Confronting Relativism

William B. Irvine

Editor's Note: This essay by William B. Irvine and the subsequent article by Charles Landesman are loosely tied by subject matter. They both address academic di- mensions of morality. The former charts from its author's experience in the class- room a landscape of the relativism that prevails among today's undergraduates. The latter explores the realm of the academic moralists, where we find scholars and philosophers projecting their political longings as unconditional imperatives for a just society. The two territories trade on each other's needs. The dreams of the moralists for diversity or multiculturalism provide alternatives to genuine ethical deliberation in a packaged philosophy that affords students the luxury of never having to formulate their own moral framework.

erica is awash in tolerance. Many of us simply refuse to be j u d g m e n t a l ou t the actions of others. Indeed , the only t ime some of us will pass

j u d g m e n t on our fellow citizens is to chastise them for be ing j udgmen ta l . In my own life I conf ron t this ep idemic of to lerance every t ime I discuss

value theory in the college ph i losophy classes that I teach. Relativism runs rampant a m o n g the undergradua tes , and those unde rg radua te s who cling to absolutes of ten do so surreptitiously, fearing the scorn of the relativists a r o u n d them. This raises problems in the classroom, since most o f the ethical theories we discuss in phi losophy are unapologet ical ly absolutist. Thus, I m m a n u e l Kant in the Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals was an absolutist , as was J o h n Stuart Mill in Utilitarianism; and almost all o f those ph i losophers who criticize Kant and Mill f ind fault no t with their absolut ism bu t with the part icular fo rm their absolut ism took. The first task in any college ethics class, then, is to con- f ront relativism.

In saying this, I do no t m e a n to imply that ethical relativists are necessarily misguided souls who can easily be refuted. It is possible for an inte l l igent person to arrive at ethical relativism as the result o f long, hard thought : con- sider, for example , David B. Wong's sympathet ic t r ea tmen t of relativism in Moral Relativity. The poin t is that most unde rg radua te s do no t arrive at ethical relativism as the result o f long, hard thought . To the contrary, they espouse relativism as the result of a failure to think things through. More precisely,

William B. Irvine is an associate professor in the Department of Philosophy at Wright State University, Dayton, Ohio. Paragon House is to release his Doing Right by Children: Reflections on the Nature of Childhood and the Obligations of Parenthood in 2001. Please address correspondence to Academic Questions, 221 Witherspoon Street, Second Floor, Princeton, NJ 08542-3215; editor@aq.nas.org.

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they espouse relativism because they harbor a n u m b e r o f misconcept ions about the na ture of ethical absolutism. In the r ema inde r o f this article, I will de- scribe some of these misconcept ions and explain how an absolutist can deal with them.

What Is Relativism?

To unde r s t and the difference between ethical absolutism and ethical rela- tivism, it is useful to think about the difference between mathemat ics and ice cream preferences.

In mathemat ics there are r ight and wrong answers. If s o m e o n e tells us 5+7=13, we don ' t say their math is unusual , we say it is wrong. If an ent ire culture tells us 5+7=13, we say the cul ture is mistaken in its mathematics; when it comes to math, we don ' t tolerate cultural differences. In mathematics , the truths are universal, i.e., the same for all people, in all places, and at all times. In this sense mathemat ics is absolute.

W h e n it comes to ice cream preferences, there are no r ight and wrong answers. A flavor that tastes good to one person might no t taste good to an- other. It would be silly for us to a t t empt to prove to someone that vanilla ice cream is not good. If someone thinks vanilla ice cream is good, then for him, it is good: De gustibus non est disputandum. For this reason, when it comes to ice cream preferences, it is appropr ia te for us to re la t iv ize judgments to individu- als or to groups. When I say vanilla is good, I m e a n good to me. W h e n I say mint chocolate is bad, I mean bad to me, but I allow the possibility that it migh t be good to others.

