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Hizbullah: An Organizational and Operational ProfileMartin Rudner

Online publication date: 25 February 2010

To cite this Article Rudner, Martin(2010) 'Hizbullah: An Organizational and Operational Profile', International Journal ofIntelligence and CounterIntelligence, 23: 2, 226 — 246To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/08850600903565654URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/08850600903565654

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MARTIN RUDNER

Hizbullah: An Organizational andOperational Profile

Founded in 1982 in response to Israel’s invasion of Lebanon, Hizbullah1

(Arabic for ‘‘Party of God’’) is a radical Shi’a political and terroristorganization. Inspired and supported by Iran, it is committed to theremoval through violence of all non-Islamic influences in the Middle Eastand to the destruction of the State of Israel.2 Hizbullah shares its politicaland religious ideology with Iran and the doctrines of the late ayatollahsBaqir as Sadr and Ruhollah Khomeini, who held that a religious jurist(Wilayat al-Faqih) should hold supreme authority over the Shi’acommunity. Hizbullah looks to Iran’s Supreme leader, Ayatollah AliKhamenei and to Grand Ayatollah Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, theleading Lebanese Shi’a religious authority, for political and policyguidance in advancing the Islamic revolution in Lebanon.3 As well, inrecent years Hizbullah has transformed its relationship with Syria into thatof an intimate strategic partnership.4 Reflecting the world outlook of thisrevolutionary Shi’a leadership, Hizbullah has promulgated a political–cultural identity around religion as the mainspring for an unremittingrevolutionary struggle against perceived enemies of Islam.5

Dr. Martin Rudner is a Distinguished Research Professor Emeritus at CarletonUniversity, Ottawa, Canada. Prior to his retirement in July 2007, he wasfounding Director of the Canadian Centre of Intelligence and SecurityStudies at Carleton, and a professor at the University’s Norman PatersonSchool of International Affairs. Research support for this study was providedby the University of Toronto Law and Counter Terrorism Project and theSchwartz-Reisman Foundation.

International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 23: 226–246, 2010

Copyright # Taylor & Francis Group, LLC

ISSN: 0885-0607 print=1521-0561 online

DOI: 10.1080/08850600903565654

226 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INTELLIGENCE

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HIZBULLAH GOVERNANCE

Hizbullah is secretive regarding its governance apparatus and organizationalstructure. According to what is known, Hizbullah is configured as ahierarchical pyramid whose base coincides with the three predominantlyShi’a Lebanese territorial governorates: Beirut, Beqaa (Biqa) Valley, andsouthern Lebanon. Since its establishment in 1982, Hizbullah has rapidlyevolved into the sophisticated organizational structure and administrativesystem required by its growing stature, strength, and capabilities inLebanese affairs.6 While numerous specialized bureaus handle political,military, socioeconomic, and information matters, the administrative systemis both disciplined and flexible in shifting seamlessly among these political,social, and militant roles.7 Indeed, Hizbullah’s own leadership denies anydifferentiation among them, insisting that the ‘‘Party of God’’ is in allaspects an integral, holistic entity whose policies and activities aredetermined by a centralized, supreme authority.8 According to ProfessorAhmad Nizar Hamzeh, a distinguished scholarly expert on the organizationand its ideology, ‘‘[Hizbullah] is first and foremost a Jihadist movementthat uses political means, not a political party that pursues Jihad.’’9

Its commanding hypothesis is one of a centralized leadership that controlsevery aspect of the Party’s activities, including its military-terroristoperations. Leadership decisions are translated into explicit policydirectives driven by Hizbullah ideology and strategic purview, coupled withconsiderations and restraints reflecting the interests of Iran and Syria, themovement’s patrons. From the outset, certain Hizbullah activities andoperations were directly controlled by Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence andSecurity, and the Party routinely reported to Teheran through the IranianEmbassy in Damascus.10

The Decision-Making Shura Council

The governing body of Hizbullah and its overall controlling authority is itsDecision-Making Shura Council (Majlis Shura al-Qarar).11 Since 1992,Sheikh Hassan Sayyid Nasrallah, Hizbullah’s senior political leader, haspresided over the Shura Council in his capacity as Secretary-General of theorganization. (See Figure 1.) The Shura Council is composed of ninemembers: seven Lebanese plus two Iranian representatives (from theIranian embassies in Beirut and Damascus) who provide a direct link onmatters that require strategic guidance or Iranian assistance or arbitration.A majority of the Lebanese members are Shi’a clerics, which indicates thetheological–political thrust of Hizbullah leadership.12 As Secretary-Generalof the Hizbullah Shura Council, Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah is also beholdento the Wali-al-Faqiih, the supreme juridical authority of Shi’a Islam,Ayatollah Ali Khamenei of Iran.13 This jurisprudential accountability

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structure further binds Hizbullah to the ideological outlook and policyperspectives of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Functional Councils

Under the Hizbullah Shura Council are a Political Advisor and severalsubordinate functional councils: the Political Council, the Jihad=MilitaryCouncil, the Judicial Council, and the Executive Council. Each functionalcouncil manages several operational ‘‘desks’’ for dealing with keyissue-areas, e.g., for the Jihad=Military Council: the Militia Apparatus,Operations against Israel from Lebanon, and Overseas Operations from

Figure 1. Hizbullah’s Organizational Structure. Source: Hezbollah: Profile of the ShiiteTerrorist Organization of Global Reach Sponsored by Iran and Supported by Syria,Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, Center for Special Studies, SpecialInformation Bulletin, June 2003.

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Lebanon. The activities of all the functional councils, but in particular thePolitical Council and the Jihad=Military Council, are determined in detailby the Secretary-General and the Shura Council.

