5a Strengthening development partner cooperation on green growth by Praveen Wignarajah-GGGI
IIRI-GGGI Workshop Final Report
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Transcript of IIRI-GGGI Workshop Final Report
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I. Executive Summary 4
II. Opening Session 6
III. Security Aspects of Climate Change 11
IV
.Current Responses to Climate Change in the Asia-Pacific 22
V. Increasing Accountability of Regional Organizations to 36
Address Climate Change in the Asia-Pacific
VI.AnnexProgram 48
List of Participants 50
Biography of Participants 52
This report summarizes the proceedings of the workshop as interpreted by the editors,
Dr. KIM Sung-han and Dr. CHUNG Suh-Yong. Participants neither reviewed nor approved this report.
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4
SecurityImplicationsofClimateChangeintheAsia-
Pacific
The Asia Pacific region is regarded as one of the
most vulnerable regions to climate change. A large
number of the population is located in the coastal
region which is being threatened by the sea level
rise. The melting Himalayan glacier has raised
concerns over the vast change of ecological
environment as well as the loss of human habitat.
Without appropriate climate change tackling
measures, the Asia-Pacific region will face various
problems including emergence of climate
refugees, lack of drinking water, increased poverty,
and more gravely, regional conflicts over limited
resources.
In fact, on the national level, several efforts have
been made in order to tackle climate insecurities.
For example, in Indonesia, various regulatory
measures and mitigation action plans have been
introduced to reduce the negative impact of
climate change. Yet, in order to achieve more
effective results in addressing climate change
and to secure more resources, it is necessary for
Indonesia to ensure the wider participation of all
stakeholders. In China, on the other hand, it
seems that there is not enough consensus
among the different fields regarding the security
implications of climate change as a threat to its
national security. While environmental groups
have been constantly emphasized on the
necessity of addressing climate insecurities, there
are other groups of people who have continuously
raised questions on whether perceiving climate
change issue as a threat to national security is
credible or not. At the sub-regional level in
Southeast Asia, ASEAN has developed several
policy initiatives on mitigation, adaptation and
disaster alleviation, and their effort has become
evident at 2007 ASEAN declaration on climate
change, energy and environment. However,
implementation of regional initiatives in ASEAN
remains weak because of insufficient capabilities
of member countries, incomparability of climate
change policies with other policies, and lack of
clarity on the security implications of climate
change at the sub-regional level. On the other
hand, Korea has developed adequate policy
measures to deal with climate change issues by
introducing Low Carbon Green Growth policy.
Different from other countries and the sub-
regions, strong political will from the head of the
government has made the Korean case
distinctive from other ones.
Except the Korean case, all of the cases discussed
above have demonstrated that there are common
problems on current efforts in tackling climate
change in both country and sub-regional levels.
The common problems are:
Lack of full participation of relevant stakeholders,
Lack of understanding on climate change as a
possible threat to national and/or regional
stability, and
Limited resources to implement policies to tackle
climate change.
Therefore, an innovative approach needs to be
introduced in building adequate climate change
Executive Summary
I
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Executive Summary 5
governance in the Asia-Pacific region. Adequate
utilization of existing regional organizations, such
as Asian Development Bank (ADB) and Global
Green Growth Institute (GGGI), may be an
immediately available option since they may
secure more resources through the bottom-up
approach based on the Public-Private Partnership
(PPP). In order to ensure the economic growth
while implementing climate change policies, such
as low carbon green growth policy, the
development of policy measures is necessary to
mobilize more political will and resources
throughout the sectors. Developing countries
need to build their capacities in tackling climate
change, and prudent efforts also need to be
developed through the effective Official
Development Assistance (ODA) policy
coordination. This policy coordination would
secure financial resources from the private
sectors and also link policies on climate change
adaptation to their economic development
policies. During this process, it is equally
important to consider the social dimension of the
issues.
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6
SecurityImplicationsofClimateChangeintheAsia-
Pacific
Good morning, ladies and gentlemen.
On behalf of Ilmin International Relations Institute, I
would like to say we are delighted to host this
workshop together with Global Green Growth
Institute. GGGI is a globally represented institute
dedicated to promoting compatibility between
economic growth and environmental sustainability.
Ilmin International Relations Institute is a member
of the Consortium of Non-Traditional Security
Studies in Asia (NTS-Asia) which is funded by the
Ford Foundation and directed by the S.
Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS)
in Nanyang Technological University of Singapore.
NTS-Asia has been providing an avenue for
scholars and policy-makers in Asia to discuss and
analyze NTS issues in the region such as climate
change, organized crime, human smuggling,
infectious disease, terrorism, etc.
As you may agree, those non-traditional security
problems cannot be effectively solved with
traditional forms of readiness and deterrence.
Thus, we need more constructive and
sophisticated forms of influence and intervention.
This constitutes the raison detre of cooperative
security in the post-Cold War era.
I believe this workshop is aimed at identifying the
nexus point between climate change and security
in the Asia Pacific region. There are several
emerging challenges for regional environmental
protection efforts: (1) a lack of multilateral
organizations to formulate and implement an
overarching environmental strategy; (2) the
insufficient resources of environmental protection
agencies; (3) unstable economic and social
circumstances in the majority of the countries in
this region and the relative lack of attention to
environmental problems; (4) the weak NGOs in
this region; and (5) the issue of sovereignty as a
stumbling block for regional cooperation.
The underlying cause of these challenges is the
lack of sensitivity and vulnerability towards
environmental problems in this region. Like the
d igita l divide,we are experiencing an
environment dividein this region. Some
countries are more sensitive and vulnerable than
Opening Session
II
Dr. KIM Sung-hanDirector,
Ilmin International Relations Institute,
Korea University, KoreaProfessor & Associate Dean,
Graduate School of International Studies,
Korea University, Korea
OPENING REMARKS
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Opening Session 7
others. The different level of sensitivity and
vulnerability cause a potential source of inter-state
conflict. Regional efforts to encounter this
problem, however, are minimal. The regional
environmental security complex in East Asia is
at best at the stage of a latent regional
environmental security complex,where the threats
are perceived only at the level of the regional
ecosystems alone (in other words, in the world of
science or social science only). At this stage, we
can say environmental threats are not socially
constructed in the region.
Against this backdrop, we, most of all, need to
prevent environmental threats from leading to
inter-state conflicts, and prepare appropriate
responses in case such conflicts do occur.
Environmental regime-building or regional
cooperation should thus be based on durable
research and a practical understanding that comes
from anempoweredepistemic community on
the environment. As you know, an epistemic
community is a network of professionals with
recognized expertise and competence in a
particular domain. An authoritative claim to an
epistemic community may consist of professionals
from a variety of disciplines and backgrounds.
Thus, an international epistemic community needs
to be empowered to deal with emerging
environmental security issues in East Asia as well
as in the Asia Pacific as a whole.
I hope this workshop will be successful in
recognizing the security implications of climate
change in the Asia Pacific. This workshop will
contribute to empowering the epistemic
community on climate change, thereby making it
possible for us to discover and implement effective
ways and strategies to deal with climate change on
a regional and global scale.
First of all, our Executive Director, Richard Samans
who was supposed to be here to deliver this
welcoming remark had another urgent mission to
attend to, so I will be delivering the welcoming
remarks on behalf of Mr. Samans.
Thank you all for coming to this new Global Green
Growth Institute. I would like to especially thank Dr.
Soogil Young, Chairman for the Presidential
Committee on Green Growth, and greatly
appreciate his participation and sharing his
precious time to join us for this workshop between
his busy schedules.
As Professor Sung-han Kim mentioned, the issue
of security and climate change is rather new to
us. If I remember correctly, the UK raised this
issue at the UN Security Council several years ago
in 2007. Today, climate change has been
recognized as an issue that involves not only
national but regional security aspects, and has
thus emerged as an issue which can be
considered to be in the scope of the UN Security
Councils work. I myself came back from the
UNFCCC negotiations currently taking place in
Bangkok, Thailand, just yesterday. At the
conference, GGGI had the chance to introduce
Dr. JUNG Tae YongDeputy Executive Director,
Global Green Growth Institute, Korea
WELCOMING REMARKS
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our activities through a press release. The
response from the international community was
evident, especially so among the Micronesia and
South Pacific Island countries, as they raised
security and climate change issues as a matter
closely related to their survival. We all know the
importance of this issue.
