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VUFO-NGO RESOURCE CENTRE

“Lessons Learned from a Decade of Experience”

A strategic analysis of INGO methods and activities in Vietnam 1990-1999

Author: Nguyen Kim Ha

Ha Noi, January 2001

This study was commissioned by the Steering Committee of the VUFO-NGO Resource Centre La Thanh Hotel, 218 Doi Can, Ha Noi, Viet NamTel.: (84 4) 832 85 70 Fax: (84 4) 832 86 11E-mail: [email protected]

This study was funded by the following Donors: Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID) at the Australian Embassy in Vietnam; The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) at the Canadian Embassy in Vietnam; the Good Governance Programme of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade of New Zealand via the New Zealand Embassy in Vietnam; and the following International Non-Governmental Organisations in Vietnam: ActionAid; CARE International; Caritas Switzerland; The Canadian Centre for International Studies and Cooperation / Centre Canadien d’Etude et de Cooperation Internationale (CECI); Cooperation Internationale pour le Developpement et la Solidarite (CIDSE); Catholic Relief Services (CRS); Environmental Development Action in the Third World (ENDA); Marie Stopes International (MSI); Maryknoll; the NGO Training Project; Oxfam Great Britain; Oxfam Hong Kong; Oxfam Solidarite Belgique; Plan International; Radda Barnen / Save the Children Sweden; Save the Children/USA; SNV – Netherlands Development Organisation; and World Vision International.

The views and opinions expressed in this report are not necessarily those of the above mentioned organisations nor do they necessarily represent those of individual member or supporter organisations of the VUFO-NGO Resource Centre.

This report was written by Nguyen Kim Ha, who initially worked as a member of the study team from April to August, 2000 and, in November 2000, took over the task of writing up the findings of the team.

In addition, the following consultants worked on the study during the time periods listed:

Mr. Tom Scott (April, 2000 to October, 2000)Mr. Nguyen Tat Canh (May, 2000 to August, 2000) Ms. Nguyen Thi Ha (May, 2000 to August, 2000) Mr. Chu Viet Cuong (April, 2000 to May, 2000)Mr. Dao Quoc Anh (April, 2000 to May, 2000)

In comparison with the copies distributed in 2001, this edition of the report has under-gone some minor corrections.

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mailto:[email protected]

Table of Contents

i) Foreword_____________________________________________________________1

ii) Acknowledgements_____________________________________________________2

iii) Executive Summary____________________________________________________3

iv) Introduction__________________________________________________________7

v) Methodology__________________________________________________________9

1. History and Development of INGOs in Vietnam_____________________________121.1 A Brief Overview of the History…__________________________________________12

1.2 Development of INGOs in Vietnam__________________________________________14

1.3 Overview of INGO Investment_____________________________________________16

1.4 Sectoral Trends__________________________________________________________20

2. Some Impacts of INGO Work in Vietnam__________________________________212.1 Sectoral Achievements____________________________________________________22

2.2 Impact on Direct Target Groups____________________________________________30

2.3 Impact on Government Programmes and Policy_______________________________41

3. Methods, Approaches and Lessons Learned________________________________473.1 Partnership______________________________________________________________47

3.2 Capacity Building________________________________________________________54

3.3 Ideas and Innovations_____________________________________________________60

3.4 Sustainability____________________________________________________________64

3.5 INGOs Internal Management______________________________________________71

4. Future of INGOs in Vietnam____________________________________________75

Appendix A -Figures and Tables___________________________________________80

Appendix B -Terms of Reference___________________________________________85

Appendix C – List of Funders______________________________________________91

Appendix D - Abbreviations and Acronyms__________________________________92

Appendix E - Key dates and Key Regulations________________________________92

Appendix F – List of Acknowledgements_____________________________________94

Appendix G - Bibliography______________________________________________101

i) Forewordi) Foreword

The publication of this report on Lessons Learned from a Decade of Experience comes at an opportune time. Vietnam continues its rapid socio-economic development, continues to integrate into the global economy, and continues to build closer linkages with the world community.

Presently, the nation is taking stock of its achievements in the Doi Moi era. Vietnam can be proud of the progress made over the past decade, perhaps the most remarkable decade in recent history. One area where this process of reflection is taking place is related to international cooperation. The Government, Party, and indeed International NGOs themselves see this last decade of partnership as an important factor in the development of the Vietnamese nation.

Although several INGOs worked in Vietnam much earlier, most began only in the late 1980s or early 1990s, in parallel with the Doi Moi process. But, the Vietnam of today is different in many respects from the Vietnam of ten years ago. During this last decade of partnership for development, what has been achieved? What lessons have been learned? How can INGOs and the Government of Vietnam improve their partnership to further the equitable development of the nation?

To begin to answer these questions, the Steering Committee of the VUFO-NGO Resource Centre, with the generous support of a number of institutions, commissioned this report.

The members of the Steering Committee of the Resource Centre would like to thank Ms. Nguyen Kim Ha, the author, and her team for the work that they have done to help our community understand where we are, and where we might go. The task was a difficult one – INGOs work in many different sectors, many different geographical areas, and with many different partners. Their experiences are difficult to compare. Therefore, and given the volume of data collected and the complex and lengthy process of preparation of this final report, inevitably many opinions and lessons learned could not be included, nor could the current approach nor impact of any sector be fully reflected. We look forward to future complementary studies.

Ms. Ha and her team have accomplished this difficult task, and her report is presented to the development community in the hope that it will further dialogue, learning, and reflection.

We are all working to build an equitable and bright future for the people of Vietnam, and we hope that this report contributes towards this great purpose.

The Steering Committee of the VUFO-NGO Resource Centre

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ii) Acknowledgementsii) Acknowledgements

A note from the author:

I would like to take this opportunity to thank all of those people and organisations that have shared information and contributed to the following report. I would like to express my cordial thanks to the VUFO-NGO Resource Centre who gave us a chance to carry out this study, to the Steering Committee of the Resource Centre, and to the donors who supported this study. I am grateful to all INGO local and international staff, governmental staff and officers, local partners and beneficiaries, who talked with us and shared information.

This report could not be done without the help and collaboration of many people. I am exceedingly indebted to my colleagues Ms. Nguyen Yen Huong for her translation and processing of interview notes, reviewing documents and external data while I was writing the draft, and to Ms. Michelle Brown for her generous guidance and encouraging suggestions.

I would like to express my gratitude and sincere thanks to the members of the Steering Committee for their support and especially to Mr. Mark McPeak, Ms. Lady Borton, and Mr. Nguyen Van Kien for their guidance and comments.

I would like to extend sincere thanks and gratefulness to my colleagues Mr. Nguyen Tat Canh, Ms. Nguyen Thi Ha and Mr.Tom Scott for their work to gather information for this study. I also thank Ms. Do Thi Hong for her administrative work for this study. I also thank Mr. Joachim Theis and Mr. Matt Desmond for their ideas and input.

Thanks to all INGO staff who trusted us to share their experiences, stories, and to those who have expanded my understanding about INGOs works in Vietnam.

The numerous organisations and individuals who contributed to the study are listed more thoroughly in the list of acknowledgements in Appendix F.

Nguyen Kim HaJanuary, 2001

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iii) Executive Summaryiii) Executive Summary

1. This report aims to present lessons learned from a decade of INGO work in Vietnam - from the beginning of 1990 to the year 2000. The Terms of Reference for the study emphasised the need to: a) describe and analyse the work of INGOs in Vietnam over the past ten years, identifying and drawing out any trends that have emerged; b) identify areas where INGOs have had an impact on development in Vietnam; and c) identify methods that have worked well in terms of INGO impact and analyse the factors critical to success or failure.

2. Nineteen organisations were studied in-depth to gain an understanding of the impact of INGO activities in Vietnam and the relative effectiveness of the different methods and approaches that have been used by INGOs. In addition, six sectoral windows were chosen for focus, and workshops were held in each of these areas, which were:

1. Integrated Rural Development (with an emphasis on remote communities and upland areas)

2. Urban Community Development3. Nutrition4. HIV/AIDS5. Inclusive Primary Education6. Micro Finance and Enterprise

3. The main method used in the study was to review available assessment reports of individual INGOs during the last ten years. This was triangulated with available literature focusing on sectoral analysis, research, and other relevant documents. It was also compared with information from interviews with both local and international staff of INGOs, partner organisations, beneficiaries, sub-contractors, Government departments and mass organisations, as well as with bi-lateral donors and other international organisations. The study team made field visits to Thai Nguyen, Hue, Quang Tri, and Ho Chi Minh City, where they held two of the six sectoral workshops and a meeting with long-time local staff members. The study included one questionnaire, which was sent to all member INGOs of the VUFO-NGO Resource Centre.

4. Based on indicators and data available on INGOs’ work in the last ten years in health, education, agriculture, and rural development, the study team feels that INGOs have made considerable contributions to the development of Vietnam. One of the sectoral areas examined was urban community development. It should be pointed out that relatively few INGOs work in this area. Obviously, there are some reasons that hinder INGOs working in urban community development. The study team would argue that, in the future, INGOs should think about expanding their work in this area, given the fact that, based on world-wide experience, urbanisation has become an undeniable trend.

5. During the last ten years, it appears that most INGO work has only reached the relatively poor and middle-income households, but not the poorest of the poor. Some reasons are highlighted in the report. Not enough attention is paid by INGOs and

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their partners in addressing the problems of the poorest of the poor. One reason is due to a limited understanding of successful methods in poverty alleviation.

6. The study team found that, although INGOs have paid great attention to gender issues when considering a project or programme, in many cases this did not bring about comprehensive participation by women. So far, most INGOs have not had an overall, strategic and long-term view on the issue. The importance of women's roles in INGO projects and programmes needs to be more than just rhetoric.

7. A lack of understanding of the language and culture of different ethnic minorities, including customs, values and ways of life of the ethnic communities, has limited the impact and effectiveness of INGO-supported projects targeting these groups.

8. People with disabilities, the aged, the unregistered and the landless appear to have been almost left out of INGOs project and programme planning, with the notable exception of INGOs that specifically target these vulnerable groups.

9. The small-scale nature of INGO projects (which tend to have small investments, pilot initiatives, bottom-up methods and farmer-based approaches) has limited the spread and application of new technology and hindered project achievement. This has reduced INGO impact on Government programmes, policies and planning.

10. While partnership is a key concept in Vietnam, a general assessment is that INGOs and their local partners have not been fully successful in achieving partnership in the past ten years.

11. Capacity building has been considered as one of the first, foremost and necessary activities in INGOs’ projects and programmes. Although there appear to be a lot of activities in the field, the study team discovered that INGO assessment reports on capacity building are rare, especially in relation to the impact of capacity building in the last ten years. Moreover, INGO capacity building has focused more on direct beneficiaries from INGO projects and programmes as opposed to institutional capacity building.

12. New ideas and innovation require time for testing. However, in the last ten years, it appears that INGOs have put up many new study models for experiment, rather than making use of, or building on, successful models from other INGOs. This has led to financial waste on specialists and in training.

13. Sustainability has been a crucial issue relating to INGO approaches. Many challenges have affected sustainability, some relating to partner selection, to changes in partner staff, capacity building, and other factors. Sometimes, dependence on international donors and unexpected factors involving legal ownership of a project or programme belonging to international donors or the Government have either encouraged or prevented sustainability.

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14. The continuous turnover of INGO representatives interrupts partner relationships and can also contribute to a turnover of local INGO staff, creating organisational instability.

15. Local staff has noted that they are required to meet programme demands but sometimes do not have adequate training. It appears that most INGOs have offered short courses; however, few INGOs have focused strategically on long-term staff training.

16. Relations between expatriate and local staff working in INGOs remain a problem. In the early 1990s, when INGOs began to open offices in Vietnam, local staff members were not experienced and had limited foreign-language skills. Expatriates often showed local staff how to do every aspect of their work. The situation does not appear to have improved considerably after ten years. INGO expatriate staff members have been criticised for sometimes adopting a superior attitude and not listening to Vietnamese staff or local partners.

Key Lessons Learned Relating to INGO Work:

1. In the future, INGOs should continue to focus on targeting the poor – especially the poorest groups in remote and mountainous areas where national projects and programmes on poverty alleviation have not yet been implemented.

2. INGOs should strengthen their staff and partners’ understanding of poverty issues in Vietnam. They should introduce into project and/or programme planning methods that identify the changing nature of poverty (including the increasing gap between rich and poor) as well as methods that focus on vulnerable groups.

3. INGOs should concentrate more on the issue of gender. To improve their work, one possibility may be to appoint a specialised gender project officer to co-ordinate and supervise activities relating to gender. The INGOs’ Gender Working Group should be strengthened through the participation of key staff working on gender issues.

4. INGOs need to improve methodologies to better target and involve women from vulnerable families, especially women-headed households.

5. INGOs should create opportunities for local staff to learn ethnic-minority languages and consider recruiting ethnic minority people to work as project officers in the field.

6. INGOs should study the culture and customs of ethnic groups living in project areas before designing programmes in order to learn how best to serve these communities.

7. INGOs may wish to reconsider their support to ethnic minorities by focusing on those minorities in remote and mountainous areas (even those in areas most difficult to reach) rather than focussing assistance on ethnic minorities who are not so isolated.

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8. INGOs should take time to evaluate and choose the most suitable project partners and consider carefully the appropriateness of opening projects for tender.

9. INGOs should review management policies regarding the roles of representatives/directors, project officers and partners, including information sharing and a process for transferring power to partners to develop and maintain equal relationships.

10. Since capacity building is based on co-operation with others, the VUFO-NGO Resource Centre and the various working groups attached to it should have newsletters and bulletins to introduce and share INGO experiences and successful models in various sectors. Contents could include project selection, selection of ethnic groups, ways to organise training courses, choice of lecturers, training materials, etc.

11. Since capacity building is a major concern, INGOs should pay attention to the quality of training. In addition to assessment reports, they should study the effectiveness/impact of capacity building with partners and beneficiaries.

12. INGOs should review training materials and re-design them with suitable information in language that is easy for participants to understand.

13. INGOs should develop and maintain a strong network to share experiences and new ideas. The VUFO-NGO Resource Centre and the working groups attached to it should review activities of the current working groups to find appropriate and effective mechanisms of future co-operation. Working groups' activities need commitment from INGO representatives/directors.

14. INGOs should work in accordance with Government programmes and with the support of Government authorities to maintain the sustainability of INGO projects and/or programmes.

15. INGOs should move towards, or continue to move towards, turning their role over to local organisations. This should be seen as an important objective in their work, but recognised that it is not necessarily achievable over night.

16. INGOs should consider strengthening the VUFO-NGO Resource Centre library by recognising that it is in their own interest to send their documents and reports to the library to encourage the overall development of INGO activities.

17. INGO representatives should have flexible contracts that extend beyond a two-year term for those who can stay longer. INGOs should consider recruiting and training Vietnamese representatives.

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18. INGOs need clear and long-term policies and systematic approaches for training local staff. Training criteria based on staff members’ organisational longevity will create more stability by increasing incentives and reducing staff turnover.

19. INGOs should pay attention to team building to create mutual confidence and an information-sharing culture so that each team member has an open, sincere and constructive attitude. This will help create equality and prevent isolation within organisations.

20. INGOs should improve and maintain a network of local Vietnamese consultants through a database at the VUFO-NGO Resource Centre.

21. INGOs should define the role and function of expatriate staff to be more in tune with Vietnamese culture, including time to learn Vietnamese and experience Vietnamese culture and social customs.

iv) Introductioniv) Introduction

The idea to carry out a study, INGO Lessons Learned in Vietnam, first began to take shape in 1996. However, for various reasons, the study did not materialise at that time.

In 1999, the Steering Committee of the VUFO-NGO Resource Centre re-considered such a study. According to the Vietnam Union of Friendship Organisations (VUFO), Vietnam’s Committee for NGO Affairs was planning, once again, to hold a conference on INGOs as it had in 1992. An independent study commissioned by the Resource Centre was seen as a potential key input into such a conference. It was hoped that this study could be a tool not only for INGOs but also for others interested in the roles INGOs play in Vietnam’s development.

While INGOs’ financial assistance does not represent a large percentage of total ODA to Vietnam, it had been pointed out that “the primary value of INGO efforts to Vietnam may now be their ability to innovate, to experiment with new approaches, to do essential research, to provide high-quality training, and to assist in providing policy makers with good ideas".1 In a broader context, understanding of the role INGOs play in the development of a country and as learning organisations has grown. Research has emerged from various parts of the world on the constraints, opportunities, experiences and comparative advantages of civil society organisations and their role within a country. In Vietnam, the experiences and lessons learned from close to a decade of significant INGO involvement had not been comprehensively explored or documented.

The VUFO-NGO Resource Centre seemed to be in a unique position to take a deeper look. The Centre was established in 1993, in an effort to collect and disseminate information, help co-ordinate, and increase awareness of the activities of INGOs. By the

1 Ford Foundation, 1999.

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year 2000, the membership had grown to over 100 INGOs. After entering into a strengthened partnership with VUFO in 1998, the Steering Committee of the VUFO-NGO Resource Centre was changed to its present composition of five representatives from International NGOs and five members from the Government Committee for NGO Affairs. The Steering Committee wished this to be an independent study, which would review and analyse INGOs’ working methods and the impact of their work on development in Vietnam over the last decade. It turned out to be a tremendous task, which raised many questions, but the decision was taken to go ahead. Needless to say, working on the study was a learning process in itself. With this report, the Steering Committee of the VUFO-NGO Resource Centre and the Study team wish to share the key findings with all those interested.

Aim2

To strengthen INGO work and create a better understanding of INGOs’ role and contribution to development by analysing and documenting INGO methods and impact after a decade of experience in Vietnam.

Objectives Describe and analyse the work of INGOs in Vietnam over the past ten years,

identifying and drawing out any trends that have emerged. Analysis should examine sectors, geographic areas, methods, staff and budget, and other INGO characteristics.

Identify areas where INGOs have had an impact on development in Vietnam. Focus should be on looking at projects and programmes which have been completed, or where particular stages have been completed, so that impact can be measured. Particular attention could be given to overall goals, such as poverty alleviation, and to key areas, such as capacity building.

Identify methods that have worked well in terms of INGO impact and analyse the factors critical to success or failure. Critical factors might include levels of working (micro versus macro), ways of working (more versus less operational), degree of participation, local contribution, co-operation and networking, transparency, partnerships etc. Focus should be placed on clearly outlining what has worked, and why.

2 Aim and objectives for the study have been defined in the Terms of Reference, which are attached to this report.

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v) Methodologyv) Methodology

Method In May 2000, the INGO Study team documented its plan to address the two tasks of (i) assessing the impact of INGO activities in Vietnam and (ii) studying the relative effectiveness of the different methods and approaches that have been employed. Opinions and evidence were to be sought from both local (Vietnamese) and international (expatriate) staff in INGOs and compared with evidence and opinions offered by other key informants directly involved with INGO project work, such as partner organisations, beneficiaries, sub-contractors, Government departments, and mass organisations. This was to be triangulated with available literature focusing on sectoral analysis, research, evaluation and impact-assessment as well as other relevant documents. Additional information was to be gathered from secondary informants, such as bilateral donors and other international organisations.

Sample Design The Terms of Reference had suggested that eight to ten INGOs be studied in depth and their experiences then compared with a wider range of organisations. The Study team as first constituted, in conjunction with the Steering Committee, felt that the original number would not give enough information for the study to draw useful conclusions; thus, it was decided to expand to twenty organisations. However, only nineteen organisations were able to participate due to one organisation’s leadership changes.

It proved difficult to arrive at a simple set of criteria for a sample of INGOs that would represent the wide range of agency activities and characteristics. The Viet Nam INGO Directory 1999-2000 lists over 220 INGOs working in Vietnam. The Terms of Reference of this particular study limited the selection of INGOs to those that had been working for five or more years in Vietnam. By using the INGO Directory of 1994 and comparing it to the most recent version, the number of relevant organisations was reduced to seventy. As this number was still too large for the Study team to contemplate, further criteria such as nationality, geographical areas, sectors, and resources (human and financial) were applied in order to come up with the sample list of nineteen INGOs below:

INGOs in the Sample:ActionAid The Canadian Centre for International Studies and Cooperation (CECI) CARE International Catholic Relief Services (CRS)Cooperation Internationale pour le Developpement et la Solidarite (CIDSE)Ecoles Sans Frontieres (ESF)Environmental Development Action in the Third World (ENDA)Helvetas - Swiss Association for International CooperationInternational Development Enterprises (IDE)Japan International Volunteer Committee (JVC)Komitee Twee Medecins du Monde (MdM)

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Medical Committee Netherlands Vietnam (MCNV)Nordic Assistance to Vietnam (NAV)Oxfam Hong KongRadda Barnen (Save the Children Sweden)Save the Children Fund UK (SCF UK)Vietnam Plus World Vision International

Early in the study, the team saw the difficulty of drawing any lessons across the board and proposed the idea of “sectoral windows” to draw out INGO learning. It was, of course, a difficult decision to choose one sector at the expense of another.

In response to the team’s proposal, the members of the Steering Committee undertook a process of elimination to determine which subject areas, within the main sectors, would form the focus of the study. A decision was made to select topics that reflected (i) sectors where the majority of INGO activities are located, (ii) sectors where significant levels of investment have been made, (iii) sectors where it was perceived that significant learning had been gained, and (iv) sectors where questions exist about the nature of future INGO activity. The six selected areas were:

1. Integrated Rural Development (with an emphasis on isolated/remote communities and upland areas)

2. Urban Community Development3. Nutrition4. HIV/AIDS5. Inclusive Primary Education6. Micro Finance and Enterprise

A number of INGOs raised concerns about the choice of sectors. In particular, some INGOs saw the absence of “reproductive health” as a mistake since many INGOs have done considerable work and learning in this sector.

The Study team was based in Hanoi and made field visits to Thai Nguyen, Hue, Quang Tri, and HCMC to gather opinions and information from beneficiaries and local partners. The team held two of the six sectoral workshops, and a meeting in HCMC with long-time local staff members in HCMC.

Data CollectionThe study utilised the following techniques to collect information:

Literature review – Information on INGO characteristics, approaches, activities and impact along with general information on trends, geographical areas, levels of investment etc., was gathered from evaluation and impact-assessment reports, country strategy papers, sectoral reviews, and conference reports available from the VUFO-NGO Resource Centre and PACCOM as well as from the selected INGO offices.

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Interviews and meetings -- The Study team held one hundred semi-structured interviews with INGO representatives and local staff, partner organisations, and other key informants as well as workshops and focus groups. Ten meetings were held on the six sectoral areas plus two meetings with experienced staff (one in HCMC and one in Hanoi), one meeting with PACCOM staff and one meeting with representatives from ministries and agencies represented on the Committee for NGO Affairs.

Questionnaires – The study included one questionnaire sent to ninety in-country member INGOs of the VUFO-NGO Resource Centre to draw information about trends in their work over the decade, budgetary and staffing information, etc. The Study team received thirty-six replies.

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1. History and Development of INGOs in Vietnam1. History and Development of INGOs in Vietnam

1.1 A Brief Overview of the History…

International NGOs have been providing support to Vietnam for many decades. This involvement falls into four key phases,3 which can be linked to specific historical periods in Vietnam and broader international involvement and relations.

In the early 1970s, some sixty-three INGOs worked in Vietnam.4 One INGO notes having been involved in Vietnam since 1948,5 while others came to work in Vietnam after the end of the war against the French in 1954. Earlier international humanitarian activities had been supported through missions of the Roman Catholic Church. Most of these first INGOs to Vietnam had religious (Christian) affiliations.

In the years up until 1975, the number increased, with twenty to thirty INGOs providing humanitarian support and relief to those in need on either side6 during the American War. During the war, many INGOs with head offices in Geneva and Paris kept in contact with the Northern Government through its Solidarity Committees. Previous to 1965, the North saw support from Socialist countries through various Friendship Associations. After 1965, popular support for Vietnamese people suffering from the war grew in other Western Countries and some INGOs started to ship goods (medicine and equipment) to “where the bombs are falling”.7 However, in 1975, most INGOs closed offices and foreign staff left as the Socialist Republic of Vietnam assumed responsibility for their activities.

