i

AN ASSESSMENT OF INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS FOR

COMBATING CORRUPTION IN NIGERIAN PUBLIC SERVICE

BY

IORHEMEN IORCHIR PETER

PG/M.Sc/10/57372

BEING A MASTERS THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, FACULTY

OF SOCIAL SCIENCE, UNIVERSITY OF NIGERIA, NSUKKA, IN

PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE AWARD

OF MASTER OF SCIENCE (M.Sc) DEGREE IN PUBIC

ADMINISTRATION (HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENT)

DECEMBER, 2011.

ii

CERTIFICATION

This master’s thesis has been read and approved by the Department of

Public Administration and Local Government University of Nigeria, Nsukka:

--------------------------- -----------------------

Dr. B.A. Amujiri Date

Supervisor

--------------------------- -----------------------

External Examiner Date

--------------------------- -----------------------

Prof. Fab. O. Onah Date

Head of Department

--------------------------- -----------------------

Prof. E.O. Ezeani Date

Dean of Faculty

iii

DEDICATION

This project is dedicated to my loving mother Icher C. Iorhemen who past

away on the 30th

September, 2007, during her sojourn on this planet, she was an

embodiment of love, excellence, honesty and humility. Mummy may your gentle

soul rest in perfect peace.

iv

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

It is with immense humility that I express my gratitude to God, for all his

mercies and enabling conditions to successfully complete this programme. All

glory and honor belong to God for helping me take far reaching decision and

remaining steadfast as I work my way sometime, the hard way to achieve success.

In the process of undergoing my programme I have benefited immensely from the

wealth of experience and financial assistance of people too numerous to mention

here. However I want to place on record my profound gratitude to the following

persons.

I acknowledge appreciatively the support of my articulate supervisor Dr.

B.A. Amujiri for his intellectual leadership, kindness and firm efforts in reading

through the manuscript and offering most valuable suggestions and contribution

which have certainly improved the style and quality of this work. The intellectual

build up by the Head of Department, Public Administration and Local

Government, Prof. Fab. O. Onah and all the lecturers in the department are highly

acknowledged. In connection with my field work, I would like to register my

profound gratitude to many who furnished me with much needed information. It

will be impossible for me to mention names without producing an extremely long

list. Suffice it to say that without their cooperation, this thesis would never have

been produced in its present form.

I owe a debt of gratitude to my dear father. Mr. Iorhemen F. Iangba. I thank

you for all the love, care and resources you sowed into my life. Also my profound

thank goes to my brothers and sisters: Mrs. Member Akpam, Mr. and Mrs.

Terhemba Iorhemen, Dondu, Mrs. Nguebur Hidan, Mr. and Mrs. Dooshiman

Tsekohol, Mr. and Mrs. Iveren Dondu, Torkuma, Miss Ngofa, Kohol, Ternerge,

Tervershima, Denen and Aondongu for their moral support and encouragement. I

as well, express my indebtedness to Sesugh Jem, HRH Chief Akpam Abeke,

Uncle Akpemlaham Agba, Dr. Atah Pine, Mike Ade, Stons Tarbunde, David

Yongo, Silas Ayaka, Akaha Gbeda and Ajayi Tsokaa as well as Datsu. They

v

readily offered me invaluable assistance. In fact, the persistence encouragement

and perhaps anxiety exhibited was the necessary tonic that kept on turning me on,

even when I was at the verge of “cease fire”.

I also thank in a special way, my wonderful friends: Emmanuel Hua, Tor

Zuama, Iorwuase Ajever, Mrs. Rita Terna-Makyur, Hon Mbatseem, Barrister

Cosmas Akigh, Chuksman, all my Class mates of M.Sc. 2010/2011 and my two

room mate David Agu and Kussa Terwase for their encouragement and support.

Finally, my eternal gratitude goes to Miss. Amechi Onah who took the

pains to type this work and other relations whose names could not appear here, but

have contributed in one way or the other. God bless you all.

IORHEMEN IORCHIR PETER

OCTOBER, 2011

vi

TABLE OF CONTENT

Title Page - - - - - - - - - -i

Certification - - - - - - - - - -ii

Dedication - - - - - - - - - -iii

Acknowledgement - - - - - - - - -iv

Table of Contents - - - - - - - - -vi

List of Tables - - - - - - -- - -ix

List of Figures - - - - - - - - -x

Acronyms/Abbreviation - - - -- - - - -xi

Abstract - - - - - - - - - -xii

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the Study - - - - - - -1

1.2 Statement of the Problem - - - - - - -6

1.3 Objectives of the Study - - - - - - -8

1.4 Significance of the Study - - - - - - -8

1.5 Scope and Limitations of the Study - - - - -9

CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW AND METHODOLOGY

2.1 Literature Review - - - - - - - -10

2.1.1 Conceptual Definitions of Corruption - - - - -10

2.1.2 Types of Corruption - - - - - - -13

2.1.2.1 Political Corruption - - - - - - -13

2.1.2.2 Economic Corruption - - - - - - -15

2.1.2.3 Bureaucratic Corruption - - - - - - -17

2.1.2.4 Judicial Corruption - - - - - - - -22

2.1.2.5 Moral Corruption - - - - - - - -24

2.1.3 Courses of corruption - - - - - - -25

vii

2.1.4 Consequences of Corruption - - - - - -27

2.1.5 Control Measures of corruption - - - - -30

2.1.6 Identified gap in Literature Reviewed - - - - -31

2.2 Hypothesis of the Study - - - - - - -32

2.3 Operationalisation of Key Concepts - - - - -32

2.4 Methodology - - - - - - - - -33

2.4.1 Data Gathering Instruments. - - - - - -33

2.4.2 Validity and Reliability of the Instrument - - - -33

2.4.3 Population of Study - - - - - - -34

2.4.4 Sample of Study - - - - - - - -34

2.4.5 Sampling Procedure - - - - - - -34

2.4.6 Method of Data Analysis - - - - - - -34

2.5 Theoretical Framework - - - - - - -35

2.5.1 Public Choice Theory - - - - - - -35

2.5.2 Relevance of the Theory - - - - - - -37

CHAPTER THREE: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF BEUNE STATE

3.1 History of Benue State - - - - - - - -40

3.2 The Development Potentials of Benue State - - - -42

3.3 Administrative Structure of Benue State - - - - -43

3.4 Socio-political and Economic organization - - - -44

3.5 Cultural and Religious Life of People of Benue State - - -47

3.6 Background Information on the Benue State Civil Services - -51

3.7 Functions and Structure of Benue State Civil Service - - -52

3.8 Environmental Effects on the Benue State Civil Service - - -58

CHAPTER FOUR: DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS OF FINDING

4.1 Introduction - - - - - - - - -60

4.2 Presentation of Bio-Data of the Respondents - - - - -60

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4.3 Test of Hypothesis - - - - - - - -72

4.4 Findings/Discussion - - - - - - -74

CHAPTER FIVE: SUMMARY, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

5.1 Summary - - - - - - - - -78

5.2 Recommendations - - - - - - - -79

5.3 Conclusion - - - - - - - - -81

BIBLIOGRAPHY

APPENDIX

ix

LIST OF TABLES

Table 4.2.1 Classification of Respondents According to Sex - -60

Table 4.2.2 Age Distribution of the Respondents - - - -60

Table 4.2.3 Education Status of the Respondents - - - -61

Table 4.2.4 Respondents Categories According to Period of Service -62

Table 4.2.5 Respondents Professional Group Categorization - -62

Table 4.2.6 Perceived Corruption in Nigeria - - - - -63

Table 4.2.7 Understanding of the Word Corruption - - - -63

Table 4.2.8 What are Considered to be the Main Causes of Corruption - -64

Table 4.2.9 Perceived Presence of Institutional Mechanisms to Combating

Corruption - - - - - - - -65

Table 4.2.10 Effectiveness of Agencies Fighting Corruption - -66

Table 4.2.11 The Rate of Corruption in Public Service before Establishing

ICPC, EFCC and BPP -- - - - - -66

Table 4.2.12 Perceived Current Level of Corruption in the Public Service

with the Establishment of Anti-Corruption Agencies - -67

Table 4.2.13 Transparency International Corruption Ranking for Nigeria -68

Table 4.2.14 Level of Autonomy - - - - - -69

Table 4.2.15 Level of Control over Staff of the Various anti Corruption

Agencies - - - - - - - -70

Table 4.2.16 Rating the General Performances of the Anti corruption

Agencies - - - - - - - -71

Table 4.2.17 Ways of Improving the Performances of the Anti corruption

Agencies - - - - - - - -71

Table 4.3.1 Computation of Chi-Value (X2) - - - - -73

x

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: Organizational Chart of Benue State Government - - -50

Figure 2: Distribution of Staff by Pay Level. - - - - -54

xi

ACRONYMS/ABBREVIATION

ADC: Agricultural Development Company

AGF: Attorney General of the Federation

AUCACRO: African Union Convention Against Corruption Related

Offences.

BBL: Benue Breweries Limited

BENSESA: Benue State Environmental Sanitation Authority

BNARDA: Benue Agricultural Ruler Development Authority

BPP: Bureau of Public Procurement

BSRUDB: Benue State Rural Urban Development Board.

BERWSSA: Benue State Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Agency

CASS: Center for Advanced Social Sciences

CBCN: Catholic Bishops Conference of Nigeria

CBN: Central Bank of Nigeria

CCB: Code of Conduct Bureau

CSC: Civil Service Commission

EFCC: Economic and Financial Crime Commission

FRA: Fiscal Reasonability Act

ICPC: Independent Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences

Commission

MAMSER: Mass Mobilization for Social Justice Self-Reliance and

Economic Recovery.

SRT: State Reform Team

SSS: State Security Services.

UNCAC: United Nation Convention Against Corruption

xii

ABSTRACT

Corruption in the public service has triggers government response by setting up an

impressive array of institutions designed to curtail the malaise in the public sector.

However, these efforts have continued to fail. This thesis have taken a deep

assessment of institutional mechanisms for combating corruption in Nigerian

public service, given special attention to the Independent Corrupt Practice and

other Related Offences Commission (ICPC), the Economic and Financial Crimes

Commission (EFCC), Bureau for Public Procurement (BPP), and Code of Conduct

Bureau (CCB). The Objectives of the study is to find out the extent to which the

anti-corruption mechanisms has gone in the fight against corruption, ascertain the

efficacy or other wise of these institutional mechanisms, to identify the problems

militating against them and maker recommendation that will strengthened these

institutions. Data for the study were generated from both primary and secondary

sources. The instrument of primary data used is questionnaire while published and

unpublished text, form the basis of secondary data. Data analysis was done by

employing both qualitative and quantitative method. However, the chi-square (X2)

was used to test the hypothesis. The thesis revealed that, factors which constituted

obstacles to the various anti-corruption institutions are basically like of autonomy

and training as well as inadequate crime fighting facilities. Although the study

discovered that, the corruption fighting agencies has reduce corruption in Nigerian

public service to some extent, it went further based on these findings and

recommended among other things that, there should be explicit compulsory public

declaration of assets and liabilities of those holding statutory position in the

Nigerian Public Service; The anti corruption agencies should be given greater

operational autonomy; Some provisions of the various laws establishing these

organizations that constituted frustrators should be reviewed; Independent staffing

and continuous training; Broad range of integrated long term national and

international sustainable efforts and reforms which flow with social value re-

orientation.

1

CHAPTER ONE

1.0 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the Study

Corruption is a global malaise which has not been known to spare any

country in the world. This entail that, corruption is a common phenomenon found

not only in the developing countries and societies, but also in the so – called

advanced societies in Europe, America, Japan and Russia despite their level of

development. However, its depth and span of existence in Nigeria has created the

negative impression that it is indigenous to the nation. Corruption is a recurring

decimal in the Nigerian public service and to socio-economic and political

development of the country. Alabi and Fashagba (2010: 1) observed that, one

major challenge to Nigeria’s search for enduring socio-economic, political and

technological development as well as efficient and productive utilization of

allocated resources in the new millennium is the pervasive corrupt practices in the

polity. In a related view Ango (1986:9) stated that, “no doubt, corruption has eaten

deep into the fabric of Nigerian Society, so much so that, I believe it is at present

the greatest obstacles to national development” corruption appears to be seen in

some quarter as something worthy of accommodation. This Ogundeji (2000:7) put

across thus;

Corruption has had such a good run in our schema of things

that many compatriots are daily seeking examples to

authenticate why the madness may essentially be

accommodated as Nigeria’s peculiar cross, a defying trait of a

people.

Events in Nigeria have established without doubt massive waste and

distortions inflicted on the people and systems as a result of corruption. This is

evident by Achabe (1983:39) quoting the National Concorde and Daily Time of

Monday, May 16, 1983 that, “the Federal government is losing N50 million every

2

month as salaries to non-existent worker. In the course of one year the Nigeria

loses N600 million in this particular racket. With this huge amount of money

been drain away just for nothing, Achabe observed as at 1983 that;

With N600 million Nigeria could build more

international airport like the Murtala Mohammed

Airport in Lagos; or if we are not keen on more airports

the money could buy us three refineries, or build us dual

express motor way from Lagos to Kaduna or pay the

salary of 10,000 workers on grade level 01 for forty

years.

Appreciating the predicament the former President Obasanjo, in Shehu (2006:87)

stated that,

The impact of official corruption is so rampant and has

earned Nigeria a very bad image at home and abroad.

Besides, it has distorted and retrogressive development. Our

infrastructures – NEPA, NITEL, Roads, Railway, Education,

Housing and other social services were allowed to decay and

collapse. All these have brought the situation of chaos and

near despair…

Corruption does not operate in a vacuum but in a social context especially

in administrative sphere. Anugwom (1977), Nwachukwu (1987) and Achabe

(1983) have identified it as a cog in the wheel of the progress of the public service

in Nigeria. Indeed, in many ways it can be argued that the popular diagnosis of the

root of Nigeria’s political and under-development since independence is the fact of

pervasive corruption in public life. For example, when the Nigeria military made

its political debut by subordinating other organs of state to itself in 1966 the war

against corruption was core aspect of their raison d’etre. In his celebrated

broadcast of January 15, 1966, major Nzeogwu proclaimed inter alia;

3

The aim of the Revolutionary Council is to establish a

strong, united and prosperous nation, free from corruption

and internal… our enemies are the political profiteers, the

swindlers, the men in high and low places that seek bribe

and demand ten percent, those that seek to keep the country

divided permanently so that they can remain in office as

minister or VIP’s at least the tribalists, the nepotists, those

that make the country look big for nothing before

international circles, those that have corrupt our society and

put Nigeria calendar back by their words and deeds

(Ademoyega 1981:87).

Despite the corruption crusade of the military interventionists, they were

themselves caught in the web of corruption. Acknowledging the corrupt nature of

the military Dudley (1982:112) noted that, the effects of years of dictatorial and

corrupt governance by successive military administration are glaring manifest in

the poor state of development in all the sectors of the nation’s life especially the

level of poverty and low quality of life of its people, the oil boom, arising from the

sudden upsurge in the foreign revenue from the petroleum products exports fuelled

the growth of corruption under the various military administration. The military

has been blamed for allowing corruption to grow hydra-headed, stifling

development (Shehu 2006:87).

This situation is reflected in dysfunction of infrastructure and support

services, whereby funds available for projects are diverted to unproductive use or

embezzled. Corruption mostly occurs at the point of interface between the public

and private sectors, where there is a direct responsibility for the provision of a

desired service or the application of specific regulation or levies (Onuh, 2000:5).

In Africa corruption flourishes as luxuriantly as the bush and the weed which it so

much resemble, taking the goodness from the soil and suffocating the growth of

plants which have been carefully and expensively bred and tended. The forces

4

ranged against it are negligible (Wraith and Simpkins 1963:12). The level of

corruption which was observed by these writers about forty eight years ago is

mere chicken feed compared with corruption now prevalent in Africa in the recent

time. Corruption has grown beyond imagination and to a degree which boggles the

mind (Adebayo 2004:19). In Nigerian public service, corruption had played an

active part in stunting the growth of the nation. It is this that made the famous

novelist Chinue Achabe write in his thought provoking book, The Trouble with

Nigeria that, “corruption in Nigeria has passed the alarming and entered the fatal

stage; and Nigeria will die if we keep pretending that she is slightly indisposed.

The Transparency International Annual Corruption perception Index

(TIACPI) consistently rated Nigeria as one of the most corrupt, at one time or the

other the most corrupt nation in the world (TIACPI 2001/2002). The

acknowledgement of corruption constitutionally and judicially as one of the

foremost challenges to governance and development in Nigeria formed the making

of the “Anti-Corruption Campaign” as a fundamental policy of the former

President Olusegun Obasanjo government, that was established by the 1999

constitution (Ribadu 2006:1).

