Irrational Solidarity Groups- A Socio-Psychological Study in Connection with Ibn Khaldûn...

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Irrational Solidarity Groups: A Socio-Psychological Study in Connection with Ibn Khaldûn

Author(s): Hellmut RitterReviewed work(s):Source: Oriens, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Jun. 1, 1948), pp. 1-44Published by: BRILL

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IRRATIONAL SOLIDARITY GROUPS

A SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICALTUDY IN CONNECTION

WITH IBN KHALDUN

by

Hellmut Ritter

What are the motive forces that are at the root of historico-political

processes? In his book Machtstaat und Utopie, Vom Streit um

die Ddmonie der Macht seit Machiavell und Morus 1, my brother

Gerhard Ritter, professor of History at Freiburg University, has

pointed out the importance of the Florentine statesman Machia-

velli with regard to the question we have raised. Whatever we

may think of the doctrines laid down in his famous book Del

Principe and their historical significance, Machiavelli was thefirst political thinker who gave the western world a clear insightin the character of one of those motive forces, the one, however,

which is of prime importance: the desire for power which

has its origin in the inborn character of the political individual

and obeys therefore the laws of natural instincts. The significanceand demonic character of this instinctive desire for power has

never, either by Antiquity or the Middle Ages, been so clearly

understood as by Machiavelli. This desire for power (according toG. Ritter) appears first with the political leaders, but reaches the

peak of significance and efficacy only if it is possible to pass it on

to a multitude of people, a nation, and to arouse in this nation its

correlate, the virtiu,viz. the virtue of combative manliness. The author

Miinchen I94o. Now Die Dimonic der Macht, Betrachtungen iiber Ge-

schichte und Wesen des Machtproblems im politischen Denken der Neuzeit,

Stuttgart (I947).ORIENS II







Irrational Solidarity Groups

mere active, organized force, not yet Cethicalreason?,its symbol being

a combination of lion and fox..." But that is not the only aspect of

virtu. He continues thus: "... therefore still another kind of virtu,which forges stronger ties than the terror of open violence, is

required. He, Machiavelli, traces it (as Cicero had done before) to the

public spirit of the old Roman Republic, particularly in its older,

better period".

Ibn Khaldun's conception of casabiya is somehow a synthesis of

definite elements of both kinds of virtiu . It is, as it were, the public

sense in its dynamic aspect, "the sense of solidarity", bearing in itself

not only the will of the community for self-assertion, the readiness

of its members to defend each other and the whole community, but

also the combative will for attack, which longs to try the accumulated

strength it has derived from the solidarity of the community, by

proving it in a fight against opposed forces. "It is the casabiya with

whose help men protect and defend themselves, bring their rights to

bear and carry through all their common decisions". (K. Ayad I93).

Ibn Khalduin has in mind first of all the solidarity, the strength

giving internal cohesion of a class of leaders, politically active and,

as a rule, normally genealogically connected, striving for rule and

obtaining it thanks to Casabiya. The most fertile moment for its

realization is that of the seizing of power, the first of the five phases

of State development, as assumed by Ibn Khaldun (Rosenthal 17).

Another substantial characteristic of the conception of Casabiyais

that its supporters have a share of the power, though with differences

indegree.

In the secondphase,

in which the leader of the Casabiya

1 Furtherdata may be obtained rom the followingreferences:M. Kamil

Ayad, Die Geschichts- und GesellschaftslehreIbn Haldiins, Berlin 1930 (For-

schungenzur Geschichts-und Gesellschaftslehre,ublishedby Kurt Breysig,2nd book); Erwin Rosenthal, Ibn Khalduns Gedanken iiber den Staat, Ein

Beitrag sur Geschichte der mittelalterlichen Staatslehre, Munich and Berlin

1932. (The translations in both books require partly revision); Francesco

Gabrielli, II concetto della ca$abiyyahnel pensiero storico di Ibn Khaldun.

Atti della Reale Academia delle Scienze di Torino 65 (1930), p. 473-512;

Alessio Bombaci, La dottrina storiografica di Ibn Haldun. Annali della ScuolaNormaleSuperioredi Pisa, Fasc. III-IV, Vol. XV (1946),p. 159-185.

3







circle rises to the position of an autocrat, he destroys the Casabiya

precisely because he no longer needs it, i.e. he deprives his fellow-

combatants of their partnership in the power and provides himselfwith an independent instrument of power, consisting of mercenaries

and clients, which involves a very different character from the old

Casabiya(Rosenthal i8).

I do not propose here to embark on the philological and historical

interpretation of Ibn Khalduin'sconception of Casabiya,my intention

being only to analyse this conception, taken in a wider and larger

sense to examine its validity and extent, and to find out whether it is

not possible to draw still more conclusions from it than has been done

by Ibn Khalduin. In the following I call the emotional componentof this phenomenon (which, according to its intensity and to the

situation in which it occurs, may have various names, such as faith-

fulness to the community, will for defence, readiness for self-

sacrifice, internal unity, common will for power, national passion.

religious fanaticism, etc.) by the comprehensive name "feeling of

solidarity", the necessarily ensuing peculiar relation between the

members of the community "solidarity", and the community held

together by it "solidarity circle" or "solidarity group".

I

We see in this feeling of solidarity a primitive phenomenon, deeply

rooted in the irrational depths of human nature, which appears and

must appear in various degrees of strength wherever a community

of men formsitself,

acommunity

which is more than a mereagree-

ment, or convention for rational purpose, its leading value being the

community itself, its aim consisting in maintaining its independence.

One might perhaps say that the smallest solidarity circle is formed

by two persons. Two friends, who are tied together for life and

death, who "go together through thick and thin", already form a

solidarity circle. But it may also come about between two men in a

less robust form. If I have to blame or criticise another man, I can

do it in two ways, either by giving him the impression that I want tobreak off my relations with him, and have done with him for good and

Hellrmut itter4







IrrationalSolidarityGroups

all, or in such a form that, in spite of everything, the warm feeling

of friendship is maintained or will soon return. It cannot be denied

of course that, for finer natures, the second way is more efficientthan the first. The blame is more efficient and the criticism is borne

more easily if the solidarity circle is not broken. If there is no

solidarity, any criticism will more likely be taken as impudence,

insolence, as an offence.

The most important smaller solidarity circle is the family. How

much an harmonious family life depends on the existence of a strong

feeling of solidarity between its members, is well known. If, owing to

certain subconscious currents, tendencies of estrangement between

father and son, or mother and daughter, are not kept in check by the

feeling of solidarity, a family conflict is unavoidable. If the bond

is strong enough, differences will be overcome, blame and criti-

cism will be accepted. Sometimes the son may at the same time

belong to other solidarity groups, which are more important to him

than that of the family, especially when he has differences with his

father. He will then take criticism from such circles more readily

than if it came from his father. We have known fathers to call on their

sons' friends for help because they could not get them to listen to

reason. If we can manage to include the servants in the family

circle, a great deal of our difficulties with them will disappear.

Among the next larger solidarity circles are Young Men's Associa-

tions, Comradeship, Student Bodies, furthermore such professional

associations as have a special code of duty and honour and are there-

fore to be considered asbearers of irrational

solidarity,such as

Officers Corps, combat soldiers, none of whom will ever leave the

other in the lurch, in short, associations mostly of male individuals

who are bound together not by obligation based on a legal contract,

but by the feeling of their normal duty to help each other and to

stand by each other, a feeling generally combined with a proud

consciousness of strength.

When the same phenomenon occurs in the political association of

a nation, the feeling of solidarity is called national feeling, whilethe proud consciousness of the force derived from national unity is

5







HellmutRitter

called national consciousness, and the enhanced, overexcited state of

the national feeling is named national passion, chauvinism.

Other important solidarity groups are formed by religious com-

munities. There the overheated feeling of solidarity is called fana-

ticism, while its antithesis, the ability to tolerate different and

foreign religious opinions and to maintain the community spirit in spite

of them, is called tolerance, two conceptions which may be applied

also to communities outside the religious sphere.

2

From the above considerations about the smallest solidarity circles,

the following experimental law may be deduced: "inside the solidarity

circle criticism is borne more easily then outside it". This principleis applied to a large extent to national and religious solidarity circles.

Criticism of the State organization of one's own country is tolerated

if made by the members of one's own nation. Here we may join in

criticising, whereas we are sensitive against criticism pronounced by

a stranger. Such criticism is easily felt as an attack on the nationaland religious community to which one belongs, and therefore arouses

instincts of self-defence.

But there are more vital things. The following principle may be

laid down: "Inside the solidarity circle sins may be forgiven, except

those which affect solidarity itself". For its preservation is more

important than the sin committed. A classic example of this prin-

cipleinside the small

solidarityassociation of the

familyis

given bythe story of the lost son. The return of the lost sun, the restoration

of the torn bond, are so gratifying to the father that he not only

forgives, but kills the fatted calf into the bargain. We have seen

similar things happen between father and son, though not in such

striking forms. The son commits an action which he knows is stronglycondemned by his father, but he decides to confess it to him and sees

to his surprise that his father's happiness caused by such proof of con-

fidence is far greater than his sorrow for what has happened. I onceread the sentence: "Members of a family may allow themselves things in

6








their home for which a stranger would rightly be shown the door" 1.

The same applies to large associations; for instance, to religious

communities, which represent the widest solidarity circles. Ortho-dox Islam professes the doctrine that even the sinful Moslem, thanks

to his adherence to the Islamic community, is eo ipso safe from

eternal damnation. At the worst the Prophet will intercede on his

behalf with Allah on the day of judgement and he will be forgiven,

because he belongs to Muhammed's community. He will thus finally

go to Paradise, no matter whether he has committed great sins or

not. On the other hand, the infidels, who do not belong to the Islamic

community, are irretrievably doomed to eternal fire, though they

may have lived most virtuous lives. Sin against solidarity is un-

forgivable. He who has apostatized from Islam will, according to

the Islamic law, be punished with death.

