Investment Dig

8/13/2019 Investment Dig

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Garcia vs. Board of Investments (BOI)

191 SCRA 288

November 1990

FACTS:

Former Bataan Petrochemical Corporation (BPC), now Luzon Petrochemical Corporation, formed by a group ofTaiwanese investors, was granted by the BOI its have its plant site for the products naphta cracker and naphta

to based in Bataan. In February 1989, one year after the BPC began its production in Bataan, the corporation

applied to the BOI to have its plant site transferred from Bataan to Batangas. Despite vigorous opposition from

petitioner Cong. Enrique Garcia and others, the BOI granted private respondent BPCs application, stating that the

investors have the final choice as to where to have their plant site because they are the ones who risk capital for

the project.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the BOI committed a grave abuse of discretion in yielding to the application of the investors

without considering the national interest

COURT RULING:

The Supreme Court found the BOI to have committed grave abuse of discretion in this case, and ordered the

original application of the BPC to have its plant site in Bataan and the product naphta as feedstock maintained.

The ponente, Justice Gutierrez, Jr., first stated the Courts judicial power to settle actual controversies as

provided for by Section 1 of Article VIII in our 1987 Constitution before he wrote the reasons as to how the Court

arrived to its conclusion. He mentioned that nothing is shown to justify the BOIs action in letting the investors

decide on an issue which, if handled by our own government, could have been very beneficial to the State, as he

remembered the word of a great Filipino leader, to wit: .. he would not mind having a government run like hell

by Filipinos than one subservient to foreign dictation.

Justice Grio Aquino, in her dissenting opinion, argued that the petition was not well-taken because the 1987Investment Code does not prohibit the registration of a certain project, as well as any decision of the BOI

regarding the amended application. She stated that the fact that petitioner disagrees with BOI does not make the

BOI wrong in its decision, and that petitioner should have appealed to the President of the country and not to the

Court, as provided for by Section 36 of the 1987 Investment Code.

Justice Melencio-Herrera, in another dissenting opinion, stated that the Constitution does not vest in the Court the

power to enter the realm of policy considerations, such as in this case.

______________________________-_

_----Enrique Garcia vs Executive Secretary

on November 16, 2011

Political Law Congress Authorizing the President to Tax

On 27 November 1990, Cory issued Executive Order 438 which imposed, in addition to any other duties, taxes and

charges imposed by law on all articles imported into the Philippines, an additional duty of 5% ad valorem. This

additional duty was imposed across the board on all imported articles, including crude oil and other oil products

imported into the Philippines. In 1991, EO 443 increased the additional duty to 9%. In the same year, EO 475 was

passed reinstating the previous 5% duty except that crude oil and other oil products continued to be taxed at 9%.

Garcia, a representative from Bataan, avers that EO 475 and 478 are unconstitutional for they violate Sec 24 of Art 6

of the Constitution which provides: All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public

debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the

Senate may propose or concur with amendments. He contends that since the Constitution vests the authority to

enact revenue bills in Congress, the President may not assume such power of issuing Executive Orders Nos. 475 and

478 which are in the nature of revenue-generating measures.

ISSUE: Whether or not EO 475 and 478 are constitutional.

HELD: Under Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution, the enactment of appropriation, revenue and tariff bills, like

all other bills is, of course, within the province of the Legislative rather than the Executive Department. It does not


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follow, however, that therefore Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478, assuming they may be characterized as revenue

measures, are prohibited to the President, that they must be enacted instead by the Congress of the Philippines.

Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution provides as follows: (2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the

President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates,

import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the

national development program of the Government. There is thus explicit constitutional permission to Congress to

authorize the President subject to such limitations and restrictions as [Congress] may impose to fix within specific

limits tariff rates . . . and other duties or imposts . . . .

---Phillips Seafood Corporation v. Board of Investments

Facts:Phillips Seafood is registered with respondent Bureau of Investments (BOI) as an existing and expansion producer of soft

shell crabs and other seafood products, on a non-pioneer status under Certificate of Registration No. EP 93-219. When Phillips

relocated its plant to Roxas City, it filed with BOI an application for registration, which the latter granted. In effect , Petitioners

Certificate of Registration No. EP 93-219 was extended up to 12 August 2000, pursuant to Article 39 (a) (1) (ii) of Executive

Order No. 226. Petitioner changed its corporate name from PS-Masbate to its current name of Phillips Seafood (Philippines)Corporation, which was approved by respondent BOI on 16 February 2001.

In a letter dated 25 September 2003, respondent BOI informed petitioner that the ITH previously granted would be applicable

only to the period from 13 August 1999 to 21 October 1999 or before petitioners transfer to a not less-developed area.

Petitioner wrote respondent BOI requesting for a reconsideration of its decision.

On 03 May 2004, petitioner received BOIs letter denying its motion for reconsideration. Petitioner elevated the matter to the

Office of the President, which dismissed petitioners appeal on the ground of lack of jurisdiction in a Decision dated 22

September 2004. The Office of the President likewise denied petitioners motion for reconsideration in an O rder dated 14

March 2005. Petitioner received a copy of the order on 01 April 2005.

On 05 April 2005, petitioner filed a petition for review before the Court of Appeals, questioning the dismissal of its appeal

before the Office of the President.

After respondent BOI filed its comment on the petition, petitioner filed an omnibus motion asking for leave to file an amended

petition to counter the issues raised in the comment for the first time and to suspend the period for filing a reply.

On 24 May 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered the first assailed resolution denying petitioners omnibus motion and

dismissing its petition for review. The appellate court denied petitioners omnibus motion on the ground that the same was

filed with intent to delay the case. Simultaneously, the appellate court dismissed the petition for review for having been filed

out of time as petitioner opted to appeal to the Office of the President instead of filing a Rule 43 petition to the Court of

Appeals within the reglementary period.

Issue:Did the Court of Appeals err in denying the petition for review for having filed out of time? NO

Ruling:Indeed, under E.O. 226, when the action or decision pertains to either of these two instances: first, in the decisions ofthe BOI over controversies concerning the implementation of the relevant provisions of E.O No. 226 that may arise between

registered enterprises or investors and government agencies under Article 7; and second, in an action of the BOI over

applications for the Office of the President is available. E.O. No. 226 contains no provision specifically governing the remedy of

a party whose application for an ITH has been denied by the BOI in the same manner that Articles 7 and 36 thereof allow

recourse to the Office of the President in certain instances. Nevertheless, Article 82 of E.O. No. 22 is the catch-all provision

allowing the appeal to the courts from all other decisions of respondent BOI involving the other provisions of E.O. No. 226. The

intendment of the law is undoubtedly to afford immediate judicial relief from the decision of respondent BOI, save in cases

mentioned under Articles 7 and 36.

In relation to Article 82, E.O. No. 226, Section 1 of Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure expressly includes respondent

BOI as one of the quasi-judicial agencies whose judgments or final orders are appealable to the Court of Appeals via a verified

petition for review. Appeals from judgments and final orders of quasi-judicial agencies are now required to be brought to the

Court of Appeals on a verified petition for review, under the requirements and conditions in Rule 43 which was precisely

formulated and adopted to provide for a uniform rule of appellate procedure for quasi-judicial agencies.

Thus, petitioner should have immediately elevated to the Court of Appeals the denial by respondent BOI of its application for

an ITH. From the letter dated 09 October 2003 of respondent BOI, which informed petitioner that its ITH would be extended

only from 13 August 1999 to 21 October 1999, petitioner appealed to the Office of the President, a recourse that is not

sanctioned by either the Rules of Civil Procedure or by the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987.

Petitioner cannot invoke Article 36 of E.O. No. 226 to justify its appeal to the Office of the President. Article 36, along with

Article 7, which allows recourse to the Office of the President, applies to specific instances, namely, controversies between a

registered enterprise and a government agency and decisions concerning the registration of an enterprise,

respectively. Expresio unius est exclusio alterius. This enumeration is exclusive so that other controversies outside of its

purview, including petitioners entitlement to an ITH, can invoke only the appellate judicial relief provi ded under Article 82. In

the instant case, the denial of petitioners application for an ITH is not within the cases where the law expressly provides for


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appellate recourse to the Office of the President. That being the case, petitioner should have elevated its appeal to the Court of

Appeals under Rule 43.

---------------Atlas Consolidated vs. CIR

ATLAS CONSOLIDATED MINING DEVT CORP vs. CIR524 SCRA 73, 103GR Nos. 141104 & 148763, June 8, 2007

"The taxpayer must justify his claim for tax exemption or refund by the clearest grant of organic or statute law and should not bepermitted to stand on vague implications."

"Export processing zones (EPZA) are effectively considered as foreign territory for tax purposes."

