Taylor, Ontology Relativism

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Journal of the American Academy of Religion, XLVI/ 1, 41-61

Towardan Ontology of RelativismMark C. Taylor

ABSTRACTDespite the significant impact of the awareness of perspectivalrelativismon the religious imagination, recentphilosophers and theologianshave rarely subjected epistemological relativism to careful scrutiny. Thispaper attempts to overcome the current theological impasse by a carefulexploration of the metaphysical implications of relativism. The central thesisof the essay is that truth is relativebecause meaningis contextual and beingis

relational. Contextualized meaning and relationalbeingjoin to form relativetruth disclosed through symbolic awareness.The roots of contemporary relativism lie deep within eighteenth andnineteenth century philosophical movements and are inseparably entangledwith the psycho-social pluralization endemic to the process of moderni-zation. The efforts of Neo-orthodoxy, polytheism, and the scientificstudy ofreligion to resolve dilemmas posed by epistemological relativism areinadequate. What has gone unnoticed is that the discovery of truth'srelativity is the realization of its inherentlydialectical character. This insightbegins to emerge when it is recognized that meaning is contextual andcontext is semiophantic. Principles identified in Hegel's logic, in Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of temporality, and in Ricoeur's and Gadamer'shermeneutics disclose that meaning assumes form through dialecticalinterrelationshipin which co-implicates mutually constitute each other. Thesynchronic and diachronic dimensions of relationality reveal theinexhaustability and perpetual revisability of meaning. The problem ofsemantics, however, is inseparable from the question of ontology.Ontological reflection leads to the conclusion that being itself is dialectical-fundamentallysocial or essentiallyrelational. Determinate identity is born ofontological intercourse with otherness. Relations are not external andaccidental, but are internal and essential to being itself. Identity anddifference, unity and plurality, oneness and manyness are thoroughly co-relative, joined in a dialectical relation of reciprocal implication. Thispluralized unity and unified plurality is the ontological matrix of truth'srelativity.Mark C. Taylor (Harvard University, Ph.D.) is Assistant Professor of Religion atWilliams College and acting editor of the AAR Dissertation Series. In addition tonumerous scholarlyarticles,he is author of Kierkegaard'sPseudonymous Authorship:A Study of Time and the Self (Princeton, 1975)and is coauthor of Religion and the

Human Image (Prentice-Hall, 1977).41


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Symbolic awarenessis the interface of contextual meaning andrelationalbeing.The densityof constitutive elationsandthe nascenceofconcrete actuality engendera dissonancebetweenmanifest and latentcontent nthe reflection f being n consciousness.Thepolysemyofsymbolscaptures hepolymorphismf being n a waythat establisheshe need oraconstantprocessof deciphermentn which we reformulate ur notionsinordermorefullyto penetrate ynchronic nd diachronic elations hatareontologically efinitive.Bymaintaininghe tensionbetweenherevealed ndthe concealed,symbolicawareness nsures hatknowledgealwaysevolvesthroughceaselessreinterpretation. or symbolicconsciousness,ruth,asbeingitself,foreverbecomes.Theessayconcludeswiththesuggestion hatthe weddingof a relativistic pistemologyand a relationalontologyin asymbolicsof thereligious magination eopens hepossiblityof constructivetheologicalreflection n a pluralistic ge.

Word and SilenceE xpressing both an acute awareness of the contemporary theologian'squandary and the conviction that theological reflection remainspossible in a post-modern world, Thomas Altizer recentlyhas written:". . .little that is overtly theological is actually hearable or speakable today.However, this situation can make possible the realization of a new theologicallanguage, a theological language which will speak by way of the voice or thevoices of our time"(3-4). Therecan be little doubt that theology is in disarray.Since the decline in the fortunes of Neo-orthodoxy, certaintyabout the natureand viability of the theological enterprisehas waned. Absence of the Word hasleft theological voices either silent or confused. If theological language isagain to be speakable and hearable, the sources of silence must be penetratedand the depths of confusion plumbed. In the following pages, we shall explorethe possibility that the paralysis of the theological imagination has been

contracted by an increasing awareness of perspectival relativism.Words and Silence

The roots of the contemporary recognition of relativism lie deep withineighteenth and nineteenth century theological and philosophical movementsand areinseparablyentangledwith the psycho-social pluralizationendemic tothe process of modernization. Having gradually become persuaded thatconsciousness and therefore knowledge bear the indelible impress of themultiple situating forces that converge upon the cognitive activity of theknowing subject, many twentieth century theologians have been forced toaddress dilemmas posed by what they understand to be epistemologicalrelativism / 1/. Although the responses to the historicization of consciousnesshave been multiple, it is possible to identify threefundamentaltendencies thathave been particularly important for theological reflection.Not infrequently, the apprehension of the situational character ofknowledge and truth stills the voice of constructive systematic theology anddirectsattention to the study of religion as an historical human phenomenon.Uncertain of the tenability of normative assertions, the student attempts to

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Towardan Ontologyof Relativism43bracket questions of truth and value through the assumption of theapparently non-judgmental stance of disinterestedor objective investigation.The "scientific"study of religion often draws upon methodological principlesdefined by what Ricoeur lately has labeled the "hermeneutics of suspicion."From this perspective, consciousness in general, and religious consciousnessin particular, is regarded as fundamentally epiphenomenal-rooted in or areflection of more primordialnatural,psychological, historical, and/ or socio-economic processes. Inquiry attempts to identify the nature of latent sourcesof religious thought and practice.In otherwords, the activity of interpretationinvolves the effort to demystifythe manifest content of consciousness throughits reduction to the morphological base from which it originates and uponwhich it continues to rest. Apart from such demystification, consciousness, itis argued, remains false. While it is impossible to deny the significance ofinsights generated by the psychology, sociology, anthropology, history, andphilosophy of religion, it is necessaryto recognizethe limitations of this modeof analysis. In the first place, the very philosophical movements from whichthis general approach to the phenomenon of religion derives suggest theproblematic character of ostensibly objective, value-freeinquiry.Upon closerconsideration, it becomes evident that objectivity is not disinterested, butreflects consent to specifiable values that carry with them importantphilosophical presuppositions aindmetaphysical implications (see Gouldner:35-52). Secondly, although insistent upon the need to demystify religiousawareness, hermeneuticistsof suspicion often have a tendency to reify latentlayers of consciousness in a fashion analogous to the absolutization ofconsciousness' manifest content in the primarynaivete of believers.When thiscourse is followed, the hermeneutics of suspicion is, paradoxically,insufficiently sensitive to perspectivalrelativism. Rather than uncovering themulti-dimensionality of religious expression, this type of scientific study ofreligion tends to become simplistically reductionistic. Probing potentialshortcomings of hermeneutical suspicion, Ricoeur maintains: "Overagainstillusion and the fable-making function, demystifyinghermeneutics sets up therude discipline of necessity. It is the lesson of Spinoza: one first finds himselffree within understood necessity. . . But, in return,does not this disciplineofthe real,this ascesis of the necessarylack the graceof imagination, the upsurgeof the possible? And does not this grace of imagination have something to dowith the Word as Revelation?" (1970:35-36).

