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IMPACTOFLOCALWELFARESYSTEMSONFEMALELABOURFORCEPARTICIPATIONAND

SOCIALCOHESION.THECASEOFBOLOGNA

LaraMaestripieri

DAStUWorkingPapers

n.5/2013ISSN2281‐6283

DAStU Working Papers | Impact of local welfare systems on female labour force participation and social cohesion. The case of Bologna. Lara Maestripieri | [email protected]

Politecnico di Milano Dipartimento di Architettura e Studi Urbani

AbstractL’Italiacostituisceunambientescarsamentefavorevoleperl’integrazionedelledonnenelmercatodellavoroperilcaratterefamilisticodelsuosistemadiwelfare.Tuttavia,Bolognarappresentadasempreun’eccezioneperiltassocomparabileconglistandardeuropeidipartecipazionefemminileallavoroedapiùparti,ladiversitàbolognesevienespiegataconl’efficienzadelsistemadiwelfarelocale.Nelpresentepaper,sarannopresentatelecaratteristichesalientidelsistemadiwelfarelocalebologneseaconfrontoconilrestodelpaese,inparticolarmodofacendoriferimentoagliambitidicuraprescolareedisupportoallacuraalungoterminedeglianzianinonauto‐sufficienti.Scopodiquest’analisièoffrireunavalutazionecomplessivainotticadigeneresulruolochequestepolitichesocialisonoingradodisvolgerenelsupportareledonneallavoro,valutandoiprincipalipuntidiforzaedebolezzadelsistemadiwelfarealivellolocale.Laricercaèstatacondottanell’ambitodelprogettoFLOWS(www.flows‐eu.eu)finanziatodalsettimoprogrammaquadro.

IntroductiontoItalianwelfaresystemIn literature, thewelfaremodelwhichbetter represent Italy is theso‐called familialmodel, inwhicheveniftheItaliansystemisinspiredtoconservative/corporatistmodel(Esping‐andersen,1990),thedifferencesamongcategoriesofworkersandtheimportantroleoffamilyasthemainwelfare provision has result in a strong stratification between insiders (public workers orpermanentworkers in companies above15 employees), semi‐insiders (dependentworkers ofsmall companies and self‐employed workers) and outsiders (temporary workers or blackmarket),shiftingallthecareresponsibilitiesonwomen(Ferrera,2006).AsexplainedbyEsping‐Andersen (1990), the aim of thismodel is to preserve the differentials of class/status in thecontext of a very conservative view of the family (inspired by Church), in which benefitsencourage the traditional nuclear family based on a male breadwinner and a female mainlyassignedonreproductiveduties.Infact,asitisnotedbyLewis(2002),thelabourcontractatthebaseofEuropeanwelfarestatewasbuiltonamodelinwhicheveryfamilywascomposedbyaregularly employedmale breadwinner,whilewomen and childrenwere their dependants: “itwas assumed that the primary responsibility ofmenwas to earn and ofwomenwas to care”(Lewis,2002:332).Actually, we can resume the main feature of Italian welfare compared to other Europeancountries,pointingoutthefollowingfourmainissues:

Thefragmentationofinterventions:mostofthemeasuresareofferedoutsideanationalorganicframework.Quiteoftenresourcesarenotequallydistributedamongrisks;asforexamplemostofresourcesaredevotedtofinancepensionsinsteadofcare.

Anunbalanceddistributionofresources:socialservicesandcarehavejustresidualresourcesinacontextcharacterizedbyadisorganisedmanagement.

Patronagesandparticularism:thestratificationofmeasureswithintimehasbeenquiteoftenmadeinrelationtointerestsofpoliticalparties.

Apassivesubsidiarity:ItalianNationalstrategyforwelfarestatehasalwaysimpliedthedevolutionofresponsibilitiestootheractors,especiallyfamilies(butalsothirdsectorandlocalauthorities).However,thishasn’tbeendoneinacontextofanadequatefinancialsupportfromtheState(Kazepov,2011).

Asaconsequenceoftheseaspects,supportsforcareinItalyareunderdevelopedaslongascareisalmosttotallydelegatedtofamilies’capacitytoservicesitsmembers;theinterventionofthestateisresidualandpublicservicesinterveneonlyinthemostvulnerablecases(Costa,2012b).Suchmodelhashadstronginfluencesonwomenattitudestofamily:ItalyhasoneofthelowestfertilityratesalloverEurope(onlypartiallycompensatedbytherecentarrivalofmigrants)and



it will be suffering in the next years of an increasingly high old age dependency ratio, thusworseningthecareoverloadofwomen.