FACTS: Petitioner corporation, a VAT-registered taxpayer engaged in mining, production, and sale of various mineral products,filed claims with the BIR for refund/credit of input VAT on its purchases of capital goods and on its zero-rated sales in thetaxable quarters of the years 1990 and 1992. BIR did not immediately act on the matter prompting the petitioner to file a petition

for review before the CTA. The latter denied the claims on the grounds that for zero-rating to apply, 70% of the company's salesmust consists of exports, that the same were not filed within the 2-year prescriptive period (the claim for 1992 quarterly returnswere judicially filed only on April 20, 1994), and that petitioner failed to submit substantial evidence to support its claim forrefund/credit.

The petitioner, on the other hand, contends that CTA failed to consider the following: sales to PASAR and PHILPOS within theEPZA as zero-rated export sales; the 2-year prescriptive period should be counted from the date of filing of the last adjustmentreturn which was April 15, 1993, and not on every end of the applicable quarters; and that the certification of the independentCPA attesting to the correctness of the contents of the summary of suppliers invoices or receipts examined, evaluated andaudited by said CPA should substantiate its claims.

ISSUE: Did the petitioner corporation sufficiently establish the factual bases for its applications for refund/credit of input VAT?

HELD: No. Although the Court agreed with the petitioner corporation that the two-year prescriptive period for the filing ofclaims for refund/credit of input VAT must be counted from the date of filing of the quarterly VAT return, and that sales toPASAR and PHILPOS inside the EPZA are taxed as exports because these export processing zones are to be managed as aseparate customs territory from the rest of the Philippines, and thus, for tax purposes, are effectively considered as foreignterritory, it still denies the claims of petitioner corporation for refund of its input VAT on its purchases of capital goods and

effectively zero-rated sales during the period claimed for not being established and substantiated by appropriate and sufficientevidence.

Tax refunds are in the nature of tax exemptions. It is regarded as in derogation of the sovereign authority, and should beconstrued in strictissimi juris against the person or entity claiming the exemption. The taxpayer who claims for exemption must

justify his claim by the clearest grant of organic or statute law and should not be permitted to stand on vague implication

National Economic Protectionism Association vs Ongpin

on September 24, 2011

Judicial Review Requisites

After the lifting of martial law in 1981, Marcos issued PD 1789 and some other PDs. The said PD was issued in order

to suspend for one year the requirement that in order for companies to validly operate in the country it must be

compose of at least 60% Filipino. NEPA assailed the said PD averring that as taxpayers and Filipinos they will be

greatly adversed by such PD. The Sol-Gen commented that NEPA et al have no personality and standing to sue in the

absence of an actual controversy concerning the enforcement of the PD in question.

ISSUE: Whether or not the requisites for judicial review are met.

HELD: NEPA et al question the constitutionality of Secs 1 and 3 of PD 1892 in relation to PD 1789, the 1981

Investment Priorities Plan and EO 676, as being violative of the due process and equal protection clauses of the 1973

Constitution as well as Secs 8 & 9 of Article 14 thereof, and seek to prohibit Ongpin from implementing said laws.

Yet, not even one of the petitioners has been adversely affected by the application of those provisions. No actual

conflict has been alleged wherein the petitioner could validly and possibly say that the increase in foreign equity

participation in non-pioneer areas of investment from the period of Dec 2, 1983 to Dec 4, 1984 had any direct

bearing on them, such as considerable rise in unemployment, real increase in foreign investment, unfair competition

with Philippine nationals, exploitation of the countrys natural resources by foreign investors under the decrees.

Petitioners advance an abstract, hypothetical issue which is in effect a petition for an advisory opinion from the SC.

The power of courts to declare a law unconstitutional arises only when the interests of litigants require the use of

that judicial authority for their protection against actual interference, a hypothetical threat being insufficient. Bona

fide suit. Judicial power is limited to the decision of actual cases and controversies. The authority to pass on the

validity of statutes is incidental to the decision of such cases where conflicting claims under the Constitution and
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under a legislative act assailed as contrary to the Constitution are raised. It is legitimate only in the last resort, and

as necessity in the determination of real, earnest, and vital controversy between litigants.

Assignment of Tax Credit Certificate (TCC); Exception to Estoppel

CIR vs. Petron Corporation, GR No. 185568, march 21, 2012

Facts: Petron, a Board of Investment (BOI)-registered enterprise, was an assignee of several Tax Credit

Certificates (TCCs) from various BOI-registered enterprises for the taxable years 1995-1998. Petron subsequently

utilized said TCCs to pay its excise taxes for said taxable years. The TCCs had a Liability Clause which provided:

Both the TRANSFEROR and the TRANSFEREE shall be jointly and severally liable for any

fraudulent act or violation of the pertinent laws, rules and regulations relating to the transfer of this

TAX CREDIT CERTIFICATE.

Sometime in 1999, a post-audit of said TCCs was conducted by the DOF. The TCCs and the TDMs were cancelled

by reason of fraud. The DOF found that said TCCs were fraudulently obtained by the transferors and subsequently

the same was fraudulently transferred to Petron. Thus, On January 30, 2002, The CIR issued an assessment against

Petron for deficiency excise taxes for the taxable years 1995 to 1998 based on the ground that the TCCs utilized by

petitioner in its payment of excise taxes have been cancelled by the DOF for having been fraudulently issued andtransferred. Subsequently, petron filed a protest letter regarding said assessment.

In 2002, the CIR served a Warrant of Distraint and/or Levy on petitioner to enforce payment of the tax deficiencies.

Construing the Warrant of Distraint and/or Levy as the final adverse decision of the BIR on its protest of the

assessment, Petron filed a petition before the CTA contending that the assignment/transfer of the TCCs to petitioner

by the TCC holders was submitted to, examined and approved by the concerned government agencies which

processed the assignment in accordance with law and revenue regulations and that the assessment and collection of

alleged excise tax deficiencies sought to be collected by the BIR against petitioner through the January 30, 2002

letter are already barred by prescription.

The CTA Second Division ruled for the CIR. Petron appealed the decision to the CTA En banc which, in turn,

reversed the CTA 2nd

Division decision, based on the following on the ground that Petron was considered an innocent

transferee of the subject TCCs and may not be prejudiced by a re-assessment of excise tax liabilities that respondent

has already settled, when due, with the use of the TCCs.

Issue: Is Petron still liable to pay its excise taxes?

Held: PETRONS NON-PARTICIPATION IN FRAUDULENT ACTS

RR 5-2000 prescribes the regulations governing the manner of issuance of TCCs and the conditions for their use,

revalidation and transfer. Under the said regulation, a TCC may be used by the grantee or its assignee in the

payment of its direct internal revenue tax liability. It may be transferred in favor of an assignee subject to the following

conditions: 1) the TCC transfer must be with prior approval of the Commissioner or the duly authorized

representative; 2) the transfer of a TCC should be limited to one transfer only; and 3) the transferee shall strictly use

the TCC for the payment of the assignees direct internal revenue tax liability and shall not be convertible to cash . A

TCC is valid only for 10 years subject to the following rules: (1) it must be utilized within five (5) years from the date of

issue; and (2) it must be revalidated thereafter or be otherwise considered invalid.

The processing of a TCC is entrusted to a specialized agency called the One-Stop-Shop Inter-Agency Tax Credit

and Duty Drawback Center to expedite the processing and approval of tax credits and duty drawbacks.

A TCC may be assigned through a Deed of Assignment, which the assignee submits to the Center for its approval.

Upon approval of the deed, the Center will issue a DOF Tax Debit Memo (DOF-TDM), which will be utilized by the

assignee to pay the latters tax liabilities for a specified period. Upon surrender of the TCC and the DOF-TDM, the

corresponding Authority to Accept Payment of Excise Taxes (ATAPET) will be issued by the BIR Collection Program

Division and will be submitted to the issuing office of the BIR for acceptance by the Assistant Commissioner of

Collection Service. This act of the BIR signifies its acceptance of the TCC as payment of the assignees excise taxes.

Thus, it is apparent that a TCC undergoes a stringent process of verification by various specialized government

agencies before it is accepted as payment of an assignees tax liability The CIR had no allegation that there was adeviation from the process for the approval of the TCCs, which Petron used as payment to settle its excise tax

liabilities for the years 1995 to 1998.

Further, any merit in the position of CIR on this issue is negated by the Joint Stipulation it entered into with Petron in

the proceedings before the said Division. As correctly noted by the CTA En Banc, herein parties jointly stipulated

before the Second Division in CTA Case No. 6423 as follows:

13. That petitioner (Petron) did not participate in the procurement and issuance of the TCCs, which

TCCs were transferred to Petron and later utilized by Petron in payment of its excise taxes.

This stipulation of fact by the CIR amounts to an admission and, having been made by the parties in a stipulation of

facts at pretrial, is treated as a judicial admission Petron had the right to rely on the joint stipulation that absolved it

from any participation in the alleged fraud pertaining to the issuance and procurement of the subject TCCs.