"The Word as Revelation" forms the basis of an alternative (andopposite) response to perspectival relativism. Recognizing the seeminglyinevitable progression from the inward turn of Schleiermacher'stheologicalmethod to the psycho-social reductionism of Feuerbach and Marx, KarlBarth insisted that theological reflection perpetually focus on the absoluteand transcendent Word of God, rather than on subjective structures ofreligiousawareness. Barthagreedwith the relativisticinterpretationof humanreligion, but rejected the applicability of such analysis to the Word of Godrevealedin Christ. The divine Word is the creativeself-disclosure of God, andnot the sinful self-projection of man. For Barth,the only way to overcome the

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anomie of relativism was by obedience to or belief in Christian revelation.Hence what Barth affirmed of all religious traditions, he denied of Christianfaith sensu eminentiori.It should be apparent, however, that Barth's answer to relativism isinadequate. His program consisted of a sustained effort to reassert theinviolability of Christianityand to insulate Christian belief from the type ofscrutiny and interpretation to which all other forms of human thought andaction are justifiably subjected. Barth responded to the confusion born ofpluralismby the reaffirmationof a radicalmonotheism that seeks to provideasingle center of value which effectively structures experience and integratespersonality. But what if Yeats is right?

Turningand turning n thewideninggyreThefalconcannot hearthe falconer;Thingsfall apart; he centrecannothold;Mereanarchy s looseduponthe world.It appears that Barth counseled a return to pre-critical naivete which nolonger seems possible for many moderns. Our course must pass throughinstead of around relativism.

A final noteworthy development on the contemporary theological sceneillustrates Peter Berger's contention that "every modern society must findsome way to come to terms with the process of pluralization. Veryprobablythis will entail some form of legitimation of at least a certain measure ofplurality" (69). In direct opposition to Neo-orthodoxy's exclusivelymonotheistic response to relativism, there recently has been a reemergenceofpolytheistic religiosity. Instead of seeing in religious, social, and psychologicalpluralism a problem to be overcome, polytheists regardit as an occasion forthe enrichment of the human spirit. David Miller explains: "Whenreleasedfrom the tyrannical imperialismof monotheism by the death of God, man hasthe opportunity of discovering new dimensions hidden in the depths ofreality'shistory. He may discover a new freedom to acknowledge variousnessand many-sideness"(3; see also Ogilvy, 1977).Although Millerrecognizes thedisorientation wrought by the loss of a stable center, he insists that "afterthefrightpasses, one notices a new sense of liberty:. . .everywhereone stands is acenter, a new center, and the universe of meaning is not limited to a tight littlehorizon, a vicious circle of a single mind and lifetime" (11). Polytheismendeavors to offer religious legitimation for psycho-social pluralism andperspectival relativism. "The multiple patterns of polytheism allow room tomove meaningfully through a pluralisticuniverse. They free one to affirmtheradicalpluralityof the self. . . . But polytheism is not only a social reality;itis also a philosophical condition. It is that reality experienced by men andwomen when Truth with a capital 'T' cannot be articulated reflectivelyaccording to a single grammar,a single logic, or a single symbol-system"(ix,4).

This new polytheism, however, is as unsatisfactory as old forms ofmonotheism. It swings from the extreme of distinct self-integration and

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Towardan Ontologyof Relativism 45social, cultural, and religious intolerance to the opposite extreme of personalmultiplicity and social, cultural,and religiousdis-integration.We are asked tochoose between the suffocation of blindfaith and rigid ego, and the confusionof a plurality of beliefs and a protean personality, which carried to its logicalconclusion is the negation of human consciousness /2/. In addition to this,polytheism's uncritical inclusiveness renders problematic theoretical dis-crimination and practical judgment. Though intending the opposite,polytheism borders on nihilism. Finally, on a metaphysical level, bothpolytheism and monotheism are equally undialectical. The formeremphasizes plurality to the exclusion of unity, and the latter stressesunity atthe expense of plurality.What neitherpolytheists nor monotheists graspis thedialectical relationship between unity and plurality in which identity anddifference come to be through each other.In sum, the majorattemptsto resolve thedilemmasposed by perspectivalrelativism appear to be inadequate. All too often words of contemporarytheologians bespeak silence rather than Word. This failure is, in largemeasure, the result of the uncriticalacceptanceor rejectionof epistemologicalrelativism. A revitalization of the theological impulse requiresa more carefulexploration of the metaphysical implications of relativism than has yet beenundertaken /3/. The remainder of this essay is devoted to an attempt todemonstrate that relativism is mandated both epistemologically andontologically. What has gone unnoticed is that the discovery of truth'srelativity is the realization of its inherently dialectical character. Truth isrelativebecause meaning is contextual and being is relational. Contextualizedmeaning and relational beingjoin in relative truth disclosed throughsymbolicawareness. It must be stressed, however, that the claim of truth to be relativedoes not necessarilyinvolve either its denial or the simpleassertion of multipleand conflicting truths. Meaning, as being itself, assumes determinate formthrough reciprocal relationship in which co-implicates mutually constituteeach other. This line of argument turns upon a distinction between theinterpretation of relativity in terms of dialectical relationality and the morecommon notion of relativity as the subjectivization of all knowledge /4/.Careful reflectionsuggeststhat the claim of the thorough-going subjectivityoftruth is negated in the very effort to affirm it / 5/. The recognition of the bondjoining relativistic epistemology and relational ontology points to a way outof this paradox of subjectivity by enabling us to see the truth aborningthrough the intercourse of truths. As the argument unfolds, it will becomeapparent that the only thing that is not relative is relativity itself. Whatremains constant amid the relativity of perspectives is constitutiverelationality-a claim that is affirmedin the veryeffort to negate it. This pointcan be made in a more provocative, and doubtless a more problematic, way.Dialectical vision discerns the necessary interplay of relativity and itscontrary, absoluteness. Relativity can establish itself only in and through itsopposite-that which is not relative, the absolute. Conversely, absolutenesscan constitute itself only in and through its opposite-that which is notabsolute, the relative. So understood relativity and absoluteness are not

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46 MarkC. Taylorsimply antithetical, but mutually coinhere. Absoluteness is the structure ofrelation by means of which determinate identities establish and maintainthemselves. Neither relata nor relationship can exist without the other. In amore theological idiom, God and world cannot exist apart from one another.God forever becomes incarnate, and the finite is always in the process ofbecoming reconciled with the infinite. The absolutizing of relativity is at thesame time the relativizingof absoluteness. These are but two dimensions of aunified epistemological-ontological process /6/.