HIZBULLAH POLITICAL PLATFORM

Hizbullah has actively participated in Lebanon’s political system since 1992for the purpose of promoting Shi’a interests14 Hizbullah’s main politicalally is the Amal Party, once the leading voice of the Shi’a community butlong since supplanted by the more aggressive, tightly organized and betterfunded (by Iran and Syria) ‘‘Party of God.’’ Following the assassination ofLebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and nineteen others in February2005, a new government was elected in which the Hezbollah=Amal blocwon thirty-five seats in Parliament and a place in Prime Minister FouadSiniora’s national unity cabinet. Subsequent political turmoil and armedviolence between the Lebanese Army and Hizbullah militia culminated inthe Doha agreement of May 2008, which confirmed a Hizbullah veto overthe Lebanese Parliament.The subsequent general elections in June 2009, which Hizbullah framed as

a virtual referendum on the ‘‘resistance’’ as a leitmotif of Lebanese politicallife, witnessed a sharp diminution in the parliamentary representation gainedby Hizbullah and its electoral partners.15 How much political leverageHizbullah will retain over the government administration formed as aresult of those elections remains to be seen.Hizbullah’s political aims and ambitions were set out in its 1996 manifesto:

. resisting the Israeli occupation until ‘‘our’’ occupied land is completely liberated;

. achieving equality and establishing the ‘‘Just’’ State;

. the introduction of a more equitable economic policy for development;

. reforming public education and reinforcing the labor movement;

. a wide-ranging program of social, health, and housing measures;

. safeguarding public freedoms;

. a foreign policy stance designed to reinforce Lebanon’s connection with Syria,eliminate Western influence and interference in Lebanon, and deal withAmerica as identical to and supportive of the Israeli enemy.16

HIZBULLAH PHILANTHROPIC, SOCIOECONOMIC, ANDCULTURAL PROGRAMS

The financial support which Hizbullah receives from its Iranian and Syrianpatrons enables the organization to run a range of philanthropic, social,and welfare programs focused primarily on its core constituency, thedisadvantaged Shi’a communities in the Beirut suburbs, the Beqaa Valley,




and southern Lebanon. Apart from reflecting a genuine commitment toalleviating poverty and suffering, these programs aim to empower theLebanese Shi’a, reinforce their links and allegiances to Iran, and promotethe ‘‘Party of God’s’’ public profile and support base in Shi’a areas, whichare the primary recruiting grounds for Hizbullah’s armed militia.17

The services and facilities Hizbullah provides to help alleviate poverty andwin political support encompass hospitals, medical centers, schools,orphanages, and rehabilitation centers for the handicapped. Hizbullah hasestablished robust networks for the delivery of these services modeled onan Iranian prototype. Together with its chain of commercial enterprises,they are managed through an array of specialized units within theHizbullah apparatus:

. Culture and Information Department: responsible for cultural activities mainlyamong the Shi’a community;

. Education Department: runs schools and training programs following an Iraniancurriculum;

. Women’s Affairs Authority: in charge of the education and vocational training ofMuslim women;

. Health Authority: provides health and medical services, including clinics,medications, evacuation of casualties, and distribution of food;

. Social Bureau: developing solutions for social welfare problems;

. Bureau of Religious Studies: conducts religious education;

. Philanthropic Association: mandated to establish and run welfare institutions.

Of particular interest is the multiplicity of specialized institutions created byHizbullah in order to mobilize resources and deliver benefits to particulartarget groups:18

. Al-Shahid Social Association: Delivers financial and social assistance to familiesof ‘‘martyrs,’’ including suicide bombers and guerilla fighters;

. Al JarhaAssociation: Provides assistance for the rehabilitation of wounded fighters;

. Emdad Commitee for Islamic Charity: Through its nine branches the EmdadCommittee supports five schools, two care centers for handicapped children,and provides welfare assistance, health care, education and recreation,orphanages, emergency aid, and income generating programs, primarily insouthern Lebanon;

. Jehad al-Binah: Undertakes construction projects in infrastructure, housing, andmilitary installations to meet Hizbullah requirements. Also known as‘‘Construction for the Sake of the Sacred Struggle,’’ a loose translation of itsArabic name, Jehad al-Bina ranks as one of Lebanon’s most importantconstruction enterprises.19

. Waad Project: A large-scale, US$350þ million reconstruction and urbandevelopment initiative to rebuild the war-damaged Dahiye district of southernBeirut, the Hizbullah home-base, in fulfillment of Secretary-General Sayyid

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Nasrallah’s wartime ‘‘promise’’ (in Arabic, Waad).20 Some seventy-five firms areinvolved in this mega-project. In January 2009, the Waad Project was reportedlydesignated a terrorist enterprise by the U.S. government for providing materialassistance to the Hizbullah military and terrorist apparatus.21

. Lebanese Media Group: includes al-Manar television and al-Nour radio.Hizbullah’s electronic and print media has a remit to transmit politicalmessaging, ideological propaganda, and militant incitement.22

. Scouts: A youth movement offering paramilitary training and exercises.23

These activities are funded through financial and material support from Iranand Syria, supplemented by Hizbullah’s own revenue sources, legal andillegal. Hizbullah also operates a plethora of business enterprises, rangingfrom fuel suppliers and construction companies to real estate ventures, achain of discount cooperative supermarkets,24 and Hizbullah’s media andbroadcasting facilities, which include printing presses and the radio andtelevision stations, al-Nour and al-Manar.25

HIZBULLAH PROPAGANDA OUTLETS: AL-MANAR TELEVISIONAND AL-NOUR RADIO

Hizbullah owns and operates the television station, al-Manar (‘‘the beacon’’),and al-Nour radio, which broadcast the Party’s religious messages andpolitical propaganda worldwide.26 Over the years they have been used astools of incitement to hatred and violence against Americans and Jews; towage psychological warfare against Israel; and to provide support anddirection to Palestinian terrorist factions. Hizbullah’s media have beenused to promote and glorify suicide attacks, and to justify jihad (holy war)against putative enemies of Islam. The pernicious mix of glorifyingterrorism, incitement to violence, racial hatred, and anti-Semitism is havingespecially deleterious effects among impressionable Arabic-speaking youthin Europe.27

Al-Manar, founded in 1991, is funded by Iran and Shi’a communitiesabroad, as well by other Muslim communities in Europe, the United States,and Canada. Funds are openly and actively solicited over the air and onal-Manar’s Website, which are then channeled to Hizbullah accounts.Al-Manar has become a major satellite network transmitting the Hizbullahmessage to audiences in Europe, North and South America, Asia, andAfrica. It broadcasts twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week. InOctober 2008, Germany placed a ban on the local rebroadcast of al-Manarprogramming because of its propensity to ‘‘support, advocate and encourageviolence as a means of implementing political and religious interests andsupport organisations [i.e., Hizbullah] . . . that arrange, advocate and threatenattacks on persons or property.’’28 In December 2008, a U.S. businessman




pleaded guilty in a New York court to a federal charge of assisting terrorists byproviding satellite transmission services to al-Manar.