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PETRON AS INNOCENT TRANSFEREE FOR VALUE

A transferee in good faith and for value of a TCC who has relied on the Center's representation of the genuineness

and validity of the TCC transferred to it may not be legally required to pay again the tax covered by the TCC which

has been belatedly declared null and void, that is, after the TCCs have been fully utilized through settlement of

internal revenue tax liabilities. Conversely, when the transferee is party to the fraud as when it did not obtain the TCC

for value or was a party to or has knowledge of its fraudulent issuance, said transferee is liable for the taxes and for

the fraud committed as provided for by law.

VALIDITY OF A POST-AUDIT OF TCCs

TCCs are valid and effective from their issuance and are not subject to a post-audit as a suspensive condition for

their validity. The implication on the instant case of the said ruling is that Petron has the right to rely on the validity

and effectivity of the TCCs that were assigned to it.

Art. 1181 tells us that the condition is suspensive when the acquisition of rights or demandability of the obligation

must await the occurrence of the condition. However, Art. 1181 does not apply to the present case since the parties

did NOT agree to a suspensive condition. Rather, specific laws, rules, and regulations govern the subject TCCs, not

the general provisions of the Civil Code.

It would be absurd to make the effectivity of the payment of a TCC dependent on a post-audit since there is nocontemplation of the situation wherein there is no post-audit. Does the payment made become effective if no post-

audit is conducted? Or does the so-called suspensive condition still apply as no law, rule, or regulation specifies a

period when a post-audit should or could be conducted with a prescriptive period? Clearly, a tax payment through a

TCC cannot be both effective when made and dependent on a future event for its effectivity. Our system of laws and

procedures abhors ambiguity.

Moreover, if the TCCs are considered to be subject to post-audit as a suspensive condition, the very purpose of the

TCC would be defeated as there would be no guarantee that the TCC would be honored by the government as

payment for taxes.

THE LIABILITY CLAUSE ON THE TCCs

The Liability Clause of the TCCs reads:

Both the TRANSFEROR and the TRANSFEREE shall be jointly and severally liable for any

fraudulent act or violation of the pertinent laws, rules and regulations relating to the transfer of this

TAX CREDIT CERTIFICATE.

The above clause to our mind clearly provides only for the solidary liability relative to the transfer of the TCCs from

the original grantee to a transferee. There is nothing in the above clause that provides for the l iability of the transferee

in the event that the validity of the TCC issued to the original grantee by the Center is impugned or where the TCC is

declared to have been fraudulently procured by the said original grantee. Thus, the solidary liability, if any, applies

only to the sale of the TCC to the transferee by the original grantee.

GOVERNMENT IS NOT ESTOPPED FROM THE MISTAKES OF ITS AGENTS; EXCEPTION

We recognize the well-entrenched principle that estoppel does not apply to the government, especially on matters oftaxation. Taxes are the nations lifeblood through which government agencies continue to operate and with which the

State discharges its functions for the welfare of its constituents. As an exception, however, this general rule cannot

be applied if it would work injustice against an innocent party.

Petron, in this case, was not proven to have had any participation in or knowledge of the CIRs allegation of the

fraudulent transfer and utilization of the subject TCCs. Respondents status as a transferee in good faith and for value

of these TCCs has been established and even stipulated upon by petitioner. [58] Respondent was thereby provided

ample protection from the adverse findings subsequently made by the Center. Given the circumstances, the CIRs

invocation of the non-applicability of estoppel in this case is misplaced.

First Lepanto Ceramics vs. CA [G.R. No. 110571, March 10, 1994]

Post undercase digests,Political Law atThursday, February 23, 2012 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind

Facts: The Omnibus Investments Code of 1981 as amended provided that appeals from decisions of the Board of

Investments (BOI) shall be the exclusive jurisdiction of the CA. Just a few monthsafter the 1987 Constitution took

effect (July 17, 1987), the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987 (EO 226) was promulgated which provided in Art 82

thereof that such appeals be directly filed with the SC. The SC later promulgated, under its rule-making power,

Circular No. 1-91 which confirmed that jurisdiction of the CA over appeals from the decisions of the BOI. SCs Second

Division, relying on said Circular, accordingly sustained the appellate jurisdiction of the CA in this present case.

Petitioner now move to reconsider and question the Second Divisions ruling which provided:
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.although the right to appeal granted by Art 82 of EO 226 is a substantive right which cannot be modified by a rule

of procedure, nonetheless, questions concerning where and in what manner the appeal can be brought are only

matters of procedure which this Court hast he power to regulate.

They contend that Circular No. 191 (a rule of procedure) cannot be deemed to have superseded Art 82 of EO 226 (a

legislation).

Issue: Was the Court correct in sustaining the appellate jurisdiction of the CA in decisions from the Board of

Investments?

Held: Yes. EO 226 was promulgated after the 1987 Constitutiontook effect February 2, 1987. Thus, Art 82 of EO 226,

which provides for increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the SC, is invalid and therefore never became effective for

the concurrence of the Court was no sought in its enactment. Thus, the Omnibus Investments Code of 1981 as

amended still stands. The exclusive jurisdiction on appeals from decisions of the BOI belongs to the CA.

FIRST LEPANTO v. CA 231 SCRA 30

FACTS:

BOI granted petitioners application to amend its BOI certificate of registration by changing the scope of its

registered product from glazed floor tiles to ceramic tiles. Oppositor Mariwasa filed a petitioner for review with the

CA. CA granted the preliminary injunction. Petitioner says that the CA has no jurisdiction as it is vested exclusively

with the SC within 30 days from receipt of the decision pursuant to the Omnibus Investments Code and therefore,

Mariwasa has lost its right to appeal. Mariwasa counters that whatever inconsistencies that the Omnibus Investment

Code and the Judiciary Reorganization Act have been resolved by SC Circular 1-91.

ISSUES:

W/n Mariwasa correctly filed its appeal with the CA.

RULING:1

YES. B.P. 129s objective is providing a uniform procedure of appeal from decisions of all quasi-judicial

agencies for the benefit of the bench and the bar. The obvious lack of deliberation in the drafting of our laws could

perhaps explain the deviation of some of our laws from the goal of uniform procedure which B.P. 129 sought to

promote. Although a circular is not strictly a statute or law, it has, however, the force and effect of law according to

settled jurisprudence

The argument that Article 82 of E.O. 226 cannot be validly repealed by Circular 1-91 because the formergrants a substantive right which is prohibited under the Constitution. These simply deal with procedural aspects

which this Court has the power to regulate by virtue of its constitutional rule-making powers. Circular 1-91 simply

transferred the venue of appeals from decisions of this agency to respondent Court of Appeals and provided a

different period of appeal, i.e., fifteen (15) days from notice. It did not make an incursion into the substantive right to

appeal.

Circular 1-91 effectively repealed or superseded Article 82 of E.O. 226 insofar as the manner and method of

enforcing the right to appeal from decisions of the BOI are concerned.

FIRST LEPANTO v. CA 237 SCRA 519

FACTS:

This is a MR of the previous case. Petitioner's contention is that Circular No. 1-91 cannot be deemed to

have superseded art. 82 of the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987 (E.O.

No. 226) because the Code, which President Aquino promulgated in the exercise of legislative authority, is in the

nature of a substantive act of Congress defining the jurisdiction of courts pursuant to Art. VIII, 2 of the Constitution.

ISSUES:

1The fact that BOI is not expressly included in the list of quasi-judicial agencies found in the third sentence of Section 1 of Circular 1-91 does not mean that said circular does not

apply to appeals from final orders or decision of the BOI. The second sentence of Section 1 thereof expressly states that "(T)hey shall also apply to appeals from final orders or

decisions of any quasi-judicial agency from which an appeal is now allowed by statute to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court." E.O. 266 is one such statute. Besides, the

enumeration is preceded by the words "(A)mong these agencies are . . . ," strongly implying that there are other quasi-judicial agencies which are covered by the Circular but which

have not been expressly listed therein.


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Same issue as in the first FIRST LEPANTO case.

RULING:

YES (as in previous case). Art. 78 of the Omnibus Investment Code on Judicial Relief was thereafter

amended by B.P. Blg. 129, 3by granting in 9 thereof exclusive appellate jurisdiction to the CA over the decisions

and final orders of quasi-judicial agencies. When the Omnibus Investments Code was promulgated on July 17, 1987,

the right to appeal from the decisions and final orders of the BOI to the Supreme Court was again granted. By then,

however, the present Constitution had taken effect.4The Constitution now provides in Art. VI, 30 that "No law shall

be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution without its

advice and concurrence." This provision is intended to give the Supreme Court a measure of control over cases

placed under its appellate jurisdiction. For the indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate

jurisdiction can unnecessarily burden the Court and thereby undermine its essential function of expounding the law in

its most profound national aspects.

Now, art. 82 of the 1987 Omnibus Investments Code, by providing for direct appeals to the Supreme Court

from the decisions and final orders of the BOI, increases the appellate jurisdiction of this Court. Since it was enacted

without the advice and concurrence of this Court, this provision never became effective, with the result that it can

never be deemed to have amended BPBlg. 129, 9.

