in Theater of · 1. NiS8iOn of Psychological Varfare.Bsyzcholoeical Warfare has been variously...

PSYCHOLOGICAL WBRBAEX

hfISSIOa: Prqare Report and i'ecommendatione on Pey&olof$cal

Warfars berat ions in the European Theater of

Operations.

%e Oeseral 30arb was eetabllehed by General Orders 125, Head- quarters " p e o a Diester of Operations, US m y , b t e d 17 June 1945, na amended 'Uy General Orders 182. dated 7 m a t 1945 mcl &nerd drdars 312 dnted 20 3ovehrber lybrj, Headquarters United States Porces, European Taeater, t o preqaa-e a factual axalysia of t h ~ strategy, tactics, snd administration employed

the United States forms in the Eurcpcan Theater.

lQEGlZiT4WdBdARD

United States Forces, mop Theater

m 408

Prepared by: W o r RAY K. Crp.ft, iiI, 0-266565, Chief, PSYChOlOgiC& ?rarfare

Sect ion.

Princippl Consultaats: Brigadior General Robert A. iicClure, USA, Director, Information

Control D i v i s i o s , USFZl’. fomarly, Director, P6ChO- lo&icc?l ?.‘crfare Division, SBAEF.

Colonel Clifford R. Powell, Inf, Deputr Director, 1nfom.t ion Control Division, USBT, fomerly, Corn=ading oi- f icer , Psychologicel War- fere Ser-dca Bnttcl ion, 12th A n y Group.

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SUBJECT FhOZ

Tatroduofion . . . . . . . , . . , . . . . . . , , . . , , . . . . . . . , . . . . . , , . . . . , . . . . , , , . Ch'iptcr 1:

1

Doctrine o f PayahologloRl % - f ~ - e Orginisption

Doctrine o f P8yahologiop1 Ferfam Ln Fiel? 0PorP.tions.. . . . . . . . ,. , . . . . .. . .. . . .. . , . . ., . . . . . . . . . .. Orginisation of Feychologic-il r w f n r e Units -t Army Groups w d Araiest SyJlo:.nont of Porsonnsl a t Lmor Echqlons *.nd iq Spmial Tnsk F'oraes.. . . . . . . Recruit"$ and Trtininq of ps.jzhologica1 7vf'--r? Fnrsonnel fcr Fiul? Oprr?.tioas. .. . . . . , . . . , . . .. . . . . . . Psychologiasl 'nvfzru Stpf'f Coorc'inntinn rt 1111 Eoholons ............................................. 18

at S M F . I * a . * 6 8 e e . . a . a ,. .. . ,, . . . .. ,. ,. ... . . . .. . 2

Chqpter 2: 6

Chaptor 5:

10

Chapter 4 : 14

Ch3ptor 5:

Chsptor 6: Colloction snd Distribution of Peycholoqionl rTarfw-0 Intolligencs.. ..... .. ... ,,. , , ... , , , ,. .. , . .. . . . , ,. . . tlonitoring of Fricmllg m& Snosy Sroxlc*.sts... .. ,. . .

22

2.6 Chaptar 7 :

Ghnptor 8:

Chnptor 9:

Chiptor 101 Proc'uction o f Lmfle t s c.xl Die t r ibh ion by

Radio moadonsting i n Pspho1ogicp.l !7?.rf,.re,. , . . . . . , Production of b?nflets c.n? Distribution by Airori.3.

Ar t i l l u ry S ' r ~ l l ~ . . . .................,.. . .... ,. , ... .. Chqptor 11: E q l o p o n t of Cmht Loud S!>or.hr ??nit8 with tho

Ini'rrntry D i v i s i o n . . . , . . . . .. .. . . . . . , . . .. . , . . $ . . . . . . .. Chnptor 12: Rnployrent of Combzt Mu?. S!io?.lmrs on Tr.nks.. . . .. . . . Chaptor 13: Consolidntion i n Friandlg drons r.ncl Ccntrol Propn-

gnndn i n Oocuplnd E m y Arw.s.. ,. . , . . . . . . , . . . . . Choptor 14: Publications an& T(?dio Program for Displ?.oed

poreona qnd Allied Prisonor8 of W3.. . . . , .. . . ..... e

Chqpter. 16: B 1 p . d or Covert R d i o Prop!tpxi:: r.n? othcr Blzok propngnnr'n,. , , . , ., . , , . . . .. ... .. ..

Chnptor 16: Financing OP payohologicr.1 %.rfnrn Oprn t i cns t

. B . . . , . q . . . . e .

hfisoelhnooua Problems.. .. . . . . . . . I . , . . . . . . . . . . . .

30

4k

47

54

53

55

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F3CPORT Oil PSYCHOLO@ICAL \9RFARE

IJTEQDUCTION --

mi6 study repressn ts p.11 'Xende f o r fu ture study uitn a brief re- ?art on Psychological VarfJre opere.tions mf f i c i en t t o expleln the we.da. Although appropr ia te recorda were not c.vc.ilcble f o r c e r t a i n sUbJscts i n the r e o r t and i t w s izpossible t o in tor f iew ce r t e in ex- perienced personnel, i t is worthy of Iiote thc.t i n thc opinion of Gen- e ra l Officer8 with vhon tile study iics discussed very e f f o r t should be d e t o ob ta in P. thorough docunentation m d crit ict-1 evaluation of ~ S ~ C h O ~ O g i c d h r f n r e operntlons in the $PO. iolloasc

.?heir comnent i n b r i e f

General George S. Pat tou: Paycho- log ice l warfere h d en import?Jt pl<ws i o the European Campaign. It CBfl acco.nplish nuch goo6. It C m also be sx t r a i e ly h8rmful."

L i e u t e m t General Leocewd T. Gerow: "Psychologicnl Nnrfere

cor8 of the Amy generally, mxmls prepercd, ead il courso of study ia Psychological 'hr- fn re introduced in to t h o CoYnnrd cnd Geceral Staff Schooln.

b.,ior Ganernl Leven. C. All-: IrToo l i t t l e is k:'.ows about psycho- log ica l ifarfnre i e tke Aray.

Psycho.Logicr.1 V,vfe.ra in t h e 320 WRS e. j o i n t A ~ g l . o - h ~ r i c ~ n operc-

IfSuch a study must be m d e .

. tpcret.ions end methods .-.re r o t su f f l c i en t ly ~ 0 1 1 known t o o f i i - I would l i k e $0 see hwdbooks Nld

d titorougli study should Iw mde ."

t i o n ln rge ly colductzd by ofi*icers t e v o r e r i l y comias iorcd i n the A r q - of tlis United S ta tes , c i v i l i r n apcc ia l i s t s of mny profeesio:m?~ categories end en l i s t ed personml of n h ~ v s g c o i d t c c d sk i l l s . should bo conducted by the dos t c z p b l o persomel obtclnable. 5roecter aapeots propc,;cndn vmrfcre is uore properly. e: Ste t e Depsrtnent t h m B 'fer bepcrtnen'; pro-alei; as such it i s .+. neglected nnd i n e p t l y uoed p o l i t i c a l md d ip lona t i c wee,pon. File A r b o f prop?&eil;ln vr.rfnre sho..d.d be developed t o thc optinuri &Ktc:iC before t he problsn arise8 os t o ;low it should be arplopsd, by t . i i l i t r r j Forces.

It Ir. Its

To recapture mar experiences of Paychologicnl !Jr.rfaPe opera t ions that were r.ot mule c, n a t t e r of record, persornal i n the U.S. m a d the Ur.ited Kirgdon rust be interviewd, C e r w records !"st be s e a h a d , w.d Gerrim c iv i l l a i i e m d kmr.n arw pcraonml h a t bo interviewed.

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1. N i S 8 i O n of Psychological Varfare. Bsyzcholoeical Warfare has been var ious ly defined, but h t s p r i m r y nieaion is t h i s : To enploy the press, radio and other media to destroy the f igh t ing no:ale of the ene- w , both R t hor~le and at the f r o n t , and t o sustain the nora le of fricnd- l y populations i n e n e q territNy. I t a second~xy mission i s t o p rovlde inforna t ion in l i b e r a t e d arees t o ' assist t h e q p r o p r i a t e militery autlr- o r i t i e e i n t h e restoration end naintenance of order. missiom whlch w i l l be'.defined i n the i r proper p l m e in t h l s r epor t ,

In World lfRr I! ( s t a r t i ng well before the cut-

'Pherk a re o the r

2. Peychalogicel :farfare 86 e weapon of war i r n o t new. It stens from e a r l i e s t times. break of h o s t i l i t i e s ) &men pSyollOlOg~C8~ warfare vas highly aucess- f u l &a p e r t o f t he ove r r l l Gerzn offensive agc-?16t Poland, Nonuay, Frcnce, BalgiuEl and H o l l w d - rgeaiat ~.ll of C e r w y l e eventual ad- veraer ies , i n fe.ct. except Sritim, Ruesin and the United Stntee.

arny i n l o r l d War 11. in World War I. I n the f i lm1 nonths of the lnet war a c o r d i h r a b l e peychologicd. warfare oper2tion wae conducted by the Anericen arny, with eir dropping of l m f l e t s and other davices i n the f ie ld os well as e l s r g e scald popegar.&, ceapalgn wqed on Lhe level of i a t e r n e t i o n a l i n f o m . t i o n serv ices .

Despite this, 110 subatea t ia l body of doc t r ine or pfm of opertr-

3. PsycholagiceJ w r f n r e w.s uot M innovation i n the Buerlcm The e f fec t of prooagdo had been well t e s t e d

4. t i ons f o r nsychologicdl wrfare a r i s t e d before the outbreak of Vorlb War 11.

5. Even sow, no firad place fo r peycholo@nl ne..rfarc i n t h e s t d f h s been determined, bu t peychologicnl wmfnre operations in t he Euro- peon campnl@ could be s tudied with R view of codifying such phases of the oparntion as lend thensalves t o p e m m s n t doc t r ibe .

6. Psycliologicnl vnrfcre i n :the Europem Tliehtar of Operations, - R j 0 h t Anglo-junericm operntion in which.poreomd nncl f n c i l i t i e s o f both n ~ t i o n a were thoroughly am-+, - m e v t r tun l ly c rcn tcd i n t h e k ropcan thea ter . conducted wi th no 8ujatmtir.l prccsbcnt o r doctrlno o r orgsr i r - t ion . The p r o b h n ~ of orgaaiging the psyc)iologicr;l m r f n r c c ~ p n i g r , astnb- liahing bA8iC doot r inc , fixing t ab lcs o f oquiynont, and f i r d i n g a p laco i n the e t d f were s t i l l U E O ~ - J C ~ nt the en4 of 1943.

psycliologicnl w f o r e opcratioris were orgw.iaod end

7. Erperienoo of psycholo&cc.l war fare tcr438 ir the 1icditcrmnce.n TheRtcr of Operations protrided thc anly b n t t l o t e s t e d 'unckgmund, md th is experiencc WEE by i ~ o Liema ndcquntc f o r the s c r l e on which tho c m p d g a in t h e EWopcm Thantcr W F E u n d ~ r t ~ k m i .

8. Rela t ion b€ Killbrsy t o Clvll inn dponciss. As developed, the p8ychological m r f a r c oucration wnn not only n j o i n t Anglo-dncrlcnn but n joint militnry-oih1ic.n opemtloii, With c i v i l i m personneL of

sovernl reaaons: Wff io i cp t quPliflcd n l l i t n r y pGreonna1 woro not mde a v d l e b l e ; the nnture of psychologicnl ivArfnrc i s .noliticrlL ns w e l l ria a i l i t c v y , And cnny dccis ions rad d imc t ivos could nnly be obteined through Rgenciee reprcscnt ing t h e Str.tc Depnrtcont o f the United Btatoa

VafiOUQ C l V i l i F U I €lgellCi86 enployod at e a DChElO2S. T h i s We6 t n U 3 for

o r the Foreign Off ice of the United Kingdon; Paychological warfare required l inieon with aocrat service agencies of a guae i -n i l l twg nature; with Allied government in e x i l e ; and with c l v l l i m coune rc id services.

9. CiviliRn agonciea pa r t i c ipa t ing direct17 i n thc ~ s y c ~ o l o g i o d warfnre ompaign were:

a.

b.

c. Po l l t l cn l Ir-toll igsncc Dept-.rt%?nt of the Poreign Office

Office of War Infornetion (United Stetes) .

Ofiico of S t rn tcg ic Servicee (United S t e t e s ) ,

(United Kingdm),

m u i s t r y of l n f o m r t i o n (Unitcb nngdon).

British Broadcasting Corporction ( W t e d Kingdou).

P o l i t i c & '!arfora executive of the Foreign Office (United ~ i n g d o ~ i ) .

d.

e.

f.

10. Paycholcgiccl varfare operrtions enbrece p o l i c i c s which con Only be f ixed at thc higheat g o v e m n t l eve l . Psychologicnl Wnrft-re Division a t Sqrsne Hoedqufsters, Allied Expedi- ti0nAI-y Porcc, while not n d n t e l n i n g f o n d liainon v i t h the S t & e Dopmtment of the Wbitcd S tn t e s , or the Foreign bf f i ae of the United Kilgdon, d i d so through thc Office of War Infornatioo and the Po l i t i ca l . In te l l igence Departncnt , cmrylng out di rec t ivca s q p l i c d f roil t h c ldghest governncnt l eve l s .

It ehould a l s o be pointed out t ha t psyoholog-cnl warfrrre, through eaployaent of personncl assigned d i r ec t ly t o the ailitary establisl inent, or t o bhe otrthd p a r t l o i p a t k g c i v i l i m egcnciecr, p r o - f i t e d by tho se rv ice o f EOIJC of t he noat highly s k i l l c d ncn i n t h c re&\ of t h e press , r m o , p o l i t i c s rad othcr civilior! prafcas ions of both the United StRtcs and Grert Sritain. logicil l wnrfnre oant r ibu t ion t o the U U C ~ O S B of thc Europcm c a p i g n could be &e without ovalwtir?g the to t a l contribution. of the various Allied c i v i l i a n t-gencies.

It should bo noted thRt

11.

No e v l u n t i o n o f t h e psycho-

12. Or,gnniention of paycholo&A \fFJfr'I% Division, s m . 510 c r i t i que an th io orgw.r.ipnt w i l l be a t t e q t e d Lcrs, exccpt t o outline thc orgnnimtloml e t luc turc , nnd t o suggest that no o r g m i z c t i o d problem fippear t o h-vo dcvcloged. i n t o the fOllOlwing SQCtiOnB:

TheSHbPg Crgcmization wns oremized

Office of Chief of Diviaion Ereoutive Admin i strr t ion Section Supply md Trmspor ta t ion Section Oo"n ic~ . t i cn Section Dirac t ives (Current Proptgmda) Section Direotivca Sect! on L e d l c t e Section RZliO Section In te l l igence , Special Operatione In t e l l i gence Scotion spOCi8l s ec t ion (Oovert PropagwdR) GsrmM licdia Control Press Control Entsrtninment Control Publ iae t ions Control H i 8toriAn

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X). Dcecrlptions of the 1T.TfOUS propciggandn media, doctrine o f snploynent of t h ~ veriaus nodia, problous related t o tho c o l l e c t i o n of i a to l l igence , planning, rclatfons with other staff sec t ions , e t c , cre covered In eubsaquant sections of this rfport.

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D C K X ” OF PSYCEOMGICAL !fAW&E Ill F I B D OPEIULFIONS.

22 Mission of Psychological !Imrfsre Eicld Opcratlo3s. Psychc- l o 2 i c d warfnre in the f i e l d s inp ly loc r l i ecd thc broad propagendn a i s s ion within the‘ coubat aonc. cadi onhalon with p r q o g m d n focused on cneuy c l o w n t s f a c i w h i6 t roops . Coalxh or f i e ld psycholoELca1 var fcrc nchioves ~~~dmun succcss when b u i l t i n t o the opere.tioncl plm aincc t h i s enable production of B S E C ~ - tid l e n f l e t e , rndio progrms e ta , &d nsmib ly of apcc ic l izad q u i p - . x n t and personnel f o r a conceiitrated o f fo r t vherc noccssary.

I t supports thc c o r m d i n g gonerel at

22. I n i b t s lt?rge sonee it is t h e u ise ion of destroying t h c cnc- :JYIS w i l l t o r e s i s t ; oncourqamnt 2nd fr .cil i tai?lon of ind iv ldunl nnd nr?SE surrcnders; co .w~n ica t ion of ordci-6, d i r ec t lvcs nnd nppccls t o civilian population on both s ides of the f ront .lints t o creP.tc n t t i - tudes md proapt c o u ~ e c s of ac t ion helpful t o a i l i t m y operntions end t o the sccu r i ty of conr.mnications.

23. Spec i f i ca l ly , conbnt operations s q l o y nedia not e.vailbnblc t o broad s t r a t e g i c propngnnda operations - l e a f l c t s produced i n h m t c and delivsrcd by : * i r c r f t o r ar t l l l .ery shc l l t o s p c c i l i c e n w units; d i r e c t voice con tac t w i t h cnmy u n i t s by lcudspockers iiounted on tfnkE or trucks; redio progrme o f n t ac t i cp l neture. prociuced in tho f i a l d f ron d e t d l e d 10ce.l i:itelligonce nnd t incd with allltbry operations. It is mceaeery t o study these r.iedin to es tnbl i sh s u c c s s O f these operations and in order t o syste:lotiaeJthoec proptvpndn nppee-ls riost successful i n vorious stnndnrd s i tun t fons .

24. Mille s tn t i s t i cPJ d a t a has l i t t l e v,due in dctern in ing t h e suceso of prop,ag&n opera t ions , i t i n notcd f o r purpose of illustrn- tlng the mope the t coribbnt units within the 12th Az-4r Qroup, w i th in R nine-nonth per iod begini;ing i n August, 1944, d i s t r ibu ted ~ 2 0 , 0 0 0 , O ~ l e a f l e t s nnd n i u i a t u r e newspapers t o Der?.lar. troops fncinr: t he Any Group nnd t o c ivi l ic ,ne i n the irmediate path of ndvmcing fo rces : pcr- fomcd 1,237 loutepoaker ?Jisaions; pnd brocdcrrst: 975 segarpto t e c t i c d radio progrma, not including &25 ncOoptnbL0 rooordings produccd in f o m a r d arcns nnd broadcast mer t h e A n y Group progrms of Xndio Lux- enbourg, RS well es the progrmg of AJSTE, RBC, c tc .