HIZBULLAH RESOURCING MECHANISMS

According to intelligence estimates, Hizbullah’s overall budget amounts toaround US$500 million annually.29 About US$100 million of this is said toderive from Iranian government and semi-governmental sponsors.30 Thiscontribution finances the organization’s military-terrorist activity (weaponsprocurement, militia salaries, logistics, etc.); post-conflict reconstructionand infrastructure development; social services and facilities such asschools, hospitals , and rel ief inst i tut ions; and the coverage ofadministrative overhead associated with various Hizbullah activities.Apart from aid transfers from Iran, Hizbullah has managed to build up its

own resourcing capacity founded upon four key pillars of fiscal support:

. Charitable fundraising: Hizbullah engages in fundraising activity in Lebanon andworldwide, mainly in the Shi’a-Muslim diaspora. It has established two frontorganizations, Bayt al-Mal and the Yousser Company for Finance andInvestment, to manage its assets and serve as intermediaries between itself andthe formal banking system.31 Bayt al-Mal functions as Hizbullah’s bank,creditor, and investment arm,32 but the organization also makes use of theYousser Company for Finance and Investment to secure loans and arrangebusiness deals in support of its activities. Actual fundraising is undertakenthrough charitable front organizations, like the Shahid Foundation (MartyrsFoundation), the United Kingdom-based Lebanese Welfare Committee, theHELP Charity Association for Relief, and the al-Mabarrat Association Lebanon,which has fundraising branches in other countries, including the United States.33

Germany has been a particularly valuable source for Hizbullah fundraising.34

. Legitimate commercial activity: Earnings of commercial firms owned by Hizbullahor its affiliated charitable institutions, as well as businesses owned by Hezbollahoperatives themselves.

. Enfo r c ed tax - l i k e l e v i e s : L ev i e s imposed on loca l bus ine s s e s i nHizbullah-dominated areas of Lebanon, and in particular the Beqaa Valley andsouthern Lebanon.35

. Criminal activity: Hizbullah operatives engage in criminal activities—mostnotably drug trafficking, smuggling, automobile theft, and credit card fraud;36

. Financial defalcation: A prominent Lebanese financer, Salah Ezz al-Din, reputedlyassociated with Hizbullah, was alleged to have illicitly diverted a substantial flowof investor funds from the Arab Gulf to Party coffers.37

. Government transfers: Hizbullah has also been successful in using its politicalleverage in the Lebanese Parliament in order to induce the governmentadministration to finance projects initiated by Hizbullah in Shi’a populatedareas. By so doing, Hizbullah reaps the publicity advantage and promotes itspolitical agenda at the expense of the national budget.

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. Cross-subsidies: Hizbullah-dominated areas in Lebanon have also benefitted froma massive, albeit hidden, cross-subsidy arising as a consequence of the generalrefusal of resident supporters to pay electricity bills.38 The financial lossessustained by the supplier, unable to enforce payment in the face of Hizbullahresistance, have had to be made up through large and growing Lebanesegovernment payments to the national power company Electricite du Liban. Ineffect, these transfers represent a substantial subsidy in favor of protectedHizbullah householders and enterprises.

HIZBULLAH GUERRILLA AND TERROR CAPABILITIES

The United States designated Hizbullah as a foreign terrorist organization in1997, and also gave it Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) statusin 2001. Other jurisdictions have also listed Hizbullah under their respectiveterrorism statutes, including Australia (Hizbullah’s military wing only),Canada, Israel, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom (military wingonly). Since the 1990s, Hizbullah has grown into a sophisticated politicaland military network that not only engages in guerrilla and terroroperations inside Lebanon, but perpetrates attacks and coordinatessupport activities all over the world against Jewish, American, and otherWestern targets. Its links with other international terrorist and criminalnetworks derive either from a shared pan-Islamic ideology or mutualoperational advantage.Hizbullah and its affiliates have a history of involvement in international

terrorism since their organizational inception. Among the most notoriousincidents attributed to Hizbullah have been suicide bombings againstFrench, American, and Israel i forces in Lebanon in the 1980s;hostage-taking and murders; aircraft hijacking; the bombing of Jewish andIsraeli premises in Argentina; rocket attacks on civilian communities innorthern Israel; along with ambushes and kidnapping, including a borderraid in 2006 which sparked the Second Lebanon War with Israel.39

United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1559 of 2004 and 1701 of2006 required Hizbullah and other Lebanese militias to disarm, but theyhave refused to do so.40 Indeed, Hizbullah is reported to have rebuilt itsstockpile of weaponry to unprecedented levels, including surface-to-airmissiles and ground-to-ground rockets capable of bombarding Tel Aviv.41

Hizbullah’s militia is funded, armed, and trained by Iran, and is given safehaven, logistical support, and operational backing by Syria. Itsheadquarters are in south Beirut, its command posts in Ba’albek andsouthern Lebanon, and its training bases and logistical facilities are mainlyin the Beqaa Valley, close to Syria. While it is capable and predisposed tooperate independently, Hizbullah often acts as a surrogate through whichIran and Syria seek to advance their strategic objectives in the region.




Strategic and high-level operational decisions are taken by itsSecretary-General, Sheikh Hassan Sayyid Nasrallah, together with the sixother members of the Decision-Making Shura Council. Additionally, thetwo Iranian representatives from Iran’s embassies in Beirut and Damascusprovide direct input on matters that require strategic guidance orTeheran’s assistance or arbitration.42 Reports also indicate the presence ofhigh-ranking envoys from Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards at themilitia command level.43

Hizbullah Order of Battle

Hizbullah’s core militant capability, which it styles the ‘‘Islamic Resistance,’’consists of three operational elements that communicate with each other onlythrough the operational headquarters hierarchy. These cover recruitment=training, guerilla warfare, and security=enforcement. Each element is madeup of self-contained, semi-autonomous, mobile contingents, interspersedthroughout Lebanon’s three Shi’a-dominated regions.The recruitment=training element identifies and selects prospective

guerrillas and then indoctrinates them with Wilayat al-Faqih (Leadershipby the Supreme Jurist) and the religious command to fight adversaries.Training is provided in combat skills, marksmanship, medical support, andweaponry. Attributes displayed by individuals during the training regimendetermine to which combat element they will be assigned.The combat element incorporates four operational contingents in its order

of battle:

a. Martyrs contingent for individuals willing to lead suicide operations.b. Commando contingent: Elite fighters who have distinguished themselves in

guerrilla warfare, some trained in Islamic revolutionary training camps in Iran.c. Rocket launching contingents: Operate heavy weapons, notably surface-to-

surface or surface-to-air rockets and mortars.d. Regular fighting contingents: Militant combatants, and also surveillance,

logistics, and medical support units.