Chart1–OldagedependencyratioinFLOWScountries,2011–Source:EurostatNevertheless, Italian peculiarities of welfare system aren’t related with the total amount ofexpenditure,whichisactuallycomparablewithothercountries,butintherelativeimportantofvoicesinsuchexpenditure,especiallythosereservedtopensions.Pensionforageandpensionsfor surviving attracts almost the 60% of the total national social expenditure compared to aEuropeanaverageof40%andasyoucanseefromthechart2Italystillspendabout20%ofitsGDPinpensions.

Chart2–Publicexpenditure in%ofgrossdomesticproduct,comparisonamongItalyandUE15,2009‐Source:EurostatTherefore,thisdistortionresultsinanunder‐protectionoftherisksconnectedtootherphasesof life cycle, such as poverty, need for care, housing distress, unemployment or temporaryemployment,without really giving assistance fordependency in theold age as long as all the



support given basically consists in cash transfers (Ferrera, 2006). Plus, if we distinguishanalytically formal and informal work (Pfau‐Effinger, Flaquer, Jensen, 2009), we have tounderline that the distribution of informal work (especially those devoted to care andhousework)ishighlygendered:inaverage,womendoabout70%ofthetotalcareandtheyarealso more likely to be employed in the black market without a contract. This results in thegeneraltendencyofpeopletoentrustmotherswithcare:evenifthelawallowsfatherstoaskforparental leave, just 10% of dependent workers who ask for leaves are father, while forindependent workers 100% are female (Ministero dello sviluppo economico, 2011). In fact,there isn’t any law in Italy that obliges fathers to take paternity leave and since the womenlabourmarketintegrationisweaker,familiestendingeneraltoallocateworktofemale,notonlybecauseofculturalreasonsbutalsobecauseoftheirlowerpays(VanderLippeetal,2010),aslongasparentalleaveisgenerallypaidonly30%ofincome.Infact,asaresultofhighgenderpaygap which is endemic in Italy even for higher educated women, families consider a rationalchoicetoinvestonwomenasfamilialcareraslongasthey’reoftentheoneswhoearnless,thusreducing the trade‐off of spending less time on paid employment compared to their spouses(VanderLippeetal,2010).A second remark is also that Italydealwitha seconddistortion,which ismore related to themechanism of redistribution: there are strong differences in terms of generosity and accessamong different categories, which are dependent on the type of occupational integration ofworkers(Ferrera,2006).Forexample,protectionagainstunemploymentisn’tuniversalisticandsomecategoriessuchascollaborators(whicharemostlyyoungandwomen)andself‐employedworkersaretotallyexcludedbythesystem;suchdistortionisvalidalsointheprotectionagainstdismissals which has different criteria for permanent workers hired in companies under 15employees.Fromthisprimarystratification,itderivesanunequaltreatmentinpension,whoseamountisofcourserelatedtothepreviousintegrationintothelabourmarket.SincethepensionisthemostimportantformofredistributionfinancedbytheStateinItaly,thesystemofpublictransfersusuallyreproducedisparitiesandquiteoftengiveadvantagetomenonwomen,whoseprofessionallivesaremorelikelytoexperienceinterruptionsduetomaternity,anhigherrisktobecaughtinnon‐standardcontracts,lessopportunityincareersandanhigherattitudetopart‐timebecausetheStatedoesn’tsupportthemwiththenecessaryservicesofcare.In conclusion,our system is stronglydualistic,unequalamongdifferent categoriesofworkersandamonggenderandgenerations,whileisfinanciallyunbalancedinfavourofcashtransfers,whicharenormallyregulatedataNationallevel.Servicesinkindonthecontraryareregionallyandlocallydesignedandprovided;so,allregionsplaysafundamentalroleinallthethreemaindomainsofpoliciesthatarerelatedtowomenlabourmarketintegrationasidentifiedinFLOWSproject(childcare,elderlycareandlifelonglearning),mainlyidentifyinggeneralcriteriafortherealization,management,qualificationandaccreditationfortheprivateandthirdsectoractors.Asaconsequence,thesituationinItalyishighlyunbalancedwithinregions,sincethewealthiest(asEmiliaRomagna)canaffordmoreservicesthanothers.