As you know, the Global Green Growth Institute
is a new born baby, just 9 months old, launched
last June. Earlier this year in January, GGGI held
its first international workshop calledGreen
Growth Expert Meetingwith the aim to produce
a report for the UN Security-Generals High
Level Panel on Global Sustainability, here in this
room. Todays workshop is the second of its
kind for GGGI, and GGGI is most happy to host
this event together with the famous Ilmin
International Relations Institute. I wish to have
very constructive and fruitful discussions today
on this very important issue of security and
climate change, with a special focus on the
Asia-pacific region.
In particular, I believe we can link the issue of
climate change security with GGGIs agenda. For
example, climate change security can be coupled
with sustainable development for developing
countries. Green growth, as GGGIs key agenda
and mandate, can also have profound
connections with the issue at hand. I hope we
can deliver such linkages on global green growth
issues through this workshop and further develop
the discussions hereon in. I am sure Professor
Suh-Yong Chung will lead this workshop with
expertise and also smoothly. GGGI hopes to
continue this kind of gathering and develop
meaningful messages to the global community.
Thank you.
Good morning, ladies and gentlemen:
I would like to begin by thanking the two co-hosts,
Professor Sung-han Kim and Mr. Richard
Samans. I thank them for inviting me to this
conference to offer congratulatory remarks for its
opening.
However, in my capacity as Chairman of the
Presidential Committee on Green Growth, I should
thank them more for having gathered leading
thinkers from around the Asia-Pacific to this
conference to exchange views on the very
important topic of Security Implications of Climate
Change in Asia-Pacific.
We, in Korea, or elsewhere in the world, have given
much thought to environmental, energy and
resource policy, economic growth and the
developmental implications of climate change in
recent years. The Korean governments proposal
of green growth, as well as its launching of the
Global Green Growth Institute have been an
outgrowth of President Lee Myung-baks own
deliberation on those dimensions of climate
change, as well as far-sighted prescriptions on
how to respond to climate change in addressing
SecurityImplicationsofClimateChangeintheAsia-
Pacific
Dr. YOUNG SoogilChairman,
The Presidential Committee on Green Growth, Korea
KEYNOTE SPEECH
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Opening Session 9
the concerns such analysis gives rise to.
It is obvious, however, that if we add up all of the
environmental, energy and resource policy, and
the economic growth and developmental
implications of climate change, we would end up
with a Pandoras box of security issues. And these
are very important and serious issues, not just to
Korea, but to every country in the world; a world
which Thomas Freedman very aptly describes as
hot, flat and crowded.
I would like to thank the organizers of this
conference for bringing this discussion to Seoul, in
particular.
The thought-leaders around the world and in the
Asia-Pacific region have already begun discussing
these issues. But as far as I know, this is the first
such discussion taking place in Korea. I welcome
this very much because I expect this conference to
help Korean thought-leaders begin thinking of
climate change and green growth from the security
perspective, and more fully recognize the
seriousness of climate change and the importance
of green growth as a remedy.
And, of course, adding on to the discussions of
the security implications of climate change in Asia
Pacific, this conference will further enrich the stock
of such analysis and hopefully make an impression
on political leaders in the region of the importance
of cooperating to launch an effective post-Kyoto
climate change regime in 2012, the final year of the
Kyoto regime.
In reality, the UN-sponsored negotiations on the
post-Kyoto regime has been fraught with
difficulties and obstacles. The situation is already
bad, and I am afraid that it may be made even
worse by the nuclear crisis that is still unfolding in
Japan. Japans nuclear crisis may greatly diminish
its nuclear power generation capacity for decades
to come and may deprive the Japanese
government of the will to contribute to a successful
climate change negotiation for some time.
What would be the consequences, and especially
the security implications, of an indefinite
stalemate of negotiations for the Asia-Pacific
region, and Northeast Asia, in particular? Is there
any way out of, or around this undesirable
eventuality? What could be the future of nuclear
power generation? Can alternative clean energy
sources be effectively and sufficiently produced to
make up for the energy gap due to diminished
nuclear generation?
While the global community is trying to moderate
this through such negotiations, climate change will
continue irregardless whether it be to a small
degree or a large one. Consequent stresses and
conflicts over energy resources, food, extreme
weather patterns, consequent natural disasters,
water stresses, health problems, and trans-border
migration would certainly bring serious security and
geopolitical challenges, both globally and
regionally. How should political leaders in the
region, especially those in Asia-Pacific countries
and those of Northeast Asia cope with these
challenges?