The country cannot but therefore respond to both domestic and

international pressures to confront corruption with all possible strategies available.

Although the need to provide the necessary mechanism for controlling corruption

has been recognized for a very long time, an ordinance to establish a criminal code

which made provisions against corruption by public officers was first enacted for

part of Lagos and the southern province in June 1916 (Nwakama 1986:185). The

need for anti-corruption machinery was also acknowledge fifty nine years ago,

February 26. 1952 to be specific by the motion moved in the Northern House of

Chiefs by the Emir of Gwandu;

The house agreeing that bribery and corruption are

widely prevalent in all walks of life, recommends that

Native Authorities should make efforts to trace and

5

punish offenders with strict impartiality and to educate

public opinion against bribery and corruption (Adebayo

2004:19).

Ironically, the institutional mechanism offered by constitution for fight

against corrupt practices in the country is itself not immured from the plague.

Indeed, the creation of extra-legislative institutions saddled with the tasks of

fighting corruption is itself an indictment of constitutional prescription and the

practical realities in an emerging democracy proceeded by long years of military

rule marked by massive corruption and rule with impunity. The Nigeria’s 1999

amended constitution contain several provisions geared towards good governance

and opposed to corruption. Hence, section 15 subsections 5- Political Objectives

of the Nigeria amended 1999 constitution say that “the state shall abolish all

corrupt practices and abuse of power”. Similarly, the economic resources of the

nation are expected to be exploited to promote the common good and to

decentralize wealth and the means of production in the interest of the majority.

These are supported by the enactment and judicial validation of accountability and

transparency augmented anti-corruption legislations, and the articulation and

vigorous pursuit of the anti-corruption policies by the successive administration of

May 29, 1999 to date. However, the nascent constitutional democratic government

grapples with the problems of governance and how to effectively combat and

prevent corruption, which has been ingrained in the Nigerian value system and

psyche as the “Nigerian factor” (Shehu 2006:105).

The Nigerian Public Service has inherent institutional mechanisms for

combating corruption. These include; the Civil Service Rule, Financial

Regulation/Instruction/Memoranda. The Civil Service Hierarchy, The Legislature,

The judiciary, The Public Complaint Commission, Auditor general’s Report and

Public Account Committee Inter-alia (Adamolekun 2006). However, these

conventional mechanisms have so far proven inadequate since corruption has

become systematic and endemic.

6

It is against this background that, the Federal Government of Nigeria

desirous of combating corruption and installing accountability and transparency in

the public service established an array of institutions in addition to the existing

conventional mechanisms. These include, The Independent Corrupt Practices and

Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) Act of 2000, Code of Conduct

Bureau (CCB) and its Tribunal Act of 1991 and enshrined in the amended 1999

constitution, The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) Act of

2002 and most recently The Bureau of Public Procurement (BPP) Act of 2007 to

check wide spread of corruption, gross incompetence and related vices in public

procurement and service delivery to citizens. The BPP aims to block the loopholes

inherent in the reckless and dubious process that contract awards often involve and

to ensure compliance with guidelines and procedures laid down for procurement in

capital projects and associated goods and services.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

The negative perception of Nigeria persists in spite of the several emplaced

anti-corruption and integrity promotion policies and strategies by successive

administrations. Before the advent of the present democratic dispensation in May

1999, preceding regimes had successively instituted instruments, measures and

policies designed to prevent and combat corruption in the country, notably,

Criminal Code, Penal Code (applicable in the North), Corrupt Practices Decree

1975 (which established the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau), President

Shehu Shagari’s Ethical Revolution, War Against Indiscipline of the

Buhari/Idiagbon Administration, Mass Mobilization for Social Justice Self

Reliance and Economic Recovery (MAMSER) of the Babangida Administration,

Code of Conduct Bureau and Tribunal Act (Cap 56 Law of the Federation of

Nigeria, 1990), Recovery of Public Property (Special Military Tribunal Act Cap

387 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 1990) as amended in 1991, Criminal Justice

(Miscellaneous Provisions) Decree 1996 etc (Ahmed 2007:1). These institutions

have functioned less than adequately and result is institutionalized corruption. The

7

above scenario virtually turned Nigeria into a pariah nation. In foreign countries

Nigerians were treated with suspicion and embarrassment and foreigners were

wary of making Nigerian their investment destination (Iorhemen 2008:3). It has

been observed that, “the more government devise complex and ambitious ways of

combating corruption and plans for the socio-economic and political development

of this country, the more their implementation is frustrated by evolution of ever

more effective and sophisticated method of corruption so that in the end the only

development we see is the development of corruption” (Smith 1976) in Nkom

(1976:227). Amujiri (2002:68) observed that, public accountability is never a

priority in Nigeria. In spite of the brave letters of the constitution and the

expensive noise of the anti-corruption crusade….

The return of democratic rule in Nigeria in 1999 more than ever before

aroused the citizen’s quest to combating corruption and installing accountability

and transparency. Pursuant to this, the Independent Corrupt Practices and other

Related offences Commission (ICPC), the Economic and Financial Crimes

Commission (EFCC) and Bureau of Public Procurement (BPP) were established

vide enabling acts. This is in addition to existing institutions such as the Code of

Conduct Bureau (CCB) and its tribunal. Why is it that, in spite of the

establishment of these impressive arrays of institutional mechanisms aimed at

combating corruption in the Nigerian Public Service, the vice still rife? The

rational for this study hinges on the fact that, it will contribute to strengthening

these institutional mechanisms for fighting corruption thereby, reducing the

malaise in the Nigerian Public Service. The questions that arose include:

i. Dose the established institutional mechanisms for combating corruption in

Nigeria has any effect on the level of corruption in the Nigerian public

service?

ii. How effective are these institutional mechanisms established in combating

corruption in the Nigerian Public Service?

8

iii. What are the problems associated with the effective functioning of these

institutions? And

iv. What can be done in making these institutional mechanisms more effective?

1.3 Objectives of the Study

The broad objective of this study is to critically assess the institutional

mechanisms for combating corruption in the Nigerian Public Service.

Specifically the study will:

1. To find out the extent to which the anti-corruption mechanisms has gone in

the fight against corruption in the Nigerian public service.

2. Ascertain the efficacy or other wise of these institutional mechanisms in

combating corruption in the Nigerian public service.

3. To identify the problems militating against the effective performance of

institutional mechanisms for combating corruption in the Nigerian public

service.

4. To make recommendation that will strengthened these institutional

mechanisms for combating corruption thereby, reducing the malaise in the

Nigerian public service.

1.4 Significance of the Study

The importance of this study is in two ways. In its theoretical

perspective, this research work would add to the existing literature on the issue of

corruption, it would contribute immensely to academic field of studies especially

in the area of human management. In addition, this work will be of benefit to

future scholars who would like to carry out research similar to or related to this

topic.

On the empirical perspective, policy maker will equally find the study

useful as it will enable them identifies present policy lapses with a view to fine

turning them. For the practitioners in these institutions and other administrators,

the finding of the study will provide them with more insight on the challenges of

these mechanisms with a view to re-adjusting their skills and methods of

9

operation. The acquisitive citizenry desirous of fighting corruption and seeing

transparency and accountability entrenched in the Nigerian public service will

equally find this interesting as it will provide them with a view to making

contribution, because the fight against it is a fight for all.

1.5 Scope and Limitations of the Study

The study is concerned on an assessment of institutional mechanisms for

combating corruption in Nigerian Public Service. The researcher is aware of the

fact that the Nigerian Public Service has similar feature in the Benue State Civil

Service as such the research is restricted to the Benue State Civil Service with the

time frame of 1999 to 2007. The period of democratic rule in Nigeria, and almost

all the institutions to be assessed were established within this period.

The researcher met the heads of the ant-corruption agencies in Benue State,

but they declined any form of interview, insisting that they needed clearance from

their headquarters before they could grant any interview or discuss their work.

Throughout the duration of the research, that approval never came.

Another limiting factor of the study is on the basis of sourcing materials

and information since materials in the public service are not accessible because of

the confidentiality of the information and fear of being quoted.

Irrespective of the limitation encountered, the researcher make vigorous

effort to assemble reasonable materials and information through some spirited

public servants who claimed to be contributing their quota in the fight against

corruption, because they were told about the objective of the research and what it

stand to achieve.

10

CHAPTER TWO

2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW AND METHODOLOGY

2.1 Literature Review

There abound numerous literatures on corruption especially as it affects the

socio-economic and political development of the country. The researcher is not

trying to over flog, but review literatures that are relevant to the topic under

consideration.

The concept corruption is properly analyzed, their effects, on development,

positive and negative consequences as will as control measures are also

considered. All this wraps up with a theory to explain the phenomenon of

corruption and its eventual effect on the political system.

The literature is review under the following sub-headings:

Conceptual Definitions of Corruption

Types of Corruption

Causes of Corruption

Consequences of Corruption

Control Measures

2.1.1 Conceptual Definitions of Corruption

As real and pervasive as corruption is, it defies precise definition. Scholars

and practitioners therefore advanced different definitions of the concept based on

their orientation and social milieu. Transparency International (TI) (1999: 1,

2002:6), the world most reputable non governmental anti-corruption watchdog

define “corruption as the abuse of public office for private gain”. Otite (1986: 12)

see corruption as:

The pervasion of integrity or state of affairs through bribery,

favour, or moral depravity: when at least two parties have

interacted to change the structure or process of society or the

behaviour of functionaries in order to provide dishonest,

11

unfaithful or defiled situation, then corruption has taken place. It

therefore, involves the injection of additional but improper

transaction aimed at changing the normal course of events and

altering judgments and positions of events.

The definition offered by Otite is from a sociological point of view. It is not

particular to the public sector as those of Transparency international (1999 and

2002) and the World Bank (1997).

Amujiri (2002: 69) espouses the views of Nelken and Levi (1996) in

defining corruption as a term commonly applied to self-benefiting conduct by

public officials and others who are expected to be dedicated to public service.

Werner (1983: 27) who subscribed to the views of scholars like Alam (1989),

Mauro (1995), Naim (1995) and Johnston (1996) Categorized the definition of

corruption into three groups; the first group, public office-centered definitions,

which involve deviation from legal and public duty norms for the sake of private

benefits, be it for pecuniary or state gain or influence. The second group,

according to these scholars is the market-centered definition, which view

corruption as a maximizing unit, a pecuniary gains according to the supply and

demand that exist in the market place of their official domains. The third group in

the opinion of these scholars is the public-centered definitions, which emphasize

the betrayal of public interest by preference of particular or common interest.

Corruption therefore, is a social phenomenon which manifests itself in various

human actions, such as dishonesty, wickedness, selfishness, embezzlement moral

degeneration, bribery, insatiability, covetousness, and so on. Hence Momoh (1991:

115) stated that:

A corrupt act can be characterized by immoral but non-violent

action on the stronger party (the person in a position of authority)

to accept or on the part of the weaker party (the person in want of

favour) to give extra-official gratification in cash or in kind in

order to induce wrong or right action.

12

Accordingly, Momoh (1991: 117) explained that there are three levels of

corruption, not only in the Nigerian society, but in any other society. These are the

low grade, the medium grade and the high grade levels. These three levels of

corruption correspond to the three classes in society the low class, the middle class

and the high class. However, these classifications of corruption are also reflected

in the way and manner in which people carry out their official duties.

Corruption, according to Nye (1967: 419):

Is behavior which deviates from the normal duties of a public

role because of private-regarding (family, close private clique),

pecuniary or status gains; or violates rules against the exercise or

certain types of private-regarding influence. This includes such

behavior as bribery (use of reward to pervert the judgment of a

person in position of trust); nepotism (bestowal of patronage by

reason of inscriptive relationship rather than merit); and

misappropriation (illegal appropriation of public resources for

private regarding uses).

It is a behaviour that abuse societal legal or social standards as well as

public role or recourse for private benefit (Johnston 1991) in (Alabi and Fashagba

2010:5). Corruption exist where there is a diversion of government revenues and

notional income flow in order to augment the current entitled government officials

private wealth, when the latter is not legally entitled to do so (1999: 33). It

involves giving undue favorus to other people with whom government officials

have clientele relationship. In a related definition Idris (2008:7) noted the views of

Khan (1996:14) in defining corruption as “an act which deviates from the rules of

conduct governing the action of someone in position of public authority because of

private regarding motives such as wealth …….” The African Development Bank

Group (ADB) (2006:1) defines corruption as misappropriation of public assets or

public office/trust for private gain. Goyepa (2000) in Iorhemen (2008:16)

13

Identified two variant definitions of corruption, traditional and the political

definitions.

The traditional connotations of corruption involve the giving and

taking of bribe or illegal acquisition of wealth using the resource

of a public office including the exercise of discretion. The

political definition is any decision, act or conduct that was

perverse to democratic norms and values. It also include any

decision, act or conduct that subverted the integrity of people in

authority or institution charged with promoting, defending or

sustaining the democratization process thereby undermining its

effectiveness in performing its assigned role.

However, the above definitions squared corruption on the public sectors as

if it does not take place in the privet sector. It however fits well into the public

sector which is the concern of this study. From the foregoing, corruption can be

said to be the violation of norms either through collection and or offer of bribe, use

of public office or trust for private gains and or misappropriation of public assets.

The private gains could be economic, political, administrative or social.

2.1.2 Types of Corruptions

Otite (1986: 14) identified five major types of corruption in our society

which are defined by the spheres or arena of special activities and integrated by

the general principle of corruption these includes:

2.1.2.1 Political Corruption

The two areas in which political corruption is manifested are the activities

connected with election and succession, and the manipulation of people and

institutions in order to retain power and office. Political positions are scarce and

the prices of office are high. Hence the competition for such resource position

involves every possible extralegal means-through corruption-in order to over come

obstacles and opposition. Ugwu (2002: 21) asserted that, in this classification

14

(political corruption), one is really pointing at the style of rulership or governance

in Nigeria be it military or civilian. “Power is the fundamental concept in politics

………. In politics, therefore the principle attraction is to have access to power-the

ability to make things happen” (Ngwuoke 2001: 33). The Nigeria political scene

has shifted from doing well to the benefit of the state to that of self-centeredness,

egoistic tendencies, corruption and knavery. This was what Onyenwuenyi (2001:

97) summarized in the following words.

We Nigerians have suffered greatly since independence owing to

unstable government resulting in military rule for 28 years of 39

years of independence. During those 28 years, we witnessed heart-

breaking drama like “two million men-march” in Abuja and “5

million men-march in Lagos: the annulment of a democratically

conducted Jun 12th

election, adoption of General Abacha by the

existing political parties as a sole presidential candidate,

indiscriminate arrest of citizens who express their views on the

governance of the national military leaders Succeeding each other

on a competitive selfish interest, conversion of national crude oil

as enterprises of personal levels, sack of Nigeria from

commonwealth, closure of media houses by decrees.

Lending credence to the above view-point, Achebe (1983: 1) gave a graphic

picture of the threatening quantum of corruption that had gripped the country and

the consequent waste of human and natural resources. He said that, “the trouble

with Nigeria is simply and squared the problems of endemic corruption and failure

of leadership, the unwillingness of our leadership and personal example”.

Changes of corruption by “outsider” to government may be interpreted as

mere objections to exclusion from central participation in corrupt practices. This

partly explains why the replacement of political incumbents does not necessarily

eradicate corruption (Otite 1986: 14). Charges of political corruption have been

15

prominent in the explanation of coups in various parts of the world. In agreement

Ugwu (2002: 111- 112) contended:

Nearly ten years after the first coup, the late General Mohammed

gave corruption and general economic indiscipline and social

drift as the main basis for toppling the General Yakubu Gowon’s

nine years of military government. As if to believe that the

military are sincere interventionists and moral crusaders against

corruption, in 1983, that was about eight years after General

Murtala Mohammed coup, the Buhari led coup struck, bringing

to an abrupt end the second republic led by Alhaji Shehu Shagari

Crusade against high-handedness and of course economic

uncertainty formed the basis for the General Babengidas coup

against Buhari’s regime. The General Sani Abachas in-house

coup of November 18, 1993 which took over from Chief Ernest

Shonekan came to “redeem the image of Nigeria” and “Salvage”

her from economic mismanagement.

This has been the trend in most military coups and takeover government

either from civilian regimes or even military. But Nye (1967: 5) has rightly

warned; “we must beware of basing our beliefs about the cause of coups on post-

coup rationalization and also of judging the social consequences of an act from the

motives of the individuals performing it.”

