incident the master was on the bridge attending to the weatherfax installation and remained on the bridge throughout.

7. As is customary on Sunday mornings, the day-work officers and ratings begin work at 0900 hrs.

8. At 0900 hrs - the Chief Mate, Chief Engineer, Second Engineer and Engineer Cadet began a tank inspection of No 5 double bottom fuel oil tank from the tank access in the lower cargo hold. In line with company tank entry procedures, the Cadet and Chief Mate remained outside the tank at the access, where two SCBA sets were provided for emergency purposes.

9. At 0900 hrs - the Third Engineer began working in the generator room and the Electrician in his workshop alongside the engine control room (ECR).

10. At 1005 hrs - the Chief Engineer and Second Engineer were checked-out of No5 double bottom fuel oil tank and together with the Chief Mate and Engineer Cadet, began to make their way to the ECR for a coffee-break.

11. At 1011 hrs - The Chief Mate and Electrician were washing cups in the sink adjacent to the engine control room, the Second Engineer was by the boiler, the Chief Engineer, Third Engineer and Engineer Cadet were inside the engine control room. At this moment a loud noise was heard in the engine room and engine control room



12. At 1011 hrs - an alarm sounded on the wheelhouse. The main engine control panel indicated a ‘main engine load down’ alarm on the port main engine. At the same time the officer of the watch felt the ship slow down.

13. At the sound of this loud noise, the Electrician, Chief Mate and Second Engineer rushed to the ECR, where the Chief Engineer and Third Engineer were at the control console and the Engineer Cadet by the door.

14. Almost a minute later, the Chief Mate, standing by the starboard ECR door and looking out of the forward ECR windows noticed smoke rising from the port main engine, which he pointed out to the engineers present. The smoke appeared first to recede and then instantaneously erupt in flame and sparks above the port main engine.

15. At 1012 hrs - the fire detection panel on the wheelhouse indicated a fire in the engine room. At the same time a call was received from the Third Engineer in the ECR reporting a fire in the engine room.

16. The fire control panel is fitted with a time-delay switch which was active. This prevents fire detectors upon initiation, from activating the general alarm bells throughout the ship. As several zones were now indicating a fire in the engine room, the OOW turned the time-delay to the ‘off’ position and the general alarm sounded throughout the ship.

17. The Chief Engineer de-clutched the port main engine and stopped the engine using the emergency stop on the engine control room console, following which, the starboard main engine stopped. This was later considered to have cut-out on overload.

18. At outbreak of the fire, the Second Engineer left the ECR to fight the fire. He saw flames issuing from numbers 1-3 cylinder heads of the port main engine. He took a 9 Litre portable foam fire extinguisher from the upper platform inboard of the boiler and discharged it onto the fire from the upper platform outside the ECR and above and aft of the two main engines. He was beaten back by the flames and smoke and exited the engine room via the starboard forward stairwell up onto the main deck. He then proceeded to cross the main deck and re-enter the engine room at the lower platform level via the port forward stairwell and escape ladder, where he proceeded to shut the manual fuel valves for the port main engine. He attempted to shut the valves for the starboard engine but was beaten back by smoke and flames from between the main engines. He exited the engine room via the port forward escape to the main deck.

19. At outbreak of fire the Electrician also left the ECR to fight the fire. He took a 9 Litre portable foam fire extinguisher from the upper platform aft of the HFO Settling Tank and discharged it onto the port main engine fire in the region of the ‘hot-box’ of unit numbers 2-3, from the platform at the top of the ladders leading down from the upper platform on the port side. The fire appeared to die down but soon erupted again until visibility was very poor due to dense black smoke. The Electrician exited the engine room from the port forward door at



the upper level and met the Second Engineer in the stairwell. They both proceeded to the main deck.

20. At outbreak of fire the Chief Mate left the engine room to recover the two SCBA sets from No 5 double bottom fuel tank access and report to the wheelhouse.

21. At 1015 hrs - All crew and passengers mustered in the wheelhouse with the exception of the Chief, Second, and Third Engineers, Engineer Cadet and Electrician. Vessel’s position 57o 5.2’N , 008o 14.0’E.

22. A ‘Wagenborg Shipping’ vessel astern of the Baltic Eider maintained radio contact and was requested by the OOW to stand-by. A ‘Securite’ call was made to all ships on VHF channel 16, which was picked-up by Lyngby Radio Station, Denmark.