Such is the case in political life also. If political rulers, in some way

or other, as for instance by warning against a threat from outside

or by proclaiming popular national-egoistic aims, succeed in arousing

a strong feeling of solidarity in the nation, they may practically take

whatever liberties they choose. Things, which would otherwise not

be tolerated, become acceptable. Apostasy from the community, how-

ever, is considered as a grave offence.

3

The ethically most valuable quality of a true irrational solidarity

circle is the readiness of its members to help and sacri-

f ic e. In a true solidarity circle the members make sacrifices for thecommunity as a whole, or for each other, without expecting any return

for themselves individually. Here is the place where genuine altruism

thrives. The highest degree of such readiness for sacrifice is the sacri-

fice of one's life in fighting for the community or as a martyr. I doubt

whether great movements or revolutions have ever taken place in

history without an appeal to the duty of men to stand together

in solidarity for the common aim. It is not only real longing for power

1 Deutsches Volkstum, June I919, p. I71.

7







Hellmut Ritter

that helps ideals to conquer, not only the harmony of egotistic interests

that leads to the creation of powerful communities, but the feeling of

mutual obligation has the same effect of building up a communityas common advantage. A policy which at home and outside has as its

only aim the balance of interests and does not appeal to the feeling

of common obligation, will leave most men, and surely not the worst

of them, cold, even repel them. That such feeling may be misused

is another thing.

But even such altruism and readiness for help show that solidarityinside its circle ignores injustice. The ancient Arabs said: "Help

your brother, whether he suffers injustice or does injustice 1. One

could produce a whole series of old Arabic poems, in which the

chivalrous poet proclaims his will to rush to the aid of his tribe, no

matter whether they are right or wrong in starting the fighting. There

is a famous English saying: "Right or wrong, my country!" This view,

arising from thoroughly irrational depths is still alive. The instinctivelyfelt obligation for solidarity eliminates the question of right or

wrong, which partly accounts for the attitude of the population even

in unpopular wars.

4

So much for the attitude of the solidarity circle towards its mem-

bers. What is its relation to the world outside? The correlate of

internal unity is first of all isolation from the outer world. Historyhas known nations whose isolation went to the length of forbidding

strangers to enter their country. There are marriage prohibitions inmany countries. There are also nations which are anxious to get rid,

by all means and through various methods, of alien communities.

living in their countries. The rational reasons put forward for such

conduct are by no means altogether plausible. A complete emotional

adoption of such communities into the complex of irrational feelingswhich are the source of genuine long-grown national solidarity, is of

course not always to be obtained and expected, but this is by no

1 Ignaz Goldziher, MuhammedanischeStudien, 2/157.

8








means necessary for the State's life. The somewhat cooler, positive

attitude, called loyalty, towards the people constituting the majority

which will certainly manifest itself -provided that its correlate,

tolerance, exist, and that the community in question enjoy a just

and proper treatment-is quite sufficient and may even become the

first step towards the building up of a new, more far reaching solidar-

ity. Thus, the reason for such elimination efforts, which partly

engender great cruelty and brutality, is to be seen-if we exclude

all coarser material motives-in the overrating of the necessity of

isolation; we want to be alone by ourselves; we do not wish to see

"strangers" amongst us, nor hear their language, nor have to wit-

ness their manners and customs, which differ from ours, etc. If it

does not come to elimination, such elements will be compelled to

assimilate, at least externally, by adopting the language and

customs of the majority in such a way that the presence of alien

elements will not be noticed.

The exaggerated desire for independence may also turn against

foreign cultural elements that infiltrated themselves into the com-

munity in consequence of historical development, because at an earlier

historical epoch, the frontiers of cultural communities had been dif-

ferent. Foreign words are then eliminated-often really to the profit

of the language-or else, in the desire to establish a cultural inde-

pendence, they are declared to be indigenous. Attempts at total eco-

nomic self-sufficiency may originate from the same feelings.

Isolation from outside is for the solidarity circle an efficient, but

very mechanically operating protectivemeasure behind which internal

weakness may sometimes be concealed. It may easily have a

provoking effect outside and arouse resentment and hatred, while

the forced restriction of the cultural horizon has a delaying effect on

the normal course of development.

5

Just as inside the solidarity circle criticism is accepted and faults

are forgiven more easily, criticism coming from outsidewill hardly be tolerated and a fault committed by an outsider will not,

9







TIellmutRitter

or not easily, be forgiven. Thus a d o u b 1e m o r a 1code arises, an in-

ternal one applying to the members of the community, and an external

one applying to the non-members. Actions ar judged with different

measures. When two people do the same thing, it is not the same

thing. This can be very well observed in the propagandaof the parties

concerned in times of political and war complications. What, inside

one's own circle, is regarded as legitimate, as a vital necessity, will,

in the other circle be considered as shameless lust for power; we

ourselves liberate, the others oppress, etc.

Criticism of wealth and the feelings of envy, illwill and hatred, are

readily turned against the alien elements of the community, or againstanother class which is looked upon with hostile eyes. Their wealth

has been acquired through shameless exploitation, deceit and other

evil manoeuvres, and it is intolerable to witness their luxury, their

riding in cars etc. Wealth within one's own circle, that of the leaders,

for instance, is judged with much greater moderation, is less

suspicious and far less provocative. What the result of an objective

investigationof the methods of

acquisitionon both sides would

be like is without any importance for such purely emotional

judgment.

For the individual it is very hard to evade the judgments imposed

upon him by his solidarity circle, and it requires a special firmness

of character and often the possibility of an independent material

existence, to object to the prevailing opinion. For such objectionwould be punished, according to the circumstances, with expulsion

from the community, loss of position and bread, to say nothing ofeven worse things, as we have all witnessed. Very often we have a

double opinion, an official one, which we are obliged to profess,

and a private one, between which there is unfortunately a tremendous

discrepancy.Of no less importance than such double morality in the judgement

of other people's actions inside and outside the solidarity circle is the

double morality of one's own action. It was once discussed in a school

whether it would be right to deceive a thief who had entered a home.The answer was yes, for the thief had put himself outside the com-

10








munity. Apparently, moral precepts are valid only inside the com-

munity. Among a gang of thieves or robbers there may develop a

standard of common morals which stigmatizes most severely lie anddeceit among members, but regards them as natural in dealing with

those outside the gang.

6

Viewed from within, solidarity circles are characterized by certain

positive emotional values. Especially for young people

the adherence to an "association" is obviously a very happy event.

We rememberthe exaltation in the Young People's Associations about

"joint emotional experience" (Gemeinschaftserlebnis). The long-

ing of youth for feelings of power and influence must have a

great bearing on this. One feels safe within one's community,

one's collectivity, i.e. freed from the distress of mind caused by

isolation and its inner defencelessness. The right age for the

spontaneous rise of smaller solidarity associations, other than that

of thefamily,

at least with nations wheresolidarity beyond

the family

and kinsmen exists, is youth, the age at which the best and most

important friendships are made.

Joint emotional experiences of great intensity may cause con-

siderable deviations from the normal status of the soul. It has hap-

pened that people, strangers to each other, have embraced and kissed

each other on occasions that strongly stirred up the common feelings.

Some mass events in the community, organized by leaders, have been

the scene of similar paroxysms.The enhanced community feeling is generally connected with a

strong positive moral valuation of this feeling. The peculiar tone of

heart-felt conviction, in which one's attitude towards and adherence

to the community is sometimes proclaimed, is an external sign of this

moral exaltation. As long as genuine values, which are worthy of

sacrifice, are at stake, no one will have anything to object to such

exaltation. If the expression of feeling is followed by true sacrifice

of one's personality, and even of one's life, such an attitude willrightly be sure of the whole world's admiration and praise. Unfor-

II







Hellrnut Ritter

tunately, however, such feelings have very often no relation whatever

to the objective value of the things for which they are cherished.

To betake oneself to a spiritual defile and defend it with fanaticismwill obviously engender such a state of exaltation, and give such

a fine feeling of moral achievement that the question as to whether

the defile is worth being defended, is not even asked. The fierce

party struggles in former times, which were carried on with self-

abnegation, with this or that war-cry, for theological formulas, for

ritual laws, are regarded to-day as having been out of proportion to

the importance of the differences which were at stake. That, during

the period of the Maccabees, a mother should have her seven sons

perish in boiling oil rather than let them eat pork-the symbol of

apostasy-, we may perhaps admire, but we can hardly understand

it. There may also be cases when, under the influence of a narrowed

horizon, the readiness for sacrifice is intended for something that,

instead of protecting the community, brings disaster upon it. Unityat any cost, even if the consequences are apparently disastrous,

reminds us in its tragedy of the sheep who, following the ram, run

back into the burning stable.

7

In relation to the world outside the circle, there

is coolness, indifference, enmity, hatredleading up to the most unchival-

rous behaviour towards the opponent, and absolute pitilessness. "Thou

shalt love thy neighbour and hate thine enemy" (Matth. V, 43). Ill-

advisedgovernments, tormenting

andexterminating

theirminorities,fanatical inquisitors, dragging their victims to the stake, all that

is perhaps not so gruesome as the complete indifference with which

the population witnesses, tolerates, approves of such treatment, identi-

fies itself with such measures and even jeers at the victims. He

who has attended public executions and observed the attitude of the

staring crowd knows how expulsion from the community can paralyse

every human compassion. Such behaviour of people towards the

"apostates" is all the more appalling, since it is even regarded ashighly moral, as a sacred duty. What a horrible spectacle must be that

12








of a little old mother,who believes that she is doing a pious act in

helpingto gatherwood for the stake of the heretic.But it is no less

appallingwhen a family, whose treason consists in having helpedmembersof a cruellypersecutedminority, s boycottedby a misguided

populationand refused its supply of food.