Contextualization of MeaningMeaning is contextual; context is semiophantic. "Meaning," writesNorman 0. Brown, "is in the play, or the interplay of light . . . in theirridescence,the interplay, in the interconnections:at the intersections, at thecrossroads"(246-47). Seeing is always seeing with-effecting a contrast. Any

angle of vision is mediated by, or arises through its relation to alternativeviewpoints. Taken alone, particular meaning is not simply false, but iscompletely indefinable,or thoroughly unspecifiable.The contextualization ofmeaning is dis-covered through dialectical reflection. When graspeddialectically, it is clear that perspectives depend upon each other for self-definition, and therefore are internally related and mutually constitutiverather than disjunctively opposed to one another. With this insight, weglimpse the end toward which our argumentis directed: context is the creatrixof meaning-meaning is constituted by the specific context within which it iscon-figured. It is necessary, however, to consider more completely the natureof contextual relationsingredientin meaning. A diagrammatic representationshould simplify our task.

Diachronic axis

T, T2 T3. . .

A >A> ' A"...Life-worlds | % "

o. B > B' > B"[Perspective(s)] t ^\

C C' >C". .

In attempting to ascertain the dialectical dimensions of meaning, adistinction must be drawn, for analytical purposes, between diachronic andsynchronic relationality. The diachronic axis of the diagramchartsmomentsof temporal process (T,, T T3. . .; A, A', A",. . .; B, B', B". . .;and C, C',

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C" . . ). Though distinguishable, these moments are caught in a complexweb of recollection/repetition, concresence/realization, and anticipa-tion/intension. The synchronic axis of the diagram depicts phenomena /7/co-extant at any particular moment of temporal process (A, B, C; A', B', C';and A"; B"; C"). While diachronism refers to temporal unfolding,synchronismpoints to simultaneityof occurrence.Vectorsjoining identifiabletemporal moments and specifiable actualities and/or potentialities indicateon the one hand, the interplay of temporal ecstases and the inseparabilityofsynchronous phenomena, and on the other hand, the thoroughly dialecticalrelationship between diachronism and synchronism. As the separation of anyinstant from other temporal moments or the isolation of a certainparticularity from coexisting particularities representsartificial abstraction,so the effort to consider diachronic and synchronic relations apart from oneanother inevitably leads to fundamental epistemological and ontologicaldistortions and to problematic theological and philosophical conclusions.With respect to semantics, the context determinative of meaning consists ofcontrasts among alternative perspectives extant at a particular time and ofrelations among dialectical moments of historically developingLebensanschauungen.If ourargumentis to become persuasive,synchronicityand diachronicity must be examined in more detail.Conceptual meaning comes to expression through "the interplay ofsameness and difference"(Ricoeur, 1973: 109). Referenceto otherness is notextrinsic and accidental, but is intrinsic and essential to the determination ofspecific meaning. In fine, meaning is thoroughly dialectical or completelyrelational. It is important to note, however, that sameness and differencearecontrafactories that reciprocally interpenetrate one another. Our diagramhelps us to see this point more clearly. Within the synchronic axis, themeaning of B' at temporal moment T2is constituted by its relation to A' andC'. Apart from association with otherness, B' remains completelyindeterminate and utterly meaning-less. B' 's meaning is defined by itsconjunction with and distinction from A' and C'. In more general terms to beelaborated in the following ontological analysis, identity is difference fromdifference, the negation of negation that is simultaneously self-affirmation.When we recognize that B' can representa particularlife-world or symbolicsystem, it becomes apparentthat the synchroniccontextualization of meaningentails perspectival relativism. Since A', B', and C' are co-implicates, themeaning of each is relative to the other /8/.If artificiallyreified, however, synchronicity implies a factitious arrest ofthe historical development depicted by the diachronic axis of our diagram.Meaning is also subject to temporal dialectics; it emerges or unfolds throughtime. Since temporal ecstases overlay one another, synchronicand diachronicrelations are inseparable. Past, present, and future are not isolable, butthoroughly interpenetrateand mutually condition each other. "My present,"Merleau-Ponty argues, "outrunsitself in the direction of an immediate futureand immediate past and impinges upon them where they actuallyare, namelyin the past and in the future themselves" (418). Or, as Stephen Crites insists,



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"anexperienced present is not simply a dissociated 'now' but contains at leasta vestige of memory and a leaning into anticipation"(32). The recognition ofthe creativeintercourseamong the threetemporalecstases must not, however,obscure the distinction between the relation of the presentto the past and tothe future.The past is generatedby the accumulation of activatedpotency andforms an ever-recedinghorizon of present experience. The weight of the pastbears on the presentand pressestoward the future. In turningtoward the past,the present attempts to dis-cover its own facticity. The past is not completelycircumscribed, but extends into the present and the future, thereby exertingdeterminative influence. But time is a two way street-present and future arenot simply the unfolding of the past. Merleau-Ponty correctly maintains that"the future is not prepared behind the observer, it is a brooding presencemoving to meet him like a storm"(411). The future invades the present andpenetrates the past. Through anticipatory reach, the present encounters thestorm gathering on the ever-invading horizon of the future. The intension ofthe future eventuates the present and reconstructs the past. The passage oftime grows out of the past passing through the presentinto the future,and thefuture passing through the present into the past. While extending pastguardstemporal continuity, impending future grounds freedom and insures novelty/9/. The present is the "crossroads,"the "intersection" of past and future inwhich the horizons of sedimenting past and imploding future overlap. H.Ganse Little summarizes our point concisely.