From 1975 to 1979, some INGOs (such as AFSC-Quaker Service, MCC and CWS) moved their offices to Thailand and/or Laos and continued to provide relief and humanitarian assistance from abroad with occasional visits. Virtually all Western donors with the exception of Sweden supported the increased embargo imposed by the US in 1979. This decreased significantly the amount of assistance available for INGOs wishing to support Vietnam, who developed other strategies in order to raise funds and provide humanitarian relief during severe food shortages. In 1979, the Ministry of Finance established AIDRECEP to facilitate assistance from foreign organisations, including INGOs. Although Vietnam and INGOs share a long history, fewer than ten INGOs had “intensive contact with Vietnam from the late 1960s through the late 1980s”.8

3 McCall, 1998.4 Information from PACCOM, 2000.5 According to MCNV, 1999 report, Secours Populaire Francais may be the first INGO to have worked in Vietnam.6 McCall, 1998.7 MCNV, 1999.8 As noted by MCNV, 1999.

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Up until 1986, INGOs’ support focused on humanitarian relief. The internal situation and external factors, in particular the US-led embargo, limited the opportunities for INGOs to increase their support for Vietnam. In relation to needs, INGO support was low but the solidarity shown was important and is well remembered by those who cite the Vietnamese expression, “we remember best the mouthful of rice given when we were hungry”.9

During the mid to late 1980s, Vietnam began to broaden its international relations. At the end of 1986, the Communist Party of Vietnam initiated a policy of Doi Moi or Renovation. This change coincided with the collapse of the former socialist countries of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe; as a result, these countries substantially reduced their support for Vietnam’s development. This change created new possibilities for INGOs wishing to support Vietnam and many renewed efforts to have representatives in the country. By 1988, the effects of Doi Moi had begun, including increased interest from foreign investors. In October 1988, CIDSE became the first INGO with a representative in Hanoi. The 1989 withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia brought the beginning of re-normalisation with Western donor countries.

In 1989, The People's Aid Co-ordinating Committee (PACCOM) of the Vietnam Union of Friendship Organisations (VUFO) was established to “work as a focal agency for international non-governmental organisations”. PACCOM’s main functions are to: work as a bridge between INGOs and Vietnamese partners and localities; facilitate INGO activities and assist local partners in their relations with INGOs; gather and share information concerning INGO activities in Vietnam; and recommend to the Government proper policies for INGOs in Vietnam. PACCOM is also responsible for processing permits for INGOs, who are requested to register with the Committee for NGO Affairs through PACCOM. In the early 1990s, the Vietnamese Government gave AFSC, ActionAid, CARE, MCC, Oxfam Belgique, and the then name Oxfam UK&I and NARV permission to open offices in Hanoi and actively encouraged other INGOs to come.

Throughout the 1990s, the number of INGOs working with Vietnam steadily increased. As the graph below shows, this growth was greatest during the mid 1990s but has levelled off; some INGOs have left but new ones have replaced them. Today, close to 500 (depicted in grey) INGOs have relations with Vietnam, 350 (depicted in white) of which are currently active with partners and programmes. The other nearly 150 non-active INGOs have at some point provided assistance or relief. An estimated 157 of the 350 have offices or work-stations in Vietnam.

Roughly 35% of the organisations listed in the NGO Directory come from North America (United States and Canada), 35% from Europe, approximately 8% from Asia (Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand), and 7% from Australia and New Zealand. In addition there are INGOs from other countries and INGOs who are described as international.

9 MCNV, 1999.

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Figure 1: Number of INGOs in Vietnam with relations and active in the country.

Source: PACCOM, 2000

INGOs working in Vietnam are as diverse as the programmes and projects they implement. A large number are development organisations, but there are also INGOs concentrating on the environment, conservation, charity, relief, reconstruction and reconciliation.

1.2 Development of INGOs in Vietnam

In the early 1990s… International isolation and Vietnamese regulations meant that, for a long time, INGOs worked from a distance and with central authorities. A long history of war left a bureaucratic system not yet adapted to peacetime and a legacy of secrecy that limited information flow.10

The administrative atmosphere in the early 1990s was significantly tougher than today. Following Doi Moi, the Government began to develop a legal framework for foreign organisations wanting to work in Vietnam. The Government’s early legal framework and legislative environment had not included the new phenomenon of INGOs. This created challenges that may have led to misunderstandings and occasional mistrust. For INGOs, difficulties included: obtaining visas, defining administrative procedures, meeting other INGOs, working at the community level, and visiting remote areas.

10 MCNV, 1999.

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In 1992, INGOs in Hanoi sent a proposal to PACCOM, addressing “the need for better sharing of information about our programmes between ourselves, with other agencies and with our Vietnamese partners”. In 1993, the NGO Resource Centre was established in the offices of Radda Barnen. By then, Vietnam was a country in transition. As it became easier to work directly with poor communities, INGOs moved away from activities now targeted by increasing multilateral and bilateral lending and support.

….through the mid-to-late 90s.... In 1996, the Committee for NGO Affairs was formed and comprised of six members at ministerial level: The Vietnam Union of Friendship Organisations (VUFO) as standing agency for foreign NGO affairs; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA); the Ministry of Public Security (MOPS); the External Affairs Commission of the Communist Party of Vietnam; and the Government Committee for Organisation and Personnel (GCOP). Decision 340/TTG, an underlaw, was issued to regulate INGO activities.

…and onwards…By 1999, the Committee for NGO Affairs had issued 320 permits:

- 42 for representative offices- 58 for project offices - 220 for operations

PACCOM notes that “by issuing permits, a clear legal framework for INGOs to operate in Vietnam has been established, providing INGOs with official recognition”.11 Indeed, although permit procedures became clearer after Decision 340/TTG was issued, some concerns remained, and new ones arose. In 1999, the Vietnamese Government issued Decision 28 regulating the reception of INGO assistance and procedures for approving projects involving Vietnamese organisations. During 2000, Decision 28 amendments were discussed to decentralise decision making and enable local authorities to approve projects at higher budget levels.

In July 2000, the Committee for NGO Affairs was disbanded in line with public administrative reform. The role of VUFO and PACCOM did not change; a different consultative committee will likely soon be formed. GCOP is increasingly becoming the central agency responsible for emerging local NGOs and is taking the lead in developing appropriate regulations. Thus, administrative responsibilities for international NGOs and local NGOs are now separated. This has led some INGOs to question the value of their previous support to agencies other than GCOP when those INGOs were trying to increase Vietnamese understanding of INGOs roles in other countries.

Vietnam is changing rapidly. Sometimes foreign organisations cannot tell what information needs to be provided and when, and who should facilitate their work. INGOs now wonder about the future structure for permit approvals and programme administration. Will new INGOs be able to secure permits to work in Vietnam? Will there be difficulties with issues relating to programme work?

11From the notes of the meeting of the study team and PACCOM staff (July, 2000).

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On-going administration reform may require patience as it brings some short-term administrative confusion even if it is aimed at making procedures clearer and easier in the long run. Currently, INGOs apply for permits with PACCOM and submit quarterly reports to PACCOM. Projects with local partners must be approved by competent local authorities or the Ministry of Planning and Investment. Implementing partners can be line ministries such as MOLISA, MOH or MARD; mass organisations; universities; or local organisations.

1.3 Overview of INGO Investment

During the period from 1975 to 1986, INGO assistance was mostly in kind relief, charity or emergency assistance. 1990 figures for financial assistance place it at 16 million USD rising more than 300% to over 80 million USD by the end of the decade12 .

Figure 2: Annual INGO Assistance to Vietnam


Based on information provided in reports of 384 NGOs to PACCOM, a total of 1458 projects were implemented in 1999 with a disbursement of approximately 81 million USD which is slightly higher than the year before. 44 million USD was provided in kind assistance in 1999.

The trend in growth of INGO investment was reflected in the information collected from 30 INGOs who responded to the study's questionnaire. However, the information from the sample is flawed in the sense that the organisations working in the country started work at different times and that it was difficult for many organisations to provide records of budgets and expenditure for their early years. For 1993, 12 organisations were able to provide this information and by 1996 this increased to 27. Nonetheless, based on a sample of INGOs, we can see that on average INGO budgets and expenditure have grown over the decade (as demonstrated in Figure 3, Appendix A).

12 Information from PACCOM, 1999.

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It is important to note the significant differences between INGOs of annual budgets and expenditures13. In total, of the INGOs who responded to the questionnaire, 20 organisations were spending more in 1999 than in their first year of work in Vietnam, while 5 were spending less and three about the same.

Indeed, the diversity of INGOs is reflected in their budgets. At the start of the decade respondents to the questionnaire noted budgets starting from USD 30,000 up to USD 1,400,000. In 1995, the lower end of the range was just over USD 13,000 and by 1999 the top end of the range had increased to over USD 4,000,000. Looking at the INGO directory for the year 2000 we can see an even wider range, with some INGOs having budgets under USD 6,000 while others are as high as USD 6,000,000 .

The disbursement rate for INGO assistance is relatively high compared with bi-lateral and multi-lateral donors. In 1998, the Resource Centre carried out a short survey of INGOs which indicated that the disbursement rate for INGO spending was 89%. However, we now see that this rate may actually be higher if we look at the sample of INGOs responding to the Study's questionnaire.14 We see an annual average disbursement rate between 92% and 123% based on the INGOs that could provide both budget and expenditure figures.

Breaking down INGO investmentAre INGO Budgets clear?

The team encountered questions from different people outside the INGO community about the clarity of INGO budgets. How much is expatriate staff really getting paid? How much goes into administration costs? What percentage of the budget really gets to the communities? The team wished to address this by asking INGOs questions related to the breakdown of budgets to which some information was gathered. This information should be treated cautiously. Not all of the questionnaires respondents provided costs or estimates of costs of headquarter support for Vietnam programmes. Formats for INGO budgets are not uniform and it is therefore difficult to draw out trends related to budgets. Respondents interpreted the questions in different ways and were asked to either quote actual costs or provide 'guestimates' (guessed estimations). INGOs also commented that the questionnaire was difficult to understand and extremely lengthy.

Nonetheless, the team gathered information15 to attempt to break down INGO spending in the 1990s with data focussing on INGO spending in 1995 and 1999.

Some INGOs gave actual costs while others provided estimated percentages. Because of this all figures were calculated in percentages and the figures represent average percentages. One set of figures for each year was drawn from the replies of 17 organisations that included head office costs. Another set of figures for each year is the average for nine INGOs which did not or could not include head office costs of their

13 Figure 4, Appendix A which demonstrates the diversity in INGO expenditures.14 See Table 1, Appendix A.15 See Table 2, Appendix A.

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Vietnam programmes. The information must be treated cautiously as there were differences in understanding of the questions and what should fall under the different categories.

In answer to those who wanted to know what INGOs are spending before the money gets to the communities - it's difficult to say for sure. However, we can come up with some averages and in addition point out the wide range in responses which reflects the diversity of INGOs.

In 1999, according to the information gathered from the respondents: INGOs allocated an average of 9.6-11.7% (head office and no head office costs) to

field office expatriate staff costs. However, there are some INGOs with no expatriate staff.

INGOs spent an average of 10.6% to 15.64% (head office and no head office costs) on indirect project support costs. However the range was between 0% to 30%.

Costs of direct project support is one of the biggest ranges. While the average expenditure of respondents was from 17%-20% some INGOs had no direct project support costs while another’s was over 80%.

Has the breakdown of INGO costs changed over time? The team asked the respondents to give these figures for 1991, 1995 and 1999. Only a few were able to provide this information for the start of the decade but sixteen organisations could give information for 1995. According to organisations which provided information for both 1995 and 1999, some changes appear in the breakdown of INGO costs over time. Notably, grants to partners for direct project costs decreased over the five year period as did field office indirect support costs. Field office expatriate costs increased as did direct costs of INGO managed projects.

As one informant stated: "Some INGOs don’t have clear budgets and many have high administrative fees of between 40 and 50%."16 However, INGOs note that it is not simply an issue of high administration fees but that this spending occurs in relation to capacity building, monitoring and evaluation.

The limited information collected was therefore not able to demonstrate how much investment was reaching communities. Something much more in depth would need to be done if the INGOs wished to follow up on this.

Changes in staffing levels in INGOs?With an increase in the number of INGOs working in Vietnam there are a significant number of people employed by INGOs. Every organisation responding to the questionnaire except one, noted an increase in the number of employees since they began operations. In a majority this was relatively small with an increase of only one or two additional members but in a small proportion staffing levels had grown by 900-1400%

16 From the notes of the meeting of the study team and PACCOM staff (July, 2000).

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with specific organisations noting increases from 1-9 staff, from 5-45 staff, from 6-60 and from 7-100 employees in one of the largest INGOs in Vietnam.

Geographical trends – expansion, consolidation and moving to more remote areas INGO programmes are active in all 61 Provinces of Vietnam. Their activities reach to an estimated 420 out of 600 Districts.17 According to PACCOM “more INGOs are coming to work in more remote provinces which previously saw little or no INGO assistance- including Lai Chau, Ha Giang, Bac Kan, Phu Yen and An Giang. Some Provinces see more INGO activities than others”.18

Over 80% of INGOs who responded to the Study's questionnaire noted changes in the geographical focus of their programmes since they first started work in Vietnam. Some INGOs have been expanding, others have been consolidating. Another trend as noted above has been away from urban areas to poorer, more remote and mountainous locations.

Nearly 40% of the organisations responded that changes were linked to a greater understanding of the economic situation and the nature of poverty in Vietnam. Other reasons included greater understanding of demographic situation; requests from partners and donors and PACCOM.

While changes have been made, some concerns have been raised by the authorities regarding the geographic focus of INGOs and one informant stated: "INGO aid has not been evenly distributed across the regions. Richer provinces and cities continue to have more assistance, while poorer province share much less. Big cities like Hanoi and HCMC received proportionately more than the poorest provinces of the Northern Upland, North central, central Highland and the Mekong Delta."19

17 From the INGO Directory, 1999.18 PACCOM and NGO Resource Centre.19 From the notes of the INGO study/PACCOM meeting (July 2000).

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1.4 Sectoral Trends

The chart below gives a breakdown of sectoral disbursements in 1999.

Figure 5: INGO Sectoral Disbursements


Changes in Sectors or Changes in Approach? The INGOs that responded to the questionnaire confirmed that health and education continued to be priorities for investment but reflected movement away from specific sectoral groupings towards more holistic, community or integrated development20. Spending can never give an adequate picture of true programme significance. Respondents also gave a percentage weight to various sectors. INGOs pointed out that the number of activities and the time spent on research, programme and strategy design and on advocacy also indicate a sector’s relative importance. According to the information collected in the questionnaire, discrepancies appear in the mid 1990s between the importance of a particular sector and the investment made. However, these values grew closer by the end of the decade.21

Why a Change in Sectoral Focus?More than half of the organisations responded that changes in their sectoral emphasis and investment were due to a better understanding of the causes of social and economic problems. Other reasons for change included: requests from partners and beneficiaries (over 40% of the INGOs noted this) and a decision to move from single sector to multi-sector approaches. Less but still significant reasons included: changing donor priorities, changing head office priorities, and changing Vietnamese Government priorities and Government permission to move into other sectors22.

20 See Figure 6, Appendix A. 21 See Figure 6 and 7, Appendix A.22 See Table 4, Appendix A.

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2) Some Impacts of INGO Work in Vietnam2) Some Impacts of INGO Work in Vietnam

The major question for the study was INGO impact in Vietnam during the last ten years. However, if impact is defined “not (as) immediate outputs or effects of a project or programme but lasting and sustained changes”,23 then developing a comprehensive analysis becomes a nearly impossible challenge.

Doi Moi and its socio-economic and political effects have been the driving force behind change in Vietnam during the last ten years. Impact cannot be accurately measured by financial contribution. Changes during the last decade have resulted from efforts by the people and Government of Vietnam with assistance from international donors, from domestic and foreign economic investment, and from an array of other factors. In general, international donors can be effective only when the host country creates a favourable environment. Thus, the broad picture should emphasise input by the Government of Vietnam, both in volume and impact. As a result of these factors, it is difficult to distinguish between the impact of INGOs and other agents of change.

INGOs’ own reports (both internal and external), their reports to PACCOM, various ministries’ reports and overviews, information submitted for the NGO Directory, and information contained in reports by the World Bank, UN Agencies, and other donors were important sources of information for the study. However, most information on impact in these reports relates only to outputs or only to partial impact.

As noted in Section 1, INGOs work in virtually all sectors in Vietnam. A thorough study of all these sectors would be too ambitious; therefore, the study team chose six sectoral windows that have attracted INGO projects and programmes: micro-finance, nutrition, HIV/AIDS, integrated rural development, urban community development, and inclusive primary education.

It was a challenge to summarise and analyse concrete INGO achievements. First, it proved impossible to secure the necessary concrete statistics, including: the total of funds given for credit-and-savings loans; expenditures for training veterinary surgeons, agricultural workers and extension workers; the number of clinics and schools built; the number of teachers and health-care workers trained; etc. Second, statistics in INGO reports usually reflected only a specific activity of a specific project in a specific geographic area. Third and most importantly, numbers cannot give an adequate picture. INGOs often stressed that the quality of their work is more important than the quantity. Thus, this report highlights only some examples from nutrition and HIV/AIDS in relation to the health sector; from inclusive primary education in relation to the education sector; and from micro-credit and integrated rural development in relation to broad agricultural and rural development sectors.

23 Roche, 1999, p..20.

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2.1 Sectoral Achievements

Health Sector

INGOs in Vietnam are active in a wide array of health-related fields and at very different levels. According to the NGO Directory, one hundred INGOs are involved in health plus an additional one hundred NGOs which have health-related activities in community development programmes. Some, such as MCNV and AFAP work at the national level through national research institutes; some, such as CIDSE and BfdW, work with medical schools; some work at the local level. Respondents to the study questionnaire indicated that the percentage of INGO spending allocated to health decreased from about 40% at the start of the decade to closer to 20%. In 1999, INGO spending in health was just over 23 million USD. 24

Other figures exist from the Project Co-ordinating Department of the Ministry of Health (MoH), which in 1998 estimated that 7 million USD out of 74 million USD ODA support to the MoH came from INGOs: Table 5: ODA to the MoH 1992-1999 in USD

1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998Total ODA

31,692,486 60,738,883 61,481,747 63,060,367 48,458,327 67,421,313 74,829,961

INGOs 3,372,119 5,394,848 2,700,00 3,399,863 (not provided) 4,513,679 7,360,000Source: Project Co-ordinating Department – MoH, May 1998

HIV/AIDSFifteen organisations (6.8% of the INGOs listed in the VUFO-NGO Resource Centre database) note their work on HIV/AIDS. Opinions gathered from interviews and the HIV/AIDS workshop on July 6, 2000 indicated that an INGO achievement has been awareness-raising of HIV/AIDS in Vietnam through the introduction of peer education. The peer education programme was considered a suitable model because simple language would make HIV/AIDS education more accessible by involving people in similar circumstances, for example women with women, youth with youth. Along with many achievements, there have been some difficulties:

If peer education is not combined with other activities, programme effectiveness diminishes. Peer educators do not continue with the same commitment when programmes finish because they have lost the economic support once provided by the INGO-funded programme. Peer education programmes need extra activities to support the peer educators’ economically, yet such activities are often beyond the programme’s capacity.

Peer education activities often cannot be fully implemented because the programmes lack specialised local staff. Government staff knowledge of the HIV/AIDS epidemic has been low, thus limiting Government support. Government

24 Health activities are often considered as part of Community Development and other integrated activities. Thus, it is difficult to estimate financial input.

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staff members do not really support these INGO activities and do not create favourable programme conditions. This, in turn, limits programme effectiveness.

Lessons Learned

INGOs could have a more positive impact if they implemented some of the following:

INGOs should use the mass media to change the social environment since peer education by itself is not enough to change behaviour. It appears that INGOs have not shown much interest in this expansion of peer education. They could organise workshops for writers and radio and television directors and work with these forms of media.

The many INGOs taking part in HIV/AIDS work should improve their co-operation. The NGO HIV/AIDS working group should strengthen its activities in information-sharing amongst INGOs to avoid overlap. A monthly newsletter or a bulletin for INGOs working in the field could be one of the activities in addition to a daily e-mail bulletin service which is being provided.

Vietnam should use INGO strengths and experience and consider INGOs part of the fight against HIV/AIDS through an inter-disciplinary, holistic approach that does not criminalise HIV/AIDS. INGOs should share their experiences with Vietnamese partners and assist with the Government’s strategic planning and provide a chance for INGO activities to fit better with Government directions. Many INGOs expressed concern about the change in the National AIDS Committee to the Committee for Social Evils – Drugs, Prostitution and AIDS. Is a change in name a change in strategy? Will amalgamating HIV/AIDS with other social evils reduce the prevention and awareness-raising work of INGOs? The fight against HIV/AIDS should be everyone’s task.

Nutrition Twenty-one organisations (9.5% of the INGOs in the VUFO-NGO Resource Centre database) note their work in nutrition. Interviews and information from a nutrition workshop on June 15, 2000 indicated INGOs (especially SCF/US) were in fact the turning point in work against malnutrition in Vietnam. INGOs set up networks of volunteer health workers focusing on nutrition and maternal and child health, put forward models of positive deviance, and supported provincial Committees for the Care and Protection of Children.25 However, some limitations remain:

Effectiveness is limited because INGO model nutrition programmes are more suitable to the delta than to the mountainous regions. Working methods, approaches, and the use of local resources have solved only the immediate problem of nutrition but not malnutrition as a whole. INGO staff members have spent too much energy experimenting. The programme's small scale and short-term outlooks have reduced their impact.

25 Notes from Nutrition Workshop (June, 2000).

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Community commitment and volunteers’ activities that once contributed to programme sustainability decreased when new local leaders did not fully understand and follow the programme. Payments for collaborators were reduced, causing them to leave the programme.

Lessons Learned

INGOs should continue to integrate nutrition into other programmes from the time of overall planning to solve root causes and continue the change from nutrition to mother and child health to address the problem rather than minimise malnutrition.

INGOs should use statistics shared by GSO and FAO to evaluate their programmes’ outputs and effectiveness.

INGOs and GOs (Governmental Organisations) should consult with each other on appropriate and shared knowledge levels for local volunteers.

INGOs should share information between organisations by setting up a sectoral working group.

Education SectorSeventy-eight organisations (35.5% of the INGOs in the VUFO-NGO Resource Centre database) note their work in education. In 1999, INGOs contributed 17% of their disbursements or just over 13 million USD to education. INGOs responding to the study questionnaire reflected a consistent pattern, with investment from 18% to 21% to education over the decade and with an allocated weight between 17% and 19%.

During the past decade, Vietnam expanded its co-operation with international organisations to implement EFA (Education For All) programmes. Komitee Twee's education for children with disabilities and Oxfam GB’s education project in Ha Tinh Province helped create the confidence that made this co-operation possible.26 INGO work in this sector includes Oxfam GB and Enfants et Developpement (SCF/France)’s support for Primary Education (PE) in Lao Cai Province; SCF/Australia’s support in Binh Thuan Province; and Radda Barnen’s work;27 Plan International, Oxfam GB and SCF/France support out-of-school education;28 and SCF/UK, Radda Barnen and CRS support education for children with disabilities.29 Many more organisations have activities in education.

Since1991, INGOs have integrated inclusive education programmes into community development, as the following case study shows:

26 Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 2000, p.70.27 UNICEF, 2000, p. 64.28 ibid.29 Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 2000, p.11.

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Radda Barnen supported a project following the International Convention on the Rights of the Child and a Plan of Action of EFA (Education for All). Educators developed a curriculum and materials for teaching children with disabilities in public primary schools. By the 1998-1999 school year, Radda Barnen, CRS, UNICEF, and SCF/UK had conducted inclusive education programmes in more than fifty districts in forty-five provinces. More than 30,000 children with disabilities were participating in day-time classes at 1,000 public schools. Simultaneously, beginning in 1995, Radda Barnen and CRS targeted children with disabilities in pre-school education through pilot projects on inclusive education.30

However, there are some limitations to inclusive education programmes :

This idea comes from abroad and requires experimenting to determine appropriateness to Vietnam and to define adaptations before extending the idea.