To the exalted feeling of moral satisfaction corresponds,as its

external counterpart, he feeling of moral indignation.This too, in

its right place, is a qualityof great value. But it is, unfortunately,too often influencedby blind solidaritymechanism.How easy is it

to excite a population o violenceagainst a poor wretchor a groupof men, how easily will even misled students burst into "flaming

indignation"without having the slightest notion of the true facts!

How often we have heard the rash words "it serves them right"when what is done to people is in no proportion o what they could

rightfully be chargedwith! The history of justice could tell a greatdeal aboutcases in which public opinionrose unanimouslyagainsta

supposed trespasser simply trying to outdo each other in their

clamoursfor the heaviest punishment,while it subsequently urned

out that the objectof all this indignationwas innocentandthe victim

of a judicialerror.The feelingsof the solidaritymassesare rashand

thereforecondemn,withoutevenconsideringan objectiveexamination

of the case. It is enoughfor themto imaginethat the solidaritycircle

has been injured, to react at once most violently, to organizemani-

festationsand pass flaming resolutions.

8

If really the validity of morals stops at the boundaries

of the solidarity circle and if the distributionof moral affections

is determinedby these boundaries, t becomes evident that morals,

equally valid for all men, will only be possible where all men are

regardedas belonging o one community.Such is indeed the content

of the Christianidea of Humanity.Whateverwe may think of the

precepts of the Christianchurches, nobody will be able to deny

that it was the founderof the Christianreligionwho, for the firsttime, on principleand with vigor broke with doublemorals, double

13







affections, and the boundary between friend and enemy: "You have

heard that it is said: Love your neighbour and hate your enemy. But I

tell you: Love your enemies... For in loving those who love you, whatwill be your merit? Are not the publicans doing the same? And if youare friendly only with your brothers, what are you doing more than

others?" (Matth. V, 45-47).

The prospect for the abolition of the boundaries of solidarity

through the establishing of one great, common solidarity circle is of

course a small one in public life. The world is not organized for the

surmounting of solidarity circles, but for their strict and correct

preservation. An official of a national solidarity circle who witnesses

cruelties to certain parts of the population in the country, in which

he represents his nation, has not to bother about them so long as no

"interests" of his country are affected. If, for once, an intervention

is made in favour of those who suffer unjustly, it must absolutely be

justified by "endangered interests", for the official world understands

such language only; the various co-existing political circles of powermust respect their mutual interests. The frontiers between the indivi-

dual sovereign states are, as it were, juridically petrified in a world

which can only live through the loosening of these frontiers.

But beyond such traditional, official attitude, the harsh main-

taining of the frontiers between various solidarity circles, the stabili-

zation in principle of the relation between friend and enemy, are bysome people praised as an ideal. They really are fond of that dynamicforce which is actuated through the opposition to an "enemy" circle.

Forthem, adjustment

ofdifferences,

eternalpeace,

areonly

a dream

and not even a beautiful one. G. Ritter says in his characterization of

the political man of power (p. 32): "In proclaiming an 'enemy' every-

thing that stands in his way to success and in placing such relation be-

tween friend and enemy above all other values, ethical laws lose their

autonomous validity for him". The difference between this formula-

tion and our point of view, lies in the fact that we do not consider this

division of the world into friend and enemy as a privilege of the

political man of power only, but beyond this as a characteristicfeature of the social field of power which we call irrational solidarity

Hellmut Ritter14








circle. The political man is only partly the creator of that social field

of power, at the same time he is also the condenser, the exponent and

beneficiary of the irrational solidarity forces, which are always pre-sent in a latent form. All the greater is his responsibility, and we

actually believe that without the portentous initiative of political

rulers fields of power would not explode into historic catastrophes.

9

The double valuation of that which is done inside the solidarity

circle and outside it, applies not only to moral values, to good and

evil, to just and unjust, but may also turn out a h e a v y o b s t a c e

for objective knowledge, owing to the fact that the dis-

cernment between true and false may come under the influence

of solidarity feelings. Unfavourable reports about occurences inside the

solidarity circle will be overlooked or will not be believed. How often

we have heard the words: "I do not believe that!" He who spreads

such reports will not only be called a liar, but he will also be regarded

as an apostate. For such things can be affirmed only by an enemy

and not by a friend, and what the enemy says is a lie, whereas what

we say is the truth. Whether an assertion is true or false will not be

decided by the criterion of reason, common to both parts, but by the

fact of one's belonging to the party. As strong feelings are in general

pernicious to the ability of perception, strong solidarity feelings also

lead to a peculiar narrowing of the intellectual horizon. One becomes

unable to appreciate the opinion of others and even to realise it or

takecognizance

of it.

The struggle between religions and, inside a religion, between

orthodoxy and heresy, is only seemingly one between truth and error;

it is in reality, to a large extent, a struggle between different religious

solidarity groups. The differentiation of religions comes about, it is

true, like that of habits, law and language (as for the latter, the pro-

cess goes on quite unawares) by the fact that various groups, con-

sciously or unconsciously, in the course of their historic development,

have taken a different choice among the infinite or finite possiblesystems, but the practical decision is generally determined by sociolo-

I5







Hellmut Ritter

gical factors. Once, however, the system has been adopted by the

community, or has been assigned to it by historical fate, it is, thanks

to a restricted horizon in conjunction with the feeling of superiority,

proclaimed as a universal and absolute one. One claims to be in posses-

sion of the absolute truth, of the only true religion, etc. The dogmasof one religion are, as a matter of course, by no means convincingto the adherents of another one and cannot be convincing for others,

since they represent no rational, demonstrable truths, but symbols of

psychological, entirely irrational attitudes.

The national historian is expected to describe the fortune and

misfortune of his national community to which he belongs as an

ardent member of that community. But his nation's triumphs and

victories, which he celebrates, are another nation's humilities, defeats,

and everything will be viewed from the opposite angle by that nation's

historian. But the apparent relativity of historical truth disappearsas soon as the historian's look embraces an ideal horizon, in which

friend and enemy belong together in a higher form of community.Fertile scientific discussion, in which

really objectiveresults are

attained, is only possible either where there exists a natural intrinsic,

tradition-established solidarity of work, or where such solidarityis formed, and if necessary renewed, through conscious acts of

resolution on the part of the different parties concerned. If, as it has

happened, on the contrary, the will for subjectivity and the negationof the objective is manifested, this means that the maintenance of

the demarcation lines, of the friend-enemy relation, is placed above

allvalues,

even above that ofobjective knowledge, even above thevalue of truth. It means renunciation of the truth which is common to

mankind. There is only one truth, that of one's own solidarity circle.

Victory of truth is thought of, as if it were something like a

victory of political power, i.e. science becomes propaganda, and,

ceases to be science; for science, unless it agrees to play the part of a

servant of theology, as in former times, or even to degrade itself to

being a servant of policy, will always claim to be universal, i.e. to be

the truth of that solidarity circle which, in principle, embraces allbeings endowed with reason, and finds its limits only where the limits

i6








of human reason itself lie. As regardsthe possibility of universal

acknowledgmentof the commontruth by the thinking men of all

solidarity groups, guided by the ethos of a pure love of knowledge,science is in principle optimistic, despite all disillusionments.

Io

As already pointed out, solidarity presents itself in v a ri ous d e-

grees o f s t r e n g t h. It may be quite latent, so that the observer

from outsideperceivesnothingof it. In this case the community m-

braced by it may present the aspect of a body of people who are by no

means united, but rather torn by quarrelsand discord,incapableofcommonaction.Subsequently, owever, hingsmayhappenwhichsud-

denly awake the dormant community spirit, actuate the will for the

defenceof commongoods,andturna splitnation nto a unitedone, i.e.

integrate t. At such a stage,the solidaritycircle,thanksto the common

directionof will and energyof all members, s an immensesourceof

power, which accounts for its enormouspolitical importance.That

powergives strength,and the courageous r arrogantconsciousness f

it leads, under certain conditions,to the further stage of a g r e s-sion.

The desire for aggression and feud, which exists perhaps always in

a latent state as the wish to try one's strength, may develop in a harm-

less way, as in battles between boys of various districts of a town,

or be confinedto smallcircumstances,s small feuds betweenfamilies,

pictured in such lively colours by Shakespeare in the exposition of

his play "Romeo and Julia". In taking larger dimensions it becomes

more dangerous, especially if through an ideology, a religious,

national or any other aim, the social dynamism, in itself colourless,

receives colour, substance and meaning.An attempt has been made to explain the conquests of the Arabs as

due to mere economicreasons:hungerdrovethe Arabsbeyondtheir

frontiers. More recent studieshave not borneout this. Indeed,desert

life has been a scantyone at all times, and the Bedouinshave often

enough carried on a predatoryeconomy throughincursionsinto a

civilised country, but this is not sufficient to explain such a tre-

ORIENS

i 7







HellnmutRitter

mendous,suddenexpansion.The Arabs were split into innumerable

small groups, the tribes, which lived in permanentsmall feuds.

Throughthe Prophet Muhammed'spersonality,who along with hisremarkable ualitiesas a leader,gave them a stirringideology,a new

faith,the Bedouinforces,whichhadbeenneutralizingachother,amal-

gamated nto a great solidaritygroup.The feeling of solidaritywas

spurredon by religious deas,andthe forcesthusintegrated oughtfor

activity.This they foundin the conquests,whichOmar,a strongpoli-tical personality,organizedafter the smashingof the first apostasymovementfollowingMuhammed'sdeathduringthe caliphateof Ab*i

Bekr.