2.1.2..2 Economic Corruption

Corruption in the economic and business world is commonplace

Businessman have been known to bid for faviours to any level provided the

economic cost of such faviours does not exceed the returns and the value made

possible . Collaborating, the economic corruption, the Central Bank Annual report

published on Sunday Puch July 2.2001, State:

The fraud steers are again on the prowl. This time, they are on

targets at banks vaults leaving over I billion Naira missing.

16

The culprits are no other ten bankers and other bank

employees who use their position to manipulate customer’s

accounts, suppress clearing cheques and steal foreign

currency. They also defalcate customers, cash lodgment,

forge transfer grant unauthorized credit and dry post friction

credits using computer. The banks credit reports that 723

eases of fraud and forgeries were identified. (Essien 2001:

18).

Nigeria as a nation is no doubt blessed with a lot of human and natural

resources but a few individual in power have bluntly refused to allow the larger

populace, the electorates, the hoi-polloi, the use and benefit of the proceed of these

resources. In this regard Oday (2001: 41) wrote thus:

Economically, the situation became so bad even in the midst of

plenty that for those who could afford it, there was apparently only

exit from the pervasive destination. A country which has been

blessed with an abundance of human and natural resources capable

of making in the pride of Africa was no longer able to provide daily

bread for its citizens because all that are needed to live and survive

were corruptly concentrated in the hands of the military vampires

that were sucking the blood of the nation.

This viewpoint is true as our leaders are themselves very corrupt and

continue to brandish before the poor masses the products of their loots from nation

economy. This has encouraged the helpless citizens to perpetrate the practice in

their own small measure thereby ruining the economy of the nation. In our market

s today corruption has been sown, watered and it has germinated. Thus Okwor

(2000: 61) observed:

In our market people now mix bad palm oil with red chemical

to make it look red. They mix powdered ground pea “Okpa

with Alibo and flour with ‘alibo’. While measuring food items

17

like beans, rice, garri for instance, the so-called “clever dealers”

use the bottom of the cup while the buyer looks on or away

without seeing. The buyer get home only to discover that the

twenty cups he paid for give hem seven full cups only.

He further noted that the dangerous trend in the forgery of some trade

names on the labels and corks. They also invent names similar to the original

products. For instance we have Bournvita in place of Bournivita or Bonita in the

place of Bouinvita. The unsuspecting buyer hardly looks at the difference of one

letter in the spelling on the one label or cork (2000: 61-62). Otite (1986: 14)

concluded in this respect that. In normal operation, business and entrepreneurs

dislike obstacles of profit-making and there fore use corrupt means to pervert the

normal institutional regulation, hasten or shorten procedures, or drew attention to

their out standing application, vouchers, bills or the like.

2.1.2.3 Bureaucratic Corruption

Bureaucratic corruption involves buying favours from bureaucrats who

formulate and administer government economic and political policies. The areas

chiefly involved are the acquisition of foreign exchange, import litical, industrial

establishment avoidance of tax and the like (Otite 1986: 14). In this connection

Oluwadere (1974: 10) in Idris (2008:10) observed that, “it is true that there are

many situation in which people may press bribes on officials thus tempting them

away from the path of probity: Oluwedare argues that in some cases officials

expect to be bribed for almost everything and that worse still, they use their

enormous power of delay to force people to bribe them: such bribe and corrupt

payment according to Leff (1964:8), are not legitimized by proper government

processes. Rather, they are appropriated by the bureaucrat, not by the state, and

they involve subversion of government political and economic policies.

18

In another dimension according to Ugwu 2002: 24 is that:

Salaries are deliberately delayed and at times denied, night

allowances, hospital bills, mileage claims, approved salary

scale, leave allowances are with-held. Sometimes they are

fixed in our banks for it to yield interests to individuals.

Also commonplace in the civil service is victimization

such as punitive transfers “sitting on ones file, sex

scandal, favoruitism such as employment to a brother or

village member, peer group, classmate, society or church

members, in laws etc.

Ugwu further argued that in the civil service, workers most often have their

salaries misappropriated, pension allowance and service money such as money for

water, electricity, telephone construction and maintenance of roads are never paid

.The strength of any government and the success of its development programmes

depend largely on an effective implementation of its policies by bureaucrats. In

this case, it becomes obvious that social development involves the efficiency of

the bureaucracy and the probity of bureaucrats. Anything else is a non rational

deviation from assigned task. Leff (1964) further observed that this chain and

logic, that is Development. Bureaucracy-Efficiency-Probity is central issue in the

critique of corruption.

It has been observed that the corruption of public office has existed in

Nigeria since the establishment of modern structures of public administration in

the country by the British Colonial Administration, however, its escalation has

coincided with the expansion of administrative structures and the full development

of the public sector (Ocheje 2001:174). The administrative structures development

has been accompanied with lack of transparency and accountability arising from

an over bloated public service that is bedeviled with excessive bureaucracy, red-

tapeism and corruption. Anugwom (2002:90) who differ significantly from the

modern structure perspective postulated that, the genesis of bureaucratic

19

corruption in Nigeria may be traced to the emergence of a Nigeria state which

adopted statism strategy like most African states as development strategy.

According to him, the statism strategy was well received at the onset of

independence as it provided a means of wrestling control of the commanding

heights of the economy from the westerners. Irrespective of the origin of public

sector corruption, the public service in Nigeria has been characterized by lack of

culture of accountability and weak institutional structure; excessive centralized of

administrative power, lack of access to citizens, and gross inefficiency

(Adamolekun 2002). These characteristic foster the practice of barefaced “theft

and stealing” of public funds and properties, waste and mismanagement of

national resources and public assets. The resultant effects of which has been the

phenomenon of inflated contracts, abandoned projects, lack f public

infrastructures, poverty of the citizens and the poor standard of living (Ocheje

2001;175). Attempts at reforms of the public service have been usually

accompanied by retrenchment of workers, reduction in the number of the

ministries and parastatals and changes in policies. However, these have not been

effective in checking corruption and corrupt practices, as the reform have failed to

address the fundamental causes of corruption in the public service.

Corruption permeates all facets of government institutions and structure in

Nigeria. In the public sphere, corruption in various arms of government appears in

various shapes. In the executive branch, corruption takes the form of over

invoicing, conversion of public properties to private use, inflation of contracts,

kick back paid to monitoring officers on contract awarded, distribution or sharing

of public resources as patronage to certain individuals to secure political support

(Alabi and Fashagba 2010:10). For instance, several allegation of corruption have

been alleged and some investigated against government officers, both the elected

and appointed members of the executive arm especially since the current returned

to democracy in Nigerian political spare in 1999. This is evidenced by the alleged

involvement in corrupt practices and subsequent arraignment in court of Professor

20

Fabian Osuji, a former minister of education (2003 – 2005) under Obasanjo

administration and Professor Adenike Grange, a former minister of health (2007 –

2008). Apart from ministers, several other administrative officers including

permanent secretaries and directors have been alleged and sometimes arraigned in

courts over charges relating to corruption. The arraignment in an Abuja high court

of the permanent secretary of the ministry of power along with nine others on 13th

and 18th

of May 2009 over financial impropriety involving the sum of N5.2 billion

naira rightly justifies this (The Nation, Tuesday May 12, 2009: P 1 – 2).

In every level of executive arm of government in Nigeria, incompetent and,

in extreme cases, non-existent construction engineering companies may be

awarded contracts for the purpose of siphoning funds from the public purse. In fact

security vote was (and is) often considered as part of the personal emolument of

the chief executive of the state or local government (Alabi and Fashagba 2010:11).

In the legislative organ, even though accountability is largely expected to

be facilitated through scrutiny of administration, the legislature appeared

concerned with the material and financial benefits it could amass using its office

and power. Appreciating the inability of the legislature to ensure transparency and

accountability Alabi and Fashagba (2010:27) note that,

The legislature has exhibited incapability in ensuring transparent

and accountable government. This is demonstrated in lack of

interest to scrutinize the audited account of the federation on the

floor of the house since 1999.

By this, despite some sporadic public hearings on certain activities of

government and some of its agencies, especially between 1999 and 2010 the

legislature has been lethargic in holding government to account by scrutinizing

public spending. The legislature has been home to series of scandals bordering on

financial impropriety. The incident of scandals in the legislature has resulted in

the removal of at least three Senate Presidents and two Speakers of the House of

Representative between 1999 and 2009 (Bello Imam, 2005; Global Integrity

21

2004). The disturbing dimensions of scandals in the Nigeria National Assembly,

especially the one involving a former Senate President, Senator Adolphus Wabara

(2003 -2005), prompted the former President Olusegun Obasanjo to assert that, “it

is disheartening that the number three man in the government hierarch in the

country is involved in this sordid matter (USA/Africa Dialogue, 2005). Perhaps,

more than any other reason, the high profile scandals that a large number of

members of the assembly have been involved in, appeared to have undermined

and indeed crippled the capacity of the assembly to serve as anti-corruption agent

Illegal funding of legislative committee’s activities by government departments

and agencies was another means by which the legislators extracted money from

government ministries or agencies over which they have responsibility to

oversight. For instance, the scandal in the ministry of Health in 2008 in which

minister of Health Professor Adenike Grange and Senator Iyabo-Bello Obasanjo,

chairman, senate committee on Health among others were alleged to have shared

the unspent part of the 2007 budget. Senator Iyabo-Bello Obasanjo had pointed

out that the money was collected to fund an official trip to Ghana in April 2008

(Saturday Tribune, 24th

May 2008:39).

Between 1999 and 2010 different forms of corrupt practices involving both

principal officers and members of the two chambers have been experienced. Often

the ministries over which committees of the two houses have oversight

responsibilities are taking advantage to extort money or other material benefit

(SGF bars ministries from funding National Assembly’s activities, 2008)

(Monday, The Punch, 19 May 2008:1). In the various legislative houses, bills are

not passed on their merits. Rather what governs the passing of bills is the readiness

of the executive to grease the palms of the so called legislators. Federal and annual

budgets stay for months before they are passed by the lawmakers because of one

form of lobbying or the other (Ezeme 2002:264). This attitude has crippling effect

in the fight against corruption. consequently, rather than scrutinizing

administration to ensure prudence in the utility of appropriated resource and

22

ensuring compliance with set rules among the implementing agencies and

departments of government, legislature has, through lack of self restraint,

mortgaged its moral basis to demand transparency and accountability.

2.1.2.4 Judicial Corruption

Allegations of corruption are rife against law enforcement agencies and the

courts. According to Amujiri (2002:76) corruption is equally rampant in the

judiciary. The administrative arm of the judiciary is the most corrupt. Judicial

corruption plays on the relative position of buyers in the social structure and use of

wealth to secure police attention and bails and even to prevent the administration

of justice. A shameful revelation by Agbeje (2008:8) in Ezeme (2002:262) is that;

There have been incident of judges refusing to give expert order or

interlocutory orders in matter of grave urgency unless gratified.

Existing orders have been wantonly vacated under highly

questionable judicial authorities. Some chief judges are more pro-

executive than dispensing impartial justice.

Amujiri (2002:76) who collaborated with the above quotation stated that;

Every step in filing, processing and assessing an application or in

getting a court order executed or obtaining a copy of a ruling

involves money. A legal practitioner going to file an application in

court knows that he has to take some extra money which he knows

will be vital to lubricate and ensure that his paper receives prompt

attention.

The accusation of long-scale corruption among the electoral tribunals

adjudicating over series of electoral disputes has dented the image of the Nigeria

judiciary. Many have often doubted the objectivity and neutrality of most Nigerian

judges who are perceived as corrupt and often subvert justice (Alabi and Fashagba

2010:13). By this, court rulings are occasionally believed to go the way of highest

23

bidder. This must have prompted one of the legal luminaries, Justice Chukwudifu

Oputa to make the following declaration;

Corruption is the greatest melody to affect any court system,

for the court is our human attempts to attain justice through the

law. Justice in our courts should never become a marketable

commodity blatantly auctioned with the hammer going down to

the highest bidder. Our judges should realize that it is not for

fun that they are addressed as Honorable Justice, so, so, and so.

They should also realize that justice is an attribute of God

Himself (Ogiri 2004:14) in (Anyebe 2007:58).

The judiciary is incapable of providing fairness and justice, thereby

rendering the innocents helpless and such development is ugly for the dispensation

of justice.

Another public area of concerned which is non-governmental in nature that

has engulfed with corruption is the religion arena. Acknowledging the existence of

corruption within the religious organization, the Catholic Bishops Conference of

Nigeria (CBCN) in a communiqué issued at the end of their assembly in 2000. The

Bishop said,

We are painfully aware that corruption has eaten deep into the

ever fabric of the Nigerian society. It has become so pervasive

that many now accept it as the “Nigerian Factor” when they

mean corruption has passes for official policy in both the public

and private sector of our national life. The socio-economic and

political system itself appears to be built on corruption and

thrives in it. Even the church and other religious organization are

themselves not completely free from corruption (Ezeme

2002:266).

24

One should not be surprised about the presence of corruption in the

churches and mosques because their members are Nigerians who must behave like

Nigeria wherever they find themselves especially as many of them have been

indigenized. In fact we are at the stage where ever body is seen as corrupt (Amujiri

2002:77). This assertion is in agreement with the views of the Weekly Star of May

15, 1983, that, keeping an average Nigerian from being corrupt is like keeping a

goat from eating yam. Although the assertion was rejected by Achabe (1983:38)

stating that;

A goat needs yam because yam is food for goats. A Nigerian

does not need corruption; nether is corruption necessary

nourishment for Nigerians.

Also in disagreement with the assumption that religious members are Nigerians

and most behave like Nigerians which seems to suggest that corruption is inherent

and quite inevitable in the nature of Nigerians Achabe (1983:38) noted that;

It is totally false to suggest, as we opt to do that Nigerians are

different fundamentally from any other people in the world.

Nigerians are corrupt because the system under which they live

today makes corruption easy and profitable, they will cease to

be corrupt when corruption is made difficult and inconvenient.

If there is nothing fundamentally wrong with the nature and concept of

Nigerians, which make them corrupt or have consistent flair for corruption, then

Nigerians cannot be exceptional in the world since they are not naturally and

fundamentally different from other human beings.

2.1.2.5 Moral Corruption

The anonymity in contemporary societies, particularly in urban and

cosmopolitan centres, has worsened, or in some cases only created, conditions

which favour moral depravity. The desire for employment, the wish to show

wealth through the acquisition of women, the flamboyant demonstration of

25

individual materialistic possession in the midst of social poverty, and the

exploitation of man by man-the powerless poor by the powerful rich, etc. all

belong to the type of moral corruption. The implication of criticism here is that the

possession of wealth is right only when it is employed to serve the needs of

society and its members, and lust, incest, avarice, covetousness etc are abhorred in

society. Yet the question is; what society do we expect to produce such

“puritans”? There is so much self-interest and greed in our society that the

political rules and top bureaucrat flout public moral code, and indeed out top elite

are generally morally vulnerable.

2.1.3 Causes of Corruption

If corruption is such a part of our society and development process, we

must identify its causes. Lord Brgce (1921) quote in Nye (1967: 418) has aptly

summarized these causes as they affect countries like Nigeria. He states that

behaviour that will be considered corrupt is likely to be more prominent in less

developed countries because of a variety of conditions involved in their

underdevelopment great inequality in the distribution of wealth: political office as

the primary means of gaining access to wealth; conflict between changing moral

codes; the weakness of social and governmental enforcement mechanisms, and the

absence of a strong sense of national community.

Aboyede (1971: 4) also discussed the above cause of corruptions, submitted

that:

In own contexts, the time lay between new regulation and

enforcement, and the loopholes discovered in laws and

rules, create conditions for corrupt practices. Also where

people use their wealth to buy political power or to occupy

formal or informal positions of political infancy there is

often a desire to corruptly replenish spend wealth and to

reconvert such a political position to an economic resource.

26

He further agued that, citizens are prone to be corrupt in a system such as

ours where the fact of being wealth is acclaimed, accepted and respected, without

an examination of the means by which such wealth was acquired. Amujiri (2002:

70 - 71), listed factors responsible for ever-increasing cases of corruption in the

public service to include poor wages, quest for flamboyant life, societal influence,

and cost of living.

Equally germane to the substanace of corruption even in the developed

nations of the world is the extent of economic opportunities available to the

people. In this regards Anugwom (2002: 91) asserted that, in places where

economic opportunities are low or where there exists severe economic hardship,

corruption may crop up as a means of augmenting what is legally possible. He

further observed that, in the case of Nigeria, a combination of years of economic

headship and a limited compensation package for public officers may have

increased the pressure to indulge in corruption. In this case public office holders

and civil servants may have exploited their positions in the bid to improve their

total benefits in the face of a severely limited compensation package.

