In 1999, Nobel Laureate, Amartya Sen wrote a book on...
Transcript of In 1999, Nobel Laureate, Amartya Sen wrote a book on...
1 Cory & Duffy-Dual Motive Theory in India-Sen
DUAL MOTIVE THEORY IN INDIA: AN ANALYSIS OF Amartya Sen's Development as Freedom
Gerald A. Cory, Jr.San Jose State University
International Technological University
Mikel DuffyInternational Technological University
Abstract
Dual motive theory, deriving from and anchored in brain physiology, permits a new perspective
on economic and political development. It is a well-known academic challenge that the
contemporary social sciences (political science, sociology and economics) lack a comprehensive
theory of development. In 1999, Nobel Laureate, Amartya Sen, taking a new turn, wrote a book
on development as freedom. He cited the expansion of freedom as both the primary aim and
principal means of development. He saw a deep complementarity between individual agency and
social arrangements with the market mechanism, itself, as deriving from the more fundamental
way humans live and interact with each other naturally—interchanging words, goods, and gifts
(1999: xii, 6-7). In the statement of this thesis, Sen builds, then, upon the well-worn Smithian
assumptions about the human tendency to "truck and barter" (Smith 1776). Such assumptions,
although taken as obvious givens by economic writers, must ultimately rest upon factors of
human nature. But human nature itself, a traditionally poorly defined and testily argued concept,
must, in turn, rest ultimately on human physiology. The arguable nature of human nature derived
historically from the lack of scientific understanding of human physiology—specifically the
physiology of the human brain. Late 20th century science has fortunately effectively closed that
knowledge gap and the assumptions of Sen and Smith can be anchored securely in the evolved
architecture of the human brain. The new findings, coming primarily from evolutionary
neuroscience and medical physiology, clarify and correct traditional economic assumptions
thereby anchoring economics in the more fundamental natural sciences in a manner previously
not possible. The authors explore the implications for economic and political development from
this new perspective.
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INTRODUCTION
It is a well known challenge that the contemporary social sciences (political science, sociology
and economics) lack a comprehensive theory of development. In 1999, Nobel Laureate, Amartya
Sen, taking a new turn, wrote a book on development as freedom. He cited the expansion of
freedom as both the primary aim and principal means of development. He saw a deep
complementarity between individual agency and social arrangements with the market mechanism,
itself, as deriving from the more fundamental way humans live and interact with each other
naturally— interchanging words, goods, and gifts (1999: xii, 6—7). In the statement of this
thesis, Sen builds then upon the well-worn Smithian assumptions about the human tendency to
"truck and barter" (Smith 1776: Bk I, Ch 2).
Such assumptions, although taken as obvious givens by economic writers, must
ultimately rest upon factors of human nature. But human nature itself, a traditionally poorly
defined and testily argued concept, must, in turn, rest ultimately on human physiology. The
arguable nature of human nature derived historically from the lack of scientific understanding of
human physiology—specifically the physiology of the human brain. Late 20th century science
has fortunately effectively closed that knowledge gap and the assumptions of Sen and Smith can
be examined. refined, and anchored securely in the evolved architecture of the human brain. The
new findings, coming primarily from medical physiology and evolutionary neuroscience, clarify
and correct traditional economic assumptions thereby anchoring economics in the more
fundamental natural sciences in a manner previously not possible. In the pages that follow we
will present these new findings followed by a preliminary analysis of the essential conditions for
development with commentary on Sen's proposition of development as freedom.
THE SOCIAL EXCHANGE BRAIN
The brain is a physiological organ. That is a fundamental fact of science. The gene-specified
neural circuits or architecture constitute that fundamental physiology. And physiologically, the
human brain is also a social brain. The emergence of the social brain concept, emphasizing both
the self-preservational (self-interested) and affectional (other-interested) components necessary to
social exchange, has been landmarked by the publication of two recent handbooks—Foundations
in Social Neuroscience (Cacioppo, et al. 2002) and Handbook of Affective Sciences (Davidson, et
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al. 2003)(see also, Cory & Gardner 2002). Earlier, but still recent volumes included Descartes’
Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain (Damasio 1994), The Integrative Neurobiology of
Affiliation (Carter, et al. 1997) and Affective Neuroscience (Panksepp 1998). Cory’s The
Reciprocal Modular Brain in Economics and Politics (1999) and The Consilient Brain: The
Bioneurological Basis of Economics, Society, and Politics (2004) represent efforts to tie these
new findings graphically, algorithmically, and mathematically to behavioral economics. Recent
years have thus brought great advances in detailing the many complex and interrelated pathways
of brain’s interactive social circuitry.
The social circuitry was forged over millions of years of evolutionary history in small
kinship groups which required a cooperative interactive dynamic for survival. These dynamic
social circuits motivate human social interaction and social exchange at all levels of our lives
today. Like many other physiological processes—for example: blood pressure, body temperature,
glucose level—that mediate between our internal and external environments, these social circuits
are homeostatically regulated (see, Wilson & Cory 2008; Cory 2004; Herbert & Schulkin 2002;
Bloom, et al. 2001, esp. pp 167-206; Kandel, et. al. 2000: 871–997; Nelson, 2000, esp. pp. 447–
494; Lapeyre & Lledo 1994; Becker, et al. 1992; Cannon 1932). In fact, the broader term
allostatic, which means adaptive, perhaps better describes the social circuitry’s rather wide,
variable, and modifiable set points and boundaries (see McEwen 2002; McEwen & Seeman 2003;
Sterling & Eyer 1981).