The necessarycondition for such a war of conquestseems to be

the initiativeof the personalityof the leader,who organizes he war.

That the popularmassesthemselves, n the formof a massmovement

shouldattack a neighbouringcountryis hardlyconceivable.Excited

popular masses may make noisy demonstrations, ocal revolts and

raids, but they do not organizea war. For a war, leadership s

responsible.

II

The feeling of solidarity, he legitimatefunctionof which consists

in giving the community he power of maintaining tself very often

appearsto be mingled with less noble motives. How-

ever much t mayinducethe membersof the community o give upor

restraintheir individualegotism, it goes very well with a collective

egotism,which,again,maydisplay tself in differentdynamicdegrees,varying from comparatively armless to very maliciousforms. Ideal

values,such as preservationof the community's xistence,its dignity,its honour, ts safety fromaggression, ts historicrights,are replaced

by morematerial hings.Someof them,which sound a little less ideal

and are pretty elastic,as for instance"interests",are acknowledgedin diplomatic anguageand have become familiar.Beyondthis, how-

ever, thereare historicor unhistoric"claims","naturalvital needs",

primarilythose for foreign riches and foreign territory,in whichthe rapacious ollectiveegotismcomes to light quite undisguised.








When the solidarity circle passes to the attack, sheer lust of con-

quest, predatory instincts, desire for plunder, rapacity, unscrupulous

egotism of economic circles, are practically always found among the

cooperating factors.

The hope of satisfying materialistic interests in the settlements of

neighbouring peoples played of course an important part in many of

the aggressive wars known to history. The persecution of heretics,

the burning of witches, the expulsion of minorities, are to a very

large extent prompted by a greedy desire to acquire their property.

These instincts, however, receive the shining lustre of the commu-

nity's more ideal aims, which are of course put in the foreground bythe leaders. The opponents on the other side have then the oppor

tunity of "unmasking", in which case the legitimate components are,

however, usually denied as sheer hypocrisy. In real life, pure emotions

are very rare and in practice hardly ever operate in an unmixed form

(compare G. Ritter's sentence on p. 2).

12

How does what we call the feeling of solidarity c o m e abou t

in practical life? We regard it as a primitive social feeling. But we

can with Ibn Khaldfun mention some special moments, which giverise to or foster that feeling1.

Ibn Khaldiun starts by mentioning blood relationship as the cause.

"It is a feature of human nature" he says, "that one feels tied to

relatives by blood". However, the feeling of being tied together may

also come about between allies, as well as between protector and

protected, a relationship characteristic of the Arabian tribes. "It

is in the nature of men that they should join one another and make a

bond, even if they be not related by blood". Furthermore, according

to Ibn Khaldun, Casabiyacomes about through social intercourse,

through long reciprocal testing and trying, and through the activities

t A seriesof moments,whichlead to the creationof nationalcommunities,is mentioned by Kaegi, Historische Meditationen (Ziirich i942), p. i8 etc. For

a given epoch and a given territory the same subject is dealt with by Huizinga,Im Banne der Geschichte (Basle 1943), p. 222 etc.

19







Hellmut Ritter

of common occupations. It also comes about between men who were

brought up together and who share the vicissitudes of life (Kamil

Ayad Io8-9). Here indeed substantial elements have been perceived,which lead to the rise of solidarity. Blood relationship is the strongest

bond, especially for semitic nations, at any rate for the Arabs who,

even after settling down, kept up the organization of tribes in the

desert. The city states of Antiquity, too, go back to the organizationin tribes, though for them the existence of tribes did not play the same

dominant role as for the Semites, and the Arabs in particular. The

ancient Arabs could scarcely imagine an association between men who

stood in no relationship to each other, and therefore, when unrelated

people were admitted into a tribe, a common genealogical tree was

established. The genealogical tables of the Arabs partly represent

relationships in the sense of ancestry research, partly are records of

old political alliances, of historical merging of weak tribes into another

strong tribe, etc.

Ibn Khalduin is of course aware of these facts. His inference is

that the feeling of belonging together does not depend on real com-

mon origin, but first of all on the subjective belief of the members

that they have the same blood (Ayad p. Io8). We would say that the

idea of relationship has the character and importance of an ideology

fostering integration 1.

The second cause for the rise of solidarity seems to have been

stronger for the Indo-Europeans, at least after their settling down,

1 Even the Islam, which united the Arab tribes did not immediately replacethese blood relationshipties. Only gradually did the conception"brother Mos-lem" becamemore importantthan the conception"tribe brother".The OmayyadEmpire perished owing to tribal feuds; it was not before the massive pene-tration of non-Arab elements that the religious community became more im-

portant than blood relationship. The struggle between these two conceptionsis related clearly by Goldziher in his MuhammedanischeStudien, Halle I888.The same applies to the closer family ties. Goldziher comes to the followingconclusion: "En general, on peut dire que Fancienne doctrine mahometanemanifeste la tendance a faire prevaloir d'une faCon reguliere les devoirs dufidele envers sa famille sur le devoir a l'egard de la foi". Influences chretiennes

dans la litterature religieuse de l'Islam (Revue de l'Histoire des ReligionsXVIII, 195).

20








than for the Semites. At any rate, at the later period we see semi-

military and social alliances of various kinds, having nothing to do

with relationship, and whose newer, harmless forms are the innumer-able clubs, comradeships, youth associations, etc., which, according to

circumstance, show a stronger or looser solidarity. The same seems

to have been the case with the Turks. The Turkish slaves, bought in

Central Asia, who formed the Mameluke Corps in Egypt, belong to

this category. The same is true of the so-called Futuwwa associations,

continued in the Anatolian Akhi associations, in which the feelingsof solidarity developed considerable strength. Characteristic of the

spirit of comradeship and the readiness for sacrifice, which wereconsidered among them as pre-requisites, is the story of an Akhi who

had his hand cut off to save that of a younger member, condemned

for theft 1.

The third cause of solidarity, common education, is even to-day

playing a paramount part in some countries, so that it has been said

that political leaders recruit themselves from among old school-

fellows.

1 Herbert W. Duda, CIizaduddinFaqih und die Futitwwa, Archiv Orientalni

VI, 1934, II2-124. In Islam, the necessity of love-ties beyond reach of the

family limits seems to have first been stressed by the mystics. The mysticNiri (d. 9o7), who was sentencedto death with a number of comrades, rushed

forward to the executioner so as to be executed first and thus to prolong the

brothers' lives by a few moments (Al Ghasali, Das Elixir der Gliickseligkeit,translated by H. Ritter, Jena 1923, p. 79). The Prophet is called upon to putforward the necessity of love for non-relatives. From the same circles comes

the sentence: "Our comrades are dearer to us than our wives and children".

Abu Talibal-Makki, Qat al-qulzb

II, 218-19. Thestory

known from Schiller's

ballad "Die Biirgschaft" of the friend who substitutes himself, as bail, for the

friend sentencedto death, is connectedwith the Pythagoreancircle. It was told by

Aristoxenos, primitively a pythagorean in Tarent, later a pupil of Aristotle's

in Athens; he heard the story from Dionysios II personally. Published by

Diels-Kranz, The fragments of the Pre-socratics 5th ed., ist vol. (Berlin

I934), p. 47I etc. Aristoxenos' work was entitledAbout PythagoreanLife. Later,

much altered texts of the Romans': Hyginus, ist century after Christ, source

for Schiller, Valerius Maximus and others. Medieval text of the I5th century

in Der Seele Trost (Kiirschners Natiomwl-LiteraturXII, p. 477). (I owe this

information to my colleague Walther Kranz.) The Arabic text, in which the

tyrannic Governor of the Iraq, Haccac, is substituted for the tyrant, in Saf-

fiiri's Nuzhat al-macalis (Cairo 1313) 213.

21







Hellmut Ritter

The "sharing of the vicissitudes of life", which Ibn Khaldiunmen-

tions, can also be traced without difficulty in wider circles than those

he had in mind. Common fate has been acknowledged by the historiansas one of the essential forces leading to the creation of States. It

can separate men arbitrarily, in spite of all blood relationship, all

religious and language communities, and unite others, who have

nothing in common, under one central power, and yet a national

solidarity feeling may come about inside such quite mechanically and

recklessly traced frontiers. The adherence to the same political sphere

of power may bring about a strong feeling of solidarity, just as

national consciousness came about chiefly on this basis l.Of course, living together in the same geographical space is also

a natural condition for the bringing about of solidarity2. The co-

lonized and inhabited space may even become an object of affection.

Common love of the country, of the native town, may certainly

engender strong solidarity feelings and arouse defence instincts. Ibn

Khaldun, who saw the Casabiyadeveloped with the nomads only, had

no reason to deal specially with the problem of this kind of solidarity.

But common habitat is not an indispensable condition for thecoming about of solidarity. Widely scattered members of a race, a

people, a social class, may feel solidarity ties with each other.

To these, rather slowly and steadily acting factors more momentarily

acting factors may be added. An event, deeply moving each individual,

may, as has already been pointed out, call forth momentary solidarity

affections, but the most important of the suddenly acting factors is

a th re a t f ro m o u t s i d e, a motive which acts with extraordinary

precision and force. Internal quarrels stop whenever external danger isimminent 3. The instincts of defence are actuated, automatically

1 See also Kaegi, Historische Meditationen, p. 21, etc., and lbn Khaldun's

theory referred to.2 Arnold F. Toynbee, A Study of History II (Oxford I939), 79-80, sees

particularly in emigrations overseas "substitution of locality for kin as the

basis of political organization".3Turtufi (d. 1126) tells in his Siric al-mulik (Cairo I306) p. 55 the following

nice anecdote: "On the death of a Caliph, the Byzantines wondered they could

not avail themselvesof the internal differences of the Moslems to start an attack

22








engendering the kind of unity which will make defence possible. This

applies also to the solidarity of fighting troops, which is enhanced

by the common danger of death. Unity among people who are in thesame plight helps to overcome fear of death.