Some writers have seen corruption especially in public officers or

bureaucracies as resulting, in the case of the developing countries, from

modernization and development (Alam, 1989: 48; Baley, 1966: 19). The argument

is that the contradiction or clash between traditional values and modern norms

invariably breed corruption. Despite the modernization theory leaning of this

argument which makes it suspect, evidence would reveal that in the so-called

traditional societies, public offices were often compromised in the pursuit of

private gains. Actually, the word “awuf” has been used in capturing this form of

compromise in the pre-colonial Nigerian Society (Amadi, 1982: 6). But this

should not be interpreted as a disavowal of the likely heightening of corrupt

practices with the monetization of the economy in contemporary Nigerian society

(Anugwom 2002: 92).

27

One obvious reason according to Anugwom (2002) for escalating

bureaucratic corruption in Nigeria may be the inability of the leaders to deal with

the problem even when the perpetrators are identified. In a related view, African

Development Bank (ADB) (2006) argues, corrupt practices becomes the

exemption rather than the norm if the likelihood of being caught is high, if the

consequence once caught is predictable and severe, and if it is generally

condemned by society. The ADB summarizes the dynamics of public sector

corruption, using a simple model: C = M + D – A; when C is corruption, M is

monopoly, D is discretion and A is Accountability. That is, corruption =

Monopoly + Discretion – Accountability. Under this model, a public servant is

assumed to have monopoly power over a good or service which generates

economic rent, and has the discretion to decide who will acquire it, that is,

determining who rent is distributed, and is not accountable for his/her action. This

is typical of military regimes, that had dominated the Nigeria political scene

(Ribadu; 2006: 5) and politicians elected into political offices. This they perpetrate

with the aid of career officers (Idris 2008:8).

2.1.4 Consequences of Corruption

The effects of corruption in the Nigerian public service are diverse and

excruciating especially on the poor and the vulnerable. It affects all facets of our

national life (security health, education, economic, political etc) and as African

Diaspora Initiative (2007: 3) asserts:

In the political realm, it undermines democracy and the

legitimacy of government by subverting formal process. In so

doing, it reduces seriously the trust and confidence of people

in their institution. Corruption in election and in legislative

bodies reduces accountability and representation in policy

making. Provision of services it undermines economic

28

development in a variety of ways of creating distortions,

inefficiencies and deviating resources.

According to Caiden (1976) quoted in Amujiri (2002: 78) corruption

involves loss of moral authority, weakens efficiency of government operation,

increases opportunities for organized crime, encourages police brutality, adds to

tax payers burden, undermines political decision, lead to insufficient use of

resources and benefits the unscrupulous at the cost of the law abiding.

Collaborating Caiden (1976) position Amujiri contended that:

On its effect on public accountability, corruption weakens

accountability. It bends the wheel of administrative structure. It

makes policy makers to look timid in taking bold steps to curb

excesses of citizens. In fact, any government official who

receives financial benefit for a contract awarded by his

government would not be bold to question the contract if the

wok was not satisfactory executed.

Corrupt practices have crippled important institution like civil service of all

states in Nigeria, thereby, preventing then from promoting economic development,

and that corruption has promoted inefficiency and ineffectiveness in the civil

service in various ways by sapping legitimacy of the civil service in the eyes of the

people. The above was the observation made by the National Association of

Sociology and Anthropology at a three days conference held in Zaria 1982. In a

similar development the Center for Advanced Social Sciences (CASS) Port-

Harcourt in their seminar in 1993 noted the devastating consequences of

corruption, particularly in government. According to notation, development has

not benefited ordinary Nigerians because of corruption. Most workers are more

interested in the spoils and patronage of office then in serving the messes.

Corruption has quantifiable and unquantifiable cost in public accountability

in particular and our economy in general. For instance, the amount of money lost

to the economy through fraud, bribes and kickbacks, direct stealing, embezzlement

29

of public funds, etc in the both private and public sectors ran into billions of Naira

(Amujiri 2002: 79). In his submission;

It has been incontrovertibly established that corruption has

contributed immeasurably to the stagnant development of the

state. Several years of economic mismanagement misrule,

abuse of office; inefficient and purposeless leadership; socio-

political retrogression and instability, moral decay and betrayal

of social trust; resentment against authority and nonchalant

attitude of Nigeria public and civil servants have affected

public accountability adversely.

Although corruption is considered as the most formidable obstacle to

development there is an emerging school of though that sees corruptions as a

positive development in our body politic. Otite (1983: 11) asserted that, a corrupt

government may not necessarily impede social development. The basic notion

here is that an elaborate and inefficient bureaucracy can reduce or remove red tap

where graft and bribes are introduced to act as incentive. By this assertion,

corruption is used in cutting through red-tapism prevalent in most of our

bureaucracies and by extension bypassing cumbersome, pensively hampering,

governmental economic regulations. Besides this, Otite (1983) presented the

position of those who accept the positive side of corruption. They argue that:

• Widespread corruption could provoke resentment and promote the chances

of a revolution beneficial to society in the long run.

• Corruption and the challenge to excel others in competitive bidding and

payment of high bribes by businessmen and entrepreneurs may produce

efficiency in commodity.

• Where government is inefficient or unwise in its spending and priorities or

where it lacks the capacity to tax excesses, corrupt practices including

avoidance of tax may help accumulate capital which may be better utilized

by entrepreneur for development purposes.

30

• Where aliens are critical factors in socio-economic development, such as

the Asian minority in East African, corruption may help sustain this factor

of development.

• Corruption provides a chance for group other than political parties to

articulate their interest, maintain a channel, and get represented in the

political process.

Corruption has done a lot to sustain Nigerian civil servants. In the midst of

poor or non-payment of salaries, mounting demands from the immediate and

extended families, the only option left for a Nigerian civil servant is to engage in

corruption (Amujiri 2002: 78). To pretend that corruption does not exist only

worsens the problems of resource allocation understanding its character may lead

to better and more realistic planning. And even if corruption is regarded as a vice,

it should be noted for comparison that private vice can cause public benefit

(Aboyada 1971: 5). Corruption has probably been, on balance, a positive factor in

both Russian and American economic development. At least two very important

aspect of British and American political development, the establishment of the

cabinet system in the 18th

century and the national integration of millions of

immigrants in the 19th

century–were based in part on corruption (Nye 1967: 417).

2.1.5 Control Measures

Scholars like Ali (2007: 511-540), and Braibanti (1960: 170) as well as the

ADB (2006) suggested strategies to combating corruption. Ali (2007) suggested

strategies for compulsory public declaration of assets and liability by all class of

public servants, careful amendment of section 308 of the 1999 constitution to

remove the immunity clause, inclusion of anti-corruption clauses in all public

contract agreements, and adoption of the Chines and Saudi Arabian models for

punishment (execution) of official corruption. Braibanti (1966) suggested for the

society value reorientation, creation of alternative means of employment; sincere

political commitment; precision of investigative and sanction device, and strong

judiciary and legislature to restrain bureaucratic excess.

31

The ADB (2006) offers more encompassing strategies to combating

corruption as, sustained political will and leadership committed to fighting

corruption; strengthening of institutions, prudent financial management, such as

the Fiscal Responsibility Act (FRA) in Nigeria, public service reform; public

procurement such as BPP, independent anti-corruption agencies; legal and judicial

reform, strong legislature, vibrant civil society organization; and international

collaboration. Since corrupt money has wings not wheels as in other developing

countries, looted money easily find save heavens abroad (Vital 2000: 3). It is

worthy to note that whatever strategy is adopted as an antidote, it should target the

root causes of corruption in a particular country under study.

Adamolekun (2002: 18) define public service as the totality of the

administrative structures within which the work of government is carried out. It

refers to all organization that exist as part of government’s machinery for

implementing policies and programmes as well as for delivering services to meet

the needs of the citizens (BPS 2007: 1). What constitutes the public service of a

country is largely influenced by domestic laws, practices and convention. Section

318 of the amended 1999 constitution of Federal Republic of Nigeria provides for

the public service of the federation and for the states. The public service means

service of the government of the federation or a state in any capacity. This

encompasses the core civil services as well as elected and political appointees, the

military, police, and other security agencies, staff of the national and state

assemblies and the judiciary, educational institutional, statutory corporation, and

enterprises in which government has controlling share or interest. Combating

corruption in the Nigeria public services therefore implies fighting the vice in the

entire machinery of government of the federation.

2.1.6 Identified gap in Literature Reviewed

From the review of these available documents it becomes clear to note that,

mention was not made on the strategies and ways of strengthening the existing

institutional mechanism put in place by government for combating corruption in

32

the Nigerian public service. These institutions are very weak and they functions

less then adequately and the result is institutionalized corruption, the scenario that

virtually turned Nigeria into a pariah nation. The central thesis here is what will be

the health status of the anti-corruption mechanisms that will enable the effective

reduction of corruption in the country? These shall be the task of this study.

2.2 Hypothesis of the Study

H0: There is no significant relationship between the establishment of

institutional mechanisms for combating corruption and the rate of

corruption in Nigerian Public Service.

H1: There is a significant relationship between the establishment of institutional

mechanisms for combating corruption and the rate of corruption in Nigerian

Public Service.

2.3 Operationalisation of Key Concepts

Institutional Mechanisms: This refers to the laws enacted for the operation of

anti-corruption bodies in Nigeria.

Corruption: An act of commission or omission intended to misappropriate public

assets or office/trust for private gain or circumventing the law, rules and the

process for personal gain.

Public Service: Government (Federal, State and Local) organization with which

work of government is carried out.

Autonomy: This is he ability to act and make decision without being controlled

by any one else.

Crime: This is referring to any conduct, acts or omission prohibited by law and

backed by punishment or punitive sanctions.

Effectiveness: This is the ability to accomplish or fulfill what is intended well

with no waste of time or money.

Self interest: Personal gain to the detriment of the interest of the citizenry.

Public interest: What the majority of the citizens want need or cherish.

33

Public Accountability: This is considered as the responsibility by government

officers to the public in ensuring that not only public funds but also human

resources are used in the service of public interest with the limits of existing rules

and regulation

Punishment: This denotes any aversive stimulus which has the immediate but

temporary effect of reducing in strength (or in probability of occurrence), the

response upon which it was contingent.

Operation: This entails an organized activity that involves several people doing

different things.

2.4 Methodology

2.4.1 Data Gathering Instruments.

Data for this study were generated from primary and secondary sources.

1. Primary Data Collection: This approach of collecting data essentially used

the face-to-face interviewing technique which was conducted using a

structured questionnaire to random selected officers of the anti-corruption

mechanisms.

2. Secondary Data Collection: This approach of collecting data takes into

consideration the fact that, the research is within a time frame of 1999 to

2007 and as such the background information for the evaluation is needed.

These sources include published and unpublished materials such as text

materials in journals, magazines, textbooks and security reports.

2.4.2 Validity and Reliability of the Instrument

According to Asika (2006: 69), validity is the degree to which a measuring

instrument measures what it is designed to measure. This entails that every

measuring instrument is designed for a specific measurement.

The content validity is adopted for the purpose of this study to validate the

instrument by subjecting the questionnaires to intellectual scrutiny by the

supervisor. The supervisor vets the questions in the questionnaire objectively,

34

paying particular attention to their relevance to the subject matter and their

coverage of entire topic of study.

Reliability is defined by Asika (2006: 73) as the consistency between

independent measurements of the same phenomenon. This entails the stability,

dependability and predictability of a measuring instrument. To ensure that the

questionnaire distributed to respondents meet that critical criterion factors which

can affect reliability such as selection of subjects, interference and other

interviewers affect, closeness of subject and difficulties in understanding question

posed are clearly eliminated.

2.4.3 Population of Study

The target populations for the study are the staff of the Benue State Civil

Service totaling about seventeen thousand (17,000). We have been able to obtain

from the payroll system the information recorded in figure two (2) relating to the

distribution of about 17,000 staff (the total in the state civil service and the

parastatals) by grades.

2.4.4 Sample of Study

Five percent (5%) of the total population of seventeen thousand (17,000)

were drawn, taking eight hundred and fitly (850) as the representative sample size.

2.4.5 Sampling Procedure.

The simple random technique, were used for the selection of respondents to

be interviewed and the face to face interviewing technique was conducted using a

structured questionnaire.

2.4.6 Method of Data Analysis

Qualitative and quantitative methods of data analysis were employed.

However emphasis was placed more on the quantitative method using tables and

simple percentages as well as chi-square (x2) used to test the hypothesis of the

study.

35

2.5 Theoretical Framework

It is necessary to produce a theoretical understanding of corruption to place

the various assumptions and related causal concepts in improper perspective. It is

therefore expedient to review public choice theory.

2.5.1 Public Choice Theory

The public choice theory directed toward the study of politics based on

economic principles. The most important contribution of public choice theory is

that, it recognized that politicians and public officers are motivated by self interest.

Public choice theory variously referred to Social Choice Theory, Rational

Choice Theory and Economics of Politics has had tremendous impact on public

policy and public administration during the past three decades. Ducan Black

(1958) is often referred to as “the father of public choice theory”. Others are

Tullock Gordon (1987, 1989 and 1962) and Buchanan James (1996). However, it

was George Stigler (1971) and Sam Peltzman (1996) that developed the

application of public choice theory to government regulation while William

Niskan (1987) is generally considered as the founder of public choice literature on

Bureaucracy (Wikipedia Encyclopedia, 2008).

The central tenet of public choice is that individuals are indeed utility

maximizes, such that they will support policies that convey the greatest individual

benefit. The basic unit of discussion is the individual and that; purposive action by

an individual is the essence of social behaviour. As utility maximizes, bureaucrats

will use their power to enlarge agency budgets, giving them larger perquisites as a

complement to the static civil servant income (Hackler 2003; 1019). These

bureaucratic actions lead to resource wast and rent seeking. Johnson (1991) stated

that “the source of bureaucratic problems lies not in the bureaucrat but in the

nature of public goods and the incentives, controls and institution existing in the

bureaucracy. And while some public servants may selflessly pursue the public

good, others do so while simultaneously pursuing their careers and economic gain

(Krueger, 1974, 1993) as reiterated by Olaopa (2008: 46). This boils down to the

36

fact that, contrary to the views of Webber and Beethan (1987) that, bureaucrats are

benevolent and social guardians maximizing general welfare which is sometimes

equated with the objective of the state, the bureaucrats as utility maximize pursue

self interest in the form of over-extended government spending, rampant

clientilism and rent seeking (Tullock, 1965; Niskanem, 1971; and Krueger, 1993).

One way to organize the subject matter studies by public choice theorists

are to begin with the foundation of state itself to which the origin of

Government is fundamental. The bulk of the study has been concerned with the

fundamental problem of collectively choosing constitutional rules. The work

assumes that a group of individuals who aim to form government focuses on the

problem of hiring the agents required to carry out government function as agreed

upon by members. The questions that need to be addressed here are: how to hire

competent and trustworthy individual to carry out the business of the government

and how to set up an effective oversight and sanctions for individuals that violate

the rules.

In answering the question above, it is necessary to assess the effects of

creating different loci of power and decision making in public service,

examination of election and appointment that might be established to influence the

bahaviour of elected and appointed public servants such as the code of conduct for

public Servants; the Civil Service Rules, Financial

Regulation/instruction/Memoranda, the Independent Corrupt Practices and other

Related Offences Commission (ICPC), Economic and financial Crimes

Commission (EFCC) and Code of Conduct Bureau (CCB), Acts inter-alia in

Nigeria and to evaluate alternative constitutional and legal rights that could be

reserved for the citizens (Wikipedia Encyclopedia, 2008).

The public choice theory has been criticized on many grounds. This

includes the language of analytic tool in economic which are inadequate in a

bureaucratic situation in which complex disposition come into play. Public choice

theory also loses sight of the existence of public services ethos which embodies

37

the beliefs and norm of conduct that define the role of public servants. However,

the effectiveness of this public service ethos is another question.

2.5.2 Relevance of the Theory

Public choice from a constitutional political economy perspective questions

the out comes of the political market by examining the origins of government. The

argument is that the choice within a constitution-operational decisions such as the

size of the education or defense budget (Jackson 1988; 13). Thus, constitutional

rules are the institutions that shape a government response to society and the

efficiency of that response.

A constitution’s framework also affects the composition of government and

determines how politicians can represent and address their constituent’s concerns.

Politicians use political party platforms to appeal to voters, and individual desires

from a aggregate impact on pressure groups. Finally, within government,

politicians work for legislation that is beneficial to them. This could account be

way Nigeria politician spend so much time and money making lows that will be in

their faviour. In the eyes of public choice theory, these events do not proceed

without private interests out weighing public interests.