The social brain concept can be easily extended and titled the social exchange brain. The
social architecture of the brain drives all levels of social exchange and, as Sen noted above, all
human social activity is in the nature of exchange—from words or conversations (even to smiles
and frowns), to gifts, goods, and services.
THE EVOLUTIONARY BACKGROUND
Leading evolutionary neuroscientist Paul MacLean, long time head of the Laboratory of Brain
Evolution and Behavior of the National Institutes of Health, pioneered the study of the neural
circuitry substrating the brain’s social architecture. Unfortunately for science, in some quarters of
neuroscience, the tri-level concept of MacLean has been gratuitously and unjustifiably referred to
as "outdated." Such statements are clearly based on transient, trivial, nonscientific issues of
"fashion" and general ignorance of his work rather than good science. In his 1990 masterwork,
The Triune Brain in Evolution: Role in Paleocerebral Functions, MacLean gives us a seminal,
comprehensive, and guiding framework for medical physiology, psychiatry, and especially the
emerging disciplines associated with evolutionary neural physiology and evolutionary
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epidemiology (see Patlolla 2008, this session). Recently, numerous works testify eloquently to the
currency and importance of MacLean's work. Among such works are a current volume on
evolutionary epidemiology (Wilson & Cory 2008), an entire issue of the journal Physiology and
Behavior (2003) and a comprehensive and influential volume, The Evolutionary Neuroethology
of Paul MacLean (Cory & Gardner, 2002). The latter volumes report the contributions of
numerous outstanding scholars applying insights gained from the MacLeanian perspective. Other
recent works, too numerous to mention here, support the currency and importance of MacLean's
work (e.g., see also Panksepp, 2002; Stevens & Price, 2000). Tom Insel, current head of the US
National Institutes of Mental Health and a prominent neuroscientist himself, notably commented
in the New York Times obituary of MacLean that MacLean’s research had opened the door for
neuroscience to “ask big questions about consciousness and philosophy, instead of the more
tractable questions about vision and movement.” (NYT, 1/10/08).
MacLean, taking an evolutionary perspective, tells us that the primary function of the
human brain is the preservation of the individual self and the human species. Although this may
be said of the nervous system of any organism which must survive as an individual to reproduce,
MacLean leads us to consider not just automatisms or tightly prewired instinctual mechanisms
but the evolved social architecture or circuitry of the human brain upon which social choices are
made. His concept of brain evolution, appropriately updated, provides the necessary conceptual
platform for this undertaking. For a detailed, documented critique and update of MacLean’s
concepts see Cory 1999, 2002a, 2004).
The warmblooded, nurturing mammalian circuits, overlaying and interconnected with the
earlier self-preserving circuitry of our earlier vertebrate ancestry, became the basis of family life
and our capacity for extended social bonding (e.g. see Carter & Keverne 2002, Numan & Insel
2003). Without knowledge of neuroscience, such scholars as Bowlby (1969), Harlow & Harlow
(1965), and Harlow (1986) earlier identified these behaviors as forming the basis of infant-mother
attachment and affectional relations. These mammalian characteristics were neurally integrated
with the life-support functional and behavioral circuitry of the earlier self-preserving circuitry to
allow for the emergence of our higher brain centers.
The unique features of our human brain were refined over a period of several million
years in a mainly kinship based foraging society where sharing or reciprocity was necessary to
our survival (e.g., see Humphrey 1976, Isaac 1978, Knauft 1994, Erdal & Whiten 1996, Boehm
1999). Such sharing and reciprocity strengthened the adaptive evolution of the now combined
mammalian characteristics of self-preservation and affection. Ego and empathy, self-interest and
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other-interest, are key dual features of our personal and social behavior deriving from these basic
motivational circuits.
The CSN model (Figure 1), developed by Cory, represents the two opposing archetypal
circuits of self-preservation and affection, which become represented as Ego and Empathy in the
higher brain centers of executive circuitry that serves to cognitively mediate their tug and pull in
social exchange activity. The CSN Model is based upon the evidence from a large body of
physiological and medical research on primates and humans beginning in 1930s through 1950s
and continuing to the present day in medical and evolutionary neuroscience. The research
includes evidence from psychosurgery practices of the mid-century (leukotomy, lobotomy, etc.;
e.g. see Fulton, 1952; Freeman & Watts, 1950) in which the connecting cables between those
circuitries and the frontal brain centers were surgically lesioned in lobotomies and similar
procedures, producing frequently a clinical deactivation or "flat effect" in motivation—that is,
reduced or no Ego or Empathy. The additional extensive documentation in brain physiology
underlying the CSN Model is omitted here for the sake of brevity and because its highly technical
nature is of interest primarily to the specialist. Readers interested in such documentation may
wish to consult the lead author’s more detailed works (e.g., Cory 1999, 2000b, 2004; and Cory &
Gardner 2002; Wilson & Cory 2008).