13

There is another kind of solidarity, for the rise of which the

f a c t o r o f t i m e, even the mere sequence of generations, plays an

important role. Common opposition to, common distance from a past

which is felt to be out of date and inferior, may bring about solidarity.This kind of solidarity too appears in various degrees of intensity.

Its most harmless form is the contrast inspired by feelings of

superiority, which sets the young generation against the old. They

dress, behave, enjoy themselves, even talk in a different way from the

older generation; they even have different opinions about life. There

is an Arab saying: "Men look more like their time than like their

fathers".

No less harmless is the peculiar solidarity in a community withregard to fashions in clothes. Whoever excludes himself from the

fashion of the day becomes ridiculous. However, if change of costume

means not only a mere change of fashion, but is to be regarded as the

external sign of passing from one cultural community to another, the

change of costume may involve tremendous conflicts. Such a mo-

mentous change in clothes fashions, for instance, is illustrated by the

adoption of the European costume by Oriental nations, and conflicts

in family life due to such changes are frequent subjects in modernOriental litterature.

against them. A wise man dissuaded them from doing this.Asked for his reasons,he promised to give an answer on the next day. When they came to get his

answer, he threw two fierce dogs upon one another. The dogs fell upon one

another, biting into one another's flesh until the blood began to flow. He thensuddenly threw a wolf against the two dogs, which immediately gave up fightingand turnedtogether against the common foe. On this the Byzantinesgave uptheir

plan of agression". See also Kaegi, Histori.che Meditationen,p. 18; Toynbee,A study of History II, 169.

23







Hellnut Ritter

Distinguished from this kind of solidarity which enforces change

is another one which acts in the opposite way. If certain costumes,

habits and manners are considered as symbols of the adherence to acertain highly esteemed community, they will be preserved tenaciously

over all changes of time. The consciousness of solidarity then mani-

fests itself precisely in the preservation of traditional customs and

institutions, proper to the circle concerned.

Solidarity pressure of the new on the old has certainly played an

important part in all revolutions, beginning with the spiritual revo-

lutions which have alteredman,

in the rise ofChristianity against

the

antique world, and in that of Islam against the old Arabian paganism.

It becomes simply impossible from a certain moment to exclude

oneself from the new movement. Thus all former, even ethically highly

valuable ties which are in contradiction to the new spirit, are doomed to

disappear. Wherever a man wants to exclude himself from the new

solidarity and approves of the old, he will be considered as a dreamer,

a romantic, over whom time passes away, and even an enemy. But

even in the conflict of these solidarity circles, where the contrast liesin the difference between the generations, the same law is in force

that applies to solidarity groups in general: the question of right or

wrong, precious or worthless, is settled not on the basis of objective

considerations, but rashly, according to the adherence to the solidarity

circle concerned. The way in which overthrown governments are

characterized and treated by their successors offers edifying examples

of this, and the same can be said of the hasty zeal with which we wit-

ness cultural reformers demolishing and vilifying everything that was

valuable and sacred to their fathers, to be replaced by new things, the

value of which is by no means established beyond doubt. Things were

not different in ancient times either. The virtues of the ancients,

which cannot be denied by reason, are for Augustine "splendidavitia",

splendid vices. When pagan Arabs complained of the terrible faith-

lessness of the new converts to their old tribe fellows, with whom

they were connected by old and valuable ethical ties, the reply giventhem was: "Islam has changed the hearts". The heritage of the past,

24








precious though it may be, has been denied more than once at the

turning points of civilization 1.

Viewed from the point of view of the Absolute, even in the light ofthe timeless verdict of History, the thus established values are not

valid. According to a famous dictum of RANKE, each epoch is direct

by relation to God (unmittelbar zu Gott). The true progress of the

social ethic, which has been brought about by historic development, is

certainly not depreciated by such considerations; but this does not

change the fact that solidarities which have risen from oppositionto the past are as blind as all the others; in their aggressiveness they

destroy the good along with the bad. Their verdict of what is of valueand the objective verdict of history do not by any means always

tally. For not everything that comes about "deserves to perish" as

Mephistopheles says. The silent work of the historian, the archaeo-

logist, the student of past civilizations, who plunge with love into

things that no longer exist and count, is an unuttered repudiation of

an attitude which approves unreservedly of the prevailing forces of

their times and surrenders completely to the narrow horizon of the

present with its meagre cultural contents.

I4

A false product of the true solidarity in which sins are forgiven

and controversies settled is the superficial w o u 1d - b e s o li d a r-

it y which polite social intercourse obliges us to maintain. Here sins

are not forgiven, but they are ignored, one acts as if one knew nothing.

The most serious differences are overlooked on purpose, lest the

harmony of the community, the most weakened, but for the common

life of men indispensable, form of solidarity should be jeopardized.

Willy nilly, no objections are made to opinions expressed, though

one knows them to be sheer nonsense; or one contradicts in an

"obliging" way which gives the impression of essential "unity" and

of complete agreement on all points. For what matters is unity at

any cost.

It is not by chance that this kind of intercourse in German is called

1 B. Croce in Huizinga's Im Banne der Geschichtep. 76.

25







Hellmut Ritter

"hoflich" (= court-eous). "What is generally understood by friend-

ship in 'Court' literature is the social intercourse which must be kept

up for the sake of one's interests 1. "Good relations" for selfish pur-

poses take the place of friendship. Such is the atmosphere, in which

evolve and develop the techniques of creating a pretended solidarity

and displaying the social forms peculiar to it. Its masterly knowledge

formerly belonged to the indispensable armour of the courtier and

is still necessary for the diplomat. For he too must keep up good

relations in the selfish interest of the State which he represents; he,

too, must, for the sake of good relations, ignore a great deal of what

he ought to condemn from a higher point of view. And if he is once

called upon to "raise a protest", this must be done in the obliging,

polite forms which are so characteristic of his profession that even

outside the professional sphere of diplomacy they are called "diplo-

matic forms".

I5

The initiative of a leading personality, of the political

ruler, is in Ibn Khalduin's arguments somewhat left in the back-ground, whereas Machiavelli puts it in the centre of his work. Yet,

Ibn KhaldCun's,oo, acknowledges the role of the leader. He deals

minutely with the general necessity of the existence of a "restrainer"

(waziC), i.e. of a personality who prevents men from falling uponeach other (Rosenthal 8-9). In the second phase of State develop-

ment the ruler is put more in the foreground. In the first phase the

political leader is a 'primus inter pares' within the Casabiya-community.

Here the author of Muqaddima has apparently in mind the Bedouin

leader, for in his opinion the true Casablya s only found among the

nomads. If the leader reaches out for autocracy, he will endeavour

even to break the Casabiya hat made him rise high, to eliminate those

who helped him come to power and those who shared it with him.

and will turn into an autocrat. (K. Ayad i15, Rosenthal I8).

The relation of the leader to the community led by him would

1 Wolfdietrich Rasch, Freundschaftskult nd FreundschaftsdichtungmDeutschen Schrifttum des A8.Jahrhunderts,Halle 1936, p. 28.

26








requirea special socio-psychologicaldiscussion, which can only be

toucheduponhere.The community ees in him the concentration nd

personificationof its solidarityforces. It expects from him that herepresent ts collectivefeelingsand make ts collectiveegotismsprevailas far as possible.As their great men nationsregardprimarilysuch

political leaders as have increased the power of their country in-

tensivelyand extensively,and haveparticularlypromoted ts interests

and successfully served their collective egotism, for instancebyterritorialextension at the neighbour'sexpense. It is by no means

the virtues of justice and clemencywhich secure the attachmentof

his adherence.The use of power,the demonstration f power,even ifcombinedwith cruelty,arouse far greaterenthusiasm hanthe quieteffects of a ruler'swisdom.For desireof powerandaggression,which

man carries within himself but cannot satisfy privately, is thus

satisfied indirectly.The readinessfor devotionto the community s often concentrated

upon its live, personalsymbol,the ruler,the leader,the Prophet,etc.

A whole scale of irrationalfeelings go to him, from simple faith-

fulness to the paroxysmalindulgencein idealizing phantasies.In-

cidentalcontactwith him brings aboutexalted feelings of happiness,andmagicforce is attributedo it; thecreationof legendsandmythical

poetry ensues, he receives, while still alive, God-like honours, and

after his death,which is often doubted,he is raisedto a superhuman

being, and to even more than that.

As every generationof a ruling dynasty does not bring forth a

strongleader, all kinds of interestingsituations ensue for the suc-

cessors. The legitimate descendantsare sometimesthe object of a

venerationwhich they do not wish at all, or are assigneda role for

whichthey are not fit (as for some ShiciteImams). Or the successor

exercisesonly the role of a symbol,whereasreal power and political

leadership are left to others (the Emiralumera n the cAbbasid

Empire, the Majordomo in the Frankish Empire). Ibn Khaldfin,

too, knows the enhanced venerationof rulers and the solidaritybe-

betweensubjects

andrulers,

but he does not include them in the

Casabiya ecause t lacksthe characteristic ign of the participationn

27







HellhnutRitter

power. For him it begins at a stage when autocracy has long been

existing, when it has been forgotten that the ruling dynasty once

came to power through the solidarity union of pares sub primo. Thepower is then accepted as a matter of course and the subjects fight

for their ruler as they do for dogmas (K. Ayad I85, Rosenthal 25).