CIR vs toshiba information equipment digest

Rationale for zero-rating of exports. The Philippine VAT system adheres tothe Cross Border Doctrine, according to

which, no VAT shall be imposed toform par t of the cost of goo ds desti ned for consumpt ion out side

of theterritorial border of the taxing authority. [Commissioner of Internal Revenue v.Toshiba Information Equipment

(Phils.), Inc., G. R.. No. 150154, August 9,2005

106(A)(2)(a) Export Sales

Q: What is the cross-border doctrine?

* According to CIR v. Toshiba Information Equipment (Phils.), Inc., the Philippines adheres to the cross-border doctrine which

means that

no VAT shall be imposed to form part of the cost of goods destined for consumption outside of the territorial

border of the taxing authority.

Hence:

actual export of goods and services from the Philippines to a foreign country must be free of VAT;

On the other hand, those destined for use or consumption within the Philippines shall be imposed with ten percent (10%)[now 12%] VAT.

Additionally, sales made by an enterprise within a non-ECOZONE territory, i.e., Customs Territory, to an enterprise withinan ECOZONE territory shall be free of VAT.

JOHN HAY PEOPLES ALTERNATIVE COALITION, MATEO CARIO FOUNDATION INC., CENTER FOR ALTERNATIVE SYSTEMS FOUNDATION INC., REGINAVICTORIA A. BENAFIN REPRESENTED AND JOINEDBY HER MOTHER MRS. ELISA

BENAFIN, IZABEL M. LUYK REPRESENTED AND JOINED BY HER MOTHERMRS. REBECCAMOLINA LUYK, KATHERINE PE REPRESENTED AND JOINED BY HER MOTHERROSEMARIEG. PE, SOLEDAD S. CAMILO, ALICIA C. PACALSO ALIAS "KEVAB," BETTY I.STRASSER, RUBY C. GIRON,URSULA C. PEREZ ALIAS "BA-YAY," EDILBERTO T.CLARAVALL, CARMEN CAROMINA, LILIA G.YARANON,DIANE MONDOC, peti t ioners , vs. VICTOR LIM, PRESID ENT, BASE S CO NV ER SI ON DE VE LO PM EN TAUTHORITY; JOHN HAY PORO POINTDEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, CITY OF BAGUIO, TUNTEX (B.V.I.)CO. LTD., ASIAWORLDINTERNATIONALE GROUP, INC., DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT ANDNATURALRESOURCES, respondents.Facts:

The controversy stemmed from the issuance of Proclamation No. 420 by then President Ramos declaring aportionof Camp John Hay as a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) and creating a regime of tax exemption within theJohn HaySpecial Economic Zone. In the present petition, petitioners assailed the constitutionality of the proclamation. The Court alsoheld that it is the legislature, unless limited by a provision of the Constitution, that has the full powerto exempt any person orcorporation or class of property from taxation, its power to exempt being as broad as itspower to tax. Thechallenged grant of tax exemption would circumvent the Constitution's imposition that a lawgranting any taxexemption must have the concurrence of a majority of all the members of Congress. Moreover, theclaimed statutory exemption ofthe John Hay SEZ from taxation should be manifest and unmistakable from thelanguage of the law on which it isbased. Thus, the Court declared that the grant by Proclamation No. 420 of taxexemption and other privileges tothe John Hay SEZ was void for being violative of the Constitution. However, theentire assailed proclamationcannot be declared unconstitutional, the other parts thereof not being repugnant tothe law or the Constitution. Thedelineation and declaration of a portion of the area covered by Camp John Hay as aSEZ was well within the powers of thePresident to do so by means of a proclamation. Where part of a statute isvoid as contrary to the Constitution, whileanother part is valid, the valid portion, if separable from the invalid, as inthe case at bar, may stand and be enforced.

Issue: WON the petitioners have legal standing to bring the petition Ruling: YES Rationale: R.A. No. 7227 expressly requires the concurrence of the affected local government units to the creation of SEZs outof all the base

areas in the country. The grant by the law on local government units of the right of concurrence onthe bases'


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conversion is equivalent to vesting a legal standing on them, for it is in effect a recognition of the realinterests thatcommunities nearby or surrounding a particular base area have in its utilization. Thus, the interest of petitioners, beinginhabitants of Baguio, in assailing the legality of Proclamation No. 420, ispersonal and substantial such that they havesustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the government actbeing challenged. Theirs is a material interest, aninterest in issue affected by the proclamation and not merely aninterest in the question involved or an incidentalinterest, for what is at stake in the enforcement of ProclamationNo. 420 is the very economic and social existence of thepeople of Baguio City. ... Moreover, petitioners Edilberto T.Claravall and Lilia G. Yaranon were duly elected councilors of

Baguio at the time, engaged in the local governanceof Baguio City and whose duties included deciding for and on behalf oftheir constituents the question of whether toconcur with the declaration of a portion of the area covered by Camp John Hay as a SEZ.Certainly then, petitionersClaraval l and Yara non, as ci ty off ic ia ls who voted ag ainstthe san gguni an Resol uti on No. 255 (Ser ies of 199 4)supporting the issuance of the now challengedProclamation No. 420, have legal standing to bring the presentpetition.

COMMUNICATION MATERIALS AND DESIGN, INC et al vs.CA et al.G.R. No. 102223August 22, 1996

FACTS: Petitioners COMMUNICATION MATERIALS AND DESIGN, INC., (CMDI) and ASPAC MULTI-TRADE INC., (ASPAC) are both domestic corporations.. Private Respondents ITEC, INC. and/or

ITEC, INTERNATIONAL, INC. (ITEC) are corporations duly organized and existing under the laws of

the State of Alabama, USA. There is no dispute that ITEC is a foreign corporation not licensed to

do business in the Philippines.

ITEC entered into a contract with ASPAC referred to as Representative Agreement. Pursuant tothe contract, ITEC engaged ASPAC as its exclusive representative in the Philippines for the sale

of ITECs products, in consideration of which, ASPAC was paid a stipulated commission. Through a

License Agreement entered into by the same parties later on, ASPAC was able to incorporate and

use the name ITEC in its own name. Thus , ASPAC Multi-Trade, Inc. became legally and publicly

known as ASPAC-ITEC (Philippines).

One year into the second term of the parties Representative Agreement, ITEC decided to

terminate the same, because petitioner ASPAC allegedly violated its contractual commitment as

stipulated in their agreements. ITEC charges the petitioners and another Philippine Corporation,

DIGITAL BASE COMMUNICATIONS, INC. (DIGITAL), the President of which is likewise petitioner

Aguirre, of using knowledge and information of ITECs products specifications to develop their own

line of equipment and product support, which are similar, if not identical to ITECs own, and

offering them to ITECs former customer.

The complaint was filed with the RTC-Makati by ITEC, INC. Defendants filed a MTD the complaint

on the following grounds: (1) That plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue as it is a foreign

corporation doing business in the Philippines without the required BOI authority and SEC license,

and (2) that plaintiff is simply engaged in forum shopping which justifies the application against it

of the principle of forum non conveniens. The MTD was denied.

Petitioners elevated the case to the respondent CA on a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition

under Rule 65 of the Revised ROC. It was dismissed as well. MR denied, hence this Petition for

Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.

ISSUE:1. Did the Philippine court acquire jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner corp, despite

allegations of lack of capacity to sue because of non-registration?

2. Can the Philippine court give due course to the suit or dismiss it, on the principle of forum non

convenience?

HELD: petition dismissed. 1. YES; We are persuaded to conclude that ITEC had been engaged in or doing business in the

Philippines for some time now. This is the inevitable result after a scrutiny of the different

contracts and agreements entered into by ITEC with its various business contacts in the country.

Its arrangements, with these entities indicate convincingly that ITEC is actively engaging in

business in the country.

A foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines may sue in Philippine Courts although not

authorized to do business here against a Philippine citizen or entity who had contracted with and

benefited by said corporation. To put it in another way, a party is estopped to challenge the

personality of a corporation after having acknowledged the same by entering into a contract withit. And the doctrine of estoppel to deny corporate existence applies to a foreign as well as to

domestic corporations. One who has dealt with a corporation of foreign origin as a corporate entity

is estopped to deny its corporate existence and capacity.

In Antam Consolidated Inc. vs. CA et al. we expressed our chagrin over this commonly used

scheme of defaulting local companies which are being sued by unlicensed foreign companies not

engaged in business in the Philippines to invoke the lack of capacity to sue of such foreign

companies. Obviously, the same ploy is resorted to by ASPAC to prevent the injunctive action filed

by ITEC to enjoin petitioner from using knowledge possibly acquired in violation of fiduciary

arrangements between the parties.