Closely related to the above view is that each event entails decision making

in the political market. In Nigeria, the voting rules, enforced to permit the mixture

of majority and minority preferences, create further problems and biases. For

example, government may gain greater discretionary power because of the

incentives for rational ignorance-that it is in an individuals best interest to remain

ignorant of particular issues because the cost of gaining information that exist are

unable to allow citizens to express the intensity of their preferences for public

goods.

With government as the producer of public goods and citizens as the

consumers, rational actors represent both sides of the political market. Just as for

bureaucrats, public choice holds that citizens have preferences for the provision of

public goods, demanding a specific quantity, quality, desired mix of these public

38

goods. The central problem in the political market is how citizen preferences are

realized and expressed. Public choice holds that only efficient government

institutions will enable the conveyance of this information such that government

will produce the appropriate amount and mix of public services.

The concern for efficient mechanisms leads to another prominent issue

within public choice theory-rent seeking. Within economics, a rent is the amount

paid for a resource that is fixed in supply in both the short and long term (Vanden

2000:604). Wealth is accumulated from these resources because its supply is

restricted particularly of market conditions are not competitive. Rent seeker desire

government regulation that promotes barriers to entry, and they will engage in

activities that use numerous resources inefficiently Rent seeker employ the time

and other resources of law, marketing, and financial-experts to lobby for favorable

government legislation. Public choice desires better constitutional rules and

institutions to minimize rent-seeking activity.

The large part of public choice theory examines the bureaucratic

implementation of policy within government and its agencies although public

administration and political science prescribes that bureaucrats seek the common

good or public interest as civil servants, public choice holds that bureaucrats are

rational individuals that will pursue policies that are personally and professionally

beneficial.

Public choice theory seeks to improve government decision making

through the minimization of public servants tendencies and rent seeking. Public

choice recognizes that every action has multiple costs associated with it (this

account for the high cost of running government in Nigeria as a result of

corruption), and understanding the political market consequences of the selected

instrument associated with such government action is central to making decision

about whether particular goods should be publicly provided; and if public, which

instruments best minimize the costs and externalities in the political market.

39

Although public choice is contentious to those in political science and

public administration, many recognize the importance of questioning bureaucratic

activity. Jackson (1988:20) stressed the importance of questioning “”Whose

interest are served by the policy, which interests dominate the process and why

inefficient government institutions lead to bureaucratic failures, and public choice

theory addresses these failures by proposing changes to the rules and incentive

structures in public services.

40

CHAPTER THREE

3.0 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF BEUNE STATE

3.1 History of Benue State

It is convenient to trace the history of Benue State from the political

engineering of the British colonial administration in Nigeria, especially with the

creation of the Benue province in 1926 following earlier administrative re-

organizations and restructuring in the Northern Region (Adejo, 2005:71). By 1946

Benue province consisted of the Idoma Division, Tiv Division, Wukari Division

(which has three independent areas-Kentu, Tigon and Ndora-in the mandated

territory), Nassarawa Division and Lafia Division. Makerdi town had a Native

Authority capacity. A very interesting remark was made, as indicated in the 1946.

Annual Report to the province, that the province economically had remained

prosperous and money appear to be plentiful as evidenced by the rapid tax

collection which was virtually completed by the end of the year (Mac Donald,

1946:4).

By 1959, Benue province, with an area of 19,318sq miles, had a total

population of 1,468,229 people within the Northern region (Counsel 1959:25).

The structure of the province remained the same until the military incursion into

politics in 1966. The military administration of Yakubu Gowon abolished the

regions and created twelve states on May 27, 1967. Benue province was merged

with Plateau province to become Benue-Plateau State. The aim was to correct the

structural imbalance between the sub-national groups of the country and also to

allay the minority group fear of being dominated by the major ethnic group within

the regions. But, as remarked by an analyst,

The jubilation that accompanied Benue peoples’ temporary relief

from the oppressive northern oligarchy was substituted for an

equally coordinated suppression campaign ….. Ordinarily, when

states are created it is expected that political tension will be eased

and the pace of socio-economic and political development

41

quickened. But in Benue-Plateau State the reverse was the ease,

as polecat tension and hostility not only escalated, but also led to

a deliberate policy of under developing the Benue section of the

state, openly manifested in Gonwalk’s policies (Okpaga, 2005:

149).

Further administrative and political restructuring of the Nigeria Federation

on February 3, 1976 witnessed the creation of seven more additional states with

Benue State coming into existence. The new Benue state was a fusion of the Tiv,

Idoma, Igala as well as other sub-cultural groups like Igede, Etulo, Akweya, Ufia

and Bassa. At inception, the state comprised Seven Local Government Areas of

Ankpa, Dekina, Gboko, Idah, Katsina-Ala, Makurdi and Otukpo. The creation of

Benue State was of momentous significance for the people but principally it

marked the realization of the wishes of those prominent Benue indigenes who led

the struggle for emancipation.

However, as Okpage observed, “the composition of the new state did not

augur well for cordial relationships among the people. Inter-tribal suspicions

manifested themselves in the so-called Benue Triangle; the tripartite divide of Tiv,

Idoma and Igala. This Struggle for positions and allocation in the state resulted in

frivolous and sectional pursuits” (Okpage 2005: 150). It was big relief as a new

federal structure emerged on August 27, 1991 when the Igala and Bassa areas

were excised to form part of the new Kogi State. Benue State was then left with

the two major ethnic groups of Tiv and Idoma, along with their sub-group.

Benue State today has twenty three local government areas of Agatu, Ado,

Apa, Otukpo, Ohimini Okpokwu, Ogbadibo, Oju, Obi, Gwer, Gwer West,

Konshisha, Kwande, Katsina-Ala, Logo, Gboko, Buruku, Tarka, Makurdi, Guman,

Ukum, Ushorgo and Vandeikya. The state is surrounded by seven other states of

the federation viz: Ebonyi, Enugu, Kogi, Cross River, Taraba and Nasarawa

States. Benue also has an international boundary on the eastern stretch of the state

42

along the Kwande Local Government axis with the Republic of Cameroon (Adejo

2010: 57).

3.2 The Development Potentials of Benue State

The creation of Benue State in February 1976 marked the climax of a long

struggle. By the 1991 population census, it has 498,554 households spread over a

reasonable land area and the 2006 census was 4.253,64 (2,144,043 males and

109,598 females). Average population density over sq-km is high but nearly 80%

of the people are rural-based dwellers. Majority of the population are farmers who

plant a variety of crops. Major crops include yam, cassava, corn and cereals of all

kinds, benniseed, soya-bean. Abundant plantation/orchard crops like orange,

mango, cashew, palm tree etc. Reasonable livestock population like goats, pigs,

native cow, sheep, chicken etc, dry season farming along the banks of River Benue

and its numerous tributaries and distributions (Okpaga 2005).

It is important to stress that the Benue physical environment is conducive

for all shades of agricultural activities. The soil is of over seven different types and

climate permits very luxuriant woodland vegetation. Its wet and dry climatic type

permit seasons of intense profitable agriculture and period of rest within harvest

and storage. All these have earned the state the names of Food Basket, Bread

Basket and Fertile Midland etc (Adejo 2010: 58).

However, although agriculture is the largest employer of the workforce,

less than half of the large tracts of cultivable land are actively utilized. Farmer’s

stills rely on traditional practice of cultivation (Adejo, 2010). The processing and

storage is poor as well, the low level of mechanization is prevalent.

Benue State is no less endowed with solid mineral resources. Some have

been determined to be of reasonable quantity in reservation while other requires

bold investigation. According to Adejo, these include Coal, Barite, Limestone,

Petroleum Clay etc. The resources available to the state have led to the

establishment of some factories and companies (although most are moribund or at

the level of un-completion) but quite strategic. They include Taraku Oil Mills,

43

Taraku; Agro-Millers Ltd, Makurdi; Benue Breweries Ltd, Makurdi; Benue Cattle

Ranch, Ikyogen; Agricultural Development Ltd, Makurdi; Benue Burnt Bricks

Ltd, Otukpo; Benue Rooftiles Ltd, Abinsi; Benue Cement, Gboko; Bentha

Makurdi Fruitcon Ltd, K/Aia; Fertilizer Blending Plant, Makurdi; Makurdi

International Hotel Ltd; Tomato/Mango Juice Factory, Wannune, Cassava

Processing factory, Makurdi; Benue Fruit juice company, Makurdi; Benue

Cement, Igumale etc. However, infrastructural development (water electricity,

road, housing etc) is irritatingly very low and has affected all the vital sectors of

the economy like Agriculture, Transport, Health, Commerce, Industries, Tourism

and Tele Communications.

Since the inception in 1976, Benue State has recorded tremendous growth

in the area of education Gyosugh and Amenger (2010:4) submitted that, from the

background of a few secondary schools and a tertiary institution, the state now has

over 500 secondary schools and six tertiary institutions. The tertiary institutions

include the college of Education at Katsina-Ala and Oju, the Benue State

polytechnic at Ugbokolo, College of Advanced and Professional Studies in

Makeudi, Akperan Orshi College of Agriculture in Yandave, the School of Health

Technology at Agasha and the schools of Nursing and Midwifery in Markudi, the

Benue State University. The Federal Government also established one University

and three Secondary institutions in the state namely: Federal Government Girls

College Gboko, Federal Government College Vandeikya, Otobi and the University

of Agriculture Makurdi, the immense contribution made in the state by Christian

Missions (University of Mkar), Development Association and Individuals are

widely acknowledged.

3.3 Administrative Structure of Benue State

The State administration is made up of the Executive, Legislative and

Judiciary. The executive arm of government comprises the Governor, Deputy

Governor, the Secretary to the Government, the Head of service and

Commissioners. The legislature, in its composition has the Speaker of the House,

44

Deputy Speaker, Majority Leader, Minority Leader, Majority Whip, Minority

Whip, the Clerk of the House and Clerk of the arms.

The clerks of the arms are responsible for taking minutes of the standing

committees of the House. Lastly, are the rest of the members of the State

Assembly, Benue state has twenty nine members in the House of Assembly. The

Judiciary is the system of courts of the judges collectively; the State judiciary is

made up of the Chief Judge, High Court Judges, the Registrar of the High Court

and Deputy Registrar, the Directors, the Judges of the customary Courts and their

Registrars.

The indigenous administrative structures and institutions include the Tiv

Traditional Council, Idoman Traditional Council and religious organization. The

Tiv Traditional Council is headed by a first class chief, the Tor Tiv, who is

advised by a council of elders known as Jirtamen. Under the Tor Tiv are the

second class chiefs called “Ter” whose domain is Local Government Area. The

third class chiefs, called Tyoor, take charge of the districts. Below these are the

kindred heads called ortaregh who are in charge of kindred’s. Last along the line

are the Tax collectors known as Torkpande. http.//www.onlinenigeria.com/links/

benweadv.asp?blurb2011.

3.4 Socio-Economic and Political Organization

If we take as characteristic of a state such features as territorial sovereignty

and a central government enjoying the monopoly of the use of legitimate force, the

people of what to day constituted Benue state which dominated by two tribes (Tiv

and Idoma) is an example of a stateless society, to use of term of (Fortes and

Pritchard quoted in Anifowose 1982: 75). In Benue, there was no central authority

or a common chief (The Post of Tor Tiv and Och’ Idoma, king or chief of the Tiv

and Idoma, is an artificial creation which came into existence in 1946). There was

no person traditionally comparable to the hamlet head (Dagech) in the House-

Fulan, emirates. The basic organization was in terms of a lineage traced

patrilineally from any one individual to the original Tiv or Idoma. The authority of

45

a patrilineal individual was limited to his lineage segment, the elder of the segment

having authority within, but not beyond it.

Urbanization was an alien feature of the Benue people pattern of social

organization, they are essentially a rural people who do not normally live in towns

but in tiny compounds varying from ten to thirty persons in size and scattered

throughout the farmland. To day, there are only five towns; these include Gboko,

Makurdi, Katsina-ala, Otukpo, Oju and Vandeikya. The people’s great respect to

age and the authority of elders is therefore maintained. The compound head is

usually the oldest person in the compound. His authority rested on his personality,

ability and powers of persuasion. The autocratic exercise of authority runs counter

to the people egalitarianism and to their republican frame of mind. In an extreme

situation, autocratic action by an elder might lead to the beak-up of the compound

especially among the Tiv people, with the offending elder being left to sit alone.

All the agnatic descendants of a single ancestor with their compounds (of

varying size) and farms form a territorial bloc. Authority within such a block rests

with the council at elders of the compounds. Meetings of the elders were

summoned to discuss matters affecting the kindred’s as a whole-war, territorial

disputes and exchange marriages. In these meeting, agreements were often reached

by consensus and the council was powerless to impose its will upon individual

compounds (Laura and Bohanna in Anifowose 1982). The heads of the

compounds did not sit in the council of elders as executive officials, but simply as

spokesmen. As Bohanna notes, “whatever their prestige, they are granted only

influences and not, authority”. Thus, traditionally among the Tiv and Idoma form

the two blocs in Benue, chieftaincy as we know it in Yoruba and Hausa lands did

not develop. In Akiga’s words in Abraham (1940:13) “the conception of executive

chieftainship is foreign to the Tiv. One can refer legitimately to a leader but hardly

ever to a chief”.

Leadership is not inherited, offering a sharp contrast to Yoruba and House-

Fulani, where authority passes from father to son. Any form of social and political

46

stratification in terms of birth, status, occupational differentiation and ethnic

identity is therefore foreign to the people. Leadership is not a function of certain

socially recognized, predetermined variables, but of individual merit and ability

plus knowledge of ritual processes. In short as Anifowose (I982: 76) rightly noted

“the conception of office, in Max Weber’s usage of the term and as known in the

centralized Hausa-Fulani, emirates, is unknown in Benue Society. However,

individual authority among the people is in most cases confined to specific

spheres. For example, in moments of crisis, a skillful and brave fighter becomes

the leader of his people on the battlefield. In this capacity, such men are called

“leader in war”. The head of the family was its magico-religious head and his

activities were not political. The elders as well as all other types of leaders, held

office by the grace of the people and hence their behavior was strictly subject to

the control of the people.

However, while British administration noted the decentralized nature of the

people of Benue political structure, they did not for a long time understand the

Benue social structure. They failed to appreciate that the Tiv and Idoma had no

chieftaincy system whereby an individual was recognized as chief and exercised

power legitimated by his office. Colonial Government which was undemocratic in

its essential aspects was imposed on the people. But to attempt to impose the

norms and rules of an alien institution on a society with a different social structure

and culture was to create the conditions for stress, violence and corruption

(Anifowose 1970:4). This attempt added enormously to the problem of occupation

and administering the people.

The economic development of the Benue people cannot be overstressed.

More than eighty percent of the people are farmers. They cultivate mainly

subsistence crops and some cash crops-Benniseed and Soybeans. In the old

Northern Nigeria, Benue province was the largest producer of those crops and the

Tiv in particular formed the largest single producers in the province (Paul and

Bohanna 1968). The contribution of the Benue people to the revenue of the

47

Northern Region through the sales from Soybeans and Benniseed was therefore

substantial. Benue state contribution to the food needs of Nigeria bestows on it the

status of the Food Basket of Nigeria However, industrially, the province remains

undeveloped. There was only one industry-the Boat Building Yard at Makurdi

which could provide jobs to only sixty people (Anifowose 1982).

In realization of the need to boost agricultural productivity and add value to

farmers produce as well as the economy in Benue State, the Government

established several agro-industries between 1976 and 1990. The companies are:

The Agricultural Development Company (ADC), Benue Breweries Limited

(BBL), Benue Cattle Ranch, Ikyogen, Taraku Mills Limited, Agro Millers

Limited, The Agro Service Centres, Benue Agricultural Ruler Development

Authority (BNARDA) (Uza 2010).All these are channel towards economic

enhancement.

3.5 Culture and Religious Life of People of Benue state

Benue state possesses a rich and diverse cultural heritage which finds

expression in colorful cloths, exotic masquerades, supplicated music and dances.

Traditional dances from Benue State have won acclaim at national and

international cultural festivals. According to Okpaga (2005), these dances include

Ingyough, Ange, Anchanakupa and Swange among the Tiv, and Anuwowowo and

Odabaru among the Idoma. He posits that the Tiv kwagh-hir theatre provides

memorable entertainment in its dramatization of Tiv folklore and social

commentary.

Marriage, funerals and other rites of passage provide occasion for rich

displays of the people’s cultural heritage.

Fishing festivals and communal hunting expeditions are colourful and

memorable social events among various communities. The Igede Agba (a new

yam festival) and the Ujo festival are the most important social occasions among

the Igede and Igumale/Agia people respectively.