The security=enforcement element consists of a Security Organ with twodistinct components: one covering Party Security and the other External(or Encounter) Security. The Security Organ is headed by a high-rankingHizbullah operative experienced in security and intelligence matters, whohas demonstrated a dedicated loyalty to the Secretary-General and ShuraCouncil.44 The Party Security component is charged with protecting theinternal security of Hizbullah and its affiliates, including suppressingdissent and preventing hostile penetrations of the Party apparatus.45 TheExternal Security component functions as a foreign intelligence unit,conducting espionage against targets, notably Israel; countering attempts

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by the Party’s domestic and foreign enemies to penetrate its ranks; anddispatching operatives abroad to infiltrate Lebanese and North Americandiaspora communities, legitimate business, and criminal networks.46

Hizbullah Militia Strength

The Hizbullah militia is primarily a light force, equipped with small arms, suchas automatic rifles, mortars, rocket-propelled grenades, and Katyusha rocketswhich are occasionally fired on towns in northern Israel. The U.S. governmentestimates that Hizbullah’s core consists of several thousand militants andactivities. According to Hizbullah, its militia strength is about 5,000–10,000strong. Other sources suggest a cadre of about 300–400 fighters, which canbe expanded to 3,000 if and when a battle occurs. Militia recruits are drawnmostly from Shi’a communities in southern Lebanon.The Hizbullah arsenal also deploys a few tanks and armored personnel

carriers, possibly captured from the Lebanese Army, and longer-rangeground-to-ground missiles and anti-shipping missiles from Iran. In late2009, evidence emerged that Hizbullah had acquired a chemical weaponscapability, including chemical artillery shells and short-range missiles withchemical warheads.47

Hizbullah Terror Operations Against Israel

Hizbullah leaders decry Israel’s ‘‘illegal existence’’48 and call for itsannihilation. They profess to be defending Lebanon against Israel’soccupation, but even after Israel withdrew from southern Lebanon in2000, Hizbullah continued its periodic attacks on the Shebaa Farms area(which the United Nations has declared is not Lebanese territory but partof Syria’s Golan Heights, under Israeli occupation since 1967) and otherIsraeli military and civilian targets.49 Hizbullah’s 1985 ‘‘Open Letter to theDowntrodden in Lebanon and the World,’’ underscored its tenet that‘‘Israel’s final departure from Lebanon is a prelude to its final obliterationfrom existence and the liberation of venerable Jerusalem from the talons ofoccupation.’’50 Hizbullah refuses to disarm, notwithstanding therequirements of United National Security Council Resolutions 1559 of2004 and 1701 of 2006. Indeed, Hizbullah continues to amass weaponry.More recently, Hizbullah has called into question the internationally

recognized border between Lebanon and Israel. In November 2008, NawafMusawi, its Head of International Relations, claimed that in 1920 ‘‘Zionistterror organizations’’ had shifted the northern boundary, deprivingLebanon of ‘‘millions of square meters’’ of village land.51

Hizbullah operations against Israeli targets include sniper and rocket fireon military outposts; ambushing convoys; planting explosive devices;




booby-trapping vehicles; and launching long-range mortar and Katyushaattacks on military bases and civilian communities near Israel’s borderwith Lebanon. In July 2006, a Hizbullah ambush killed three Israelisoldiers and kidnapped two others within Israel proper, triggering a swiftresponse that sparked the month-long Second Lebanon War.52

Ongoing Hizbullah activities directed against Israel include:

. Cross-border smuggling of terrorists and weapons into Israel;

. Setting up terrorist cells inside Israel (according to Israeli security authorities,since 2003 six Hizbullah cells have been uncovered among Israeli Arabs);

. Financial assistance to extremist Palestinian factions, e.g., Hamas, PalestinianIslamic Jihad, Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades;

. Technical advice to Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad on improving theirQassem rockets so as to increase their range and lethality;

. Operational advice to Hamas and Palestinian Islamic groups on guerrilla tacticsand other fighting techniques;

. Espionage on Israeli targets, sometimes using foreign nationals, particularly EUpassport holders.

In 2008, Azerbaijani authorities arrested a joint Hizbullah–IranianRevolutionary Guards cell suspected of plotting attacks on the buildinghousing the Israeli embassy (and also the Japanese and Thai embassies) inBaku, as well as on a Russian-operated radar station at Qabala.53 Later, in2009, the Israel security intelligence service reportedly foiled a Hizbullahplot to assassinate the Chief of the General Staff of the Israel DefenseForces (IDF), allegedly in retaliation for the killing of its head of externaloperations, Imad Mughniyeh, in Damascus in February 2008.54

In its ongoing intelligence war against Israel, Hizbullah claimed in early2009 to have dismantled an Israeli espionage network that had extensivelypenetrated its military apparatus. According to reports, this Hizbullahcounterespionage operation was assisted and supported by a special unit ofRussia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) using highly sophisticatedelectronic detection systems.55 Among those arrested and turned over toLebanese authorities for trial were high-ranking military and policepersonnel and prominent business personages.Hizbullah openly affirms that its material support for Palestinian

terrorism is deliberately intended to counteract the PalestinianAuthority’s declared goal of progressing toward peace with Israel.Prompted by their mutual link to Iran,56 Hizbullah and Hamas engagein regular consultations on strategic and military affairs, including thekidnapping of an Israeli soldier in Gaza. More moderate Muslimobservers complain that Islamist extremists of the sort Hizbullahsupports are hijacking the Palestinian cause and turning the resistanceto occupation into a war to eliminate the Jews.57

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HIZBULLAH’S INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE

Hizbullah has established a presence in virtually every country where aLebanese Shi’a diaspora is present. Its operatives have exploited theopenness and generosity of those jurisdictions in order to infiltratelegitimate community institutions and businesses, to engage in propagandaand incitement, to create ‘‘front’’ organizations for fundraising andrecruitment, and to engage in criminal activities intended to further theParty’s objectives.Beyond Lebanon, Hizbullah engages in terrorist-related activity in various

parts of the world through an extensive and growing network of alliances andpartnerships with other radical extremists and criminal groups. U.S.intelligence reports say that Hizbullah cells operate in Europe, Africa,South America, and North America.58 Terrorism analysts believe that thisinternational network of cells comprises some 15,000 operatives in theUnited States, Canada, Argentina, Paraguay, Brazil, Belgium, Britain,France, Germany, Spain, Switzerland, Indonesia, Malaysia, and much ofAfrica. These covert criminal and terrorist tentacles reach out globally tomount attacks and also to provide weapons, explosives, training, funding,and guidance to other allied extremist organizations.