Thepresentdrives likea wedge' nto both therecedingpastandtheoutstanding utureonly becauseit is concommitantlynvadedbyaccumulating astandarching owardthe futureandan impendingfuturearching oward he past. Conversely,he future mpendsandthe past accumulatesonly becausethe present s anticipativeandrecollective.There s no routeto a positionbeyond hepuzzleof thisprimordial reciprocity. Historicality, although multiform anddialecticallyecstatic,' wingson a singlehinge-the coinherence fpast, present and future. (16-17)Due to the dialectical structure of temporality, meaning is necessarilyhistorical and perpetually revisable. It is unfinished, yet always refinishing.Since the present is the "middest"(Kermode) distended between beginningand end, meaningis born of the tension generatedby the interplayof retentionand protension /10/. Returning to our example, the meaning of B' isintegrally related to its own past (B) and future (B"). Discernment of themeaning of B' requiresarcheological and teleological reflection that graspsitsinternal relation to B and B". Since time is an ongoing process of negation/II/ or unchanging change, meaning is never static, but is perpetuallyemergent. The meaning of the past belongs to the future, and the futureincarnatesconstitutive reverberationsresounding through the past. Because

meaning evolves with the passage of time, it remainstransitional, is constantlyre-forming. The articulation of meaning presupposes unending temporal re-

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visioning. The diachronic contextualization of meaning points toward thetemporal or historical relativity of truth.In order to complete our consideration of the contextual character ofmeaning, it is necessary to join more closely our synchronic and diachronicanalyses. We have discovered that the meaning of B' is constituted on the onehand by relation to A' and C', and on the other hand by relation to B and B".Through the extension of our synchronic investigation of co-existentperspectivesat T2to moments Tl and T3,it becomes clear that the meaningofB and B" grows out of their relations to A/C and A"/C" respectively.Moreover, it should be evident that our diachronic analysis of the dialecticalinterplay of B, B', and B"also applies to A, A', and A"and to C, C', and C".These insights lead to the inference that the confluence of synchronic anddiachronic relationality establishes a mediate (rather than a direct) relationbetween B' and A, C, A", and C". For example, B' is drawn into indirectrelation with A through direct relation to A' and B (indicated by dottedvectors AB'/B'A), etc. /12/. These indirect relations form the final factorcontributing to the meaning of B'. Our overallanalysis leads to the conclusionthat the meaning of B' is a function of the concrescence of the dynamicallydeveloping contextual field of which it is an integral member /13/.

The contextualization of meaning unearths the roots of perspectivalrelativism. Meaning assumes form through dialectical interrelationship inwhich co-implicates mutually constitute each other. Synchronic relationsamong simultaneously appearing perspectives and diachronic relationsamong temporally unfolding Lebensanschauungenreveal the inexhaustabil-ity and ceaseless revisability of meaning /14/. As the reader may suspect,however, a furtherproblem lurks beneath the surfaceof ouranalysis. Thoughthe contextualization of meaning might make sense, has it any reference?

Relationality of BeingOur exploration of perspectival relativism has led to the recognition ofthe synchronic and diachronic relations intrinsic to determinant meaning.However, if ourargumentis to havemore than semanticsignificance,we mustturn our attention from matters of epistemology and hermeneutics toontological analysis. Having probed the contextualization of meaning, wemust attempt to establish the socialization of being.According to Wallace Stevens, "Nothing is itself taken alone. Thingsarebecause of interrelationsor interactions"(163). Stevens'richinsight points thedirection for further reflection. Whereas our previous task involvedovercoming logical atomism through dialectical reason, we now seek tosublate ontological substantialism and monadicism in relational ontology.Neither a radical monism nor an extreme pluralism representsan adequatemetaphysical position. Monism tends to hypostatize purely abstract, self-identical substance (often defined as Sein, Being-itself,or Being-in-general)asthe ontologically prior foundation of all reality in such a way that differenceor plurality is reduced to accidental, insubstantialstatus. Monadicism, on the



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contrary, absolutizes difference or multiplicity and consequently rendersunity and integration epiphenomenal. Though representing contrastingmetaphysical viewpoints, monism and pluralism rest on the commonassumption of the irreconcilable opposition between unity and plurality,identityand difference.Having establishedan artificialeither-or,one is forcedto choose between two apparently incompatible alternatives. While monism(as monotheism) accents unity over multiplicity, pluralism (as polytheism)stresses multiplicity to the exclusion of unity. Neither perspectiverecognizesthe interconnection of oneness and manyness through which each isconstituted by relation to the other. An identity-within-difference and adifference-within-identity; pluralized unity and unified plurality-such is theontological base of perspectival relativism reflected in contextualizedmeaning /15/.A more careful consideration of identity and difference promisesdisclosure of the relationality of being. Not uncommonly, particularexistentsare regarded as essentially discrete and primordially separate from oneanother. Accordingly, identity is believed to be estabished through self-relation independentof reference-to-other. Relations to differentsubsistencesare external to the antecedently constituted entity and therefore remainaccidental to determinatebeing. From this viewpoint, identity and differenceare indifferent. But this line of interpretation is seriously misleading, foridentity and difference are inseparably bound in a dialectical relation of co-implication. Altizer is correct when he points out that "wecan evoke an actualor real identity only by embodying difference, a real and actual difference,adifferencemaking identity manifest, and makingit manifest as itself. Onlythepresence of difference calls identity forth, and it calls it forth in its differencefrom itself, in its difference from an identity which is eternallythe same"(37).In other terms, being-for-self necessarily entails being-for-other.That which"is equal to itself and is for-itself is such only in its absolute difference fromevery other. And this differenceimpliesa relationwith otherthings, a relationthat is the cessation of its being-for-itself"(Hyppolite: 116).As Hegel arguedin the second chapter of his Phdnomenologie des Geistes,anyconcrete "thingis set up as having a being of its own, as existing for itself, or as an absolutenegation of all otherness;hence it is absolute negation merely relatingitself toitself. But this kind of negation is the sublation of itself, or means that it has itsessential reality in another"(174). Since determinate entities are co-relative,otherness ceases to be merely other and difference no longer is indifferent.Relation-to-other is simultaneously mediate self-relation in which concreteidentity is establishedand maintained. Simple difference is abrogatedwith therecognition that it is through "its opposition that the thing relates itself toothers, and is essentially this relation and only this.The relation, however, isthe negation of its independence. . ." (Hegel, 1967:174) / 16/. Relations areinternal and essential, rather than external and accidental. Any "object [orperson] is reallyin one and the same respectthe opposite of itself-for itself 'sofar as' it is for another, and for another 'so far as' it is for itself. It is for itself,reflected into self, one; but all this is assertedalong with its opposite, with its

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Towardan Ontologyof Relativism 51being for another, and for that reason is asserted merely to be sublated. Inother words, this existence for itself is as much unessentialas that which alonewas meant to be unessential, viz. the relation to another"(Hegel, 1967:175).As we move from analytical abstraction to dialectical reflection, we discernthe relationality of being. In short, our analysis supports Stevens' contentionthat "Things are because of interrelations or interactions." Relation isontologically constitutive-to be is to be related. An extended text fromHegel's Wissenschaftder Logik summarizes the insighttoward which we havebeen moving.