An ethical relativist is in the habi t o f add ing relativizing clauses to his ethi- cal judgments . He is disinclined to label a certain activity as being r ight or wrong, period. Rather, he tells us that the activity migh t be wrong for him but right for others; or that the activity might be wrong for one culture but r ight for another culture. In o ther words, he treats e th ica l judgrnen t s in much the same way as he treats j u d g m e n t s with respect to ice cream.

An ethical absolutist, on the o ther hand , treats ethics like math. Accord ing to him, there are right and wrong answers to moral questions. The answers are the same for all people, in all places, and at all times. Thus, an activity that is wrong for me is wrong for everyone; and if others th ink the activity is right, they are simply wrong in their ethical viewpoint, the same way as someone who thinks 5+7=13 is simply wrong.

Undergraduate Relativism

Why do undergradua tes favor ethical relativism? In large part because they harbor various misconcept ions about ethical absolutism. Here are some o f them.

Misconception #1. Only someone coming from a conservative religious background would favor ethical absolutism. It is true that most religions are absolutist with

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respect to ethics, bu t f rom this it does no t follow that absolutist ethics invari- ably p resupposes e i ther the exis tence o f God or certain religious views. It is entirely possible for an atheist to be an ethical absolutist. Such an individual cannot , o f course, say that the reason we should do the right thing is to please God (or avoid p u n i s h m e n t f rom God) , bu t he can instead a r g u e - - a s Mill d i d - - that we should do the right thing because we should act to maximize the hap- piness o f h u m a n beings. It is worth no t ing that nearly all o f the (absolutist) ethical theories deve loped by ph i losophers involve no religious presupposi- tions whatsoever.

Misconception #2. Absolutists think they have all the answers, ethicall~ speaking. Although there may be absolutists who think they have all the answers, most will admit that they do not know everything. For most absolutists, the situa- tion in ethics is like that in mathematics: Al though any mathemat ica l absolut- ist will tell you that the truths o f ma themat ics are the same for us all, no r ight -minded mathemat ica l absolut is t would claim to have all these truths. The best you can h o p e for in mathemat ics is to c o m p r e h e n d a por t ion of the mathemat ica l domain . Thus, mathemat ica l absolut ism does no t entail math- ematical omniscience. The same is t rue o f ethical absolutism. An ethical abso- lutist might claim that there arecorrect answers to ethical questions, bu t quickly add that he himself lacks the answers to many of these quest ions.

Misconception #3. Ethical absolutists view the world in black and white terms: They regard every action as being either right or wrong and don't allow for cases that are simply outside the realm of ethics. In fact, a thought fu l ethical absolutist will no t regard every action as be ing e i ther right or wrong. It is t rue that he will classify some actions as be ing morally obl igatory and some actions as be ing morally impermissible, bu t he will also allow for a third possibility: that an act ion is ne i the r morally obl igatory nor moral ly impermissible , bu t is "morally neu- tral." Thus, suppose I pause in my writing to heave a sigh. It is no t wrong for me to heave the sigh, and it would no t have been wrong for me not to heave the sigh; my sighing simply did no t raise any moral issues. The same can be said of most of my daily activities, including my decision on which clothes to wear, what book to read, whether or not to play tennis, and whether or not to pet the cats. (These activities all could have moral impl icat ions-- i f , for example , I had stolen the book I was reading or if by playing tennis I was breaking a p romise to my wife to do the t a x e s - - b u t in most cases do not have moral implications.)

The re is ano the r sense in which ethical absolutists might be cha rged with engaging in "black and white" thinking with respect to ethics: An ethical rela- tivist might tell us that absolutists are unwilling to allow for except ions to moral rules. Thus, an ethical absolutist who thinks abor t ion is wrong, will th ink it is wrong in every case, with no except ions . An ethical relativist, on the o the r hand, will be willing to relativize his views on abor t ion to various cases, argu- ing, for example , that abor t ion is right for a w o m a n who is p r egnan t as the result o f rape.