48

The first organized state-wide kwagh-hir competition festival dates back as

far as December 1981 and was initiated by the then chairman of the Benue State

Council for Arts and culture, Dr. Iyoruese Hagher, a university professor

(www.benuestate.gov.ng 2011)

Among the Tiv speaking people of Benue state of Nigeria the Word

“kwagh-hir” literally means the folktale or simply something magical

(www.benuestate.gov.ng 2011). It is a unique form of theatre in the generic

concept of folktales told in traditional societies all over the world. Folktales are

told in virtually all societies all over the world with trickster characters like the

rabbit, or the tortoise or the cat dominating their plots and playing unassailable

roles. The objectives of these folktales and stories are not only to entertain young

children at bedtime but to also teach some morals on contemporary issues. The

kwagh-hir theatre is therefore an enactment of the Tiv folktales. Since the Tiv

people are good hunters, their stories and imaginations are full of bush animals

(Nyam). Some of the episodes of the kwagh-hir feature highly imaginative forms

of wild beasts that dance to the melodious tunes of the humans. Tiv folktales are

not only told about animals, but spirits (Azov) and puppets (Even) as well.

Spirits in the world-view of African societies are a reality. Benue people

like other Africans believed in the existence of the spiritual world of various

people made by the Almighty God, lesser gods, good spirits, evil spirits and

ancestors. In fact, human beings who live virtuous lives and die at a ripe old age

transform into the state of ancestors who must be appeased anytime a social

occasion is to start. In the imagination of the Tiv kwagh-hir theatre, spirits

manifest in many fantastic forms performing various activities as are carried

among human beings.

What perhaps distinguishes the kwagh- hir theatre from any other theatre in

the world is its composite nature bringing together the role of carvers, drummers,

singers, masquerades dancers, manipulators and actors. It features a rich repertoire

49

of marionettes performing various human activities with a view to making

comment or teaching morals in the Tiv society.

In essence, the kwagh-hir theatre is a unique fusion of the human world, the

spiritual world, the animal world and the world of fantasy. All these characters

share common music and instrumentation, common beliefs, common world view

and common virtues. Although the kwagh-hir performance may not have a single

plot as in formal drama, each enactment has its own characters, action and

message existing independently.

The socio-religious festivals of the state are equally famous. The Alekwu

ancestral festival of the Idoma for instance, is an occasion when, it is popularly

believed the ancestors emerge from the spirit world to reestablish contact with the

living in forms of masquerades. Although, the Benue population is largely made

up of christians and traditional religious worshippers. Muslims constitute an

insignificant number, scattered only in a few ‘colonies’ in the big towns of

Makurdi, Otukpo, Gboko and Katshina-Ala.

50

51

3.6 Background Information on the Benue State Civil Services

Commentaries on the performances of the civil services, by both its

apologists and critics alike, rarely make reference to the historical background of

the administrative machinery, as it sheds some light on the various aspects of it

present state of being. Yet, on examination, it becomes clear that the civil service

as it is today. In spite of the various reforms during the last four and a half

decades, still retains many of the structural and operational patterns inherited from

the colonial administration.

Although the scope of responsibilities of the colonial civil service and

consequently its size were much more limited than what we have today in Benue

State today, the civil service was and still is the principle employer of labour in the

state. The structure was patterned after the British model characterized as a

basically class and closed career services; and its functions, limited to “public

management” i.e maintaining law and order and collecting revenue for

Government. Thus, in terms of scale or size, internal structure as well as the

burden of economic and social services it is expected to carry, the civil service in

the immediate post-independence era, was a much simpler system of organization

than it is at present. In line with Armstrong’s (1970.1) observation, the civil

services, like any social institution responds to changing times and changing

needs, “not only the manifest changes following from a change of government but

also the longer-terms, less immediately obvious, changes arising from

developments in society as a whole and its institution both public and privet”.

A number of factors must have brought about the relatively new forms of

responsibility, which in turn must have necessitated new or expanded structures

and new or modified approaches or processes in the administration of government

policies and programmes in Benue state.

Perhaps, the most obvious factors was the attainment of single state in

1976, accompanied inexorably by rising expectations for Government to embark

on state policies on education, health, housing, infrastructural development,

52

employment and a lot of other problem areas. Government ability to respond to

these new demands were made possible by the creation of new ministries and

extra-ministerial agencies old ones were expanded and new civil service systems

were established for newly created local government areas in the state.

The Benue State Civil Service is made up of thirteen (13) ministries and

prostatals established in the following regulatory services and development areas;

regulatory service, personnel administration, administration of justice, policy staff

services, research and development, administration of social services,

development agencies and administration of economic services (Pine 2008). The

modern civil service in a developing society has accepted responsibility, as the

custodian of deferent kind of knowledge, expertise. Skills and technologies needed

in policy counseling and in executing policies and programmes of government.

The growth of government and the public sector in Benue State during the

last decades or so according to Abdulsalami (1991:4), has been accompanied by

corresponding changes in the perception of the civil service and a demand for

change in the structure, method of operation as well as the attitude of the state civil

service.

3.7 Function and Structure of Benue State Civil Service

The civil service has become part and parcel of modern government. Its

function are numerous and varied. The Benue State civil servant collect facts and

figures, undertake research, advise the commissioner who is a novice to his new

appointment, and make plans to satisfy the needs and requirements of the people

.what the civil service really does according to Anyebe (2007) is to maintain the

government as a going concern it oils the machinery of politics by relating it to

detached, disinterested and practicable experience. With the increasing activities

of the state the elected executives are no more in a position to handle effectively

the various aspects of public affairs (Eghe 2002) .They depend greatly upon the

information analysis and judgment of the civil servants. The civil service

53

constitutes the machinery through which the Benue State government realizes its

objectives or fulfils its obligations towards its citizens.

The function of the Benue civil servants especially the higher ones is no

longer restricted to the giving of policy advice to the people above them, more and

more, they are assuming the managerial role of running effectively the

administrative machinery under them (Ato, 2008). Benue administrator like their

counterpart in other state are no longer anonymous this is because they also

participates in the policy making process. In agreement with this view Eghe (2002:

259) postulate that, today, the civil servant plays a crucial role of canvassing

support for a government policies and programmes. He further stated that, the civil

servant has to seek public participation in the implementation of such policies and

progremmes.

The structure of Benue State civil service is organized in line with the 1974

recommendations of the Udoji Commission the unified grading system in which

all the jobs or position in the service were graded from levels 01-17, grade level 01

being the lowest while grade level 17 represents the highest position in the Civil

service (Civil Service Report 2008). With the development, an employee can join

the service at level 01 and climbs upwards to his ability before retirement. In spite

of this, five main classes of civil servants which existed prior to the Udoji

commission still exist today in Benue State, though not officially. These include

the administration class, the professional class, the executive class, the clerical

class, and the manipulative class.

As a matter of fact, the organizational structure of the Benue state Civil

Service reflects its bureaucratic nature. It is highly hierarchical, having no fewer

than sixteen (16) level or grades. It formally organized around thirteen (13) line

ministries which are subdivided into departments, paratatals boards and agencies.

No organizational chart of the service is currently available, but the structure is

illustrated graphically in the State Reform Team (SRT) document (Benue Profile

and Institutional Assessment 2002). As is customary in this type of rather rigid

54

structure, there are few mechanisms for coordination across the hierarchy (merrick

and Kembe 2002)

The Civil Service Commission (CSC) is responsible for recruitment and

posting of staff in the grade level seven (7) and above, with the exception of the

appointment of permanent secretaries which is done by the state Governor.

Authority to appoint staff up to grade level six (6) is delegated to ministries (Bual

1999).

Figure 2: Distribution of Staff by Grade Level

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

3000

3500

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15

Grade Level

Nu

mb

er o

f S

taff

Source: SRT: Benue Profile and Institutional Assessment (2002)

The establishment of Ministries, parastatals and agencies by government is

broadly in line with the classical organization theory which explains that

administrative organization are set up according to purposes, according to

“function”, or according to “process”. Accordingly the scope of activities and the

number of different agencies established at any time depends on the powers and

responsibilities of Government as defined by the constitution and on the size, of

resources available to government at each level (Abdulsalmi 1991). The Benue

55

State civil service is structured in to thirteen (13) ministries and office of head of

service under the following names;

Ministry of commerce industry and Tourism:- The ministry is responsible

for formulation and implementation of policies on commercial industrial and

tourism developments; Advancing Government on commercial, industrial, and

Tourism ventures. It is the cabinet responsibilities of over 14 Government owned

companies and prostratels. The ministry is currently structured into four major

departments namely: administration and finance, commerce, industries and

tourism.

Ministry of Agriculture and National Resources:- This ministry is saddled

with the responsibility of formulating virile policies/programmes and to monitor

the implementation of the following policy objective, Attainment of Self-

sufficiency in the basic food products for enhanced food security. Increase

production of agricultural raw materials to meet the growing demand in the agro-

allied industries. Modernization of agricultural productions processing, storage

and distribution through the infusion of improved technological packages and

management so that agriculture can be more responsive to the demands of other

sectors of the economy among others. The ministry is made up of six directorates,

two parastatals, one tertiary institution and an outfit for accelerated food

production.

Ministry of Education:- The ministry aims at providing adequate qualitative

education on cooperative basis between teachers, parents, communities, voluntary

agencies and corporate bodies. The ministry has six functional department’s one

state university and four tertiary institutions.

Ministry of Finance:- The functions of the ministry touch on the activities

of all other government establishments and some other non-governmental

institutions within and outside the state. Such statutory functions and

responsibilities include the formulation of major financial policies for the state

Government; Advising Government on Financial matters including investment,

56

Reports Grants, Loans and the disposing of government stores and unserviceable

vehicles; Entering into financial relationship with other government among others.

The ministry of finance comprises of three main departments and has cabinet

responsibilities over the office of the Accountant General and Board of Internal

Revenue.

Ministry of Health:- The ministry saddle with responsibilities of over seem

health affairs of the state. The ministry is structured into seven departments.

Administration and Supply, Finance and Accounts, Health Planning and Research,

Pharmaceutical Services, Nursing Services, Clinical Services and Public Health.

The ministry also has Hospital Management Board as its parastatal responsible for

the day to day running of government hospitals.

Ministry of Information and Culture:- The ministry is organized in four

main departments and deals essentially with policy matters of its mandate. The

ministry has six parestatals and a statutory Government department. The six

parastatals under the ministry and superintended by it are: Radio Benue; Benue

Printing and Publishing Corporations; Benue State council for Arts and culture;

Benue State library Board; Government Printing Department and Benue State

Television Corporation.

Ministry of Justice:- The ministry is essentially a professional and service-

oriented ministry established to render legal service to the government of Benue

state and all its agencies. The ministry of justices is structured into the following

department directorates, of public prosecution, civil litigation, legal drafting and

advisory services, citizen rights protection and administration as well as finance.

The ministry has area chambers in some local government area of the state. It also

runs a marriage Registry.

Ministry of Lands and Surveys:- The ministry is comprised of three

technical departments; Town planning, lands and land surveys, with a support

department of administration and finance.

57

Ministry of Rural Development and Cooperatives:- The ministry for Rural

development and cooperatives was created with the primary mandate to initiate,

implement, manage and sustain development programmes amongst rural

communities especially in the key areas of infrastructure, economic empowerment

and human capacity building. The ministry has the responsibility of coordinating

and monitoring the activities of other organizations and agencies involved in the

implementation of rural development activities, as well as mobilizing additional

resources for rural development in the state. It have established a ministerial

structure with four Department and two programme support units.

Ministry of Water Resources and Environment: The ministry has as its

primary objective, the provision of potable water to the growing population of

Benue State. The ministry also has the mandate to address more adequately, the

ecological and environmental challenges of the states. The ministry has five

department as well as five parestatals. The parastatals are Benue State Water

Board (BSWB), Benue State Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Agency

(BERWASSAL, Benue State Urban Development Board (BSUDB), Benue State

Environmental Sanitation Authority (BENSESA) and Local Empowerment and

Environmental Management Programme (LEEMP).

Ministry of Women Affairs and Social Development:- The ministry is an

offshoot of the defunct Benue State Commission for Women became a ministry in

1997 following Federal Government directives that all commission for women

Affairs be up-graded to the status of a ministry. The ministry has four departments

made up of one general service department and three operational professional

departments.

Ministry of Works, Housing and Transport:- The Benue State ministry of

Works, Housing and Transport has six (6) Directorates each headed by a Director.

The Directorates are civil engineering directorate, public building and housing

directorate, mechanical engineering directorate, Administration and supplies

directorate and finance and accounts directorate. The ministry also oversees the

58

activities of two parastatals each headed by a General Manager. These parastatals

are: Ben house Building society and Benue Links Company.

Ministry of Youth and Sports: The ministry of youth and sports which is a

vehicle for physical enhancement, promotion of National unity and cohesion as

well as an instrument for international diplomacy and youth development is

structured into three main departments which include administration and finance,

youth development and sports development department respectively.

The office of Head of Service is made up of five Bureau, each is headed by

a permanent secretary .these bureau include Administration, service welfare,

Establishment and management services, manpower Development and Training as

well as pensions.

All the ministries are headed by commissioners who are the Chief

Executive Officers are overseeing the affairs of the ministries while the permanent

secretary is the chief administrative officer of the ministry and the accounting

officer and the departments are overseeing by directors.

3.8 Environment Effects on the Benue State Civil Service

The historical, geographical, political and socio-economic factors, usually

referred to by social scientists as ecology, have such inference on the structure and

functions of the Benue Civil service. Although Udoji has identified the

universality of the problem, there is no doubt that it differs from one society to

another in content and magnitude (Udoji 1974). The sociological factors, for

example, would be less severe in homogenous than in plural societies, among

which Benue is one. The Benue Public Service still being characterized by family,

local, and ethnic loyalties which compete with and often take precedence over

loyalties to state, coupled with the problem of widespread corruption.

To curb these problems, there is need to have a public service code of

Ethics and a new style of public service. The code of Ethics should be geared

towards eliminating, or at least, combing the problems of corruption and

instituting a sense of state consciousness while the new style public service will be

59

geared towards results oriented management to generate and maintain efficiency in

the public service. Toward this end while the institution of ombudsman caters for

the issue of maladministration, other institutional machineries need to be establish

or strengthened to cover the issue of corruption in the Nigerian society in general

and Benue Public Service in particular. Such machineries include Economic and

Financial Crime Commission (EFCC), the Independent Corrupt Practices and

other Related Offences Commission (ICPC); the Code of Conduct Bureau (CCB)

and its Tribunal and Bureau of Public Procurement (BPP).

60

CHAPTER FOUR

DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS

4.1 Introduction

This chapter deals with the presentation, interpretation and analysis of

respondents of the respondent studied. This provides the analysis of the data

collected.

Eight hundred and fifty (850) questionnaires which are five percent (5%) of

the total population of seventeen thousand (17,000) are administered. In all, eight

hundred and ten (810) questionnaires were returned, giving ninety five percent

(95%) returns. It is on these returns that the analysis of the data is based.

4.2 Presentation of Bio Data of the Respondents

Table 4.2.1: Classification of Respondents According to sex

Sex Frequency Percentage

Male 520 64%

Female 290 36%

Total 810 100%

Source: Field Survey 2010

As contained in Table one above, five hundred and twenty (520)

respondents, representing sixty four percent (64%) were male while two hundred

and ninety (290) respondents, representing sixty four percent (34%) were females.

Table 4.2.2: Age Distribution of the Respondents

Age Frequency Percentage

20 – 35 185 23%

36 – 45 343 42%

46 and Above 282 35%

Total 810 100%

Source: Field survey

61

Table two above gives us the classification of respondents according to age.

From the table respondents under 20 – 35 years constituted one hundred and

eighty five (185) representing twenty three percent (23%), while those whose ages

falls between 36 – 45 were three hundred and forty three (343) representing forty

two percent (42%). Those aged 46 and above were two hundred and eight two

(282) respondents, representing thirty five percent (35%).

Table 4.2.3: Educational Status of the Respondents

Level of Education Frequency Percentage

WAEC/NECO (SSCE) 109 13%

OND/NCE 150 19%

HND/B.Sc 456 56%

M.Sc/Ph.D 95 12%

Total 810 100%

Source: Field Survey

Table three shows the level of education acquired by the respondents. It

revealed that one hundred and nine (109) respondents, representing thirteen

percent (13%) acquired WAEC/NECO (SSCE) while one hundred and fifty (150),

and four hundred and fifty six (456) respondents which constituted nineteen (19)

and fifty six (56%) acquired OND/NCE and HND/B.Sc respectively. The

remaining ninety five (95) respondents that constituted twelve percent (12%)

obtained M.Sc/Ph.D.