THE CONFLICT SYSTEMS NEUROBEHAVIORAL (CSN) MODEL
Figure 1. The Conflict Systems Neurobehavioral (CSN) model. A simplified cutaway
representation of the brain showing the behavioral programs (or circuits) and the derivation of
Ego/self-interested and Empathy/other-interested motives and behaviors. I should note that earlier
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models, e.g. Freud (id, ego, and superego). Freud, however, was unable to tie his model to brain
circuitry and it remained ungrounded in neural science because brain research had simply not
advanced to that point (see Cory 1999, 2000ab, 2001ab, 2002b, 2003, 2004, 2006ab)
Each circuit of the CSN model is an inseparable part of our makeup, because each is
coded into our genes by the process of evolution. Behavioral conflict potentially exists, then,
simply by virtue of the presence of these two large-scale dynamic circuitries in our lives—up and
running even prior to birth. As an expression of the homeostatic regulatory process, behavioral
tension, which we may subjectively experience as frustration, anxiety, or anger, occurs whenever
one of our two fundamental behavioral programs—self-preservation or affection—is activated
but meets with some resistance or difficulty that blocks its satisfactory expression.
Behavioral tension serves as an dynamic internal emotional compass that we can use to
guide ourselves through the often complicated and treacherous pathways of interpersonal
exchange relations.
Behavioral stress tells us that we are exceeding safe limits for ourselves and others, and
for our larger social, economic and political structures.
THE MAJOR RANGES OF RECIPROCAL SOCIAL BEHAVIOR
The two master, inclusive circuits or programs of self-preservation and affection operate as global
state variables (see Panksepp 2002; cf. Schulkin 2002, who refers to central motive states) to
shape our social exchange behavior.
The major ranges of the CSN model (Figure 2) illustrate the features of this Ego-Empathy
dual dynamic. In the display, social behavior is divided from right to left into three main ranges
called the egoistic range, the dynamic balance range, and the empathetic range. Each range
represents a varying mix of egoistically and empathetically motivated behaviors. The solid line
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stands for ego and pivots on the word “Ego” in the executive program of our brain diagram. The
broken line stands for Empathy and pivots on the word “Empathy” in the diagram.
Figure 2. The Major Ranges/modes of Behavior. To simplify the graph, the three points are
intended to mark the center points of each range, with varying mixes of Ego and Empathy on
either side of each point. The graph thus intends to communicate, not a zero-sum, either/or set of
behavioral options or expressions but a spectrum of the increasing or decreasing (depending on
direction of movement) proportions of Ego and Empathy in behavior. The graph represents only
what may be thought of as central tendencies of interactive behavior, and is far too simple to
represent all the shadings of emotion and motivation (see Cory 1999, 2000ab, 2001ab, 2002b,
2003, 2004, 2006ab).
The Egoistic Range
The egoistic range indicates behavior dominated by self-preservation programming.
Since the two behavioral programs are locked in inseparable unity, empathy is present here, but to
a lesser degree. Behavior in this range is self-centered or self- interested and may tend, for
example, to be dominating, power-seeking, or even attacking, where empathy is less. When
empathy is increased, ego behavior will become less harsh and may be described more
moderately as controlling, competitive, or assertive. As empathy is gradually increased, the
intersection of the two lines of the diagram will be drawn toward the range of dynamic balance.
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Ego behavior will be softened as empathy is added. But the defining characteristic of the
egoistic, self-interested range is self-over-others. Whether we are blatantly power-seeking or
more moderately assertive, in this range we are putting ourselves, our own priorities and feelings,
ahead of others.
The Empathetic Range
The empathetic range represents behavior weighted in favor of empathy. Ego is present,
but is taking a back seat. When ego is present to a minimal degree, empathetic behavior may tend
to extremes of self-sacrifice and submission. When ego is increased, empathetic behaviors
become moderated and may be described as supportive, responsive, or any of a variety of “others
first” behaviors. As the influence of ego is gradually added, empathetic behavior will approach
the range of dynamic balance. In the empathetic range, the key phrase to remember is others-
over-self or others first. Whether we are at the extreme of self-sacrifice or more moderately
responsive, we are putting the priorities and feelings of others ahead of our own.
The Dynamic Balance Range
The range of dynamic balance represents a working balance between ego and empathy.
At this point our behavioral programs are operating in roughly equal measure. I speak of
“working,” “rough,” or “dynamic” balance because the tug-and-pull between the two programs
continues ceaselessly. The dynamic nature of the circuitry means that “perfect” balance may be a
theoretical point, unattainable in practice. Our more balanced behavior tends to be characterized
by equality, justice, sharing, and other behaviors which show respect for ourselves and others. In
fact, respect for self and others is the keynote of the range of dynamic balance. In essence,
dynamic balance represents the range of optimal social rationality and minimal behavioral
tension in social exchange activities.
The interplay of the dual primary circuits allows for the emergence of reciprocity in our
social exchange behavior.
RECIPROCITY: THE UNIVERSAL NORM
The norm of reciprocity expressing our social neural architecture has long been a major theme in
anthropology and sociology (e.g., see Gouldner 1960, van Baal 1975) and more recently in
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economics (e.g., Fehr & Gachter 2000, Bowles & Gintis 1998, esp. ch. 17; Cory 1999, 2004;
Gintis 2000; Eckel & Grossman 1997). Reciprocity is essentially a dual motive process. This
universally observed norm, found in all societies, primitive and modern, has been accounted for,
or shown to be possible, in evolutionary theory by such concepts as kin selection, inclusive
fitness (Hamilton 1964), reciprocal altruism (Trivers 1971, 1981) (Alexander 1987), and game
theory (Axelrod & Hamilton 1981, Maynard Smith 1982). These efforts draw upon so-called
gene-centered perspectives, which see such reciprocity as basically selfish. More recently
extensive reciprocity seen as based not upon selfishness, but empathy, has been reportedly
observed in the behavior of rhesus monkeys (de Waal 1996). F. de Waal’s approach is a welcome
departure that tries to escape the selfishness of gene-centered approaches and looks to the implied
motivational mechanisms. All these approaches, however, to include that of de Waal’s, have been
based on the external observation of behavior. They have not attempted to identify or even
speculate upon the neural mechanisms within the organism that must necessarily have been
selected for by the evolutionary process to accomplish the functions of motivating, maintaining,
and rewarding such observed reciprocal behavior.