ThemainfeaturesofthelocalwelfaresystemintheBolognaarea1Ingeneral,thelevelofservicesofferedinEmilia‐RomagnaishigherthaninotherpartofItaly,thanks to a stronger commitment of the local governments toward social policies, moreresources available and a tradition of civic engagement; this has result in a quite higherparticipationofwomeninthelabourmarket,especiallyinBologna.Plus,quiteoftenwomenare1 The following sections has been developed on the basis of three intermediate reports in the FLOWS project(www.flows‐eu.eu)on the threemain scopes of localwelfarepolicies considered tobe relevant in favoring femaleparticipationtolabourmarket:childcare,elderlycareandlifelonglearning.Thetheereportwerewrittenby:RobertaCucca and Stefania Sabatinelli for childcare (2011), Giuliana Costa and Lara Maestripieri for elderly care (2012),RobertaCuccaandTatianaSaruisforLifelongLearning(2012).Seereferencesformoredetails.



moreeducatedthanmen,aswellastheyshowlowerschooldropoutandbestreturnsintermsofprofit.Nevertheless,thisbetterachievementineducationhasn’tresultinareductionofgendergaps in integration in the labour market: women are constantly less active and moreunemployedthanmeneveninthisarea.Thisisinpartcausedbytheirconcentrationincertainfieldsofstudy,especiallythoseorientedtoservicesandthehumanities,whichrepresentasortof weakness, because of a general lower marketability of these sectors on the Italian labourmarket.Anyway,EmiliaRomagnaistheregioninwhichtheparticipationofwomentolabourmarketishigherandmoreequallydistributed inarange,which is inmostofcasesabovetheBarcelonatargetfixedbyUEof60%.Thus,thoseresultsmightsupportourhypothesisthatabetterwelfareprovisionhas resulted inaneasieraccess to labourmarket for thosewomenwhoarealreadywillingtoparticipatetoit.Infact,careprovisionsofRegionEmiliaRomagnaaremoregenerouscompared to other regions, thus resulting in a better level of services offered in localwelfaresystems (especially in Bologna). Plus, Emilia Romagna is one of the regions that investmoreresources in social expenditure, even if it’s surpassed by the autonomous regions such asTrentino/AltoAdigeorValled’Aosta(whichhavespecialregulationsandmoreresourcesfromthecentralstate).Ingeneral,regionallawsareentitledtosetstandardsforaccreditationoftheprivateactors,tofixcriteria foraccessanddeterminetheminimumqualitystandardsfortheservicesprovided,while municipalities provide services even if theymight add some local specifications in theguidelines.Thisschemehoweverisnotcompletelyvalidforlifelonglearningpolicies:evenifinthis domain the region is again themost important actor in planning policies, there is also acentral role fromprovince,whose responsibility is tomatch theRegionalGuidelineswith thespecific needs of the territory. As well as the other Italian regions, Emilia‐Romagna offersprivilegedaccesstocertaincategoriesinitswelfareprovisions,suchasaccessandintegrationofdisabledchildrenand forchildrenwithsocialandculturaldifficultiesandelderly thatare inaconditiondefinedasvulnerablebecausedisabled,abandonedorpoor.Thosearethecriteriabywhichfundsarethendistributedforsustainthedemandofthosefamiliesforpaidservices(asforexample,domiciliarycareforelderlypeopleorvoucherstopaycrèches).Caringresponsibilitiesareusuallyspreadamongdifferentandnon‐coordinatedpolicyfieldsandnational, regional and local agencies; being in need of care is a condition not defined by anynationallawwithcommoncriteria.Eachregionhasdefineditindifferentwaysandindifferentcontexts, sometimeswithin regional laws, sometimesbyadministrativenorms. Ingeneral, thelocal welfare system in Emilia Romagna is organised following regional guidelines, whichsubstantiallyactasasortofsoftstandardizationoftheofferatregionallevelthoughtthesystemofaccreditation.As longasregions in Italyareentitledmorewitharoleofcoordinationandplanning,mostofservicesaremanagedatlocalordistrictlevel;nevertheless,theroleofmunicipalitiesinthelocalwelfaresystemisquitedifferentregardingthetypeofpolicydomainwe’refocusingon.So,theoutstanding performance in terms of labourmarket integration of women has been possiblethanks to higher investments of Bologna’s municipal resources for families and childcarecomparetoothermunicipalities.Infact,childcareprovisionshavebeenstronglypromotedandthey’re still one of the most important elements of cost in the public budget of the city ofBologna.This investmenthaspermittedinthepasttodevelopstrongnetworksofcrèchesandkindergarten that aredirectlymanagedby themunicipality and also to start up experimentalservices, almost direct to deal with flexibility of the labour market and hours’ schedule ofparents.