Hizbullah Terror Operations Against Arab Targets

Within Lebanon, Hizbullah—along with Syria—has reportedly providedfunding, weaponry, and tactical support to militant Salafist groups engagedin violent confrontations in the north of the country.59 Elsewhere in Lebanon,nearly ninety percent of all attacks against international peacekeepers,diplomats, journalists, and ordinary civilians are attributed to Hizbullah.Across the Middle East, Arab governments are becoming increasinglyconcerned about Hizbullah activities seen as exacerbating the mountinganxieties over Iran’s projections of power and a widening Sunni–Shiite rift.60

In April 2009, Egyptian security authorities reportedly dismantled a majorHizbullah terror cell, arresting some fifty suspects for allegedly plotting, inleague with local militants, a series of attacks on targets in Egypt.61 Then,in June 2009, Egyptian authorities dismantled another terror network innorthern Sinai, suspected of plotting attacks on shipping in the Suez Canaland on natural gas pipelines, and allegedly linked to Hizbullah andal-Qaeda.62 Yemen’s president has also accused Hizbullah operatives oftraining Shiite rebels in that country.63

Hizbullah in the United States

According to U.S. intelligence officials, Hizbullah maintains agents andsleeper cells in the U.S. ready to embark on terrorist attacks when




summoned to do so by the Beirut leadership.64 Hizbullah activities in the U.S.include fundraising and money laundering, cigarette smuggling, currencycounterfeiting, credit card fraud, theft, and drug trafficking. Detroit hasbeen cited as the main center of Hizbullah fundraising activity in the U.S.The extent of Hizbullah’s activity in the U.S. was first exposed when two

brothers from North Carolina, Mohamad and Chawki Hammoud, wereconvicted in June 2002 of providing material support to Hizbullah througha cigarette smuggling ring that knowingly directed money to the terroristorganization. The terror cell reported directly back to a senior Hizbullahmilitary commander in Lebanon, and was part of a larger North Americannetwork responsible for raising funds and procuring dual-use technologiesfor Hizbullah. Items purchased in both the U.S. and Canada includedgoggles, global positioning systems, stun guns, naval equipment, nitrogencutters, and laser range finders.

Hizbullah in Europe

Hizbullah is known to maintain an extensive network of support andfundraising cells across Europe. According to intelligence officials,Hizbullah has established a presence in Belgium, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Croatia,Cyprus, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Lithuania, Norway,Romania, Russia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine,and the United Kingdom.65

Hizbullah’s European presence equips it with a potential to conduct terroroperations against local or international targets. German security authoritiesclaim that Hizbullah has some 900 Hizbullah core activists in the country,who regularly meet in thirty cultural community centers and mosques,giving it the capability to mount damaging terrorist attacks in Germany,Great Britain, and elsewhere in Europe.66 Hizbullah terrorism directedagainst European targets to date has included attacks and assassinations inFrance, Germany, and the United Kingdom.67 British authorities forewarnthat Hizbullah sleeper cells distributed throughout the U.K. arethreatening to attack local targets in retaliation against a military strike onIran. Indeed, some European counterterrorism officials reportedly expressgreater concern about Hizbullah than al-Qaeda.68

Hizbullah’s terror infrastructure in Europe has also served as a launchingpad for operations directed against Israel.69 The European cells haveprovided ‘‘cover’’—including fraudulent travel documents and resources—for Hizbullah operatives to travel surreptitiously to Israel in order toengage in espionage, conduct surveillance, liaise with local sleeper cells,remit funds, and mount attacks.Germany has been identified as Hizbullah’s main fundraising center in

Europe. Most of those funds come from charitable organizations and are

238 MARTIN RUDNER



ostensibly earmarked for Hizbullah’s social welfare work. In 2002, Germanyclosed down two such charitable organizations which were raising money forHizbullah: the al-Shahid Social Relief Institution, which was the Germanbranch of the Hizbullah Martyrs’ Foundation (Bonyad-e Shahid) inLebanon; and the al-Aqsa Fund, a Hamas front that also raised money forHizbullah. Other pseudo-charitable fronts, like the Orphans ProjectLebanon, an affiliate of the Shahid Foundation, reportedly continueserving as fundraising funnels for Hizbullah.70

The importance of European-sourced fundraising for Hizbullah wasacknowledged by Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah himself, when hereportedly told Arab media in 2005 that any European Union restrictionon fundraising would ‘‘destroy Hezbollah. The sources of our funding willdry up and the sources of moral, political, and material support will bedestroyed.’’71

Hizbullah in Canada

Hizbullah is known to have an active presence in Canada. According toCanadian intelligence authorities, Hizbullah raises funds, recruits terrorists,purchases military supplies, and forges travel documents in Canada.72

Suspected Hizbullah operatives wanted for terrorist activities overseas werefound hiding in Canada. Hizbullah has also been involved in criminalactivity in Canada, including credit card and banking scams, trade incontraband, and the theft of luxury cars for shipment to Lebanon for useby senior Hizbullah officials.A U.S.-based criminal ring raised funds and procured dual-use

technologies for Hizbullah through its Canadian link in Vancouver. TheCanadian component was alleged to have raised funds by engaging incredit card and banking fraud and used transfers from Hizbullah inLebanon and from its criminal rings in the U.S. to purchase dual-usemilitary technologies to be smuggled to Lebanon.More recently, Hizbullah has been suspected of conducting espionage on

prospective targets in Canada in preparation for retaliatory strikes againstthe West in the event of an attack on Iran.73 According to a Canadianintelligence assessment, Iran assigned Hizbullah the explicit responsibilityfor counterattacking with terror assaults on presumed aggressors and theirallies among Western countries. Hizbullah in turn committed itself toattacking Israeli interests ‘‘anywhere in the world,’’ and identified Canadaas a target, having made particular note of Jewish community facilities andIsraeli interests in the country.74 Canadian security services have reportedlywarned that Hizbullah operatives have already been deployed on scoutingoperations to ready tactical plans for attacks on selected targets if andwhen called upon.75