A present method of inclusive education regarding children with impaired hearing of sending children from special education or early intervention programmes to regular schools without changing the new educational environment may only be suitable for children with mild and moderate hearing loss and with appropriate hearing aids. This method of inclusive education is not effective for children with severe or profound hearing loss. Demand for school admittance is much higher than the number of places, with the result that integration is slow. Many regular schools are not willing to accept these children.31

Lessons Learned

INGOs should re-evaluate the effectiveness of programmes by: assessing the integration level of children with disabilities into regular schools; studying aspects of child psychology when children with disabilities share classes with other children; and measuring the classroom understanding of children with disabilities in comparison with other children.

Agriculture and Rural DevelopmentMany INGOs have been involved in agriculture and rural development during the last decade. Since it was beyond the scope of this report to examine all the issues in this sector, the study team chose only two areas: integrated rural development and micro-finance.

Integrated Rural Development Thirty-one organisations (14% of the INGOs in the VUFO-NGO Resource Centre database) work in integrated rural development. Respondents indicated investment between 6 and 8% from 1992 to 1999 and weight of work around 5% over the decade. Various projects (such as credit, health, clean water, education, etc.) within the

30 Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 2000, p. 26.31 Komitee Twee, 1996.

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programmes strengthen the integrated approach, making INGO programmes more accessible and easier for local partners to support.

In the beginning, organisations implemented various projects (such as credit, health, clean water) in one location, calling them an integrated programme. However, such projects did not necessarily support each other; thus, the integrated approach must be reviewed when beginning project implementation. An entry point into the community helps the INGO assess community needs, whether they are in health or irrigation. Then, based on these needs, the INGO can support other activities linking, step by step, to a full programme.

Integrated approaches and projects had some of the following difficulties:

Integrated programmes demand that project officers individually or as a team have comprehensive knowledge. One person can hardly possess all the needed knowledge but as a result, project quality may often be reduced, and staff prestige may decline.

In many cases, INGO ways of working with partners have created difficulties in implementation, supervision and follow up.

Micro-Finance Thirty-six organisations (16.4% of the INGOs in the VUFO-NGO Resource Centre database) note their work in micro-finance. Respondents indicated investment of about 5% over the decade in micro-finance, but the average work weight allocated was higher in 1999, at about 8% (See Section 1). Micro credit in rural areas is among the most active sectors of INGOs. Most INGOs consider savings and credit a common means to promote income generation, while a small number see savings and credit as income protection for the poor.32

Some Observations Related to INGO Credit Projects

An appropriate INGO approach emphasises loans for the poor. Many INGOs appear to have targeted average groups rather than the poor and the poorest. If loans are beyond the reach of the poor, then it could be argued that INGO projects and programmes lose meaning..

INGO loan programmes have integrated many other purposes, such as empowerment, income generation, and reduction of the gap between the rich and the poor. Larger goals will require time. Small loan and credit programmes do not achieve ambitious goals.

At present, the Women’s Union is the most common INGO partner in credit programmes. However, some Women’s Union staff members have not had sufficient training and interest. Moreover, Women’s Union staff members have rotated, limiting project sustainability.

32 UNDP, 1996.

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Programme expansion without adequate training has caused many INGO credit programmes to fail because these INGOs have not become specialised in credit and no one in the partner organisations had had credit training sufficient to run a viable programme. This has actually increased debt. In addition, a framework of mutual understanding was not established in some programmes, with the result that funds were moved to other programmes.

Lessons Learned

INGOs should develop relationships with local partners, setting up a temporary legal framework of mutual understanding. Then, the programme can extend, creating greater co-operation with managers and policy makers at higher levels.

INGOs should maintain the commitment between themselves and local partners by starting with a small model before expanding. Without careful planning, the number of people who participate and then withdraw is fairly high, creating additional per capita costs, wasting training resources, and reducing programme impact.

INGOs using the Women’s Union as a partner should emphasise local training. Although the Women’s Union has a commitment to credit and savings work from the national level on down, and a concomitant awareness of the programme, Women’s Union staff are not financial managers. INGOs working with local Women’s Union partners in credit and training must make a substantial investment in training to ensure project success.

INGOs should be clear as to whether they want to be a financial-service organisation or a financial-support organisation.

* *

*Lessons Learned in relation to the sectors above

Sustainability was mentioned in all INGOs sectors, especially credit, nutrition, and HIV/AIDS. To achieve sustainability, INGOs would need to work in accordance with Government programmes and with the support of Government.

Networking within programme activities is needed to maintain regular contacts and for information sharing between and among INGOs and Government agencies. Working groups should be strengthened towards working more closely with government agencies/donor community to link with national programmes and to avoid overlap resulting in wasted resources. Although there has been networking in some sectors, the VUFO-NGO Resource Centre should further support networks concerning INGO activities.

28

Information on INGO work during the last ten years in health, education, agriculture and rural development indicates that INGOs have made considerable contributions to Vietnam’s development.

Urban Community Development 33 Information on INGOs activities in this sector was limited because only a few INGOs (mostly in the south) focus on this area. This report will try to analyse some reasons that might explain a perceived lack of interest in INGO work in this area.

The projects or programmes implemented by INGOs in this sector include:34 - Micro-finance- Water and sanitation- Environment- Scholarships for poor children- Health insurance for poor children- Programmes for children with disabilities- Vocational training- Infrastructure construction - Housing

The number of urban community development projects and programmes are far fewer that in the agriculture and rural development sector. Some difficulties that might affect this and that the study team found are :

There appears to be a lack of community cohesion in the cities, leading to programme obstacles. The loose connection between urban residents makes community-based projects and programmes to help disadvantaged groups inconvenient or even impossible. For example, a CBR (Community Based Rehabilitation) project aimed at rehabilitating disabled children through a community approach to create faster integration into the community. However, in Vietnam, the urban living of 'just within your own house' ('nhµ ai biÕt viÖc nhµ Êy') may have prevented other community members from intervening and assisting disadvantaged children troubled by domestic violence or harassment. Another example appeared in micro-finance. Regular group repayment meetings to strengthen group cohesion and improve knowledge faced difficulties compared with similar rural meetings. This may be because urban members had different work times and greater distances between them.

Officials’ lack of eagerness and support makes it more difficult to implement urban community development projects/programmes. It is difficult to reconcile local people's and authorities’ requests with an INGO’s strategy.35 Without intending to do so, INGO assistance to urban poor in slum areas may have

33 The INGO Directory lists this sector together with rural development under the heading community development.34Preliminary Note at the Urban Community Development Workshop, Ho Chi Minh City ( July, 2000).

35 INGO activities in the cities are numerous when compared with rural areas.

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created magnets contradicting city efforts to curb urban migration. Another related issue is the different expectations between INGOs and partners. For example, the study found that one INGO wanted to carry out a project for disadvantaged children but failed after one year because the INGO wanted to improve attitudes towards disadvantaged children through training, while their partner wanted wheelchairs and financial support.36

Security in urban areas is of more concern than in the rural areas. Local paperwork for an expatriate to visit project areas can be confusing making it seem as if the Vietnamese side has tried to create difficulties. This may in turn diminish INGO interest in urban projects and programmes.

Urban community development projects have been risky and can lack sustainability. For example, group members in micro-credit projects for urban poor may include unregistered citizens, increasing the risk that loans won’t be repaid. Additional risk can arise from infrastructure and construction projects. Even city authorities cannot assure the stability in the project area. For example, the study team visited a new resettlement area, where an INGO had helped build roads, sanitation, electricity, a water system, and had provided loans for house construction in a project to resettle people in Ho Chi Minh City. However, an official of the project area expressed uncertainty, noting that he himself was not quite sure of the future of the newly resettled area.

Urbanisation is a universal trend in developing countries, making it likely that urban areas will become a more important sector for INGOs.

Lessons Learned

INGOs should consider the needs of local people and authorities, but the first planning priority should be the needs of the people.

INGOs should co-ordinate with the city management board regarding the city’s development plan.

INGOs should respect Vietnam’s administrative rules and avoid expatriate visits to project sites without notifying the local authorities.

INGOs urban community development projects and programmes should support community groups in the process of urbanisation.

INGOs should support training for Vietnamese officials in urban management.

2.2 Impact on Direct Target Groups

36 Note from Workshop (July, 2000).

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Changes in INGO Target Beneficiaries - Moving Closer to the Poor and Vulnerable. Many respondents (47.2%) to the INGO study questionnaire reported a change in either the kinds or numbers of beneficiaries, noting a change towards focusing more closely on the poor, the vulnerable and ethnic minorities. A small number of programmes have moved away from beneficiaries initially indicated by the Government. Thirty per cent of the INGOs cited as reasons a greater understanding of the economic situation and the nature of poverty in Vietnam; nineteen per cent cited requests from partners and beneficiaries.

What has been the impact on the target beneficiaries of INGO programmes in relation to vulnerable groups?

The PoorTen years ago, the poor were neglected in most INGO projects and programmes, with the main reason being a lack of confidence in the poor. By the early 1990s, INGO focus on this group helped lift many out of poverty, and the poor themselves contributed to changing the social perception of others.

Some of the positive INGO impacts on the poor are:

Change and diversification of production activities Access to appropriate technology Improvement of living standards and working conditions Income and property generation, debt reduction Access to health care and education Increased self-confidence and self empowerment Enhanced role in the family and in the community Confidence of other organisations to create access for the poor to credit.

However, information collected from interviews and reports confirmed that, so far, most INGO projects and programmes reach only the relatively poor and middle-income households. As one INGO report notes: “the poorest groups in communities are often left out" and "most of the project of poverty alleviation mainly seems to attract the better off strata within the poor communities”.37

A lack of attention paid to addressing the poorest of the poor as illustrated in the case of micro-credit (below) may be due to limited understanding of INGO staff members in poverty alleviation methods.

Local project partners tend to choose only those poor households able to pay interest and repay loans. Extra conditions for the project participants sometimes include: no debts to the co-operative, good health, work management skills, freedom from drugs, a reputation for hard work, and ability to pay interest and repay the loan.

37 NAV, 1996, p. 23.

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For example, the criteria for selection of participants in one credit and savings programme has been:

Poor, as indicated by having less than 13kg rice/person/month income equivalent Ability to repay and, later, ability to deposit savings Active membership in the Women’s Union.38

Such criteria can appear contradictory, as a hard working person with management skills may not be among the poorest and will not be continuously in debt. Many poor households are in debt from emergency expenditures, such as health costs, or from investing in a venture, which has failed.39

The same situation appears in agricultural projects. Criteria for participant selection in one extension project for farming on sloping land were:

Households which have suitable land for setting up a SALT model Households which have enough labour force to implement activities Those who can contribute local materials, experience and knowledge

Poor farmers who have land, labour and the capacity to contribute not only experiences but also materials will not be the poorest of the poor.

There appears to be a contradiction between project sustainability and the participation of the poorest. Most projects and programmes have set up selective criteria for the sustainability which leads to the exclusion of some of the poorest.40 For example, a sustainable interest rate of INGO credit programme is usually 1% , 1.2% or 1.5% while the Vietnam Bank for the Poor and the Vietnam Bank of Agriculture charge 0.7%. While INGOs debate interest rates, some question whether high INGO interest rates prevent the poorest from borrowing in INGO credit programmes. Perhaps INGOs may need to do more to raise awareness as to why they wish to have higher interest rates. As a local interviewee stated: “We can’t understand why INGO projects want to help the poor but their interest rate is higher than the Bank for the Poor”41.

INGOs working in agriculture and micro-credit tended to select partners who were not the poor or the poorest in order to guarantee success. One staff member noted that, “it is difficult to identify the poor who are able to carry out micro-enterprise”42 and that selecting poor participants could have a negative impact on programme results. Another staff member noted that, “poor site choice and poor application of recommendations, ... reduced the impact of hedgerows for many farmers”.

38 Porter, 1997, p.14.39 Government of Vietnam; Donor; NGO Poverty Working Group, 1999. 40 Notes from the Workshop on Credit, (June, 2000).41 Note from the field trips.42 Notes from the field trips.

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INGO participation requirements of local resources have prevented the poor and the poorest from taking part in projects. The poor can contribute labour to a project by carrying earth and digging wells, but they cannot contribute cash, especially to a big project. One INGO said that its policy in the past was for local people to contribute 30%. Now, that figure is 50%, and in the future, the local contribution will probably be 75%. If expenditures for a clean water project run in the millions of VND, the project participants who must contribute will not be the poor and the poorest.

INGO project partners such as the Farmer's Union or the Women's Union require

that borrowers be active members, limiting access for the poor, particularly in remote areas. Although the mass organisations generally have impressive outreach, they are not active in many remote ethnic minority areas, where poverty is greatest.43

Project selection has gone through many steps and levels, thus hindering the participation of the poor and the poorest. Through the recommendation of PACCOM, an INGO may then go through a process of contacting a relevant province, then going from the province to a district, which is supposed to be poor or not yet having many implemented projects. Then, the INGO moves from the district to a poor commune and from the commune to poor hamlet. Then poor households are selected to participate. The long process moving through many different administrative levels sometimes makes the selection of the poor dependent on the wishes of individual authorities. Even though criteria for the selection process may be transparent, local officials may exert inappropriate influence.44

Difficulty accessing markets in remote areas limits participation in INGOs credit and savings programmes because the poor cannot sell their goods. According to one INGO staff member, “some ethnic communities near the Laos border are so isolated that they do not use the market system at all”.45

In the future, will INGOs support individuals from the better-off social strata, continue to support the middle poor, or support the poorest of the poor?

Lessons Learned

INGOs should target the poor, especially the poorest in the remote and mountainous areas, where the national projects and programmes on poverty alleviation have not yet been implemented.

INGOs should adjust and reschedule their projects to take risks.

43 UNICEF, 2000, p. 43. 44 World Bank and DFID, 1999, p.60.45 Interview with an INGO informant.

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INGOs should work to change people’s perception on participation and consider potential beneficiaries’ sense of responsibility to the community rather than ability to make financial contributions.

INGOs should engage the close co-ordination and commitment of the authorities to support the poor.

Administrative steps should be minimised to ensure the poorest can participate.

INGOs should strengthen the understanding of INGO staff and partners regarding poverty issues in Vietnam. Methods to identify and cope with the increasing gap between the rich and poor and especially to address vulnerable groups should be introduced in programme and project planning.

Women’s GroupsMany INGOs have a goal to improve gender equity and have supported projects targeting women, including credit and savings projects through the Women's Union. To encourage women's empowerment, INGOs have strived to have women taking part in other project activities, particularly training. INGOs have had the following positive impacts on women:

Empowerment Enhanced women’s participation in communities Changed labour division within families Improved lives of women, their families and children (income generation, access to

the basic services of health care, education)

INGOs noted that the credit and savings programmes helped women to speak their minds more freely, feel more self-confident, and become more included in community activities. Participants also learned more about disease prevention, sanitation, and agricultural extension. However, these comments applied more to average women than to the poor or the poorest as the following quotes illustrate. One assessment report found that “women are thus often marginalised, particularly if they come from poor families” and that "women of poor families are (paid less attention to) in the various.... projects, and also in the credit schemes for women”.46 Another noted: “The credit scheme... has had some impact on the livelihoods of some (poor) women but the impact is limited. The research is not conclusive on the notion that the poorest and most vulnerable families and women within a hamlet now participate more or less in the affairs of their community- the answer appears to be no change and no impact.”47 Since many INGO micro-credit projects have mostly been in partnership with the Women’s Union and yet have not reached the poor and poorest women, INGOs may want to consider whether the Women’s Union is the best partner.

46 NAV, 1996.47 Oxfam Great Britain, 1998.

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Some reports indicated that women’s roles have improved in society and in the family as women’s opinions become more respected. However, this impact is not clear. The chance for women to extend their influence and access various sources of information has been very limited because most women have been busy with household work. Thus, they do not have much chance or time to join meetings, especially those in remote areas.48 Participation in credit projects may impose more work and responsibility on women. Some reports indicate that, though the working loads for women have increased with loans from credit programmes, the participants remain pleased because they feel “their work is much less difficult than before and the condition of work is better”49. Thus, increased work loads should not be considered a negative impact of the credit and savings programme on women.50

The focus on women in INGO projects and programmes has created an opportunity for men to neglect their duties and responsibilities. Consequently, men have not actively taken part in many programmes, thereby leading to an increase in women’s work loads and responsibilities. Many activities in a nutrition programme for children required women’s time, including: taking the child to be weighed, tracking the child’s growth, and preparing special meals. One INGO nutrition project concluded women’s participation and time investment was necessary for project success in order to have any effect, including advocacy.

Recently, women’s participation in INGO projects has increased. One INGO commented that 50% of its team and participants were women. Women seem to participate more at the community level. For instance, some women have been community health workers, community veterinarians, voluntary nutrition workers, and staff in rural integrated development projects.51 Women have been very active from cultivation to harvesting in agricultural and silvicultural activities. In many places, women do even harder work in the fields than men. Both women and men have participated in cultivation and silviculture, whereas women have mostly taken part in animal husbandry and IPM projects.

Women’s participation in INGO training activities has attracted more attention when women have been invited by name to attend a training course, or a couple has been invited to a meeting when a project is being implemented. However, most assessment reports have not yet evaluated women’s participation in training activities. The study team felt that the impact of training activities on women has been limited for the following reasons:

48 Interview notes.49 Oxfam United Kingdom and Ireland, 1997, p.37. 50 ActionAid Vietnam, 1996. 51 Notes from the field trips.

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Men were the family's representatives in project meetings and training activities, thereby limiting women’s participation, particularly in rural areas and particularly in the early 1990s.52

Generally speaking, women’s education is lower than men’s, particularly in remote

and mountainous areas. Consequently, even if they are invited, women seldom attend meetings because they lack self-confidence.

INGO project times and venues have not considered the different education levels and different roles between women and men within the household.

Women’s participation in training activities has often been only symbolic. Although participation encourages and inspires women, it has yet to be evaluated.

The study team found that, although INGOs have paid great attention to gender issues, and participation has increased, they have not yet deeply involved women. INGOs have not yet had an overall, long-term view of the issue. Sometimes women’s roles in INGO projects seem more rhetorical than actual. As one informant said: “They (INGOs) require women’s participation just to demonstrate their gender attitude, but they do not carefully take care of women’s concerns or interests.”53

The study team could not collect information on the number of men and women participants in project management boards, though did observe that men have taken most of the functional roles while women have assumed support roles. Men dominated in agriculture and in agriculture extension. As one report noted: “Men still dominate most functions and are well represented in most of the projects’ Boards of Management. Efforts to empower women within the.... programmes are few.” 54

In Vietnam 27% of the heads of households are women; most are poor. This number will likely increase.55 INGO information regarding programmes and projects for this target group was not available. Thus, INGO impact on women heads of household is not clear.

At present, most INGOs have a goal to enhance gender equity. However, none of the studied INGOs have appointed a staff member specialised in gender, although some staff are responsible for gender among other issues. Addressing gender issues can therefore becomes extra work, making gender activities secondary. Some INGOs did establish a Gender Working Group, although it appears symbolic with no responsibility or power.

Most of the studied INGOs have organised training courses on gender issues for their staff and some of the partners. However, the knowledge gained in the training courses has not yet been fully applied. One INGO assessment report indicates that, “staff and local partners did not articulate a plan to have gender in the ‘project’, and there was a

52 UNICEF, 1994.53 Interview notes.54 NAVprogramme Review, p.35.55 UNICEF, 2000, p.18.

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lack of consistency about how gender policy is translated into programme”.56 In general, INGO project officers have not been fully trained and do not thoroughly understand the methods and skills necessary to address gender issues. One INGO project officer wondered: “Why it is necessary to question the time, activities and different demands between women and men? Addressing the gender issue will be complicated and a waste of time. Even worse, in the religious or fishing communities, there could be some strong protest”.57

Lessons Learned

INGO staff should promote gender understanding among their own staff. Senior programme staff should understand gender dimensions in development. Gender training should be a first priority in internal staff-training programmes.

INGOs should have a specialised gender project officer to take responsibility for co-ordinating and supervising project or programme activities on gender issues. A Gender Working Group should include representatives of various sections within INGOs so that these staff members have enough power to address gender issues within project activities. Their participation should have a clear commitment from the organisation.

INGOs should have a system to track gender criteria in programmes and projects, especially within training activities, should keep statistical data on men and women who participation in these activities, and should assess the impacts of training on both men and women.

INGOs should mobilise men and women and urge men to share in housework, home production activities and childcare.

INGOs should improve their methodologies for targeting women-headed households.

Ethnic groupsWorking with ethnic groups has been an INGO goal. Respondents confirmed recent INGO efforts to target ethnic minorities. Indeed, work with ethnic minorities has been the main focus of some INGO projects and programmes. However, few assessment reports address the impact of INGO programmes involving ethnic minorities, although there are sections on ethnic minorities within overall programme evaluations. Moreover, these reports have not mentioned some sensitive issues, such as inter racial attitudes. Still, INGOs have contributed to positive changes in ethnic communities, such as:

INGO projects and programmes supporting traditional professions, including herb gardens and traditional treatments, have increased income and restored ethnic identity. One NGO noted that, “…the project has had a positive result in reviving at

56 Oxfam Hong Kong, 2000, p.45. 57 Notes from the field trips.

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least two craft skills -- silk weaving and dyeing -- and making them a viable economic livelihood for group members. ... Productive use of traditional ethnic Thai skills is one of the most valuable aspects of the project as far as the district is concerned.”58

Some INGO projects and programmes such as small irrigation systems have changed old habits of cultivation, thus contributing to economic stabilisation for ethnic minorities. Highland ethnic groups such as Tay, Nung, Muong and Thai can now cultivate two crops annually, whereas H’mong communities with new irrigation systems can now cultivate in terraced fields.

INGO projects and programmes have increased people’s participation in community activities, particularly in the case of ethnic minority women. As one INGO noted: “Several of the projects have been implemented with possible bias toward the inhabitants of hamlets with poor and more vulnerable ethnic groups, effectively attempting to involve them much as possible. H’mong and Dao men are more involved in community affairs than in 1993”.59 Those INGO activities in remote and mountainous areas where Government programmes have not yet been visible have reduced the isolation of ethnic minorities. “More interaction between the most marginalised ethnic minorities and outsiders (occurred) as a result of the project.”60 Local authorities acknowledge this. One provincial leader said that “INGO project activities in remote areas created opportunities for contact with outsiders".61

Health programmes such as clean water systems and training courses for health workers have had a positive impact on ethnic communities. “The health of ethnic minorities has definitely improved... the impact of this water availability has been huge and has positive results on the health of the women and children.” 62

However, some factors have reduced the impact of INGO activities.

Language has been a big obstacle to effective INGO work with ethnic communities. Most project officers do not know ethnic languages. Consequently, contacts with people who speak only ethnic languages depends on bi-lingual commune leaders, with the result that local people are left out of decision making, thereby reducing project impact. One INGO staff member commented: “It is very difficult to develop a project in ethnic communities. During hamlet meetings, the villagers just sit in silence, giggling or even speaking their own language. That’s why in the beginning, needs assessments were implemented only in the Kinh-speaking ethnic communities or with Kinh-speaking leaders.”63 This raises the question whether project requests from ethnic communities where there are few Kinh-

58 Oxfam Hong Kong, September 1998, p.47.59 Oxfam Great Britain. 1998.60 Oxfam Great Britain, 1998. 61 Notes from the field trips.62 Oxfam Hong Kong, 2000.63 Notes from the field trips.

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speaking people and little contact with outsiders have come from the communities themselves or, instead, from the few Kinh-speaking leaders.

Poor understanding in ethnic languages has led to poor knowledge of ethnic customs, psychology, values and behaviours, thus limiting project impact. For instance, an INGO paid a small salary to the trainees in a course in basic knowledge for commune and hamlet health workers so that workers would also have income-generation possibilities in their own communities through treating patients. However, a hamlet health worker told the study team: “I did not receive payment for medical treatments or injections because the ethnic minorities do not pay for this kind of service. They consider these activities as ‘self assistance within the community.’ Besides, most households in the commune or hamlet are my relatives. Some would bring gifts, (but) other than that I did not receive anything. No one would pay me.”64 Thus, the idea of income generation for commune health workers did not succeed. Similar results have happened with commune veterinary workers.