Thus something hrough ts own naturerelates tself to the other,becauseothernesssposited nit as its ownmoment;tsbeing-within-selfincludeshenegationwithint,bymeansof whichalone tnow hasits affirmativedeterminate eing.But the other is also qualitativelydistinguishedromthis and is thuspositedoutside hesomething.Thenegationof itsother snowthequalityofthesomething,orit is asthissublatingof its other that it is something. t is onlyin thissublationthatthe other sreallyopposed o anotherdeterminateeing; heotheris onlyexternallyopposed o thefirst something,or rather, ince nfact they are directlyconnected, . .their connection s this, thatdeterminatebeinghaspassed over into otherness,something ntoother,andsomethingsjustasmuchanotheras the other tself s. Nowin so faras thebeing-with-selfs thenon-being f theothernesswhichis containedn it but whichat thesame imehas a distinctbeingof itsown,thesomethings itself henegation, heceasingofanother nit; tis positedas relating tselfnegatively o the other and in so doingpreservingtself; hisother, hebeing-within-selff thesomething snegationof the negation, s its in-itself,and at the sametime thissublationspresent n itas asimplenegation,namely sitsnegationofthe othersomething xternal o it. (125-26)We might fruitfully return to the diagram previously employed. Sinceour concern at this point is ontological rather than semantic, the lettersrepresent particular phenomena such as concrete actualities and/orimaginable possibilities /17/. For the sake of consistency, let us once morefocus on B' (though the same mode of analysis could be applied to anydepicted phenomenon). The previous shape of the argument gathered in theforegoing pages persuadesus that the determinateidentityof B'can be said tobe posited by its relation to other objects in the field of which it is a member.Again it is helpful to distinguish synchronic and diachronic dimensions ofrelationality. Considering the synchronic axis, we see that the actuality of B'grows out of its intrinsic relation to otherness, in this instance to A' and C'.Given the dialectical bond between identityand difference,it is evident that B'"through its own nature relates itself to the other"-to A' and C'. Relationsare not added to discrete subsistencesby the cognitive activity of a subject,but

are ontologically ingredient in all determinate phenomena. Apart frominternal relation to difference, B' is no-thing. In-itself B' presupposes



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reference-to-other. There is (nothing) no thing-in-itself, for self-relation isalways mediated by relation-to-other /18/. Moreover, although synchronicand diachronic relations are as we have seen, distinguishable, they areontologically inseparable. Being, never static, is always in the process ofunfolding-of becoming /19/. Consequently, determinate identity is forgedboth by association with phenomena coexistent at a given time, and bythoroughgoing situatedness within temporal-historical process. From theexamination of the diachronic axis of our diagram, we recognize that B' is in-formed by relation to Band B"and by indirectconjunction with A, C, A",andC". The emergent character of the diachronic constituting field implies thatthe actuality of B' develops gradually. Identity is never completelyestablished, afait accompli; it is always arriving,always coming-to-be, alwaysbe-coming. Identity is not immutable, but is dynamic, temporal, historical.The synchronicand diachroniccomponents of relationality arejoined byisomorphic morphology. More specifically, negativity is the structure of bothsynchronic relations among co-existents and of diachronic relations amongtemporally developing phenomena. As our borrowings from Hegel suggest,negativity is the structural foundation of constitutive relationality. Theaffirmation of identity is mediated by the negation of otherness that itself isnegative. In keeping with Spinoza, "omnisdeterminatio est negatio."In otherwords, the formation of determinate being involves a process of doublenegation in which essential relation to otherness is created and sustained."Thus something through its own nature relates itself to the other, becauseotherness is posited in it as its own moment; its being-within-selfincludes thenegation within it, by means of which alone it now has its affirmativedeterminate being" (Hegel, 1969:125).Returning to our diagram, we realizethat A', C', A, B, A", B",and C" representthe negation of B', or are non-B'.The affirmation of B' is mediated by its negation of its own negation, non-B'.Briefly stated, B' is the negation/non-being of non-B'. Affirmation is at thesame time negation, and being is simultaneously non-being.

Thepositive s positedness s reflectedntoself-likeness;utwhat sreflecteds positedness,hatis, thenegationas negation,andso thisreflection-into-self as reference-to-otheror its determination. henegatives positedness sreflectedntounlikeness;utthepositednessisunlikenesswith tselfand absolute elf-reference.ach s thewhole;thepositedness eflectedntounlikeness-to-selflsocontains ikeness.... Each is itself and its other; consequentlyeach has itsdeterminatenessot in an other, but in its own self. Each is self-referred,ndthe referenceo its other s onlyaself-reference. hishasa twofoldaspect:each is a referenceo itsnon-being s a sublating fthisothernesswithin t;and its non-beings onlya moment n it. Buton the otherhandpositedness erehas becomea being,an indifferentsubsistence;onsequently,he other of itselfwhicheachcontains salso thenon-being f thatinwhich t is supposedo becontained nlyas a moment.Each herefores,onlyin so faras itsnon-beings,and sin anidentical elationshipwith t . ... Inthefirstplace, heneach s,

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only in sofar as the other is; it is what it is, throughthe other, throughits own non-being; it is only a positedness; secondly, it is, in so far asthe other is not; it is what it is, through the reflection-into-self. Butthesetwo arethe one mediationof the oppositionas such,in whichthey are simply only posited moments. (Hegel, 1969:424-25)Expressed in less technical terms, presence is present as absence, or withAltizer, "presence becomes absence, and becomes actual as absence, and theabsence is the self-enactment of presence"(88). Instead of"to be or not to be,"the sum of the matter is to be and not to be, for to be is not to be, and not to beis to be.