According to the CSN model of our neural architecture, reciprocity through conflict is
achieved in the range of dynamic balance where behavioral tension operating freely tends to pull
us. Taking the dynamic balance range to be approaching or approximating the equilibrium of ego
and empathy as driven by behavioral tension, we can derive a formula that expresses this
dynamic.
THE EQUATION OF SOCIALITY OR SOCIAL EXCHANGE
The homeostatic reciprocal interplay of our archetypal circuits approaching equilibrium can be
stated mathematically in the form of the equation of sociality or social exchange. The explication
of the equation is presented using abbreviations of the actual terms rather than the usual letter
symbols of economics. This is done to facilitate the maintenance of continuity across disciplines
and to aid the non-mathematical reader to more easily follow the transitions in presentation. The
equation is expressed as approaching equilibrium or dynamic balance.
BT = Ego or Emp = 1 (dynamic balance, approx. equilibrium or unity) Emp Ego
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In the above formula BT stands for behavioral tension and is a function of the ratio of ego
to empathy or vice versa. Because of the physiological homeostatic nature of the dynamic either
ego or empathy can serve as the numerator or denominator to accurately reflect the magnitude of
behavioral tension. The degree of convergence or divergence is what is of interest.
This equation gives basic mathematical expression to the social exchange architecture of
our evolved brain structure. As the conflicting circuits of our social architecture approach
equilibrium or dynamic balance (represented by the symbolic approximation to unity or dynamic
balance, ± 1), behavioral tension/stress are minimized. On the other hand, as the ratios diverge
increasingly toward the extremes of Ego or Empathy, behavioral tension increases. That is, if we
have an empathy magnitude of 8 and an ego magnitude of 4, or vice-versa, we have a behavioral
tension magnitude of 2. At a minimum the neural dynamic serves generally to keep our social
behavior, homeostatically, within survival limits which accounts for its Darwinian selection. On
the other hand, at the level of optimal functioning the interactive circuits, driven by behavioral
tension, tend to move us toward dynamic balance of ego and empathy or self and other interest;
that is, balanced reciprocity, or equality. The formula, therefore, is very simple, but deceptively
so, because it can be quite variable and can ramify in many ways (for more extensive proofs of
the equation see Cory 2006ab).
THE EVOLUTION OF THE MARKET
To understand the behavior of the modern day free enterprise market as it is shaped by our
inherited brain structure and behavior, it is helpful to go back to early times—to reconstruct as
best we can the days before the market appeared. For a discussion and documentation in detail
see Cory (2004, 1999).
The Family or Group Bond
In those times, when people consumed what they produced, the excess that they shared
with, gave to, or provided for the needs or demands of the family or community was in the nature
of natural affection or empathy. The reward for the empathetic, supplying act was emotional—
there was not a specific, but a diffuse value assigned to it. It also had social effects—the givers,
providers gaining status in the group. The emotional and the social effects were both directly
governed by the reciprocal algorithms of behavior.
Let us look more closely. The provider, say the warrior brought meat from the hunt or the
wife brought berries and fruits from the field, tanned skins, and so on, to give to the family or
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group. The act of providing, giving, created behavioral tension in the giver, who acting
empathetically denied ego to some degree and required a response of acknowledgment, gratitude,
respect, affection, or some other reaffirmation of ego. This providing or giving also created
behavioral tension in the receivers. It was a service to their ego, their needs or demands—to their
own preservation—which created tension requiring an offsetting empathetic response, a thank-
you, an expression of appreciation or respect. In any family or close group, even now, this
dynamic flows constantly, even in the smallest activities. In the small group the rewards, the
reciprocations of such social exchange, are largely not quantified, but are diffuse. They become
obligations—bonds—that hold the group together for protection or mutual survival. Nevertheless,
they must achieve some approximation of balance or the unresolved tension will build within the
group and become disruptive. Expressions for thank you and you’re welcome, found in all known
human languages, reflect this reciprocity in social exchange activity.
The Gift
From these early, primitive behavioral exchanges, emerged the gift: an empathetic act of
providing or serving that followed the same algorithmic behavioral rules that governed provision
for survival. It created tension in the giver—an expectation of reciprocity—and tension in the
receiver, who was bound to reciprocate. The rewards associated with the gift were diffuse,
unspecified, unquantified—except by some subjective measure of feeling, emotion, or behavioral
tension. A gift to a warrior or chief might vaguely obligate his protection. A gift to a prospective
mate might vaguely obligate his or her attentions. The gift economy of so-called primitive
peoples—an important theme in anthropology—operated in this way (e.g. see, Mauss 1990
[1925]; Bohannon 1963; Cheal 1988; Godelier, 1999; Gérard-Varet, et al., 2000; Davis 2000;
Fennell 2002).