I n addition t o nll Chc tbcncs exploycd in fltrateglc prognganda, t h e bas ic then6 of coiioat propegmda loE!flCtE, brocdcasts, nnd loudspeaker appods wns siuply t hn t of p c b s w d i y Gorr.ir.n soldicrs t o lay down t h e i r nrna wul becona prisonere. T h i s the.% m s through e l l the output of t he vnrious ncdia:

25. Propaganb Theice Ctrcased in Coibat Pwcholofiical Wurfare.

R. Idea of surrender.

b. Surrender is hono~mble for fBe G e m .

0 . Hethcds of eurreader.

d. The Act of our;cnder i s now the nost ronsonable a c t under ex is t ing c l rcuns t mcos.

I t met not be fo rgo t t en that thc a c t of marrendor i s e.tten- dsd by considerable risk, nnd theh d e t d l e a in s t ruc t ions i n thLs Pan- oivccr :mat be c o m t a t l y g iven to the encny soldier t o f a c i l i t a t e h i e sumendor.

26.

Theso i r s t r u c t i o n s JUS% a lso be c o d c a t e d t o f r i c n d l y

troops and coordinate? v i t h eny surrcndcr e t tenpt .

27. The sccondarp theac, conatantly i q r e s s e d through l c p f l e t s , broedcests, e t c , werc thc Ifsix points11 of Axricexi good t r en tncn t of priaorors, cons tan t ly fcpentcd v i t h refcrcnce t o guarantees of t h e Gcncvr. conventlone. Thcac NCPCI

a.

b. Dcccr-t trcr.t:icrt "86 b c f i t s soldicrsn.

6.

1:neaiiRtc rc:.ioval fron thc dmgcr zonc.

Ihc sx ic food as tL-t given t o km-icm sDldici-s. " t h e b e s t gcd Amy in t h e r.rorldlt.

d. Adcqunte hospi tn l oarc.

c . Pos t e l n r iv i l epes , t o comunicntc with f a i l i e s at hozic.

f . Re tum hoxc c f t c r t h e w f r , I l f s soon r.6 possiblcfl .

Supporting thcsc )?sic theilea rerc thosc of a pure ly wcrcr 28. t lonnl natura: Trotic-1 d .v~ntogcs enjoyat by the Pdvancing Briericnn froopsl s u p e r i o r i t y of ncn d nn tc r i e l o f r.dvmcIn2 troops; ins t ruc- tions I ron f i e l d coxx"crs t o opposinE troops o r c i v i l i c m s in t h e pe.th Of dvcnce; accentuatcd g r i cvmces e;:ong kmnu ao ld ic r s f r o a units mmging f rou a c i i c s aoch1 t o plntoons: lecdcrship; food supply short*§; i n s t m c c s of :.liatrentnent, injU8- t i c e , e to .

weaicncsscs of cr0r.1~~1 co-nd '.

29. S ~ S conduct Pc.6~. Probably t he noat e f f cc t lve l e a f l o t of t h e war WEB t he ~ ~ P f i s e i c r e c h e i n ~ ~ o r nSnfc Conduct Pass". Pr in t ed ae an o f f i c i a l docuoant, it borc the senla of the United S t a t 0 6 nnd Greet BriWn, carried tho s l g m t u r e of the S u p m e Ce-dor in f a c s i n i l e ; nnd erpheaised dhcrence t o t h c Gcncva CO;lvCntiOnE,

30. The f o r n nnd twrdir-g of thc Pnssicrschcin, o w e es tab l i shed , 1w.8 ncvcr V F U ~ C ~ . ever Arise i n the &.n&n 6OldierlE t IhdrA8 t o tho WthCntiCity O f the

It *ins b t r i c t l y adhercd t o 60 th,t no doubt would

do Cu.lOll'".

Po pro f ioe one d e conduct pnae for the e n t i r e f ron t , t h e l e a f l e t wrs produced only by PND sW. forbrdo reproduction of tllQ safe conduct pnseon the reverse of ~ n y other l e r f l c t . In tc r roge t ion reports condifned thnt t h i s l e a f l e t occcnpliahad i t 8 purpoes; t h a t i t V J ~ S regnrdca by Geinrr, aoldicrs 0 8 w o f f i c i d docunent nnd coula be trUstCd, t o thE iiore conventionpl a iguicn ta t ive l e a f l e t , "It ucy be true", "gut i t i s probably fuse pr~n;;andd, appcere4 nc t t o apply t o th i s leaf le t ; .

l yp icn l of o ther l e d l e t doctrinc, t o inp lan t t hc surrender i d e a in tha nind of the Gcrim so ld i e r nnd t&c adventage of t h e "do- la$ed nctionn c f f s c t of n l e a f l e t , 'ms that onployad i n the ' 'Ei Sor- ?endcrlf l e a f l e t , yrovidine o phonetic G e w m s p e l l i w of "1 SUrCnder". "his them was fu r the r developed with o ther l~ngU%e l c s sbmq, of prffi- t i c a l vnlue t o the:Genon soldier in cage o f surrender or d e r r t i o n , u d of i n s i r e c t progeganda iap,nct. o f such t e r m RE HI need &lother b 1 W e t n , "I w a n t m o t h a r cigarette, p l e ~ s B ! ~ , etc .

31. In Decenbcr, 1 9 U , d i r c c t i v e s

Objcotions rnlscd b:g Gcr-w eo la i e r s

32.

Leaaons lmlUdQd phonotic epelling

33. ITerrs as Prmagad.a Venpon. In ociibbat propcganda, AS well as i n s t r a t e g i c propgMd8, f d t u r l new8 w s the oliiaf nethod o f per- sunding the O o n a so lb ie rs th0.t t h e i r causc was h p c l e s s e d surrcnder

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inavi teb le . Augnenting the s t r a t e g i m l distribktdgn o f 'N'achrichtenfl, the London-produced newspaper ' f o r Geman troops, (Dis t r ibu tcd by air) was Wrontpost'l , 2nd "Feldpestl!, produced by 12th Amy Group f o r tac- t i c e l d i s t r i b u t i o n by r?lr and m t i l l e r y ehel l . Iaws in these two pa- pcra rmgcd f r o n world news t o happenfix on the fr0r.t at coqpany and platoon l eve l . of course, obtained d i r e c t l y f r m in t e l l i gence sources.

34. . force, whilc "Beldpost~l, u t i n y bpt nowsy l e a f l e t , wne d i s t r i b u t e d by a r t i l l c r y .

coiaient, Gcrrmn spor t r-ews iob ta ined by nonitoring Gcrilan brondcnets) p lus i t e m cu l l ed fron in t e l l i gcnce eources. Thcy conte.incd no odd- torials o r cover t propfgtudo preaching. d special f ea tu re WEIE ,"the Yc.nkee SpeakaH, an nppcd of nw- ordirztry Auerican soldier11 speaking d i r ec t ly t o llan ordinnry Germn Soldicrl aeroas the l i n e s . papers were w r i t t e n with e ca l cu la t ing regard for p ~ ~ p n g t ~ ~ d ~ a f f ec t , but did not v i o l n t c bnslc r u l e s of t ru th . constant u s e of good s i t u c t i o n q s t o explain t o t h e G c n a n aoldier the tme s t a t e of a f f a i r s on tha f ron t .

Other l e a f l e t s o f ?'oven e f f e c t bere thostl bssed on cmptured

!be b o s h source of va l id i t e m o f t he l a t t e r s o r t were,

The llIFrontpostll was dis t r ibubed by planes of the t a c t i c a l sir

55. Them mall netrspa,ers contained ncvs p ic tu res , coluuns o f

These new+

O f proven value wan t h e

36. eneny docunents, p a r t i c u l a r l y aecre t G a r ; l ~ n doa-mnts which exposed (1) i n e f f i c i c r c y , inrLoquac7 md goncral deeperation i n h igh lkhmach t Circles , a d (2) corruption, ru th lessness and bungling i n ITazl l eadcr - ship,

cannot be overecpbs lzed t h a t appeals t o t h c grea tes t i q a c t me those addrassed t o p a r t i c u l a r groups o r epeoi f ic units. Tlius Fiussima m.d Poles i n t h e Gernm m . ~ roceived l e a f l e t s wr i t ten i n t h e i r oim l e - %OS, appeals t o divlision, reg inonts , conpenies, otc. were addressed t o t11u.i 'JY nme end n m t e r ; appeale t o the p p l a t i o n of Bpeoific c i t i e s and towns were mdo with appropr ia te denuncietions of SS o r Baei PnrtY leFvlnrs r e spomib le f o r hopeleas r e s t s t a w e .

37. @e&ets. A ~ c a l s Addrsascd t o Succial Uni t s m a Grauus. I t

34.. Etratcgir . And !?ocbicnl PrOpRgand.3. Expci-icuce proved that no c lcbr - x t d i a t i c c t i o n c m Sa i i d e bctwecn coiibat o r t n c t i o d propegnnda ma Xor.gmu.gc f i t r a t eg ic propaganda. 'I'hus, while output o f s t r a t e g i c prup&cnda WRS l a r g e l y delel-;oted t o t h c fixed r d i o s t a t i o n s mu5 pr in- t i n g facilities of t h e zone of cwxpu ic j t i ons , ( a i t h t h e except ion O f RaUo Luxenbourg vihich ,served R dual s t rc tcg ic- tac t ic01 nfseion) thc resp3i.slbil i ty of supplyiw i o t e l l i + m c e f o r this OUtp-at $Us nbttz'gct- ti!&' of strP.tcgic leaf le t bonbing on cnecg troops f o i m t i o n e , e td , ti08

esaen t in l ly that of t he conbet t e ~ r i s .

39. Dispos i t ion of ?s:ychologlcal Ycrfare d i t s and Personnel. c l e a r . t h a t f o r e f f i c i e n t employuent o f tlw l i a i t e d I t a l s o became

psychological vrarfare personncl a d equipment, d v a n c e planning f o r any given ope ra t ion was of f i r s t importance. a p@ychological tuaz3'aa-e t e a f o r firod attachment t o a unit (Amy Group or Army) on a b a s i s of a BCandardlEed tEiole of orgonieationrnd equipment, WBB t ha t of building teams t o accompli& missions as an i n t e g r a l pa r t o f spec ia l p lane f o r p a r t i c u l a r operations, ning could only be euecessful if done i n r sa l t i on t o o ther s t a f f plans.

ifore important than hildiq

Thus advance p lan-

b. E s s e n t i a l s o f Bield Propaanda Doctrines. In summary, it would appear ' c e r t a in from combat opere.tione i n t h e European Theater, t h a t m c c e s s depends upon ready Bcceaa t o su f f i c i en t renources of i n t e l l i - gence, personnel E& equipment to . be able t.0 focus pi*opa&mda b a t t e r i e s on ' ths onemy i n spec i f i c sbtSLetions o f ueakneaa. Varying s i t u a t i o n s

- 8 -

requlre coord ina t ion of many propaganda resourcee, in addition t o proper coordination with t he combat units, and should k b u i l t into the operRtioila1 p l a n t o Bchieve maxim euccesa.

41. Such f o c a l employment was demonstrated in p r a p a . g h opera- t i o n e i n t he e n t r y o f Bliiea forces i n t o Paris; the ultimetum at Bachen, meeting the drdsnnea offsna lve , reduction of tha R&r pbclcet, atc . Theoe operations will not be analysed here, Cor trill opsrationa em- brac iu more l imi t ed t a c t i c a l objectives, but are c i t e d t o emphasize necesaity f o r a au f f i c i a3 t f i e l d argariiaation, readily aasembled, t o exploit m i l i t a r y developments, large ond mal.1, uirich Occur in the C O W 8 G of a C a m p d g n .

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CHAP”cEIK 1

OXANIZATIOI? OF PSYCEOLOGICAL VAF3ABE UNITS AT luLrY GRGUPS

AXD M E S : EIQLOGtEIlT OF PBRSO?TNEL AT LOWER ECHELOITS

A.tD !I SPECIAL TASK FORCES

42. Paycholonical Ytrrfars Organisation lfi thin Twelfth Amy Qroup. N O attempt w i l l be mede withlx! this br i6f report t o analyze t c b l e s of or.gRnieation or t ab l e s of equipment f o r psychological warfare Witti within Twelfth Group, or t o explore problem8 which developed 6ur- ing the European campaign.

43. I t i s c l e a r t ha t a thorough atudy of t h i s orgaxiza t ion m e t be made and t h a t payohological warfare operations within t h i s m y group, employing pereonnel and equlpaent on a w a l e reasonable adequate f o r t h ~ mission, provide s u f f i c i e n t eqerhence on diich t o base fuOute p l a c s for lnrga sca l e psychological warfare combat operations.

44. Psychological warfare at 3 t e l f t h Army Group was provided thrcugh establishment of the Pub l i c i ty a d psycholcgical Narfere Sec t ion , n spec ia l staff sec t ion w i t h oonaiderable operational r e spone ib i l i t i e s , th ich embraoed the e n t i r e f i e l d of public re le t ions , press censorsh ip , end psychological warfaro a c t i v i t i e s .

45. S t d f coordination and operational d i rec t ion were combined i n tho P & PW Off icer , nnd for psychological worfare an assistent f o r Paychologfccil Warfare.

exerc ised through

46. t h r o w Censorship.

47. quer te rs ataff seot ion , plue a l a r g e p & PW DatAchQllt, i n whk&h personnel f o r t h e several highly Bpecializcd operations vera sepregeted i n spec ia l b rmchee .

Pub l i c r e l a t ione ,snd p res s censorship con t ro l VAS auerc ised a s s i s t a n t for Publ ic Relations and AC Assis tan t f o r Press

The F u b l i c i t r and Psychol~@criL Varfnre Section embrncad B hemi-

48. Within the p Bp pw. detnchmnt was the Psyohologicnl Varfnre Branch, t o which vcxioua propaganda spec ia l i s t s were assigned, inc lud- ing S5 c i v i l i a n e p s c i n l i s t e from the Offioe o f tlar Informal;iOn, Office Of S t r a t e g i c SerMces, a d par t i c ipa t ing B r i t l h .a@rCies.

49. Service clementa of t h e army group publ ic i ty and psychologioa l warfare opera t ion ware embrncsd in the 72nd Publ ic i ty Service B a t t a l i o n , which was ass igned t o Special Troops, Twelfth Anu Group,

t e r s company, p l u s the 2nd cx.d 3rd Mobile & d i o 9roadomting Companies (propgtaiida companies) assigned, and later the 5th Ho’sile &dlo Broad- costixg Conpany, fittached.

In planning, the 72nd Eublici*,y bervide Bat t a l ion was msembled , (following conferences Setween military and c iv i l inn Manor p l anne r s ) on the basis of aupplylng two armiea i n the f f r l d unddr the army group.

9. This b a t t s l i o n inclucled a ba t t a l ion hetdqusrtere nnd hoodquar-

51.

52. The th roe subdiv is ions of pub l i c i ty and psychologic& warfare operations, - pub l i c r e l a t i o n s , prese oensor8hip, and psychological warfare, - were in&Qr&& t o share canmunications, admin i s t r a t ive and other s e rv i ces f a c i l i t i e s in t h e f i e l d . Tbia planning was e rp res sea

- 10 -

as fo l lovs : t he 72nd m b l i c i t y Service Bat ta l ion lW11 couthin a h c a d q u r t e r s com- pn:? with n s ~ c s s a r y adminis t ra t ive and operational pe r somel and v e h i c l e s t o be s p l i t i n t o three serv ice groups, cach c a p b l c of mcesing, housing, &-.,?E. t ronspor t ing 9 w n r correspondents, necessary psychological warfare =its end pres s consors.II The headquarters company A ~ B O pravidcd for ne commulica'cions platoon t o supply indcpendcnt signal comunlca t ions t o a d w u n of 200,000 vorifs per day westbouud f o r *ier correspondents! Copy ami 75,000 words per day eastbaand psychological va r f a rc copy for ?rqe@rrc?n use and pol icy d1reotives.n

1n:add.ition t o the two Ho3ile Radio 3roadcastir.g Cojnpanies,

53. In p rac t i ce , the t h ree subdivisions hsared adminis t ra t ion and BODE f a c i l l t i e s at amy group (thr.ou& t h ~ 72nd P u b l i c i t y Serv ice Bat- t e l ion , ) but oporated i dependen t ly in the f i e l d . caxps, f o r ins tance , were f requent ly some dis tance from armd' headquar- tcrs , wldli psychologicd warfare operations teams :emained i n c l o s e 2roz in i ty t o haadquarters.

The loce t ion of p r e e s

9. In p a c t i c e , a l s o seinzice groups w i t h i n t h e headquei-tcrs company of the 72nd Pub l i c i ty Service Bat ta l ion esrvioed only the p u b l i c i t y and press censorship operations i n t ho f i e l d , while se rv ice and adminiatra- t i on of psrchologica l warfare f i o l d teama at amice ve re handled from headquarters of t h c eelv ice ba t t a l ion at army groiip.

55. Ta summarize: The joint pub l i c i ty end psycliological warfare p l a n vias r.ot followed at amiss. llre c lea r ly divarae rature o f t h c t w o o p e r a t i ons ea r ly b o w e apparent. Competition betwecn p u b l i c i t y and peycho- log ica l warsare requirements f o r connunications, t r m s p o r t and other seavices vss intense, f o r t h c reason that operations made widely biver- gent damandn upon those f a c i l i t i e s . The o p r a t i o n e , eqmding from two t o four armis8 LTder armjr group, overtaxed .babies of o r g m i e a t i o n end t ab les of equipment. Administrative personnel end equipment at armies were d iver ted from the fljoint operationfl p lan t o thp.t of eenrioing t he public r e l a t i o n s a c t i v i t i e e . "Joint CoolGnviicationsn were used almost c rc lus ive ly f o r publ ic rclations.