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Not only can an ethical absolutist "make except ions" to moral rules, bu t a thought fu l absolutist will make plenty of them. Thus, cons ider an ethical ab- solutist who agrees with the "abor t ion except ion" jus t cited. H e might tell us that abor t ion is morally permissible if a woman is p regnan t as the result o f rape, bu t go on to argue that abor t ion is morally impermissible if a woman is in her eighth m o n t h of pregnancy, if she voluntarily got pregnant , and if he r life is no t th rea tened by cont inu ing the pregnancy. In making such claims, is the absolutist giving in to relativism? Not at all. The claims in ques t ion are more proper ly descr ibed as be ing conditional (i.e., "if-then") claims ra ther than relativistic (i.e., "for") claims. Ethics is a complex subject, and we should no t expec t ethical truths to be simple. Is it wrong to tell lies? Usually, bu t no t always. Suppose, for example, that by telling a "white lie" you can save the life o f an innocen t person. Is it wrong to kill people? Usually, bu t no t always: con- sider killing in self-defense. Thus, a thought fu l absolutist p robably won ' t want to make a b lanket declarat ion that abor t ion is always wrong, bu t will ins tead want to specify the condi t ions u n d e r which it is wrong; he will, in o the r words, conditionalize his ethical declarat ions with respect to abor t ion.

But having declared, for instance, that abor t ion is morally permissible if a woman is p regnan t as the result o f rape, the absolutist will go on to tell us that this condi t ional s ta tement , if it is in fact true, is t rue for all people , in all places, and at all times. His condi t ional ethical claims, in o the r words, are absolute condi t ional claims: H e will refuse to add a relativizing clause to his condi t ional declarat ions and say, for example , that for him abor t ion is permis- sible if a woman is p regnan t as the result o f rape.

Much the same thing happens in mathematics. A mathemat ic ian might make a claim like the following: "If x=5, then x+7=12." The claim itself is condi- tional, bu t we should not conc lude f rom this that in making the claim, the mathemat ic ian has a b a n d o n e d his absolutism. To the contrary, he will ho ld that it is a condi t ional claim which, if true, is t rue for all people , in all places, and at all times.

Misconception #4. Absolutists are intolerant of others. This is only a partial mis- concept ion . Ethical absolutists will be in to lerant in one sense o f the word. They will no t be universally accept ing o f the behavior of o the r individuals, bu t will instead somet imes label their act ions as be ing morally wrong. Suppose , for example , a father beats his children. An ethical absolutist will likely react with intolerance. H e will hold the father 's actions to be morally c o n d e m n a b l e . H e most certainly will no t react to the inc ident by saying (as a truly to lerant and particularly shallow relativist might) that a l though he would never bea t his children, he is unwilling to force his personal ethics on to others.

Having admi t ted that ethical absolutists will be in tolerant in one sense o f the word, let me de fend them from the charge o f in to lerance in a n o t h e r sense of the word. In this second sense, an in to lerant individual is one who is self- r ighteous and is therefore continual ly expressing his disapproval o f the be-

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havior of others. What makes many students shun absolutism is their belief that ethical absolutists tend to be intolerant in this sense of the word. Students generally want to have lots of friends, and they know that if they go around constantly criticizing the behavior of others, they will find themselves with few. As character traits go, self-righteousness is, in this day and age, distinctly uncool.

Students are mistaken, though, if they think advocacy of ethical absolutism requires people to be publicly intolerant in the manner just described. Con- sider again the absolutist who determined that the behavior of the child-beating father was wrong. Although this absolutist holds the father's behavior to be morally condemnable, it does not follow from this that he will make his opin- ion known to the fa ther - -or to anyone else, for that matter. He might instead report the father to the police in an anonymous fashion, but never confront the father himself. Indeed, he might even decide that morality requires him to keep absolutely silent about the father's behavior. Suppose, for example, he knows that the police refuse to intervene in such cases, and that if he ex- presses his outrage at the father's behavior, the father will react by beating his children more severely.