From Gift to Transaction
From the gift evolved the transaction—namely the gift with the reciprocal specified or
quantified (e.g., see, Mauss, 1990[1925], Polanyi 1957, Sahlins 1972, Gregory 1982, Appadurai
1986, Seymour-Smith 1986, 44, Barfield, 1997, 73; Hunt 2002; Osteen 2002). The transaction is
the beginning of the contract, perhaps of the market itself. The transaction operates, however, by
the same behavioral dynamic as the gift—except that it attempts to head off the residual,
unresolved behavioral tension that creates a condition of obligation or bonding. After all, in the
market, we may be dealing with strangers not to be seen again. Nevertheless, it retains its
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essential mammalian characteristics as an act of empathy, of nurturing, which requires a
balancing reciprocal act in payment to ego.
When we encounter its equivalent in the impersonalized market economy of today, how
often do we feel the subjective experience of the transaction? We take our sick child to the
physician, who empathetically and carefully applies the knowledge it took 10 years and a fortune
to gain. We pay the bill—that is, we make a return gift with money that represents a portion of
our accumulated education and labor. The scenario is repeated in transactions with the plumber,
the carpenter, the computer maker. The behavioral algorithms still apply, but the feeling, the
subjective experience has to a large degree been lost.
Behavioral Tension Yet Drives the Transaction
But wait! Let the transaction go wrong, the expected reciprocals not be forthcoming and
the behavioral tension becomes immediately and personally felt. The reality of the transaction—
the market—reveals itself with clarity and intensity. No one likes to be cheated or short-changed.
And most will be motivated to take some action to correct the imbalance in expected reciprocity
or harbor the behavioral tension indefinitely to be acted upon in the future. The dockets of our
small claims courts are filled with cases reflecting the tension of such unbalanced reciprocity.
The evolution of the transactional market (demand and supply) as shaped by neural
architecture can be summarized in Figure 3.
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Figure 3. Evolution of Market Exchange Based on Dynamics of Neural Architecture.
METAECONOMICS AND THE DUALITY OF MOTIVES
From the transactional perspective, the CSN model also provides under-pinning for what is called
metaeconomics and the question of multiple motives or utilities (Hayes & Lynne 2004; Lynne
1999, 2000; Lutz 1993; Etzioni 1986). The CSN model shows that the tug and pull between Ego
and Empathy goes on constantly within us and between us as we interact socially. To the extent
that our economic transactions or choices are social, and they inevitably are, they will involve the
tug-and-pull of ego and empathy to some degree. The very nature of social or market exchange is
dual or transactional necessitating give and take. The idea that we make independent choices
separate from interpersonal or social concerns is largely illusional. The transactional atom when
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opened up is shown to be composed of ego and empathy, mutual benefit, in a state of negotiated
tension (Cory 1999, 77–78). There is therefore some degree of behavioral tension from the tug
and pull of Ego and Empathy, a dual motive on both sides in every social or market choice or
transaction. The degree of tug and pull or behavioral tension will depend upon the triviality or
significance of the transaction—something neoclassical theory does not discriminate. Adam
Smith recognized clearly this essential mutual benefit nature of the market in the line quoted
below which immediately precedes the customarily quoted passage which traditionally has been
wrongly taken to justify a sole self-interest motive.
Give me what I want, and you shall have what you want, is the meaning of every such offer (1776: Bk I, Ch 2).
In modern times we recognize the above quote on mutual benefit as win-win. The dual
mutual benefit or balanced reciprocity position of win-win is reflected in the graph of the CSN
model as dynamic balance and in the equation of social exchange as ± 1.
THE INVISIBLE HAND IN THE STRUCTURE AND BEHAVIOR OF THE MARKETPLACE
To understand the function of the invisible hand in the socio-economic market, it helps to
maintain a clear distinction between structure and behavior.
Structure
The invisible hand as the tug and pull of Ego and Empathy is expressed in the market
structure as demand and supply. The reciprocal dynamic tends to work despite the unidimensional
overemphasis on self-interest in classical economics by the fallacy of self-reference. This is
because the very structure itself of the market is the institutionalized product of the Ego/Empathy
dynamic of our evolved neural architecture. That is, as Adam Smith saw, when we enter into
market exchange, we fundamentally agree to a give and take exchange which necessitates mutual
benefit, reciprocity, respect for self and others, or Ego and Empathy. Our self-survival Ego
demands are rooted ultimately in our ancestral protoreptilian or vertebrate neural complexes and
represented in our higher frontal brain circuits as self-interest or ego. Contrastingly, the act of
providing or supplying, is fundamentally an act of mammalian nurturing—likewise represented in
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our higher frontal brain circuitry as other-interest or Empathy. The market exchange system
originated from and is sustained by this dynamic. The market could never have evolved or been
maintained on the basis of Ego or self-interest alone. Without Empathy we would not know how
or what to do to respond to the needs of others. Dinosaurs and crocodiles, as well as our ancestral
vertebrates, never produced markets.
Behavior
Behavior, in individual choices and transactions within the above institutionalized
structure, may vary considerably in the mix of Ego and Empathy motives on both the demand and
supply sides. Nevertheless, even in the most Ego-skewed (or self-interested) market behavior, the
overall unobstructed tendency of the market will be toward a balance of Ego and Empathy.