Although helpful, the circumscription of our diagrammatic representa-tion can be misleading. The relational ontology we have been unfolding is, inthe final analysis, holistic. Something assumes complete concretion and fullself-realization only through its internal relation to the whole of which it is apart. This whole, it must be emphasized, is not abstractand does not exist inisolation from its parts. "There is nothing in the whole which is not in theparts, and nothing in the parts which is not in the whole. The whole is notabstract unity, but unity as of a diverse manifold; but this unity, as that inwhich the elements of the manifold are related to one another, is thedeterminateness of each element through which it is a part. The relation has,therefore,an inseparableidentity and one self-subsistence" Hegel, 1969:515-16) / 20/. The whole is the self-identicalstructureof relationalitythatassumesconcrete actuality through the particularitieswhose determinate identities itestablishes and maintains /21/.Our ontological reflection leads to the conclusion that being isfundamentally social, essentially relational. Determinate identity is born ofontological intercourse with otherness. The whole ingredient in andconstituted by particularentities is a self-differentiating totality that evolveshistorically /22/. Identity and difference, unity and plurality, oneness andmanyness are thoroughly co-relative joined in a dialectical relation ofreciprocal implication. This pluralized unity and unified plurality is theontological matrix of truth's relativity.

Symbolics of Relative TruthTruth is the unity of thought and being, the coincidence of subjectivityand objectivity, the coadunation of sense and reference.From the perspectiveof relational ontology, however, this coalescence is not created by theconjunction of independent opposites, but is the self-conscious explication ofradical (radix) unity. Our onto-noetic analysis suggests that truth is relativebecause meaning is contextual and being is relational. Or as stated earlier,contextualized meaning and relational being join in relative truth disclosedthrough symbolic awareness.Epistemological and semantic considerations suggest the perspectival

relativityof truth. The historicityof consciousness establishesthe inescapablesituatedness of the knowing subject. Cognitive activity arises through the



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confluence of multiple conditioning factors, and issues in knowledge thatinevitably bears the mark of the situation within which it is generated.Moreover, we have seen that meaning is contextual. Meaning remainsunspecifiable apartfrom dialogic relation with alternativepoints of view. Thesynchronic and diachronic extensiveness of such relationality implies thatmeaning is inexhaustible and ever revisable. Consequently the meaningful-ness of truth necessarilyentails dialectical relation with contrastingframesofinterpretationand is constantly subject to re-formation. Truth emerges onlythrough the synchronic and diachronic interplay of truths. In sum, truth isrelative to the perspectivefrom which it is apprehendedand is co-relativewithimplicated truths whose reciprocity it presupposes /23/.

The relativity of the ordo cognoscendi, however, does not necessarilydistort the ordo essendi. To the contrary, the relationality of being isaccurately comprehendedonly in truth that is relative. Like thought, being isinherently dialectical. In other words, that which thought seeks to grasp isitself relative. As a result of the sociality of being, determinate identityassumes concretion through internal relation with difference. Particularphenomena are posited by an extensive mutual interaction that forms a singlecomplex web. Our ontological investigation has shown the synchronic anddiachronic coordinates of constitutive relationality. Determinate identity isestablished through association with co-existing entities and throughlocationwithin temporal process. Due to the historical unfolding of multipleingredient relations, being is always in the process of becoming. Dynamic,dialectical actuality cannot be re-presented in static, sharply delineatedcategories of cognition. If such being is to be known, it must be graspedrelative to otherness from which it is inseparable, and must be regularlyre-construed as it re-constructs. As an adequate reflection of the energetics ofbeing, truth changes-it requires constant re-visioning /24/.Relative truth is the interfaceof contextual meaningand relationalbeingwhich is most fully disclosed to symbolic awareness.Ray Hartpoints out thatsymbols "serve to carry over into consciousness the carrying over betweenthings, and between things and the self, in their very being." Symbolicconsciousness "is the disposition of the mind as a whole to the 'thing'in pluralpresentiment to the intentionality of consciousness in its plurisignification"(247) /25/. The polysemy of symbols reveals the polymorphism of being. AsRicoeur maintains, "the sole philosophical interest in symbolism is that itreveals, by its structure of double meaning, the equivocalness of being: 'Beingspeaks in many ways.' Symbolism's raison d'etreis to open the multiplicityofmeaning to the equivocalness of being" (1974:67). The symbol mirrors theinterplay of presence and absence, disclosure and concealment characteristicof determinatebeing. A symbol always means more than it says, and being isalways more than it appears. Unfathomed relations remain hidden andunrealized potency lies dormant in all actuality. The density of constitutiverelations and the nascence of concrete actuality engender a dissonancebetween manifest and latent content in the reflection of being inconsciousness. The multivalence of symbols capturesthe multidimensionality

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of being in a way that establishes the need for a constant process ofdecipherment in which we reformulate our notions in order more fully topenetrate synchronic and diachronic relations that are ontologicallydefinitive. Bymaintainingthe tension between the revealedand theconcealed,symbolic awareness insures that knowledge always evolves through ceaselessreinterpretation. For symbolic consciousness, truth, as being itself, foreverbe-comes. We may conclude with Brown:

The etterkilleth,but thespiritgiveth ife. Literalmeanings sagainstspiritual rsymbolicalnterpretations,matter f LifeagainstDeath.The return to symbolism, the rediscoverythat everythingissymbolic-alles Verganglicheur ein Gleichniss...Everythings symbolic,everythingsholy.There s nospecial imeorplaceor person,privilegedo representhe rest.And thendemocracycanbegin.Themanyare madeonewhenthetotality s ineverypart.Whenonething s takenup,allthingsaretakenupwith t;one floweris the spring.It is all thereall the time.(191, 239) /26/Describing the transition from "early modern" to "modern"religion,