Hizbullah in South America

Hizbullah is widely present across South America, most notoriously in theTri-Border region of Paraguay, Brazil, and Argentina. The region has beenused by Hizbullah operatives for fundraising, money laundering, drugtrafficking, weapons and people smuggling, and document and currencyfraud. Hizbullah was implicated in the 1992 bombing of the IsraeliEmbassy in Buenos Aires, and the 1994 bombing of the AMIA Jewishcommunity center in Buenos Aires.Fundraising for Hizbullah is undertaken through legitimate enterprises,

charities, criminal activities, and extortion of money from local expatriateLebanese business people and professionals.76 Paraguayan authoritiesidentified a network run by Assad Ahmad Barakat, a leading Hizbullahoperative and chief financier in the Tri-Border region. This networkallegedly engaged in criminal and fundraising activities, remitting someUS$50 million a year to Hizbullah between 1995 and Barakat’s arrest byBrazilian police in 2002.

HIZBULLAH AND THE JUNE 2009 ELECTIONS

Hizbullah’s political base in Lebanon is grounded in the religio–regionalsolidarity of Shi’a communities in the south of the country, bolstered upby its military prowess, reinforced by an extensive network of coalitionsand partnerships, and commanded by an authoritative leadership sustainedby external resources and power.77 Because of this double dependency ontwo disparate political systems, the elections held in both Lebanon andIran in June 2009 may, ironically, have far-reaching ramifications on theevolving role of Hizbullah in future Lebanese and regional affairs.In Lebanon, the fiercely contested June 2009 general elections witnessed

Hizbullah plunging into the vortex of Lebanese politics in what wasgenerally perceived to be a national ‘‘referendum’’ on the ‘‘resistance.’’78

To be sure, Hizbullah and its coalition partners were bested at the polls bythe incumbent coalition of Sunni Arabs and other minorities that havegoverned Lebanon since 2005. Nevertheless, Hizbullah’s political alliancesand armed might will likely accord the ‘‘resistance’’ an irresistible voiceand strong leverage over national affairs under any new post-electiongovernment. Although the Lebanese state may lack the capacity to exercisecontrol over Hizbullah and its fighting forces, ‘‘The Party of God’’ hadnevertheless clearly failed in its bid to transform Lebanon politically into astate in its own image.As Lebanon seeks a new balance of political forces, the cut and thrust of

Hizbullah activism will depend, in good measure, on the course of politicaldevelopments in Iran in the aftermath of the June 2009 presidentialelections. Whereas the incumbent President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was

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declared victor in a controversial outcome, and in face of protests on thestreets and signs of dissention among the ruling mullocracy, the turbulentaftermath gouged sharp fault lines in the Iranian body politic. Whether theensuing internal tensions and political struggles will invoke a harsherregime response domestically, along with a more strident foreign policyposture, or whether there might emerge a more tempered, less intimidatingIranian pattern of conduct in its domestic, regional, and internationalaffairs, remains to be seen.79 Whereas the latter might prompt Hizbullahto adopt a more restrained stance on Lebanese affairs, the hard-lineleadership would be prone to deploy its Hizbullah proxy to attack rivalsand exploit tensions in support of Iranian power interests across theMiddle East.Just as war may be deemed to be, according to Carl von Clausewitz’s

classic definition, ‘‘a continuation of politics by other means,’’ so terrorismcan be considered to be a pursuit of warfare by other means. According toformer U.S. Secretary for Homeland Security Michael Chertoff, Hizbullahis today ‘‘the most sophisticated terrorist organization in the world.’’80 If,until recently, the Hizbullah ‘‘resistance’’ directed its terror operationsprimarily against Israel and other perceived threats to Lebanon, Hizbullahoperations latterly appear to be ranging more widely in support of, and asa spearhead for, Iran’s strategic agenda across the Mashraq, the easternrealm of Arabdom. How and to what extent current political developmentsin Lebanon itself, and to the leadership struggle in Iran, taken together,will impact upon the Hizbullah pursuit of politics, war, and terrorismremains a matter of conjecture.

REFERENCES1The Arabic name, hizbu-’llah(i), is transliterated in this article as ‘‘Hizbullah,’’ inconformity with the usage on the organization’s own Website; other spellings usedin various publications include Hezbollah, Hizb’Allah, Hizballah.

2On the origins and goals of Hizbullah see Ozlem Tur, ‘‘The Lebanese War of2006: Reasons and Consequences,’’ Perceptions, Vol. 12, No. 1, Spring, 2007,pp. 111–115; Ahmad Nizar Hamzeh, In the Path of Hizbullah (Syracuse, NY:Syracuse University Press, 2004); Magnus Ranstorp, Hizb’Allah in Lebanon:The Politics of the Western Hostage Crisis (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996).

3Yonah Alexander, ‘‘Hezbollah on EU Terror List?,’’ Middle East Times, 30September 2008; accessible at http://www.metimes.com/Opinion/2008/09/30/hezbollah_on_eu_terror_list/6274/

4Prem Kumar, ‘‘Realigning Syria,’’ Foreign Affairs, Vol. 88, No. 2, March=April2009, p. 136.

5Cf. Ian Buruma and Avishai Margalit, Occidentalism: The West in the Eyes of ItsEnemies (New York: Penguin Press, 2004), pp. 110–111.




6Hezbollah: Profile of the Shiite Terrorist Organization of Global Reach Sponsoredby Iran and Supported by Syria, Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center,Center for Special Studies, Special Information Bulletin, June, 2003; accessibleat http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/html/hezbollah.htm

7Ahmad Nizar Hamzeh, In the Path of Hizbullah, pp. 78–79.

8Hezbollah. Profile of the Shiite Terrorist Organization of Global Reach Sponsoredby Iran and Supported by Syria.

9Ahmad Nizar Hamzeh, In the Path of Hizbullah, p. 33.

10This Hizbullah dependence on Iran was noted from the outset by U.S. signalsintelligence intercepts of communications between Teheran and the IranianEmbassy in Damascus; see Matthew Aid, The Secret Sentry: The UntoldHistory of the National Security Agency (New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2009,pp. 178–179.

11Cf. Hezbollah. Profile of the Shiite Terrorist Organization of Global ReachSponsored by Iran and Supported by Syria, and Ahmad Nizar Hamzeh, In thePath of Hizbullah, p. 44.


