Fortnight Publications Ltd.

Irrational IdentitiesAuthor(s): Kevin RooneySource: Fortnight, No. 363 (Jul. - Aug., 1997), pp. 19-20Published by: Fortnight Publications Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25559401 .

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COVER STORY I

frontier relationship based on pragmatic considera tions of mutual benefit and not on a political agenda. "More people know in their heart that at the end of the day this is where we will be." Perhaps he is right

but he says nothing about an executive: does he envisage a power-sharing administration! If so does it make sense to build an executive on the major fault-line in Northern Ireland politics? A leap to the next stage is required: the replacement of single issue politics by normal politics, by parking the constitutional issue and reviewing it at intervals. If Ulster British are reassured that their is no threat to their British status and the Ulster Irish are guaran teed equality, without foreclosing the possibility that some form of Irish unity may evolve by agreement, is it inconceivable that the normal political process of a democratic society would replace the futile tug-of

war which passes for politics now? How could the province reach any such outcome,

since the twin demons printed out by Senator Mitchell-violence and intransigence -could wipe out the possibility of agreement, not to speak of wrecking any settlement?

It is evident that there is a huge need to intensify contact, understanding and reconciliation between the main traditions but it is also clear that a settle

ment cannot await the results. Indeed a settlement would open the way to healing and helping on a far wider scale.

While the Ulster Unionist Party's willingness to pigeon-hole the decommissioning issue is a hopeful sign, the prospects for a successful outcome to the inter-party talks are far from brilliant.

The province is well-endowed with forces of all kinds yet two additional forces must be brought to

bear on the situation: the power of ideas and the force of public opinion.

A peace process without an engine will not go far. It needs a body or bodies which is/are neutral and respected and which is/are willing to undertake or sponsor sustained work to identify the main compo nents and conditions of a feasible settlement, to feed their ideas into the political process, and to mobilise public acceptance and support. Who could take on such a role? The Churches? Both universities? The

Group of seven business and trade union organisa tions which have drawn attention to the effects of political instability on the economy and in particular on job security and prospects? Or should one look for a bodywith no consti tency and no baggage from the past, such as Democratic Dialogue?

The ultimate power is not that which comes from the barrel of a gun but from public support for well

balanced proposals leading to an agreement which is full and fair. There is no reason to doubt that the

public will respond if those who think propose a better future and those who decide come to an agreement.

Finally, a word about consent. If there are two traditions in conflict, a majority vote in favour of or against a proposed settlement is not a satisfac tory way of deciding the matter. Majorities of

Ulster British, the Ulster Irish and of the non aligned should be required. They would undoubt edly emerge to support an agreement which seemed fair and especially one which went be yond a mean-spirited low-level compromise to offer hope of a new beginning. At that point, the violent and the intransigent might come to terms with the will of the people.

Irrational identitie

The renewed optimism injected into the Irish peace process by the election results in the UK and Ireland soon gave way to dark projections in the aftermath of the IRA killings of two RUC officers in Lurgan in

June. Most of the politicians and commentators who reacted to these killings made an immediate leap to the prospect of an explosion of sectarian violence around the forthcoming 'marching season'. David Trimble, John Hume and Mo Mowlam all made reference to the prospect of a Drumcree three and the potential powder-keg on the Garvaghy Road.

It is perhaps a good time to reflect for just a moment on how a traditional Orange parade in Portadown has become the single biggestflash-point in Northern Irish politics to which all events are automatically related.

In fact the emergence of the Orange Marching season as the main source of conflict between catholics and protestants in Northern Ireland is a relatively recent development. While the Twelfth

was one of many opportunities for nationalist youths

to stone security forces, the vast majority of national ist families either ignored it or booked their holidays to coincide with it. In my view there is some evidence to suggest that the conflict around the marches is a direct product of the peace process itself and the new all-embracing emphasis on culture and identity as the key to resolving the problems of Northern Ireland.

Up until the current peace process, the dominant presentation of the Irish conflict was of a clash of competing national sovereignties--United Ireland versus United Kingdom. The irreconcilable nature of these opposing claims resulted in a war between the IRA on one side and the British state and their

Unionist allies on the other. The peace process sought to resolve this conflict

by re-posing it. The advocates of the peace process argued that the only way to achieve peace in Ireland was to get away from the 'winner takes all' mentality and replace it with a scenario in which 'accommoda tion' of both sides became the solution. The conflict

JULY/AUGUST 1997 F o R T N I G H T 19

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I COVE STORY I

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was recast as a clash of cultures and identities and the solution became a

mutual respect for those identities and a new tolerance for the 'other' commu nities' culture and traditions.