Chart3–Coverageratesofservicesforchildrenunder3byregions,2009‐Source:ISTAT,dataonchildcareservicesBologna itselfhashadavery innovativeattitude towardschildcareservices,becauseofahighdemand of women that had already a strong attitude towards paid job, thanks also to anabundanceof jobsdueto thevital industrialenvironment.Withoutaffirmingthatonewasthecause of the other, we might anyway say that such fertile combination of cultural attitude,economic growthandwelfare systemhasmadeBolognaan exemplary city in Italy for femaleparticipation to labour market. In fact, Bologna has been the first city in Italy to implementmunicipalkindergartenin1906andthesamehappenedwithcrèches,whichwerefinancedandintroduced in thecityand inregionabout tenyearsbefore thenationalstateactuallysetupalawforthemin1971.Aswecanseefromthechartabove,EmiliaRomagnatopstherankinginItalybothincoverageandintakeuprates:about39%ofchildrenunder3yearsoldhaveaccesstothisservicecomparedto19%oftheItalianstandard.Nevertheless, such innovative attitude of local welfare system towards childcare isn’trecognizable in elderly care and lifelong learning domains. In fact, the system of elderly carepoliciesismainlybasedoncashtransfersandeveniftheprovisionsaremoregenerousthaninotherpartofItaly,thestructureofinterventionarebasedondelegatingcareresponsibilitiestofamily,withonly a financial supportof cash‐for‐care. For lifelong learning, instead, there isn’treally any additional resource or policy from local governance andmost of the interventionsderivesfromtheEuropeanSocialFund.Actually,thespecificroleofmunicipalityofBolognafordependencyinoldageistocoordinatewith thenationalhealthsysteminorder todeliverdomiciliaryservices. In fact,elderlycare isprovided in the public system mainly within social assistance policies and partly by healthpolicies with some integration among them, at least in home care. Plus, the municipality ofBologna make just the coordination of social workers unit, while access, management andevaluationofcasesaremoreterritoriallyspreadandat levelofneighbourhood(9 in thecity).This is a specific orientation of policy, which is aimed to be the nearest possible to citizens.Furthermore,as itsprimarygoalofpolicyintermsofelderlycare,EmiliaRomagnaregionhasbuiltasysteminwhichthepermanenceofelderlyathomeispromotedasmuchaspossible,inorder to avoid institutionalization in residential facilities: in this context,many resources areinvestedtosustainfamiliesinordertoprovidedomiciliarycare(mainlybytransfers).In Italy the concept of lifelong learning policy is quite recent, because just in 1993 the Law236/93for“Urgentstrategiestopromoteemployment”has introducedit inthegeneralpolicyframework. The central actor in the field of the LLL policies is the Region, since the largest



amountofpublicexpendituredevoted toLLL is fromEuropeanFunds (ESF).EmiliaRomagnaRegionsetsupthemainaimsofthepoliciesandplanstheserviceprovisioninaccordancewiththe Provinces, through special Agreements. The most recent one, “Agreement between theRegion and the Provinces 2011‐2013”, identifies the general objectives and the resources(regional, national and European) to implement those policies. The provincial planningmusttakeintoaccountthedifferentskillsandsocio‐economicfeaturesoftheprovince,alsoconsultingtogether with Unions and Employers’ associations. Nevertheless, for what it concerns LLLinvestments level, Italy is still late if compared toaverageUE. In facts, expenditureonhumancapitalinterestsjustasmallpercentageofpopulationinworkingageevenifthereisatendencytowardsthegrowthinthelastdecade.

Chart 4 – Rates of LLL participants on population 25‐64, comparison among Italy and UE27(2000/2005)‐Source:EurostatConversely, municipalities have weak competences on this area of policy (Riva, 2008). InprovinceofBolognatherearefewactionsdevotedtowomenaffectedbysocialdisadvantageandadvanced training courses on both traditional and innovative technical professions, wherewomenarestillunderrepresentedsuchasITCindustries.Actually,thismightbeaninterestingmeasure in order to reduce the horizontal and vertical segregation of women, which puts inquestiontheeffectivequalityofworkofwomenaffectedbytemporarycontracts,scarcechanceof careers and motherhood penalty. Despite those residual initiatives, however, most of theresourcesaredevotedtopassivepoliciesofwageintegration,whichareavailablejustforapartofworkersdependingonthetypeofcollectivecontractsandtheoccupationalstatusofworker(self‐employedandcollaboratorsareexcludedbyallthemeasures).Furthermore,duringthelasttwodecades,thepreferenceforpublicserviceshasdroppedoverallItaly and even in regionEmilia‐Romagna a strong attitude towards amoremixed systemhasemerged both at government level and in the public opinion thus giving the opportunity forcooperatives to enter themarket, now becoming the secondmost important provider in theregionafterthestate.Actually,thisisquiteaspecificfeatureofthisregionwhoseeconomyhasalways been livening up by the strong presences of cooperatives in all the economic sectors.Plus,inordertoanswertothesevereeconomiccrisis,theNationalGovernmentisplanninganausteritypolicy,whichisgoingtodefinelimitstoMunicipalityexpenditure.BecauseinBolognaelderlycareandchildcareservices(especiallykindergartens)representahugeexpenditureforthelocalgovernment,drasticchangesinthenextyearsmayoccurintheseareasofpolicies.Inaddition,thepostponementoftheretiringageduetotherecentreformofpensions(December2011)maydecreasethegrandparents’availabilitytotakecareabouttheirgrandchildren,whichinItalyhasstilltobeconsideredasanassetforwomenemployability.Similartrendsareoccurringforwhatitconcernstheservicesforelderlycare.ThemainsourceoffinancingisaNationalFundforDependency,whichhasbeencreatedatNationallevelin2006and distributed among regions (Costa, 2012b). This ring‐fenced fund, which had since thebeginningquitealowamount,hasbeenusedindifferentwaysatRegionallevelbutonlysome