"They submit to the strong religious belief that they must obey him,

and thht the earth would shake in its foundation if they coveted

the power either with him or in his place" (Rosenthal 25).

In the Islamic Orient devotedness of the ruled to the ruler has been

strongest where the person of the ruler was surrounded with a

religious halo, as for instance in the various Shicite sects. About theShicite dynasty of the Safawides the German traveller Engelbert

Kaempfer writes: "Last but not least, the authority of the Great

King becomes enhanced through the peculiar form of faith of the

subjects, which makes for unconditional submission to their absolute

and sacred ruler, even though he commit the most injurious actions

or exact the oddest things from them. The condemned person will

not even protest by gesture when the Treasury confiscates his property,

or when the executioner is going to put his eyes out, or when anunexpected royal messenger wants to cut his head off..., for it

appears natural to everybody to sacrifice his property, his eyes and his

life to a whim of the Great King. The era of the Shah Safi (I629-42)

has witnessed examples of how, by an order of the Sovereign, fathers

stabbed their sons' hearts and sons their fathers', all yielding with a

fearless spirit to the necessity of the murder of relatives. They

would as readily, amid the noise of a funeral banquet, in fulfilment

of the order of the Shah who gave the verdict, cheer the instigatorof the murder. No son would refuse to cut off his father's ears, nose

and even head, if the ruler so commanded"1.

Although European history knows no examples of such an extreme

kind, it is by no means without cases of political contrasts tearing up

every family tie or one family member informing against another

politically (as well as religiously) and causing his ruin.

1Engelbert Kaempfer,

AmHofe

des PersischenGrosskiinigs (I684-85).Das erste Buchder AmoenitatesExoticae.Introduced ndpublishedn German

edition by Walter Hinz, Leipzig I940, p. 17 and 65.

28








Related tothe

solidarity betweenruler and

ruledis

that betweenthe more impersonal government and the governed. Here

all possible degrees can be observed, from the unquestioning loyalty of

the official to the subversive activities of the revolutionary. In the

Islamic history of sects and dogmas, the problem of whether an

impious government should be obeyed or, to put it in a religious way,whether the common prayer rite should be performed behind an im-

pious Imam, worried the minds a long time. While the sect of the

Kharijites would make the Imams' competence of governing depen-dent on a moral and religious life, Orthodoxy has held the view that

prayer is allowed behind any Imam good or bad, and has adoptedthis theory into its creed. To secede from the ruler invested by

historic development, i.e. by God's will, was not in line with the

Orthodox conception, according to which one was bound to abstain

from abondoning the great masses of Moslems, from whatever "split-

ting of the staff". In this conception, which is supported by many

words of the Prophet, is expressed the so often emphasised "Catholicinstinct" of Islam, which is nothing else but the solidarity feelingdealt with here.

The question of one's attitude towards the government is discussed

in Islamic literature in still another way. In Islamic religious literature

protest against abuses and injustice committed by the government,is often referred to by a Koranic term, the accuratetranslation of which

is difficult: "to command what should be approved and to forbid

what should be disapproved". The question is then raised as to theperson upon whom that duty is incumbent, whether upon everyMoslem or only on those who are qualified for it, or on the Imam

himself, as the representative of the community. By what "should

be approved and disapproved" is meant not only actions of the

government, but lawful and unlawful acts in general 1. Political

1 From the Imam's qualification to exercise by proxy the commandof what

should be approvedof and the forbidding of what should be disapprovedof isthen inferred the police authority of the State.

29







Hellmut Ritter30

movements of opposition have frequently adopted the Koranic ex-

pression as their watchword. Ibn Khaldfn deals with this question

in order to demonstrate again the validity of his principle that ideal(religious) propaganda without the help of an Casabiya s doomed to

failure. "If that is so for Prophets themselves", he states, "of whom

the breaking of habits (in normal life) can be expected first, what

is then to be expected from others?... In this chapter belongs the fate

of the men of the common people and that of the scholars of the

sacred Law who rose in order to abolish what cannot be approved.For many men, who devote themselves to divine service and religious

life, think that one has to rise against the unjust ruler, and appeal forthe "commanding of what should be approved and for the forbid-

ding of what should be disapproved" in the hope of God's reward;

they have of course many adherents and indifferent followers among

the crowd and the lower people, and they therefore expose themselves

to the greatest dangers. But the majority of them perish in this way...For the power of Kings and States is strongly established; it can be

discarded or overthrown only if power, based on the Casabiyaof the

tribes and tribal groups, calls it to account, as we have already

pointed out" 1.

These sentences of the Arab philosopher of history have lost nothingof their actuality. The attempts of pious circles and personalities to

form an opposition on ideal grounds are according to Ibn Khaldiin,

doomed to failure. But in Islam, too, courageous scholars have

protested occasionally. In the I3th century courageous jurists in Egyptdeclared prayer in a cemetery chapel, which the Sultan had erected,

as not permitted, on account of the inhumane methods used during its

construction2. A tacit, boycott-like opposition to the governmentexisted in certain pious circles of the early Islamic Middle Ages,when any money coming from the government was considered reli-

giously forbidden property. It is even reported that some pious peopleconsidered it forbidden to drink water from a canal dug by the

1 Muqaddimta Beyrouth I9oo) p. 159. Compare Rosenthal, p. 54.

2 Max Herz-Pascha, Die Baugruppe des Sultans Qaldan in Kairo (Ham-burg 1919), p. 37-38.








"Emirs", .e. the government,or to fasten theirbootlacesat the lightof a lampbelongingto the government.

A positive solidaritywith the State, a State feeling, in regardtoState property,seems to have developedcomparatively ate. Even

where nationalfeeling is stronglydevelopedeverythingis not alwaysin perfectorderin the awardingand receivingof Statecontracts.The

first condition for the developmentof morality regardingtaxes is,of course,just taxation,the development f whichwas prevented or

a long time by the methodsof tax-farmingand delegationof tax-

levying to tax gatherers.

Modernsocialism is hoping for some sort of solidarityfeeling be-tween labourand the State as employer,becausenationalizednstitu-

tions are considered n a certain sense the workers'own institutions.

Whether and how far such solidaritycan develop is yet an open

question.

17

Justas

solidaritygainsin

powerand determinationwhen backed

upby a strongleadership,t gains in clearnessof purposeandstrengthwhen the gatheredforces are shownby an i d e olo g y the direction

in whichthey oughtto be active. Ibn Khaldunknows ideologyin the

form of religion. A common religious faith would be capable of

strengthening he CasabiyaK. Ayad p. 112-3). Religion was surelythe most important deologyin past times,but not the only one. The

aim pursuedmust in any case be an ideal one; purely economic n-

terests and practicalaims, belongin

associationsand

societieshavingthese corresponding ims.

Ideology need not always be formulated.The ethical expressionof the will of a communityof solidarityappearsvery often in the

form of an unwrittenCode of Honours and Duties, which imposea certain conduct upon the members. The line of conduct s not

prescribed n definite terms, but is a thing silently understood.To

talk about it becomesnecessaryonly if the unwrittenCodeof Duties

has been infringed upon, just as children'sduties in the familycircleare only talkedof when they are neglected.Often it is no more than

31







Hellmut Ritter

a vaguely felt "Weltanschauung",which even those concerned in it can

hardly formulate and which takes the place of a formulated ideology.

The interpreter of this not clearly established ideology is very oftenthe poet who is the normal interpreter of irrational feelings. What

we know of the social ideas of the ancient Arabs, we know from

their poetry. The considerable part which songs play for the young

people's associations, strong in the emotional and weak in the rational

elements, underlines the significance of this phenomenon. The role

of poetry in such associations is sufficient proof of their irrationality.An Academy of Sciences does not sing, nor does a Loan-Office.

Yet often an ideology is formulated. Thus in the creeds of religious

communities, in Party programs, insofar as they express a "Weltan-

schauung". But there too, solidarity is essential, whereas the rational

content of the ideology is less important. The watchword issued maybe wrong, without, for that matter, losing anything of its unifying

power. The fact that not all the points of a Party program can be

approved of does not always prevent cooperation, provided only that

some of the irrational needs are satisfied.

Formulas of religious tenets are retained as symbols of religiouscommunities even where their rational contents are no longer be-

lieved. This is due to the desire to maintain the connection with the

great epoch which created those symbols 1.

I8

There are a number of i n f 1u e n c i n g m e a n s by which solidar-

ityis

achieved, preservedand

cultivated.The best known and most

important way of influencing people is the spoken and written word.

1 Moreover, the maintenance of complicated common symbols of faith in

religious communities seems to be dependent on the existence of a theologicalprofession, which is simultaneouslythe bearer of civilization and which pro-duces a religious and theological literature or is able to interpret texts handeddown by tradition. Minor sects which have no important theologians and do

not own a theological literature usually fall into decay. On the other hand,small popularenclaves, which differ in doctrine andrite from theirenvironments,

often persist with great tenacity when the clergy takes care of the maintenanceof both.

32








At certain stages of civilization it is the poet's word to which this

role falls. The old Arabian poets incited the Casabiyaof their tribe

to common great actions.If

we are to believe Uhland's poem "Bertrandde Born", it was the same in Europe in past times. Beside poetry, there

has been from the oldest times the prosaic word in its numerous forms.

It has a double function: it wants to convince through arguments, but

at the same time rouses the irrational forces of the soul. To obtain

this effect rhetorical means are required.A clever simplification of com-

plex facts, the reduction of complicated contrasts to a couple of splen-

did antitheses, thrilling metaphors, may produce an incredible effect.

Antiquity and the Middle Ages in East and West possessed a thoroughtechnique of the art of speech, of rhetoric. With the establishment

of romantic aesthetics, rhetoric disappeared from the school-pro-

gram as a branch of study, and this art is noy practised unconsciously.The audience is no longer able to discover by what kind of technique

they are being influenced and is therefore all the more at its mercy.