As Chairman of Koreas Presidential Committee
on Green Growth, I particularly welcome this
conference, and look forward to learning the
outcomes of the conference. This is because
todays discussion is expected to highlight the
potential role of green growth, seen both as
Koreas national strategy and a global strategy,
and as a remedy to address some of the
challenges of climate change. If so, in what way
can Koreas green growth strategy best be
exploited?
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The Global Green Growth Institute was established
to internationalize green growth for the benefit of
developing countries. It embodies an international
strategic response to the security challenges posed
by climate change. As such, what should be the
modus operandi of GGGI?
The Korean government is bidding to host COP 18
later next year. It is competing with Qatar, and the
winner of this bidding will be decided in June this
year. Assuming that Korea wins this bid, what
should Koreas ambition be on the outcome of
COP18? Korea achieved a success at the Seoul
G20 Summit in bridging the gap between
developing and developed countries in regards to
facilitating global cooperation. Will the Korean
government be able to repeat this success as a
bridge-builder on climate change cooperation at
COP18 if it hosts and chairs this? What should be
Koreas strategy as the chair country in steering
the negotiation process?
I have stressed this repeatedly, and highlighted
some specific issues which are on my mind,
hoping that they will be dealt with at this
conference.
I also did so in order to underline the timeliness
and relevance of this conference and its theme.
I would like to congratulate the organizers on this
conference. I also congratulate the speakers and
the participants of the conference for having
gathered to discuss all of these issues of absolute
importance.
I also would like to congratulate Mr. Richard
Samans for having joined the GGGI as its
Executive Director. I think that Chairman Seung-soo
Han of GGGI was lucky to have spotted Mr.
Samans and have successfully persuaded Mr.
Samans with his illustrious career in Washington
and at the World Economic Forum in Davos to take
up this role of critical strategic importance for such
a new international institution of a vital global
importance.
I also hope that you will soon begin to enjoy your
stay here in Korea. I am sure that all the
participants, from Korea and from around the
Asia-Pacific region, certainly including myself, will
enjoy working with you and help you enjoy your
new life in Korea and the Asia Pacific.
In closing, I hope that you will enjoy the
discussions, and that this will be a very successful
conference.
Thank you very much for your attention.
SecurityImplicationsofClimateChangeintheAsia-
Pacific
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III
Security Aspects of Climate Change 11
SecurityImplicationsofClimateChangeintheAsia-
Pacific
Security Aspects of
Climate Change
Session I
was chaired by Dr. KIM Sung-han, Director, Ilmin
International Relations Institute, Korea University and
the topic of this session wasSecurity Aspects ofClimate Change.
Global warming is a manifest and inevitable trend in the world of the 21st century. Much of this is
attributed to the accumulation of greenhouse gas emitted into the atmosphere since the industrial
revolution. Regardless of blame, however, the unchanging reality is that climate change will be an
ongoing challenge for decades to come. As changes in climate have generated unprecedented threats
to human society, it is time to look at this issue in terms of security. Below are the main points
discussed in the session:
Climate change has brought about significant changes in the Asia Pacific region, whether positiveor negative, some of which may have posed threats to regional stability.
Governments in the Asia Pacific region should to adapt to climactic changes, prepare for potential
threats within/out of their boundaries, and engage in regional cooperation to avert the
detrimental impacts of climate change and to prevent possible conflicts in the region.
Introduction
In its simplest form,national securityis the ability
of a state to protect its government and it people
from harm. Threats to national security can come
in many different forms, including foreign nations,
internal threats, or environmental changes.
Traditional threats generally arise from other
nations exercising physical force, while non-state
actors can also play a similar role. Natural events,
such as weather, earthquakes, or droughts also
cause harm to a nations stability and security.
Unlike traditional security threats, these can be
THREATS TO SECURITY FROM CLIMATECHANGE IN THE ASIA PACIFIC
Mr. Andrew HOLLANDResearcher,
International Institute for Strategic Studies, Washington, D.C
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even more dangerous because one cannot
negotiate with nature nor anticipate its moves.
Considerations of national security must also
include the stability arising from a peaceful
international system. National security and
international stability, therefore, are closely linked
for any country that relies on global trade and
investment.