INGOs tend to reach only more accessible ethnic communities with natural resources. Thai, Tay and Nung communities receive more opportunities than H’mong and Kho-mu groups, creating considerable contrast between the number of beneficiaries in the two geographical areas. For instance, in one INGO credit and savings project in a Thai hamlet, 100% of the women in 34 households took part, while in another hamlet of a different ethnic minority only 44% (7 out of 16 households) had women taking part.65

The same INGO project design applied to various ethnic minorities has created different results between different ethnic groups. The study team could not collect any data comparing beneficiaries within Tay, Nung, Muong, Thai, H’mong and Dao in the same project. However, generally speaking, Tay, Nung, Muong and Thai are more advanced in Kinh language, education, general knowledge and communication skills. Thus, if the numbers of beneficiaries are the same, then it could be argued that Tay, Nung, Muong, and Thai beneficiaries will receive more advantages from INGO projects. An evaluation of a project to train commune health workers indicated: “The levels of education, language and geography have considerable impact on the learning skills of participants. Participants with higher levels of education and better ability in speaking Kinh and who are not so isolated will have a better chance to learn and understand new information compared with those having lower levels of education, less fluency in Kinh and homes in more remote areas.”66 These dynamics create differences among beneficiaries in a project involving different ethnic groups and expand opportunities for the more advantaged.

Members of project management boards tend to be people living in accessible areas rather than those living in remote or mountainous areas. Consequently, large ethnic groups have dominated small ones in projects.

64 Interview with a Halmet Health Workers in Tay Commune. 65 Author field note.66 Action Aid, 1998-1999, p.4.

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Lessons Learned

INGOs should overcome ethnic language barriers by:

encouraging project officers in charge of ethnic minorities to study the ethnic language, perhaps facilitated through daily contact with a local staff speaking that language.

training a local staff person as interpreter encouraging local people to take part in the project recruitment process.

INGOs should study and learn the culture and customs of ethnic groups living in project areas.

INGOs should separate ethnic groups and apply approaches appropriate to each during project planning. The length of training activities for Tay, Nung and Thai may be similar to that for Kinh. However, H’mong, Dao, and Kho-mu may need language training in Kinh and longer training time for project activities.

INGOs should reconsider their policy of supporting ethnic minorities and invest in the most difficult areas rather than let those areas remain isolated.

Other Vulnerable Groups

People with Disabilities Thirty-four of the INGOs in the VUFO-NGO Resource Centre database work with people who have disabilities. It appears that few INGOs integrate people with disabilities into their work. Often, people with disabilities have not been allowed to participate in credit, agriculture or training sessions partly because of a decision that these people would not be able to work. A project officer in one credit and savings project said that they “do not let the disabled groups borrow money because they have lost their working capacity, so it is very difficult for them to repay their loans”.67 In general, people with disabilities appear to have only been a concern for specialised INGOs such as Komitee Twee, Radda Barnen, World Vision, Handicap International, HVO, and CRS. The work depends on the individual organisation’s philosophy. For instance, KTW focused on hearing-impaired children while Radda Barnen has worked to apply the Convention on the Rights of the Child in Vietnam. People with disabilities are sometimes involved if they live in the project areas, as in the case of PSBI, which has an inclusive education project for hearing impaired and deaf children as one of its activities in Thai Nguyen Province.68

Although disability has not been a primary focus, the Disability Forum comprised of about twenty INGOs has aimed to promote co-operation, collaboration and better communication between INGOs, organisations of people with disabilities, and relevant

67 Notes from the field trips.68 Viet Nam INGO Directory 2000-2001.

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Government ministries. Some specialised INGOs make people with disabilities their primary focus, while other INGOs have developed specific activities as part of broader programmes. The study team did not find any attempts to explore reasons preventing the broad inclusion of people with disabilities in INGO programmes. As one INGO staff member said, “we have no conscious recognition of people with disabilities in any programme planning”.69

In general, INGOs do not seem to have addressed the issue of recruiting people with disabilities to be office staff or project officers serving people with disabilities; and it seems unlikely this question will be on the agenda soon. INGOs may not have sufficiently emphasised people with disabilities (with the result that many are still left out) or existing social attitudes may have hindered INGOs efforts to take initiative.

The Aged Only four INGOs in the VUFO-NGO Resource Centre database work with the aged. They focus mostly on housing and food for the elderly or co-operate with the Research Institute of Traditional Medicine to develop herbal medicines for harmonious ageing. Some reasons may explain the limited INGO involvement. First, since most INGO projects target households, economically independent elderly living in the family are unlikely beneficiaries. Second, care of the elderly in Vietnamese culture is the duty of the children. Thus, helping the aged is more a matter for families in particular than for society in general, making this not as urgent a social issue as in other countries.

Other Vulnerable GroupsThese groups include single-headed households and unregistered citizens in project and programme areas, in particular, big cities. These groups appear to be a fairly new focus of INGO work.. One INGO staff person said, “our organisation has only begun to address the issue of the unregistered since last year, when it was raised for the first time by SCF/UK”.70 Some INGO Vietnamese staff did not even realise that no unregistered families in their areas took part in their projects or programmes.71

The unregistered are more important in big cities and the Mekong Delta. Those of working age comprise most of the people who move from one area to another in search of work, especially to big cities such as Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City. However, INGOs and their partners do not appear to have tried to create opportunities for these people, particularly in credit and savings projects, where there would be no guarantee of loan repayment. As an informant in one INGO study stated: “Illegally settled families have no access to either credit or poverty alleviation programmes.”72 It should be noted that this is not true of all INGO work.

69 Interview notes.70 Interview notes.71 Interview notes.72 From the Report of a Review of the Three Projects in the Mekong Delta funded by an INGO. November 1998.

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Single-headed households also have not received much INGO attention even though gender has been an INGO focus.73 One INGO noted that in their projects and programmes they have aimed to focus to “get technology across” to the extent that “the project paid no attention to marginalised groups”.74

INGO inclusion of these vulnerable groups in project and programme planning seems to have been more by chance than purpose. Can these groups become more a part of INGO projects and programmes?

2.3 Impact on Government Programmes and Policy

To examine INGO influence on Government programmes and policy, the study team used: information collected from six workshops, in-depth interviews, and published reports. Interviewees fell into two main groups:

individuals in international organisations,75 as well as policy makers, researchers; officials of Government agencies; local authorities; members of mass organisations; and staff of local NGOs

INGO staff.

The study team interviewed fifty people in the first group, with Government staff comprising the main interviewees (24/50), including one person at the deputy minister level (see the table below). The second group consisted of local and expatriate INGO staff, including programme and project officers and representatives. The interviewees had been working in various sectors, such as education, health, agriculture and rural development, and urban community development. Some interviewees’ remarks spanned many sectors.

The interviewees’ opinions were diverse but fell into three main sub-topics:

impact on Government programmes impact on Government officers and staff impact on the formulation of Government policies, documents and regulations

below the level of a national law.

73 See previous section.74 Interview with a member staff from an INGO.75 Here, the term international organisations includes UNDP, multilateral organisations, and other bilateral donors but not INGOs.

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Table 6: Interviewees According to Work Positions and FieldsSectorsInterviewer

Education Health Agriculture &Rural Development

Urban C.D

Others Total

Minister/vice Minister

1 1

Gov. officers 8 7 4 2 3 24Local leader 8 3 1 12Mass org. 2 3 5Local NGO 1 1 2 1 1 6INGO Rep. 4 1 10 2 17INGO staffs 4 9 18 3 34Others 1 1 2Total 17 21 46 11 6 101

2.3.1 Impact on the Way to Access Government Programmes

Most interviewees shared the opinion that INGOs’ ways of working have been flexible, bottom-up and community-based, and, as such, have positively influenced Government.

INGO activities in agriculture and rural development have had major impacts on MARD programmes, including agricultural extension, credit, IPM, agro-forestry development, and land and forestry contracting and management. INGOs have particularly affected sustainable agricultural development.76

PRA methods have influenced Government programme planning and implementation. INGOs have mobilised local people to solve problems in their own communities. Many Government projects have applied these methods with flexibility to assess community needs and priorities. Local authorities have followed INGO methods to mobilise local forces for road construction, digging wells, sanitation facilities and school construction. A director of a provincial health department commented, “the PRA method was applied by health staff when implementing Government projects such as the CBM (Community Based Monitoring) in five districts in 1998”.77

INGO activities in credit programmes in the early 1990s expanded some models already in use in Women’s Union pilot projects, including the use of small groups, instituting savings among the poor, and implementing loans through gradual repayment. The Government then applied these models to help the poor. One interviewee noted, “Our credit programme contributed to the city’s hunger-and-poverty-eradication programme. For example, in the early stage, Government credit programmes always collected interest at the end of the period, and offered no training to borrowers. Thus, there was not much result. Later, the programme succeeded following my organisation’s experiences in gradual collection of interest.”78

76 Interview notes.77 Interview notes.78 Notes from field trips.

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INGOs demonstrated new ways of working on HIV/AIDS prevention and helped decrease the epidemic’s impact in Vietnam. Some INGOs such as SCF/UK created a new model by establishing a network of peer educators, who then contributed to the primary framework of Government programmes. As an officer of the former National Committee for HIV/AIDS Prevention commented: “Although INGO projects have only established small models, the National Committee for HIV/AIDS Prevention has applied them to large Government programmes. For instance, in the beginning, the model of peer educators was not accepted by the Government. During the last two years, the Government provided financial support to twenty provinces for peer education.”79 One INGO staff member thought INGO activities in HIV/AIDS would fail because the Government had recently integrated the Committee for AIDS Prevention with the Committee for the Prevention of Social Evils.80

INGOs in nutrition, in particular SCF/US, contributed significantly to Government programmes on nutrition.81 By using health volunteers for child-and- women-focused interventions specific to anti-malnutrition, INGOs brought a new model to Vietnam. This model included growth monitoring, nutrition-education and rehabilitation, as well as pre-and-post-natal care. The use of a positive deviance study enabled communities to utilise their own resources to address malnutrition.82

INGOs in education have offered latest and up-to-date information on training. One interviewee noted: “This source of information is so precious for us, even better than money. INGO activities have contributed to changing knowledge at the community and ministerial levels, thus creating new and effective ways of working."83 Komitee Twee’s education programme for hearing-impaired children has stimulated contributions from local schools to upgrade classrooms. MRM (Maternal Reflective Methods), a modern and effective method for children with severe hearing impairment, use hearing aids and can be applied in the mother tongue. Many other resources have contributed to the renovation of methodology in public schools.84

2.3.2 Impact on Government Staff

INGO activities have influenced Vietnamese Government staff members, who have improved their professional skills when working with INGO experts in agriculture, health, and education. In addition, INGOs have sent Government staff members abroad for training, giving them access to advanced technology.

Co-operation with INGOs has helped local officials learn about planning, implementation, management and supervision of small projects, knowledge that they have applied to projects from other sources of funds. An official from a mountainous

79 Notes from field trips.80 HIV/AIDS Workshop, (July, 2000).81 Workshop on Nutrition, (June 2000).82 Save the Children US, 1995.83 Interview notes.84 Komitee Twee (Evaluation Report).

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district noted: “After having implemented the INGO project, we realised we had learned a lot and applied the INGO way of project management to various projects in the district. It is very difficult for us to find other donors, but we have written some project proposals to send out to donors for financial support. It is obvious that management skills of commune leaders have improved from implementing the INGO project.”85

Co-operation with INGOs has helped improve the capacity, role and prestige of some mass organisations, such as the Women’s Union, Farmers’ Union, and VACVINA.

INGO activities in agriculture, education, and health have contributed to a changed perception of Vietnamese staff, thereby improving the role of peasants, and helping children with disabilities and people living with HIV/AIDS integrate into communities.

INGOs activities in building capacity for partners have influenced training methods for Vietnamese staff. In the early stages, INGOs opened training courses for health workers, commune veterinary surgeons, etc. Then, later on, provincial and district leaders organised training courses using INGO models but Government funds. One INGO staff member stated: “At the beginning, our INGO organised a training course for hamlet health workers. Later on, the district heath department organised training courses for other hamlets with contents similar to our programme."86 A director of a provincial health department noted that, “the contents of training courses organised by MCNV for commune health workers have had a great impact on teaching methods and contents in the medical schools, in particular the use of student participation”.87

Some interviewees noted that, although INGOs had received credit for training Vietnamese staff, INGOs have drawn skilled and talented staff away from Government agencies, creating a negative impact. An official heading a research institute noted: “We now lack staff with ability to do fundamental research because our good staff have become consultants for foreign organisations.”88 Some argued that serving as consultants to foreign organisations, including INGOs, has caused Vietnamese researchers to lose their creativity and initiative in relation to Government work and that it has become more difficult for these staff to become specialised in their own field, harming human development in Vietnam. Others felt co-operation with INGOs has improved the knowledge and working skills of Government staff. They felt that Vietnamese staff who had moved from Government work to INGOs also contributed to Vietnam development and that this trend should not be considered a negative impact.89

85 Interview notes.86 Author field note. 87 Author field note. 88 Author field note.89 Author field note.

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2.3.3 Impact on the Making of Policy, Regulations and Documents below National Laws (“under-law documents”)

Collecting information for this section was difficult because interviewees either did not understand this relationship or did not know about INGO work in detail. However, the study team was able to collect the following information:

One policy maker stated that when drafting under-law documents on the new model of co-operative, they did review and consult the model of co-operative introduced by one INGO in Thai Nguyen Province.

INGOs have helped open the possibility of permission for children with disabilities to attend school. In 1997, provisions which prohibited children with disabilities from attending kindergartens were abolished. The Ministry of Education and Training (MOET) confirmed that disabled children learning in special schools should attend regular schools.90 With Komitee Twee support, MOET began specific activities, including:

Organising a university division with a training curriculum in the field of hearing impairment

Providing preparatory education courses for lecturers to establish special education departments at local teachers training colleges

Providing general training courses for primary and kindergarten teachers Establishing key pedagogic universities in the north, the centre and the south, and

at the National Institute of Educational Science to improve curricula, develop training and continue research in education.91

Lessons Learned

Generally speaking, INGOs projects with their small investments, pilot initiatives, bottom-up methods, and farmer-based approaches have limited the spread and application of new technologies. These factors may have in turn reduced the impact of INGOs on Government policy planning and programmes. However, it could be argued that some of these factors (small scale investments and bottom-up methods), will have also had positive influences in relation to the use of more participatory approaches.

To extend the impact of their programmes, INGOs should consider some of the following:

INGOs should understand and consider the policies of the Vietnamese Party and Government in order for their work to be appropriate. INGOs should co-operate with and support Government activities. Only through this way will INGO work be

90 Interview note. 91 Komitee Twee (Evaluation Report).

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effective. For instance, solving the root causes of malnutrition requires Government involvement at all levels.

INGOs in the same sector or sharing the same partners should establish and maintain a strong network facilitated by the VUFO-NGO Resource Centre. INGOs might then have a common voice when speaking to the Vietnamese Government.

INGOs in the same sector should meet with concerned Government staff and agencies to discuss experiences and share information. Only in this way can INGOs apply the results of their work to development policies of Vietnam.

INGOs should co-operate with and support Government offices and local Vietnamese organisations appropriately to train and strengthen Vietnamese staff.

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3. Methods, Approaches and Lessons Learned3. Methods, Approaches and Lessons Learned

Changing from service delivery to capacity buildingOver 65% of the organisations responding to the study’s questionnaire reported changes in their activities since starting work in Vietnam. The most apparent shift is from a focus on service delivery to capacity building of project partners. More than 40% of the organisations surveyed noted that sectoral investment changed with greater awareness of social and economic problems and that activities also changed to include more appropriate responses. Shifts also resulted from partner and beneficiary requests and awareness of new or innovative activities. Other reasons included requests from headquarters and donors and changes in the Vietnamese regulatory framework92.

Changing to participatory approaches and active learning INGOs reflected a lack of consensus about what constitutes approaches and methods. Nevertheless, over 80% of the organisations surveyed noted changes in approaches and methods. Trends included increased emphasis on capacity building, participatory methods, supporting local structures to manage activities at the grass-roots level, and greater use of active learning methods93.

An understanding of why methods have changed can be gained by examining replies of specific organisations. One INGO stated “a bottom-up approach has always been applied” but “more recently PRA processes have been introduced and are completed before the design of programmes”.94 Based on these findings, the organisation is beginning participatory planning at the village and commune levels. Staff noted that these new ways of working will require time before they become normal practise. Another INGO pointed out that it focused on introducing “innovative ideas and approaches” in its early years but later favoured applying these approaches.

3.1 Partnership

Partnership is extremely important to INGO work in Vietnam. INGOs most often collaborate with the Government and mass organisations at local and central levels, as well as with emerging local NGOs, social development organisations, research and consultant institutes, and universities.95 In reality, INGOs’ co-operation with Vietnamese agencies and organisations varies from one INGO to the next. Following are five common typologies, some of which may overlap:

INGOs that do not have offices in the country. Approximately 193 INGOs (350 active INGOs minus 157 with offices or workstations in the country) are working from abroad. These organisations mostly operate through their local partners or even

92 See Table 7, Appendix A.93 See Table 8, Appendix A.94 Interview notes. 95 VUFO-NGO Resource Centre, 1999, p.4.

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sometimes through another INGO which has an office in Vietnam. These organisations were not included in this study.

INGOs that situate international staff and volunteers in country to implement programmes. These organisations employ no or very few local staff. Volunteer-sending agencies fit in this type.

INGOs with field project offices that have direct relationship with local people where project or programme activities are carried out. Some INGOs have a head office and also establish project offices on site in project areas. For example, CARE has a representative office in Ha Noi, and project offices in Ngoc Lac, Phu Yen, and in Ho Chi Minh City. Or, an INGO may have only one office and choose to locate it in a project area, for example, Save the Children Australia in Binh Thuan Province.

INGOs with centrally based offices in Ha Noi, Ho Chi Minh City, Hue, or other provincial capitals, from which field projects and programmes are implemented. An expatriate usually heads the office, and usually each project or programme has a Vietnamese officer responsible for supervision and monitoring.

INGOs that serve as donors supporting Vietnamese agencies or NGOs to implement projects and programmes. Vietnamese counterparts implement the projects; INGO staff only supervise, monitor, and evaluate.

At present, INGOs have various partners for co-operation; thus, the term partnership has been used freely. As one INGO notes, “partners are sometime at provincial, district or commune level and sometime at all three levels. In the village, there is said to be partnership with the Management Committee of an activity. Partnership with international and local NGOs is also possible.”96 A careful project assessment and choice of the right partner can help to guarantee the success of an INGO programme. Some INGOs with long experience have tried many types of co-operation. They note that it is often difficult to find partners appropriate for the organisation’s objectives and philosophy.

None of the nineteen INGOs selected for this study belonged to the first since all were based in the country. Few fit the second type. As a result, the study focused on the remaining three types. Their strong points are:

Having local project offices helps prompt implementation through the assistance of local staff at the main office. Many mistakes can be avoided. INGOs partners acknowledged that this model was suitable. Overall, provincial and district officials’ attitudes towards having a local office were positive. The local office helped ensure co-operation between the organisation and its partners and minimised delays.97

96 Oxfam Hong Kong, 2000, p. 79.97 ActionAid Vietnam (The Son La Programme - 5 years).

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The recruitment of staff from the locality for project offices helps INGOs have easy access to local Government and people, thus avoiding mistakes caused by misunderstanding the local culture and local situation. INGOs can improve local staff capacity through training courses and daily discussion with consultants and staff from Hanoi offices.

Recruitment of specialised staff from the field to work at the project area reduces the costs of a cumbersome management mechanism. Generally speaking, recruited staff members have met INGOs criteria so that INGOs did not have to lose time in initial training. Moreover, local Vietnamese project officers served as bridges between INGOs and Vietnamese partners, thus contributing to project success.

INGOs who have been working as donors and have made use of the existing Vietnamese structure, to improve staff capacity and have not drawn talented staff from Vietnamese Government agencies. (See the section on policy impact.)

In spite of the above-mentioned strong points, some weaknesses appeared:

INGOs initially had difficulty recruiting local staff with the capacity to implement and supervise projects. Main-office staff had to train local staff. However, the presence and support of main-office staff could make local staff at the project office dependent, which could cause a loss of initiative and creativity. One INGO staff member said that “local project officers still depend heavily on Hanoi officers even after so many years of assistance. Many local officers cannot yet write a report”.98 As a result, giving support for a short time and then withdrawing seems inappropriate.

The relationship between main-office staff and staff recruited from project areas to work in the field is a sensitive issue not mentioned in most assessment reports. Local staff members in project areas have a tendency to form local alliances, while main-office staff have a tendency to dominate and press to assure the organisation’s objectives are followed. This can create tension and disputes with the risk of harming work relationships. One INGO main-office staff member said that “local staff’s cohesion and their partial attitude have made the staff from main office feel isolated”.99 Different policies for main-office and locally hired staff in the field add to these tensions.

Professional project officers running projects through local partners will not be effective if the INGO officers do not have enough time to manage, supervise and grasp the whole project because the project partner may change the project design during implementation. One INGO staff member commented: “When our credit project began, the Women’s Union agreed to give loans with 1.2% interest, but when the project was almost completed, our project officer learned that the Women’s Union had reduced the rate.”100 Generally speaking, local partners are in charge of

98Notes from the field trips.99Notes from the field trips.100 Notes from the field trips.

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daily work, while INGO project officers must follow the steps of the project implementation closely; otherwise, the project may become only symbolic. As an example, one HIV/AIDS project set up a network of local collaborators in an attempt to attract the participation of health organisations, the Women’s Union and Youth Union. However, the project was not effective one year after the network was, in theory, established.

Some issues have emerged between INGOs and the supported organisations such as Government offices, mass organisations, and local NGOs.

Mass organisations (particularly the Women’s Union) are not specialised in

finance; thus their lack of management capacity appears during project implementation. Moreover, partner organisations second personnel to work with INGOs in addition to regular work, thus reducing the impact of both the INGO and the partner organisation.

The many levels from INGOs down to beneficiaries (sometimes as many as four) may lead to indirect relationships and weak project management. Government organisations are often expected to ensure a project’s technical aspects, yet the partner may only supervise the project.

Partner agencies sometimes take advantage of the situation for their own benefit. One INGO staff member indicated that some Vietnamese agencies implementing projects have cheated both the INGO and the beneficiaries. Training activities are a good example, with the number of budgeted courses, attendants and actual expenditures unknown to both INGOs and beneficiaries. The same issues appear vis-à-vis co-operation with local NGOs, as described in the following section.

INGO assistance may not be mentioned when local partners feel the INGO projects they implement are theirs, making it hard to assess INGO impact.

Both sides’ aspirations, expectations and ideas should be discussed when partnership is being discussed . Otherwise, differences may arise during the project process owing to different expectations.

The relationship between INGOs and local partners is not yet fully successful, as the following points illustrate:

Different methods and approaches between partners and INGOs have hindered good partnership. Some partners complained that INGOs mostly work top down, while INGOs themselves often stress their bottom-up approach. Partners in one credit project complained about high interest rates. District officials working with an integrated rural development project complained about unwanted visits by INGOs, local organisations and university students. In another case, discord between district authorities and project staff over fund management, interest, and administrative

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procedures led to the project’s early end in May 2000 instead of 2004. Different styles have created misunderstandings. For example, INGOs expect to discuss issues openly with wide community participation, while partners often want to raise issues privately within their communities. One INGO staff member commented that “the problem with community development in Vietnam is the fact that the implementing partner wants to be told what to do and then go off and do it in the community and then tell you what happened”. 101

The way to work either directly or indirectly with partners of many different levels of INGOs is one of the causes that hinders good partnership. INGOs tend to reduce the role of intermediate partners to have more direct relationships with beneficiaries. Provinces have signed most contracts, but districts or communes have implemented the projects and programmes. Activities in completed commune projects were reported to the district; however, the province as indirect partner neither received comprehensive information nor fully understood project activities. The director of a provincial health department complained: “The provincial department only knew them (the INGOs) in the beginning of the process. Then we were told what they had done and how the project was implemented in the district or commune, even though we were an indirect partner. We don’t create obstacles for INGOs, but we do want to know about their activities so we can support and supervise their health work in the province.”102

Financial transparency remains an issue. Some partners complain that INGOs are not transparent. INGO staff members have admitted to this. One INGO staff member stated: “We are trying to be transparent, but there are still some budgetary issues. In the first year we translated our whole action plan, which shows progress up to a point. However, we can never be truly equal because of our position as funders.”103 Meanwhile, INGOs have demanded that their partners be financially transparent. One partner stated that “they (INGOs) force us to submit detailed monthly, quarterly and even yearly financial reports on every item, even very small items like paper, pens, and ink. Yet we know they spend money in a very wasteful manner at their main office.”104 Local partners have accused INGO staff of lacking transparency in credit and construction projects.