2. YES; Petitioners insistence on the dismissal of this action due to the application, or non

application, of the private international law rule of forum non conveniens defies well-settled rulesof fair play. According to petitioner, the Philippine Court has no venue to apply its discretion


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whether to give cognizance or not to the present action, because it has not acquired jurisdiction

over the person of the plaintiff in the case, the latter allegedly having no personality to sue before

Philippine Courts. This argument is misplaced because the court has already acquired jurisdiction

over the plaintiff in the suit, by virtue of his filing the original complaint. And as we have already

observed, petitioner is not at liberty to question plaintiffs standing to sue, having already acceded

to the same by virtue of its entry into the Representative Agreement referred to earlier.

Thus, having acquired jurisdiction, it is now for the Philippine Court, based on the facts of the

case, whether to give due course to the suit or dismiss it, on the principle of forum non

convenience. Hence, the Philippine Court may refuse to assume jurisdiction in spite of its having

acquired jurisdiction. Conversely, the court may assume jurisdiction over the case if it chooses to

do so; provided, that the following requisites are met:

1) That the Philippine Court is one to which the parties may conveniently resort to;

2) That the Philippine Court is in a position to make an intelligent decision as to the law and the

facts; and,

3) That the Philippine Court has or is likely to have power to enforce its decision.

The aforesaid requirements having been met, and in view of the courts disposition to give due

course to the questioned action, the matter of the present forum not being the most convenient

as a ground for the suits dismissal, deserves scant consideration.

SCHMID & OBERLY, INC. vs. RJL MARTINEZ

G.R. No. 75198 October 18, 1988

Facts:

RJL Martinez Fishing Corporation is engaged in deep-sea fishing. In the course of its business, it needed

electrical generators for the operation of its business. Schmid and Oberly sells electrical generators with

the brand of Nagata, a Japanese product. D. Nagata Co. Ltd. of Japan was Schmids supplier. Schmid

advertised the 12 Nagata generators for sale and RJL purchased 12 brand new generators. Through an

irrevocable line of credit, Nagata shipped to the Schmid the generators and RJL paid the amount of the

purchase price. (First sale = 3 generators; Second sale = 12 generators).

Later, the generators were found to be factory defective. RJL informed the Schmid that it shall return the

12 generators. 3 were returned. Schmid replaced the 3 generators subject of the first sale with generators

of a different brand. As to the second sale, 3 were shipped to Japan and the remaining 9 were not

replaced.

RJL sued the defendant on the warranty, asking for rescission of the contract and that Schmid be ordered

to accept the generators and be ordered to pay back the purchase money as well as be liable for damages.

Schmid opposes such liability averring that it was merely the indentor in the sale between Nagata Co., the

exporter and RJL Martinez, the importer. As mere indentor, it avers that is not liable for the sellers

implied warranty against hidden defects, Schmid not having personally assumed any such warranty.

Issue:

1) WON the second transaction between the parties was a sale or an indent transaction? INDENT

TRANSACTION

2) Even is Schmid is merely an indentor, may it still be liable for the warranty? YES, under its contractual

obligations it may be liable. But in this case, Schmid did not warrant the products.

Held:

An indentor is a middlemen in the same class as commercial brokers and commission merchants. A broker

is generally defined as one who is engaged, for others, on a commission, negotiating contracts relative to

property with the custody of which he has no concern; the negotiator between other parties, never acting

in his own name but in the name of those who employed him; he is strictly a middleman and for some


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purpose the agent of both parties. There are 3 parties to an indent transaction, (1) buyer, (2) indentor, and

(3) supplier who is usually a non-resident manufacturer residing in the country where the goods are to be

bought. The chief feature of a commercial broker and a commercial merchant is that in effecting a sale,

they are merely intermediaries or middle-men, and act in a certain sense as the agent of both parties to

the transaction.

RJL MARTINEZ admitted that the generators were purchased through indent order. RJL admitted in its

demand letter previously sent to SCHMID that 12 of 15 generators were purchased through your

company, by indent order and three (3) by direct purchase. The evidence also show that RJL MARTINEZ

paid directly NAGATA CO, for the generators, and that the latter company itself invoiced the sale and

shipped the generators directly to the former. The only participation of Schmid was to act as an

intermediary or middleman between Nagata and RJL, by procuring an order from RJL and forwarding the

same to Nagata for which the company received a commission from Nagata.

Sale vs. Indent Transaction:

The essence of the contract of sale is transfer of title or agreement to transfer it for a price paid or

promised. If such transfer puts the transferee in the attitude or position of an owner and makes him liable

to the transferor as a debtor for the agreed price, and not merely as an agent who must account for the

proceeds of a resale, the transaction is, a sale.

3 evidences pointing to fact that Schmid is merely an indentor:

a. the Quotation and the General Conditions of Sale on the dorsal side thereof do not necessarily lead to

the conclusion that NAGATA CO., was the real seller of the 12 generators.

b. When RJL complained to SCHMID, it immediately asked RJL to send the defective generators to its shop

to determine what was wrong. SCHMID informed NAGATA about the complaint of RJL. After the generators

were found to have factory defects, SCHMID facilitated the shipment of three (3) generators to Japan and,

after their repair, back to the Philippines.

c. the letter from NAGATA CO. to SCHMID regarding the repair of the generators indicated that the latter

was within the purview of a seller.

2)

Even as SCHMID was merely an indentor, there was nothing to prevent it from voluntarily warranting that

twelve (12) generators subject of the second transaction are free from any hidden defects. In other words,

SCHMID may be held answerable for some other contractual obligation, if indeed it had so bound itself. As

stated above, an indentor is to some extent an agent of both the vendor and the vendee. As such agent,

therefore, he may expressly obligate himself to undertake the obligations of his principal.

Notably, nowhere in the Quotation is it stated therein that SCHMID did bind itself to answer for the defects

of the things sold. Balagtas testified initially that the warranty was in the receipts covering the sale.

Nowhere is it stated in the invoice that SCHMID warranted the generators against defects. He again

changed his mind and asserted that the warranty was given verbally. Hence, RJL has failed to prove that

SCHMID had given a warranty on the 12 generators subject of the second transaction.

MR Holdings Ltd. vs. Sheriff Bajar Case Digest

MR Holdings Ltd. vs. Sheriff Bajar

[GR 138104, April 11, 2002]

Facts: Under a "Principal Loan Agreement" and "Complementary Loan Agreement," both dated 4 November 1992,

Asian Development Bank (ADB), a multilateral development finance institution, agreed to extend to Marcopper Mining

Corporation (Marcopper) a loan in the aggregate amount of US$40,000,000.00 to finance the latter's mining project at

Sta. Cruz, Marinduque. The principal loan of US$15,000,000.00 was sourced from ADB's ordinary capital resources,

while the complementary loan of US$25,000,000.00 was funded by the Bank of Nova Scotia, a participating finance

institution. On even date, ADB and Placer Dome, Inc., (Placer Dome), a foreign corporation which owns 40% of

Marcopper, executed a "Support and Standby Credit Agreement" whereby the latter. agreed to provide Marcopper

with cash flow support for the payment of its obligations to ADB. To secure the loan, Marcopper executed in favor of


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ADB a "Deed of Real Estate and Chattel Mortgage" dated 11 November 1992, covering substantially all of its

(Marcopper's) properties and assets in Marinduque.

It was registered with the Register of Deeds on 12 November 1992. When Marcopper defaulted in the payment of its

loan obligation, Placer Dome, in fulfillment of its undertaking under the "Support and Standby Credit Agreement," and

presumably to preserve its international credit standing, agreed to have its subsidiary corporation, MR Holding, Ltd.,

assumed Marcopper's obligation to ADB in the amount of US$18,453,450.02. Consequently, in an "Assignment

Agreement" dated 20 March 1997 ADB assigned to MR Holdings all its rights, interests and obligations under the

principal and complementary loan agreements, ("Deed of Real Estate and Chattel Mortgage," and "Support and

Standby Credit Agreement"). On 8 December 1997, Marcopper likewise executed a "Deed of Assignment" in favor of

MR Holdings. Under its provisions, Marcopper assigns, transfers, cedes and conveys to MR Holdings, its assigns

and/or successors-in-interest all of its (Marcopper's) properties, mining equipment and facilities. Meanwhile, it

appeared that on 7 May 1997, Solidbank Corporation (Solidbank) obtained a Partial Judgment against Marcopper

from the RTC, Branch 26, Manila, in Civil Case 96-80083, ordering Marcopper to pay Solidbank he amount if PHP

52,970,756.89, plus interest and charges until fully paid; to pay an amount equivalent to 10% of above-stated amount

as attorney's fees; and to pay the costs of suit. Upon Solidbank's motion, the RTC of Manila issued a writ of execution

pending appeal directing Carlos P. Bajar, sheriff, to require Marcopper "to pay the sums of money to satisfy the

Partial Judgment." Thereafter, Bajar issued two notices of levy on Marcopper's personal and real properties, and over

all its stocks of scrap iron and unserviceable mining equipment. Together with sheriff Ferdinand M. Jandusay of the

RTC, Branch 94, Boac, Marinduque, Bajar issued two notices setting the public auction sale of the levied properties

on 27 August 1998 at the Marcopper mine site. Having learned of the scheduled auction sale, MR Holdings served an

"Affidavit of Third-Party Claim" upon the sheriffs on 26 August 1998, asserting its ownership over all Marcopper's

mining properties, equipment and facilities by virtue of the "Deed of Assignment." Upon the denial of its "Affidavit of

Third-Party Claim" by the RTC of Manila, MR Holdings commenced with the RTC of Boac, Marinduque, presided by

Judge Leonardo P. Ansaldo, a complaint for reivindication of properties, etc., with prayer for preliminary injunction

and temporary restraining order against Solidbank, Marcopper, and sheriffs Bajar and Jandusay (Civil Case 98-13).