But this by the way. In demagogical mass assemblies the persuasion

of the audience through genuine arguments and factual information,

plays but a very small part. It is well known that only plain, easilycomprehensible trains of thought have a chance of reaching larger

circles, or the popular masses. Their want of definite, easily graspedtruths is too great for them to be able to grasp real problems. The

audience wants first of all to have its feelings of solidarity, its moral

exaltation confirmed, enhanced and animated.

Another means is the use of ceremonial or festival occasions. The

quiet common service in a religious community, from which everybody

returns home in a joyful frame of mind, the family holiday, patrioticperformances, and last but not least, the gigantic festivities organized

by certain Parties have a stimulating effect on the feeling of solidar-

ity. On rational minds these things have obviously less influence,

and, if used beyond measure, they easily become worn out, anyhow.

In certain communities, chiefly religious, there are also regularly

performed rites. It is characteristic that in religious communities, of

all rites those which symbolize adherence to the community last

longest. People have their children christened as Christians and cir-ORIENS I 3

33







cumcised as Jews and Moslems, though they have long given up

going to church, the synagogue and the mosque. One is perhaps

most indifferent toward what is going on there, but to break the tiewith the community would be felt as reprehensible faithlessness and

distressing self-isolation 1.

To this must be added the concrete common duties of the hour

which are imposed on the members of the community from outside.

Not every man is able to set himself tasks that go beyond the satis-

faction of his immediate needs. First of all, it is youth that is gratefulwhen assigned duties which fill it with enthusiasm. For does not the

possession of a concrete aim mean the practical answer to the questionabout the meaning of life? Youth, being desirous of using its forces,

trusts its leadership gladly and in good faith. The consciousness of

cooperating with others for a great and common task constitutes a

compensation for the sacrifice of personal freedom.

I9

The feeling of solidarity may be a r t i f i c i a ly b o o s t e d

from the Centre and thus stimulated to extraordinary achievements.

Such boosting consists, in the first place, in intensifying the incentive

measures for the strengthening and preservation of solidarity, and

secondly, in artificially promoting the natural conditions for its rise.

To arouse European knighthood to participate in the Crusades, for in-

stance, a considerable preaching propaganda was used. Through the

modern means of radio and press the spoken and written word has

become an evengreater power.

Commonholidays

too areonly

too

often used to the utmost limits.

Isolation from outside and restriction of the intellectual horizon

may be created artificially. The pious Moslem is enjoined never to

read the holy books of the Jews and Christians; books which maybecome dangerous for the pious Catholic are put on the index of

1 This attitude has of course other reasons also. It is characteristic of the

religiously indifferent man that he persists in a certain half-hearted attitude

towards religion. His reason denies, but his soul does not dare to bear thewhole consequence of this attitude and to break with God entirely.

HelUmut itter34








forbidden books; reading foreign newspapers, listening to foreignradio stations, is stigmatized as treacherous, and therefore forbidden,

or prevented by such drastic measures as the seizure of all receivinginstruments. Youth, or at least the pick of it, is being isolated in

special schools with fixed mental horizon, attempts at fraternization

are rendered impossible; the contact with foreigners is largely impeded

through supervision methods and similar measures. Moreover, the use

of such methods proves that-luckily-man as a private civilian per-

son bears no natural hatred towards his fellow man in other countries,

but that hatred between nations has to a large extent to be artificially

created from the Centre.For the lacking genealogical root of solidarity a compensation may

be created through an artificial race theory. The law of experience,

according to which threatening of the community by an enemy rouses

and strengthens solidarity can be taken advantage of by proclaiming

the community as threatened from outside, even though such is not

the case-since, as we have seen, solidarity feeling does not make

much critical inquire-and, if necessary, by seeking, finding and

inventing again and again new enemies threatening the community.

After all, with the powerful modern terror methods it is easy to

paralyse any breaking away from the desired line and to silence or

annihilate any opposition.

20

Between the various solidarity circles there may exist t e n s i o n s

and con f licts. Inside the borders of aState, they

are home-

political, outside them they are foreign-political tensions and conflicts.

This brings us to the problem of the creation of political power at

home.

Ibn Khaldun refers to it as follows: "Inside every tribe"-we

have already seen that the normal solidarity circle for the Arab is the

kinsmen circle-"there is a group of genealogically stronger adherents,

which group has therefore a stronger coherence, as a small group

of kinsmen, a family, or the sons of one father. In this group theCasabiya s stronger than in the others. This Casabiyagroup is neces-

35







Hellmut Ritter

sarily destined to rule over others, as at the origin of a body one

of the four elements must outweigh and rule over the others". Ibn

Khaldun knows thus the conception of a class of leaders, held

together by a strong bond of solidarity, which he, as an Arab, imaginesof course to be always genealogically connected. "Even if in one tribe

there are various noble families and many casabiyas (= solidarities),one is bound to be stronger than all of them together, overpowering and

obliging them to obey. In this group, all individual solidarities amalga-

mate, so that it is like a single great 'asabiya" (Rosenthal II). The

creation of power is therefore for Ibn Khaldiunpurely based on a

naturally given dynamism. In his aristocratic State opposing solida-

rities are crushed, forced to obey, and then amalgamated into a single

great solidarity. If, owing to weakening through a life of pleasureand luxuriousness the ruling casabiya group has become degenerate,the rule will pass to a stronger Casabiyagroup of the same nation, i.e.

to another clan." (Rosenthal 24).

Of legal norms, which stabilise and regulate the conditions of powerin a State, Ibn Khalduin does not say much for reasons which do

not concern us here (s. Rosenthal 60). Creation of power and changeof power are considered under a purely dynamic aspect. We cannot

deal here with the relation between right and power in Europeanhistory and the State theory, but we may perhaps all the same take

a glance at modern democracy and the dictatorial State.

Though in modem democracy, in contradistinction to the old feudal

State, the struggle for power at home is free, it has to observe certain

practical rules, whichprevents

itsbecoming dangerous.

Here too,

various solidarity groups, Parties, are struggling for power, but the

struggle is not decided by weapons and violence, but by the polls and

by a mechanically resulting majority. But here, too, Ibn Khaldun's

second phase may come about mutatis mutandis. The Party, which hast a k e n o v e r, turns autocratic and destroys the institution which

helped it to seize power. The regular control of solidarity relationsis eliminated or prevented by terroristic means from taking effect.

A sort ofcompulsory solidarity comes about, which the Centre triesto consolidate by strongly emphasising irrational values and by the

36








means mentioned above, which, though successful, impart to the whole

solidarity the peculiar character of something made up, artificially

kindled, not freely and quietly grown. Indeed, everything that is doneis supposed to be determined by the will of the nation, to speak with

Ibn Khaldiun: the rights of the casabiya community are acknow-

ledged theoretically-but the practical possibility of checking the will

of the nation, which is in fact the will of the rulers, ceases. In this

sense the French terrorists in the 1782-4 epoch already interpretedthe volonte generale.

It goes without saying that a thriving and strong State life can

develop best where the members of the State are held together by a

feeling of solidarity common to everybody, a State feeling; it can

undoubtedly only thrive if total solidarity is stronger than the indivi-

dual Party solidarities. This depends on two conditions: the first is

that the State form itself be recognised by all Parties and incorporatedin the feeling. The second is that the ruling Party or one social class,

or an economic group whether of employers or employed, put their

individual solidarity behind the common solidarity and free themselves

from the delusion that their special interests are identical with those

of the State.

Artificially created solidarity, on the other hand, may become so

strong that any difference of opinion at home will be stigmatized as

treason to the nation. For such enhanced hypersolidarity it is charac-

teristic that it has very little or no understanding at all for the dif-

ferentiation of political, to a great extent even, cultural life. That is

whywe observe a

peculiarintolerance toward and

jealousyof the

formation of any community that has not been organized by the

Centre. Such a State is unable to tolerate within its territory the

creation of independent opinions and communities, though the

richness of the nation's cultural life depends upon them. The totalita-

rian State knows but one alternative: conformity or prohibition. It

can obviously imagine solidarity only as sameness of all view, uniform-

ity of aims, with the utmost possible State-monopoly of initiative.

This attitude very often produced an intolerable dullness even insocieties and clubs of young people, no matter how patient and easily

37







persuaded thay may be. A national community cannot be created in

this way. For a genuine and prospering community can only subsist

where natural tensions and contrasts remain alive, where there is

abundance and variety of aims, but where all contrasts are bridged

by solidarity. In the keeping alive of a differentiated life-entity, which

becomes fruitful, i.e. creative of civilization, through solidary activity,

in the overcoming of inveterate contrasts, but without crushing in-

dividual existence, lies the secret of a sound organisation of State.

The latter will be a failure whether the national community dissolves

itself into an anarchicalbody

ofpolitical

and ethnicalgroups, fighting

against each other, or whether it is reduced to a dull uniformity, to

a mechanical unity, by artificial and violent means of political pro-

paganda and terroristic pressure.

21

A sort of intermediate thing between conflicts in connection with

home and foreign policy is constituted by t h e conflicts w i t h

ethnical minorities. One might think that under a wise

and moderate leadership it should be possible for various ethnical

groups to live peacefully together in a State. The ideal way of living

together would of course be for the minorities to adopt the political

feeling of the majority, and love their State in the same way as do

they. That this is possible, even where the minorities are ethnicallyand linguistically nearer to the population of a neighbouring country,is shown

bySwitzerland's

example. But,if it cannot be

done,the

ruling nation will have to put up with that cooler, positive, attitude

called loyalty.The latter relation was, as it were, established by law in the old

Islamic countries. The minorities of other religions enjoyed protectionand owned rights of a lower degree; loyalty, financial contributions,were expected from them, but they were exempted from the most

important contribution of solidarity, military service in time of

war. The substitution for the old Islamic conceptions by national andpopular ideologies has changed these relations radically.