INGO and partner differences in information sharing and participation in decision-making have damaged partnership. As one INGO staff member stated: “We are reasonably accountable to our partners and improving. We try to be open, as it is better to be open. We are sharing all our documents, reports, everything except performance appraisals.” Few INGOs so fully share information with partners; rather partners often do not know anything about assessment team results. One informant noted “we have met and worked with a lot of assessment and evaluation teams on technology, on impact, on socio-economy, but we have never heard their results or their comments so we could learn.” Partners seldom have the chance to participate in

101 Interview notes.102 Notes from the field trips.103 Interview with local partner. 104 Notes from the field trips.

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decisions regarding projects. For instance, INGOs (not partners) choose consultants. Many partners raised concerns about the recruitment and selection of consultants: “We only know the consultants when they come down to work with us. Only then do we know how they work and their capacity. Some consultants are good, but the rest are not qualified.”105

Project officers play an important role in the relationship between INGOs and partners. A lack of project officers’ decision-making power weakens this relationship. Several INGOs staff members commented that “some expatriate INGO directors want to watch every project activity closely and want project officers to consult with them on every decision, however small”.106 As a result, partners ask the expatriate to solve work-related issues. This delays project implementation because good partnerships also depend on the attitude of the directors and representatives. On the other hand, project officers’ limited capacity can cause partners to lose confidence, particularly if the project officers’ capacity is weaker than the partners’.

INGOs need an appropriate partner for project and programme success. Vietnam is different than any other developing countries, where those INGOs may implement similar programmes more directly with beneficiary communities. Partnership is crucial in Vietnam. One attendee at the workshop on integrated rural development noted, “choosing the right partner is important to success. A partner with weak capacity will not lead to success.”

Lessons Learned

INGOs should build stronger commitments with their partners. Before signing contracts, both sides should thoroughly discuss expectations, advantages and disadvantages. Without this process, either side may singly change the terms during project implementation. Signed contracts should be considered as both legal documents and guides for project implementation.

INGOs should take enough time in advance to evaluate and choose the right partners based on criteria about where a project or programme should be located. They should avoid partners with too many other commitments since they may not take the project seriously or may turn it into a new kind of service.

INGOs should consider whether their direct partners should be organisations with technical consultants or mass organisations. Many INGOs have changed partners after learning that Vietnamese mass organisations are neither independent nor technically specialised, and may have been too busy with their own activities.

INGOs should review management policies relating to representatives/directors and project officers. During early programme stages, negotiating with Government officials can take half a director’s time. This work should then be transferred to

105 All quotes in this paragraph are from interview notes. 106 Experienced Staff Workshop, (July, 2000).

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project officers. INGOs should review their systems of information sharing and power transference to partners. Only by this way can equal relationship be maintained.

INGOs should consider whether bidding is an appropriate way to find good project partners.107 Many INGOs have followed this model, for example in infrastructure construction where a bidding process is used. However, if using this process INGOs should give close attention to the issues of quality and supervision.

A Case Study of Partnership 108

One agency’s programme aimed to train teachers for children with impaired hearing. The agency consulted with the province People’s Committee about education for disadvantaged children. About 200 children among 4,220 disadvantaged children in the province joined the agency’s programme. The agency trained teachers at every level in working with disabled children. Teachers trained in the programme then received local hearing-impaired children into their classes.

The province had good intentions but no money. Province officials were happy when the INGO came and agreed to help. The INGO arranged for the training of major teachers in the districts, and the National Institute for Education Sciences (NIES) provided master training and experience with hearing-impaired children. The province wanted to have an independent programme but had to use NIES staff because not enough province staff had attended the initial courses. Thus, the province was a partner but under direction of another institution, NIES.

The INGO thought the province would pay NIES for the training, but to save money, the province wanted to use its own staff. In addition, outsiders sometimes determined the selection process. Teachers whom the province wanted were not trained, and the salary for trained teachers was less than 70% of their normal salary. The province wanted to work directly with the INGO and discuss these problems frankly but had to go through NIES because NIES was the INGO’s official partner. Thus, the province could not speak directly with the INGO about its problems with the project.

Most partners have tried not to complain about INGOs but, rather, have praised them. One partner stated: “When working with us, they (INGOs) still make some mistakes and have weaknesses, but it’s good they have helped our people. Although the support is small, it is better than nothing.” Partners worry that strong criticism will dampen INGO support. Sustainable co-operation can come only from mutual understanding, mutual respect and mutual frankness. Vietnamese partners need to express their opinions frankly

107 HIV/AIDS Workshop, (July, 2000).108 Interview notes.

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about INGO ways of working and co-operation. INGOs should create an atmosphere to encourage this.

3.2 Capacity Building

Thirty-six organisations in the VUFO-NGO Resource Centre database include activities in capacity and institution building. The study defined institutional capacity building as “providing training opportunities for local organisations or partners so that they improve their skills and take charge”. INGO capacity-building activities included supporting the development of community development plans, gender awareness, study tours, building local NGOs, and staff development of partner institutions to strengthen local capacity.109

Capacity building appears to have emerged as a new approach in INGO activities during the past decade and with more focus on it in recent years. INGOs that responded to the questionnaire noted a growth in capacity building from under 5% in 1991 to approximately 12% by the end of the decade. The financial means allocated to capacity building increased from 7% in 1991 to around 12% over the same time. However, such figures may not adequately reflect the importance given to capacity building as it may be an activity built into other sectoral programmes and projects.

Most INGOs agreed on the importance of building capacity for local staff, partners, and beneficiaries. Some argue that “the role of INGOs is to help the partners develop professional capacity and commitment.”110 Perhaps this is the reason capacity building has become one of the foremost activities in INGOs projects and programmes. Although INGOs have engaged in many activities, assessment reports on capacity building are rare, especially in relation to the impact of these activities during the last ten years. This section will concentrate on the institutional capacity building and capacity building for the direct beneficiaries.

Information collected from interviews with various groups confirmed the following strong points in INGO capacity-building activities:

Capacity building has had positive impacts on Vietnamese organisations and staff. This effect was noted above in attitudinal changes towards the poor and people with disabilities as well as in improvement in planning and management skills at the grass-roots level while simultaneously enhancing the prestige of mass organisations.111

Some INGO projects and programmes proved their effectiveness in capacity building in relation to INGO achievements. One INGO noted that, “the results of capacity-building efforts were clearly shown during the project implementation process. The technicians, GREWs (grass-root extension workers) and group leaders

109 NGO Directory 2000-2001.110 Minutes of Terre des hommes INGOs Policy Conference, HCMC, August 1996.111 For more details, please read Section 2 and 3.

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fulfilled their work during the project and contributed to its success. Many GREWs improved their skills in participatory training and technology transfer.112 Komitee Twee noted, “(local staff) support was effective, contributing to the development of education for handicapped children in Vietnam. The project was practical for the development of training for teachers at different levels, especially in the current situation where there are few such teachers and training facilities are not available for them. Komitee Twee support was comprehensive in training personnel and providing necessary facilities and equipment for the children’s development.”113

Capacity building for local beneficiaries can be considered a primary tool for working with vulnerable community groups, such as the poor, women, and ethnic minorities, providing them with knowledge and new skills. Direct project beneficiaries such as women in the credit projects, children in anti-malnutrition programmes, participants in IPM projects, and users of clean water systems participated in training activities. Consequently, INGO beneficiary training went beyond the programme designers’ first expectations.

Some challenges facing INGOs in capacity building for partners and beneficiaries are:

INGOs and partners differed in their perception of training needs. One INGO staff person said: “We do not engage in institutional capacity building and do not have information.”114 Some INGOs explained that they were small with only a small training budget, which they concentrated on necessary technical training for implementing partners rather than on English training, education abroad and overseas study tours. They felt those activities were more suitable for Government.115 Some INGOs felt they should focus more widely. As one of INGO staff member said: “We can be justly criticised for not doing enough in capacity building. We have not responded to partner expectations for training.”116 Another INGO staff member noted: “We don’t want the partner to be a small version of our NGO. We don’t want to create babies with all the attending limits and dependencies. We try to reinforce existing bodies and their actors."117 Some INGOs felt they should do even more to improve their capacity-building work.

Some training courses focused only on certain target groups and did not reach all needy people. In some cases, a few partners with English fluency and high positions had numerous opportunities to attend courses, while others hardly had any opportunity. This created an elite among partners. One INGO staff member commented: “Some partners have improved their professional skills, but the situation among Government staff remains unbalanced since INGOs invest only in some personnel.”118

112 Interview notes.113 Komitee Twee, 1998. 114 Interview notes.115 Notes from the field trips.116 Interview notes.117 Interview notes.118 Interview notes.

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The intention of partner capacity building often does not lead to subsequent expected results because the trained staff members are not in decision-making positions. They cannot apply their new knowledge in their daily work. However, if capacity building is with elected individuals, then elections may shift responsibility during the project, thus affecting training results. One INGO staff member commented: “The effects of training activities had to go in accordance with long-term commitment of the partners, but in fact the project which I have to complete in five years has seen partners change three times.”119

Some INGOs have supported social and community development institutes. This model could be very promising, as one INGO staff member said: “We hope in the future to get universities more involved in our work and assist social work to become an established profession again. We need good, trained people – social and community development professionals – to do the work. Community development needs to be introduced as a form of intervention, and it must be taught at university. We should support Vietnamese groups teaching people to do community development. We want to establish independent research to enable Government decisions to be based on the real situation, not on decrees. Services will only improve when professional people manage them.” 120

A Case Study in Skills Transfer

One INGO wanted to build the capacity of local authorities to implement an urban community development project involved with resettlement. The INGO had partnership with other INGOs, the Youth Association and the Women’s Union. The INGO provided training in management skills to Vietnamese partners. A Management Board was established, with community members and the local authorities. In a meeting, the INGO stressed that training and daily work needed to go together. Training should be in the project context so people in management roles could better understand their work.121

INGO capacity building is not always successful because much training is top-down, too technical, from the West, and not suitable to local conditions. INGOs do not always understand the problems of local people and the local culture. They tend to think technically, try to do a number of projects, and apply a number of models. In one integrated rural development project, an INGO wanted to provide tam hoang chicken to peasants as the first grant in a supposedly highly productive income-generation project. However, this kind of chicken requires special food and living conditions. The particular province had severe weather, making it hard for the chickens to survive. In addition, the peasants were too poor to buy the special food necessary for the chicken. As a result, the project failed within a short period of time.122

119Notes from the field trips. 120 Interview notes.121 Interview notes.122 Notes from the field trips.

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INGO training sometimes does not bring the intended effects because of logistics, funding, and other obstacles. Some INGOs had to shorten their courses or limit the number of attendants, meaning partners often were not effectively trained.

Extension training has had both a positive and negative impact, and is cut or repeated depending more on finances than on effectiveness. INGOs described training activities as flexible and casual. Some INGOs allocated funds to training with no clear plans. In turn, some partners implemented many small activities or a few very large ones, indicating a lack of clarity and strategy.

Training of trainers (TOT) aims to build capacity in skills transfer within a core group of people who can then work with target groups. "Although nobody can be 'made' to learn, a skilful trainer who knows the target group, its background and earlier experiences, can raise and direct audience interest towards the desired topic, .... creating optimal conditions for each individual learner to build a personal mental model on which practical performances are based.”123 The following points became clear:

TOT sessions run by INGOs did not turn out to be very effective because TOT quality depends on selection of initial trainers, course content, materials, teaching plans for on-going training, course length, etc. TOT courses and INGO methods of extension training revealed weaknesses, as described in the following example:

A Case Study in Training of Trainers

“Some staff of the PHC project were trained in Hanoi ... on the Grameen Bank credit model. After the training, the Women’s Union staff designed a training programme for the commune staff, but there remained a big gap in the training contents. The Women’s Union lacks experience of general economic management, especially in the management of credit and savings programmes. District and commune staff, who did not have sufficient experience or methods or materials, then conducted training for borrowers. That led to a poor quality of training. Borrowers raised many issues that could not be answered by the managers124.

The quality of trainers is important to the success of capacity building. At present,

INGOs rely on their own capacity, human resources and network to choose trainers. Trainers may be university lecturers, staff of specialised agencies, or even INGO staff. Each type of trainer has strong and weak points. The way of transferring knowledge is important. University lecturers have in-depth knowledge but may lack suitable skills for communicating with peasants and may not be appropriate trainers for courses aimed at farmers. INGO staff may be qualified but lack time. They could organise beginning TOT courses with subsequent classes taught by specialists.

123 Department of Agriculture and Rural Development, 1997, p. 6. 124 Notes from an interview with an INGO.

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Staff members such as district agriculture extensionists and districts health workers have been suitable trainers for INGO training courses. First, they are the local people who know the local topography and socio-economy, especially in ethnic-minority regions. Those who understand ethnic languages are in a better position to provide training. A commune staff member in charge of agriculture said: “The three days of training were not enough for peasants to absorb the knowledge; we have to instruct them at every step. For instance, with the plants having insects, what should they do? How should they treat pigs that are ill? Thus, agriculture extension staff must deal with all sorts of problems.”125 Training and capacity building serve various purposes, for, by training local partners, trainers increase their own capacity as well.

Training manuals are important for capacity-building quality. However, few INGOs have built programme-training manuals for their courses. One evaluation stated: “Few documents in structured training and technical extension leaflets are available for extensionists and farmers. No standard training manual is yet available; most training costs are for new staffs or to transfer courses to other districts.”126 Training materials used came from invited trainers, creating differences among the INGO programme. University lecturers tended to bring materials that were too academic; trainers from central agriculture departments often used materials that were either too general or not suitable to the local environment.

Training materials and methods are often inappropriate. An assessment of health training for communes and hamlets noted that some points of the curriculum were inappropriate for the hamlet level.127 Trainees sometimes received books that were too complicated or contained nothing new; the new books stayed on the shelves. One beneficiary of an integrated rural development project stated that “the trainers talked a lot but I did not remember a single word. Then I took the plants home. The local technicians gave instruction. Then I understood how to space the plants”.128

Lessons Learned

INGOs should continue to use a TOT approach for ethnic minorities, but note the need for serious investment. INGOs should provide training for several months to the most competent community members to upgrade technical and presentation skills. INGO project staff should provide adequate supervision and follow-up to trainers in remote areas. People of the same ethnic group should be more closely involved in project management and activities. It may be necessary for INGOs to train them in Kinh (Vietnamese) language and in report preparation, or for INGO staff and project partners to learn to work in minority languages. As one INGO staff member said: “We have to instruct ethnic minorities directly about the work. If

125Interview notes. 126 CIDSE and SNV, February 1999. 127 ActionAid Vietnam, 1998-1999.128 Interview notes.

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INGOs could be patient enough to build local capacity, then that would be a big difference between INGOs and Government organisations.”129

INGOs should clarify their goals to improve training for women’s capacity building and improve women’s participation in project design. With the exception of credit projects, many INGOs could not establish how many women had participated in training courses, though it was clear that women had participated less than men. Factors in this dynamic were course design, timing, level of needed education, and each locality’s culture and customs.

INGOs should consider limiting staff and partner training abroad because it is costly and risky for local partners because of electoral turnover. The money spent on a staff trained abroad could be better used in TOT groups. However, INGOs should provide close supervision to ensure the quality of TOT training courses.

INGOs should consider the increasing demand for partner-and-beneficiary training. Training commitments must depend on each INGO’s strategy and financial situation. One INGO staff member noted: “this is a life-long investment. The same contents can be repeated, and attendees can return for retraining. Training can also be considered as networking together local people sharing mutual concerns.”130

INGOs should also focus on capacity building gained not only through training but also by daily work. Sharing experiences between INGO consultants, project officers, partners and beneficiaries are important. A modest attitude, openness, eagerness to learn, and mutual respect are crucial. Foreign consultants, especially, should avoid coming to tutor others rather than to learn.

INGOs should improve their co-ordination in capacity building. They should use other organisations’ knowledge and experiences in the same sector when selecting partners, organising training courses, writing training materials, and working with ethnic minorities. The VUFO-NGO Resource Centre and its attached working groups could produce newsletters and bulletins to introduce INGO experiences and good models in each sector.

INGOs should study impact of capacity building on their partners and beneficiaries, and pay attention to the quality of training they bring to Vietnam.

INGOs should review training materials. INGOs should compile materials with easy-to-understand language and contents suitable to participants’ levels. Materials should be consistently suitable for various target groups, such as farmers, extensionists, and policy makers.

129 Interview notes.130 Interview notes.

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3.3 Ideas and Innovations

INGO contributions to Vietnam’s development reach far beyond the transfer of funds to encompass more important elements, including the introduction of innovation, new ideas, international linkages, and improving solidarity.131 Interviews confirmed that stakeholders learned creativity and innovation from co-operating with INGOs. One example is an INGO training activity using “Theatre for Development.”

Participants who were bored with logic and analysis wanted something both trainers and trainees could respond to with passion. Topics emerging from a group discussion to be explored through theatre included dengue fever, waste management, family planning, agriculture extension, and dental health.132 Such new models have had a positive influence on different target groups and on Government programmes and policies. (For more details, see Sections 2.2 and 2.3.) However, several challenges remain:

New ideas need time for testing, but some testing is needlessly repetitive. In the last ten years, INGOs have put forward many new models for experiment rather than make use of other INGOs’ established models, thus creating financial waste on foreign specialists and in training. A staff member from a bank in Vietnam wondered “why are INGOs still testing micro-finance models when some INGOs did that in the early 1990s? Why don’t they evaluate their models, revise them and then enlarge them? Why don’t the later INGOs follow the models of the former ones or learn from the former ones and then re-design their programmes. INGOs just keep testing and testing.”133

Most new models have been imported, thus requiring that specialised consultants be foreigners, some of whom would look down on Vietnamese staff. In reality, the qualities of foreign consultants have not always matched those of Vietnamese consultants. Several Vietnamese consultants noted that “foreigners always act as if they are more knowledgeable than Vietnamese. They hardly listen to our suggestions about how to run a project. They think they are superior. They just give instructions, and operation manuals, but they do not adjust to local conditions”.134

Most INGO projects have remained in a testing phase, reducing the possibility of replication. Some INGOs had no clear strategy when entering Vietnam; still trying to formulate one, they create new projects annually. One Government officer with long-time experience with INGOs commented: “I have the feeling that some INGOs are like the blind, just groping their way. They move when their cane shows them there seems to be a way. Otherwise, they continue to grope.”135

131 VUFO-NGO Resource Centre, 1999, p.7.132 Interview notes.133 Interview notes. 134 Interview notes.135 Interview notes.

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INGOs’ encouragement of new ideas and initiatives in their working environments sometimes leads to anarchy and a lack of consensus within the INGO. This has negative impacts on projects and programmes. Some INGO Vietnamese staff acknowledged that they felt relaxed in INGO environments because their boss welcomed most of their new ideas and provided both financial support and time to test them. If they failed, they could try another new idea the next time. No one was blamed even when tests created waste and additional costs. Obviously, each INGO has its own style of project implementation. Another INGO staff member indicated: “Credit projects have been the most diverse projects in my organisation with various target groups deciding different ways to give loans and applying different interest rates. In one project we let the loan group use the interest but in another collect the money monthly, like bank staff.”136

Some new INGO ideas have not been suitable to Vietnam’s culture, economic conditions and legal framework, thus reducing project impact. An INGO education staff member said: “education projects have been so ambitious in trying to influence teaching methods and content to improve the quality of education, but in fact, change depends on many other socio-economic factors. The content of education programmes is under MOET, with teachers returning to Government programmes. INGO projects have no legal status; thus, it is impossible to intervene in the training content and methods without permission.”137

Sometimes, new project ideas involve an enormous objective requiring macro solutions, which is not feasible for an INGO. One example follows:

Case Study on New Ideas and Innovation138

A micro-enterprise project aimed to assist development by adapting small-scale rural enterprises to local conditions so farmers could eventually access formal credit sources. The INGO helped organise a small tea enterprise for production, processing, and marketing. The INGO did not pay 100%; farmers contributed part of the project’s costs.

The project was designed to promote bottom-up participatory planning and monitoring to elevate lessons learned and provide feedback to policy-makers. It aimed to produce models of successful small-scale rural enterprises, which could demonstrate market potential, long-term comparative advantages in cost versus profitability, and provide access for poor people, particularly women. The project design met the local people’s requests. The INGO supplied each group of six to eight farmers with a hand pump to encourage farmer unity and mutual assistance. The INGO set up a Community Economic Organisation (CEO) in the project area to help the farmers work in a co-operative way.

However, commune leaders indicated that sharing hand pumps caused difficulties:

136Interview notes.137 Interview notes. 138 Note from field trip.

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- Everyone needed to pump water at the same time during the dry season; otherwise tea productivity would be low. Some households had tea hills far from water sources, making pump use impractical. Conflicts arose; farmers tried to keep these quiet, fearing the INGO would take the pumps back.

- The limitation of only one pump for seven farmers when need was greatest meant that most farmers had to buy their own pumps; thus, sharing the pumps failed, and the INGO’s contribution proved to be, relatively speaking, insignificant.

The programme’s small size was a weakness. The limited number of pumps caused disputes, and the equipment fell into disrepair. Group cohesiveness slipped. Income from tea depends on quantity and price, which is decided by quality and market. Irrigation systems and fuel for drying tea were significant issues. One beneficiary said the project should have supported an irrigation system through cost sharing instead of supplying hand pumps,

There were some small-scale opportunities to market in the district, but the quality of other local teas was better. The province, which already produces many kinds of tea, was too small to absorb a major increase in another variety of tea that was not widely exported. Farmers had to buy fertiliser and find larger markets outside the province and the country. So far, no tea associations except the CEO facilitate the co-operative use of equipment and marketing; however the CEO is still weak.

Overall, the project design presented objectives that were significantly difficult for implementation, monitoring and evaluation. Activities emanating from the stated objectives appeared to be designed in a logical, participatory way. However, some activities were insufficient to meet designated objectives.

One informant said INGOs can help the enterprise and its ways of working but shouldn’t attempt small-scale forays into marketing. INGOs should learn that in some situations their ability is limited; they cannot handle complex areas, such as tea marketing. Since marketing is a difficult problem for the Vietnamese Government, what can a small INGO expect to do? Tea for export must move through the Government system. Economies of scale are such that an INGO does not have the capacity to handle the tea marketing.

The INGO based its new model on co-operating farmer groups sharing one pump and one tea-drying machine. However, it appears that the INGO did not pay attention to the inconvenience of sharing equipment during high-intensity periods. Farmers soon sold their share in the equipment to one member of the group; thus the idea of sharing, as in the time of command-system co-operatives, failed.

Although INGO introduction of PRA (participatory rural appraisal) to access and work with communities has had an impact on Government methodologies and programmes (For more details, see Section 2.3), the use of PRA has met the following unexpected challenges:

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PRA as a tool has not been effective in all circumstances. More than the normal five to six days are necessary to delineate solutions for difficulties besetting a whole community. PRA can risk becoming another tool for outsiders to come and do something quickly.