In an Order dated 6 October 1998, Judge Ansaldo denied MR Holdings' application for a writ of preliminary injunction

on the ground that (a) MR Holdings has no legal capacity to sue, it being a foreign corporation doing business in the

Philippines without license; (b) an injunction will amount "to staying the execution of a final judgment by a court of co-

equal and concurrent jurisdiction;" and (c) the validity of the "Assignment Agreement" and the "Deed of Assignment"

has been "put into serious question by the timing of their execution and registration." Unsatisfied, MR Holdings

elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals on a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus (CA-GR SP

49226). On 8 January 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision affirming the trial court's decision. MR

Holdings filed the Petition for Review on Certiorari.

Issue:Whether MR Holdings' participation under the "Assignment Agreement" and the "Deed of Assignment"

constitutes doing business.

Held: Batas Pambansa 68, otherwise known as "The Corporation Code of the Philippines," is silent as to what

constitutes doing" or "transacting" business in the Philippines. Fortunately, jurisprudence has supplied the deficiency

and has held that the term "implies a continuity of commercial dealings and arrangements, and contemplates, to that

extent, the performance of acts or works or the exercise of some of the functions normally incident to, and in

progressive prosecution of, the purpose and object for which the corporation was organized." The traditional case law

definition has metamorphosed into a statutory definition, having been adopted with some qualifications in various

pieces of legislation in Philippine jurisdiction, such as Republic Act 7042 (Foreign Investment Act of 1991), and

Republic Act 5455. There are other statutes defining the term "doing business," and as may be observed, one

common denominator among them all is the concept of "continuity." The expression "doing business" should not be

given such a strict and literal construction as to make it apply to any corporate dealing whatever. At this early stage

and with MR Holdings' acts or transactions limited to the assignment contracts, it cannot be said that it had performed

acts intended to continue the business for which it was organized. Herein, at this early stage and with MR Holdings'

acts or transactions limited to the assignment contracts, it cannot be said that it had performed acts intended tocontinue the business for which it was organized. It may not be amiss to point out that the purpose or business for

which MR Holdings was organized is not discernible in the records. No effort was exerted by the Court of Appeals to

establish the nexus between MR Holdings' business and the acts supposed to constitute "doing business." Thus,

whether the assignment contracts were incidental to MR Holdings' business or were continuation thereof is beyond

determination. The Court of Appeals' holding that MR Holdings was determined to be "doing business" in the

Philippines is based mainly on conjectures and speculation. In concluding that the "unmistakable intention" of MR

Holdings is to continue Marcopper's business, the Court of Appeals hangs on the wobbly premise that "there is no

other way for petitioner to recover its huge financial investments which it poured into Marcopper's rehabilitation

without it (petitioner) continuing Marcopper's business in the country." Absent overt acts of MR Holdings from which

we may directly infer its intention to continue Marcopper's business, the Supreme Court cannot give its concurrence.

Significantly, a view subscribed upon by many authorities is that the mere ownership by a foreign corporation of a

property in a certain state, unaccompanied by its active use in furtherance of the business for which it was formed, is

insufficient in itself to constitute doing business. Further, long before MR Holdings assumed Marcopper's debt to ADB


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and became their assignee under the two assignment contracts, there already existed a "Support and Standby Credit

Agreement" between ADB and Placer Dome whereby the latter bound itself to provide cash flow support for

Marcopper's payment of its obligations to ADB. Plainly, MR Holdings' payment of US$18,453,450.12 to ADB was

more of a fulfillment of an obligation under the "Support and Standby Credit Agreement" rather than an investment.

That MR Holdings had to step into the shoes of ADB as Marcopper's creditor was just a necessary legal

consequence of the transactions that transpired. Also, the "Support and Standby Credit Agreement" was executed 4

years prior to Marcopper's insolvency, hence, the alleged "intention of MR Holdings to continue Marcopper'sbusiness" could have no basis for at that time, Marcopper's fate cannot yet be determined. In the final analysis, MR

Holdings was engaged only in isolated acts or transactions. Single or isolated acts, contracts, or transactions of

foreign corporations are not regarded as a doing or carrying on of business. Typical examples of these are the

making of a single contract, sale, sale with the taking of a note and mortgage in the state to secure payment therefor,

purchase, or note, or the mere commission of a tort. In these instances, there is no purpose to do any other business

within the country.

Vinoya v. NLRC [G.R. No. 126596, February 2, 2000]

Tuesday, January 27, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes

Labels:Case Digests,Labor Law

FACTS:Petitioner Vinoya was hired by RFC as sales representative. He avers that he was transferred

by RFC to PMCI, an agency which provides RFC with additional contractual workers. In PMCI, he was

reassigned to RFC as sales representative and then later informed by the personnel manager of RFC

that his services were terminated. RFC maintains that no employer-employee relationship existed

between petitioner and itself. Petitioner filed complaint for illegal dismissal. RFC alleges that PMCI is

an independent contractor as the latter is a highly capitalized venture.

ISSUE:Whether or not petitioner was an employee of RFC and thereby, illegally dismissed.

HELD: Yes. PMCI was a labor-only contractor. Although the Neridoctrine stated that it was enough

that a contractor had substantial capital to show it was an independent contractor, the case of Fuji

Xerox clarified the doctrine stating that an independent business must undertake the performance of

the contract according to its own manner and method free from the control of the principal. In this

case, PMCI did not even have substantial capitalization as only a small amount of its authorized capital

stock was actually paid-in. Also, PMCI did notcarry on an independent business or undertake the

performance of its contract according to its own manner and method. Furthermore, PMCI was not

engaged to perform a specific and special job or service, which is one of the strong indicators that is

an independent contractor. Lastly, in labor-only contracting, the employees supplied by the contractor

perform activities, which are directly related to the main business of its principal. It is clear that in this

case, the work ofpetitioner as sales representative was directly related to the business of RFC. Since

due to petitioners length of service, he attainedthe status of regular employee thus cannot be

terminated without just or valid cause. RFC failed to prove that his dismissal was for cause and that he

was afforded procedural due process. Petitioner is thus entitled to reinstatement plus full backwages

from his dismissal up to actual reinstatement.

Case Digest on Vinoya v. NLRC, G.R. No. 126596, February 2, 2000- Labor Law

Q: B is a lady Security Guard of Company O. She was last assigned at Vicente Madrigal Condominium II located in

Ayala Avenue,Makati. In a memorandum, the Building Administrator of VM Condomunium II complained of the laxity

of the guards in enforcing security measures and requested to reorganize the men and women assigned to the

building to induce more discipline and proper decorum. B was then transferred another building in Taytay, Rizal. B

filed a complaint alleging that her transfer amounted to an unjust dismissal. Was the transfer of B illegal?

A: No. Service-oriented enterprises adhere to the business adage that, the customer is always right. In the

employment of personnel, the employer has management prerogatives subject only to limitations imposed by law.The transfer of an employee would only amount to constructive dismissal when such is unreasonable, inconvenient,
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13/26

or prejudicial to the employee, and when it involves a demotion in rank or diminution of salaries, benefits and other

privileges. In this case, the transfer was done in good faith and in the best interest of the business enterprise.

Evidence does not show that Company O discriminated against B in effecting her transfer as such was done to

comply with a reasonable request. The mere inconvenience of a new job assignment does not by itself make the

transfer illegal.

Q: Give an example of export sales under the Omnibus Investment Code of 1987 and other special laws .

In Panasonic Communications Imaging Corporation of the Philippines v. CIR, Panasonic produced and exported paper copiers

and their sub-assemblies, parts, and components. It was registered with the Board of Investments as a preferred pioneer

enterprise under the Omnibus Investment Code of 1987; it was a registered VAT enterprise; and its export sales were zero-

rated.

[Panasonic Communications Imaging Corporation of the Philippines v. CIR, GR No. 178090, 8 Feb. 2010.]