Robert Bellah argues that "The central feature of the change is thecollapse ofthe dualism that was so crucial to all the historic religions."Bellah is quick toexplain that "This is not to be interpretedas a return to primitivemonism:it isnot that a single world has replaced a double one but that an infinitelymultiplex one has replaced the simple duplex structure. It is not that life hasbecome again a 'one possibility thing' but that it has become an infinitepossibility thing" (40). Such pluralization often leads to psychological,intellectual, and social fragmentation. The fundamental religious,philosophical, and existential issuefacing our time is the perennialproblemofthe relation between oneness and manyness. How can we mediate unity andplurality within and without? Not infrequently psycho-social pluralizationbringsan acute awareness of perspectivalrelativism that results in the stillingof the theological and metaphysical impulse. Throughout this essay, we haveattempted to overcome such paralysis and to render theological languagehearable by exploring some of the metaphysical presuppositions andimplications of relativism. The wedding of a relativistic epistemology and arelational ontology enables us to appreciatewith Hegel that:"Appearanceisthe process of arising into being and passing away again, a process that itselfdoes not arise and does not pass away, but is in itself, and constitutes realityand the life-movement of truth. The truth is thus the Bacchanalian revel,where not one member is sober; and because every member no soonerbecomes detached than it eo ipso collapses straightway, the revel is just asmuch a state of transparent unbroken calm" (1967:105). Being withinbecoming; unity within plurality; identity within difference; truth withintruths; constancy within change; peace within flux.



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NOTES

/1/ For an examination of major eighteenth and nineteenth century forcesoperative in the modification of the contemporary theological and philosophicalimagination, see Taylor, 1977: 185-235./2/ Proponents of the polytheistic position do not seem to realize that thecomplete pluralization of consciousness is the destruction of its human form. Humanself-consciousness presupposes the simultaneous maintenance of plurality and unity.If unity does not accompany plurality, we cannot even be aware of plurality asplurality, and in the absence of any inner difference, we are unable to recognize ourself-identity./3/ It might be argued that such a program is inherently self-contradictory.Rather than necessitating further metaphysical reflection, the recognition ofperspectivalrelativism seems to rendermetaphysicsimpossible.This line of argument,however,artificiallyseparatesepistemology and ontology. Everyepistemology (even arelativistic one) harbors an ontology. By disclosing the ontological presuppositionsimplicit in relativistic epistemology, we discover novel possibilities for theologicalreflection./4/ In light of the seemingly ineradicable ambiguity of the word "relativism," tmight be argued that use of an alternativecategory would help to avoid unnecessaryconfusion. Despite the danger of misinterpretation,the term"relativism" ontinues tobe well-suited for the purposes of this essay. We have already indicated that theargument of the paper seeks to address theological and religious problems that growout of a relativistic view of human knowledge. Although the movement from strictlyepistemological preoccupations to ontological questions casts a differentlight on theissue, the fundamental problematic remainsclosely tied to what recentlyhas gone bythe name "relativism."Secondly, and more importantly, the etymology of "relative"points to the conclusion toward which the argumentmoves. Strictlydefined,"relative"means "having mutual relationship;related to, or connected with, each other;arisingfrom, depending on, or determined by, relation to something else or to each other"(Oxford English Dictionary). It derives from the Latin "relativus"meaning "havingrelation or reference to."/5/ The extreme subjectivization of knowledge usually results from a view of therelationship between subject and object that is insufficiently dialectical. The positiondeveloped in this paper implies an understanding of the subject-object correlationwhich recognizesthe inseparabilityof the creativecontribution of the knowing subjectand the persistentresistanceof the known object. Overemphasison eitheraspect of thisdialectic leads to an inadequate epistemology. Elaboration and defense of thissuggestion, however, would take us beyond the bounds of the present inquiryand thusmust await a lateressay. Thegeneraldirection of the argumentwould follow the courseidentified in Hegel's effort to offer an alternative to the choice between what heregardedas subjectiveidealism and a simplisticallyempiricalepistemology. Stated asconcisely as possible, the situated locus of the knower is grounded in the nature ofbeing-itself./6/ The usual understanding of relativity and absoluteness as mutually exclusiveopposites makes these suggestions particularly puzzling, if not flatly contradictory.

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/14/ Our effort to join synchronicityand diachronicity in the contextualization ofmeaning seeksto overcome the tension between structuralistand hermeneuticalmodesof interpretation. While structuralists tend to stress the synchronic axis, recenthermeneuticists are prone to focus on the diachronic axis. As our analysis suggests,thorough interpretation requires both factors. For a discussion of this problem, seeRicoeur, 1974: 27-61./15/ The recognition of the relationality of being constituted by the interplay ofidentity and difference lies at the heart of the Christian doctrine of the trinity(Dreieinigkeit). According to the Christiandefinition, God is three-in-oneand one-in-three-pluralized unity and unified plurality. Apart from such a dialecticalinterpretationof identity and difference, incarnationaltheology is impossible. One ofthe primary theological and philosophical puzzles confronting Church fathers whoattempted to formulate the doctrine of the trinity was the articulation of a notion ofunity that includes, rather than excludes plurality.Trinitariantheology walks the fineline between abstract monotheism and contradictory polytheism./16/ Emphasis added. It should be clear that the sublation of simple difference isnot the abolition of distinction. Distinction remains as the groundof both identityanddifference./17/ Our analysis of diachronicity suggests that the modalities of phenomenalpresenceare distinguishable.Present phenomena are actually on hand, whilepast andfuture phenomena are presentas absent-the past as having been and the futureas yetto be. The presence of the present is inseparablefrom the simultaneous presenceandabsence of past andfuture. Therefore it is an oversimplificationto regardthe presentasmerelypresent, for at the same time it is in itselfabsent. This point is developed in moredetail in what follows./ 18/ This ontological insight might appear to pose problems for the interpretationof relativity presented in this paper. When relations are construed as internal, is therenot an important sense in which nothing (no-thing) can be relative, since there is no-thing sufficiently itself to be qualified by relation to other? Does not the internalityofrelations dissolve the otherness upon which relativity depends? Such questions missthe point we have been pressing. It is assumed that the identity of determinatephenomena is constituted in itself, apartfrom relation to other. Relations thus remainsecondary and external to pre-establishedidentity. Any mitigation of the discretenessof determinatephenomena is regardedas an encroachment on individualidentitythatthreatensthe loss of concreteparticularity.We have seen, however,that this position isself-negating. The very formation and maintenance of the in-itself is impossible apartfrom being-for-other. Existence-in-itself comes into being through the mediation ofotherness. Something can be itself, and therefore be the other of its other, only inrelation to otherness. Farfromdissolving the othernessupon whichrelativitydepends,relations form the determinacy without which otherness is impossible. In-itself andfor-other, identity and difference,assertion and negation areinseparable.Nothing canbe itself first and then come into relation with difference, for it becomes itself onlythrough ingredient otherness./19/ A corollary of this suggestion is that permanence and change are notantithetical. Permanence is the unchangeability of change-the immutability ofmutability. As unity and multiplicity are indissolubly joined, so permanence andchange are indivisible. In more theological language, eternity is found in time, inhistory. God is incarnate.