PRA tools sometimes create conflicts between INGO capacity and community requests. Some INGO staff members commented that they have a hard time balancing the people’s requests and the INGO’s reality. An INGO may take a long- term perspective that creates problems for funders and accountants. Organisations need to stress a long-term perspective but may not have the time to do the necessary work. As one INGO staff person noted, “staff are available for only three days during PRAs. They need to hang around rather than focus immediately and try to define the community’s potential. Much of what we have learned comes from our mistakes, our unattained claims and dry wells. We are now convinced of the need for going slowly.”139 In addition, PRAs can raise expectations which NGOs may not be able to meet. Open communication is needed to avoid later conflicts. As the same INGO staff member noted, “We don’t have the funds, since our total budget is only 15,000 –20,000 USD.140

PRAs sometimes go beyond the capacity of PRA beneficiaries such as project officers, local staff, or partners. PRA tools have been used to create village development plan addressing issues far beyond the INGO’s capabilities. The inability to respond has caused frustrations and problems for extensionists.141

PRAs may not always be appropriate for remote ethnic minority communities. Difficulties in visiting these areas and using ethnic languages prevent careful use of PRAs. In reality, PRA information collected in remote areas has reflected the thoughts of only Kinh-speaking leaders. (See section 2.2.) Moreover, men in remote and ethnic minority areas, dominate so that PRAs reflect only the aspiration of men. (See the following sections.)

Lessons Learned

INGOs should do more research before developing project and programme activities. Still, some INGOs have so concentrated on research that the money spent on beneficiaries has been meaningless. INGOs should harmonise the two. The balance should depend on lessons learned from other compatible INGOs sharing the same standard for consultants and Vietnamese partners.

INGOs should set up and maintain a strong network to review activities and find more effective mechanisms. Activities of different working groups have been uneven; some groups have been very active, attracting a large number of participants, whereas other groups have tapered off. INGO representatives and directors need to

139 Interview notes.140 Interview notes.141 CIDSE and SNV, February 1999.

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support these activities by creating time for staff to attend. Information sharing among INGO staff in working groups is a good opportunity for staff training.

INGOs should ensure that not only expatriate staff and consultants but also local consultants participate in design as local people know and understand their own problems and the environment needed for project success. INGOs should be careful not to select expatriate consultants with arrogant attitudes who come to Vietnam to teach rather than to learn.

INGOs should review the use of PRA as a tool and seek other supportive methods to carry out baseline surveys when starting projects and programmes.

3.4 Sustainability

“In recent years, 'sustainability' and 'sustainable development' have become common words used by donors, including bi-laterals, multi-laterals and INGOs. However, it is generally said that sustainability is a critical issue for all countries, not just for those in the 'South’.”142 In Whose Reality Counts?, Robert Chambers states: “Sustainability means that long-term perspectives should apply to all policies and actions, with sustainable well-being and sustainable livelihoods as objectives for present and future generations.”143

In 1997, Vietnam’s Open University listed six elements of sustainability: continuity extended time frame activities that are self-supporting the development of capacities the realisation of capacities through performance learning as an integral part of developing capacities and assessing performance.

Different INGOs describe sustainability in different ways. Not all INGO projects keep sustainability in mind. However, sustainability was an issue of keen interest of all people interviewed, although it often seemed elusive for reasons such as:

Some projects have been going only two to three years, and some long- term projects and programmes are still being implemented.

Most evaluations focused on assessing implementation and impact after a certain period of time in a certain community. Few reports mentioned programme sustainability with a long-term perspective.

Information on sustainability is rare. INGO staff members sometimes provided guesses or expectations. Completed projects often had no mechanism for supervision, making it difficult to collect information from the beneficiaries in projects and programmes finished four or five years ago.

142 Studio Driya Media & Cuso, 1990, p. 17. 143 Chambers, 1997, p.10.

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INGO project sustainability was described in various ways. Some interviewees noted that INGO projects have had a much higher level of sustainability than comparable Government projects. Others had the opposite opinion and considered sustainability to be the INGOs’ weakest point. Yet others took a suspicious attitude. One INGO partner commented that “if (INGO X) stopped, continued project success would depend on financial support from the province (then) I suspect the project would develop much more slowly".144

Some INGOs mentioned their approach as proof of sustainability. “Everything is based with solidarity in mind. We do not know if we are going to last forever since our income is based on personal donations. So, we focus support on projects that local beneficiaries can look after themselves.”145 Meanwhile, other INGOs believe that a particular programme is sustainable only when methods and approaches are permanently altered, as in the case of new methods for teachers. Others noted that programmes would be sustainable if the funding stopped but the activities continued, that an INGO’s new ideas, technical input and financial support simply helped speed up the development process.146

These different ways of assessing sustainability reflected different INGO approaches. One INGO staff said: “Projects are sustainable if project activities continue after the project has finished.” Another INGO noted: “A project is sustainable when three factors are present and addressed: the sustainability of society, the economy and the environment.”147 Another said: “Sustainability occurs when benefits continue to be maintained, local people’s participation continues to be strengthened, and the organisational structures managing project activities are maintained (e.g. BoMs ands Self Help Groups).”148

The following factors adversely affected INGO project sustainability:

Stakeholders become frustrated with project implementation when their thinking is not fully reflected in the project design. Some credit projects are an example. A staff member from the Bank for the Poor said that “INGOs credit projects are a failure when the total financial and non-financial factors in training and study tours is considered. Credit projects have no sustainability”.149 Meanwhile, an INGO credit project officer indicated that the INGO project was highly sustainability because loans were given to women. Interest rates had been high, but the Women’s Union had the ability to control the credit.150

Adverse consequences occur if development managers are not clear about the objectives of intervention at the start with respect to sustainability. This lack of clarity may prevent a thorough analysis of the environmental factors within which

144 Interview notes. 145 Interview notes.146 Interview notes.147 Interview with an INGO staff member.148 Interview with an INGO staff member.149 Interview notes.150 Interview notes.

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projects must operate, reducing sustainability. For example, some INGOs expected that leguminous hedgerows would prevent upland soil erosion, stabilise soil quality and increase yields on upland plots. However, 80% of the target farmers in core communes found that hedgerows were more appropriate to paddy land and not applicable in areas subject to night frosts, (which occur) where the farmers lived.151

Sustainability exposes the vulnerability of many INGOs projects and programmes. One INGO mentioned a project to assist farmers investing in bee keeping. After a period of time, for whatever reason, the bees flew away. Obviously, the project had failed.

Selection of unsuitable partners has led some INGOs to change partners during implementation, creating waste and reducing effectiveness. An education INGO staff member said: “It is difficult for me to understand why an INGO selected the Women’s Union as partner for an education programme. How could the programme be maintained?”152

Partners’ level of participation is another factor. Most INGOs have chosen districts or communes as partners. One interviewee noted: “Counterparts of …projects are districts because districts have enough professional branches to work with. And, districts have the power to co-operate.”153 Another INGO staff person added: “If counterparts are at the district level, management and extension of a model is easier. Having district-level counterparts should be a strategy for the future.”154 However, other INGOs had different arguments; they had chosen only provincial and commune level partners but had not included the district. One INGO project officer commented: “The partner is on the provincial and commune levels but not the district because the district level has no money or power. The district level cannot decide policies and finance by itself. We once chose the district level as a partner, but this was not successful. We work directly with the provincial level on strategy, but the commune level is our direct partner.”155

Changes of partner staff have challenged INGO project sustainability. Partner staff members may change with elections, requiring that INGOs train the new staff on project management and implementation even though budget allocations are usually larger during the project’s first stage. This training can be learning through working, but then new staff members possess incomplete knowledge, adversely affecting their capacity in project management and implementation. Changes of partners reduce long-term commitment, which can also adversely affect a project or programme. An example follows:

151 Action Aid Vietnam: The Son La Programme After 5 years, p. 17.152 Interview notes. 153 Interview with staff member of INGO.154 Interview with staff member of INGO. 155 Interview with staff member of INGO.

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Cafe Condom Case Study

A Cafe shop was set up to focus on HIV/AIDS protection by providing information to young people about various aspects of their lives. This was an innovative programme and very difficult to start. Information topics and activities soon expanded to include:

Reproductive health,STDs Counselling

The name was changed from Thanh nien (Youth) to BCS1, (the Vietnamese abbreviation for condom). When BCS1 started, the shop did not receive Government attention or support. Then the increasing number of HIV-positive residents made such programmes more important. BCS1 received attention and support.

A fee was to be used to pay the manager and some of the volunteers. The remaining funds would be used for project support. The Cafe Condom project was evaluated as a successful model after the INGO project finished in December 1999. However, after six months, activities had decreased to just 10% of those in the past because volunteers did not receive project financial support as they had in the past. The partner did not follow its commitment with the INGO to support activities financially after the hand over.

In June2000, a second Cafe Condom opened based on experiences from the first. To ensure project sustainability, the partner will provide a room and a salary for the volunteers. The proceeds from Cafe Condom 2 will cover the manager’s salary and some volunteer allowances. However, the Youth Cultural House took the Cafe shop on as a commercial venture rather than an HIV/AIDS education project. As a result, a local NGO social fund appears to be running a business.156

. Capacity building for partners and beneficiaries is only one factor contributing to

project and programme sustainability. For partners, knowledge and management capacity can be a decisive factor affecting INGOs projects. For the beneficiaries, capacity in daily implementation is also a decisive factor. Training methods and contents for both groups have affected the quality of training courses (For more detail, see Section 3.2). Development of capacity alone is insufficient for achieving sustainability. From a development manager’s perspective, the final element of learning in the action-learning cycle that underpins any process of development should be a central consideration in any intervention and should be examined carefully in the research stage.

INGO staff members are necessary in the beginning of a project, though some INGOs have no clear vision of their partners and do not plan to reduce the INGO role in the project. When partners have enough management capacity, in-depth

156 Interview with an INGO staff member.

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INGO assistance reduces the partners’ independence and the programme’s sustainability. One credit project evaluation noted: “The scheme was managed by the district Women’s Union banking service. However, the management capacity demonstrated by the district Women’s Union banking service was weak, and many management functions had to be performed by (Organisation X). This will present a problem when (Organisation X) withdraws from direct participation.”157

Payment of salaries or subsidies for programme volunteers and participants limits sustainability. When such INGO programmes finish, volunteers and beneficiaries stop participating. A nutrition report indicated: “The stipend was described as a monthly incentive for volunteers in all programme activities. This unintentionally created an expectation that beneficiaries would be paid to attend weighing sessions and that they would obtain a paid position. After nine months, when INGO collaboration ended, some volunteers would not participate for free.”158

INGO local programme management structures may contribute to sustainability. Some INGOs have established local programme management structures, including Boards of Management, Rural Development Associations, District Management Boards, Village Voluntary Development Committees, and Water User Groups. INGOs have encouraged the selection of people not in the local Government administration for these groups. It is unclear whether these new mechanisms are capable in project management and implementation. In addition, a new management mechanism which is not controlled by the local Government will likely create dissension when the INGO leaves if the local Government administration is not supportive. One local partner remarked: “The idea of an INGO to set up a local management mechanism is great. However, if a mechanism (is) not in the Government administration system (it) will disappear when the project is completed. Such a board can operate (only) if it is under the local Government administrative mechanism.”159

A lack of feasibility studies when introducing new techniques has been a leading cause of un-sustainability. Following is an example:

Case study for sustainability160

157 UNDP, 1996. 158 Evaluation of the Child Nutrition Programme in Quang Ngai Province, TT Lang and DA Tuan, May 1998.159 Interview notes.

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The total area of the district in question is about 118,000 ha, of which nearly 60% is forest, more than 30% is fallow and bare hills, and 3% is cultivated and pasture land. Generally speaking, bare hills and fallow land are common features of the district. The overall project goal was to diversify and increase agriculture production with sustainable

resource management to address food security, hunger eradication and poverty alleviation. The project covered about one-third of the total number of communes in the district where

Sloping Agriculture Land Technology (SALT) or Sloping Land Farming (SLF) is one of the main ways for food security and income generating opportunities for the ethnic minority people who suffer from unsustainable farming practices for a long time which had partly contributed to destroying the forest and to increase annual soil erosion.

The beneficiaries of the project include the poorest of the poor in target communes. As planned, most farmers have maintained the target area of 1,500 m2 of sloping land per household with canals and leguminous hedgerow.

Documents and interviewees indicated that the projects were sustainable, but some other aspects should be considered: Local conditions were not carefully studied before introducing new varieties and new

farming techniques, thus creating difficulties for the implementation of the project. There are some models on which farmers planted only coffee trees on the terrace. The farmers expressed that coffee trees did not grow well on the plot, a lot of leaves turned yellow and offered few fruit, even many trees died because of stem borer insects. There are certainly many causes such as inappropriate land, fertiliser shortage, unfavourable weather and climate, lack of water and the like. Hence, coffee trees will not be suitable to integrate long-term trees with short-term crop in the sloping land farming plot.

Concerning the demo plots, INGOs did not carefully consider making a sufficient action plan to carry out the activities. The PMT (Project Management Team) did not have enough time to think and consider the idea of setting up demo plots and, on the contrary, they themselves tried to run the activities according to a plan which led to unsuitable households. As a result, the demo plots failed.

Legal ownership of a project can affect sustainability. Credit projects are an example. In many cases, the Women’s Union as partner does not have the legal right to manage the capital when the project is completed. Funds from some completed projects were transferred to banks or were put under the management of the local Government administration.

Dependence on international or bilateral donors affects sustainability. Many INGOs have unpredictable sources of project funds. One INGO staff person noted: “When we began to implement a project in an area, we first have to meet the beneficiaries for a needs assessment; then we carry out a feasibility study. The final but most important part of the process will be fund raising because sometimes we do not have any idea about the project in advance. Seeking funds from an external donor can affect the length of the project.161

Lessons Learned160 Evaluation Report of Participatory Extension Project of Slopping Land Farming in A Luoi District, Thua Thien Hue Province. JVC, May 2000. 161 Authors field note.

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INGOs should carry out feasibility studies on the environment, target groups, partners, etc., before carrying out work in a new community.

INGOs should establish working groups to support the sharing of information and experiences between INGOs, policy makers and experts as a crucial factor in increasing sustainability. Below is an example of the activities of one working group.

Sustainable Agriculture and Natural Resource Management Working Group

Launched to revive the previous Agro-forestry and Sustainable Development Working Group. The objectives of this group are: to increase knowledge of member organisations of successful experiences and approaches in Vietnam and outside Vietnam; and to contribute to the promotion of and debate on sustainable agriculture and natural resource management in Vietnam. Participants include INGOs, Government ministries, local organisations, and bi-lateral and multi-lateral organisations. The Steering Committee of the group meets once each month to facilitate, plan and support the wider group, which plans to meet quarterly.162

INGOs should support information sharing through publications. INGO attention to the sharing of key documents has not been very strong. Most INGOs do not have a person in charge of this work, with the result that documents and evaluations have not been systematically kept. Many recent evaluations have not been sent to the VUFO- NGO Resource Centre. As a result, the Centre lacks updated reports on INGOs activities. INGOs should build a strong library at the Resource Centre and should develop a mechanism whereby they feel that it is in their own interest to circulate and share their reports.

INGOs should foresee a clear division of work between themselves and their partners from the beginning, including a description of work to be accomplished in each period so that co-operation and power sharing happens appropriately.

INGOs should work within the Government legal framework to insure INGO programme sustainability. Through ten years’ experience, it has been clear that: “In the working process of a project both the Government and the INGO should make a contribution. This will ensure the project’s sustainability.”163

162 Viet Nam INGO Directory 2000-2001.163 Notes of HIV/AIDS workshop in Ho Chi Minh City, (July, 2000).

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3.5 INGOs Internal Management

INGO office management (both home office and in Vietnam) is an important factor that significantly influences programme quality. The study addressed only internal management of INGOs in Vietnam, including the role of the representatives, expatriate salaries, and local staff personnel policies.

a) Role of expatriate representatives and some problems

INGOs programmes have been implemented without any long-term strategy but based mostly on the representative’s experience and background. When INGOs began to establish and re-open offices in Vietnam, most expatriates came without any understanding of Vietnam. The US embargo had not been lifted; only INGO representatives with good will towards Vietnam came to work. They started the foundation for INGOs in Vietnam. One INGO expatriate staff member noted: “My predecessor’s background was education, and that was her main interest. Our first pilot project with NIES was designed to develop teaching materials for working with children with disabilities.”164 Later on, programme changes were based more on organisational philosophies, partner requests and Vietnam’s changing situation. However, expatriate attitudes toward programme priorities still continue to play a crucial role. One INGO project officer said: “Our former representative devoted time to the ethnic minorities, but my new boss spends more time on advocacy. I have to upgrade my knowledge. Otherwise, I won’t fit in.”165

The turnover of expatriate representatives and the resultant programme shifts has negatively impacted offices and project implementation. Many interviewees felt as one INGO Vietnamese staff member commented: “A two-year contract is rather short for a manager to have a proper plan for office operation in the long term. We just follow the representatives’ changing ideas.”166 Sometimes representatives have left behind programmes reliant solely on their own ideas and energy but having no staff ownership. Representatives’ short terms have contributed to a feeling of unsuitability of representatives because representatives do not plan strategically and learn Vietnamese so they can better understand the culture. Experienced Vietnamese staff noted that expatriate representative turnover creates additional organisational costs to hire successors. In addition, changing representatives has brought two other disadvantages: interruption of established expatriate working relationship with partners turnover of Vietnamese within the organisation as staff move to other

organisations, thus contributing to organisational instability. The INGO representative’s way of working has been considered one of the

important factors determining office morale. Participants in the experienced staff workshop were clearly of the opinion, that: “A representative’s way of working is

164 Interview with an INGO informant.165 Interview with a staff member of INGO. 166 Interview with a staff member of INGO.

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very important. If a representative encourages local staff to work independently and local staff members feel appreciated, they will be active and creative. However, if the representative is not active, the local staff members become passive as well.”167.

INGO representatives’ transparency creates favourable conditions for a good working atmosphere. Open discussion and information sharing between representatives and staff create an open atmosphere. It is inappropriate for the representatives to consider information as their own property and equally inappropriate for them to use opportunities for training and salary increases as gifts for staff. A lack of transparency on the part of representatives creates disputes and distrust within the INGO, hindering solidarity between staff members.

b) The role of local staff members and some related problems

INGO Vietnamese staff members, from administrators to project officers, have been crucial in implementing country programmes. Local staff must balance the needs and demands of the organisation with needs and pressures from the partners. As one local staff person noted: “Local staff within INGOs are the middle persons between the agency and their local partners. It is a very sensitive position. They cannot favour anyone.”168

Representatives of various INGOs indicated their high respect for local staff. One typical comment was: “There is a high level of competence amongst staff on development issues, though there are individual differences here as elsewhere. They have good local knowledge, are mature and have quite good qualifications and sufficient competence in financial matters and accounting to meet present requirements.”169

The background of some local staff members may limit their ability to work effectively. During the early 1990s, few Vietnamese had both the knowledge relevant to INGO work and English proficiency. Early staff members working for INGOs were mainly those with English diplomas. This sometimes led to low programme quality since Vietnamese staff often could not understand technical context and meaning.170 Local staff sometimes felt a lack of understanding and knowledge yet found themselves in charge of projects. One informant said: “INGOs should not conduct integrated projects (if) their staff lacked training and had limited capacity.”171

INGO Vietnamese staff qualifications have changed dramatically. Before, INGO staff mostly had a B.A degree. Currently, many senior staff members/managers have advanced degrees and have engaged in mid-career training. Much of this change has been a result of INGO capacity building for local staffs.

167 Note from the meeting of experienced Vietnamese staff July, 2000.168 Note from the meeting of experienced Vietnamese staff (July, 2000). 169 Interview with an informant of INGO.170 Interview with an informant. 171 Interview with a member staff of local NGO.

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INGO Short-term training courses have contributed to local staff capacity. Staff members need basic knowledge for the field in which they work. Short training courses PRA, community development, credit management, TOT, etc., have offered staff the chance to build skills. One local INGO staff member noted, “INGOs’ local staff have been trained in a number of skills, such as project management, community development, project implementation, monitoring, report writing and English language.”172.

Capacity building for local staff has become crucial. The local staff feel they are required to meet programme demands but sometimes they do not have the opportunity to be trained, when they themselves are spending most of their time and the INGO’s resources on capacity building for others. Most INGOs have offered short- term study opportunities, but few have focused on long-term staff training. Reasons hindering long-term training for local staff are:

small INGO budget with small line-items for training if staff contracts are for only one year, long-term training courses will affect the work

of the INGO experience has shown that experienced and qualified staff look for better paying jobs

after having received training.

Local staff members do not feel they have job stability; staff turnover has been rather high. Participants at the workshop for experienced INGO staff indicated: “At present Government staff have become more specialised in their fields and the number of people with higher education has increased. Vietnamese staff members working for INGOs have had trouble securing long-term training opportunities. In the past, with B.A degree, they could become a project manager. Now, applicants have post graduate education. Many wonder whether INGOs will require higher levels of education.”173

Relations between expatriate and local staff remain a problem. In the early 1990s, when Vietnamese staff members were not yet experienced and had limited English skills, expatriates showed local staff how to do every aspect of their work. In some cases, this situation has not improved. Some INGO expatriates do not listen to local partners or Vietnamese staff but instead act as if they are superior. Few INGOs representatives respect staff opinions. Generally speaking, decision-making is top down. For example, local staff members have hardly been involved in representative recruitment but are informed of decisions after they are made.

Local INGOs staff are often unwilling to go to distant and remote areas because they do not want to be away from their family and also because of a perceived lack of information and day-to-day working skills. INGOs have solved this problem by

172 Interview with a staff member of INGO. 173 Hanoi-Workshop with Experienced Staff (July, 2000).

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recruiting staff from the project area or have made it clear in job advertisements that time out of the city is required.

Lessons Learned

INGO representatives should have flexible contracts that extend beyond a two-year term for those who can stay longer, and INGOs should consider recruiting and training Vietnamese representatives.

INGOs should have clear and long-term policies and systematic approaches for training local staff. Training criteria based on staff members’ organisational longevity will create more stability by increasing incentives and reducing staff turnover. INGOs should secure a clear commitment from staff members that they will return to work for the organisation after training. In order to reduce the training costs and to keep the work of the organisation going, staff should go for postgraduate education in Vietnam through a flexible time frame of reduced work demands during the time of study.

INGOs should pay attention to team building to create mutual confidence and an information-sharing culture so that each team member has an open, sincere and constructive attitude. This could help to create equality and prevent isolation within organisations.

INGOs should improve and maintain a network of local Vietnamese consultants through a database at the VUFO-NGO Resource Centre. Vietnamese staff should take part in the selection of expatriate consultants.

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4. Future of INGOs in Vietnam4. Future of INGOs in Vietnam

Most people raised questions about the future of INGOs in Vietnam, including: Are INGOs going to stay in Vietnam, or will they leave soon? Will the work of staff and partner organisations with INGOs be stable? Who will take on the work of INGOs if they leave?

Other questions raised were:

How will the large multi-lateral and bi-lateral donors' apparent shift to sectoral approaches and partnerships affect the relationship between INGOs and their partners? What is the future role for INGOs with their relatively moderate funds compared with other donors?

What will be the impact of globalisation and regionalisation on INGO work in Vietnam and in other countries?

Are INGOs accountable to the donors, to their partners, or to their beneficiaries? If INGOs are responsible to their donors, what happens when donors make changes in their policies and approaches? How do INGOs adapt? How can they best contribute to and support poverty alleviation in Vietnam?

These questions and issues are not unique to Vietnam. After ten years, it is commonly recognised that INGOs play an important role in Vietnam. As one senior retired Government official noted: “Through their small projects and programmes, INGOs have supported and assisted Vietnam."174 This combined with INGO ability to respond quickly has contributed to hunger eradication and poverty alleviation. INGOs have emphasised the transfer of experience and training mainly through providing "support towards self-sufficiency". INGOs try to work through harmonious development or “harmony between development and environment, between economy and society, between the human being and nature, between macro and micro".175 Finally, INGOs have emphasised human resource and capacity building and have supported the development of local organisations.176

This raises questions concerning INGO roles in a coming period of development in Vietnam. Vietnamese informants and INGO local staff raised one concern: the gradual replacement of expatriates with Vietnamese in development work in Vietnam. The majority considered it time for Vietnamese to take charge of the work, though some wondered whether this was a realistic aspiration or simply a dream. Two important points arise:

whether INGO local staff can be independent in their work when foreign INGO staff leave the country, and

174 Nguyen Van Thanh, 1998. 175 ibid.176 Interview notes.

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whether Local NGOs can replace INGOs in the course of Vietnam’s development.

a. INGOs local staff

Local staff members have gained experience and have made achievements during their time working with INGOs. However, the short-term training and learning through working have often left local staff as only the implementers of INGOs ideas. Few local staff members have been trained in management skills in a long-term manner. As a result, they may depend on expatriate staff and consultants. Like their partners, they may have only the capacity to implement programmes but, with few exceptions, do not independently plan or manage projects. This is particularly true in organisations where the number of expatriate staff is large and Vietnamese staff act as assistants to the expatriates. INGOs should question how local INGO staff members can take responsibility of the work if expatriates are withdrawn.