23. The Second Engineer and Electrician telephoned the bridge from the cargo control room on the main deck to report that they were out of the engine room but had not seen the Chief Engineer, Third Engineer, Engineer Cadet or the engine room ratings. The bridge confirmed the engine room ratings were mustered and accounted for.

24. At 1017 hrs - A fire party was organised to proceed to the engine room, led by the Chief Mate.

25. The Chief Engineer, Third Engineer and Engineer Cadet remained in the ECR. Dense smoke outside in the engine room had prevented them from leaving via port and starboard doors and was beginning to fill the ECR.

26. Two emergency escape breathing apparatus (EEBA) sets are provided in the ECR. A firemen’s outfit including a self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) was located in the workshop adjacent to and just outside the ECR starboard door. On the morning of the fire the SCBA had been removed for the tank entry to No 5 double bottom fuel oil tank and was therefore not available.

27. The Chief Engineer, Third Engineer and Engineer Cadet prepared to escape from the ECR which was becoming heavy with smoke. The telephone was not working and communication was difficult. They called the bridge using the ‘sound-powered’ telephone to state they were about to leave the machinery space. EEBA sets were worn by the Chief Engineer and Cadet, whilst the Third Engineer wrapped a towel around his face to provide some protection from the smoke.

28. The Third Engineer confirmed that the he had shut the door between the generator room and engine room workshop and therefore the generator room should be relatively smoke-free. At the aft end of the generator room there is access to the steering gear space with onward escape to the main deck.

29. At 1020 hrs- The Chief Engineer, Third Engineer and Engineer Cadet, led by the Chief Engineer with the cadet between them, made their escape through the workshop, generator room, steering gear space and up onto the main



deck. On the main deck they were met by the Second Engineer and Electrician who reported them safe and unhurt to the bridge using the cargo control room telephone.

30. All personnel on the main deck, including the fire party, made their way up to the bridge via the aft walkway past the port funnel, which was issuing dense black smoke from the engine room vents.

31. At 1022 hrs - the Chief Mate closed the fire-flaps on the engine room vents and together with the Second Engineer operated the fuel oil quick-closing valves and emergency stops from the fire station on the starboard aft shelter deck. The Electrician and Chief Engineer started the emergency generator set located in a space aft of the port funnel casing on the upper deck.

32. At 1023 hrs - with all personnel accounted for, the Master gave the order to release CO2 flooding into the engine room. The Second Engineer released the CO2 from the emergency control station and went forward to check its actual release from the CO2 room forward, which was confirmed.

33. The main deck above the machinery space was monitored for hot-spots.

34. At 1038 hrs - vessel anchored safely, 4 shackles in water - position 57o 5.2’N , 008o 14.0’E.

35. At 1141 hrs - a team made up from the Chief Engineer and Third Engineer entered the Engine Room wearing breathing apparatus and confirmed the fire was out.

36. 6th August 2001 1218hrs - Tug “Bugsier 21” commenced tow to Cuxhaven, Germany.



Comment and Analysis

1. Initial examination on re-entry to the machinery space after the fire had been extinguished revealed:

The port main engine ‘hot-box’ covers had been blown-off Nos 1,2,3 and 9 units.

Affects of severe heat on covers and entablature of both main engines

Melted aluminium walkways between the engines.

Heat damage to both main engine turbochargers

Heat damage to deckhead insulation above the main engines.

Heavy smoke damage (black) to entire main engine room.

All electrical wiring in the vicinity of the main engines burnt.

Light smoke damage in engine control room.

2. Further investigation revealed a missing erosion plug from No. 4 fuel injection pump on the port main engine. This plug is one of two such plugs fitted to the pumps manufactured by L’Orange Fuel Injection Systems. Their purpose is to act as sacrificial elements to prevent erosion of the pump body in regions where turbulent flow of the fuel oil creates cavitation within the pump housing. The internal thread in the pump body housing the erosion plug was largely undamaged, with the exception of the last half-turn of the thread which was torn away but still attached.

3. An erosion plug was found in the hot box of the port main engine in the vicinity of Nos 3 and 4 units. This plug was not a new plug as signs of cavitation were evident on the face the plug. The thread of this plug was undamaged although its appearance showed effects of the fire consistent with that shown in the internals of the hot box.

4. The planned maintenance system kept by the Chief Engineer shows No.4 fuel injection pump on the port main engine to have been in operation for 5741 hours on 30th July 2001. The records show that this pump unit was installed on the port main engine on 14th July 2000. Prior to this the unit was a spare fuel injection pump which had been overhauled by the ship’s engineers, which is normal practice.