Individual and collective actors, whether seemingly motivated primarily by self-interest or not,
will be compelled by the very evolved and institutionalized market structure itself—to survive in
the market—to perform the structural equivalent of Empathy. That is, they will be required to
provide (supply) a proper service or product to fill the needs (demand) of others. This is
especially true of the idealized purely competitive market envisioned by standard economic
theory.
To the degree, however, that Empathy is a consciously included and recognized
behavioral motivational component within the market structure, the product or service provided
may be enhanced in quality and the emergence of trust in market relationships will be facilitated.
Conversely, the overemphasis on self-interest in the neoclassical paradigm tends to vitiate the
development of quality and the emergence of trust in the market. Aside from the scientifically
inaccurate concept of the market in neoclassical economics, this vitiation of quality and trust,
adding to transaction costs, is one of its greatest drawbacks, in practice.
From the perspective of brain physiology, then, reciprocity through conflict is achieved in
the range of dynamic balance where behavioral tension operating freely tends to pull us. In
dynamic balance, ego and empathy provide for the emergence of cooperation and fairness, trust
and morality, in interpersonal, social, and economic exchange activities. Taking the dynamic
balance range to be approaching or approximating the equilibrium of ego and empathy as driven
by behavioral tension, again we call upon the previously derived formula:
BT = Ego or Emp = Demand or Supply = EP = 1 (approx. equilibrium or unity) Emp Ego Supply Demand dynamic balance
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The above equation (with either Ego or Empathy as the numerator or denominator to
accurately reflect the magnitudes of behavioral tension in the transaction) gives basic
mathematical expression to interaction of Ego (demand) and Empathy (supply). As the two
motives intersect freely in the marketplace, we tend to have equitable exchange. Or, in the case of
specific products and services, we tend toward equilibrium price (EP), or fair price. Since the
evolved algorithmic dynamic works imperfectly, I use the word tend.
The formula or equation proceeding from evolved neural network architecture thus
provides the unifying linkage between brain physiology (or neuroscience) and economics or
social exchange theory. The behavioral tension driving toward the proximate dynamic balance
between demand and supply in the marketplace accounts for the motive force for the venerable
Invisible Hand—that illusive dynamic previously accounted for variously by the hand of Deity,
Newtonian mechanics, or other inappropriate physical processes (see Cory 2004, 1999: 92–95,
Ingrao & Israel 1990).
The marketplace is thus clearly a product of the dynamic of our evolved neurological
architecture. The same dynamic formula can be shown to underlie not only market and social
exchange but also power relationships, social stratification, relations of inequality, and even cost-
benefit analysis (Cory 2004). Kept free (by appropriate institutions) of the skewing effects of
excessive wealth accumulation and the pressure of powerful special interests, both a democratic
free enterprise economic system and a democratic political system will, in accord with the neural
architecture, tend toward a dynamic equilibrium which minimizes economic and political
inequalities.
On the other hand, the behavioral tension or inequality within a market system or a
political system may be indexed by the same dynamic formula to the extent that it departs from
dynamic equilibrium and the ratio begins to diverge increasingly.
FRAMEWORK FOR DEVELOPMENT
In this section we will apply the neural dynamic represented by the CSN model and the social
equation to a preliminary search for the fundamentals of development. In the process we will
comment upon Sen's proposition of development as freedom.
Fundamentally, if development is freedom, freedom, then, would allow the free
expression of the dynamic social exchange neural architecture. And, of course, allowed to operate
freely in any society, perhaps, as Sen proposes, the outcome would be development. Sen's
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argument seems to be based fundamentally on such an unclarified assumption about human
nature. An assumption that is equivalent to the intuited neural dynamic—although he has no
concept of such a dynamic.
The question, then, arises: To the extent that we increase freedom does development
occur inevitably and spontaneously?
If development is natural, if it occurred anywhere, it should occur in the environment of
the primitive family where the neural circuits evolved. Recent research has indicated that the
primitive social environment was essentially an egalitarian one. The neural circuits functioning
freely, however, also impose limits on our own and others' freedom. Limits are imposed by their
conflictual nature and the resolution of that conflict in dynamic balance. Resolution blends the
priorities of self and others. This blending constitutes essentially a compromise with individual
freedom. Or perhaps we should say, that left to function freely the exchange architecture will tend
to a dynamic equilibrium that is reciprocal and in that sense mutual—egalitarian, like the
primitive family. True freedom then would be mutual reciprocity, each individual’s freedom
limited by empathetic respect for others.
But on its own would such freedom lead to development, political and/or economic? In
the primitive essentially egalitarian family that existed for 100,000 or more years prior to modern
society—it did not! It lead to essential harmony—as we perhaps all hunted and gathered and then
sat around the campfire telling stories, singing songs and dancing. Essential egalitarian harmony,
but not dynamic development.
Predictions of the CSN Model
What, then, does the CSN Model of our social exchange architecture predict for
development? Cory (1999, 2004) argued that the human brain evolved as a scarcity-coping organ
in a primarily kinship based foraging society where sharing or reciprocity was essential to
survival. The survival strategy of the human species, in the face of scarcity, was sharing.
Scarcity-coping by sharing does not automatically lead to development.