To reinforce this point, consider the situation of mathematical absolutists. Even though they are absolutists, this in no way requires them to go around telling everyone of their mathematical discoveries; and it is a good thing, too, since mathematicians who are unable to stop talking mathematics generally have few non-mathematical friends. In the same way, an ethical absolutist can be privately disapproving of certain behavior--i.e., be intolerant in the pri- vate sense of the word--but not publicly express his intolerance--i .e. , not be intolerant in the public sense of the word. He can, in short, be an absolutist and have friends.

Another thing to realize about absolutist intolerance is that absolutists will generally be quite tolerant of behavior that is primarily self-affecting. What they will be intolerant of is behavior that negatively affects others. Suppose, then, that someone dyes his hair green. It would be difficult for an absolutist to develop a moral argument against this behavior, since it primarily affects the person doing the dyeing. Suppose, on the other hand, that the person doing the dyeing steals the dye from his neighbor. The absolutist would be quick to condemn this behavior (and might or might not choose to express his condemnat ion publicly), inasmuch as it is behavior that negatively affects someone else.

"Outing" Closet Absolutism

How can one persuade student relativists of the error of their ways? Here is a technique that I have employed with some success. During my classroom discussion of relativism, I pick one particularly outspoken relativist and an- nounce that I am considering giving him an F i n my course because he is

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wearing socks. T h e n I pick a second relativist and a n n o u n c e that I am consid- er ing giving him an A in my course because he (like the first relativist) is wearing socks.

After some initial be fudd lemen t , s tudents compla in that it would be wrong for me to give grades in this manner . W h e n I ask t hem why it would be wrong, they generally raise issues of fairness. Fairness requires that I grade them no t according to whe the r they wear socks, bu t accord ing to the quality o f their class work. Fairness also requires that I treat like cases alike. It is manifest ly unfair for me to give one s tudent an F for wear ing socks and then turn a r o u n d and give ano the r s tuden t an A for wear ing socks. Somet imes s tudents go on to poin t ou t that I have a contractual obl igat ion to grade them fairly; therefore , by giving a s tuden t an F for wear ing socks, I am no t only guilty o f act ing unfairly, bu t I am also guilty of a breach of my e m p l o y m e n t contract .

I r e spond by accusing these relativists o f in to lerance . Accord ing to their ethical views, unfairness or breach o f cont rac t might be wrong, bu t who are they to force their ethical views on me? Even t h o u g h unfairness might be wrong for them, shou ldn ' t they, as ethical relativists, allow that it might be right for me? And what are they, as relativists, do ing throwing a r o u n d such absolutist concepts as fairness and contractual obligat ion? In the face of such quest ions, they quickly abandon their relativism. They realize that because this is a case in which s o m e o n e else's actions affect t hem personally, they have every right to be judgmenta l .

Cultural Relativism

Earlier we have been discussing individual ethical relativism. It is also pos- sible for s tudents to engage in cultural relativism. Cultural relativists a rgue that different cultures have dif ferent ethical s tandards, that the ethical stan- dards of o the r cultures are jus t as "valid" as ou r own, and that it is wrong for us to j u d g e o ther cultures by our own ethical standards. Students who have b e e n exposed to an th ropo logy often come away cultural relativists.

There is less to cultural relativism than meets the eye. What is astonishing, when you view o ther cultures, is not how di f ferent their ethical beliefs are, bu t how similar they are to our own. What differs are the circumstances u n d e r which these o the r cultures must apply their ethical beliefs. Because of circumstant ial differences, the same ethical s tandards can result in seeming dif ferences in ethical practices.

My favorite illustration of this is f ound in the writings of Gont ran de Poncins. Poncins was a French aristocrat who had an interest in "simpler" cultures. In 1938 this interest led him to live a m o n g the Esk imos- -or , as they are now known, the I n u i t - - a n d travel with t hem across the Canadian Arctic. In his book Kabloona he describes his adventures and provides w o n d e r f u l insight into how the Inuit lived before be ing "modern ized ," At one po in t in his narra- tive, Poncins describes an Inuit who had killed an elderly relative:

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It was his own mother that he had driven out and set down at sea to freeze to death. He was fond of her, he explained. He had always been kind to her. But she was too old, she was no longer good for anything; so blind, she couldn't even find the porch to crawl into the igloo. So, on a day of blizzard, the whole family agree- ing, he had taken her out, and they had struck camp and gone off, leaving her to die.