56; In consequence, psnchoiogical warfare u n i t s ware g e n e r d l g eboii: 3f t r a m a o r t a t i o n , devoid o f adequate coimunicatione, esd i n con- sLus:atvle &ministrati-re corhralon since administratioil Of field teama vuc conducted from ami group headquarters.

5.f . I h s it! r o t t o im ly that the public f e l a t i o i s end press COnsoP- sld> tlmaiids w r e not va l id , but only t o show that (1) pub l i c i ty and p ~ l y :.!!si logical m r f a r e dcvoloped a lo rgcoqe t i t i vB P&ther than coopera- t l v z j:;.res in the f i e l d : ( 2 ) c ~acx!i, Lxior i ty on equipment and personnel; (5) a study of t he e n t i r e orgmir.&tioL, Embracing a l l tables of organisation Rnd t a b l e e Of equip- l a (m4 , r i l t h c. rccord rind atudy of t h c i r f i c l d emp1o:mcnt o f p c r s o m c l ar-d cqaipmcnt will bo ncccssnry t o aupport baalo recomendatlons f o r C t W g C .

psyohological warfare vas f r e q u e n t l y g iven

5E. I t should also Ilc pointed o u t , in appraising opcrntions of t h e Publ ic i ty and Paychologicnl !tarfare Section of 12 th A m y group i n the %ropeen Thoatcr of Operations tha t (1 ) publio r e l a t i o n s an8 p r e s s con- sorship:operationa, l i k e those o f peidlological warfare, were Conducted on h? u-preccndentcd s o d o : ( 2 ) thcrc wan l i t t l c a i l i t a r y d o c t r i n o on Which t o baoo t hc oporationa; (3) pub l i c i ty and press caneorship d 8 0 involved p o l i c i e s rcaoMly t o Ugh govcmcn ta l l c v c l s ou ts ide the u i l i t a r y organisation; and (4) wer corresnond~nts , represcntiw the press and publio i n t he Unitod Sta tes and t h e United K i ~ o 3 , formed an i n f l u e n t i a l b loc t o i,lfluenco n i l i t a r y peraoimol i n the f i e l d t o ob- tsin s a t i s f a c t i o n f o r t h e i r dcntrnds; t h in would not have baan t h e caw?

" 11 -

had public r e l a t i o n s and pres s ceneorehip operations in t he f i e l d been sepwated from psychological warfare operations in planning and organization.

59. Orga?izntion of t h c dobi le Radio Brodcas t ing Companies. The .@bi l e Radio Broadcasting Compauier prope&anda campanias ‘*ere m d e up Of 20 o f f i c e r s And 145 e n l i s t e d msn,‘and desigrred t o s e d e s ing le a m y in the field RS 8 se l f -conta ined propaganda unit. in t e l l i gence personnel , i n t e r roga to r s ma writers, v i t h nobi le p r i n t i r g prosscs and s p e c i a l i s t personnel; a cMJnulllcation8 sec t ion equipped with t h e ,:lobile rad io scntcr m d rece iver SOB 399: a public aciddress s e c t i o n v i t h bobi le loudspeaker e q u i p n a t f o r propegante. nFpeals: R radio sec- t i o n v i th n one k i l o v a t t nohlle 1.abio ’broadzastix s t a t ions , SCR 696 and SCIi 69~. f o r t a o t i c d propagandn broadcasts; a !:mitoring un i t v i th 30-

b i l e monitoring oqulpnonf; eod an administrative section which perffiitted operations Re a solf-contained unit in t he f ic ld

..

A coqany inc luded

60. lfhile designed fir use as bn 1r ; tegrd amy teem, experience i n t h e f i e l d showdd thc &antage of pooling all equipment and permnne l A t thE levo1 O f besic f i e l d operations, in this case et m v group. cOLssquencc, while tile mobile radio bropAcastiilg corqanies r e t a ined t h e i r organlsational i d e n t i t y at arwv groups; only ce r t a in personnel and e+p- pent were ‘attached t o a i i e s , while other personnel tme employed (1) t o s t a f f the l a r g e l e d d t a& radio aectione at Luxarlbourg, (2) t o uake up ~ppocial task fo rces for specie1 nissions, (3) t o adjust shoi-ta~;es of s p e c i d i z e d pcrsonnal requfretlents f o r various i rd iv ldua l operations.

In

61. made herb, except. t o explain thn t amy conbnt teems were b u i l t t o nccom- glia!! the epcc i f ic ru.my missions,ouly, while large sca l e conbat propaganda wae or ig ina ted at Army O m p .

62. Orgenization of Special Task Bo=. It bocane c l ea r , s h o r t l y

Or?a iea t ion of Combat 32atm at Armies. Bo aIId.ySiS will be

n f t s r the invaaior: of Norr.~andy, t h a t Paychological werferc f i e l d opera- t i o n s voulb r equ i r e frcquont d i spa tch of sa l1 indqeneent groups, o r task forces , t o i cco rq l i sh spoc i f ic aiasione not e j36c i f a~a l ly r e l a t e d t o psychologicd W ~ W Q operatione at a,mier. mpacial force6 t o sc izo or o p r a t e rad!o statione; t o ca tab l i eh and t o mainat in neespapcrs i n f i n d Lccal i f i ss : t o condwt pro;anged opera t ions ngenist pockete much AS por t c i t i eo umler siege;, t o acke p o l i b i c a l surveys, sewoh f o r d.oumc?.ts, ga tker :!eoiniiaed i n t e l l i g r -me , and EO cn. Aesenbly aaeigr?ms?t of tbase b p a d s l l a z d group8 €or long o r ahort periods wag poscl!.’oia through aoi:;ts:~~nocs Of t h ? p O D l Of peraon!!cl ~ . d ne1 and equipnent x d e r operational contra: s f ax!y grou?.

These nivoions included

65 . visionel. e m p l o y ” of thc 3rd P s y c h o l ~ g i a a ~ . bnr B :lictecimert Pmvisiona]. (an Office of Stratcglc Scrvicee fiaLb = i t -rns:;lciLd in f i . c l d opera t ions o f a covert nnk re ) , This unit YIRB atka&A ?o tho P a 1w Detachment, 12 th Amy Cr0.q: mcl C ~ C G under gei-aaticnai control of t h e Peyohologi- o d Warfivc Brench, I t MCE dispetahed t o 12th Amy Group with 110 cqulpmnt or ach1r-t s t r a t i v e o r sugply porsonn2l. The parent organization of $hi8 imlt W.B 0Veill;ualiy i o m t e a i n paria, and problans of r:! supply a d adainltltration iierc only solved wlfih g rea t d i f f i c u l t y .

64, Division. h c d q u a r t c r s at a lewl lover than b y . with corps Rad divisions were “ g a d through l i d s o n o f f i c e r s trav- elling t o lower hcailquartarshom thc cmbat team t o awy; Bnb through att-ent of f i e l d t E 8 X I S such as loudspeaker teens t o lo-ar headquarters f o r spec ia l d s s i o n a . The concensus of o f f i c e r s em&%ed i n

Employaent of the ?rd P ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ c ; ! ; - _ ‘ . r - ~ - z ~ D e t e c l l m c i i t Pro- F o abnid st rct j .vc psyc;iJlt;gLc:ai .sm.Ccwe pianntng contemplatad

~ n y l o m e n t oi-hologica~. ttarfere ~ e r s o n n o l at corps No psyzha3lugical w&arc personnel were aeaigncd t o an^

Operetione i n connection

- 12 -

pychologicnl warfa?e, based on f i e l d experienoe, i a that amy i a the iowest love1 t o which my subetential psychological wrfare orgnni- zntion shou3d bo aeaignad.

- 13 -

65. Pcrsonncl &.auircnw.ts i n PEpChOlOKiCP~ Vmfare. I n tho uat- t e r of peraonncl, t he plan of operations of Peyohological Varfarc in the &ropean carppdgn VAB boscd upon one oxprossed pr inc ip le :

n ~ c c n u e e of tho highly s p c e i d i z e d t a l e n t s mqui rcd by prapa&t?nde work, auch as lin,@atic flucncy, e d i t o r i a l judgicn t ead p o l i t i c a l knowlcdgo, ar$ psychological. w n r f w e orgcnization ,mst collbinc Civi1ie.n end r d l i t c r y pcrsounol; n e i t h e r the US Arny nor thc Anerican c i v i l i e n p.g'gofi~ias can provide m f f i c i o n t ,.ion o r s u f f i c i e n t a b i l i t y wittrout pooling t h e i r ~ O ~ O U P C C ~ . This apa l i c s c q w l l y t o the s p e c i d i z e d equipnent required. 11

66 . KO brdcdorin w i l l bc attempted harc of t& p c r s o n x l rosCcrs Of VAfiOus ~ r ~ l t ~ in psycholaEicc1 Imrfarc. organizations r e l i e d lergelp for spccinlizod a ' o i l i t l c s upon a group of eoldiers an8 ci\3liMa made up of w r i t e r s , students aud i n s t ruc - t o re in lmngunge, n is tory , ;poLiticnl sc tcucc , ctc. of these wcrc rccer.tly noturn l i sed c i t i z e n s dram f ro2 Gcrnan and other refugee elements.

I t nay bc s t a t e d that

A hi& porccntagc

67 . It ahould bb poin ted out tha t the prablens o f finding conpetbn% nen of l i n g u i s t i c a b i l i t y and p o l i t i c a l hojrledge of Europe, o q h b sized i n t he psychologi cnl verfElre operations, might well concern all agencies of t h e governumnt who LWQ reiponaiblc f o r United S h t a s par t i c ipa t ion i n world a f f a i r s .

69. Anothcr protlcu of f i rs t iuport.sncc WE t h a t af f ind i rg of f icere su i t ed f o r the peychologicdl weuiare mission. specialized pcrsonn.el vert c i v i l i a n s , j un io r o f f i cc r s m C er l l ie ted men, and no p r k i s i o n had been URdc for providing sufficient f i c l d grade o f f i c e r s f o r orgar-izaliions other t b n tliet at S W .

Warfare (in the pub l i c i ty and PaychEogical Ifarferc Scction, "), ~ s m m e d his d u t i e s on 22 Dccenber 19L3, and i i incdiatcly engaged i n es tab l i sh ing a trdcining cen te r for the P & P ?f units at ClsVOdOn,

Tho b;uk of

69. Unit ad. Individud TrRini . The A e e i s t m t f o r PsycllologiCal

Englanb.

70 . ALSO estpiolishcd. i n ooopomtion wit.1 PVD/SWF, O'fI, OSS, 1101, and Lhe PNE, were t r e ln ing ccn tc r s e.t boxlou, Srondeeburg, IV&- ford, Cavcrshau an8 Burton-on-tho-Hill.

71. In those ccntcrs, perticularly f o r t ra in ing bf i n d i v i d u d e ,

Thds knotuledgc WBB rwlo frcols- nva i l - much r e l i ance W 0 6 placed on the B r i t i s h knolllodge of Europcan p o l i t i c s , i n t e l l i ecuco opcratlone ctc . A 5 1 C t o the U.6. pcrsoiiizcl.

72. ds late as 1l iBrch 1944, no plar-s, i n s t n x t i o n s o r t r a i n i n g d i r ec t ives had been recGived from h ipher nuthor i ty and no psycholo- g i c a l warfare personnel was present. divldwrl t r a i n i n g And were being inplemented, but no t n c t i c d o r log is - tical doct r ine had, been eetahlished, only, with clemonts aeserdbling ii tho United StRtos, except t hn t c iv i l i ans vecru i tod f o r du ty v i t b NSAQ verc a r r iv ing in Englmd. Theac c iv i l i ans were, hovever, being d lver tod to other clutice by SliUV, OVI ma oss.

Plana htd boen per fac ted for im

l!h~ organization w RS an papor

73. No f l c l d grade o f f i ce r s had been profided fo r psychological " f e , o ther than the Assistant for Psychological Vcrfare, and l ip pro-rision had bccn nada for e t d f o r f o r operational planning end supervision at A r n y &odque.rters.

g r d c o f f i c e r s ware ncedcd, and o f f o r t s werc made t o p rocaro end t r a i n such pcreonncl. Hhicvcr, there wcro no tab le of organizehion v?sanciee and It was thc rc fo rc i~ipofieiblc t o t r a i n psychologicnl warfarc o f f i- Cora f o r e m i e s .

74. A study of f i c l d operations in Africa ind ica ted t k t field

75. Tho tre.ining progren this crcated wae solved by i n fomnl cooperation of arny eraup and aruics, end extensive use of the enhoole Fad f a c i l i t i c s providcd by SHBEF and m80.

76. Even by 1 Juie 1944 no f i a l d t e s t of the novel units o r any No overall propn&.mde plan hob Of t h c i r c l m c n t s hcd haw. qossible.

been furnish& by SrraFS Rnd no pol icy d i rec t ives or y i d m c e had h e n n3Ccivsd. V i r tua l ly no perecnncl of f i e l d expcricnco had been made crvailable. with insufficient t r a in ing 'Jecause of delay in activRting the units, del tv in r ec ru i t i ng personnel and non-existence of doct r ine and plans f o r conbct p r o ~ a g ~ n d a operatione,

pllkhed t a o l o g i s t i c e l f i s f d t e s t s in X n g l w A . Thc P & Plf Det. aocm- p l l6 l rd 011.0 l o g i s t i c e l f i e l d beet. P & W t e a s was aver acconpliahed; nor were they cvcr field tes teb.

crith Hcadqmrt e rs and Hedquar tors Oafiipuny, 72nd R.lblic1 ty Scrv ice Bnttalion, on a p p r o x h t e l g 1 August 1 9 4 . Pereornel included appro+ M t d Y 50 c i v i l i e n s who hcd been attnched long enough t o reocive some psychological wnrfol-e t r e l n i n e mud sone f l e l d t r a in ing , tar,.& n p r o x i - W.tely a other rcprcsontativea of thG clv-llian agonclcs rtt tache& at the last ninute. Thoso tmrc COmplQtCly untrained f o r t h c field, in- c l d i n g a c o q l e t c Morale @eratione wit o f the Off ice of 5 t r c l ; ~ g i o Servlces.

P6yehologicc~ unr fare units becem operational in t ho f i e l d

77, The Bsychologicol "arfnre Brezc!, P & Plf Dcta.chucot. nccon-

30 opera t iowl trr . ining of the

Oroup, l o f t f o r t h e Gontincnt as, The P 80 PM Det., 12 th

79. !he 2nd wK9 Cowpny. vhiolr a r r ived 7 April 1$4, r ece ived extensive training of pereoiae l , but tho peychologicd trnrfaro elements which .aOCOmp@nied the 3'lrst US b y on the Invasion of Normandy wont without R f i e l d tast.

80, The 3rd MBD C o r q ~ , which a r r ived 23 14t-q 1944, had l n su f - f i c i e n t tfme t o take fv l l cdvwtagc of the t ra in ing p r o g r m and f a c i l i t i e s . Basic ind iv idua l progt-tpnda t ra in% 1?ns ef fec ted , bu t t h i s c0np-y a l s o beparted f o r t h e continent, with t h e Thlrd US Amy, w i thont"a.f f e l d test.

81. Although both oo~panies ar r ived i n England IJithOut mush of t h e i r equipuient, s p l e n a d irq"v1erdion madc possiblc the i r disp&ch t o the Contincnt with all essential i t e m ercopt high powered loud- fipenkers.

62. Problems Faised by SrupLoyment of Civillane. The Tables of Organlention end Equipment of t he various psychological uarfexe units bid not provide for i i d i v i d u d equipmont f o r c l v l 2 i ~ . n s , end i t was never procured on the b c s i s of dlowances f o r m i l l t e y personnel.

83. The o x a c t statu of c i v i l i r n s was ncv8r dctennincd i n nany raapects. Hwh confusion, p c j t i c u l a r l y i n mattbra of R d m i n i s t r ~ t l o n and cxccrclse of au thor i ty , cont inua l ly rcsu l t td . Bortimataly, mort

- 19 -

of these c i v i l i a n s were ab le and t o l e r a n t men, who r e n d e r d e x c e l l e n t eenriee md eucceedcd in their equivbcd status.

c i v i l i a n Mminie t ra t ive Officer, who &so served as i n f o n o d LieLson Officer t o the c i v l l i a n Bgenaiss, and as Purtb lng end dontrnoting Officer for those agencies in th6 field. While this sys tea provcd sa t i s fnc tory t o 0!7I perrcimel. i t was f a r from sa t i s f ac to ry t o pan- some1 of OSS and the British @encies.