Training involves participation in training courses and self-training. To date, there are no standards for INGO staff; thus INGO local staff need not deal with the urgent question of self-training. One INGO staff member said: “There is no momentum for us to move forwards to self capacity development. That’s why after ten years of working, I still have a B.A degree."177 Moreover, annual contracts and few opportunities for promotion have made INGO local staff feel no need to develop their own capacity.

Some INGOs have hoped that they could train Vietnamese staff members in management skills so that they could become their organisation’s representative in Vietnam. During the last ten years, very few Vietnamese have become INGO representatives because of the following obstacles.

Most INGOs representatives appear to have no confidence in Vietnamese leadership and no desire to train Vietnamese to be managers. Indications of this can be seen during the time of hand-over between a new representative and an old representative where an interim expatriate representative is appointed. With rare exceptions, Vietnamese staff members do not act as interim representatives, not even for a few months and not even when the temporary expatriate replacement creates disorder in the organisation and when this person cannot work as effectively as a Vietnamese staff member.

In general, there has been a tendency to compromise in INGOs when selecting Vietnamese staff members who are relatively suitable to management positions rather than to invest financially in training for staff development. INGOs prefer to use available human resources without considering long-term investment. For example, INGOs with a long-term view might train up ethnic minority managers when targeting those groups, but few if any INGOs have invested in training ethnic-minority managers.

177 Interview notes

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Expatriate managers and local INGO office staff hold very high expectations of Vietnamese managers, making recruitment of Vietnamese managers difficult178. Both expatriates and local staff feel Vietnamese managers need to be democratic and development-oriented and not directive and father-like.

b. Local NGOs

Opinions differ relating to the transfer of INGO work in Vietnam to Local NGOs. Some argue that Vietnam’s mass organisations with their strength and networks are best for project and programme implementation, with LNGOs acting as consultants. Others argue that Local NGOs have already implemented projects and programmes; thus INGOs should have a concrete, step-by-step plan for LNGOs to take over their work.

The definition of NGO is tied up in definitions of civil society, with the latter being unique in each country, according to unique social, political and cultural factors. As Harper notes: “A common understanding of civil society is as a voluntarily formed body of organisation situated between the state and the household which operates to pursue commonly identified goals.”179 From an outsider’s perspective, civil society may be more difficult to define in Vietnam’s socio-political system, where every type of organisation has been linked to the State through a broader umbrella organisation. LNGOs are very new in Vietnam. Unclear perceptions about them exist and the situation is different than in other countries.

While there may not be agreement in Vietnam as to what constitutes a LNGO, Vietnamese civil society organisations could fall into four main types:

NGOs defined under professional, scientific and technological associations Charity organisations Other types of organisations Mass organisations of the Fatherland Front.

For the purpose of this report, LNGO refers to organisations other than the mass organisations of the Fatherland Front. When thinking about handing over, INGOs need to think about two issues:

whether a LNGO is strong enough and sufficiently qualified to succeed the INGO how and by what means the INGO should transfer decision-making power and

the work itself to the LNGO.

LNGOs in Vietnam have emerged in the last ten years. Few LNGOs have a long-term strategy. Thus, strategic planning and human resources development become major concerns for INGOs considering handing over. Most LNGO staff members are senior retired people from State jobs or young students who have just graduated. Most LNGO managers are retired Government staff who may not have a long-term commitment and

178 Zung Le, Leadership and Management of NGOs in Vietnam. 179 Harper, Caroline, 1996.

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whose family style management makes it difficult to create the equal working environment of a development agency.

Low salaries and incentives have hindered LNGOs’ ability to attract good staff. English language skills are weak. As a result, LNGOs have difficulty sharing information, extending working relationships to the international community inside Vietnam, and taking part in international exchanges. Most LNGOs rely on project proposals to raise funds from international donors and depend on consultant fees as trainers to support their organisations. Limited financial resources prevent LNGOs from spending money on training their own staff. This creates dependence on outside funds, leading LNGOs to search for training scholarships abroad or to join INGO training courses.

Some weaknesses relating to LNGOs include:

No single umbrella for local NGOs currently exists to promote LNGO information sharing and co-operation. Currently, the VUFO-NGO Resource Centre membership includes only INGOs. Information sharing between the Centre and local organisations is ad-hoc and informal, making it difficult to know which local organisations are doing what. This can inhibit co-operation when international organisations are looking to set up partnerships.

Vietnamese NGOs’ unclear legal status adds to “uncertainty that many of these local groups feel about their role in the Vietnamese development context and thus their role in and value to the emerging development partnerships”.180

The lack of legal clarity has contributed to unclear management and financial structures, making it difficult for LNGOs to operate, for example, to open bank accounts.

Heavy INGO and other international financial support to some LNGOs has led many to question the evolving purpose of LNGOs: whether they are working for Vietnam’s development or for their own benefit.

LNGOs may not be sustainable when international funds are withdrawn. One participant in the workshop on “Co-ordination and Co-operation among Local NGOs” organised in Hanoi in September 1998 spoke for many: “It is not good to depend on one source of funding. A local NGO is less vulnerable, if it has funds from different sources. And, for external reasons, the donor can also decide to change its policy.”181

Local NGOs have fewer opportunities for co-operation through institutionalised

forums and processes. For example, there is no broader non-governmental umbrella only for LNGOs such as the monthly INGO Forum. Co-operation does take place more informally through task forces or project-specific work but usually at the

180 Poverty Policy Learning Group Paper – Partnerships. 181 Coordination and Cooperation among Local NGOs. September, 1998, p.16.

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initiative of an external actor or donor. Establishing a LNGO network will take time and paper work.

Nevertheless, the Study team feels that INGOs in Vietnam should prepare to hand over their work to Vietnamese organisations. The length of this process will depend on INGO interest and willingness and Vietnamese efforts. Any hand-overs should be done in a 'step-by-step' approach in accordance with the both organisations’ long-term perspectives to create appropriate awareness and understanding on both sides. But first and foremost, co-operation between LNGOs and INGOs must be enhanced, and a legal framework must be established.

The Study team did not attempt an in-depth study or evaluation of any particular INGO, but instead has tried to draw out the experiences and lessons learned after ten years of INGO work in Vietnam, so that INGOs (and other organisations) can avoid the repetition of mistakes and so that INGO work can improve. Of course, the INGOs themselves will draw their own conclusions on the future of their organisations’ work in Vietnam.

The study team hopes that the results of the study will be useful to the reader.

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Appendix A -Figures and TablesAppendix A -Figures and Tables

The following figures and tables have been referred to in the body of the text:

SSSSSource: INGO Study questionnaire, 2000

Figure 4: Expenditure of 7 INGOs 1991-1990

Source: INGO Study Questionnaire, 2000

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Figure 3: Average INGO Budget and Expenditure in the 1990s from Sample

Table 1: Average INGO Disbursement Rates over the decade Year Disbursement

Rate 1991 98%1992 95%1993 94%1994 93%1995 99%1996 92%1997 96%1998 99%1999 123%


Table 2: Comparison breakdown of average percentages of INGO budgets in ‘95 and ‘99

Head Office Costs Provided No Head Office Costs Provided1995 1999 1995 1999Average %

Range %

Average%

Range %

Average %

Range %

Average %

Range %

Overseas/head office costs of Vietnam Programme 182

8.46 1.5-20.8 12.8 1.5-42

Field Office expatriate staff costs 183

7.14 0-16.7 9.6 0-27.3 9.71 0-19.5 11.7 0-45

Field Office indirect support costs184

9.171 0-30 10.6 0-30 18.02 5- 26.91 15.64 3.4-26.9

Direct project support costs185

21.84 0-80 17.4 0-37 15.01 0-54.56 20.66 0-83.8

Expatriate consultants 0.899 0-5 3 0-22.6 2.24 0-10 1.56 0-10

Local consultants 2.07 0-9.7 1.7 0-9.7 0.63 0-3.8 0.5 0-3Project management and admin fees paid to partner186

2.25 0-12.5 2.5 0-12.5 0.96 0-5 0.87 0-5

Direct costs of INGO managed projects187

19.97 0-78 19.8 0-78 27.08 0-84 18.04 0-84

182 Expenditure incurred elsewhere in the world (usually in head offices). Includes costs of servicing and supporting an INGO programme in Vietnam (including desk officer salaries, field trips, equipment, pre-service training etc).183 Expatriate staff costs in Vietnam (including salaries and other expanses paid in the country of origin or in Vietnam).184 Cost of the field office in Vietnam and which indirectly supports the work in the field (admin costs, accountancy, staff development etc) but excludes expatriate costs.185 Direct costs of supporting projects in the field (field office based project officers, partner training, transport and allowances for project officers etc).186 Amount of project budgets or grants that are diverted to local partners administrative or management costs.187 Project budgets for schemes directly run by INGOs (e.g. project staff teams, materials, equipment, costs of activities, credit funds etc).

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Grants to partners for direct project costs188

28.24 0-79.4 24.90.9 0-79 24.44 0-60 27.22 0-78.4

Other 0 0.9 0-5.7 1.83 0-7 3.8 0-13Source: INGO Study Questionnaire, 2000

Table 3: Why a change in geographical focus for INGOs?Reasons for changing geographical focus Percent of

Organisations Greater understanding of the demographic situation 19Greater understanding of the economic situation/nature of poverty in Vietnam 38Permission granted to work in other areas 19Donor request 13Head office request 8Request received from partners/beneficiaries 27Request from PACCOM 11Other reasons including: planned expansion of programme; better official partners; desire to concentrate work in a few areas; recommendations from evaluations; new opportunities for experimentation in different locations; lack of funds; response to disasters; etc…

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Figure 6: Average INGO Investment in Sectoral Areas 1991-1999


188 Grants paid to local partners for the actual operating costs of projects (project staff, material costs, cost of activities, credit funds etc).

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Figure 7 : Sectoral Importance


Table 4: Reasons for INGO Sectoral Changes Reasons for Sectoral Changes: Percent Better understanding of causes of social or economic problems 56Request from beneficiaries or partner organisations 42Changing from single sector to multi-sector/integrated approach 39Changing donor priorities 28Changing head office priorities 25Changing VN Government priorities 14Permission from VN Government to move into other sectors 17Other reasons, including increased capacity to deal with more difficult issues; changing sources of funds; possibilities to work closer to the grassroots; greater openness with counterparts; etc..

27


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Table 7: Reasons for INGOs Changing Activities Reasons for Changing Activities Percent of

Organisations Greater awareness of appropriate responses to the causes of socio-economic problems 44Requests from beneficiaries/partners 42Awareness of new or innovative activities 31Requests from donors 3Headquarter office requests 8Changes in Vietnamese regulatory framework 11Other reasons including greater capacity; long term strategies; evaluation recommendations; greater awareness of the situation; more involvement at commune level; institutional capacity development; etc.

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Table 8: Reasons for INGO changes in methods used Reasons for Changing Methods Percent of

Organisations Growing understanding of the causes of economic/social issues 39Awareness of new/innovative methods/techniques 66Growing technical capacity 47Demands for new, more relevant methods from partners and beneficiaries 36Donor requests 11 Head office requests 8Other reasons, including ability to use participatory methods; sharing lessons of success and failure; growing staff capacity; increased partner transparency; more sustainable options; and global societal changes

31


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Appendix B -Terms of ReferenceAppendix B -Terms of Reference

“Lessons Learned from a Decade of Experience”A strategic analysis of INGO methods and impact in Vietnam 1990-1999

(finalised 25-10-99)

Background and Rationale: International non-governmental organisations (INGOs) have been active in Vietnam for many years in ever-increasing numbers. Recent years have seen an increase of INGOs with substantial programmes and offices as well as a broadening in their scope of work. A large amount of collective experience has been built up and there has been an increasing desire on the part of donors and other INGOs to learn from NGOs' experience in the country to date. Aside from a conference on INGO activity organised in 1992 by the People’s Aid Co-ordinating Committee (PACCOM), there has been no comprehensive study of the 'lessons learned'. In 1997, a similar conference was planned, which would have taken place in conjunction with an INGO Study commissioned by the Resource Centre in Hanoi. This conference was postponed and therefore so was the research. The Committee for NGO Affairs plans to reschedule the conference for 2000. A strategic analysis of INGO methods and impact would be an important contribution to this conference, in addition to being a useful tool for INGOs, policy makers and donors as well as a valuable learning experience.

While NGO assistance, in dollars and cents, represents a small percentage of total ODA to Vietnam, it has been pointed out that “the primary value of NGO efforts to Vietnam may now be their ability to innovate, to experiment with new approaches, to do essential research, to provide high quality training, and to assist in providing policy makers with good ideas” 189. In a broader context, understanding of the role that INGOs play in the development of a country and as learning organisations has grown. Research from various parts of the world has emerged on the constraints, opportunities, experiences and comparative advantages of civil society organisations and their role within a country. The experiences and lessons learned from close to a decade of significant INGO involvement in Vietnam provides a huge resource, which has not yet been fully explored or documented.

Co-operation has been a critical aspect of INGO work in Vietnam and the VUFO-NGO Resource Centre was established in 1993 in an effort to help co-ordinate and disseminate information about the activities of INGOs. It is managed by a Steering Committee representing 5 INGOs, the Vietnam Union of Friendship Organisations (VUFO), PACCOM and 3 members from the Vietnamese Government 190.

189 The Ford Foundation. March, 1999. A Preliminary Note on INGOs as Learning Organizations.190 Specific representatives have yet to be determined.

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This Steering Committee wishes to commission this independent study to review and analyse INGO methods and impact over the last decade. The study will move beyond pure description of programmes and activities, which already exists in the VUFO-NGO Resource Centre’s Annual Directory. The study would provide important qualitative input to the conference planned for next year. It would be a useful learning experience in terms of analysing, defining and documenting lessons learned. Finally, it would be a valuable source of information for the audience concerned - the NGO community and their partners, donors, public officials and policy makers - to better understand INGO methods and impact in Vietnam.

Project Aims and Objectives

AimTo strengthen INGO work and create a better understanding of INGOs role and contribution to development by analysing and documenting INGO methods and impact after a decade of experience in Vietnam.

Objectives1. Describe and analyse the work of INGOs in Vietnam over the last 10 years,

identifying and drawing out any trends that have emerged. Analysis should examine sectors, geographic areas, methods, staff and budget size and other INGO characteristics.

2. Identify areas where INGOs have had an impact in Vietnam. Focus should be on looking at programmes and projects that have been completed or where particular stages have been completed so impact can be measured. Particular attention could be given to overall goals such as poverty alleviation and to key areas such as capacity building.

3. Identify methods that have worked well in terms of INGO impact and analyse the factors critical to success or failure. Critical factors might include: levels of working (micro vs. macro), ways of working (more vs. less operational), degree of participation, local contribution, co-operation and networking, transparency and partnerships, etc. Focus should be placed on clearly outlining what has worked well and why.

Methodology and Sample

1. Comprehensive literature review This would be guided by the Resource Centre Steering Committee and include evaluations; policy documents; proceedings from relevant conferences and sector reviews.

2. Identify the sampleConsult with 1) INGOs; 2) relevant government agencies and 3) partners and beneficiaries to develop sample of INGOs who have worked in Viet Nam for at least 5 years and who have completed programmes and projects with valuable lessons to share in terms of successes and short-comings in their impact and contribution to Vietnam’s

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development. The sample will include 8-10 INGOs which have been working in Vietnam for at least 5 years.

The study aims to examine INGO work throughout the country. Therefore, the research will focus on 4-5 geographical areas encompassing urban, rural, coastal and mountainous locations as well as at the central, provincial, district, commune and village levels to be determined by focus group discussions. Careful attention will need to be paid to the selection of geographical and administrative areas191. The study should not only focus on areas where many INGOs are working but also look at areas with a smaller number of INGOs. These concerns will, of necessity, shape the sample to be studied. Questionnaires/interviews/focus group discussions will be used.

3. Study the sampleThrough consultation with this sample, their partners, beneficiaries, donors and government agencies, identify particular methodologies which have had an impact as well as factors critical for success or failure. A historical perspective should also be taken analysing what was possible in the early 90s as opposed to now. This will involve a field trip, questionnaires/interviews/focus group discussions and the documentation of relevant and illustrative case studies.

4. Extrapolate Results Results from the sample INGOs will be reviewed with the wider INGO community which would include newer INGOs to Vietnam to validate and explore similarities and differences.

This will also involve questionnaires/interviews/focus group discussions with INGO Representatives; Vietnamese partners and authorities including VUFO and PACCOM; relevant multilateral agencies (e.g. World Bank, UN organisations, etc…) and bilateral agencies; as well as participation in monthly Forum meetings, various sector group meetings, relevant donor meetings and others which are called over the time frame of the study.

Outputs A comprehensive study analysing INGO methodologies and impact since 1990 including case studies of successful work to be used by government in reviewing policy, donors for their information and NGOs to benefit from lessons learned.

Study Team The study team will consist of 3 researchers plus one interpreter/administrative assistant. At least one member of the team will be an expatriate who may play the leading role. At least two of the team members should be locally based and one (preferably two) of these must be Vietnamese national(s).

191 It is a common understanding among many INGOs in Vietnam that some provinces are easier than others to work in.

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The composition of the team should reflect qualifications and experience in the various fields listed in the above objectives. Of particular importance is: -Solid understanding of roles, activities and ways of working of INGOs in a range of sectors and specifically related to Vietnam;-Solid understanding of the role of the State and the processes of development in Vietnam;-The team leader must have demonstrated experience in leading research, dealing with a lot of information while drawing out key issues and carrying a process such as this through to the end;-Fluency in English and Vietnamese (as a team); additional languages would be an asset.

ManagementThe team will work in co-operation with the Steering Committee of the VUFO-NGO Resource Centre in Hanoi, and under the direction of 1-2 people from the Steering Committee responsible for close follow-up of the study. The VUFO-NGO Resource Centre in Hanoi will be the administrative base of the study and accommodation and work space will be provided in the adjoining hotel. Monthly meetings will be held with the whole Steering Committee for feedback and direction.

Time FrameFour months, including 3 months for research and preparation of a solid draft and one month for revision.

Budget The study will cost around USD 50,000 depending on the fees of the consultants who are chosen, whether they are based in Vietnam or elsewhere, type of accommodation, amount of travel, etc... The budget will need to be modified at a later date taking into account actual costs.

Funding The Resource Centre can contribute USD 5,000 towards this study and is seeking additional donor funding of approximately USD 45,000. The VUFO-NGO Resource Centre will be responsible for the acceptance of the grant and for the administration of funds for the project.

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Budget – INGO Study Project : 'Lessons Learned' (revised 25-2-2000)

Description Unit Unit Cost Total

Personnel (in days)Consultant 1 (team leader) 90 200 18000Consultant 2 90 100 9000Consultant 3 90 60 5400Interpreter / Admin. Assistant 90 50 4500

Sub-total Personnel 360 36900

TravelInternational (if based abroad) 1 Rt Fare 1500In-country air-fare

1 Rt HN-HCMCForeigner 2602 Rt. HN-HCMCVietnamese 2861 Rt HN-DNGForeigner 1432 Rt. HN-DNGForeigner 143

other travel Car Rent / Taxi / other 2000

Sub-total 4332

Accommodation Hanoi 120 nights 20 2400 Field 40 nights 10 400

40 nights 10 40040 nights 10 400

Sub-total accommodation 3600

Per Diems (food and miscellaneous) 90 working days 15 1350

270 working days 10 2700

Administrative (stationary, phone, fax and email)

500

Translation 100 pages 5 500

Sub-total non- personnel 12982

5% Contingency (excluding Personnel costs) 649

Total 50531

INGO Study Project : 'Lessons Learned' (USD)

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Revised Budget June 2000 (sent to donors) USD USD

Description Unit Unit Cost Total Personnel (in days)Researcher: 90 200 18000Researcher: 17.5 80 1400Researcher: 17.5 70 1225Researcher: 85 70 5950Researcher: 55 70 3850Researcher: 40 70 2800Administrator: 75 30 2250Interpreter 18 50 900

Sub-total Personnel 399 36375TravelInternational (if based abroad) 1 Rt Fare 1190In-country air-fare

1 Rt HN-HCMC-Hue-Hanoi Foreigner

278 278

4 HN-HCMC-Hue-Hanoi Vietnamese

146 584

other travel Travel to field (20 days) 43 860 Travel in HCMC (9 days) 20 180Travel in Hue (6 days) 20 120Travel in Hanoi (60 days) 4 240

Sub-total travel 3452

Accommodation (nights) Hanoi 115 20 2300 Field 33 20 660

33 15 49533 15 49533 15 49533 15 495

Sub-total accommodation 4940WorkshopsSpace (big meeting room @ La Thanh) 50 USD * 6 300Lunch (25 people * 5 USD * 6 workshops) 750

Sub-total workshops 1050Per Diems (food and miscellaneous) 146 15 2190

309 10 3090Administrative (stationary, phone, fax and email) 500Translation 100 pages 5 500Sub-total non- personnel 162225% Contingency (excluding Personnel costs) 811

Total 53408

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Appendix C – List of FundersAppendix C – List of Funders

The VUFO-NGO Resource Centre would like to thank the following organisations for their financial support to this project:

AusAID at the Australian Embassy in Vietnam The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) at the Canadian Embassy

in Vietnam The Good Governance Programme of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade of

New Zealand via the New Zealand Embassy in Vietnam ActionAid CARE International Caritas Switzerland The Canadian Centre for International Studies and Cooperation / Centre Canadien

d’Etude et de Cooperation Internationale (CECI) Cooperation Internationale pour le Developpement et la Solidarite (CIDSE) Catholic Relief Services (CRS) Environmental Development Action in the Third World (ENDA) Marie Stopes International (MSI) Maryknoll; Oxfam Great Britain and the NGO Training Project Oxfam Hong Kong Oxfam Solidarite Belgique Plan International Radda Barnen / Save the Children Sweden Save the Children/USA SNV – Netherlands Development Organisation World Vision International

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Appendix D - Abbreviations and AcronymsAppendix D - Abbreviations and Acronyms

CEO Community Economic OrganisationEFA Education for AllIPE Inclusive Primary EducationMOET Ministry of Education and TrainingMRM Maternal Reflective MethodNIES National Institute for Education SciencesPPA Participatory Poverty AssessmentPRA Participatory Rural AssessmentTOR Term of ReferenceTOT Training of Trainers

Appendix E - Key dates and Key RegulationsAppendix E - Key dates and Key Regulations Relating to Relating to INGO activitiesINGO activities

Some key dates in recent history 1975 exodus of INGO personnel from Vietnam although many continued to provide

support 1986 Doi Moi (renovation) in Vietnam and general opening up 1989 the People’s Aid Co-ordinating Committee (PACCOM) was established 1990 First NGO Directory was published 1992 International Symposium on INGOs was held in Hanoi 1993 Decision 80 was issued on ‘foreign NGO assistance to Vietnam’ 1993 NGO Resource Centre was established in Hanoi to help improve sharing and

exchange among the NGOs. 1994 end of US embargo 1994 PACCOM reported that 97 INGOs spent 70 Million USD in country 1996 Decision 340 was developed as a legal framework for INGOs in Vietnam and

regulated 3 types of permits which can be issued 1996 The Committee for NGO Affairs was established as an inter-ministerial board

to approve permits. The Vietnam Union of Friendship Organisations (to which PACCOM is the administrative arm) was the standing agency for INGOs. The Government Committee for Organisation and Personnel was the relevant body for local organisations. At the central level, the Government of Vietnam promulgated the Regulations on the Operation of Foreign NGOs, and in parallel, formed a state body – the Committee for NGO Affairs, designated to oversee INGOs’ activities.