Cargill Inc. vs Intra Strata Assurance Corporation

Facts:

Cargill (foreign) is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of Delaware. Cargill executed a contract with Northern Mindanao Corporation (NMC) (domestic), whereby NMC agreed to sell to

petitioner 20,000 to 24,000 metric tons of molasses to be delivered from Jan 1 to 30 1990 for $44 per metric ton

The contract provided that CARGILL was to open a Letter of Credit with the BPI. NMC was permitted to draw up500,000 representing the minimum price of the contract

The contract was amended 3 times (in relation to the amount and the price). But the third amendment required NMC toput up a performance bond which was intended to guarantee NMCs performance to deliver the molasses during theprescribed shipment periods

In compliance, INTRA STRATA issued a performance bond to guarantee NMCs delivery. NMC was only able to deliver 219551 metric tons out of the agreed 10,500. Thus CARGILL sent demand letters to

INTRA claiming payment under the performance and surety bonds. When INTRA failed to pay, CARGILL filed acomplaint.

CARGILL NMC and INTRA entered into a compromise agreement approved by the court, such provided that NMCwould pay CARGILL 3 million upon signing and would deliver to CARGILL 6,991 metric tons of molasses. But NMC

still failed to comply RTCin favor of CARGILL CACARGILL does not have the capacity to file suit since it was a foreign corporation doing business in the PH

without the requisite license. The purchase of molasses were in pursuance of its basic business and not just mereisolated and incidental transactions

Issue: Whether or not petitioner is doing or transacting business in the Philippines in contemplation of the law and established

jurisprudence/ Whether or not CARGILL, an unlicensed foreign corporation, has legal capacity to sue before Philippine courts.

Held: YES

According to Article 123 of the Corporation Code, a foreign corporation must first obtain a license and a certificatefrom the appropriate government agency before it can transact business in the Philippines. Where a foreign corporationdoes business in the Philippines without the proper license, it cannot maintain any action or proceeding beforePhilippine courts, according to Article 133 of the Corporation Code

Doing Businesso .. and any other act or acts that imply a continuity of commercial dealings or arrangements, and

contemplate to that extent the performance of acts or works, or the exercise of some of the functionsnormally incident to, and in progressive prosecution of, commercial gain or of the purpose and objectof the business organization.

Since INTRA is relying on Section 133 of the Corporation Code to bar petitioner from maintaining an action inPhilippine courts, INTRA bears the burden of proving that CARGILL was doing business in the PH. In this case, wefind that INTRA failed to prove that CARGILLs activities in the Philippines constitute doing business as would

prevent it from bringing an action.

There is no showing that the transactions between petitioner and NMC signify the intent of petitioner to establish acontinuous business or extend its operations in the Philippines.

In this case, the contract between petitioner and NMC involved the purchase of molasses by petitioner from NMC. Itwas NMC, the domestic corporation, which derived income from the transaction and not petitioner. To constitutedoing business, the activity undertaken in the Philippines should involve profit-making.

Other factors which support the finding that petitioner is not doing business in the Philippines are: (1) petitionerdoes not have an office in the Philippines; (2) petitioner imports products from the Philippines through its non-exclusive local broker, whose authority to act on behalf of petitioner is limited to soliciting purchases of productsfrom suppliers engaged in the sugar trade in the Philippines; and (3) the local broker is an independent

contractor and not an agent of petitioner.

To be doing or transacting business in the Philippines for purposes of Section 133 of the Corporation Code, theforeign corporation must actually transact business in the Philippines, that is, perform specific business transactionswithin the Philippine territory on a continuing basis in its own name and for its own account

CARGILL is a foreign company merely importing molasses from a Philipine exporter. A foreign company that merelyimports goods from a Philippine exporter, without opening an office or appointing an agent in the Philippines, is notdoing business in the Philippines.

Constitutional Law 1 Exception to Non- Delegation Doctrine- Delegation to thePresident


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HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY vs. SOUTHWING HEAVY INDUSTRIES, INC.

G.R. No. 164171 February 20, 2006

HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, HON. SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS (DOTC),

COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, LAND TRANSPORTATION OFFICE (LTO), COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, SUBIC

BAY FREE PORT ZONE, AND CHIEF OF LTO, SUBIC BAY FREE PORT ZONE, Petitioners,

vs.

SOUTHWING HEAVY INDUSTRIES, INC., represented by its President JOSE T. DIZON, UNITED AUCTIONEERS, INC., represented byits President DOMINIC SYTIN, and MICROVAN, INC., represented by its President MARIANO C. SONON, Respondents.

G.R. No. 164172 February 20, 2006

HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATION (DOTC),

COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, LAND TRANSPORTATION OFFICE (LTO), COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, SUBIC

BAY FREE PORT ZONE AND CHIEF OF LTO, SUBIC BAY FREE PORT ZONE, Petitioners,

vs.

SUBIC INTEGRATED MACRO VENTURES CORP., represented by its President YOLANDA AMBAR,Respondent.

G.R. No. 168741 February 20, 2006

HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, HON. SECRETARY OF FINANCE, THE CHIEF OF THE LAND TRANSPORTATION OFFICE, THE

COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, and THE COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, SUBIC SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONE, Petitioners,

vs.

MOTOR VEHICLE IMPORTERS ASSOCIATION OF SUBIC BAY FREEPORT, INC., represented by its President ALFREDO S.GALANG, Respondent.

CASE This instant consolidated petitions seek to annul the decisions of the Regional Trial Court which declared Article 2, Section

3.1 of Executive Order 156 unconstitutional. Said EO 156 prohibits the importation of used vehicles in the country inclusive of

the Subic Bay Freeport Zone.

FACTS

On December 12, 2002, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued Executive Order 156 entitled "Providing for acomprehensive industrial policy and directions for the motor vehicle development program and its implementing

guidelines." The said provision prohibits the importation of all types of used motor vehicles in the country including the

Subic Bay Freeport, or the Freeport Zone,subject to a few exceptions.

Consequently, three separate actions for declaratory relief were filed by Southwing Heavy Industries Inc, SubicIntegrated Macro Ventures Corp, and Motor Vehicle Importers Association of Subic Bay Freeport Inc. praying that

judgment be rendered declaring Article 2, Section3.1 of the EO 156 unconstitutional and illegal.

The RTC rendered a summary judgment declaring that Article 2, Section 3.1 of EO 156 constitutes an unlawfulusurpation of legislative power vested by the Constitution with Congress and that the proviso is contrary to the

mandate of Republic Act 7227(RA 7227) or the Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992 which allows the

free flow of goods and capital within the Freeport.

The petitioner appealed in the CA but was denied on the ground of lack of any statutory basis for the President toissue the same. It held that the prohibition on the importation of use motor vehicles is an exercise of police power

vested on the legislature and absent any enabling law, the exercise thereof by the President through an executive

issuance is void.

ISSUE

Whether or not Article2, Section3.1 of EO 156 is a valid exercise ofthePresidentsquasi-legislativepower. YES.SC RULING

Police power is inherent in a government to enact laws, within constitutional limits, to promote the order, safety,health, morals, and general welfare of society. It is lodged primarily with the legislature. By virtue of a valid delegation

of legislative power, it may also be exercised by the President and administrative boards, as well as the lawmaking

bodies on all municipal levels, including the barangay. Such delegation confers upon the President quasi-legislative

powerwhich may be defined as the authority delegated by the law-making body to the administrative body to adopt

rules and regulations intended to carry out the provisions of the law and implement legislative policyprovided that it

must comply with the following requisites:

(1) Its promulgation must be authorized by the legislature;

(2) It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure;

(3) It must be within the scope of the authority given by the legislature; and

(4) It must be reasonable.

The first requisite was actually satisfied since EO 156 has both constitutional and statutory bases.

Anent the second requisite, that the order must be issued or promulgated in accordance with the prescribed

procedure, the presumption is that the said executive issuance duly complied with the procedures and limitationsimposed by law since the respondents never questioned the procedure that paved way for the issuance of EO 156 but

instead, what they challenged was the absence of substantive due process in the issuance of the EO.

In the third requisite, the Court held that the importation ban runs afoul with the third requisite as administrativeissuances must not be ultra vires or beyond the limits of the authority conferred. In the instant case, the subject

matter of the laws authorizing the President to regulate or forbid importation of used motor vehicles, is the domestic

industry. EO 156, however, exceeded the scope of its application by extending the prohibition on the importation of

used cars to the Freeport, which RA 7227, considers to some extent, a foreign territory.The domesticindustrywhich

the EO seeks to protect is actually the "customs territory" which is defined under the Rules and Regulations

Implementing RA 7227 which states: "the portion of the Philippines outside the Subic Bay Freeport where the Tariff

and Customs Code of the Philippines and other national tariff and customs laws are in force and effect."

Regarding the fourth requisite, the Court finds that the issuance of EO is unreasonable. Since the nature of EO 156 is

to protect the domestic industry from the deterioration of the local motor manufacturing firms, the Court however,finds no logic in all the encompassing application of the assailed provision to the Freeport Zone which is outside the


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customs territory of the Philippines. As long as the used motor vehicles do not enter the customs territory, the injury

or harm sought to be prevented or remedied will not arise.