65. Problem Rniscd by Emloynont of Br i t i sh Pareonnol. The

&. Administration of c i v i l i a n personnel wee supcrviaed by a

original plan s tc ted :

"Any peychologice-1 verfe.1.o o r g a i s a t i o n "at conbin0 dll t h e avoilnble r 'cwurcce i n pcrsonnsl md equipmnt of tho United Stntee And Orcet a r i t c in . An inportoat rooson f o r the combinod d.q$O-dmericau combat c.nd eoneoli&.tion propagmdrs u n i t e i e t h o neccesity of coordinnting Aeernicen and Br i t i sh p~opngandn eo closely t h t neibiicr thbienemy nor Allied sympathizers on tho Continent w i l l be nblc t o discern nny dLBfr.aehion;t,Ooordination t o such e-? exten t i s D o t simply a matter of po l icy d i r e c t i v e s

h d l i d s o n on h i& Icve l s ; it requires En in tegrc t ion of oomon purpose end e f f o r t , only poseiblo when American end a r i t i e h elements have been so thorouglily merged t h d thcy thcneelves CORBD t o mako distinctiona.fl

s6. Attachment or S r i t i s h personnel t o peydiologicel warfare units prcaented rmv prcblcms, particular1.y i n ne t%crs*df &iniB- t rc t ion nild suppl;g,

Pbc plan f o r conbincd *lo-bcriccn tccloe proved p e r f e c t l y sound at Pmfsm, pRrtkw.&Uly with regexd t o po l icy rooking, etc. , but i t did ncit work out ~ o i i i n tho f i e l d .

e&. Necessity f o r Military Ireiciw of All Paycliolop.ical We.rf'arc Persoanel. Piobilo Radio Broadcasting Compmioa (Propaganda compnuics) a r r i v e d i n Europe ing Oentcr at C q 8itchi.e. Opcmtione in the Europcnn campalm aon- f i r i c d t he v d u o of the tr&.ning received Ihcro, by corqnrison with the performmce of t:icsa ncn i d t h th-t of siiitriy pereonnol nnd civl- libme who h& not had tho G ~ n p Ztichfc treining. Sonc subetitufrc for this training, d o n g t h e linea of i nd iv idud t r d n i n g only, we.6 provided by &ort-t inc a t texdaice at psychologicnl " f a r o t r e i n i n g con- tcrs inprovised in Englcad, but this t r a i s i n g vas ineu f f i c i cn t . A Thorcugli grounding i n euob ,iilitnry tn tc l l igencc e.s organization of the Oerrvln Briny, orgml rn t lon of tho h c r i c a n AnW; l i v i a e m d working under f i e l d conditione, e tc . , werc found t o be Ebsolutcly neccaeary. A thorough bas ic n i l i t m y ead thorough bcaic n i l i t n r y l n t c l l i g e h c c t r c in inc of n11 peyuhologicd uarfnre pcraonnel i~ e s e c n t i t l t o COJ- bat propagandn unite. If su f f i c i en t uilitrry peraoiulel skilled in peychological worfme C N ~ be provided i t w i l l be U M C C O ~ ~ R ~ Y t o cmploy c iv i l i an poreornel i n oonbct piopagandn operatione.

S7,

It should bc aoted t k t the bulk of the p s r s o m s l of the

e f t c r conaidernblc t rn in ing a t the Wlltrcry In t e l l i gence Tmin-

89. Indoct r ina t ion of Offfccrs of a1 A m 8 ~ n d Serviaes. It cannot bo overempheslsed tha t one Erect d i f f i c u l t y fncing pnyho log ice l war- f e r e pers&el n t cill times-was the lack of u;ldcrst&ding 0: t h e i r aieeion on the p a r t of other of f icers . werr continually put i n the pos i t ion o f having to f t s o l l " their mission at all echelons t o o f f i c e r s he.vlng e i the r comend or s t a f f p1e.nnh-g ra spons ib i l i ty ,

psychological vnrfaro +rations.

Psychologic,ll. we.rfnre personnel

90. This HRS due t o t h c fe.ot that no baeic doc t r ine ex i s t ed for It i s suggeatod #hat due t o tho

gravity of the peychologicd warfare mireion, And its proven effects in the European campeig~, thnt all officers be given aome bseic psycho- l o g l c ~ 2 warfare indoctrination.

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PSYCHOLOGICAL Y A R F ~ srm COORDI~UTION --.

AT ALL ECHELONS

91. Establishment af t he Psychologicnl !hwfe,re Division a s e. Special S ta f f Section at SIIlIEF. the Psychologicnl Y n r f m Division, Supreae Bedquar te rs , Al l ied Ex- peb i t iomry Force, as e Rpecial s t a f f section, incUcnte8 t h e cond i t ion Of unprep~rednese which ex is ted f o r the w a g i n g of psychological war- f a re on a l a rge soalc. paign suf fered , because no f ixed doctrine existed f o r s t a f f coord ina t ion at all echelone, no fixed doc t r ine existed f o r psychological iJAlfBTe i n r e l c t ion t o o the r s tdf s sc t io se , as well tre.i;ied f i e l d grodecLlffi- cera were not ave.ile.'ole f o r peyohological vnrfere at A m y Group m d Army levels .

A brief history of the c rea t ion of

Psychological warfare In the Europeen Can-

a. I n the Unitcd S t r t e s dmv, p r i o r t o h e r i c e . ' s en t ry i n t o World War IS, t h e psycholoeical warfare section cons is ted of a elud.1 section bn MIS, 0 2 , Icr Department.

b. From 6eptember 1939, the Br i t i eh A r m j r hnd been conducting paycholo&$cd warfare through the poll t i c a l Intell igence Departaent of the Foreign O f f i C B , I i iniat ry of Informt ion , and 3 r i t i s h B r o d c e s t - ing Corporation, q l o y i n g both rad io Rnd l e a f l e t s .

c. In t h 6 l a t e sumer of 1941, the United S ta t e s e s t ab l i shed the Office of Coordinator o f Information, in Maehington, D.G.

d. In 1942, the Office of Coordinator of InformRtlon wa6 a p l i t i n t o two orgtrtlim,tione, t h e Office o f Strategic Serv ices nnb the Office of '.far Infornation.

e. I n Lozaon, l a t e $3 1942, the London Liaieon Sec t ion of t he Offioe of War In fo rmt ion mid political I n t e l l i g c x e DBpsrtment agreed t o issued each week::e. Jo in t Peycholpgicnl lfarfare D i sc t ive t o vhich the var ious ~ayciio.l.ogica1 bar fare ogenctes of t h e two c o u n t r i e s vould be aubject.

f . I n bTovcmbcr, 19k2, by orders of Ceno:d Eisenhower; a joint Anglo-AmericAn-liilitery-olvill~ unit wc6 attp.chcd t o Allied Force Heedquarters a f t e r a l l i e d landings in Brcnch llorth Africa. v7e.s known as Psychological Vnrfare Branch, ASXQ, E& l a i d nmy O f the foundations f o r t he mrc olabornto s t ruc ture of Psychologlod #firfete Division, SHAEF.

This a@ncY

6. In April, 1943, Anglo-ber1ce.n discussions worz he ld in Lomiox t o d ivorcc Publ ic i ty aud Propeganta !tntfnrc a c t l v l t i o a from othar i n t e l l i gcncc c o t i v i t i c a .

h. Is June, 1943, a plan fo r creation Of a Di r so to ra t c O f

I n October, 1943, the annc Press Rnd Propa- Pross end P r o p ~ o n d e . (DpP) ves epproved by thc Jo in t In t c l l i gancc Con- n i t t e e of t h e Vnr Cabinet. &-a was ohmgcd t g Publicity and PsyChologicol !Farfaro.

1. Betwoen July, 1943, pnd I'Iovetlbor, 1943, B r i t i s h and h e r % - Can c o m i t t e e s f a i l e d to agrco as t o whether Ftiblicity an8 PWohologi- o e l Varfare should be held toga ther or separated. l e f t t o the Supreme

$he dac is ion was ConrJnltder when he should Be nmed.

A. I n November, 1943, Brigedier Gensrel Robert A. keClure arrived i n London from AFHQ t o aseume dut ies as chhbf of the P u b l i c i t y and Psychological Wexfare Division, SUEF.

k. In February, 1944, Denerd IWlure was Bppointcd a s s i s t a n t Clrief Of StRfP, G-6, new designation of the P & FY Division ae R eonoral s t a f f division.

I,, h d In AprZl 199, the 0-6 gene rd Steff d iv i s ion was aboliahed, and two spec ia l steff d iv i i ione wore se t up: t ione Division under Br igadier & n e r d Thomas 3. Dads & i Psycholo- gleal 'garfare Division under Brigdier General iiolluro. (The ordcr s ta ted t h a t t he two d iv i s ions , when necessary, 6hould share counui- cations and censorship f a c i l i t i e s ) .

division becme Information Control Division, W t c d Sta tos Forces, Europe~n Theater. (Ceesction of h o e t i l l t i e s brought no diminution Of r e spons ib i l i t i e s t o t he div is lou , ;IOW concorncd with a lpsgc program of infoamation cont ro l in occupied G e r m y ) .

Public %la-

m. From April, l9&, w-til dissolution of GUW, the

92, Psycholoaical %&mo i n the Steff of-r Xcholons. A b r ie f aL7mnW follows of t h e p lace , Psychological Warfare eventurrlly found in the s t a f f sac t icne of o ths r echelons:

a. Section, a spec ia l staff oeation under R P & PY Ufficer, with M Assistant f o r PsJrchOlDeical "larfare d i r ec t ing p8ychologicol warfflre ac t i v i t i e e.

b.

12 th Arny Grocp - Publ ic i ty and Psjrchologicol t h r f a r e

21et Amy Group - EubZicity and Psychological Yarfaro Seotioa, a spec ia l e t e f f sec t ion under CI P b Plf Off icer , with a Psyoho- log ica l Per fare Off icer heedice, a eeparatc brprch !tithin the e-tcff Bection.

c. 6th Army bout - Publ ic i ty and Psychological Warfare Section, e. s p e c i d s t e f f sec t ion of extremely liruited pereonnol.

b. First C.S. Amy - Publ ic i ty en8 Piwohologiccil th-f-fare Section, R s p e c i d staff rec t ion embracing a PBychological lfarfare Comimt %an (headed by an operations Offlcor nnt an Iu t s l l i gence Of- f i ce r ) .

t ion, with a Peychologicnl :!erfare Officer heading t i o branch. e. Third US Arm,, - Psychologiod Vnrfe.rc B nnch, 6 2 Sec-

f . Xinth US &v - Publ ic i ty md Psychological Xazfare Sac- t i o a , R speoinl s t a f f m c t i o n with R psychological Iforfnrc Off icer i n chnrge of operations w d c r tho P B W Officor.

g. Sovcntt US ).ray - Psyciiologicnl ' Inrfnro Brnnch, E 2 Scction.

93. In sUnmc.ry, i t w i l l bc seen t h r t psychological warforc hpd fixed plncc in t h e s t o f f , f e l l ing i n t o one of thrcc cn tcgor i ss : A special e t d f sec t ion , c branch of thc P u b l i d t y end Psychological warfare specie1 s t d f sce t ion , and 8 bra;lcL of thc G-2 Scction. IXdm Buccoss i t i s ncccssary tha t (1) tha plnce o f psychologic?,l vrnrfnre In the staff be cooidinatcd bt all echclons n?id thnt (2) psychological warfare doc t r ine be finaly OEtebliShCd i n r e h t i o n to a l l o ther s t a f f sec t ions .

For

94. I?-2 Section.

p l a t i o n of ~ e g t ~ o l w i c ~ '!erfere n iss ion end operations with Coordination of pyschologionl warfate with G 2 activit iae

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proved ~ ,bso lu t6 ly necessary, and i n geceral W ~ B eccomjdiehed at8iEfCC- t o r i l y *hother or not psychological werfare was inoorporated i n the G 2 section. Tlie gexeral f lo r i o f G-2 in te l l igence yas of course e s s e n t i a l for both psychological warfare apprsciation nnb propaganda output, 6 8

v c l l 08 i n t e l l i eence fron t h e subsec t ions such OB Counter I c t o l l i g e n c e COXYE, 0-2 Docuents Section, e tc .

95. The E 2 Off icer IIDB frequently ca l led upon t o r e l acse i n f o r m - t i on f o r propaganda output 1ihlch we8 banned by routine censorship eir- cctive8,- *.h:Q case 0-2 BvolLuntion of Che r o p e s t vas of pa rmoun t ixportrnce.

96. Serious question c r j e e during thc crvnpoigxi whether psycholo~i- c3.l ifasfare proper ly belonga t o the 0-2 section, pssc3Lological warfare a c t i v i t i e s i q o 9 e d R vast catalogue of responsi- b i l i t i e e Upon the 6-2 o f f i c e r with which he was not otherwise concerned such P.6 the Collection of in te l l igonos for propeganea output: oollec- tioil of dOCU3Qnt8 f o r propeg& output; collection O f po l i t i cd l -amd morrle in ta l l igonco gecera l ly unreleted t o the c0nSe.t lnbe l l lgcnoc uiesion o f the G2 sect ion; plue opera t fowl coatrol of t he Psycho- log lcn l Varfnra Units.

It was &own t h c t

97. pe la t ion of Psycholozical l h r f a rc n i s a l o n end operations wi th

t a m oosratlons (whethcr i n loudsoezkkor misoion in d i r e c t contnct with 6-3 section. I n rdctiix t h e p6~hOlOgiCRl \f=fmc uifision t o U l l i -

the-eGmy or I n &iic and leaflet*campaigns coordinated with l a r g e e c d e t a c t i c d l o r s t i a t eg ic operations) it was proven that c l o s e s t liaison with khhe 0-3 sec t ion was neoessary. Access t o G-3 f a o i l i t i e s , Such a6 t:le s i t ua t ion my ancl tactical information serv ioes (partima- I.arly the PW"3PI) radio ne t , were of parernout importance. Knowledge of future >lens was required t o ant~cipate~ppsycholosical warfare out - put requireuents. Gooperatioi with 0-3 speclalistis e n g s l n g i n d e c q - t i v e operations was necessary, and Jo in t plaming sometimes proved necessary.

98. The proposit ion w i l l not be bqiored here, but t he re i a foun- Cation f o r one oontention that of general s t a f f sec t ion t h e E 3 800-

t i o n has t he primary i n t e r e s t in the peychologicd warfare miasion.

99. F5 Seation. pean canpdgn revealed a considerable a rea cf overlapping i n t e r e s t e . 1po anal:isis of the problene wil l be undertalcen here, but in i n d i c a t i o n of the sphere of QUCh ea inqxiry i s given i n tiis following comment from Brigadier General 0. 9. %pa, chief of the 6-5 section on t he General 90WB:

Relation of Psyccholo~ical Warfare Mission and Operations with Relations with the G-5 section throughout the W o -

Qhring operations in Branoe and other l ibera ted count r ies , Psycho- log ica l lrarfare W 8 S r i spons ib le for propagandbing civilians behinh

enerdy l i n e s , and on occasions a lso assisted through i t s loudspeaker trucks i n e f fec t ing the local control of c iv i l i ans i n forward area*. Later, entering G e r r a v , it ]?ublishd. Gem-lenguags newspepere f o r d i s t r ibu t ion thrpugh K i l i t a r e r Goverme& Detachments. end through i t s r a d i o etotiona t h r o d c a e t i r i l i t r a y Qovem-uent news anrl aaouncementa. Its planes dropped inforwational material for &iuplac$d persons and refugees, reeponeib i l i ty f o r the oontrol of w k l c h persona vas that of tlilitaqr Ooverment.

"In G e r m y , complete r e spons ib i l i t y f o r c o n L r o l of al.1 Gelzlan in forsa t iona l aemicee van placed with Inforrrultion Control b i t s o f Psychological \Jarfare, but t h e pol ice enforceeent of these con t ro l meesures We8 l e f t almost e n t i r e l y with lfllitarp Government Detachments. A t the same t i ne , r e spons ib i l i t y f o r Germ educational and r e l i g i o u s

- 20 -

s f f a i r s was exclusively that of Mi l i ta ry Ooverment u n i t s , but Psycho- logical lfarfare UCOntrOllEd all church publications.

“me frequent overlappine of 13-5 and P & PW i n t e r e s t s resulted i n a c t i v i t i e s t ha t were not always coordinated, a t t imwwith adverse e f f ec t s on one or the other, and remlted in a strong f ee l ing dur ing the operation t h a t the i n t e r e s t s should be cons4lidated under a single direction.

“A study o f in te r - re la ted a c t i v i t i e s of 0-5, G-2 and P u b l i c i t y atid Paycl?olo@cal Ifnorfare Sections and t h e i r operating units i n propaganda and control of c i v i l i a n infornation services, including t h e prees . radio, thea te rs , publishing, schools and chui-ches should be undertakan, t o deternine t h e extent of overlapping and conflicting i n t e r e s t s , i f any, and means of eliminating them.”

100. Psycho~ogica l Varfaie aa a Branch of the Pub l i c i ty md Psycho- log ice l Warfare S p e c W Staff Section. Psychological !Jarfare was f i r s t planned as a j o i n t operation with publ ic re la t ions (or pres s ami pub- l i c i t y ) i n the P & PW spec ia l s t a f f section ata W F , t o share conmunl- cations, t ranspor t , administration and senrice f a e i l i t i e s , etc. This plan, dropped at SBBEF before it was ac t iva ted , YBS nevertheless car- r i ed out at 12th Amy Group and i n the F i r s t and Finth US kmis, with P & F%’ special staff section.

101. I t bcasle c l e a r in the campaign that t h i s concept, for-paarc- t i c a l purposes, had m a n y drawbacks. c o q e t i t i o n f o r t ranspor t , communications, servioa f a c i l i t i e s , e t a . The missions, i . 6 . making psychological warfare against tha enemy, on the One hand, and supplying dwands o f the American an4 Br i t i eh p r e s s and public on the other , - were found ts follow divergent rather than pa ra l l e l l i nes .

The two branches were in constant

102. Further, the s t a f f o f f l c e r charged vi th r e s p o n s i b i l i t r of both operations found l b s e l f ( i n . ~ W n a t t e r of a l l oca t in$ equipment as well as t ha t of asrrigning personnel), confronted with bnc demands of a vociferous corps of war correspondents and the n e c e s s i t i e s of psychological warfare.

103. Experience throughout the canpaign showed that d d a of the press vere f requant ly s a t i s f i e d at the eqenas of ~ s y c h o l O g i c 8 ~ warfare .

LOk. This experience m e p a r t i a l l y due t o one ser ious weakness iu the planning, recru i tnent and t r a ln ing of ps;ychological warfare personnel, nanely, t he f a i l u r e t o provide suf f ic ien t f i e l d grade o f f ¶ - ce rs t ra ined in psycholo&cal warfare. In oonsequenoe, fieZb.:grade o f f i ce r s f o x t h o P & W operations were l a rge ly drawn frou W O n g thosa with publ ic r e l a t i o 3 s t ra in ing , or those with no subs t an t i a l t r a i n i n g i n e i t h e r press or psychological warfare operations.

105. Since few trainod persons of f i e l d grade were ava i l ab le paychologioal warfare operational Fersonnel grnvitated toward 0 2 Section f o r plmming a d aupport, and i n frequent ins tances f o r all. p r a t i c a l purposes were undqr operational con t ro l of t h e C-2 Section. Ha4 su f f i c i en t f i e l d grade o f f i ce r s been t ra ined i n psychological warfare i t would have provided fon Snforned pspehological warfare reeprasentation at all echelons, including division.