Something else, then, is needed—something that not just releases the free expression of,
but that encourages and accelerates, the social exchange dynamic. Cory (1999, 2004) writes that
modern capitalism changes the scarcity-coping neural dynamic into a scarcity-generating
dynamic. The scarcity-generating dynamic, however, requires a stable social system to support
cumulative development—else the effort may be dissipated in chaos.
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According to the logic of our evolved social exchange architecture, then, the fundamental
requirements for development would be two:
1. The acceleration of the scarcity-coping dynamic into a scarcity-generating dynamic
2. The provision of a stable society in which
a. the exchange dynamic can operate freely
b. and the productive outcomes could be cumulative.
The above fundamentals require the presence and operation of what economists define as
institutions—the rules, procedures, or customs that permit and support those fundamentals. They
require such institutions, howevcr, from both the political and market perspectives—not from just
the market perspective alone as often assumed by economists.
The Unified Perspective of Economics and Politics
We must first, then, realize that for a comprehensive theory of development we need to
incorporate more than the market perspective alone. We must consider both the political, market
—essentially the entire social perspective. Our current departmented university system militates
against this, forcing us into narrow channels of specialization. A development theory from the
market perspective alone is inherently incomplete—likewise is one solely from the political
perspective. Only a combined perspective will suffice.
Cory (2004) attempted this unified perspective. Based upon the dynamic of the social
exchange architecture, all society is seen as an overarching social exchange system with two
essential component subsystems: an economic exchange system and a politico-legal exchange
system (Figure 4).
These represent functions that were combined in the family unit of our evolutionary past
(which shaped the very neural architecture itself), when families hunted and gathered
economically and politically had the power of distribution among members. As societies became
larger, these functions became represented in the larger units. They are essential to any society
today, national or global.
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Figure 4. Society consists of a politico-legal system plus an economic exchange system.
The two systems cannot be separated. They determine the nature of the overall social
system—they either preserve and force social exchange equilibria or they allow such equilibria to
form with more or less freedom. Allowed to function freely, the two systems together form a self-
correcting mechanism with both sides based on and motivated by our selfsame social exchange
neural architecture. That is, ideally, where the economic system fails, the political system
corrects. When the political system fails (overcorrects) or becomes unstable, the economic system
reacts sending signs of reduced productivity and efficiency. The critical questions for
development center around how this interaction between the two systems works to both
accelerate the social exchange dynamic and assure its freely operating and cumulative capacity.
This brings us again to the question of institutions —which govern or channel that interaction.
The institutions that operate implicitly or explicitly within each system determine the way
the systems function. Institutions channel the neural organic dynamic. So what, then, are the
institutions that channel the dynamic for development?
Looking to Present-day Economics
On the economic side we might look to present-day economics for some direction. What
concepts does it offer? For the basic outline of such a framework, we can look to traditional
macroeconomics and the concept of long run aggregate supply (LRAS).
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LRAS is said to be determined by the interaction of three factors: resources, level of
technology, and structure of institutions. The new findings added here by dual motive theory are
that these factors direct the flow of the neural exchange dynamic. Said another way, the neural
exchange dynamic is the driving force which works through the traditionally identified factors. A
change in any one or more of the three factors affects development. An increase or favorable
change causes a growth in development; a decrease or unfavorable change causes a decrease or
decline in development. Holding resources and technology constant, the essentials of the
framework we seek will be found in the structure and nature of institutions. Many nations have
resources and are undeveloped. Many have access to technology but remain undeveloped. Given
resources and technology, what, then, are the institutions that promote development? It is
instructive to turn to history.
From Mercantilism to Free Enterprise
The great historical move from mercantilism to free enterprise occurred in 18 th century
Europe, especially in England. To understand what happened at that juncture of history is
important to any understanding of development.
The movement from mercantilism in 18th century England to free enterprise was a
momentous step in the re-channeling of our dynamic exchange architecture. A look at the
concepts and institutions of the mercantilistic period in terms of the political and economic
systems is enlightening.
Political system: Politically, mercantilism was among other things a highly controlled
system based upon the following institutional concepts:
1. A nation’s wealth was built by taking from others, it produced winners and losers in
trade, therefore,
2. It was a matter of national policy to block free trade in favor of a favorable balance of
trade.
3. It was based on a Zero sum concept of wealth that often led to exploitation,
colonialism.
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21 Cory & Duffy-Dual Motive Theory in India-Sen
4. Creation of a nation's wealth, then, was seen as taking it from others
Economic system: These institutional concepts were forced politically upon the economic
system. The fledgling manufacturing economy of England was subordinated to political
objectives of securing wealth by one-sided trade and exploiting the resources and wealth of
colonies.
As a zero-sum based institutional system, mercantilism had no real concept of
development. The assumptions and institutions of mercantilism, in fact, militated against
development. Development is by definition opposed to a zero-sum concept of wealth.
Adam Smith was instrumental in turning the tide against mercantilism. In his landmark
work, The Wealth of Nations, Smith argued directly against this zero-sum concept of wealth
creation that underpinned mercantilism. He thus contradicted the fundamental premise of
mercantilism. He said the wealth of nations was created, not zero sum—and it was based on the
productivity of the people. Therefore free trade and unleashing the productivity of the people was
the path to wealth creation —thus the title, The Wealth of Nations.
This was for the first time truly a development concept!
What, then, were the institutional features of the free enterprise system advocated by
Smith?
Political system: The institutional adoption of what is called Laissez Faire, an
institutional concept which emphasizes a minimum of government control of enterprise
exchange and trading activity.