5. The engine room log manually recorded at 2200 hrs 4th August 2001 shows fuel oil pressure and temperature entering the starboard main engine at 7.6 bar and 130 deg C. The last record of the ‘Damatic’ main engine monitoring system, printed at 0000hrs 5th August 2001 records normal values for all main engine parameters.

6. The ‘Damatic’ alarm panel in the ECR had run out of paper prior to the incident. The last alarm recorded was 1640 hrs 4th August 2001.



7. The Chief Engineer, Second Engineer, Third Engineer and Electrician all reported hearing what they thought to be a main engine turbocharger surging immediately before the outbreak of the fire. The Chief Mate and Engineer Cadet reported this as a ‘loud bang’. This is coincident with a ‘load down’ alarm on the port main engine on the engine control panel on the wheelhouse. The OOW also reported feeling the ship slow down at this time.

8. All the witnesses report an initial fire located on or above the aft end of the port main engine. The Engineers reported it at the location of Nos. 3 to 4 cylinder units. All those in the immediate area saw the initial fire and smoke appear to diminish, then almost immediately erupt again with flame and sparks followed by dense black smoke.

9. Witness statements from the master and navigating officer of the watch report the fire alarm panel on the wheelhouse to have indicated a fire in the engine room, this was recorded by hand at 1012 hrs 5th August 2001. The report of the OOW states several engine room zones were indicating simultaneously.



(a) Main Engine Fuel Oil System

1. The main engine fuel oil system is designed for continuous heavy fuel duty, the engines can be stopped and started on heavy fuel oil provided that the fuel is heated to the correct operating temperature, monitored at inlet, by a viscometer. The engine mounted fuel system is situated inside an insulated ‘Hot Box’ where circulating fuel, together with heat radiation from the engine, keeps the space hot and thus prevents the fuel cooling and becoming too viscous. The fuel oil burned in the main engines of the Baltic Eider is heavy fuel oil with a kinematic viscosity value of 380 centistokes, which becomes very viscous, (almost ‘tar-like’) if cooled.

2. The main engines are fitted with a double injection system, each cylinder is equipped with a fuel injection pump and two injection valves, main and pilot. The pilot injector, fitted in the side of the cylinder head is linked to a control system and is designed to give better combustion at varying conditions, whereas the larger main injector delivers the fuel directly to the centre of the cylinder head.

1. Pressure gauge 8. Quick couplings2. Pressure sensor 9. Flow sensor (waste oil)3. Inlet temperature indicator 10. Pressure control valve4. Temperature sensor 11. Waste oil pipe from ‘hot-box’5. Fuel drain manifold 12. Main injector6. Flow sensor (clean) 13. Pilot injector7. Fuel injection pump

712

13

Fig 2. Main Engine Fuel System



Erosion Plug

Fig 3 - Fuel Injection Pump

1. Before the main engine mounted system, warm heavy fuel oil from the heavy fuel oil service tank is pumped via a fuel oil supply pump delivering 4m3/hr at 6.5 bar, it is then further boosted to a pressure of approx. 8 bar by fuel oil booster pumps delivering 7.6 m3/hr and passes through heaters, heating the fuel to 130 deg C before entering the engine via filters and a viscotherm monitoring its kinematic viscosity.

2. The used erosion plug found in the hot-box of the port main engine is almost certainly the plug missing from the aft end of No.4 fuel pump unit on the same engine. The engine could not function with a plug missing from a fuel injection pump, therefore the plug must have been in-situ, albeit not fully home, immediately prior to the incident and this was the only loose plug found in the hot box after the incident. As the plugs are not changed in situ, there would appear no other explanation for a used plug to be found in the hot box of the port main engine.

3. Loss of an erosion plug from a fuel oil injection pump would result in complete loss of back-pressure in the fuel oil supply rail to the port main engine and resultant instantaneous loss of power, this is consistent with the port main engine ‘load-down’ alarm indicated on the bridge console. Immediate loss of engine power and speed often results in a surge in the turbochargers, the sound of which was reported by the engineers immediately prior to the fire outbreak. The loss of engine power results in a loss of exhaust gas velocity driving the turbine end of the turbocharger, the resultant reduced turbine and compressor speed creates an imbalance between the compressor output, the boost pressure in the



inlet manifold of the engine, and the engine’s reduced air supply requirements at the new low power. This imbalance results in a pressure wave or surge in the air manifold which manifests itself in a loud bang or ‘thud’ sound.