At t h e highest echelons pub l i c i ty and p s y c h o ~ o g i c a ~ warfare have muoh in common, pa r t i cu la r ly in the sphere of p o l i t i c a l i n t e l l l g e n c e and p o l i c y control. Bowever, a t lower echelons, under f i e l d cond i t ions , operatjons of t he two sec t ions proved to have nothing in common.

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107. Hisaion of PSYcholOgiCal 'iarfare Intell igence. Peychalogioal ! f a r f ~ r e In t e l l i gence requiresents d i f f e r materially f r o 2 o ther si?i- tam in te l l i gence requirenents in two part imarg: armheaim ia on aol f -

109. Exciawe of Intell ipence !with C i v i l l a kencios . A copa ta r t fhow of i n t e l l i gence between ps:rChOlOgiCd WAl'ft?d! Sd V€Ll'ioUs Civ i l i an agencies (Office of War Information, Office of S t r a t eg ic Senricee, and the var ious Br i t i sh agencies) as well as a flow O f information t o psy- C~l0~ogice.l warfare from c i v i l l s n news 8@ECieS Was mdntaincd. essentia.1 t o r e l a t e peychologicd warfare e c t i v i t i c s core c lose ly to t ha t o€ other staff sections and specialized in t e l l i gence Rgencies.

I t is

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130. Exchange of Intell iRence rrith 0-2 Section. llasic t o mccess- ful psychological warfare upcrctione i s collection of i n t a l l i gence fron G-2, and that co l l ec t ion presupposes tha t 0-2 of every echelon i s fmi- l iar with psychological i inrfare operatione and is not only wi l l i ng t o a s s i s t i n pro.r;ding in t e l l i gence , but i s !.dlling t o releaso b e e e n t i a l items f o r propaganda output.

each enemy div is ion , cnaq? pe r sona l i t i e s , conditibns i n cnerkv t e r r i t a q 1 , E t C .

111. Psychologice lwarfare requires e huge voln" of d e t a i l s about

112. One yroblem which was only resolved i n later stwee of the European ccuirpaign vas propcr l i a i s o n with C-2 a t all echelons. 12th drmY Group sa t i s facbory l i a i s o n wa6 ouly achieved after 3one e i x iilonths had elapsed. S i n i l a r problems presentod theaselves at m i i e s a w i n g e a r l y s t a e a and the p r o b l w reoccured a t corps and diViBiOn6. It nn:' be s t a t ed that successful Liaison w i t h 6-2 'tas fina13.y 'eased on synpathctic understoading 015 the p a r t o f individual 6 3 o f f i c e r s , r a t h e r than any bas ic r i l l i f a r y procedure o r d o c t r h e covering the relationship.

A t

113. Another problen vhich beset psychoLogical wrfare , "186 that of ob ta l r lne clearance of n a t e r i a l f o r propaganda output; t he r e s p o n s i b i l i t y Of re leas ing c l a s s i f i s d in t c l l i gencc i tcns,ivas n c w r satisfactorily de- tervined i n the European campaign. pa6EQd through the hmds of G-2 end 6 5 sections via8 readily obtained, end a grea t deal of tlds m t e r i a l was o f f i r s t - r a t e value f o r propaganda a t p u t . I t vias of t en d i f f i c u l t t o f i n d an of f icer i n t h e G-2 sec t ion n i l l i n g t o assunc responsibility f o r ralrasing c lns s i f i ed material f o r th is purpoaa. lit S M P t he problea vies solved in the folloiring manner; l i a i abn o f f i c e r medc re levant ex t r ac t s fron G 2 n n t c r i a l and subnl t ted this report i n w i t t a x fora t o the responsible G 2 of f icer . nairkcd paesagee oa c lcs red f o r propaganda output, and those which W C 1 6 t o be c i r cu la t ed f o r fi lfornation ofilly. propaganda canpaigns.miere paced more r an id ly , the problcri was more of- t en solved by personal cor,ference.

Access t o c l a s s i f i ed docuricnts ivhich

This x i s t rue at a l l levels. t he psgcholoelce.1 w r f a r e in te l l lger ,cs

This o f f i c e

A t lower echelon8 whcra t a c t l c a l

114. Exchwe of In t c l l i acnce with G-3 section. :?hilt G3 sec t iona w r c gcnera l ly cord ln l t o p s y c h o l o ~ i c a l w r f a r e pe r so ine l , end provided essential in fomet ion when rcqucatcb, psychologiw.1 m r f e r c was n o t nl- w a y s considered i n p l a i i ? ~ fu tu re operntions. Tac t icn l d t u R t j , O A E developed which could have been f oreacen by the G-3 ecctirwj ix i ts plax- nlng, rnth subsequent increcso in efficienoy 02 t h e p a r t o f pspcholO&- c a l warfare teaxs, had they becn properly briCf6d.

115. SaPP ly of P o l i t i c n l I n t s l l i ~ c n c e t o C-5 Section. o f suppxring p o l i t i c a l intel!.igance t o the G-5 sec t ion wag never clearly defined, and l ed i n EOLlO i n s t ances t o i , i i sunders tana i~s . P o l i t i c a l i n t e l l i gence of value t o G-g IWS R n o m 1 by-product o f psychological warfare lnterrogmtione &ad surve ys. f:lis ':ma p a r t i c u l a r l y true a f t c r occupation of arcea i n Gcimny, when it becars necaseor j t o l e a r n t h e npol l t ica l Cli?aten i n Gerwi:.r, 0;rd i n t e l l i p n c e becam increaa ingly a Job of p o l i t i c a l raporting.

The uiss ion

116. Collection of intel.lip;ence i n France, Belgiun ma Hollend during ea r ly s tagcs of ooilbnt, w.53 a l s o of c loses t i n t c r e e t t o t h e C g section. t ion on coasol ida t ion a c t i v i t i e s .

This r e o p m s i b i l i t y will 50 rliecuaaed f u r t h e r i n t h e see-

117. Docuaents were freely exchanged bctwaer. psycDologicd warfere in t e l l i gence peraonnel an8 0 - 5 , mid it vas cons tas t ly inpressad upon in t e r roge to r s i n t h e f i e l d t h e t when reporting oa coI'tdditiOnS a f f e c t i n g 0-5 adminis t ra t ion o r Fol icg , olearanca should be obtained i n thQ f i e l d

2a-

with the rowponeonbible o f f i c e r s . c iv i l i ans , i t was i nev i t ab le that there should bs c r i t i c i sm o f military government zppo6ntees o r Even of military g-wemaent pepsornel. G l O S Z f I t l i a i s o n -at all echelons was sou&ht t o avoid nlsundertnndings.

I n reporting on t he a t t i t u d e s of

The

118. Rela t ions i n the f i e l d betwEen in tc l l igcnce teens and a i l i t m y .j'ovcrment detachments wore a l n o s t without cxception cordial . M l i t e r y s o v e m e n t detachments began t o seek eagerly f o r the servico of psycho- l o z i c d warfare i n t e l l i q e z c s o f f i c e r s who aiCed the;> in u o l i t i c a l acreen- in: of candiaeteq f o r l o c c l o f f i ces , e tc .

Hawever, i n somc h iehe r e c h h , - due t o the lnck of def i a i - $ion of the poychological warfare-nil i tary govem'lent r e l a t ionsh ips , l i a i s o n bc t r cen the sections va8 not alvags sa t i s fac tory .

119.

120. I t nay be a d d t h n t i n t h i s relationship r e l i a a c e ~'JOS plsccsd :.\ore on irdlvidual t a c t and judgnont rati ier than upon any fix&& n i l i - tc iy Goctriiie, ElnCe no such doctrlno existed.

121.. T e c h i a u e s of Iiitcri*oge.tion and Colloction of Other In t e l l i gence . : b ~ n tile psychological 1mrfai.a in0clli;:ence tems entered upon the Lkcopenn c txqa ign ( t h e f i r s t ; began on %Day plus 3) they possessed very l i l r t l e knowledge of xel;:ioGs o f g a t b r i n g intel?ii;eacc f o r coxant psychologicnl warfare opere.+ions. There bad been a record of experience I n the I'orth Afrlcnn e.nd Itdinn ceupaigns, but l i t t l c inforrwrtion about these opera t ions had loachod those s e t t i n g out for tlic cempdgn i n ESurqc. Bovever, i t is' b e l i c w Z Lhat tho iatellipmco sec t ion davel- oped i.lothods of the highest order, during tire Cerrl;aign.

and d i s t r i b u t i o n 2 psgciiologicd wsrf&cc in the ,European c ~ p a i g n aahieved R hi& degree of proficicncy. Processing an8 distribution was acconp13.shecl w i th in t h e Eec t iond t every acheelon wi th reports going bo th t o l o q r tu?& LigLer oclielons as nseded. Reports WRre ,

geiiernlly with a view t o output requirements, -out 86 t he campaign developed, o t h e r staff sec t ions shoyed an increasing i n t e r s s t i n "pure ir . tel l igencen, and the t 3 e 3 of r epor t s te+aded t o spec ia l izes A t a l l levels supuaaries of i n t e l l i e e n c e , ane;lyain& morale conditione i n the G e w amy and on the Germm )lome f ron t , p lus items su i t ab le f o r propa- gmda output were ppoduced. a large audience amow both m i l i t a r y Clvisions and various c i v i l i a n agencies. xequest'ed f o r E 2 at a l l l e v e l s , ? ~ U B r e q m s t s from higher headquarters f o r t i s t r i b u t i o n t o the c i v i l i a n prqngande agencies.

122. P rocess i ' e.nd Dis t r ibu t ion of I n t e l l i mce. The c o l l e c t i o n

A t SUET intell.i,:ence publ.icatione found

A t Twelfth A m y Group t he d a i l y summav of in t e l l i genoe was

125. Use of Prisoners o f !h? i n PropWanda Apneals, Prieoilers of :iar Vere used e f fec t ive ly in direct r a d i o appeals, but no: sa t i s foc - t01-x procedure f o r obtaining suitaN,e pr i soners ..+ea ever worked out. It w s t he roconmeadation of the chief of the i n t e l l i&ence sec t ion tha t at7 adeauate l i a iaon be s e t up with pr i son carrlp su tho r i t i e s t o glvo then an i n t e g r a l part i n the selectioii procedure, and that a spec ia l s e c t i o n should have been o r e u t s t (preferab ly i n tlie rad io Section) t o deal with t l ie problem as i t s exc lue i ie province

124. Pub l i c Opinion ?echniggs BS Applied t o Prisonere. %be under- l y i n g morale o f t he Vehrmacht 8 8 e:.idenced by i t 6 behavior i n b a t t l e appeared t o be n subject ;lot suscept ib le of measl?.rernent by t h e queEtiOn- na i r e nethod. Yevert!Leless. the survo:' service8 ''rere use fu l with res- pec t t o determining a t t i t u d e s of e l l ee i a rxe t o ihz i l eade r s and syrabols, f e l r s crith res imct t o &lo-hicrican in ten t ions , and E i Q i h r mat ters . IL i i as fomd thst the survey technirme required Careful A0pI'dE.d in t he light of other media p.vailab1.0 before conclusions could be d r a m .

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125. Se isure and Ssmtiiry of Documents. Docunents f o r peycholo- gicel warfare puqoses were obtained I n two ways, by coblectfon i n t h e f i e l d by psychological warfare personnel, and by o l t a in ing them direc6- L p f r o m t h e 0-2 S e c t i o r documents. Phc nard f l o w of enemy docuglents uas from regiment or d iv i s ion t o 0 2 at Army, Rnd from ermy t o t h e 6 2 documents s ec t ion at SHAEF. Eovever, 13 t h i s w e r e , much depended on opportuniiy. I t was observed tha t no very firn doct r ine ex i s t ed i n any sec t ion f o r t h e c o l l e c t i o n end preserva t ion of d o w e n t s , aud that much renains t o be developed I n t h i s sphere.

126. Use of Mcni'corlAag Peports of Enemy and Friendly Broadcasts. Iionitored r enor t s of enemy and f r i end ly nropaganda blroadcaatq, due soni tored r 6 o r t s of s t r e i g h t new6 were in & m a i n g demand-ai a l l echelons. papers as well as formal in t e l l i gence sunmaries of ener:py propaganda trends, e t c , ,This func t ion , of keeping the armies im"orued of neve developmenta, became a liighly valued psychological warfare serv ice although it was not i n i t i a l l y contemplated i n the m?.ssicn. In the l a t e r stage Of the campaign monitoring u n i t s ve re able t o furnish mary p i e c e s Of velluable, spec ia l i zed in t e l l i gence t o 6 2 . For in s t ance , the Oer- W S re@ar lg broadcast t h s mine River readings, vh ich were o r in- t o re s t t o 6-2. c!Urters d a i l y with t h e German, Russian and other cormuliques.

rsychological warfare monltors, in f a c t , orovide6 f i e l d news-

The :nonitoring group a l s o su-lie6 1 2 t h Army Group head-

127. use o f Eefermce 1:'orks. I t should a160 be noted that n com- p l e t e l kb ra ry of rc fe rence norks on eiieny a r m s uas e s s e n t i a l for propa- Zcinda output, s ince coneteilt research was nocassary to give co lo r end badc,pound t o pr0pagand.a mssages. spec ia l importance in wri t ing mater ia l f o r >lad: or cover t propal;nndn,

128. Evaluation of 1ntel.ligence Operations. Psychological Warfare in te l l iEenca personnel, i n e t a f f group at various echalons and i n individual f i e l d teams v o d c i ~ at p r i sone r of wa~ c e e s , in l i b e r a t e d md occupied towns and c i t i e s , QT \vas t a sk forces i n the tiloat forward areas, achieved a high degree of efficiency. r e d t e d i n a cons t tu t f l o v of i n t e l l i ge i i ce of the Ii ighest o rder . Ps;%hological warfare in t e l l i gence opera t ions and experience w x d d qovide e pro f i t ab le f i e l d of study for any mil i t a ry o r c i v i l i a n in- t e l l i gence agencjr,

This type of mntcr ia l vas of

Techiques were developed which

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171). . The basic mo?Atoriw of broadcasts i x the hropean thents r , t o mat requiraacnte of both a i l l t e r y ant. civilian qenc ie s , van dom b:r t h e 6 r i t i s h Broadcas t iq Coiporatior, cnpio:,riq: it W:e Vdtad Kingdom aqvoximatelg 1,000 peo>?e and olabora2e t e c h l c d equipment. ?&dio stations brocdcasting i n all wave lmgths fro:a E V C ~ d%op~an c o E t r g , BS well 8 9 from America, E r i c a and bthes places, -.:ere IzOXitOrEb by these people. 8L:~lyScB Of the bighest order.

?his monitori:~g supplied n o t news rs,orts azt nropsganda

l \ lI i ls sumi!arica of thase reportB t!cre of 'relue t o ?sy&o~O&cal 131. irarfare tFm9 i n the f i e l d , diff ic idt iae in cor.icrAct.-tiorq prevsntsd rapid ee l ivc rp of these rmor t s t o f i e l d tcams. ezd nroved of l i t t l e immediate vtitue i n tilc f ron the f i e l d .

p r o p g L i analysis mi p r o p a g d a outgut

132. Reliance vias m x s s a r i l l nlaced c:i " i t o r i ~ 3:- f i e l d teams at 12th Am;r Group and at armies.

133. Thc f i a l d moxltors rewixd &@laud before the :Tomaw cempaiga vibh iio t ea in ing i n uordtoring. L l t t l e cquipacnt was wai lable f o r t r a b i n g at the psychG1o:iod. warfar: traiaini; ceutcr iripproviscd at Clsvedox, Englard. Traizin;. via8 comcnced there, :!o~"zr', c . d the noxi- i t o r s bek:e.n by rccord i r? stre.i&t new broadcasts i n E;l.@ii3Il aml German, includi?ig the daily Germnil co.7nru;iauc broadcast 0:'er -rarlous German stctXoi:s. Later, f o r a period of t v o vecks, t::e zonitors reocivad t'ratnirig at the Ar1tieh xroxbxst iq corpore.tion ~ i o i l i t ~ r i ; ~ s t a t ion , ftmiliarizing thcmsclvefi with various rcceivers, rcc0rdii.c: devices, etC.

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gence and opera t ions personnel infomed bf every neve and propaganda aeoelopment.

13E. These repor t s a l e 0 vere c i r d a t e d , t o v,zrious Staff s e c t i o n a t Ariw Groups an8 armica, as well as t o the oroductioii 8eCtiOnS engaged i n psycLologica1 warfare output

139. The necessit:- f o r maintaining monitoring teaus end operatloris I n c loses t proximity t o the i n t e l l i@mca and operations section8 o f psychological warfare units engaged i n output becaie apparent f o l l o l r h g the l i b e r a t i o n o f Redio Luenbbwrg. naln hefdquarteA-s of 12th Aruy Group, at Verlun, and their firishad repor te were de l ive red t o Luxeabourg by courier. siderable lrandicep t o during pe r iods of r au ia ly changing n i l i t a r y and yolit ice.1 d c v e l m e n t s .

The uon i to r ing t ~ a n s remaincd e t

Qila del&= p r o v ~ d a COY tho sec t ions engag6d i n output, Bac t i cu la r ly

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CWLPTER B

U D I O BROIDYSTPG IN PSYCHOX%ICAL WARFARE

140, Dootrine of ?adio EroRdcasting i n Psychological Varfnrc. XO nttampt vri l ' i bo mado I n t h l s ~ a h o r t r epor t t o cover thct dootrine o f rad io b-oadoigtinfi i n psycholoKica1 vmrfnro, but only to ou t l ine the s c o p ~ o f these op&ntibns. paganda, both s t r a t o g i c en2 t a c t i c a l , < w i n < the Europenn cmnpaign, in - qu i r i e s must bd msdo i n to G e r a n rooorfis and Gsrmnn m i l i t a r y wxl o i v i l - i an pcrsonnol m u s t be in te r rops ted .