62

Table 4.2.4: Respondents Categories According to Periods of Service

Period Frequency Percentage

25 years and above 81 10%

20-below 25 years 121 15%

15-below 20 years 89 11%

10-below 15 years 81 10%

5 – below 10 years 193 24%

Below 5 years 245 30%

Total 810 100%

Source: Field survey 2011

From table four above, it can be deduced that, one hundred and eight (108)

respondents, representing fifty four percent (54%) are civil servants whose periods

of experience in the public service range from below-5 years. The rest respondents

totaling ninety two (92) representing forty six percent (46%) are civil servants

whose experience is above 10 years.

Table 4.2.5: Respondents Professional Group Categorization

Professional Frequency Percentage Professional Frequen

cy

Percentage

Admin officer 161 20% Doctor 65 8%

Executive officer 160 20% Nurse 57 7%

Clerical officer 61 7.5% Typist 16 2%

Medical officer 41 5% Driver 13 1.5%

Planning officer 17 2% Messenger 8 1%

Teacher 81 10% Information officer 20 2.5%

Finance clerk 21 2.5% Lab Attendant 56 7%

Statistician 17 2% Accountants 8 2%

Total 810 100%

Source: Field survey 2011.

63

Table five above, gives the categorization of respondents according to

professional groups. It clearly shows that the study reported in this research

indicated the views of respondents with different professional groups as

represented in the sample unit.

Section B

Table 4.2.6: Perceived Corruption in Nigeria

Response Grading Frequency Percentage

Yes 560 69%

No 250 31%

Total 810 100%

Source: Survey 2011

Respondents were to ascertain the presence of corruption in the country.

Their responses as presented on the table above clearly shows that majority of the

respondents totaling five hundred and sixty (560) representing sixty nine percent

(69%) are of the view that there is corruption in Nigeria, while the remaining two

hundred and fifty (250) respondents, representing only thirty one percent (31%)

are in disagreement with the majorities’ opinion.

Table 4.2.7: Understanding of the word Corruption

Response Grading Frequency Percentage

Bribing, which means illegal giving out and taking of money 336 41%

stealing/embezzlement of public funds 127 17%

Misappropriation of fund 65 8%

Immoral act/indiscipline 76 9.5%

Inability of a person to perform their job or duty justly 67 8%

Cheating people 36 4%

Disobeying rules and constitution 62 8%

Taking things that do not belong to you 40 5%

Total 810 100

Source: Field survey 2011

64

Respondents where asked to state what they understand by the word

corruption. About three hundred and thirty six (136) respondents, representing

forty one percent (41%) described corruption as bribery, while one hundred and

twenty seven (127) respondents, representing seventeen percent (17%) described

corruption as stealing and embezzlement, sixty five (65) respondents, representing

eight percent (8%) described corruption as misappropriation of funds, while

seventy six (76) respondents, representing nine percent (9%) described corruption

as immoral act and indiscipline, inability of parsons to perform their duty justly is

the description of corruption by sixty seven (67) respondents, representing eight

percent (8%), while thirty six (36) respondents, representing four percent (4%)

described corruption as cheating people. The remaining sixty two (62) respondents

representing eight percent (8%) and forty (40) respondents, representing five

percent (5%) described corruption as disobeying constitution and taking things

that do not belong to you respectively as presented on the table above:

Table 4.2.8: What are considered to be the main causes of corruption?

Response Grading Frequency Percentage

Poverty/hunger 360 45%

Greed/selfish interest 316 39%

Bad leadership/lack of good leadership 25 3%

Laziness 26 3%

Influence of money 28 3%

Tribalism 26 3%

Economic system of the country 16 2%

Fear/thinking of old age 13 2%

Total 810 100

Source: field survey 2011.

The above table shows that, poverty/hunger which is the opinion of three

hundred and sixty (360) respondents, representing forty five percent (45%) and

65

greediness/selfishness which constituted the position of three hundred and sixty

(360) respondents, representing thirty nine percent (39%) respectively are the

main causes of corruption.

We may add that, behaviour that will be considered corrupt is likely to be

more prominent in less developed countries because of a variety of condition

involved in their underdevelopment; great inequality in the distribution of wealth;

political office as the primary means of gaining access to wealth; conflict between

changing moral codes; the weakness of social and governmental enforcement

mechanisms, and the absence of strong sense of national community.

Table 4.2.9: Perceived Presence of Institutional Mechanisms to Combating

Corruption.

Responses Grading Frequency Percentage

Yes 581 72%

No 229 28%

Total 810 100%

Source: Field survey 2011.

Respondents were asked whether they have noticed the presence of

institutional mechanism for combating corruption in the public service. Their

responses are presented on Table nine above; it shows that majority totaling five

hundred and eighty one (581) respondents, representing seventy two percent

(72%) noticed the presence of anti corruption agencies, while the remaining two

hundred and twenty nine (229) respondents, representing twenty eight percent

(28%) do not notice the presence of institutional mechanisms for combating

corruption in the public service.

66

Table 4.2.10: Effectiveness of Agencies Fighting Corruption

Responses Don’t know Very ineffective Ineffective Effective Very

effective

ICPC 28 80 212 403 85

EFCC 4 14 43 287 462

BPP 142 188 228 168 82

CCB 23 203 280 155 149

Source: Field Survey 2011

Respondents were asked to rate the effectiveness of the various agencies

fighting corruption in the public service. The table above shows the respondents

views, comparatively; the most effective of the agencies set up to fight corruption

have been the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission and Independent

Corrupt Practice and other Related Offences Commission.

Table: 4.2.11: The rate of Corruption in Public Service before Establishing

ICPC EFCC and BPP

Responses grading Frequency Percentage

Very high 442 55%

High 240 30%

Moderate 82 10%

Low 34 4%

Very low 12 1%

Total 810 100%

Source: Field survey 2010

In assessing the rate of corruption before the establishment of the anti

corruption institution. Respondents were asked to rate the level of corruption in

the public service. The responses reveal that four hundred and forty two (442)

respondents, representing fifty five percent (55%) argued that, corruption was very

high, while two hundred forty (240) respondents, representing thirty percent (30%)

67

maintained that corruption was high. Eighty two (82) of the respondents,

representing ten percent (10%) perceived the level of corruption to be moderate,

while the remaining thirty four (34) respondents, representing four (4%) and

twelve (12) respondents, representing one percent (1%) views the corruption rate

to be low and very low respectively. The table eleven above shows this clearly.

Table 4.2.12: Perceived Current Level of Corruption in the Public Service

with the Establishment of Anti Corruption Agencies.

Responses grading Frequency Percentage

Very high 306 38%

High 85 10%

Moderate 323 40%

Low 55 7%

Very low 41 5%

Total 810 100

Source: Field survey.

Respondents were further required to rate the current corruption level in

Nigerian public service with the establishment of the various anti corruption

agencies. The responses generated from this showed that, forty one (41)

respondents, representing five percent (5%) argued that corruption is very low,

while fifty five (55) respondents, representing seven (7%) maintained that the

level of corruption is low. Majority of the respondents as high as three hundred

and twenty three (323) representing forty percent (40%) held that, the level of

corruption is moderate. However eighty five (85) respondents, representing ten

percent (10%) are of the view that corruption level is high, while the remaining

three hundred and six (306) respondents, representing thirty eight percent (38%)

rated corruption very high. Table twelve above represents such information.

68

Table 4.2.13: Transparency International Corruption Ranking for Nigeria;

1999-2007.

S/N Year CPI No of

survey

used

No of

Countries

Ranking Remark(s)

1 1999 1.6 __ 99 98 Ranked ninety eight in terms of

accountability and transparency but 2nd

most corrupt of the 99 countries covered.

2 2000 1.2 4 90 90 Last in public accountability but first in

corruption

3 2001 1.0 4 91 90 Ninetieth in accountability but second in

corruption out of 99 countries covered.

4 2002 1.6 6 102 101 Ranked 101 in accountability but 2nd

in

corruption out of the 102 countries

5 2003 1.4 9 133 132 Ranked 132 in accountability but 2nd

in

corruption out of the 133 countries

covered

6 2004 1.6 9 145 144 Ranked 144 in public accountability but

2nd

in corruption out of the 145 countries

7 2005 1.9 9 158 152 Ranked 152 in terms of public

accountability but 6th

in corruption out of

158 countries covered.

8 2006 2.2 __ 163 142 Ranked 142 in public accountability but

21st in corruption out of 163 countries

covered

9 2007 2.2 8 179 147 Ranked 147 in public accountability but

32nd

in corruption out of 179 countries

covered.

Source: Extracted from Transparency International Corruption perceptions Index

(1999 -2007).

69

At this point, the researchers relied on the report of the Berlin-based

Transparency International (World Leading Anti-Corruption Watchdog)

established in 1993. The organization uses the perception of knowledgeable

respondents, local and expatriate residents, business elites, scholars and country

analysts. The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) used reflects the perceived

levels of corruption in the Nigerian public service. The CPI gathers data from

sources that span the last five years and ranges between ten (10) (highly clean) and

zero (O) (highly corrupt).

The Table thirteen, shows that, for the nine years (1999 - 2007) and for the

number of countries covered in each of them, Nigeria was once the most corrupt

(2000), five times second most corrupt (1999, 2001, 2002, 2003 and 2004).

However she was dropped to the sixty most corrupt in 2005, twenty first in 2006

and thirty second in 2007.

Table 4.2.14: Level of Autonomy

Responses grading Frequency Percentage

Strongly agreed 78 10%

Agreed 220 27%

Disagreed 170 21%

Strongly disagreed 342 42%

Total 810 100%

Source: field survey

Respondent’s reaction to the autonomy of the various anti corruption

mechanism is measured. The responses reveal that only seventy eight (78)

respondents, representing ten percent (10%) strongly agreed, while two hundred

and twenty (220) respondents, representing twenty seven percent (27%) agreed

that anti corruption agencies has autonomy. However one hundred and seventy

(170) respondents, representing twenty one percent (21%) disagreed, while the

remaining majority that constituted three hundred and forty two (342) respondents,

70

representing forty two percent (42%) strongly disagreed. Table fourteen above

shows this information in a tabular form.

Table 4:2.15: Level of Control over Staff of the various anti Corruption

Agencies.

Responses grading Frequency Percentage

Strongly agreed 138 17.3%

Agreed 214 26.4%

Disagreed 327 40.3%

Strongly disagreed 130 16%

Total 810 100

Source: Field survey 2011.

Respondents were asked to rate the level at which the various institutional

mechanism for combating corruption controlled their staff. The responses revealed

that one hundred and thirty (130) respondents, representing sixteen percent (16%)

strongly disagreed that anti corruption agencies does not have control over their

staff while, three hundred and twenty seven (327) respondents, representing forty

point three percent (40.3%) disagreed that the anti corruption agencies has no

control over their staff. However two hundred and forty (240) respondents,

representing twenty six point four percent (26.4%) agreed that the institutional

mechanisms for combating corruption has control over their staff, while the

remaining one hundred and thirty eight (138) respondents, representing just

seventeen point three percent (17.3%) strongly agreed that the anti corruption

mechanisms has control over their staff. Table thirty above shows this clearly.

71

Table 4.2.16: Rating the General Performances of the Anti Corruption

Agencies.

Responses grading Frequency Percentage

Very high 122 15%

High 224 28%

Moderate 294 36%

Low 96 12%

Very low 74 9%

Total 810 100

Source: field survey 2011

Rating the performances of the anti corruption agencies on the general note.

One hundred and twenty two (122) respondents, representing fifteen percent 15%

posit that, the agencies performed very high, while two hundred and twenty four

(224) respondents; representing twenty eight percent (28%) rated them high.

Majority of the respondent totaling two hundred and ninety four (294)

representing thirty six (36%) goes with moderate, while ninety six (96)

respondents, representing twelve percent (12%) rated the agencies low, the

remaining seventy four (74) respondents which represent just nine percent (9%)

maintained that their performances are very low. The information is presented on

the table sixteen above.

Table 4.2.17: Ways of improving the Performances of the Anti-corruption

Agencies

Responses Frequency Percentage

Autonomy 485 60%

Training and Re-Training 219 27%

Provision of crime fighting facilities 106 13%

Total 810 100

Source: Field Survey 2011.

72

The respondents were asked to choose what they considered as ways of

improving the performance of the various institutional mechanisms for combating

corruption in Nigerian Public Service. Majority view of four hundred and eighty

five (485) respondents, representing sixty (60%) argued that, the autonomy of the

agencies must be improved, while two hundred and ninety (219) respondents,

representing twenty seven (27%) were of the view that, the only way of improving

these institutional mechanisms is through training and retraining. However the

remaining one hundred and six (106) respondents, representing thirteen (13%)

advocate for the provision of crime fighting facilities as the panacea for

improvement. Table seventeen presented the information above.

4.3 Test of Hypothesis

From the aforementioned level of corruption before the establishment of

Anti corruption agencies as rated by the respondents, relationship between

establishment of institutional mechanisms for combating corruption as an

independent variable and rate of corruption in Nigerian public service as a

dependent variable are analyzed. This is to permit the establishment of possible

correlation that might exist between the variable contained in the hypothesis.

Corruption in Nigerian public service as reported in this study is accepted to be

very high while the establishment of institutional mechanisms for combating has

succeeded in reducing the rate to an extent. This has proved the efficiency of the

anti corruption machineries, although there is needs for some improvement.

The statistical tool used to test the hypothesis is chi-square (x2). The

hypothesis is tested using statement on table 4.1.12.

The Chi-square (X2) formula is;

X2 =

( )

∑

∑−∑

2O

Where: O = Observed frequency

∑ = Expected frequency

73

Expected = rolls ofNumber

frequency observed of Sum

E = 1605

810

N

O==

The level of significance which chi is measured is 0.05 (that is 0.5%)

DF (Degree of Freedom) = RC

Where R = Rolls

C = Columns

Table 4.3.1: Computation of Chi-Value (X2)

Responses Observed (O) Expected

(E)

O - E (O -∑)2

E

2)- (O ∑

Very high 306 162 144 20736 128

High 85 162 -77 5929 34.74

Moderate 323 162 161 25921 160.06

Low 55 162 -107 11449 71.55

Very low 41 162 -121 14641 90.37

Total 810 810 0 (X2) 484.72

Thus df = (r – 1) (c – 1)

df = (5 – 1) (2 – 1) = 4

Thus, critical value of (X2) = O.711

Calculated value of(X2) = 484.72

Decision

Since the obtained X2 of 484.72 is greater than the critical value of 0.711,

required for significance, at the 0.05 level of significance, for df, this value is

significant so we reject the null hypothesis (Ho). Consequently, we can conclude

that there is relationship between the establishment of institutional mechanisms for

combating corruption and the rate of corruption in Nigerian public service.

74

4.4 Findings/Discussion

Finding of this study as presented on table 6 shows that, the level of

corruption seems to be very high in Nigeria as a society, but specifically singled

out the Public Sector as been more corrupt. This is in agreement with scholars like,

Agalamanyi (2002) who postulate that, in Nigerian public service, corruption has

played an active part in stunting the growth of the nation, Achebe (1983) who

acknowledges the alarming rate of corruption in Nigeria and Amujiri (2003) who

rightly noted, one of the most fundamental problems facing Nigeria today is

corruption. These constitute one of the reasons why public accountability is never

a priority in Nigeria.

It was revealed in table 5 that the most common form of corruption known

is bribery and is closely followed by misappropriation and embezzlement of public

funds by government officials and politicians. In our country “Nigeria” on day to

day interaction with public officer’s illegal money is being offered and/or accepted

to deliver services that should have been delivered for free.

This study exposed some diverse excuses for becoming involved in corrupt

practices by Nigerian public servants, although some may consider it to be the

causes of corruption as stated in table 7. These excuses or causes are clear

departure from what is given as factors responsible for corruption by Amujiri

(2002), Aboyed (1971), Anugwon (2002) and African Development Bank (2006).

The table 7 is of the opinion that poverty/hunger and greediness/selfishness are the

main causes of corruption in the public service. Because of selfishness, corrupt

people turn a blind eye to the suffering that their corrupt practices inflict on others,

justifying bribery simply because they themselves benefit from it. Another factor

responsible for corrupt practices in the Nigerian public service is fear of aging.

Until recently the pensions system in Nigeria has been in crisis. Many retire from

active service in their sixties and are unable to access their pensions and other

sums owing to them for years on end. Coupled with the very low wages paid for

75

public service, civil servants tell themselves they have to prepare for the future

given a system of pensions they are almost certain will not provide for them.