Fig 5. Photograph of fuel injection pump erosion plug (30 mm dia.) found in

the port main engine hot-box in region of no 4 unit.

1. Erosion plugs are removed and checked at each fuel pump overhaul at 16,000 running hours. The cavitation of the face of the plug is checked and if it extends as far as the thread of the plug, it is replaced by a new plug. The overhauled spare fuel injection pump fitted to No 4 unit would have undergone this procedure. The plugs are tightened in accordance with the Wartsila service manual to a torque setting of 200+/-5 Nm. There is no securing method (e.g. locking-washers or wiring) other than correct torque setting.

2. It can only be assumed that the aft plug in No.4 fuel pump had somehow become loose and unscrewed itself out of the casing under the influence of local vibration. The last half turn of thread would have been torn away as the force of the internal pressure overcame the retaining force of the thread holding the plug in position as the area of useful thread reduced as the plug worked its way out.

3. How the plug became free to turn itself out of its housing remains unsolved. This is the first instance of such an occurrence on the Baltic Eider. The engine manufacturers have been consulted by the vessel’s operators with respect to this matter.



Figure 4 - L’Orange Fuel Injection Pump



(b) Outbreak of Fire

1. Loss of the fuel injection pump erosion plug in service would result in a 30mm diameter jet of hot fuel oil at a temperature of 130 deg C and pressure of 7.6 bar issuing into the hot box of the port main engine.

2. The hot box of the main engine is closed at the top and front end of the engine by removable covers. It is open behind the fuel system to between the cylinders of the engine. Fuel leakage is collected and run-off into a fuel leakage drain at the aft end of the hot box, which is fitted with an alarm to indicate excessive leak-off of fuel. The fuel issuing from the aft erosion plug port of No 4 fuel injection pump on the port main engine would have sprayed directly onto the forward face of No 3 fuel injection pump and engulfed the hot box. From there excess fuel would have run between the cylinders and down the inboard side of the engine. The amount of hot fuel at such a pressure and in contact with plane surfaces would have been deflected, broken down into smaller droplets and atomised as it was sprayed about the hot box. The port main engine exhaust is situated along the inboard side of the engine at a level above the cylinder heads. It is covered and insulated above and along the inboard side of the engine.

Fig 6 - post-fire photograph showing hot box covers and cylinder heads of port main

engine (Nos 1-3 units hot-box covers blown-off)

3. The actual ignition source cannot be determined with accuracy. The most likely source of ignition is hot fuel oil coming into contact with the hot engine exhaust, the temperature of which at the time of the incident was somewhere in the region of 450 deg C.

4. The covers blown-off Nos 1,2,3 and 9 cylinder units of the port main engine indicate an initial explosion or pressure wave within the hot box. The witnesses



described an initial fire and smoke centered on top of numbers 3-4 units of the port main engine, receding and then erupting into sparks and flames up to the deckhead of the space. This would be consistent with such an explosion within the hot-box which could have resulted in blowing-off the hot box covers.

5. The Second Engineer and Electrician attempted to fight the fire, which they both report as coming from the hot box in the region of No3 unit of the port main engine. The fire was not brought under control by their efforts.

6. The Second Engineer went to the lower platform to shut off the fuel supply to both main engines. He reports a fire raging between the engines. The fire prevented him from reaching the fuel shut-off valves for the starboard main engine, which are sited at the forward inboard corner of the starboard engine at lower platform level. The seat of the fire by this time was almost certainly between the main engines, fed by fuel running between the cylinders and down the inboard side of the entablature of the port main engine onto the tank top between the main engines. This is consistent with the resultant fire damage above and between the engines.

7. Until the fuel supply valves were closed by the second engineer, the electrically driven fuel supply and booster pumps would continue to supply the port main engine with fuel at pressures in excess of 7 bar.

Fig. 7 - post-fire photograph looking aft between main engines, showing heat damage

and melted floor plates



(c) Action Taken During Fire

1. The time elapsed between the outbreak of fire and the flooding of the space with CO2 was eleven minutes. During this time all personnel involved acted responsibly and efficiently to ensure that the damage to the ship was minimised. The fact that the engine room was manned at the time of the fire outbreak and that all of the personnel in the space were together in the control room contributed to the swift response and eventual extinction of the fire.