1999 Decision 28 issued to replace Decision 80 on Management and Usage of Foreign Non-Governmental Organisation’s Aid

1999 meetings between child focussed INGOs’ are permitted to take place at the Union of Friendship Organisations in Ho Chi Minh City

2000 The Committee for NGO Affairs is disbanded. VUFO and PACCOM note that this is in line with Public Administration Reform and that their role in relation to INGOs will not change – but a new advisory board/committee will be established

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Some key regulations issued in the 1990s for INGOs:

- Decision of the chairman of the Council of Ministers on the Issuance of the Regulation on Relations with NGO Assistance – No. 80CT, 28 March, 1991

- Decision of the Prime Minister on the Issuance of Regulations on the Establishment of Representative and/or Liaison Offices of Foreign Non-Governmental Organisations in Vietnam – No. 581/TTg, 30 September, 1992

- Guidance on the Regime of State Financial Management of Aid from Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) – Circular No. 87 TC/VT, 27 October 1994

- Decision 339/TTg on May 1996 by the Prime Minister on the Establishment of the Committee for NGO Affairs.

- Decision of the Prime Minister on the Issuance of the Regulations on the Operation of Foreign NGOs in Vietnam – No 340/TTg, 24 May, 1996

- Regulations on the Operation of Foreign NGOs in Vietnam (Promulgated in accordance with the Decision - No. 340/TTg, 24 May 1996)

- Guidelines for the Implementation of Regulations on the Operation of NGOs in Vietnam – Nov. 05 UB-PCPNN, 7 August, 1996

- Decision of the Government Prime Minister on the Promulgation of Regulations on Aid Usage and Management of Foreign NGOs – No 28/1999/QD-TTg, 23 February, 1999

- Regulation on Management and usage of Foreign Non-Government Organisation’s Aid (promulgated together with Decision No. 28/1999/QD-TTg) 1999

- Joint Circular guiding the Implementation of Regulation on Foreign NGO’s Aid Management and Use – No. 04/1999/ttlt-bdh-bht, 1 November, 1999

- Decree Promulgating the Regulation on Organisation and Operation of the Social Funds and Charity Funds - No 177/1999/ND-CP, 22 December 1999

Appendix F – List of AcknowledgementsAppendix F – List of Acknowledgements

Organisations Full name Position

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ActionAid Ramesh Singh RepresentativeHa Quynh Anh Project OfficerPham Van Ngoc Policy Research and Advocacy ManagerLe Thi Lan Microfinance CoordinatorChe Phong Lan Project Officer - SNCDuong Van Thieu Project OfficerLy Bich Huyen CD-IT OfficerNguyen Van Dao Senior Project Officer

AAV Uong Bi Programme Le Minh HueAustralian Red Cross Nguyen Van Tuan Programme Officer

Bui Thi Thu Hang Programme OfficerAllianz-Mission Nguyen Tuan Hung

Trinh Thi MaiCaritas Switzerland Vu Minh Lan Programme AdministratorCARE International in Vietnam

Pham Nguyen Bang Project Manager BAHAP ProjectJens Rydder ANR CoordinatorRichard Harman Country DirectorNguyen Anh Thuan Programme OfficerTruong Quang Hong Programme OfficerNguyen Thi Le Hien Office Manager

CECI Kathleen McLaughlin RepresentativeNguyen Minh Thu Project Assistant

CIDSE John Egan RepresentativeThan Thi Chung Bac Thai Reginal CoordinatorNguyen Minh Hien Central Regional CoordinatorNguyen The Thach Senior Project OfficerNguyen Thi Phuong Nga Project OfficerLuu Thanh Tue Project Officer

CIDSE in HCMC Bui Ngoc Hiep Project Officer ManagerCatholic Relief Services Christopher Gilson Representative

Dang Huong Giang Project OfficerNguyen Van Gia Project OfficerCynthia WeillLuu Thi Khuyen SED Project OfficerDang Hoang Hai SED Project Manager

CORD Nguyen Thi Thao Programme OfficerDanish Red Cross Phung Thi Binh AdministratorDKT International in Vietnam

Le Sy Tri Southern Sales Manager

Environmental Development Action in the Third World (ENDA)

Nicolas Renard General AdvisorBang Anh Tuan AdvisorDoan Van Khai

Ecoles Sans Frontieres Michele Bergdoll Programme DirectorFord Foundation Oscar Salemink Programme OfficerGRET Luong Quoc TranHelvetas Sylvaine Rieg Country Representative

Pham Nguyen Khoi Project OfficerTran Lan Huong Senior Project AdvisorTran Ngoc Vy Project Officer

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Health Ed Vo Chieu HoangHOLT- Vietnam Ho Dang Hoa Country DirectorInternational Development Enterprises

Dan Salter RepresentativeNguyen Van Quang Hue Regional CoordinatorNguyen Van Chat Deputy Director

IMA Nguyen Thu Hue Country CoordinatorInternational Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies

Ingela Holmertz Le Ha Van Vu Xuan Tuong

Social Welfare Advisor Social Welfare Programme OfficerProgramme Officer

Japan International Volunteer Centre

Ito Tatsuo Agricultural SpecialistIto Sachiko Programme OfficerHo Thi Phuong Dai Project Coordinator

Komitee Twee of the Netherlands

Barry Wright Education DirectorTran Thi Thiep Deputy Director Xa Dan school for the

Deaf, Hanoi; Coordinator Early Intervention Project; Coordinator K2 Education of Hearing Impaired Children Programme

Nguyen Thi Hoang Yen Director Training and Development Centre for Special Education, Hanoi Pedagogic University

Maryknoll Vu Quang Trung Admin AssistantMennonite Central Committee

Dinh Thi Vinh Programme Officer

Medecins du Monde Yvan Thebaud RepresentativeDang Thi Nhat Vinh HIV/AIDS Advisor

MCNV Pamela Wright Senior Technical AdvisorNguyen Thuy Huong Accountant

MCNV office Dong Ha Quang Tri

Mardo Hekker Reproductive Health Advisor

MCNV Central Vietnam Nguyen Huu Thai AccountantVUFO-NGO Resource Centre / Oxfam Hongkong

Nguyen Thi Yen Information Officer

Nordic Assistance to Vietnam (NAV)

Egil Hauge RepresentativeThai Quang Thuan Project OfficerDang Dieu Tan Trang Project OfficerVan Thi Minh Chau Project OfficerNguyen Minh TamTran Viet Tuan AdministratorPham Thu Huong Secretary

Oxfam Solidarity (Belgium)

Josie Cambel Pham Thi Phuong Lan

Advisor for RDP Administrator/Accountant

Oxfam GB Nicolette MooreGillian Frost VSO Teacher, Lao Cai & Ha Tinh

Oxfam GB Vu Thu Hong Programme OfficerNguyen Thi Thuy Programme Officer for Education &

MicrofinanceNguyen Thanh Em Local Project Officer

Oxfam Hongkong Nguyen Minh Cong Administrator/Accountant

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Van Thi Minh Chau Project OfficerNguyen Manh Toan Project OfficerSusana Hopkins-Leisher Representative

Oxfam Quebec Lisa Fancott Project DirectorPham Cong Phin Project Manager

PACT (Vietnam) Nguyen Thu Huong Project OfficerMelissa Knight Representative

Plan International Le Quang Duat Programme Support ManagerNghiem Giang Huong Health Advisor

PDI Ruth BowenNguyen Duy Linh ARDC

Quaker Service- American Lady Borton International AffairsFriends Service Committee Le Hoai Phuong DirectorRadda Barnen Britta Ostrom Representative

Fanny Gjorup Programme ConsultantTa Thuy Hanh Programme Officer

Save the Children Japan Nguyen Linh Van Programme OfficerTran Thi Huong Lien Programme Officer

Save the Children Fund UK Joanna Hayter Deputy Programme DirectorLe Thi Bich Hang Admin. CoordinatorTrinh Thi Huong Project CoordinatorTran Xuan Canh Project OfficerNguyen Kim Phuong Project Coordinator

Save the Children Fund UK Tran Thi Nhieu Senior Project OfficerHCMC Tran Cong Binh Senior Project Officer (HIV/AIDS)

Le Thi Minh Chau Senior Project officer (Child Protection)Krishnamurthy Pushpanath Programme Director

Save the Children / US David Claussennius DirectorDoan Anh Tuan MIS/Micro finance ManagerTran Thi Lang Project OfficerDang Xuan Kha Micro-finance Programme OfficerDinh Anh TuyetNguyen Thanh Hien Deputy Director for Programmes

SNV Vu Quynh Anh Project AssistantPham Thi Hong Project Assistant

SNV Ninh Binh Toon Keijsers Development AdvisorHeino van Houwgelingen NAPA Credit Advisor

SNV Quang Binh Rene Orij Banking AdvisorEvelijn Bruning Credit Advisor, NAPA

Terre des hommes Le Thi Thu Thuy Project OfficerFondation Lausanne Le Quang Nguyen Street Children Programme Officer

Hoang Thi Lan Anh Community Development Project OfficerVNAH Bui Van Toan Programme CoordinatorVSO Stephen Price- Thomas Programme DirectorVSO Agneta Dau Valler Acting Programme Director

Mai Thi Quynh Giao IT ManagerVietnam Plus Bernard Kervyn Representative

Le Thi Yen HangDinh Xuan Hung

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Villes en Transition Jan NiebudekWorld Concern Vietnam To Thi Bay Senior Project OfficerWUSC Pham Van AnhWorld Vision International in Hanoi

Michael Hegenauer National CFDC CoordinatorEllen Hegenauer National Health CoordinatorDang Nhat Thanh Team LeaderThan Thi Ha Project OfficerBernie Angle Community Development CoordinatorLe Thi Lan Project AssistantLe Ngoc My Project AssistantHuynh Nhat Tien Project AssistantTran Viet Phu Team LeaderNguyen Thi Tuong Van Admin. AssistantNguyen Duc Thien Project AssistantLe Viet Hoa Project AssistantBui Quang Minh Project MonitorLuong Thi Chung ThuyNguyen Thanh Nha

Jamie Uhrig HIV/AIDS ConsultantDo Thanh Muoi Project Officer

WWF Hoang Thanh Manager, Vietnam Conservation Programme

Freelance Consultant Paula Kelly

Other International Organisations

CIDA Louise BuhlerFood and Agriculture Organisation (FAO)

Christine Orema

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

Nguyen Phong

World Bank Cris ShawUSAID Laura PhanUNICEF HCMC Le Ngoc Hai

List of people met in Vietnamese Departments and Agencies

HEDO Trinh Ngoc Trinh Director Rural Development Services Centre

Dang Ngoc Quang Director

Inclusive Education Centre,MOET

Le Van Tac Chief of Research Department

Content and Methods Centre, National Institute for Education Sciences, MOET

Do Dinh Hoan Director

Foreign Relations Nguyen Xuan Dau Expert

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Department, MOETPrimary Education Dang Thi Lanh Deputy DirectorDepartment, MOET Vu Xuan DinhCentre for Mountainous EducationMOET

Mongky Slay

National AIDS Committee Dang Van KhoatMicro finance Resource Centre, National Economic University

Dao Van Hung Deputy Director

National Institute of Prof. Tu Giay AdvisorNutrition, MOH Tu Ngu

Nguyen Tri TamBank for the Poor Nguyen Thi Thin Deputy DirectorNational Institute of Nutrition

Nguyen Cong Khan Deputy Director

National Centre for Social Sciences and Humanities

Nguyen Huu Minh

Women Studies Faculty, Ho Chi Minh City Open University

Nguyen Thi Oanh Advisor

HCMC Healthcare Preventive Centre

Le Dai Tri Director

PGD, Binh Chanh, HCMC Vo Kim LoanWomen Studies Department-HCMC Open University

Le Chi An

Tuoi Tre Newspaper Thuy CucHCMC Red Cross Huynh Thi Minh Tam

Ly Vinh MinhThao Dan Street Children Programme

Nguyen Van Hung

HCMC AIDS Committee Truong Hong TamTruong Xuan LieuLe Thuy lan Thao

Sai Gon Giao Phong Newspaper

Kieu Oanh

Voice of HCMC Bich Phuong HCMC Department of Nguyen Hoang NhanCadastre, Land and Tran Thi Thu NgaHousing Vuong Dinh HaoHCMC Architecture Do Phu HungUniversity Bach Anh Tuan

Pham TuTruong Quang Thao

ODAP HCMC Le Dieu AnhHCMC Union of Friendship Organisations

Nguyen Thi My Tien

HCMC Poverty Alleviation Nguyen Van Xe

99

and Hunger Eradication ProgrammeHCMC Economic Institute Nguyen Thi Tuong ViTien Giang Tran Van DungVinh Phuc Nguyen Thien HaoHope Cafe Luu Ngoc Thanh

Nguyen Xuan NghiaDOLISA Nguyen Thanh Cong

Phan Nguyen Binh DirectorLe Minh KhaNguyen Thi Thanh Binh

Health Information and Do Hong NgocEducation Centre Tran Hue Trinh

Truong Trong HoangCEMMA Pham Manh HungNational Institute for Agricultural Planning and Projection (NIAPP)

Nguyen Huong Tra

State Bank of Vietnam Vu Manh HongFUFA Tran Hong TruongDEVAID Trinh Thi BinhVCPCC Nguyen Trong AnVACVINA Nguyen Van LanVie 96/029 Bui Thi Kim QuyNIPA Tran Trong Duc

Ludovic DewaeleSocial Work Centre, Nguyen Thi NhatVietnam Youth Association Nguyen Van Quang

Le Thi My HienSocial Science Institute Huynh Thi Ngoc TuyetMDM Huynh Thi SangRural and Agricultural Department of Thai Nguyen Province

Ngo Quang Ngo Deputy Director

Thai Nguyen Agriculture and Forestry University

Dang Kim Vui Dean of Forestry faculty

Plant Protection Department of Thai Nguyen Province

Mr. Vuong Deputy Director

Thai Nguyen Department of Education and training

Nguyen Quang Hien Deputy Director

Thai Nguyen Centre for Agriculture Extension

Tai Ngoc Hai Deputy Director

Thai Nguyen Women's Union

Ms. Tham Chairwoman

Phu Luong District People Committee

Nong Van Tran Chaiman

Quang Tri people’s Dang Hoang Mai Director of the Foreign Relation

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Committee DepartmentDalkrong District Women’s Union

Nguyen Thi Ha Chairlady

Vinh Linh District Women‘s Union

Nguyen Thi Thu Vice Chairlady

Quang Tri provincial Health Department

Le Van Hao Director

Centre for Family & Women Studies

Le Thi Former Director

Centre for Reproductive and Family Health

Nguyen Thi Hoai Duc

Centre for Disadvantaged Children

Pham Thi Lien Director

Centre for Education Technology

Pham Toan

Ministry of Finance Nguyen Duy Le Deputy Director Aid Reception Nguyen Thi NhuongCentral Commission for External Relations of the Vietnam Communist Party

Do Hoang Long

Ministry of Foreign Affairs International Organisations

Nguyen Van Kha Deputy Director

Department Nguyen Thanh Huong Ministry of Public Security Do Le HoangMinistry of Planning and Investment

Dao Trinh Bac

Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development

Cao Duc Phat Vice Minister

Vietnam Union of Friendship Organisations, American Department Bui Ba BinhEuropean Department Nguyen Van LongVietnam Committee of Religious Affairs

Nguyen Thi Bach Tuyet

People’s Aid Coordinating Phan Trong Thai DirectorCommittee (PACCOM) Nguyen Van Kien Deputy Director

Tran Thu Thuy CoordinatorLe Van Son CoordinatorDang Minh Tuyet

Appendix G - BibliographyAppendix G - Bibliography

101

1. ActionAid Vietnam. Evaluation Report on the Training Course for Health Workers in the Commune of Mai Son District, Son La Province. 1998-1999.

2. ActionAid Vietnam. Saving and Loan Use Survey and Gender Impact Assessment of Uong Bi and Credit Program. By Natasha Pairaudeau, 1996.

3. ActionAid Vietnam. The Son La Programme After 5 years. 4. ActionAid Vietnam. Savings and Loan Use Survey and Gender Impact Assessment of Uong

Bi and Credit program- ActionAid- Credit and Saving. By Natasha Pairaudeau. October/November 1996.

5. Aminin L. Abubakar and Ngo Tien Dung. Micro Enterprise Promotion Project Evaluation Report Integrated Pest Management Training Thai Nguyen Province. February 1999.

6. Bergren, Gretchen Glode and Tran Tuan. Evaluation of Save the Children (SC/US), Poverty Alleviation /Nutrition program. Thanh Hoa province. November 1995

7. Boyd, Charlotte and Le Dinh Chung. Review of the Impact of ACTIONAID-VN's Irrigation Projects in Son La province. July 1997.

8. CECI. Micro-enterprise promotion. Project (MEPP), Phase 1. Final report ( revised version). August 1999.

9. Chambers, Robert. Whose Reality Counts? Putting the First Last. Intermediate Technology Publication. 1997.

10. CIDSE and SNV. Report of the Evaluation Mission of Agricultural Innovation and Agricultural Extension in Thai Nguyen province. February 1999.

11. CIDSE. Mid-term Evaluation of Credit Programmes. December 1998.12. CIDSE. Mid-Term Survey and Evaluation on the Extension Program for Mountainous

Regions in Bac Thai province. May 1993.13. CIDSE. Evaluation report for Credit and Saving project VO601. By Dao Van Hung.

February 2000.14. CIDSE. Evalution report on Credit activity in the Primary Health Care (PHC). By Dao

Hung. May 1995. 15. CIDSE. Study the Implementation of SALT Model in Agricultural Extension Programme,

Phase 3 ( VO509). November 1999.16. Department of Agriculture and Rural Development. Vietnam -Finland Forestry Sector

Cooperation Programme.Tech. Report. No 5. Training Needs and Training of Trainers in Forestry Extension in Cho Don District. Bac Kan Province. 1997

17. Ford Foundation, ‘A Preliminary Note on INGOs as Learning Organisations’. March 1999. 18. Government of Vietnam - Donor - NGO Poverty Working Group: Attacking Poverty. 1999. 19. Goyder, Hugh and Flli Free. Technical Desk Review of Son La Program 1992-1997.

September 1997.20. Grady, Heather. Report on the Credit Programme Evaluation of the American Friends

Service Committee (AFSC) –VN. August 1993.21. Ha Thanh Binh. Report on the Review of Working With Aids Project. January 200022. Harper, Caroline. 1996 Paper on: Strengthening Civil Society in Transitional East Asia: The

Role of Foreign Donor Agencies.23. JVC. Evaluation Report of Participatory Extension Project of Sloping Land Farming in A

Luoi district, Thua Thien Hue. May 2000.24. Komitee Twee. An Evaluation Report on Komitee Twee Education of Hearing Impaired

Children in Vietnam by Le van Tac, Pham Kim and Nguyen Thi Mai Ha. 1998.25. Komitee Twee. Final Evaluation Report. VN 91003. June 1996. 26. Kristiansson, Bengt and Rita Liljestrom. Report on Evaluation Mission of Community based

Rehabilitation in VN. November 1993.27. Le Van Tac, Pham Kim and Nguyen Thi Mai Ha. Evaluation Report K2 programme-

Education of Hearing Impaired Children in VN. 1998.

102

28. M., Janine and Wassana. Border Area HIV/AIDS Project (BAHAP). Care International. Draft External Review Document. February 2000.

29. MCC. Evaluation of the Impact of the MCC Tam dao Saving and Credit program, 1995- Menonite Central Committee (MCC). Final draft. By Dao Hung. Nov 1995.

30. McCall, Dorothy. Partnership with Government: A Realistic Strategy for Poverty Focused INGOs. 1998.

31. Medical Committee Netherlands Vietnam (MCNV) NGO Experiences in the Health Sector in Vietnam. 1999.

32. Nguyen Van Thanh. Review the Role of INGOs in Vietnam. The Research and Exchange Magazine. No 17. September 1998.

33. Nguyen Xuan Nguyen, Nguyen Van Cuong. CIDSE. Assessment of CIDSE SV-607 Project Linking Bank with Self-help Group: Credit Program to Assist Poor Women in Improving Household Economy. November 1998.

34. Oxfam GB. Oxfam's Impact on Livelihoods in Lung vai. December 199835. Oxfam Great Britain. Oxfam’s Impact on Livelihoods in Lung Vai. 1998.36. Oxfam Hong Kong. Vietnam Review of the Programme. 2000. 37. Oxfam Hong Kong. Report of An Evaluation of Two Oxfam Hong Kong Assisted Craft

Projects with Ethnic Minority Women, September 1998. 38. Oxfam Hong Kong. Mid-term Evaluation Report. By Koos Neefjes. July 1998.39. Oxfam United Kingdom and Ireland. Evaluation of the Ky Anh Credit and Saving Program

of Oxfam/United Kingdom and Ireland. March 1997. 40. Oxfam/ United Kingdom and Ireland. Evaluation of the Ky Anh Credit and Saving

Programme of Oxfam/United Kingdom and Ireland. March 1997.41. Turcot, Paul and Dale Posgate. Monitoring Mission Report CECI: Vietnam-Canada Micro-

Enterprise Promotion Project- Micro-enterprise. May 199842. Porter, Beth. Assessment Report of Credit Programme in Ky Anh, Ha Tinh 3-1997, 43. Poverty Policy Learning Group. Issue Papers in English. Meeting between Donors and

INGOs. June 19th, 2000. 44. RDSC, TEW, RTCCD. Coordination and Cooperation among Local NGOs. September

1998.45. Report of Socialist Republic of Vietnam (Official report) – National Committee for EFA –

2000 Assessment.46. Roche, Chris. Impact Assessment for Development Agencies-Leaving to Value Change.

1999. 47. Save the Children UK. Final Report to EC. HIV & AIDS prevention and management

program. May 199948. Save the Children US. Evaluation of Save the Children US Poverty Alleviation/Nutrition

Programme. Thanh Hoa Province. 199549. Save the Children US. Investment For Nutrition in VN. December 1989.50. Save the Children Fund UK. Assessment Report of Credit Programme in Ky Anh, Ha Tinh.

March 1997. 51. Rawlings, Sharon. Entry Point Activity Assessment-CECI-Micro-Enterprise Promotion

Project ( MEPP). September 1998.52. Socialist Republic of Vietnam (Official report) – National Committee for EFA – 2000

Assessment. 53. Studio Driya Media & Cuso, 1990, p. 17. Sustainable Development - Voices from Rural

Asia. Volume 1.54. Provincial Women's Union of Soc Trang and Medecins du Monde. Training of Trainers.

Network of Volunteers in Health Education. Narrative and Financial Report from January to May 2000.

103

55. TT Lang and D.A Tuan. Evaluation of the Child Nutrition Program, Quang Ngai province, Viet Nam. 4-6 May 1998.

56. UNDP. Microfinance in Vietnam: A Collaborative Study Based Upon the Experiences of NGOs, UN Agencies and Bilateral Donors. 1996.

57. UNICEF. Vietnam Children and Women, a Situation Analysis 2000. 58. Vietnam Plus. Report on the project progress and measurement-Community Development

Project. December 1999.59. Vietnam Poverty Attacking. 1999.60. Vietnam-Finland Forestry Sector Cooperation Programme. Tech. Report. No 5. Training

Needs and Training of Trainers in Forestry Extension in Cho Don District, Bac Kan Province.

61. VUFO-NGO Resource Centre. Partnership for Development: International NGO Contribution to Vietnam.1999.

62. World Bank and DFID. Voices of the Poor. November, 1999. 63. World Vision International. District 8, Ho Chi Minh City, Urban Development project an

Evaluation Report. August 1999.64. World Vision International. Investment For Child Nutrition In Vietnam ( Child Malnutrition

Control Strategy). December 1998.65. World Vision Vietnam. STD/HIV/AIDS Evaluation Le Chan District Hai Phong .January

2000.66. World Vision. Report Edited by Sarah Croutear. World Vision UK. Report on the

Evaluation of the Phu Loc/Huong Thuy District Development Project (JFS 1300). Ngo Dinh Chuong, Tran Thi Dang, Nguyen Thi Yen Ha, Vo Thi Hanh, Truong Thanh Le, Nguyen Tat Ngai, Ton Nu Luu Phong, Tran Duy Thanh, Nguyen Duc Thien, Julian Srodecki and Pauline Wilson. 21 June to 30 June 1999.

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