Experience has it that, behaviour that will be considered corrupt is likely to

be more prominent in less developed countries because of a variety of condition

involved in their underdevelopment; great inequality in the distribution of wealth;

political office as the primary means of gaining access to wealth; conflict between

changing moral codes; the weakness of social and governmental enforcement

mechanisms, and the absence of strong sense of national community. In a related

view Aboyade (1971) rightly noted that, “the great difficulty in financing parties

causes corruption”. In our own contexts, the time leg between new regulations and

their enforcement, and loopholes discovered in laws and rules, create condition for

corruption practices. Another strong factor which is the assumption of the

researcher is where people use their wealth to buy political power or to occupy

formal or informal position of political influence, there is often a desire to

corruptly replenish spent wealth and to reconverts such a political position to an

economic resource.

It has been revealed that, the people were quite impressed with the

performance of government agencies set up to combat corruption and specifically

mentioned the Independent Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences

Commission (ICPC) and the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission

(EFCC) as agencies they believed to be effective in fighting corruption. This is

noted in table 9.

Table 10, 11 and 12 shows that, the establishment of anti-corruption

mechanisms haves reduced corruption in Nigerian Public Service to an extent. The

data gather from Transparency International exposed Nigeria position on the

would corruption chart which on several occasions Nigeria were ranked first and

second most corrupt country. However, there was little improvement in 2005,

2000 and 2007 when she descended to sixth, twenty first and thirty second

prostitution respectively. Although the 2.2 in 2006 and 2007 out of 10.0 at the

76

Corruption Perception Index (CPI) is very low, it does not show any remarkable

improvement in accountability and transparency in public service.

This study revealed that, the anti corruption agencies does not have

reasonable level of autonomy as shown in Tables 14 and 15, over seventy five

(75%) of there staff are drown from other government establishment like Nigerian

Police, State Security Services (SSS) Customs Service (CS) Immigration, Central

Bank of Nigeria (CBN) etc and as such, the staff could be recalled by the mother

organization anytime. The recalled could be at a time the particular staff is

undertaking a sensitive assignment for the agencies. Worst hit by like of control

over staff is EFCC whose chairman, a widely a claimed anti-corruption cezar was

sent on compulsory study leave. Sections and parts of the law establishing almost

all institutional mechanisms for combating corruption in the public service has

given wider power to the Attorney-General of the Federation (AGF) to interfere at

will with operations of these agencies making him a mini-god in the temple of

justice. Specifically, the part 61 of the Independent Corrupt Practices and other

Related Offences Commission (ICPC) Act provides that “Every prosecution for an

offence under the act or any other law prohibiting bribery, corruption and other

related offences shall be deemed to be done with the consent of the Attorney

General of the Federation, while section 39 of the EFCC ACT empower AGF to

“makes rules or regulation with respect to the exercise of any of the duties,

functions or powers of the commission”. To worsen an already bad situation, the

Attorney-General of the Federation under section 174 (1-3) of the 1999

constitution as amended has been given so much power such that, he can takeover,

truncate, discontinue any criminal proceeding undertaken by any organization in

the country. This has decimated the powers of the various anti corruption

machineries and slowed down their activities. This provision must have tempted

the former Attorney General of the Federation Michael Aondoakaa SAN to

declare that, all anti-corruption agencies must report to him; this has emboldened

him to interfere in the trial of former Abia State Governor (Uzor Kalu) and the

77

investigation of his Delta State Counterpart (James Ibori) (Tell October, 2007: 15).

This political interference could also be said to have led to the remover of the

former chairman of one of anti corruption agencies, Nuhu Ribadu from the office

before the expiration of his statutory second term.

Table 17 provides that, the various anti corruptions should be given full

autonomy to operate, the autonomy could be in the area of funding, recruitment,

prosecution without interference and the security of tenure of management staff.

Emphasis should also be placed on the area of training and retraining of staff in

modern way of crime fighting. This argument is in line with the fact that, most of

the staff deployed to function in various anti-corruption agencies are from

Nigerian Police. Professional training after recruitment in the police last between

three to six months (Police Regulation 1968). This training by any standard can be

considered short, and arise doubts about its adequacy considering the nature of the

duties recruits would be assigned. Finally crime fighting facilities should also be

made adequately to staff and officers of the anti-corruption machineries.

The results of the chi-square (X2) test (table 18) shows that the null

hypothesis is rejected. Hence there is a significant relationship between the

establishment of institutional mechanisms for combating corruption and the rate of

corruption in Nigerian public service. This have shows that the anti corruption

agencies established for the purpose of combating corruption has performed up to

expectation to an extent, but needs some amount of autonomy and level of

improvement.

78

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

5.4 Summary

The central argument contained here is that, the issue of corruption has

dominated much of public and private discussions in Nigeria in the last thirteen

years of Nigerian return to democracy. It also constitutes the substance of much of

the publications in the Nigerian dailies. Indeed, corruption together with its twin

sister bribery appear to be stock in trade in official dealings in Nigeria, and is seen

as a ‘canker worm’ that is very much affecting the standards of discipline and

morale in Nigerian Public Service. Examining the contentions of scholars and

public commentators on the perils of corruption in Nigeria, it is bravely adduced

that Nigeria has been unable to fashion an effective institutional mechanism of

controlling corruption in the Public Service within the past five decades or so.

Two hypothetical postulations viz: there is no significant relationship between the

establishment of institutional mechanisms for combating corruption and the rate of

corruption in Nigerian Public Service and there is a significant relationship

between the establishment of institutional mechanisms for combating corruption

and the rate of corruption in Nigeria Public Service. The questions generated by

the study are; does the established institutional mechanisms for combating

corruption in Nigeria has any effect on the level of corruption in the Nigerian

Public Service? How effective are these institutional mechanisms established in

combating corruption in the Nigerian Public service? What are the problems

associated with the effective functioning of these institution? And what can be

done in making these institutional mechanisms more effective?

The main aim pursued by the study is to critically assess the institutional

mechanisms for combating corruption in the Nigerian Public Service. The specific

objectives the work achieved are; to find out the extent to which the ant-corruption

mechanisms has gone in the fight against corruption in the public service,

ascertain their efficacy, to identify the problems militating against their effective

79

performance and to make recommendation that will strengthened these

institutional mechanisms for combating corruption thereby, reducing the malaise

in the Nigerian Pubic Service.

5.2 Recommendations

In view of the research findings, the following recommendations are made

as measure to enhance the efficiency of the various institutional mechanisms for

fighting corruption.

There should be explicit compulsory public declaration of assets and

liabilities of, especially holders of statutory position in the Nigerian Public Service

to enable the citizens and the mass media report cases of non-compliance by such

officers to the Code of Conduct Bureau (CCB). This calls for a review of the law

establishing the CCB and the 1999 constitution as amended.

The anti corruption agencies also need greater operational autonomy. This

will enable them discharge their responsibility at a greater pace. Particularly the

provision that the Attorney General of the Federation (AGF) make rules and

regulation in respect to any functions and duties of the agencies should be

revisited. All anti-corruption cases should be investigated and prosecuted by anti

corruption agencies without recourse to an individual in the capacity of AGF.

The overwhelming majority of the staff of the anti-corruption agencies if

not all, should be recruited from the pool of graduates and by the agencies

themselves instead of mass transfers and secondments from other government

organization. This mass transfers and secondments would only transform the new

organization into where they are transferred from. Thus, fresh graduates should be

trained from the scratch towards an appreciation of the importance and objectives

of the anti-corruption agencies. Similarly, the agencies independence with regard

to funds, human and material resources should also be guaranteed.

Section 25 of the Independent Corrupt Practice and other Related Offence

Commission (ICPC) Act that deals with the investigation of chief executive and

their deputies in event of contravention of the act will lead to pervasion of justice

80

as the chief executive may escape punishment. This is considering the political

economy of Nigeria. This Act need to be revisited since the ICPC Act does not

confer immunity on anybody. Section, 308 of the 1999 constitution as amended,

needs to be equally revisit.

The public procurement Act also needs to be amended to extend its scope

to other level of government (state and local government). This will make the fight

against corruption more encompassing.

Since corruption has gone international in Nigeria, there is need for the

anti-corruption agencies in corroboration with government to adopt a coordinated

multi-level response to reinforce national efforts. These include the United Nation

(UN) Convention against Corruption, the Extractive Industry Transparency

Initiative (EITI); the African Union (AU) Convention against Corruption and

Related Offences; and the World Bank Stolen Asset Recovery (STAR) initiative

among others.

On a general not, there is also the need for reform of political parties, the

courts, and the police for serious lack of confidence of these public institutions.

Other includes reform of civil society organization and the mass media. A timely

enforcement of Freedom of the Information Bill (FIB) is needed to make these

organizations more effective as potent weapons of the anti-corruption war. There

is the need for societal value re-orientation of the entire citizenry about the public

service. This is because rules, regulations and other institutional structures are not

enough to fight corruption. Mass mobilization is essential in this regard.

Strong political leadership at all levels that is committed to actually fighting

corruption is required at all levels of government to successfully combat

corruption in the Nigerian Public Service. Strong legislature and judiciary is

needed to enforce sanctions. Strict rules and funding of political parties and

electoral campaign should be put in place so that; money cannot buy power any

longer in Nigeria. The fight against-corruption should be sustained since positive

result can only be achieved with continuous effort.

81

5.3 Conclusion

In conclusion, we discovered that there is high level of corruption in the

public service which is rationalize by flimsy excuse like poverty, hunger, greed as

well as selfish interest, bad leadership, tribalism, economic system of the country,

influence of money, laziness and thinking of old age among others. Corruption in

public services had been on the increase since the country independence which the

greater number of years was presided over by the military that have opportunity to

loot the nation’s treasury. The return to a civilian democratic political system in

1999 does not make any significant difference. Nigerians yearn for the dividends

of democracy; rather they continue to reap the cost of corruption. Although it is

acknowledge that the various anti corruption mechanisms could not achieved

much due to endogenous and exogenous forces that has been exerting influence on

the operations of the anti-corruption agencies. We submitted that, the

establishment of institutional mechanisms for combating corruption in Nigerian

public service has been able to redefine the position of Nigeria on the world

corrupt chart as evident by Transparency Perception Index and the result of the

hypothesis tested. The country’s corruption perception Index (CPI) staggered

between 1.0 in 2001 to the higher of 2.2 in 2006 and 2007. This represents a

dismal performance of 22% which is below a pass mark.

82

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Abraham, R. C. (1940) The Tiv People. London: OUP.

African Development Bank Group (2006). “Combating Corruption in Africa:

Issues and Challenges”, Concepts Note Paper for the Annual Meetings,

Ouagadougou, Burkinafeso.

African Diaspora Initiative (2007) Anti-corruption and Governance, Training

Module.

Ahmed, M.Y. (2007) “Public Service Perspective on Anti-corruption Crusade and

Promotion of Integrity”, The Special Guest, Head of the Civil Service of

the Federation, at the March Edition of ICPC Chairman Guest Forum,

ICPC Auditorium, on Tuesday, 13th

March.

DFID (1999) Benue State and Local Government Institutional Appraisal

Jones, M. and Kemba, M. (2002) “Assessment of Human Resources in Benue

State Government” DFID CNTR: 000512A/SLGP Consultants’ Report 401.

Rebadu N. (2005) “Sanitizing Nigeria’s Business Environment for Direct Foreign

Investment” Being Paper presented at the South African Business Forum,

on Thursday February 22.

Ribadu, N. (2006) “Nigerians Struggle with Corruption” Being an Abridge and

Edited Version of Presentation to USA Congressional Committee on

International Development, Washington D.C, On May 18.

Websites

Benue State: Back Ground Information. http://www.onlinenigeria.com/links/

benue adv asp?blurb (assessed 10/28/2011).

89

Global Integrity, (2004) Country Report. www.globalintegrity.org/reports/

2004/country (assessed 24/2/2009).

Kelly, L.R. “Rent-Seeking, Public Choice and Persona Dilemma

http://www.friesian.com/rentlited accessed 10/10/2008.

Transparency International Corruption Perception Index, http://www.

transparency.org/survey/index.litmel (Accessed 10/10/2008).

USA/Africa Dialogue (2005) No 526: Nigerian Corruption Saga.

www.Utexas.edu/conference/africa/eds (Accessed 24/2/2009).

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www.benuestate.gov.ng (Accessed 26/11/2011).

90

APPENDIX

University of Nigeria, Nsukka

Faculty of Social Science

Department of Public Administration

and Local Government.

15th

October, 2011.

Sir,

QUESTIONNAIRE

Please, the researcher is a Master of Science (M.Sc.) student in the

Department of Public Administration and Local Government, University of

Nigeria, Nsukka, undertaking a research on “Assessment of Institutional

Mechanisms for Combating Corruption in Nigerian Public Service.”

The research thesis is purely for academic purpose and your answer to any

particular issue will be treated with utmost confidentiality.

Yours faithfully,

Iorhemen Iorchir Peter

Please Tick [ ] as it applies to you.

SECTION “A”

1. Sex: (a) Male [ ] (b) Female [ ]

2. Age: (a) 20 – 35 [ ] (b) 36 – 45 [ ] (c) 46 and above [ ]

3. Marital Status: (a) Married [ ] (b) Single [ ] (c) Divorce [ ]

4. Educational Qualification

(a) WAEC/NECO (SSCE) [ ] (b) ND/NCE [ ]

(c) B.Sc/HND [ ] (d) M. Sc/Ph.D [ ]

5. How long have you been working with the public service

(a) 5years [ ] (b) 5 – 10 years [ ] (c) 10 – 15 years [ ]

(d) 17 – 25 years [ ] (e) 20 – 25 years [ ] (f) 25 years and above [ ]

91

(6) Please kindly state your professional group

(a) __________ (b) __________ (c) _________ (d) _________ (e)___________

(f) ___________ (g)___________ (h) __________ (i) __________ (J)_________

SECTION ‘B’

7. Do you believe there is corruption in Nigeria?

(a) Yes [ ] (b) No [ ]

8. What do you understand by the word corruption?

(a) __________ (b) __________ (c) _________ (d) _________ (e)___________

(f) ___________ (g)___________ (h) __________ (i) __________ (J)_________

9. What do you consider to be the main causes of corruption?

(a) __________ (b) __________ (c) _________ (d) _________ (e)___________

(f) ___________ (g)___________ (h) __________ (i) __________ (J)_________

10. Do you perceived the presence of institutional mechanisms to combating

corruption in the public service?

(a) Yes [ ] (b) No [ ]

11. How do you rate the effectiveness of each of the anti-corruption agencies?

(a). Don’t know [ ] (b) Very ineffective [ ] (c) Ineffective [ ]

(d) Effective [ ] (e) Very effective [ ]

12. What was the rate of corruption in the public service before establishing

ICPC, EFCC and BPP?

(a) Very high [ ] (b) High [ ] (c) Moderate [ ] (e) Low [ ]

(f) Very low [ ]

13. What is the current level of corruption in the public service with the

establishment of anti corruption agencies?

(a) Very high [ ] (b) High [ ] (c) Moderate [ ] (e) Low [ ]

(f) Very low [ ]

14. Do the anti corruption organizations have reasonable autonomy?

(a) Strongly agreed [ ] (b) Agreed [ ] (c) Disagreed [ ]

(e) Strongly disagreed [ ].

92

15. Do the institutional mechanisms for combating corruption have total control

over their staff?

(a) Strongly agreed [ ] (b) Agreed [ ] (c) Disagreed [ ]

(e) Strongly disagreed [ ].

16. What is the general performance of the anti corruption agencies?

(a) Very high [ ] (b) High [ ] (c) Moderate [ ] (e) Low [ ]

(f) Very low [ ]

17. What is the ways of improving the performances of the anti corruption

agencies?

(a) __________ (b) __________ (c) _________ (d) _________ (e)___________

93

Figure 1: ORGANIZATIONAL CHART OF BENUE STATE GOVERNMENT

Source: http://www.onlineniger.com/links/benueadv.esp?blurb=2011

People of Benue

Governor Speaker

Deputy Governor Deputy Speaker

Clerk of the

House Chief of Staff Head of Service

Secretary to the State

Government

Permanent Secretary Assistant to

Governor

Advisor to

Governor

Commissioner

of commerce,

industry &

Tourism

Commissioner

of Agriculture

& Natural

Resources

Commissioner

of

Education

Permanent

Secretary Permanent

Secretary

Permanent

Secretary

Commissioner

of

Finance

Commissioner

of

Health

Commissioner

of

Information

and culture

Commissioner

of

Justice

Commissioner

of

Land and Survey Commissioner

of Rural

Development

and Cooperative

Commissioner

of Water

Resources and

Environment

Permanent

Secretary

Permanent

Secretary

Permanent

Secretary

Permanent

Secretary

Permanent

Secretary

Permanent

Secretary

Permanent

Secretary