38 -Hell;mtutitter








The setting up of a solidarity feeling between population groups

of different origin or different religion, is rendered difficult if the

individual solidarities formed by religion and historic developmentare larger in number and stronger than those demanding common

solidarity. Common country, common habitat, and common historic

destiny, play a relatively small part for those sections of the popula-tion which are very strongly divided ethnically and religiously, as in

the medieval Orient, where religion governed all customs, food and

fashion. It is in recent times that the factor of a common country has

had a stronger solidarity creating effect in some regions of the

Orient. Strongest is the differentiation in India, the country of caste

division and religious contrasts. What political difficulties have

resulted therefore for the constituting of an all-India governmentis well known.

Only too often is the majority anxious to terrorize the minority;

the former is altogether unable to imagine a unified State without

assimilating methods. That is why minorities are, if not theoret-

ically, practically put in a worse position than the majority. They are,

for instance, prevented from cultivating their own language and

from preserving their own cultural aims, to get rid of them is perhaps

what is most desired. But such measures are liable to prevent precisely

what they are meant to obtain: the realization of a genuine solidarity,

embracing both majority and minority, and it is then that the majority

will have reason to complain of the lack of loyalty on the part of the

minorities, which is, however, not surprising at all.

Wherever the elimination of contrasts seemed hopeless, differentways have been tried for the solution of the difficulties. The most

radical one is the physical extermination of the minority. This way

has been repeatedly chosen in history, quite successfully so, in fact;

for the opponent being dead, one has no longer any trouble with him.

Nobody will have a word to say for this solution. A less radical,

but still horrifying solution is that designated by the word "resettle-

ment"-the expulsion of defenceless people from their country and

their homes. The only sound solution, in our opinion, is the creationof a superethnical solidarity, such as Switzerland and other countries

39







HellzmutRitter

have managed to establish. The solidarity circles must become largerand incorporate the individual circles, then the conflicts will disappear

by themselves.

22.

We are now coming to e x t e r n a c o n f I i c t s. Political solidar-

ity of a nation is a first class source of power; for Ibn Khalditn too,

it is the indispensable source of power for success in politics and war.

Machiavelli comes to the same conclusion "untiringly repeating that

armies of mercenaries are good for nothing and that only national

armies are a useful instrument of power" (G. Ritter p. 41).Ibn Khalduinis also convinced that when the casabiya has become

absolutely ingrained in a nation, it turns aggressive by its very nature.

"When", he says, "the power over the nation has been realised throughthe Casabiya, it will naturally try to gain power over another,

distant, casabiya. When the latter proves to be a match for it and

can resist, they will become enemies and rivals and each of them

will have power over its domain and nation, as has been the case with

the tribes and nations scattered over the world. But if the casabiya

manages to defeat that other Casabiyaand to enforce its obedience,the latter will amalgamate with it and increase its power. It will then

look for an aim to develop this power and gain authority, an aim that

is higher and farther reaching than the first one" etc. (Rosenthal

ii). Power is therefore, just as for Machiavelli, a purely natural

force, a force that strives, self-impelled, to rise and spread until it

meets with effective resistance. Webelieve, however, as we have

already said, that without the conscious initiative and command from

above even the strongest solidarity is unable to start a modern war.

The wars, which Ibn Khaldfn had in mind, were of a far more pri-mitive character.

Ibn Khaldfin's theory has still another peculiarity. For it, the

internal growth of power thanks to its victory over an oppositecasabiya group, and the external one based on the defeat of an

external solidarity circle, is on principle the same thing. If we assumethis to be correct, it ensues that the friend-enemy relation with its

40








double morals is on principle equally valid in either case. Where the

purely natural development of power, the dynamic element in political

life, is alone regarded as important and decisive, the external policyis a straight continuation of the home policy and the treatment of

opponents in internal and external policy is on principle the same.

This conception has undergone a certain restriction in the theoryof the constitutional State as established in the i8th and Igth centuries,insofar as the constitutional State monopolizes the use of power al-

together, abolishes free feudal law and connects the use of power with

legal regulations to the largest possible extent. In foreign policy this

has of course been possible only in a far lesser degree than in internal

policy, for there is no supreme authority to adjust the conflicts be-

tween states and nations. All the same, there were certain internatio-

nal limitations of brute force. War was war and peace was peace. The

establishment of a double morality was solemnly proclaimed throughthe declaration of war and everybody knew what he was up to. These

rules have today (I943) almost gone to pieces., Just as in Ibn Khal-

duin's theory, the dynamic forces follow their course unrestrictedly.The old international limitations are now completely destroyed owingto the methods of warfare used by various nations.

23

As regards the question of the possibility of restoring these rules

and extending them to the abolition of free feudal law between the

nations altogether, it is in our opinion identical with the question of

thepossibility

ofsuper-national solidarity,

whichwould then haveto be protected and consolidated by supernational legal regulations.

The prerequisite of a law-creating foreign policy is the developmentof a super-national solidarity.

The obstacles for the realization of a super-State solidarity are byno means inconsiderable. The individual solidarities of the nations and

their desire for isolation are still stronger than the modest tendencies

for super-national common feelings. The giving up of the free feudal

law in favour of a central settling of all differences has for thoseconcerned the character of submission to a foreign power. The indivi-

41







4Hellmut Ritter

dual rulers owe their positions to the fact that they are at the head

of a whole orchestra of national solidarity feelings and collective

egotisms. Is it not a capitis diminutio if they can no longer decide forthemselves upon the most important questions, those of foreign policy,but must submit to the opinion of others?

The hitherto practised form of the organisation of international

relations is, moreover, little fitted to prepare such a solidarity. For

it is obvious from what has been said above that such a super-national

solidarity can have nothing to do with the spirit in which the usual

alliances of interest between States are made. These are merely the

expression of a temporary, casual constellation of interests and last no

longer than the interests themselves.

Nor have the permanent or temporary conferences and congressesof representatives of many or all countries proved to be the sources

in which genuine solidarity thrives. Each representative of a countrywent to such conferences rather with the instruction and firm in-

tention, not so much to think of the prosperity of the whole familyof nations, as to get for his country as much as possible, just as

the parties in a bad Party-State do not make a State policy, but an

egotistic party policy. Instead of helping at least to prepare true

solidarity, these conferences are rather the stage on which the repre-

sentatives of various countries are offered a wished-for opportunityof demonstrating impressively the interests and claims of their coun-

tries. This, moreover, is-as a consequence of the century-old divi-

sion of Europe into individual rival States-in line with the conception

of theskilled professional diplomat who,

inprinciple,

must not and

should not go beyond the circle of "interests" of the individual State

represented by him. Such inflexible thinking in competing national

solidarity cilrcles, however, does not in the long run work out in

favour of the individual States themselves. What is required is the

integration of the individual solidarities into a super-nationalsolidarity

rooted in the heart of man rendered possible by the will for tolerance

of other individualities, a conception embodied in the sentence of the

Arab thinker Al-Beruini: "The efforts of men in this world aredifferent and on this difference rests the civilization of this world".

42








This is the only way to free ourselves from situations which have

long become intolerable. Perhaps common opposition to the disturber

of peace and rest will then form the common front which is necessaryfor the maintenance of solidarity. Neither diplomatic skill, nor brute

force will be able to take the place of this grown solidarity. It must

rise from the ardent desire of the nations themselves, as a genuine

longing, not a phrase used to disguise or embellish interests of the

stronger and liable, sooner or later, to be unmasked.

Thus irrational solidarity has a double face. It may do good and it

may bring harm. It is a natural force of the human soul and may, like

any other natural force, wisely ruled and directed, not only bringendless blessing on the human society, but it is even indispensablefor the existence of this society. Overexcited and misguided, however,

it may cause horrible disaster and ruin, worse than that which the

unleashed forces of nature bring upon men.

Reason, that other great force given to us, can neither replace nor

create the irrational forces of the soul. Butjust

as theengineer

can

force the power of the torrent into harmless and useful courses,

reason can perhaps lead the irrational forces of solidarity and show the

course along which they may work for the good of mankind, instead

of inflicting disaster on it. But it can only be used if there is goodwill.

For scholars united by the common ideal of searching for and

establishing objective truth in every field of human knowledge,

theestablishing

ofsupernational solidarity will be easier than

for other

people, international cooperation having been acknowledged long ago

as indispensable for the progess of human knowledge. After all

the material and ideal destruction brought upon the world by the

last war, such international cooperation will be still more necessarythan it used to be in the peaceful prewar times. The solidarity of

scientists will perhaps help a little in getting out of the presentdisastrous situation which threatens the very civilization of mankind.

Let us therefore remember the old tale from "Kalila and Dimna",the Arabic translation of the Indian Mirror of Princes Pan;atantra:

43







44 !HellmutRitter, Irrational Solidarity Groups

"A flock of pigeons had fallen into the hunter's net. Each pigeon was

fluttering in the net in which it had been caught, trying to save itsown life, when the Queen, the ring-dove, spoke up: "Do not leave each

other in the lurch in your efforts to rescue yourselves! To none of youshall its own life be of greater importance than its comrade's, bu t

let us rather help one another and tear off the net

together so as to be saved by our joint effort". The parable then tells

how, by this common effort, the captured pigeons managed to free

themselves from the entanglement in the deadly net.

Bebek, 1943, with additions made in 1947.

Irrational Solidarity Groups- A Socio-Psychological Study in Connection with Ibn Khaldûn...

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