regions like Emilia‐Romagna and Liguria have substantially increased their financialcommitment allocating their own specific resources to complement the National Fund. So, in2007EmiliaRomagnacreateditsownfundfordependentpeoplecalledFNRAinwhichnationalresources and regional ones have been collected. Such found represented the occasion tocompletely redesign the welfare systems for this population. It gave priority to improveresidentialservicesandtoincreasethecoveragerateofhomeservicesandcashtransferaswellas to develop innovative services, as for example e‐care services and consultancy for homeadaptationsforelderlypeople.From2008withtheelectionofthenewright‐wingcoalitionandtheworseningofthefinancialcrisis,however,resourcesbynationalstatehavebeendrasticallyreducedandin2011thefoundhasbeenabandoned.Suchcontractionofresourcesatnationallevelwillputinquestionthesustainabilityofsocialpolicies,whicharemanagedbyregionsbutfinanced nationally, especially in the poorest regions where there isn’t any additionalcontributionatlocallevel.Thissituationconstitutesaproblematicissuethatmightputinquestionthesustainabilityofthelocalwelfareatthepresentstateoffinancing.Withoutnationalresources,itmightbeimpossibletokeepthelocalwelfaresystemasitisnoworganizedinBolognaandsomeoftheserviceshavebeen already shrunken in 2011 and in 2012 (as for example, domiciliary care for elderly,regionaltransferforcash‐for‐careormunicipalkindergarten).ForwhatitconcernsLLL,thelargestpartoffundsavailableoriginatefromESF(67%),whiletherest is covered by companies’ investments and intervention of employers/trade unionsorganizations. So, LLLwill be less effected by the intervention of the austerity orientation ofItaliangovernment,butithasalreadybeenaffectedbytheshrinkingoffoundsforESF.

ThemissingintegrationOneofthebiggestproblemsinpoliciesinItalyistheirfragmentation,whichispartiallyduetothefactthatspecificdomainsquiterarelycoordinatewithothersandpartiallybecausetherearethree levelofgovernanceundernationalstate(regions,provinces,municipalities),whichhavedifferentcompetencies–justinsomecaseswithexclusivejurisdictions.Thecoordinationinthedomain of social policies should be done thought CTSS, which is a governance body of theprovinceofBologna,composedbythe50mayorsofthetownshipsofthearea.TheCTSSbodyisin charge of the planning, coordination, orientation and control of all the health, social andterritorial policies of the area and should be coordinating with the local health area of theprovince of bologna,whichmanage all the intervention for domiciliary care and dependency.However, the coordination is still a problematic issue and public bodies quite often don’tcoordinate.Ingeneral,eachofourdomainofinterest(childcare,elderlycareandLLL)it’ssupposedtohaveprivileged interlocutors, such as employment and economic development and combiningcompetitiveness with social protection for LLL or health prevention policies for elderly care.Nevertheless,evenwithinasinglegoal–asforexampledomiciliaryassistancefordependency–many different actors intervenes, just overlapping without keeping control of possiblesuperimpositions. In fact, even if in Italy resources are scarce, it is quite common thatmanyinterventionsfromdifferentactorsaredirectedtosolvethevulnerabilityofjustonecase,thusleavingothersjustwithoutsupportbecauseallresourceshavebeenalreadydevotedtothefirstone.Anyway,itmustbehighlightedthatcomparedtootherregions,EmiliaRomagnaistryingtodealwith this problemby setting up guidelines, coordination body and data collection at regionallevelandkeepingsocialassistanceatmunicipallevelastheonlygatekeeperforaccessingsocialinterventions. Although this effort, however, directors of different department aren’t reallyaware of what is happening outside their competencies and there isn’t really any survey tomonitorifthepeoplefollowedbyaservicereceiveotherformsofsupport.