To-datcrmino offeots of A l l l s d r?dio pro-

141. It rood c o t be .smph%aiz.sE thr.t tho p6actL-n.j mtworks of t h o rndio inriuskry form a v%st r saorooi r of Rcp.Ii.pmGnt !tnd po r sonwl suitud t o v w r t h o opcrntion. The mission o f psyoholoeical Wurfarv V(I8 this:

n. Sorvio ing the h iqh porvclr fixed t ra .mai t txrs w i t h spe- c ia l i zed pommnol , d i r ec t ives and policy p i lame, and in tc l l igeaoo .

k. Surv lo ing high povror firrod t r m 6 n I t t o r wi th voice rclnya snrl r e c o r d i n p from tho f i e l d .

0. Beoatnblishment ef 1iberr.ted StQtiotIE i n f r i e n d l y a roas , ml opurntic.x of octptured enemy rndio stntions.

Op. r a t i o n of mobilo transmittors. (1..

142. Employment of High Powor Fircd Trnnsmittcrs. Yost impor tan t of the psychologicnl wnrfare radio opsrationa ?rere oonauoted ovor tho f o l l m i n g f ixed t rnns mi t te r s :

n. B r i t i s h B r o i d o i e t f n g Corporntion.

b. A D S E (Amrioan Brondonstine; Stiltion i n Europo, ompluying t rnwmi t t ing f r . o l l i t i e s o f RBC).

0. Voice of brio? ( sho r t u ; y ? t ransmi t te rs i n tho IioitQ? Statos.) (

d. Rndio 1,uxombourg (following i t a li1:orntion, umployac! by SFAEF c.nc! L?th A r m y Group in both s t rn tog io and t n c t l c n l rndlo programs)

143. Progrnmming for H l E h P o w r Fixod T~anami t tu r s . A l l iod high powered Pixod tr?nsmitters mlntnineC 11u *udience embrwing rl largo p;roent?go of t h o Goman m i l i t a r y Rnri c i v i l i ? n nopulation, p n r t i o u l n r - ly during nm78 bronrlcwts. g?nd4 opcrationa a i l 1 bo unds r tnbn , orcopt t o akctch oporztions of ABSIE and R?c!Io Luxombourg t o auggust roqulromcnts of spee i? l i sod i n t o l - ligencu, pcrsonnol, e to . , 2or t h u i r S W O D B S f U l opernt ion.

r.. ABSIE: Pr io r to 30 Apr i l 1944. tho Radio Divis ion o f

No n n i w l s of this vast sphere of propa-

tho @I htid t h c F r l m v y t a sk o f feet l iq ERG w i t h "Amcricnn Cq l l i rg Europe" pr0grotr.s vrhloh originnted i n N ~ v r York. Amerlc:.tn Brozclcnstinq S tn t ion I n Europc. wrjnt oil the Y i r , and broadcas t e i c h t hour3 onch day, witho,ut i n t e r rup t ion , in. Grrmnn, French, Dnnish, Norwsglxn, Dutch, Plemish and h g l i s h . Thc brosons t mn te r i a l of threo kindo: t o the emmy f rom Ganernl Elsonhowerfs Hucc!qur.rtors; ( 2 ) s t r n i g h t now8 3f' svonts on t h e f igh t ing f ron te prcsentod t o mnke t h o enemy under- s t m d the i n o v i t o b i l i t y of h i s &dent nnd t o holp Amerion~a A l l i e s spnrocinte Amr ion l s p s r t i n t h e v ! w ; ( S ) featuro ln s t e r ln l r e in fo rc ing

Frm 30 Apr i l 1944, the

(1) 0rdar.s t o pooplo o f oooupiei, countric-a an6 whrnings

- 2 1 -

6tr : i ight news nnc! pra jeo t ing t h e p w t plnywl by h o r i o m s o l d i e r s .

b. Radio Luxwhourg: Fron tho t i n e it 7ont on the T i r ia 2 3 Saptmbor 1344, (with rolqys from Lonc'on !"I NCT! York) Chis s t r t i o n v i r t u a l l y opcrrllted wound t h e oloak, rrith ?rop;rnns rnngint: from ncr:o i d oo?;~i:.aut c!ireotrd t o Cormrtn soldioro nad a l l o l w c e n of' thc Gar.nc.n ponulation, Frogrnm dirootcd t o Al l i sd ?c.op1os, 1.rogrnms i n u ight lan=uag;3s 6iraoted t o fore ign w o r k r c mr' other foreign g r ~ i u p ~ vrithin G Q ~ ? I I J ~ , t r .ot ica1 progrims bmcP on inti;.?-.tts c n m y i n t e l l i p n o o , o t c ,

144. It :?ill be notad th- t whorons only Radio Lu%om'..ourg, or n l l thc i n n j o r roclio stctione., vraa o p ~ r ~ t f i d 3 3 ?. s t r i c t l y mi l i t4 rg ontar- pris:, txiriir p:-ohologiosl snr fnre personnel, Trogrm raquiraments of' t h f s t n t i o n s o;,orntod by oivi1iP.n oga:ioics (PBC, APSIE, Voice of Awria .? . ) roI ie2 Oil m i l i t n r y ~ O U P C E ~ S f o r ia ta l l igencc on :7hloh t o bnco t h , i i r propc.:.::-nd.n p ixgram di rao ted tu v.-riuus r.udienoes i n enomy torritor::. Tlw r o b of pyoholo3ionl x.ri'r.ra in te l l igonoc opctrntions oin*iot t c ovcrmphasircrl . "'hen intern11 comnuniontions VJiim uncur'kin, R V ~ *:!hen troops asnsed tht thcir camin? :.ns unoertsin, Gr.rmin t roops turu:c! i n d o s p r a t i o n t o Allied sourcos f o r in formt ion . I t should a l s o 1;c *3r.?ilw.i sed t?ir\t r e c o r l i q s f r o a th.3 f ic l f l , %-.de i n for:r.nrr! zr.?ca h y a n 9 1 reoor6ing b n a s , pln::iA r.n incronsiQ; role in tF.neo *

proqrxm.

148. Rcfic dquipment for t,hw f o w mobile 3roadonstinE Sanpmios l n t i jn~ lc r i l o r t h i s oomht propnl;nndQ c i i s s ion , vcre one kilov:nt*, t r im- mi t te rs 9CB E%, hoiisad Zn l z r p w n s , ' i ch b d becn dcveloond Sy .tho Signs1 Corps wd tho F-2 Sootion o f tlw r.r PepP.rtm.-ut. The oanccpt of the one k i l o w t t rad io t r w s n i t t e r na 3. busio eouipmmt of t h o liobilc iladio Brc?.rloaatinq Corcpflnius r,iiSht he s tud1 d with R vi6r.r of dovc-lop"? of t ransmi t tors of g r a l t a r p o w r which mould not noco8- s q r i l y bJ mobi!c, ?,ut would be cQpghlc of dis-aescmbly f o r shipnonb, and re-rrssonbly i n tho f i e l d st pennr.innt or somi-permanent loont ious. Tho one kilsc:.r.tt t r n n a m i t b r t q p t h e r l i t h the e tudio SCR 696 w . 6

Pound t o o b d i y nnd pandi.rous for s u c m n s f u l ficld apernt ion 3s plamd. Tho s m u oqui;ricrt, with some madificztions, 7 . ~ ~ 6 ronowd from t h 5 V?.Id

m a instnl lsd. i n t w o nnd n h s l f ton t rucks, v i t h '1 r u a u l t h e iinprovi.- mfint in mobi_lity.

147. ;To s u b s t Q n t i s l . t o s t of t h i s instrmont ~ $ 8 m%<e i u cmb?t, Iltholigh 'cho SCR 698 rms om?loyc.C?. r.t ?.o:igos f o r n shor t p o r i o l ?.R n oonsolic!ntinn st,?.tion w i t h f?ir auocess .

148. 'Ilio k s i o I n s t r w o n t notur.1l.y enploy& I n f i c l d bro,p.r?c?.ct- inf vn6 tlr; -PCR 299, 1 - t b r kr" Rs SCR 399, n et?n+nrd S i e n a l Sorps oommir.iontiona instrwnent moriifie? t o mork i n th brondowt b~nd. If groric1.d nn imtrumcht; n o t p c r f e o t for the purpoac, hut vq lu tb lo ba- 0-tuae o f it0 cv.-.ilnbility, ef'ficicmoy -.ncl. mobil i ty .

400/500 m.tt n i t h nu Rffm.:otive rndiue o ? 10 t o 2 5 miles, clapandinp oil t h e i?it,;:i;:r.s ofi'ioienogr. O O V G ~ ? ~ ~ , but imoertrrir. conditione i n t h c f ie ld. onforoes 3 o m s o w ? . - k i w <mtinmte 3f its e f r e c t i v e r?nrge.

1G9. O?. kh6 b r o i i c w t br.nd, out?iit 0,: tho RCR 399 V:RS l in i tc6 t o

Tosts o f t o ? ~ rxu.:leil grentigr hrap.dth of

150. X o s t usefu l a c r r i o e perforxed by this inatrmicnt l?g in the

- zg -

f i b l a of Voico comnunlcitipn f o r rcbronr!cnst, b u t one expe r imnt , w i t h n t a c t i c a l .tom nttachod t o the contr?inlng forco %t Loriont, is irorthg of spooi?.l study. I t provide4 tho solo e x ' q l e of n smll trcmfinit tor in t i c t i c a l rnfiio propogqndn.

161. ?hi6 pro@-ap.., bemod t o t ho Gorman Forces baing contrtdnod nt h r i s n t Y'M nn i n t ima te progrzm bwed on in te l l iconca reports (obtained by' in tor rogc t ion of Drieoners) m d featuring suoh items a s r0verhec.i-d in hr icn t" , t n l k s a d discussions nbout p o r s c n n l i t i 6 ~ i n Chg Gsrimn garrison n t Lor i sn t , surrender appenls ni?d promisea of good t r e r , tmn t ; m d app0alB such 11s "If yo^ don ' t l ika your Pr isoner of T.>r 0-go y ~ u 0% go o n bnck", o t o . , t i ed i n K i t h tho octuo.1 te%urn of nrisonora t o the bcsiogot! ga r r i son , h d e n wi th c~.nc: ' am! c i g w e t t c s nmd prop-rec! t o give first-hrat: r epor t s of h e r i c i n goo? truntment. A l s rge nixlicncu was built , mong t h e German p r r i s o n , an?,. a c c r t n i n c " ~ t l : f s p i r i t Y ~ S

injectcd in to t h o progruns, w i t h sn t i ro , , jO!aEj licqorlcks, sto. A i l ?very;c 0:' 20 Geman so ld ie rs oclch dny duscrtcd to thF; Americtns during thc pcriod of t h i s p ? o g o m , and rlfter Jiscontinurncu of tho pr0grr.n - when tho rndio toam WUCE orrllc? for r,.uothcgr miaaion - almost no pr i - soners 7 r 0 t ~ taksn.

152. 0no e x p r l n e a t !rith t h c SC;. 3Cl9 had bsan ?ttompted on tho Cotcntin poninsiilz, but wns n o t successfu l ly p u t on the n i r b iom36 of f l iPPicultics i n oln.n.ring 2 r-.dio b i d f o r the l.rondc-.at.

159. Goman 2 0 Y; i lovmt t l l o h i l o Bronf.!onst Trnnamitkr. , Possibil- i t k s i n imn'lo t rnosmi t te r squipxent nra i d i c n t a d i n t h a 'Gormn 20 E mobi.le t r r n s n i t t e r ctpturcd in .+he 1 m t Z+ of t h c war. o u t f i t v r w mouated in t a n l a rga v?.ns. Althoug,'? obviously !n %da:tatim rqther ' t h m c ?loaned job of eng imar ing , it had baa? used o f fcc t ive ly both ns a bro-dcastint: h t r u m s n t ld, si juming stc.tion uaorl n g n i n s t 12th Army Gro.apIs oovort rq2io opor:itioo, {Cp.!wition A m i u , SCJC Scction 15) :.ad o the r n l l i o d propuns . i n [I apoci?.lly $esigncd rc.ilron+, t m i n .

T b o n t i r e

ThiR t rnna l r i t t e r i s irlstallor!

154. l o b i l e Rocording Equiprnont f o r Field Woordinqs. T t i a c. basic t o rnC.io propngm6t progrivns BE t o c l 7 i l i a n protpms thzt c o l o r nnd i n t c rus t nuat be introduoed h t o tho progrms. V2st importnn'h i n oomht propagc.nr'r. i r j t h i t progrrlms eitir?n?tz f r a t h a forwnr? %rem ns often ns pos3:blo. vki le oornbat oon<;.tiona u s u d l y prcvsnt "Live Brofidc?.ats" mobilo recordinc rlsvicbo d c m k u i t po8aibla t o roprotluce silch p:-o~rw.s f rm thcl f ron t .

155. Wirc recordors, t a p racorc'ors :ind o t h m novel d 6 v i c a e wcm not employod t o m y conei~?crQbls a x t w t in psychologicnl MnrfTro opnr:'.- t iona , (although oons i?er lb lc s x p i r b n t - . t i o n v ~ n s done i n t h o fici?: by pros6 scctiona ) b u t oor.sirlarnblo "on tho apot" recordingc 7"ru nr.C!O by four rucorc'ing tonnrs v i t h nobi lo oqcipmnt,

156. Closod mnbulfinca hodius provcc' t o bc thw no8t usclful vi-hi- olea for mountin4 t h i s uquipr;.cnt. Thcy of fore? p r o k c t l o n from c!uat, whioh ruins tho dqviprmnt, ?.nd mi.?^ it ?oesibla to ho?t tho i n t c r l o r i n tvinlxr t o "r the p l w s bnso d F s h s o t1ie.t tlu; cu t t ivg new116 aould porform. f'nnnec! by n technicip.n-drivar an3 Pn I n k t r o < n t o r - nnnounwr, tlicao rcrcodera wore n l l opor-.tofi up inc' d0v.m t h s front, vrith m:rr!coc! SUCCGES. Tney vwri) ~ l s o cnpl.o:.od uifialy i n tho ooneo1id.a- t i o n piv.80. i n rooorc'tng intarviews wi th aivil icma behind t h e l i m a , prisonors of wnr at cnges, d i S p k c W 1 porsons, c t c .

157. Bmonnai~sanoo and Cspturc of Rnc'io S tz t inns . The Rcdio Section of 12th Amy 9royp r e n l i z s ? n brood GxparimoG i n reconncis- sancc nw! capturc of md io s tRt ions , both i n thG ae ieu r i of Ralio

- 30-

LuxemhcurG Sr, Ecqkember, 1944, ?nL se ieure of O-rman s tn t ione dur ins t h e moii!:hs I?cbbrur.ry, ?&roh, A p r i l and exrly i n Iriy, 1945. e f f o r t n iivr2 L'ir~otoGI t o a t tempts tc aeize r l t - . l kmsn rnrlio oquip- meat br;f'o:-o c!eTiolition could h e canplotor! nnd b f i f ~ r a th6 s t n t i o n s nnd eqxii,w..?ui: cofild bo dumaRsd by our o m troops, through h i l u r o to rcooqr;izo tbu vnluo of tr.e oquip:nont.

Their

158. E p r i o n o . 3 wi th R s d i o LuxomSoiirg L:s s c t the p n t b r n l o r t h i s opcrntion. dim rl "task forco" o f nmwr and snginesr peroonncl h?!! b w a improvistld t o seize the tranenittcr.

159, Z'ncovsriog o f r d i o atstictla n t Trier, S,mrbruckcn, Coblonr, S t u t t g t r t , Cc lope , FrnnWurt, Murombcrg, k1ipzi.g R I ~ Llunich each pose2 G p O C i - : l ylTh13PJ8.

le0. Thc CrQhlmg a t Sanrbruokon, f o r i n s t snce , c o n s i s t e d rnoroly of ;..r?.nin:.np; !\n ina tn l ln t ior . on ly s l i s h t l y Znaq?.l. s tq t ion b:?E t o be t d c c t and ht l t l uindcr arti'.lrrry firs which l?stcc! no?: th-.n n vmo-1:. Gologna ?nJ Fr?nkfvrt ' s t? t ions ?mr'D not m?chC.c! u n t i l ?.fYc.r hc7.T clomolition hw: bcon ccoonplinhv'. aholo3ic?l. ::orfnrs pilrsonnal occu-dsd t h e r d i o s t f i t i o n vrh ih infnrrtry coii:b?t m e w.gcc1 on 50th e l d c a , Scwenth dl*!iri citii nn ormnirc.d task fort.; of high firo p v r u r .

A t Coklenz the

A t L c i p S i g , pay-

The ?iimioh s t ? t i o n WflE crpturod by

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PIIODUCTIOX OF LEaFLETS A W DISTRIBUTIOI BY AIRCUFT

161. Doctrine of Leaflet Distrib,ution, by f+ircrnf t l 110 ?..stht,d for mass d i s t r i b u t i o n of l e n f l e t s i n e n " nnr' er"LocourJied t e r r i t o r v has be% c'.zviaed except 6isseminPtion by a i r c r a f t , ' I n thb Eutopsm C h - pai::n l on f l_e t iq> foot iou, through expor i r r an tn t io~ w i t h m r i o u s types o f Is Rf le t bonbs nnd improvonents i n t i r g e t i n g .

a i r c r i P t nohiewed a high degree of teohnicnl pur-

162. Throu@i continuod sxp;sri:-.ontation employm~nt or airborne loan le t s ~ f l n PrcpnpnPa urcapon i n militr?.ry o p r n t i o n s mny be further pcrfrotoc! on t h e b n s i s of expcrionce r;ninc;r: in t h e Europsnn Tnenter. It G Q C ~ f a i r l y c e r t a i n th?t oh io l inp-o-/.zncnts yo t t 3 k m6a i n ?ha amplo~.C!1t o f lOLflGtS dissoein-.tad by C.ircrnft ail1 ho i n hprG-flicg bnsic doctrine of psychologici l mrfm-o b n f l e t opor-tiona ooordinntad with m i l i t a r y opcr?t ions, m d i n h .Frovi iq corn-unicition of t a r g e t d y t a m d le?.flat roquirbmonts from thn f i c l d .