The language of the Downing Street Declaration of 1993 and the Framework Document of 1995 reflected the new commitment to replacing outright so lutions with an "accommodation of two traditions". The language of these docu

ments has provided the buzz words of the peace-process: identity, diversity, parity of esteem, pluralism, respect. Originally the preserve of nationalists like John Hume, they are now just as likely to trip off the tongues of David

Trimble, Gerry Adams and the leader ship of the Orange Order.

The widespread acceptance of the re casting of the conflict has been the

main success of the peace process. It is not hard to see the appeal to all sides. The British lose their image as the re pressive State imposing its rule in its last

colony and transform themselves into the neutral facilitator bringing the two traditions together into negotiations on an inclusive framework for peace.

The Republican movement can disguise the de feat of the IRA's war against British rule in Ireland by retrospectively reposing the armed struggle as a fight for equal rights with unionists and recognition of the nationalist tradition.

The reposing of the conflict has given rise to the explosion of the conflict resolution and community relations industry in Northern Ireland. Almost with out exception the theorists in these areas accept the root of the conflict as a cultural/religious one and

work on devising solutions which will allow each side to maintain their culture and traditions while re specting the different culture and tradition of the other community.

Yet despite the frenzied attempts at celebrating difference and respecting alternative traditions, the

reality in Northern Ireland today is a dramatic in crease in sectarianism and an all pervading sense of dread of the forthcoming celebrations of tradition. Could it be that far from reconciling the two sides, the emphasis on the 'diversity' is entrenching sectar ian divisions rather than resolving the conflict?

Progressive republicans in the past emphasised that the most damaging consequence of partition

was the creation of two artificial identities-nation alism and unionism. For them one of the main reasons for dismantling the sectarian state was to remove the basis for these divisions and allow all the people of Ireland to move forward on the basis of common goals. This aspiration has now been com pletely lost and the Republican movement, far from claiming to represent the interests of all the people of Ireland, has accepted that they are a sectional

movement representing the interests of one group the nationalist working class. While the language of cultural diversity stands in

great contrast to the confrontational language of the past, in many ways it heralds an even more depress

ing future for the people of Northern Ireland, one in which people are encouraged to stand still or even retreat into our distinct cultural pasts. Neither, as we have seen, does it herald a decline in violence.

When nationalists call for the re-routing of Or ange marches because they are an affront to nation

alist sensibilities, unionist leaders will accuse them of denying loyalists the right to celebrate their tradi tion and culture. When the RUC beat nationalist protesters as they did last year they will claim they are doing so to protect the right of one community to display their culture. All sides will use the language of the peace process to justify their polarised posi tions. The irony of the notion of diversity is that the people of Northern Ireland are one of the most homogenous communities you will find anywhere in Europe. Racially and ethnically identical, the simi larities between the youth of the Falls Road and the Shankill Road far outweigh their differences-the tragedy is that they will be so busy celebrating their diversity this summer that they are unlikely to find that out!

So Mr. Blair has laid it on the line, writes John O'FarreU. The provos have, at the time ofwriting, five weeks to call a ceasefire. Thereafter, the unionists will have six weeks to get used to the idea of sharing a plenary meeting in Stormont with Martin

McGuinness and the stoic presence of Gerry Kelly. * It is seventeen months since the talks chair George

Mitchell published his proposals for parallel decommissioning, the rejection ofwhich by the then Prime Minister John Major ended the seventeen month IRA ceasefire.

It is possible to choose any number of dates for the commencement of the 'peace process', depending upon who you credit with initially 'taking risks for peace'. Late 1993 (Downing Street Declaration), early'93 (Hume-Adams), 1990 (secret talks between British and Sinn Fein), 1985 (Anglo-Irish Agree ment), even 1981 (Bobby Sands' election). Until now, progress was measured in millimetres, and

could be knocked back yards by a single incident. The speed of Labour's Irish 'project, is compara tively breathtaking, not least with Blair's determina tion to reach a settlement by May 1998.

If the IRA go for the bait in August, most likely after the Apprentice Boys' Twelfth parade in Derry rather than Blair's preferred date, August 4th, we

will be staring at a settlement paper after a period equivalent to when Tory ministers were contemplat ing meeting Adams and Co. for the first ever time.

The negotiating parties, with the exception of the loyalists, have spent the past three decades slowly staring each other out. The new brooms from Labour plan to sweep all before them at a pace previously unthinkable. A lot of toes are going to be stepped on. Drumcree will be the first test, with both provos and loyalists marking their re spective score-cards. It's going to be a white knuckle ride.

20 F o R T N I G H T JULY/AUGUST 1997

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