13Yonah Alexander, ‘‘Hezbollah on EU Terror List?’’

14Cf. Ozlem Tur, ‘‘The Lebanese War of 2006: Reasons and Consequences,’’pp. 109–115.

15A Win for the West,’’ The Economist, 11 June 2009.

16Hezbollah’s 1996 Electoral manifesto cited in Hezbollah. Profile of the ShiiteTerrorist Organization of Global Reach Sponsored by Iran and Supported by Syria.

17Khalil Osman, ‘‘Key aspects of the modus operandi of Lebanon’s Hizbullah-ledIslamic Resistance,’’ Crescent International, 16–30 September 2000.

18Ibid.

19Matthew Levitt, ‘‘Shutting Hizballah’s ‘Construction Jihad,’ ’’ PolicyWatch#1202, 20 February 2007.

20‘‘Waad Project: Promise of a Continuous Victory,’’ al-Manar TV: http://www.almanar.com.lb/NewsSite/NewsDetails.aspx?id=53377&language=en

21Nicholas Kimbrell, ‘‘U.S. goes after Hizbullah’s Waad rebuilding effort,’’ DailyStar (Beirut), 9 January 2009.

22Avi Jorisch, ‘‘Al-Manar: Hizbullah TV, 24=7,’’ Middle East Quarterly, Vol. 11,No. 1, Winter 2004.

23Robert Worth, ‘‘Hezbollah Marshals the Young via Scout Troops,’’ The NewYork Times, 20 November 2008.

24Nimrod Raphaeli, ‘‘The Iranian Roots of Hizbullah,’’ MEMRI Inquiry andAnalysis Series, No. 448, 17 June 2008; accessible at http://memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=ia&ID=IA44808

25On the role and objectives of Hizbullah’s media strategy, see Rune Friberg Lyme,Hizb’allah’s Communication Strategy: Making Friends and Intimidating Enemies,Danish Institute for International Affairs, Report 2009–19.

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26Avi Jorisch, ‘‘Al-Manar: Hizbullah TV, 24=7.’’

27Ibid.

28Germany, Federal Ministry of the Interior, Ban Order Al Manar TV, Berlin, 29.October 2008, cited in Alexander Ritzmann, Hezbollah’s Fundraising Organizationin Germany, European Foundation for Democracy, Report 2009–01, Brussels,July 2009, p. 18.

29Anti-Defamation League of B’nai Brith, ‘‘Hizbullah’s International Reach,’’accessible at http://www.adl.org/terror/hezbollah_print.asp

30Daniel Byman, ‘‘Should Hizbullah Be Next?,’’ Foreign Affairs, November=December 2003.

31‘‘Treasury Designation Targets Hizbullah’s Bank,’’ Press Release, USDepartment of the Treasury, 7 September 2006, HP-83.

32Matthew Levitt, ‘‘Shutting Hizballah’s ‘Construction Jihad.’ ’’

33Steven Emerson, ‘‘Blood Money: Hizbullah’s revenue stream flows through theAmericas,’’ The American Legion Magazine, March 2007.

34Cf. Alexander Ritzmann, Hezbollah’s Fundraising Organization in Germany.

35Cf. Financial Action Task Force, Terrorism Financing (FATF=OECD, 29February 2008) esp. p. 18; Loretta Napoleoni, Terror Incorporated: Tracing theDollars Behind the Terror Networks (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2005),p. 181; Audrey Kurth Cronin, Huda Aden, Adam Frost, and Benjamin Jones,6 February 2004, Foreign Terrorist Organizations: CRS Report for Congress,Congressional Research Service, Washington, D.C.; accessible at www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL32223.pdf

36See Bernard Kaussler, ‘‘Latin American Narco-Dollars Financing Hezbollah’sGrowing Establishment,’’ Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 6, Issue 21, 7 November 2008.

37Robert Worth, ‘‘Billion-Dollar Pyramid Scheme Rivets Lebanon,’’ The New YorkTimes, 16 September 2009; Ferry Biedermann, ‘‘Hizbollah ally charged withembezzlement,’’ Financial Times [London], 12 September 2009; TariqAlhomayed, ‘‘Is He the Imad Mughniyeh of Finance?,’’ Asharq Alawsat, 6September 2009; Robert Fisk, ‘‘‘Lebanon’s Madoff’ bankrupted after bouncing$200,000 cheque to Hizbollah,’’ The Independent [London], 8 September 2009;Ferry Biedermann, ‘‘‘Lebanese Madoff’ mystery stuns investors,’’ FinancialTimes [London], 9 September 2009. Hizbullah for its part denied anyinvolvement in the financial scandal: ‘‘Hezbollah denies links to bankruptbusinessman,’’ Gulf News [Manama, Bahrain], 9 September 2009.

38Nimrod Raphaeli, ‘‘The Iranian Roots of Hizbullah.’’

39Ozlem Tur, ‘‘The LebaneseWar of 2006: Reasons and Consequences,’’ pp. 111–117.

40Ibid.

41Richard Beeston and Nicholas Blanford, ‘‘Hezbollah Stockpiles 40,000 RocketsNear Israel Border,’’ The Times [London], 5 August 2009.

42Magnus Ranstorp, Inside Hizballah’s Decision-Making, July 2006, accessible athttp://counterterrorismblog.org/2006/07/inside_hizballahs_decisionmaking_1.php#trackbacks





44Ibid., p. 72.

45Ibid., pp. 72–73.

46Ibid., p. 70.

47‘‘Hizballah deploys chemical and biological weapons near Israeli border—Arab,European sources,’’ DEBKAfile Special Report, 3 September 2009, accessed athttp://www.debka.com/headline.php?hid=6249. See also, ‘‘Hizbullah silentover report that group got chemical weapons,’’ Daily Star [Beirut, Lebanon],4 September 2009.

48‘‘Hezbollah’s International Reach,’’ Terrorism Update, December 2007, andOzlem Tur, ‘‘The Lebanese War of 2006: Reasons and Consequences,’’ p. 111.

49Ozlem Tur, ‘‘The Lebanese War of 2006: Reasons and Consequences,’’ p. 113.

50For details, see Lara Debb, ‘‘Hizbullah: A Primer,’’Middle East Report Online, 31July 2006, accessible at http://www.merip.org/mero/mero073106.html

51Ha’Aretz, [Tel Aviv], 4 November, 2008.