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/20/ With the recognition of the holism of relational ontology, some of the ethicalimplications of this line of analysis begin to emerge.The effort to acknowledge and toincorporate difference need not necessarily lead to an uncritical relativism that isfinally indistinguishable from nihilism. Holistic relationality suggests criteriasuch ascomprehensiveness,inclusiveness,and coherence by which normativediscriminationscan be made and throughwhich a critical relativism can bedeveloped. The formulationof the ethical correlate of the epistemological and ontological position developed inthis paper is the task of another essay./21/ This structure of relationality qualifies for what usually goes by the name"Being-itself"or "Being-in-general."Unlike such abstractions, relation is inseparablefrom relata. We can now see more clearlythat what remains constant amid relativityisconstitutive relationality, interpreted in terms of the structure of double negativity.Perduring relations form the ground of being of determinate phenomena byestablishing particular entities in their definitive co-relativity. Thoroughgoingrelativism is impossible apartfrom the absolutenessof relationality.Itmightbe helpfulto recall an earlier theological expression of this point. God and world cannot existapart from one another. God forever becomes incarnate,and the finite is always in theprocess of becoming reconciled with the infinite./22/ It is important to recognize that by describing the whole as the structure ofrelation throughwhich partsare constituted, ratherthan viewingthe whole as the sumtotal of the parts, this position avoids the hermeneutical impasse usually faced byholistic ontology. It is not necessary to know everything (i.e., every particularphenomenon) in orderto know anything.Put differently, knowledge is possible beforethe end of history, for history is always finishing, though ever refinishing./23/ Truth-itself(as Being-itself)is an empty abstraction. Definable truth assumesdeterminate form that grows out of dialectical interrelation with otherness./24/ Pannenberg correctlycontends that "Everyabsolutization of a contemporarytruth would at once misunderstand the historical multiplicity of picturesof the truth.In this situation, unity of truth can now only be thought of as the history of truth,meaning in effect that truth itself has a history and that its essence is the processof thishistory. Historical change itself must be thought of as the essence of truthif its unityisstill to be maintained without narrow-mindedlysubstituting a particularperspectivefor the whole truth. To date, Hegel's system should be regardedas the most significantattempt at a solution to this problem. It is distinguishedfrom other philosophies ofhistory by the fact that truth is not to befound alreadyexisting somewhere as a finishedproduct, but is instead thought of as history, as process" (20-21)./25/ Hart makes these remarks in the context of his extraordinarily insightfulexploration of the imagination. What I havelabeled"symbolicawareness"bearsmanysimilarities to Hart's "imagination."/ 26/ Compare: "In the last analysis, Goethe's statement 'Everythingis a symbol' isthe most comprehensive formulation of the hermeneutical idea. It means thateverythingpoints to another thing. . . . But the statement implies something else aswell: nothing comes forth in the one meaning that is simply offered to us. Theimpossibility of surveyingall relations is just as much present in Goethe's concept ofthe symbolic as is the vicarious function of the particularfor the representationof thewhole" (Gadamer: 103).



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WORKS CONSULTED

Altizer, T. J. J.1977 The Self-Embodiment of God. New York: Harper and Row.Bellah, R. N.1970 Beyond Belief: Essays on Religion in a Post-Traditional World.NewYork: Harper and Row.Berger, Peter1974 The Homeless Mind: Modernization and Consciousness. New York:

Random House.Brown, N. O.1968 Love's Body. New York: Random House.Crites, Stephen1975 "Angels We Have Heard," Religion as Story. J. B. Wiggins, ed. NewYork: Harper and Row.Gadamer, H. G.1976 Philosophical Hermeneutics. D. E. Linge, ed. Berkeley:University ofCalifornia Press.Gouldner, A. W.1965 "Anti-Minotaur: The Myth of Value-Free Sociology," Sociology onTrial. M. Stein and A. Vidich, eds. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall,Inc.Hart, R. L.1968 Unfinished Man and the Imagination. New York: Herderand Herder.Harvey, V. A.1972 TheHistorian and the Believer: TheMorality of Historical Knowledgeand Christian Belief. New York: Macmillan Co.Hegel, G. W. F.1967 ThePhenomenology of Mind. J. Baillie, trans. New York:HarperandRow.

1969 Science of Logic. A. V. Miller, trans. New York: Humanities Press.Hyppolite, Jean1974 Genesis and Structure of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. S.Cherniakand J. Heckman, trans. Evanston: NorthwesternUniversityPress.Kaufman, G. D.1960 Relativism, Knowledge and Faith. Chicago: University of ChicagoPress.Kermode, Frank

1975 The Sense of An Ending: Studies in the Theoryof Fiction. New York:Oxford University Press.

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Toward an Ontology of Relativism 61Little, H. G.1974 Decision and Responsibility: A Wrinkle in Time. Missoula, Mt.:Scholars Press.Merleau-Ponty, Maurice1966 Phenomenology of Perception. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul,Ltd.Miller, David1974 The New Polytheism: Rebirthof the Gods and Goddesses. New York:

Harper and Row.Niebuhr, R. R.

1972 Experiential Religion. New York: Harper and Row.Ogilvy, J.1977 Many Dimensional Man: Decentralizing Self, Society and the Sacred.New York: Oxford University Press.Pannenberg, Wolfhart1971 Basic Questions in Theology, vol. I. F. H. Kehm, trans. Philadelphia:Fortress Press.Ricoeur, Paul1970 Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation.D. Savage, trans.New Haven: Yale University Press.

1973 "Creativity in Language: Word, Polysemy, Metaphor." PhilosophyToday, 17:97-111.1974 The Conflict of Interpretations:Essays in Hermeneutics. D. Ihde, ed.Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

Stevens, Wallace1957 Opus Posthumous. S. F. Morse, ed. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.Taylor, M. C.1975 Kierkegaard's Pseudonymous Authorship: A Study of Time and theSelf. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

1977 Religion and the Human Image. Englewood Cliffs:Prentice-Hall, Inc.Wilson, Bryan1974 Rationality. London: Blackwell.

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