Man-made climate change is the driving cause of
environmental changes that will ultimately lead to
changes in human society. Climate change
presents a comprehensive threat because it affects
many different areaswater supplies, food
production, energy use, migration, governance,
and others. These changes present threats to both
individual and national security by directly harming
human life and property, and to international
stability by causing migrations and shifts in
resource allocation, all of which can destabilize
fragile governments and incite conflict. The
security threats posed by climate change have
become a priority for policy planners, making it
necessary to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to
avert this trend.
The Asia Pacific Region
For this report, three Asian sub-regions were
examinedthe Tibetan Plateau, East Asia, and
South East Asia. These three regions are
undeniably linked, politically and geographically,
by the most important regional political actor,
China. This report also includes the Small Island
States on the Pacific Ocean, as they are uniquely
vulnerable to climate change, especially rising sea
levels and the bleaching of coral reefs. Their fate
is disregarded in the major powersinternational
security calculations, but they present an
important moral argument for action on climate
change.
The Science of Climate Change
Greenhouse gas emissions have grown
significantly since the 20th century. Evidence that
man-made emissions are responsible for recent
warming trends is robust, while predicting the
evolution and outcomes of climate change remain
difficult and ambiguous. Variability and uncertainty
are features of the climate system; no one knows
how quickly climate change will happen, or what its
specific effects will be. At the long-term global
level, the picture is becoming clearer as climate
scientists update their computer models with more
accurate measurements and a greater
understanding of the climate system. However,
security planners do not operate over century-long
periods, and cannot rely exclusively on computer
models as this can create a false sense of security.
International efforts to reduce emissions over the
next decade will determine the climate of the
second half of the 21st Century, but most of the
warming until 2050 islocked inby the cumulative
emissions of the past two centuries. Therefore, the
world should prepare for a consistent warming of
at least 0.2Celsius per decade. In addition, there
is a dangerous possibility ofpositive feedback
where the ecological system, itself, intensifies
global warming. Variability over the short term and
uncertainty over the long term will continue to be
features of the climate system. Instead of relying
on models to erase that uncertainty, planners and
policymakers will have to embrace it, noting that
long-term predictions can be wrong.
The Physical Effects of Warming in the
Asia Pacific
Global climate change has already had definite
and observable effects on the environment in the
Asia Pacific region. Most glaciers have shrunk,
plant and animal ranges have shifted, ice on rivers
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Pacific
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Security Aspects of Climate Change 13
and lakes break up earlier in the year, and trees are
flowering earlier as well. Climate change may
already be changing weather and precipitation
patterns. While individual events cannot be
definitively attributed to climate change, some
scientists claim that these events were so far
outside the historical norm that they could only be
explained by man-made climate change. The
impacts of global warming will vary in their severity,
duration, and extent across the region.
Increased temperatures will speed up evaporation,
increasing the total amount of rainfall across Asia.
This will be far from universal, however, and we
should also expect increased seasonal variability.
Warming is likely to be most pronounced on the
Tibetan Plateau. This region is warming almost
twice as fast as the rest of the world. Sometimes
calledthe Third Pole,the Himalayas and the vast
Tibetan Plateau are the source for at least 10 of
Asias major rivers. Thus, climate change in East
Asia will manifest itself primarily though changes in
water supplies. Scientists predict that the
Southeast Asian region will experience temperature
increases below the global average, but remain
highly vulnerable to increases in sea levels. In
addition, calculated effects of warming on tropical
monsoon rains are highly uncertain. Some
scenarios predict a stronger monsoon with heavier
seasonal rain, while others see the annual cycle
being cut-off completely. This region should
expect climate change to cause greater annual
volatility in seasonal rains.
Climate Change and Security in the
Asia Pacific
The effects of climate change listed above are not
occurring in a vacuum: across the Asia Pacific
region, warming temperatures will be
accompanied by rapid population growth,
pollution, urbanization, resource shortages, and
energy price increases. Analytically, it is difficult to
separate the effects of climate change from these
and other factorsincluding food shortages,
migration, and ethnic tensionsthat could drive
violence. However, the regional impact of climate
change on water, energy, and agriculture will
make it athreat multiplierthat is likely insufficient
to cause conflict on its own, but could be one of
several drivers of conflict over the next few
decades. There are three particular scenarios that
are most likely to drive instability: acute natural
disasters, conflicts over scarce resources, and
climate-induced migration.