WomenandWelfareThe localwelfaresystem inBolognahasbeendesigned forsupportingwomen inemploymentevenwhen theyare entitledwith childcare responsibilities. SuchattitudeofpolicydesignhasrewardedtheareaofBolognawiththehighestrateoffemaleemploymentinallItaly.However,thesameattentionforwomenisnotrelevantinelderlycare,sinceuntilnowfamilycarerhavebeenwomen already outside the labourmarket (such as pensioners), and in LLL, as long asimproving women in labourmarket is not considered a strategic goal. Especially for what itconcerns LLL, women aren’t considered a privileged target, as long as their rate of LMparticipation is already above the Barcelona standard, despite any deeper qualitativeconsideration of what type of occupation women actually are able to get. Moreover, the fewactivepoliciesaredependentonESFfoundsandlocalwelfaresystemisnotputtinganyspecificinvestmentsorpolicyorientationinthem.Fromouranalysiswecanconclude thatoneof themost importantassetsof the localwelfaresystemofBolognahasbeenaconspicuousinvestmentinservicesforchildcare,whichhasbeeneffective in reducing the gap in women participation to labour market. Despite this fact,however,wemustunderlinethatagoodprovisionofchildcarefacilitieshasnotresultedintoanincreasedfertilityrateofwomeninBolognacomparedtotherestofItaly,whichisstillquitelowingeneral(1,27)andlowercomparedtoregionEmiliaRomagna(1,46),Italy(1,40)andEurope(1,6)in2010,eveniftherehasbeenquitearepriseafteritslowestpeak(in1991,thenumberofchildrenperwomenwas0,85).Suchincreasefromearly‘90shasbeenmostlyduetomigrantsanda catchupof late thirtieswomenwhichhavehad theirmaternity later than thepreviouscohort.Furthermore, there are other issues thatmight still constitute a tension for thewomen livingthere.SuchasthegeneralItaliansystem,thelocalsystemofelderlycareishighlygenderedanditisdesignedespeciallyforfemalecarer;policiestakethissituationasamatteroffactanddon’tpromoteanyactiontoreducethegendergapincare.AlmostallthemeasuresdevelopedinItaly(suchascash‐for‐caresupport,dependencyinoldagegrantsfromregionEmilia,paidleavesformothers) just give financial transfers to families instead of promoting services. This is achallenge for women as long as they’re considered the natural caregivers. Furthermore, theimpact of local elderly care on female propensity to participate to labourmarket is still verymodestandatthepresenttimesitdoesnotdependsomuchonthelevelofcareservices.Indeed,inItalythedemographicchangehaspostponedthetimingofthedependencyandnowitusuallyregardsmostlyelderlyofabove80yearsold.Thisfactimpliesthatwomeninchargeofcareareusuallythechildrenofthoseelderly,agedbetween50and60yearsold,andtheyarequitelikelytobealreadypensioner(around60yearsold).Probably,beinginvolvedinelderlycareforthosewomenhas insteadanegativeeffectonchildcaremorethanreducingthepropensityonbeingactiveonthelabourmarket,becausethechildrenofthosewomencannotbefullysupportediftheir mothers are involved in their grandparent’s care. Plus, some policies, as for exampleZerododici(acash‐for‐careprogramforlowincomeparentswhowantstotakecaredirectlyoftheir children), might have a depressing influence on the participation of women to labourmarket,especiallyinthemostfragilecasessuchaslowincomesinglemother.Infact,favouringmothersthatstaysathometakingcareoftheirchildrenmightimplyamoredifficultre‐insertionofthemintothejobplaceafterthisperiod.Nevertheless, the Italian investments on cash‐for‐care instead of promoting services alwaysassumethattherewillbesomeonewhotakescareofthepersoninneedforcare;suchrolehasusuallybeenplayedbywomeninthepastandithasbeenstronglyfavouredbyanorientationoftheStatewhichhasallowedwomentobecomepensionerearlierthanmen(evenifthathashadasasideconsequencetohave lowerpensions).Thisequilibriumwillbeput inquestioninthenextyearsasthenewreformofpensionintroducedin2011reducedsuchpossibilityforwomen



to exit the labour market before men: in fact, women between 50/60 years old have had astrategic role in providing care in past and in the next decades theywill bemore andmoreoverloadedas longastheywillbeaskedtoparticipatein labourmarketwhiletakingcareofagrowingnumberofdependantsonasinglewomen.In fact, asdemonstratedby the chartbelow, theold agedependency ratio is growingall overEuropebutespeciallyinItaly.Moreover,Bolognaisexperiencingalreadyanemergencywithavalueof such index around40,but it doesn’t look like they’re trying to setupany innovativepolicytogetoverthemodelofcash‐for‐care.