2. The initial knock-down fire fighting attempts using portable extinguishers proved to no avail, from then on it rapidly became clear that this was a serious engine room fire. All involved spoke of being alarmed at the speed at which the fire engulfed the engine room.

3. The action of the Second Engineer in closing the manual fuel supply valves to the port main engine undoubtedly limited the amount of fuel oil feeding the fire.

4. The key element in arriving at the stage where CO2 could be released into the machinery space was in ensuring that all personnel were outside the space and accounted for.

5. The personnel who remained in the engine control room: Chief Engineer, Third Engineer and Engineer Cadet, became trapped by the dense black smoke in the engine room. There exists no direct escape from the engine control room. It is worthy of note that this was the Engineer Cadet’s first time in the engine room of the Baltic Eider and he would, under the circumstances, have been unable to escape on his own. His escorts remained calm and fitted him with emergency escape breathing apparatus of which there were only two provided in the ECR for this purpose. Although there is no regulatory requirement to provide such equipment in the machinery space on cargo ships, it proved fortunate in this instance that the operators of the vessel had chosen to do so.

6. Of the means of escape available to them, the escape route taken by the three persons trapped in the ECR was chosen wisely. The workshop area was open to the main engine room as the double doors at the forward end of the workshop were normally left in the open position as they were at the time of the fire. The Third Engineer knew that the door between the generator room and the workshop was latched in the closed position and presumed therefore that the generator room would be relatively free of smoke. Once through the workshop area adjacent to the engine control room and into the generator room they had escaped the fire effects and had an easy passage up onto the main deck via the steering gear space.

7. The CO2 fixed gas fire extinguishing system initiated to flood the machinery space remotely from the fire control station was successful. When the Second Engineer went forward to confirm its release, he saw frosting of the CO2 pipework supplying the machinery space, indicating that the gas was indeed expanding as it passed through the correct section control valve. The Baltic Eider is fitted with a bulk CO2 system holding 19.7 tonnes of gas, of which 2.5 tonnes were released into the machinery space the day of the fire. The CO2 extinguished the fire which was later confirmed by the party entering the space wearing breathing apparatus.



Conclusions

1. The fire started initially as a consequence of the loss of an erosion plug from a fuel pump on the port main engine which sprayed hot fuel oil under pressure into the hot box of the engine.

2. The hot fuel oil and resultant oil mist came into contact with a hot surface sufficient to ignite the oil vapour and initiate a fire in the hot box of the port main engine.

3. The hot box of the main engine was insufficient in design to contain such an oil leakage and resulted in fuel oil flowing between the cylinders of the port main engine and down to the tank top between the two main engines.

4. Fuel oil issuing from the port main engine fueled a large oil fire, smoke from which rapidly engulfed the engine room.

5. Evacuation of the space was the only alternative, which was achieved efficiently.

6. The bulk CO2 fixed gas fire extinguishing system was effective in extinguishing the fire in time to prevent the spread of the fire to surrounding spaces.

Fig 8 - Post-fire photograph showing engine room deckhead above the main engines (A-60 fire division separating machinery space from main cargo deck).



Recommendations

1. The Marine Administration should immediately notify all ship managers and owners of this incident. They should instruct operators to check the tightness of all unsecured plugs fitted to fuel injection pumps of main engines and auxiliary engines.

2. Wartsila, the engine manufacturer’s should consider modifications to the erosion plugs to facilitate securing plugs and prevent plugs vibrating loose.

3. The Marine Administration should consider recommendations for emergency equipment and/or arrangements for escape from engine control rooms. As this tends to be the first place to which engine room personnel go in the event of an alarm or incident, consideration should be given to facilitating their escape.

4. The master and staff involved should be commended for their actions which succeeded in preventing injury to personnel and saving the hull and machinery of this ship. A special mention should be made of the Engineer Cadet who found himself in a major fire in an alien environment, where he remained calm and acted on orders from his Chief Engineer to escape from the space.



Appendix 1 - Fuel Pump Modifications

PLUG

WIRE

post-fire photograph after main engine overhaul showing fuel injection pump erosion plugs which have been drilled and fitted with securing wire.

Wartsila, the engine manufacturer’s who carried out the repairs to the Baltic Eider’s two main engines have modified the fuel pumps as shown above. The erosion plugs have been drilled at the cap to facilitate securing wire. The tightening torque of the plugs was increased from 200Nm to 300Nm. At the time of writing, no service bulletin had been produced by Wartsila to promulgate this to all ships fitted with this type of fuel injection pump.

PLUG

WIRE


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