Regarding acute natural disasters, climate change
is expected to increase the severity, duration, and
frequency of extreme weather events. Typhoons,
floods, and droughts can damage private
property, public infrastructure, and cause
casualties. Due to these threats, governments
have increasingly called upon their militaries to
respond to natural disasters. Although not a
climate-related disaster, the unprecedented,
wide-scale deployment of the Japanese Self-
Defense Forces in response to Marchs
earthquake and tsunami should be seen as a
model for how nations will call upon their armed
forces amid widespread devastation. Militaries are
not generally trained for such humanitarian
missions, but their organizational ability and lift
capacity give them a unique ability to rapidly
respond. Single events, no matter how
overwhelming, are unlikely to harm the stability of
a state, but repeated events will eventually wear
down the capacity and will to respond. In addition,
the American military is currently the only military
that has the sea and air lift capacity along with
forward deployed troops to be able to respond to
mass casualty humanitarian events around the
world. The US Navy is always deployed in both the
Indian and Pacific Oceans, and can be a
humanitarian stabilizing force for its allies.
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Being central to almost all economic activity,
changes in water resources will be the most visible
impact of climate change on human society
across the Asia Pacific. Predicted rainfall changes
and droughts could turn inland marginal farming
and grazing lands into deserts, while annual
reductions and seasonal variability in river flows will
cause water shortages in areas that lack consistent
rains. This means that while some places are
parched, others will be cursed with an
overabundance of rain. In East Asia, competition
and disputes over trans-boundary water flows
along the Mekong River are already a realitywith
those in downstream countries blaming Chinas
aggressive dam-building for abnormally low flows
in 2010. Water shortages or imbalances of water
distribution can also lead to civil conflict in
marginalized societies, such as low-levelwater
riotssome leading to deathsthat were seen
last year in Indonesia and the Philippines. A
second resource that could be made scarce by
climate change is food. Like water resources,
history shows little record of food shortages
causing interstate wars, but there is a long history
of domestic disturbances that are at least partially
catalyzed by price increases of staple foodsfrom
Revolutionary France to todays revolutions in the
Middle East.
The number of climate migrants is potentially as
large as it is uncertain. The accounting will be
nearly impossible, as the decision to migrate is a
complex one, affected by many factors. When
climactic changes, resource shortages, and
conflict make the local environment to inhospitable
to live, migration will be a rational response.
Temporary migration as an adaptive response to
climate stress is already apparent in many areas.
Most migrants stay within their home country,
where they move from the countryside to the city,
where economic potential is often higher. Conflict
between migratory herders and stationary farmers
over well waterexacerbated by tribal, ethnic, and
religious differencesis widely cited as the spark
that began the Darfur crisis.
Recommendations
We can expect the climate to continue warming for
at least the next 30 years. Adapting to the effects
of climate change will therefore be necessary,
especially in the formation of long-term plans.
However, in many countries around the Asia
Pacific region, there is a tendency to think that
heavy infrastructure investments, like dams and
sea walls will be enough to protect the population.
We must be careful that such investments do not
merely provide a sense of security similar to the
sea walls in Fukushima Prefecture. Instead, such
adaptation measures need to address the
following:
Water:To reduce the threat of social conflict,
water should be at the center of climate
adaptation efforts. Water supplies will be heavily
reduced by climate change in drought-prone
areas, and water shortages are a likely cause
of conflict around the world. Therefore,
infrastructure investments and policy changes
that can more efficiently deliver, store, and
distribute water should be prioritized. In addition,
where water supplies cross borders, negotiating
water sharing agreements should be a priority.
Food:Food production in Asias major rice and
wheat producing regions will be adversely
affected by climate change. Positive benefits of
warming such as a longer growing season in
northern regions are possible. However, the result
will be declines in yields for the two most
important crops in this region. Achieving a secure
food supply will become a challenge for more
countries because of a combination of increased
prices and shifting areas for viable food
production.
SecurityImplicationsofClimateChangeintheAsia-
Pacific
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Security Aspects of Climate Change 15
Migration:One solution would be to classify
migrants asrefugees,granting them officially
protected status. However, there is significant
resistance to this idea because it could
overwhelm the already stressed international
refugee system. For this to work, certain areas
would have to be designated as official sources
of climate migrants, otherwise any migrant would
seek to proclaim himself as a protectedclimate
refugee.On the other hand, planned migration
is a rational adaptation to climate change. Within
some large East Asian countries, planned
migrations away from low-lying shorelines and to
newly productive land could be beneficial over
the long-term, but would require significant
dislocation in the short-term.