Chart5–Dependencyintheoldageindex,bydifferentterritoriallevel,1995–2050(projections)‐Source:Eurostat,MinisterodelLavoro,ComunediBolognaAsa consequence, thedesignof Italianwelfare systemand thequite spreadmodelofdouble‐earning family inBologna has resulted in a high demand of care services unanswered by thestate, which at the present moment has been mainly filled by low‐cost migrants care workmigrating from lessdevelopedcountries (andmostlyemployed inunregulated jobs).Thishasjustpartiallysolvedtheproblemoffemaleoverload,aslongasfinancialtransferfromthestatehasbeenusedtopaythe lowcostcarework frommigrants thatmighthelpwomeninsustaincare(Costa,2012).Thephenomenon,anyway,hasbeengrowingconsistentlyunregulatedinthepastdecade.Togiveanidea,wehadanactofindemnityinItalyin2002inordertoregularizeworkers thatwere employed in family care: between2001 and2002migrant familyworkerspassed from 142.196 domestic services’ assistant to 419.808 (Catanzaro, Colombo, 2009). In2008, there has been another act of indemnity which has been oriented to regularizeunregisteredcaregiversanddomesticworker:therehasbeenabout300.000requestinallItaly(about 115.000 for carers), 6.500 of which just for the province of Bologna (Ministerodell’interno,2009).Infact,aswe’veseenintheintroductiontheItalianwelfarestateconsidersfamilyasthemainprovidercare,thusresultinginahighlevelofinformalfamilycarethatissupportedbythestatemainlythroughfinancialsupport.Migrantworkersarecentralinthismechanism,aslongastheyprovidethecareworkneededwhichisactuallypartiallycoveredbythecashforcaretransfersfromtheState,aslongasthereisalittledevelopmentofformalmarketprovision(Lyon,2009).Nevertheless, many scholars agree with the fact that only thanks to black market (andsubsequently low salary) Italian families have been able in the last years to combine femaleworkwithcare,thankstothissortofsoftmarketizationofservices.Briefly,ouranalysisoflocalwelfaresystemofBolognahasshownthateveniftherearespecificfeaturesofBolognacomparedtotherestof Italythatmakethisareaanexcellenceforwhat itconcerns the childcare provisions, still its localwelfare system is deeply rooted in the Italianapproach, mostly based on financial transfer and total delegation of care responsibilities tofamily. Women pay the price of such conservative orientation in welfare policies, by beingoverloadedbycarewhenthey’reintheir50s/60s.



ConclusionsIn the analysisofBologna localwelfare systemswehavebeenallow tohighlight the intrinsicgenderedapproachoftheItalianwelfaresystem.EvenifthesituationisbettercomparedtotherestofItaly–especiallyforthechildcareservicesofferedlocallybythemunicipality,womenandfamiliesarestillthemainwelfareproviderfortheirdependents.The features of Bologna can be summarized in some points. First of all, a good provisions ofchildcare facilities has resulted in a higher female participation to LM, but hasn’t got anyinfluence on fertility ratewhich remains still one of the lowest in Italy. Female propensity tomaternity should have been influenced by the good level of childcare services but it has notsignificantlybeenpromotedcomparedtotherestofItaly;thismighthelpusconcludethatthereareotherfactorsatstakesthatpreventswomentofullyengageinfamily,suchforexampletheinstabilityofjobswhichaffectswomenandyoungmorethanmenandthescarcepromotionofgenderequalitypolicies.More than investing on services, the past choices of Italian legislator has been oriented toprovide cash‐for‐care sustain to families. Bologna hasn’t departed from such an approach,especiallyinelderlycarethatisgenerallyorientedinkeepingdependantelderlywithinfamilieswithafinancialsupportbythestateoralimiteddomiciliaryassistance.Thisresultisduetobotha cultural orientation towards ‘ageing in place’ and to economic reasons, sinceinstitutionalization in residential facilities is more costly. The shrinking number of womenavailableforcareandtheincreasingnumberofdependants(bothchildrenandelderly)hasputintensionsuchequilibrium.Bynow,thishasbeensolvedbyastrongdiffusionofthemodelofco‐resident migrant familial assistant, which complements 50s/60s women in the everydaymanagementofdependants’needs.Anyway, it isstillunansweredhowwould itbepossibletomaintainitinthefuturewhenwomenwillbeaskedtobemoreactiveandforlongertimeinthelabourmarket,inthecontextofshrinkingresourcesforpublicservices.Labour Policies have been mostly oriented to passive measures, instead of promoting theactivationof people involved.Moreover, as a consequenceof the inequality of unemploymentprovisions,animportantpartoflabourforcehasbeentotallyexcludedbypassiveinterventions.Active policies have been mostly financed by ESF, in the substantial absence of a strongorientation of local public bodies; furthermore, women aren’t really considered as the maintargetofpoliciesaslongastheirparticipationtoLMisconsideredachieved.To conclude, gender inequality is still themost important factor that explains the quantity ofinformalworkprovidedwithinfamiliesinItaly,evenintheexemplarycontextofBologna.Theimportant role of women in combining reproductive role and labourmarket is still not fullyunderstoodbythepublicbodies,bothatlocalandnationallevels,whichsimplytendtodelegateallthecareresponsibilitiestofamilywithoutreallysupportthemwithservicesorbypromotingbetter policies for combining family responsibility and work. This situation is destined toworsen as long as there will be a postponing of age of retirement for women and a widergenerationgap,withaconcentrationofcareresponsibilitiesaslongastheoldagedependencyratiowillbecomeworseinthenextyears.TheconservativeorientationofItalianpolicies,bothatlocalandnationallevel,willprobablyputseriouslyinquestionthesustainabilityoftheactualcaremodel.