A cultural relativist might respond to this tale by c o m m e n t i n g on differ- ences in cultural values. He might argue that we should no t j u d g e the Inui t by the values of our own culture. It would be wrong for us to leave our aged parents outside to freeze to death in a blizzard, but who are we to impose our ethical values on the Inuit? Intercul tural tolerance, he might add, is as impor- tant as interpersonal tolerance.

The thing to realize about the case jus t described is that the cultural relativ- ist would be mistaken if he used this case to demons t ra te intercul tural differ- ences in ethical values. For notice that when we apply the ethical values of mode rn America to the Inuit, we are likely to reach the same conclusion as they did about the proper thing to do with one's elderly relatives. The Inui t described by Poncins differ f rom us not in their ethical values, but in their physical circumstances.

The life of the Inui t (before they were "modernized") involved traveling across the ice in winter looking for food- -p r imar i ly seals. Anyth ing that im- paired the mobility o f the family uni t therefore impai red its chances o f surviv- ing the winter. On the Arctic ice in 1938, there were no homes for the aged where elderly relatives could be deposited. The Inui t who found themselves traveling with an enfeebled elderly relative were therefore faced with the fol- lowing choice: Ei ther let the relative die, or much of the family uni t (includ- ing the relative) dies. It is clear what the Inui t should do if they value h u m a n life: they should let the relative die. It is also clear that if a m o d e r n American family with s tandard ethical values found itself in similar c i rcumstances - - i f it was out on the ice with only primitive tools, was forced to travel miles each day to find food, and had no alternative to this way of l i fe-- i t would make m u c h the same choice. The conclusion: Modern Americans share many ethical val- ues with the Inui t peoples o f sixty years ago; where we differ is in the physical circumstances u n d e r which we must apply these values.

In discussing the Inui t practice of leaving people out on the ice to die, we should keep in mind that the chosen means of death is a relatively gentle death. When you die of hypothermia, you become progressively more tired. Though t processes slow down until you are in a stupor. Ult imately you slip into uncon- sciousness, never to awaken. It is a process that, ra ther than being painful, is marked by an absence of feeling, It is therefore perhaps the kindest dea th that the Inuit, who lacked mode rn drugs, could have inflicted on the elderly.

In those cases in which there a r e genu ine ethical differences between our- selves and some o the r culture, it hardly follows that we should be tolerant o f

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those differences. Thus, if we discover a cul ture that c o n d o n e s slavery, mora l to lerance would be ou t o f place. The m e m b e r s o f this cul ture are simply wrong in their views on s lavery--assuming, o f course, that we are right in ou r views. We should do what we can to help them "see the light" with regard to h u m a n rights, in much the same way as we might try to he lp them see the light, math- ematically speaking, if they bel ieved 5+7=13.

Conclus ion

After deal ing with s tudent relativism for decades, I have come to the con- clusion that it is a view students can fairly easily be talked ou t of. It is no t at all difficult to reveal to s tudents the ex ten t to which they are closet absolutists. It is also no t difficult to reveal to them that their fondness for relativism is in large par t due to their misunders tand ing the na ture of absolutism. A n u m b e r of misconcept ions su r round absolutism, and s tudents fall victim to these mis- concept ions . It doesn ' t help matters that many of their college professors have fallen victim to these same misconcept ions and as a result encourage s tuden t relativism. In their minds, by encourag ing relativism, they are encourag ing to lerance in the classroom.

As we have seen, though, absolutism is no t synonymous with intolerance. Morality allows us to be to lerant in some cases, bu t requires us to be in to le ran t in others. By conf ront ing relativism in the c l a s s r o o m - - b y correc t ing s tudents ' mistaken beliefs abou t abso lu t i sm--co l lege professors are taking an impor- tant step in fostering their s tudents ' d e v e l o p m e n t as moral beings.

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