The Court finds that Article 2, Section 3.1 of EO 156 is VOID insofar as it is made applicable within the securedfenced-in former Subic Naval Base areabut isdeclared VALID insofar as it applies to the customs territory or the

Philippine territory outsidethe presently secured fenced-in former Subic Naval Base areaas stated in Section 1.1 of

EO 97-A (an EO executed by Pres. Fidel V. Ramos in 1993 providing the Tax and Duty Free Privilege within the Subic

Freeport Zone). Hence, used motor vehicles that come into the Philippine territory via the secured fenced-in formerSubic Naval Base area may be stored, used or traded therein, or exported out of the Philippine territory, but they

cannot be imported into the Philippine territory outside of the secured fenced-in former Subic Naval Base area.

Petitions are PARTIALLY GRANTED provided that said provision is declared VALID insofar as it applies to the

Philippine territory outside the presently fenced-in former Subic Naval Base area and VOID with respect to its

application to the secured fenced-in former Subic Naval Base area.

Namuhe vs. Ombudsman G.R. No. 124965, October 29, 1998

Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes

Labels:Case Digests,Political Law

Facts:Petitioners were employed at the Mountain ProvinceEngineering District

and Ifugao Engineering District of the DPWH. In connection with the purported public bidding held for

the Bailey bridgecomponents for use in Mainit, Mountain Province, they were charged with dishonesty,

falsification of official documents, grave misconduct, gross neglect of duty, violation of office rules and

regulations and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. As a result, the Office of the

Ombudsman dismissed petitioners from the government service.

Issue:Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction over appeals of administrative disciplinary decisions of

the Office of the Ombudsman

Held:In Fabian v. Desierto (G.R. No. 129742, September 16, 1998), the Court held that appeals from

decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the

CA under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. In so holding, the Court en banc declared as

unconstitutional Sec. 27 of RA 6770 or the Ombudsman Act of 1989, which provided that decisions of

the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the SC by way of a petition for review on certiorari

under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Such provision was held violative of Sec. 30, Art. VI of the

Constitution, as it expanded the jurisdiction of the SC without its advice and consent.

ROMEO C. NAMUHE, petitioner, vs. THE OMBUDSMAN and OMB TASK FORCE ON PUBLICWORKS ANDHIGHWAYS, respondents.

[G.R. No. 124932. October 29, 1998]

JIMMIE F. TEL-EQUEN, ROLANDO D. RAMIREZ and RUDY P. ANTONIO, petiti oners, vs. Hon. FRANCISCO A.VILLA, Hon. GREGORIO VIGILAR and OMB TASK FORCE ON PUBLIC WORKS ANDHIGHWAYS, respondents.

[G.R. No. 124913. October 29, 1998]
http://cofferette.blogspot.com/2009/01/namuhe-vs-ombudsman-gr-no-124965.htmlhttp://cofferette.blogspot.com/search/label/Case%20Digestshttp://cofferette.blogspot.com/search/label/Political%20Lawhttp://cofferette.blogspot.com/search/label/Political%20Lawhttp://cofferette.blogspot.com/search/label/Case%20Digestshttp://cofferette.blogspot.com/2009/01/namuhe-vs-ombudsman-gr-no-124965.html


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ROMULO H. MABUNGA, petiti oner, vs. THE OMBUDSMAN and OMB TASK FORCE ON PUBLIC WORKS ANDHIGHWAYS, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

PANGANIBAN, J.:

In Fabian v. Desierto et al.,[1]this Court declared that Section 27 of Republic Act 6770, otherwise known as theOmbudsman Act of 1989, was unconstitutional. Accordingly, this Court has no jurisdiction over petitions for review of decisionsof the Office of the Ombudsman imposing administrative disciplinary sanctions.

The Case

Filed before us, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, are three Petitions for Review on Certiorariseeking the reversal ofthe March 28, 1994 Resolution[2]of the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB), which dismissed petitioners from government servicefor acts of dishonesty, falsification of public documents, misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of theservice.[3]

Likewise challenged is the OMBs Order dated December 11, 1995, which denied petitioners Motions for

Reconsideration.

The Facts

Petitioners Jimmie F. Tel-Equen, Rolando D. Ramirez and Rudy P. Antonio were employed at the Mountain ProvinceEngineering District (MPED) of the Department of Public Works and Highways in Bontoc, Mountain Province. Tel-Equen wasthe district engineer, Ramirez the assistant district engineer, and Antonio the chief of the construction section. On the other hand,Petitioners Romulo H. Mabunga and Romeo C. Namuhe were the district engineer and construction section chief, respectively, ofthe Ifugao Engineering District (IED) in Lagawe, Ifugao.

The petitioners were among the respondents in the Administrative Complaint, docketed as OMB-0-91-0430, filed by the

OMB Task Force on Public Works and Highways. In connection

with the purported public bidding held for the Bailey bridge components for use in Mainit, Mountain Province, they werecharged with dishonesty, falsification of official documents, grave misconduct, gross neglect of duty, violation of office rules andregulations and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.

As earlier stated, the OMB dismissed petitioners from the government service in the first assailed Resolution promulgatedon March 28, 1994, and denied reconsideration in the second challenged Order dated December 11, 1995.

Hence, these three petitions[4]were directly filed before this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.[5]In its Resolutiondated February 24, 1997, the Court ordered the consolidation of these cases.[6]

Ruling of the Ombudsman

In ordering the dismissal of herein petitioners from the government service, the OMB ruled:

x x x x x x x x x

After a circumspect evaluation of the record, it is crystal clear that there was conspiracy among the respondents, Jimmie F. Tel-Equen, Francisco Miranda, Rudy P. Antonio, Alfredo C. Apolinar, Rodolfo B. Camarillo and Felix Gasmena, Jr. to defraud thegovernment considering the following circumstances, to wit: Firstly, there was no immediate need for the bridge components and

yet, they made it appear that the same were needed; Secondly, they made it appear that on May 10, 1990, they conducted a publicbidding for said materials when in truth and in fact, there was no actual bidding as shown in the investigation report of the NBI;and lastly, the individual acts of the respondents contributed to the defraudation of the government when it was made to pay forits own property. While there was nothing illegal in the acts of Mabunga and Namuhe in the lending of the bailey bridgecomponents, it is obvious from their acts that they had knowledge of the transaction and cooperated with Jimmie F. Tel-Equenand other employees of the MPED in defrauding the government as shown by the following circumstances: Firstly, there isnothing in the records to show the necessity of lending the bridge components; secondly, it was the supplier, Dangayo, whohandcarried the letter-request of Tel-Equen to Mabunga and Namuhe. Had they been more circumspect in their actuations, they

would have questioned the authority of Dangayo to transact business with them for and in behalf of the MPED; and lastly, intheir statement before the NBI, they denied that it was Dangayo who brought the letter of Tel-Equen. They also denied havinganything to do with the lending of the bridge components and pointed to Manuel Aguana, (who was given immunity by the Hon.Ombudsman) as the culprit who acted on his own without their prior consent and approval. The reason is they [were] privy to thetransaction of Tel-Equen, otherwise they would have been more candid to the fact that it was Dangayo who went to their office tofacilitate the release of the bridge components.

x x x x x x x x x

As shown by the evidence on record, the government was defrauded in the amount of P553,900.00 on account of the fictitioustransaction engineered by the officials of the Mt. Province Engineering District (MPED) and the Ifugao Engineering District(IED) thru falsification of various official and public documents.

Issue
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/oct1998/124965.htm#_edn1http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/oct1998/124965.htm#_edn1http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/oct1998/124965.htm#_edn1http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/oct1998/124965.htm#_edn2http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/oct1998/124965.htm#_edn2http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/oct1998/124965.htm#_edn2http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/oct1998/124965.htm#_edn3http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/oct1998/124965.htm#_edn3http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/oct1998/124965.htm#_edn3http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/oct1998/124965.htm#_edn4http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/oct1998/124965.htm#_edn4http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/oct1998/124965.htm#_edn4http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/oct1998/124965.htm#_edn5http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/oct1998/124965.htm#_edn5http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/oct1998/124965.htm#_edn5http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/oct1998/124965.htm#_edn6http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/oct1998/124965.htm#_edn6http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/oct1998/124965.htm#_edn6http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/oct1998/124965.htm#_edn6http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/oct1998/124965.htm#_edn5http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/oct1998/124965.htm#_edn4http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/oct1998/124965.htm#_edn3http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/oct1998/124965.htm#_edn2http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/oct1998/124965.htm#_edn1


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Petitioner Tel-Equen contends that the evidence against him is weak and inadmissible, Petitioners Ramirez and Antonioassert that there was a misappreciation of pertinent facts, while Petitioners Mabunga and Namuhe insist that the findings againstthem have

Investment Dig

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