Bibliografia

Libri:

CatanzaroC.(2009).Badanti&co.IllavorodomesticstranieroinItalia,Bologna,IlMulinoeditore.CostaG.(2012a)‘Italy.AcaseofmissingreformsintheLTCarenaandincrementalinstitutionalchange’,inC.RancieE.Pavolini(eds).InstitutionalChangeinLongtermCareinEurope,Berlin,Springer.Esping‐AndersenG.(1990).Thethreeworldofwelfarecapitalism,Cambridge,PolityPress.FerreraM.(2006).Lepolitichesociali.L’Italiainprospettivacomparata,Bologna,IlMulinoeditore.KazepovY.(2011).‘Lepolitichesocio‐assistenziali’,inU.Ascoli(ed).IlwelfareinItalia,Bologna,IlMulinoeditore.Pfau‐EffingerB.,FlaquerL.,JensenP.H.(2009).Formalandinformalwork.ThehiddenworkregimeinEurope,Oxon,Routledge.RivaE.(2008).Ilwelfareattivoemiliano‐romagnolo,trapartecipazione,integrazioneeamministrazione,inColasantoM.,LodigianiR.(eds).Welfarepossibili.Traworkfareelearnfare,VitaePensiero,Milano

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CostaG.(2012b).IlLongTermCareinItalia:uncasodicambiamentoistituzionalegradualesenzariforme.RivistadellePoliticheSociali,n°1/2012,pp.50‐80.LewisJ.(2002).Genderandwelfarestatechange.EuropeanSocieties,vol.4,n°4,pp.331‐357.LyonD.(2009).Intersectionsandboundariesofworkandnon‐work’.EuropeanSocieties,vol.12,n°2,pp.163‐185.VanderLippeT.,DeRuijterJ.,DeRuijterE.,Raub,W.(2010).PersistentInequalitiesinTimeUsebetweenMenandWomen:ADetailedLookattheInfluenceofEconomicCircumstances,Policies,andCulture.EuropeanSociologicalReview,vol.27,n°2,pp.164‐179.

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Ministerodell’interno(2009).Dichiarazionediemersione.Sintesideirisultatidefinitivi[Online].Disponibilesu:http://www.stranieriinitalia.it/news/report1ott2009.pdf/MinisterodelloSviluppoEconomico(2011).Rapportosullacoesionesociale[Online].Disponibilesu:http://www.forumterzosettore.it/?action=documenti&id=254/

Rapportidiricerca:

CostaG.andMaestripieriL.(2012)‘MeasuringLocalwelfaresystemsandthewelfaremixinrelationtotheprovisionofcareforolderpeople’,WP3IntermediateReport,FLOWSproject(www.flows‐eu.eu).CuccaR.andSabatinelliS.(2011)‘Localpoliciestowardschildcareandthewelfaremixinrelationtotheprovisionofchildcare’,WP3IntermediateReport,FLOWSproject(www.flows‐eu.eu).CuccaR.andSaruisT.(2012)‘Localpoliciesandwelfaremixinrelationtoemploymentorientedlifelonglearning’,WP3IntermediateReport,FLOWSproject(www.flows‐eu.eu).

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