Economic system: A competitive market in which
a. Individuals were egoistically incented to perform acts of production or supply—that
is, rewarded for performing acts of Empathy for others.
b. The social exchange dynamic of our neural architecture was accelerated by
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incentives, releasing and encouraging individual initiative in the form of self- and
other-interest, Ego and Empathy (It is obvious that individual initiative is
not limited to self-interest as often assumed by economists; people can exercise
great personal initiative in Empathy or other interest).
Of course these political and economic institutional features rested upon pre-existing
institutional features of the English political economy. These institutional features can all be
understood as acts of official Empathy, designed to mitigate the unbridled expression of Ego or
self-interest. They are:
1. Respect for private property
2. Enforcement of contracts
3. Provision of limited public goods (i.e., infrastructure, education)
4. Political stability or order
Such institutional features, in effect, freed and channeled the neural dynamic toward
creation of wealth. Most of the effectiveness of the market economic system, then, is the result of
the political institutions providing the right institutional framework.
The Delicate Balancing Act
To maintain a productive economy that produces Adam Smith's anticipated more
equitable share of wealth to all requires a delicate balancing act between the two major exchange
systems. To take advantage of the self-correcting tendency of the interactive politico-legal
exchange system and the market exchange system, driven by our neural architecture, requires a
delicate balancing act to assure economic growth.
1. The politico-legal exchange system must, after providing stability and facilitating
infrastructure, function to correct the failures of the market system.
2. And it must do so without stifling the productivity of the market exchange system.
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Democracy vs. authoritarianism
Sen argues from the perspective of freedom, essentially democracy. He acknowledges the
so-called "Lee thesis" attributed to Singapore's former prime minister, Lee Kuan Yew. The Lee
thesis argument is essentially authoritarian and holds that denial of civil rights and political rights
helps to stimulate economic growth. Such argument has been seen historically in the rise of
Hitler's Germany and was even used widely to justify proletarian dictatorships under official
communism during much of the latter part of the 20th century.
According to dual motive theory, the essential problems with the argument are:
1. Authoritarianism, like central planning, interferes with the self-corrective mechanism
of our dynamic neural architecture as it is expressed freely in a democratic
political system combined with a free enterprise market system.
2. Authoritarian systems may work well for development in the short run, but they are
dependent upon authority and caprice. No one can be sure when they no longer
choose to support the conditions necessary for development.
3. In the long term authoritarian systems interfere with the natural neural dynamic that
pushes toward dynamic balance in both wealth and power.
Dual motive theory predicts that based upon the neural dynamic, individuals as they
achieve dynamically balanced economic freedom, will also tend to seek dynamically balanced
power and/or political freedom and rights and vice-versa. It is noteworthy that Sen (1999: 150)
cites evidence that people will choose political freedom and rights even above economic
development.
Any deviation from dynamic balance in any situation of significance, be it power or
wealth, will be responded to by the self-corrective tendency to homeostatic dynamic balance or
equalization. Based upon the dynamic, the minimum acceptable position on issues of true
significance (survival) would be dynamic equality. This, self-corrective tendency is, in fact, the
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engine of competition and productivity. As Cory (1999, 2004) points out, the human brain
evolved as scarcity-coping organ in primitive kinship based foraging societies—we survived by
sharing and by enforcing that sharing through groups and alliances.
Development is fundamentally achieved by turning our brain's scarcity-coping
mechanism into a scarcity-generating mechanism and providing the institutional stability and
protections to sustain the transition. Development, then, depends on the managed creation of
inequalities and the tendency of all to homeostatically strive to correct them. The self-correcting,
self-equilibrating of Ego and Empathy, demand and supply, is the engine of development.
Nowhere is this more clearly seen than in the capitalist enterprise of advertising. The entire
advertising industry is unabashedly dedicated to the creation of demand—not merely to satisfying
the demand that previously exists. This newly created demand is, of course, to be responded to by
newly created supply. The engine of productivity, the acceleration of our neural dynamic, goes
into full throttle endlessly creating demand and the responsive supply—generating endless
productivity as an end in itself.
This, of course, brings us to the question of sustainability. Given the endless acceleration
of productivity, demand and supply, we must face the growing danger of exhaustion of resources,
global warming, and pollution. But these issues are beyond the scope of this brief paper.
CONCLUSION
This paper began as a consideration of Sen's proposition of development as freedom. Such a
proposition must rest ultimately on assumptions about human nature about which Sen is never
clear. Examined from the vantage point of brain physiology and dual motive theory, it is doubtful
that freedom alone will produce development. In the primitive egalitarian societies of our
evolutionary heritage it did not—for 100, 000 or so years. Development requires institutions that
accelerate the evolved scarcity-coping dynamic of our homeostatically-regulated social neural
architecture, allow it to be expressed freely, and provide as well the stability necessary for the
productive outcomes to be cumulative. These are the fundamental requirements for development
although the details of such institutions may vary situationally. The shift from mercantilism to
free enterprise thinking in 18th century England provides a conspicuous historical example. The
free expression and acceleration of the neural dynamic, however, does not stop with economic
development. It presses also to dynamic equality in power as well. The dynamic works best in
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and tends ultimately toward a society with a democratic political system interacting and self-
correcting with a free market economic system. Both systems, of course, are driven by the
selfsame homeostatically-regulated social exchange architecture.
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