52Ozlem Tur, ‘‘The Lebanese War of 2006: Reasons and Consequences,’’pp. 111–117.

53Anar Valiyev, ‘‘Alleged Iranian and Hezbollah Agents on Trial for TargetingRussian-Operated Radar Station in Azerbaijan,’’ Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 7,Issue 20, 9 July 2009; Matthew Levitt, ‘‘Hizbullah Campaigns at Home,Exposed Abroad,’’ Washington Institute for Near East Policy, PolicyWatch#1528, 5 June 2009; The alleged plot to bomb the Israeli embassy and kidnapthe Israeli ambassador was supposedly in retaliation for the assassination of theHizbullah chief of external operations, Imad Mughniyeh, in Damascus inFebruary 2008.

54Uzi Mahnaimiin, ‘‘Plot to kill Israel’s army chief of staff,’’ Sunday Times[London], 6 September 2009.

55‘‘Russian Secret Service helped Hizballah Bust Israel’s Lebanese Spy Rings,’’DEBKAFile, 5 August 2009, accessed at: http://www.debka.com/index1.php;see also ‘‘Russian FSB services helped Hizbullah bust spy ring—Report,’’ DailyStar [Beirut, Lebanon], 11 August 2009.

56Magnus Ranstorp, Inside Hizballah’s Decision-Making.

57Tarek Fatah, Chasing a Mirage: The Tragic Illusion of an Islamic State (Toronto:John Wiley and Sons, 2008), pp. 70–83.

58Council on Foreign Relations, Backgrounder on Hizbu’llah, accessible at http://www.cfr.org/publication/9155/

59Sanaa al Jack, ‘‘Syria and Hezbollah Backing Salafist Groups in NorthernLebanon-Security Source,’’ Asharq Alawsat [London], 27 August 2009.

60‘‘Hezbollah’s Growing Regional Role Piques Arabs,’’ Asharq Alawsat [London],21 May 2009.

61Abdul Sittar Hatita, ‘‘Hezbollah Planned Three Synchronized Attacks in Egypt,’’Asharq Alawsat [London], 25 April 2009; Amro Hassan,‘‘Egypt: How Guilty arethose in the ‘Hezbollah cell?,’ ’’ The Los Angeles Times, 24 August 2009.

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62‘‘Egypt: Police arrest 25 ‘terror suspects’ in Sinai,’’ Adnkronos [Rome, Italy], 17July 2009, http://www.adnkronos.com/AKI/English/Security/?id=3.0.3548856997

63‘‘Hezbollah’s Growing Regional Role Piques Arabs,’’ Asharq Alawsat [London].

64See Jim Kouri, ‘‘Fox News reveals mounting Hezbollah terror threat in U.S.,’’Law Enforcement Examiner, 14 September 2009, accessed at http://www.examiner.com/x-2684-Law-Enforcement-Examiner~y2009m9d14-Fox-News-reveals-mounting-Hezbollah-terror-threat-in-US. Jim Kouri is currently fifthvice-president of the (U.S.) National Association of Chiefs of Police.

65For a recent threat assessment of Hizbullah activities in Europe and elsewhere,see Olivier Guitta, ‘‘Hezbollah, an Imminent Danger,’’ Middle East Times, 17November 2008, accessible at http://www.metimes.com/International/2008/11/17/hezbollah_an_imminent_danger/5433/

66Cf. Bundesamt fur Verfassungsschutz, Verfassungsschutzbericht 2007, Berlin,2008, pp. 206–208, accessible at http://www.verfassungsschutz.de/de/publikationen/verfassungsschutzbericht/vsbericht_2007/; Alexander Ritzmannand Mark Dubowitz, ‘‘Hezbollah’s German Helpers,’’ The Wall Street Journal,17 April 2007.

67Magnus Ranstorp, Hizb’Allah in Lebanon, p. 33; Alexander Ritzmann,Hezbollah’s Fundraising Organization in Germany, esp. p. 6. For an account ofsuccessive Hizbullah plots against targets in the United Kingdom foiled by theBritish Security Service during the 1990s, see Christopher Andrew, Defence ofthe Realm: The Authorised History of MI5 (London: Penguin, 2009), pp. 800–801.

68Olivier Guitta, ‘‘Hezbollah, an Imminent Danger.’’

69Alexander Ritzmann and Mark Dubowitz, ‘‘Hezbollah’s German Helpers.’’

70Alexander Ritzmann, Hezbollah’s Fundraising Organization in Germany, esp.pp. 11–16.

71Quoted in Alexander Ritzmann and Mark Dubowitz, ‘‘Hezbollah’s GermanHelpers.’’

72Canadian Security Intelligence Service, CSIS Report: ‘‘Hizballah and Its Activitiesin Canada,’’ Report # 2002–3=15, 2002.

73Stewart Bell, ‘‘Canada May Be a Terror Target,’’ National Post [Toronto], 24 July2009; Integrated Threat Assessment Centre, ‘‘Canada: The Threat FromTerrorists and Extremists,’’ Intelligence Assessment 08=18, 2008 03 14, p. 3. Seealso Michael Chertoff, former U.S. Secretary for Homeland Security, ‘‘How toReinvigorate the War on Terrorism Here at Home,’’ Daily News [New York],30 July 2009, for a similar assessment regarding a Hizbullah threat to theUnited States.

74Integrated Threat Assessment Centre, ‘‘Hezbollah’s Open War: Implications forCanada,’’ Intelligence Assessment 08=17, 2008 03 06, pp. 2, 4.

75Stewart Bell, ‘‘Canada May Be a Terror Target.’’

76Bernd Kaussler, ‘‘Latin American Narco-Dollars Financing Hezbollah’s GrowingEstablishment,’’ Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 6, Issue 21, 7 November 2008; Blanca




Madani, ‘‘Hizbullah’s Global Finance Network: The Triple Frontier,’’ MiddleEast Intelligence Bulletin, Vol. 4, No. 1, January 2002.

77Michael Young, ‘‘Shiites want a quiet life, and that’s bad news for Hizbollah,’’The National [Dubai, U.A.E.], 6 August 2009.

78‘‘A Win for the West,’’ The Economist, 11 June 2009.

79Michael Young, ‘‘Shiites want a quiet life, and that’s bad news for Hizbollah.’’

80Michael Chertoff, ‘‘How to Reinvigorate the War on Terrorism Here at Home.’’

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