163. I n g?nerQl, d i s sos in%t ion of k a f k t E by n i r c r n f t depen6.s f o r e f f cc t upon nnsa distribution, o r sntur. i t lon or lqr$u b l r g e t nrens. For t h i s rci:aon, h m r y nodim b'mhurs, r d f i g h t e r bmbars cnrr icd lanf - Lots L? Worlr! 1'7x 11, r%ther th?n ll&it okaarvTtion-typa n i r o n f t . r h e jcb TMch .light hnva been done by l i g h t r-ircrnft, w m delcgnted to n r t i - l l e r y , o?.?r.hlc t o pin poin t t n rge t t i ng . 000 lbnflota K G ~ D droppar! i n enomy or enomy ~ccupie t ! t e r r i t o r y 6.urine tho h o p o n n crmpnign.

A t o t z l of morc! than 5,000,000,

164. Dowlopmerrt o f P,- .f loting by Aircr.rft., L i a f l e t ing by a i r - or-.ft ins no iiovclty in Norld. Tar 11. D u r i n g Vcbrl? Tnl'lr I bl l ioc! p i - l o t s fin6 bcmbnrflisrs hqcl thrown bnflstfl c u t of thu open cookpits of fightor nru! bombcr plmea.

165. DC6pitD t h i s procedcnt, n o doctrine for 2 i r c r n f t l o n f l c t i n g t-.s clcvolopd botwwn w n r s , ?.nd qt. t h e o d b r e n k of 'orld War 11, trhoil f l i e r s of tho T\o!~.l A i r Foro6 bogtn lo?f la t inE, le-tflata v w r o ? p i n t h r o m by ,!vine: out c f bombers. L-rtcr lo.".fl6ts wGro dwped i n 1zrp.o qu?.ntitios from tho b m b b n p i n t o th sl ip atrc-nn. Still l h t c r , Lnf- lo t s w'rc clroppcd i n bundles s e c u r d by n ncch%nic?l rtevico d e a i g n d t o broik t h e buiiElea i n t h e fq.11, Thma c:atl.o?s wire ?.ll vr?stoful, nnd nccur-to .b.rEetin.; m a n lmos t h o p l o s s ovca owr 1,zr;o %r8?3. For iustnnoo, a boibnr f l y i n g n t 30,000 fi:& with n 60 mile ninC hxd tc drop h n f l e t u smcvrliere n e w Frussrrls i f t c rdc t ing on Pzris.

1W. Jlevclopnr.nt o f tho L m f l o t Bomb. Dovalopment of tho T-1, o r Uonroo Pa&. I m m 4 n f k r tho invantor. !4r.ior JVIGS Yonrce. r.n n i r foroe l i c i s o n &our Issigned to PWD/S!GF,)"Pirst brought lexf lot ~ i B s s m i m t i o n t o '1 f a i r st.?to o f por fec t ion for s t r i t a g i c bombing, r.nc! therwftor c e s u r o d a ranicnrthle degree ot nacuraoy in snturnt ion t n r - gating. The banb w n s first used in b n f l a t dropping an n mission ovor ~ o & n y con 19 A p r i l 1944..

167. This b m b c a r r i d 80,000 lon f l a t s ( s i z e 5 1/2" by 9 1/2") ,IM! since ?. hoavy b m h s r (Fortross of Lihor?.t@r) o m onrry 10 suo11 bombs, 11 s i 2 c l o plnns could dul ioor 8(?0,000 k ' l f l o t s o-vilr 1 givon tr-rgot.

16% Thd Konroe bomb wqs imprbvisoc! from lizhht yeight ccac con- tn ina r s for X17 m l n b l e c l u s t a r chumioc.1 tmts. It consistact cf n ln- min?ted p q o r CylkIflG). of gmnf st rength. This cy l in lo r , sealed with wood on ooch ond, m a laced with doublo st rands of primer cord, nff ixod

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t o n bx-omotric fuse. mer corc!, r 'slch bisoctad t h e piper cout".iimi-, rillowing the le?.flotB t o d isperse i n tho cir . a pn t t c rn o f d i spo r s3 l covering roughly nn crcn of ono soux-e n i l c cn tho grounc'.. G imn onlcu lz t ions fo r mind CriPt, t h i s l r j i f l e t bcmbing eohievcr! ?. f r . i r doareu o f conoontrTtion on t n r g ~ t s .

Explosion of t h i s f u a o (T-SO) r'otcn?ted tho p r i -

S e t t o explcc!e r.t 1,500 tc 2,600 f e a t , t c . s t s sllwrcd

169. One kmsric.'.n henvy bcmb%rchont squnr'rnn of the ElRhth Air Force vns r.ssigncd t o the missicn of lonf la t bombing.

170. !!nil0 t h i s squwlron, togcthar v i th F l inos of tho R r ~ y n l ;,ir Force, I?P.S c s e i p o d t o v-:ricua t - r p t s f o r r,ll throo army groups, plus s t rn t eg ic hanhing 5.n tho i n t a r i c r of Germnx~, Demnzrk, Morwny, e tc . , i t provick?. 3 oonsiiiercblp V C i m G oP la?.flat barbing f r r cnch I:rc.up. For emmplo, Pram D Day (6 June 19M) t o V 9c.y ( 8 V%y 1946) this s?whon *isseminntoc! npproximztely ~~80,000,000 l enf le t s on t a r j e t s s c t by Twelfth Army Grcu? nnr' its ?.rdes nlcne.

171. Tc.rC;Lt.ting for S t r l te r j ic Ln-flot Bcmbinp S t r . l t a s i c h?.fl:k bmbing clcpoda upnn m086 die t r ibu t ion , u r sntur.iticn n f lC%rga +"to t o achievo i t s c f foa t . This t ? r p t t i l l g r q u i r o s a?rcful plafinilq, 1,914- eve r , nnd if this if3 c'cno n re-.scnhblc 3ssm.ptic.n a m bu m?$c th?t l o n f l e t s ?.ro w i n g f i i r ly wall oonaentr.-.tot! on spec i f i c t a rge t s . t s r g o t s nr.y bo c.s follcws:

Such

n. t.11 pcpuLtr.2 $re38 rf a corcntry or rcFicn t o nh ich l e n f l o t 6 ::nd othwr puh l i cn t ims ?rQ r.rtr'.rr.ssod. Eisenhowcr stntmnont proclnimirg miliL".rg i;ovorwcnt Cestinor! for 7.11 Germens ; tho publ ica t ion "LlAiwriquc cn Cuorre" fcr -11 Frenoh; Spo- c i ? l mcssnps f o r 1111 Yorwegizw, D.*.ms, gutoh, ,Aelgi'Ine, &e. )

(For exnnplo, t h o

1:. Cities, tovmn cr cther l r I c ~ . . l I t i ~ s o f cnnceii tr?tion, t o whioh spocln l l c - f l e t s ? r e -.PPreeaed. (For cxxmplu, l c c f l e t s Rc?~lrca- sed "To t k c people of C-lzgne" , ""'nrninE t o Fr??kfurt-liannheim L.ra?:', "Faruing t o Ci t izens of tho Ruhr wee.", oto. )

c. k pRttern of spccinl am11 t v z e t n , such ns r!iilrond yards, i u l u s t r i r . 1 p lnnts , e tc . , nheru puoplo cf spec in l Croups ?ro P.6- samblcd nnc! t o trhnm spaoi?l lo-ifletfi cro r.t.r!rasse?: "?%ssngc t o m i l m y WGrkGrs", " T n Poroign S1q.v~ L?bborora", e tc . )

( W r axnmplo,

d. A pp.ttern cf enemy mi l i tn ry t?r;;&s, euoh '1s commicc.- t icas coiltors, nasembly ?.rem, or -.?proxhn.to rlivis icnn.1 v m a o f n o m y troops in thc line v i t h t c rga t t i ng m oross r o z h , r a t i c n dumps, c tc . For thc oxmpla, t he mmsp?.por, "~achriohtcn", rlroyx.? or: n rough p n t - t o r n follcn*.%ng tlw front, l i n e t h r u o to tc?% milos trr the ronr o r t.110 l i n e V:RS shcvm to lnvo reqchc? a h r g e parccnt?qe of onemy troo;is t l x r s .

c. C i t i 6 8 air' islr.n?s undor E ~ G ~ O , lnrgc prckr-ts v f on- c i rc lcmor t , o t o .

172. Employment p f Mobim Bonbors for Tclctical L e ? f b t i n g . ?:;rdiun bombors b?.aod on the Europcnn dentincnt w r o ufhotiv:ly emgloyi,c! through Fobrwry, Mriroh an$ Apr i l DP 1926, with !4nrn~ders car ry ing t h o M.rnrno T-1 bcmb for t w t i o q l b r ; e t t i n f , b f Frrntpost xnd l n l f l o t s pro- 6ucorl i n Erussels. l o r 8 drcppC +.wing th in purid..

Approxi.rr.sl;F:ly 20,220,000 copies cf thsso 1a::fLts

173. Employment n f Nqh ta r Rcmlxrs f o r Tnctiozl LuTf le t ing . m- plomenz o f f i b t o r brmbore for dissGmin;?tion of Frantpnet and h R f l i t 8 - - of a a b i c t l y L o t i c a l nnture bric'pC' thc 6P.p hotvreun i r t i l b r y loaf- l c t ing nnr' s t r c t o g i c an turn t ion bnb inx by Bri t i sh basod hcqvy bcmbors. This employncrt prav5drE two *8VPIItFgGS ovor he'ITy brntmrs f o r t r o t i o n l

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- Jb -

178. Doctrine cf Tic t io%l Ler.flet Distr ibut ion by A r t i l l e r y S h G l l . A r t i l l e r y ahe l la a r e omployed f o r e ie t r ibu t icn o f k.nPlats , bocr.u?lor

a. A r t i l l e r y proriPos t h o mnly aura maam of r 'elivery h n f - l e t s n t t h e r i g h t timc t o rpeoifierl onony units.

b. l i r t i l lsry prcvic'ss t h s monna rf r s n i 4 l y + ia t r ibu t ing l u n f l e t s v n - i t h x a on the apnt from loon1 intolllp,encs to fit tho t z c t i c - -1 s i tua t ion .

179. A r t i l l e r y leaf la ta mag t o of tVr. kinds: S t i d w P br.ttlo l e i f l e t s such 0.8 tho "Safo Coricluct" l e ? f l o t , "@ne Uinute Pihiah Ilay Snm, Ywr i i f o " , o tc . , rrhich hrve -t spncinl ?rc:pny,?x-!n impnct i n 8 1 0 - oifio s i tuz t icns ; an? l m f l a t s prcyror! on the s p o t ti' f i t II Inca1 s i t m t i o n such r.8 ultimnto br . f l&a ; locf lc ts c u t l i n i n e thi: tmtiur .1 s i tuq t ion o f PRrticuLir units; lccel DO t o sur rodc- r" l e n f l e t s , a t o .

3 It i e olenr t h i t p r i r r t o lcndin;: rn the ITcrmnn6y coaa t fL-r 180.

the Puropcan cnmpnibm, insuf f io icn t r.tthiitioa 1-8 pni:q t o the tGCh- n i o h l ~ p o c C s o f c r t i l l e r g l w f l o t i n g ,

1 R I . During Bnrlri !Wr I, tho Fronoh hc? s u c r s s f u l l y e~;>lnyotl Z5mn f i o l d picces f o r shooting t c o t i c a l l o r ; f l e t s , The Ils Army lnrl e m p l y o r ! thc GtokeE Alortqr f o r t h c anme prpoae . I n l'iorld T3r I1 %hc Br i t i sh hnd axployor' the 25 prunbr cl.urin(; ths TuniEi5.n w m p a i y R i e l good ef fec t . Trials in North Afr lcn pr ior tn the F i f t h IB A n y 1"- ing in I t n l y hn2 ostablishetl the 105 mn s a l o b s h e l l FIB the bust ShQll f o r aar ry ing lef i f lota . Erwavcr, t !~ ; F i f t h Army repor t on n r t i l l o r y leaf'loting i n tho I t a l i a n umpniKn st?.terl t M t uao cf a r t i l l e r y Por dissclrinntion of l e i f l o t s v . m "on ly i u the oxparimental atago ,I1

182. 'Fhon Amriaan force8 lTnCaE i n Ilormsnr'y, n r t i l l o r y 1ur.t- l e t ing from tho standpoint cf the ?rt.llbr.y, v . 8 s t i l l in th:. o x y r i - mentnl stngo. the m o d officiant m c ~ n s l>f br inginx :iropgannP? t o t.-nr on ~ ' n m y tronpa in t c o t i c c l s i tuct lnns , auoh opx.-.ticns vert hnn+ionppw? i.uriut; tho smly stngns of t h s E u r o ~ . ~ ~ n Campaign by i c s u f f i o i e n t technica l infonnc.tion mC lnok o f unbrs tnndiug of the payohclogicnl sirfmo mission on the Lv.rt of 6-2, G-3, n r t i l l c r y nrr' or'"I.lcc c f f i o e r s . Vllried cxporincnts hnr' benn mndu by pBphOk!@Onl nmrfirs p o r m n w l , by G-2 af f icors of varlous uni ts , and by ooi-tC.Fn f i r t i l l m y off loera , b u t ne i ther r.t S Z E F nor flt winy gra? w.w tizorc any on0 soct ion or ruiy one me.n oxolusivcly intorsate< hi this yoblen, nor wna therfl pro:jor oocrrli:ir.tirn of t h o vnriqua a x p o r i m a t n l offor ta .

Althrrqh d is t r ibu t ior? nf l o n f l s t s t y ' I r t i l l e r y shall w?.s

183. A rnnge tnble for prnp-.$nuc!n shal ls prep-.red by tho U l ' O l B A nrc'mnoc of f ioor wns rrvnilabla nnd hnd b m n diatrihute?. throcgl.. @. r t i l - lery chamola t o s m e n r t i l l a r y uni t s oonoornsd.

184. This r?nge t a b l u , prep".ror! cn 1 F6hru'u-y 1944, ProVf". cf l imitad vnluo ainoa tho prerbmin'mt i?ictor governing xoourite d i s s o - minxtion of L h f l e t a rsa-uir.78 not I n l y Rn ncaurntc r % n p s e t t i n g , h u t ccna idornt ion of exia t in& ninc' Veloci'by' nn?. r'ireotion. ohznges boCmccn stin+,nrP smoke ahel le vith a tn ia te ra an$ thc snioko a h e l l w i t h l o n f k t losds O R U ~ R S n mnxhm vnriat ion i n rctnet? oP sono

Bs1:iatic

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d . The corps l inison o f f i c e r rcturne t o Army he.-.rlquirtcrs crd xvnrks niit c:otails w i t h the intel l igonco an?. o p r n t i o n s section o f the psychnl3~ic?I. w-rfnrc ?atachment thera .

e . h team confurence i s bkl; cs san t iq l intxjlligcnoo ?2.tn ia nssenbloc!, v r i t e r s -re lnfsrme? of t e x t ?ai p n l i o y requiromnts . 1cr.fli:t is vfr i t tnn, inr! r'elirmrod t r l t h e pr int ing s s c t i r n with tho mi.- bile print ing press.

Tho

f, mo m i n t i n g s a c t i c n n rohcos ths l en f lo t , ( r o q u i r i q 12 tfJ 14 hours frrni tho time the w r i t i n g is hcgun. plus typcsottinl; , lny- o u t , photngrr-phy ?n*' plqto rmblnp f o r thG rd'het i\re.sa nnr' t he r\ctuc.l p r i n t i q ) vl i i lc the x - t i l l u r y l i? isr ,n o f f i ce r eu?urvisos l:.n.din;, z l ans f v dcl ivory .-.nC f i r i n g .

192. Z t t r i l l Su nrtcr! i n tho ?.l.cvo r,utline n f typicc.1 l m f l o t rNper?tims i n thc f i e l d , t h ? t t h e G-5 sact ion rli6 nr,t f i p r o 1v::oly. I t I s c o r t - i n th;.t thr: ;&yohal?(iianl vc r f - ro lir.issn r f f i c b r s "ifL n r t f u l l y r!(?vclop rcl , . t icnahins with 6-3 suoticns. [email protected] st?.tus of iacet psychrlo@ccl x r f a r e f ' e t i ohxn t s , vhc vmre forci?fi. cantinuT1ly t o " a c l l " p s y c h - l c ~ i c n l wnrf?rr- -.t 1111 lavsls : Euc!i s e l l i x z wou1.d hr.w been unnuosss-.ry ha.? 9.11 st:.ff n f f i w r s ccncurmtl. a+, 9.11 3ChCh'1:3 becn in6cc t r in r t rd with thG n o t h d s an+ missinn r.f psych-,- 1cgicr.l %;-.rfnrc. who gcnorally r o r c t k e m o s t s p y . t h c t i o t o t h o rsychrlr@o?1 vnrfnrc

This u-s CUQ t o thr,

Tharo Y I ~ E n tcn?cncy t o loan u?rn 6-2 str.ff o f f i c e r s

m i 0 0 i GU.

193. Th- A r t i l l e r y Liaisrn Officer, An stz*tu' befcrc , tho Frc- hlcms of coorr?inr.tin: nccossary a t e p i n r.ctunl le i f le t inc. ;mcurwncnt r f u n " i t i o n , IcnCinq r f s h e l l s , f 'olivory t. t h s f i r i t q units ?.ix'. s u p - v i e i o n of thc ehantin; operntiiin, ? rCrO solver! by nssigmont of t h R q r t i l l o r y l i n i son c f f i ce r v i t h i n tho psyoholcCic?l n?rl'?ra *!ot?.c:i- ment. This officer he??cd tk.a ? . r t i l lcr j r l i ? i a rn b?ma Qt %my kvG1, mm.in*.ining 1in.j.fir:n with c.rmy, corps -.nZ .'ivisipna nrs' usu-illy trnao- >?r t iq lo?.r'w? p r c y n p n h ~ h c l l s r'ircwtly t 3 the b7t tur ios fnr tho shrnt . His cht ios , - e ?frela?ed, wuro 7.8 follws:

2. Lieisnn vrith ormy ordnr.nco cmc? a m u n i t i r n cf t ' iccr t o in- sqre c cnntinunus nu-ply of a m u n i t i o n f c r prr.y:anr'!> pur?nscs.

1). Licisrn with a r t i l l e r y sac t iom s t a l l l eve ls t o insuro timaly shooting o f lcnPlets end cxchh-n:a o f teohnioil infcr!n?tion.

da;.ots nnc?/nr corps ASPs. c. Cclleotion of require? smoka ~ h c l l s f r c m nmy w m n " t i n n

cl. IIolific, i$im m r 1 l r , v h g of ? m " t i c n with b TtPlots for f i r i ng .

u. I j e l i r e ry of lcac!e-: n j " i t i o n s tack t s i ,.'+ots, s ~ 2 l ; r x l n t a , otc. , c r t n n r t i , l l e ry b n t t c r i o s os required.

f . Assist-.noa of s r t i l l o r y units in the f i r i w c.f ?ro:,nqctnin wnunl ti on.

g. Th.;se "ut1c.a vier! ?cccmplisliec! with D o m ? l l cruw o f cn- l iate: ' inen ?.tt%chw' t o tho R r t i l l o r y li?.ieon ECcticn, nnd usu?lly n s m ? - l l crcw o f civi1im.m em?loye*l fnr proy.r?.tirm of l a n f k t r c l l s ?t tho nr i i i t ing pl:\ce,

195. I n the F i r s t Ixs Army an a r t i l l o r y cperRtinnc.1 mmnrnn(:ur.? wnrkzr! out i n ccorc'inaticn with psycholcgicnl wqrfsre perennncl, stntuc! t h n t lcnr'ing oT she l l s It .Ups ehcuLr2 bc. :xrformc? by rr.'n%nce p r s c n -

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200. Woouremr,nt rf Amunitim far Art i l l twy k a f l s t i n r , It may be nnted t h ? t Trrclfth Amy Grr,up er;w?it'.ltures of ;,rrpng!;nr'n k v u i ' t i o n were nF..roxilir.tely 10,000 t q 16,000 roamS.6 p r m o n k .

201. Aimunitinn f o r ;rw;,:agsnIr. ;w;cses sns not c l w n y a Rvnilable. FnrwnrC t r a m p o r t a t i m of RE n m u n i t i m .:uritq perlor's pf a?oo,?y fo r - mrd movement wnc t h e nmmunition o f f i ce r ' s p imary ac.ncem, rnd crrcy pEyahdGgi0d ivnrfnre c1.ctaohmants were frequantly r n t i r n d to 100 rcundn per &y ( f o r an w m y f ront) when t h a amrage U'SSklY ox:ew'lturc-s vrcrft ael4m b s s tlann 1,500 rounds, S q l u t i o n of this :roblem of nwnunitinn

c 39 -

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240. Doctrine o f CcmoliAation nn:'. C m t r o l Frop?antdn. Xniilc t!ic a i s s i o n of ccnsol idat ion nnr' control ;-,i-ry;a ;m!a ; i lninly Aiffnrs

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as p o l i t i c a l i n t e l l i g e n c e and pub l i c r e l a t ions advisor t o c i v i l a f f a i r s of f i c ms .

$h. IB the a u t w n of 1944, t h r o q h agrement wi th t h o French and Al l ied military au thor i t i e s , t h i s t rend amy f r m psychologica l warfare atd toward pure information serv ica was further accentueted w i t h establishment of the United States Infculnation Service (USIS) Ppiu; head- q i w t e r s in Paris, s t i l l Undbr .

Psychologioal Warfare Division but i n faat operatad by the Of f i ce of War Information except I n matters r e q u F r h S military decision.

mis organization continued the mission of re r r le r inz aid t o the l ibe ra t ed governments in rcconstructki:: pcblic i l lfornation mfdia, sucli a id inc ld in : : supply of news serv ices , personnel anc: equipment as we l l as p o l i c y Zuidance. and magazlnee, e t c . was c a r r i d out.

256. n-ith psychological warfare and/or USLS personnel attached t o the ,S€iAEF missions t o those gwernments.

opera t iana l corltrol of the Chief of

$5.

k gret . t ly axpandad d i s t r i b u t i o n of films, books

S h i l a r serv ices were rendered in Eebim, Holland and Denmark

257. Record of Information C m t r o l in G e m r . i?sycholo:ical warfare q o r a t i o n s with and f o r m i l i t a r - - governrieii , were expandd as A l l i d arn:les hroke i n t o Germany, and as &e l i a i s c n a c t i v i t i e s of c i v l l a f f a i r s gave way t o the occ:pational r e s2onsab i l i t i e s of military govermiicnt. Serv icas similar to thoDr? ror2tved i n France and Belgium were continucd i n t h e occupied enemy a r m s , n i t h the added respons- abilities of s l lspendin~ Geman press, rad io and publishing a c t i v i t i e s , a s Tell as publ ic en te r t a i r aec t a c t i v i t i e s and the ultimte respohs- a b i l i t y of rev iv ing those a c t i v i t i e s urdar ?raper cont ro l .

F i r s t dissemination of p r i n t d news far German c i v i l i a n s was on 3 November Vbh, wiien 10,000 copies o f Vrontpos t" were d i s t r i b u t d thro?Jgh m i S i t L ? r y govwumeot c h a n n d s , Zoitungll appsred, a full s ized reukijr nLrspaper f o r Oerman c iv i l i ans , p r d u c d by psychologfcal iarfare personiiel o f Tvrd.fth Army G r o q , aooord issue o f the paper omrid t h e new rime, Qie Kittoiluncen'l , which puhl ica t ion c o n t h u d wi thout i n t e r r F t i o r i 03011 week for 22 i:eeks.

21 Apr i l l9U, having been gradually ror:i.icd hi c i r c u l a t i o n area 8s new publ ica t ions appoarcd under the 0.3. Amy I t p r i n t t h lXolnischer K u r i r f I , a t Co lope , the IlFrankfurtcr Pressdl at I V F . r ! c f u r t , L\e fXessiche Post11 a t Kassel, the Waunschwei=er ktoJ1 a t Ziraunschmig, t h e IcRuhr Zeituncll a t K u ~ ~ I Q . ~ , a t c .

o c c y i a l by American forces r x c e d e d 3,cK)O,OOO copim on 12 Hay 19bS.

Eachrichtmll, a nam.sxTer published i n liachon by R Gcrmn puhlishw, under con t ro l of D detachme?t. fran P8:dlolo;ical Tlarforo Div i s ion , Suprano Radqunr te rs , A l l i d Expeditionary Force. of t he ~ l l i cenaee" papers ~s t ab l l shcc l , i n G b m l i , i. e. pW:ers published by l icensed ?eman publishers.

D i s t r ibu t ion of papors t o t,lie German population in occWc.d a r m s durin:; t h e period of h o s t i l i t i e s ws never @sy. was a l loca ted f o r this purpose, no r hac1 liaison ~~5th miliiwy p v a l P n M t officials been es tab l i shed . V. orous f i e l d improvisation a c c m p l h i i d this apera t icn ]>owever, w i t h 0 3 o f f i c e r s aid military qovernmcnt of2iccrs ~ J I +he field ccuperat.ing on a cord ia l h3si.s.

' 258.

On 27 Novwber 19[11) Wie Neue

The

259. Ibe la$% issue of the reuM.y l D i c 1:itteilungcntl appear& on

260.

261. ?his f igu re d i d not incl.udc Circulation of the ll:achcmcr

Tota i c i r cu la t ion o f paners printcd far [email protected] in t e r r i t o r y

l%iS W s Lhe first

. 262.

Eo t r anspor t

D i s t r i b u t i o n

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CEAPTER 16

BUCK OR COVERT RADIO PROPAGAUDA AND OTrIER

BLACK PROPAGM'DA

278. Doctrine of blaok r a d i o propagnnda. Black o r covert Drouaeandn i s t h a t prouaaanda which concee.16 i t s source, i . e . ,' which - . - &&a t o em.ne.te from within t h e t e r r i t o r y of the enemy and e i t h e r takes the form of o f f i c i a l enemy pronouncuments t o onuse di8may or confusion, o r prctends t o be t h e expression of subversive emny clemonb. As [I wenpon in psycholoqical warfare it requires R g r e a t degree of ski l l i n i t s produotion an3 employment.

279. Blnck propxgenda need not nlwn;-s be com$letel!r successful from the St'In6point of deception t o ach ieve 3 mrthwhilc purpose. instnnoe, nn a l e r t l i s tener mny w e l l uncleratand thp.t a blnok r-.dio progrnm is not what it purports to be, and may s t l l l be influanoecl by its oontext.

For

280. >Wia f o r blnck o r covert propngacda flre radio, l e a f l e t s , "olnndestine nesspr\pers", runours s b r t o d by agenta I n f i l t r n t e d i n t o snomy t e r r i t o r y . Other m e d i s a r e f o r g e r i e s and d is tor t ions of o f f i c i n l onmy documents, e ta .

281. Blnck propfignndn requires eouruos of intel l igenco of the most de ta i led sort, writers thoroughly f m i l i o r with t h e sub joc t mat ter nnd gre-t s k i l l i n composition rind reproduction. American propaganda personnel were i n i t i a l l y unfamil inr w i t h t h i s type o f propfignndn, bu t adftpted themselves t o this medim w i t h v igor and imagination.

282. There soem8 l i t t l e doubt t h n t the moet e f fec t ive of blaok propaganch i n tho Europesn oampfti&n wt?a t h n t disseminn-tcd bj rndio. Evployment of black r i d i o propaganda f o r the a i d nnd anoouragement of aubwrs ivo elements within are18 oont ro l led by the enemy t\ffords opportunitos for substantial benef i t s . a t ions were the two Br i t i sh operst ions, "Soldntansonder Cnlais" n d "Kurzwollonsen6er Atlant ic" , (proqrms of nom and musio for the Germn armed forcos ,) and the Ameriom opere.tion "hnnie", which employed r n i i o L.uxembourg cluring night and esrly-morning houra and presontsd a "C~EnfiustiOo" progrnm ostenaiblv from an undorgrounc! group i n tha Rhinelnnd. Theso were dnngerous oporntions from the s tnndpoint of s o u u r i t y and required handling w i t h g r a n t s k i l l .

l h s t notoworthy of thdae opor-

233. Operation "Annie"; This pr0,sr.m known t o i . t s l i s t a n o r s 0.s "1220 sONk3I", ra ised the moat controvoray r.mone; Anglo-American psychologion1 vr?rf%re personnel,' and nmonc cortnin s ta f f of f i o e r s Cutside the prapngnndo. c irc les , I t wns a n p . d n c i o u un6ertaking which i n t r o - duced n now element i n t o blaok radio opernt ion -- the employmQnt of detr.ilod news of the t a t t l e fronts, and c 'e ta i led intol l igonoe on t h e German orr1.er o f k- t t le , t o h u i l A a d hol6. an audience nmong enemy mi l i tn ry formations. sons iLtorchlc volume f o r t i c t i c n l dooeption, a d ult imntcly fekad news to crr?.te fonr and c'isorc'er in t n r g o t l ooz l i t i e s , u n t i l nfforded apportuni t ios f o r spootaoular militr.ry banofi ts .

It employer' highly olnasif ied i n f c n n t i o n i n

I t f u r t h o r dovolopatl .,:,, s t rong "underground" pol i t ion1 line.

284. Operation "ScldEtensbnder West", This British-conducted progrnm operated over a long per iod t o d ia t r ibu to nem and m U E i C b

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t % plor.mn rimy. nays r l c s i p x ! t o shn t to r Gerlrvln m n r q l e , but; d i d not a t t u n p t t n o t i o % l x i 1 i*ry Cooeptiun.

I t o a p i t r r l i r d on i i i t d l i g e n c a rsporte, dl8tribut;od

265. Operntian "Kurev,wlelTenganPsr At l in t i c " . This Br i t i sh - cnnr'uo+,o< prcgrzm cperatc.1 on linea s i n i l n r t o "Solcletenscnder VJoat". ' E e a r Frn,Fcfim ware coduc t t ? v i t h g r m t skill ncd enjoyoC n huge f o l l m i n g sf Gemnu l i a h n e r s , regardloss r-f whether t he Germn l istenurn knew t h s t t h e prop,r?nm wore proc'.ucer' ,by the A l l i e a ,

286. Bkok L o n f l e t s . Blnck loclflota my Sr distributed cither by a i r o r agauts; ixnd proslrmo t o bc produce? by e u b v a r s i w Dncnp e l s m n t s . 'Frequent me o f t h i s de-Jioo v1c.6 m:.Pe turing the Europenn o i q n i g n , bu5 on6 f i f r i c u l t y preaentod j.toolP, thrit of i n f i l t r q t i w Agentn throiigh tho l i m a , oporntioti VCLE t h a t cf d~ ip l ioa t ing COrin!!n "Skorpicn" output. "Skorpiod' lmflcts rere published by Gemm prnpqand i s t s for d i s t r i b u t i o n by nir to t%ir o m troops. ns n madim of rofuting P-ll ied propngsndn, h p i a of t hes s l e a P l u t 6 , with suhvrraiva texts, vrere Eupliontad fd d1Btt-j.-

'

tjutcd to tho enoq' foroos. This ortuse? nbnnZorront of thc "Skorplon" L ~ f l O t 8 .

< i t a i s h o t n v n i l r i F t i v i t t h e s e u s in t h i s report .

oar?. p r t + o u l n l - l y nuooeee!ul h a f l a t

297. Office .of S t rq t sp ic Sorvica Fiold Cporntions. S u f f i c i o n t

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CUPTER 16

FINAPGIW OF PSPCBOLLXICAL NhRF.4QC OPEPATIO'S :

~!ISCPLIAYEOI)S PRCRIELS I

288. Employment of funds of Off ice of Wnr Information, OfPico of Strategic Servicea, and 0 t h - funds. It v r i l l n o t bo P.t+rmmpted Foro to analye8 f i a c a 1 Iiroblema inoident t o t h o oavoholoa ica l a n r f n r e opera t ion - " in the Eurqenn- Thefitor. I n i t i a l l y , psycno1oyio;l 8 s r f s r e Div is ion of Suprema Heecclqunrters , Alliod Expoditionary Force, ha$ no independent fimds f o r operation, dependix upoi roquis i t ioncd supplies and matoriel cont r ibu ted b:. the civilirrn p r t i c i p a t i h g agencies. f i s o n l s e c t i o n m a s;lt up i n lVD, SYAEF, and henoeforth PYffl met cortsin vbl iga t ions from a bnsio fund, oontriLutxxl on a 50-60 baais hy tho S r i t i a h and Amcricm govurnmenta. Thu Anariortn ooL>tr ibut ion VI96 qlit betveoo tho OffiarJ o f War Informt ion and t h o 3Pfioa of Strotag3.c Sorvicos ; t he B r i t i s h oontril-ution o ~ n t c through t h e Xin ia t ry of Inforin- s t i o n , the Pollt l .oa1 Ii:tolligonoo 3gpartmcnt of the Yoroign Cffico, and thQ nr: t i s h Froadcanting Corporition.

On 16 ?.!By 1944 a

289; !Tot a l l cont.ri'.iiticns arc i a c-s!i wrppliod t o t he f2m,i1, s o n oon t r i i u t i cna , (such as from trig Hinistr:! of I n f o r m t i o n , ) be ing i n tb farm o f ps:rcholoyical vmrfa..re b i l l s paid d i r e c t l y by t h e pa r t i c ipa t ing agenoy. The amount of ma twia l obtniiioZ trom the various agoncics was of oonsiderabln consei-mnci?, i n viovr af .t:..%D fact t!mt oquipwnt providod in tiie tab les of equipwnt had t o b a u p m t e d by l'lrp quan t i t i ea o f spcoislizod ewipmtjnt from cources outside tho lmy.

290. Supply and Trnnsport. The y-obloma o f supply find t ranspor t have not lwon in;eatipnted i n t . i s repor t . worth GI' eqnipmant of R hip;'ily ap;oializcxl iiaturit, v a s nmployd i:i psyoholopical wirfare orerationa. rcc3ivors; piilrlio addross a:y-tamS; press monitoring oquipmont; motion Zic ture . C i l m s and projvotors; irmonao stooka o f papsr; rndio broadonst t ra rami t te rs , eta.

?'Rny ioilliona of do l lnrs

This aquipmsnt includcd rad io

291. =una of Xewaprint. Tho pob lcm of ohtuininq nawaprint rind O t l l Q r **par w m basic t o t he ps>-o-aholcgionl a n r f i r o oi.)arc;:ion in t h e Europuail !il\;c.ter, both in tho 'Tnib . ?iy-,do- continant. a nevrepl-int boar+. to nlloofita alnilaklc 6tor.k~ t o Fr iw u m r a . Newspapara 2nd othor publicatioua puliiisiiod. hy l i b e m t i d govcrnna:its o r individunls i n 1itarstr.d nr?Rs, T.hc S t z r s nnl S t r i p s and other kmericnn m d Arit isl i 'roo:, mwspnperc -nd p ib l i ca t ions , nnc' Psycho- log icr \ l wnrfaro nuwspspers, pmphlcts , 1. nf l c t s , ? t c .

0'1 tho Euro7Grx Tk:.es~ nro!,!ems of s1~pplg w..w solvot T r i t ' i crstnblishmnt Qf

292. p s ~ - c h c l o ~ i o ~ l Pqrfwr Cm,nniij cr.tions . Tho N ~ O ! G problom of 8 i g n e l o ~ n i c r , t i o n s , o-nbriring, p. 1-rp;;r o p r i t i o n f o r payoho- lo$I.cal w?rf!,:m, hns qot h,'m -ovcrc... in t:.,.is repor t .

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in Theater of · 1. NiS8iOn of Psychological Varfare.Bsyzcholoeical Warfare has been variously...

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Transcript of in Theater of · 1. NiS8iOn of Psychological Varfare.Bsyzcholoeical Warfare has been variously...