Conclusion
One of the most pressing concerns will be to
discourage counterproductive solutions. Countries
are tempted to isolate themselves from problems
beyond its borders. However, resilience is built
through strong international cooperation. Planners
should adapt their thinking to meet the modern
threats posed by climate change. This will require
new doctrines, mindsets, and equipment. The
challenges will be significant, and will include the
protection of infrastructure, humanitarian
assistance, resource wars, and the protection of
the global commons. Notably, many of these
missions are best addressed by civilian
departments of government rather than by the
military. Addressing climate change will require a
whole of governmentfocus. Instead of isolating
climate efforts intosecurity missionsand non-
security missions, adaptation, mitigation,
international aid, and crisis response should all be
planned jointly across governments.
Introduction
Natural disasters, in particular hydro-
meteorological disasters, have increased in
frequency. It is debated whether this increase in
extreme weather events is the result of climate
change, but it has been shown to be a strong
accelerator.Climate change is expected to
increase the frequency, intensity, and duration of
many types of extreme events such as floods,
droughts, and tropical cyclones, which will have
implications for human security. Unmitigated
climate change beyond 2 C will lead to un-
precedented security scenarios and is likely to
trigger a number of tipping points leading to further
accelerated, irreversible, and unpredictable climate
changes.
The newly recognized socio-economic aspects of
climate change and the implication for sustainable
development will include greater detail on regional
effects of climate change as well as risk
management within the framing of a response.
The wordsecuritizationdescribes the process by
which issues are incorporated into the security
agenda, which is increasingly the case with
SECURITY ASPECTS OF CLIMATECHANGE
Ms. Wan Portia HAMZAHSenior Fellow,
Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS),
Malaysia
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climate change. Current approaches to security
range from traditional concepts to broader
understandings of human security. However, there
are concerns that environmental challenges will
become militarized if traditional security institutions
take up the issue. This will depend on how climate
change will come to be framed. Because the Asia
Pacific region is one of four regional hotspots to
be increasingly affected by climate change, how
governments will address theclimate security
issue remains a question. It will be necessary to
trace the linkage between climate change and
security, identifying regional impacts (focus on the
ASEAN region), and outlining some strategic
responses to the security aspects of climate
change.
Climate Change: A Security Threat?
Stability within and among nations is often a
means to avoid full-scale military conflict and
ensure national security. As such, priority is given
to protecting stability and creating it where it does
not exist. Too often, however, threats to national
security are no longer linked to military conflict but
emerge from other sources including economic
instability, social inequality, out-break of infectious
diseases, refugee movements, transnational
organized crime, climate change, and degradation
of the natural environment. Likewise, climate
change is not just an environmental issue, but a
multidimensional challenge. Climate change will
impact countries differently, presenting diverse
security challenges such as mounting potential for
conflict and an increase in social tensions. Climate
change can also act as a threat multiplier in some
of the most volatile regions of the world, adversely
affecting all levels of social life and the entire
spectrum of human security and regional stability.
Three fundamental levels of security can be
identified:
Level 1:Climate change poses a threat to
human security particularly in societies that are
already marginalized. For the millions of poor in
the region, they will be the least resilient and least
able to adapt. Poverty will exacerbate climate
insecurities. Climate change will therefore
undermine the achievement of the Millennium
Development Goals, including those on reducing
poverty and achieving sustainable development.
Level 2:Internal security concerns the extent to
which climate change will influence violent intra-
state conflict, either between different population
groups or social groups within a state. There have
been a number of studies, but to date,
environmental factors have rarely led directly to
violent conflicts or problems of internal security.
Level 3:International security relates to potential
conflict between states. Issues of international
security that are influenced substantially by climate
change include potential conflicts of interest over
the use of water as well as regional destabilizing
events that may result from the collapse of states
or violent conflicts within states.
Assessments of the linkage between climate
change and potential conflict are complex, but
climate change is considered to be a potential
factor in destabilization and conflict. Climate
change functions as an additional stress factor on
societies that are already fragile as a result of
geographical location, dependence on natural
resources, and lack of financial or institutional
support. In other words, in weak and fragile states
with poorly performing institutions and systems of
government, climate change is likely to overwhelm
local capacities to adapt to changing
environmental conditions and will reinforce trends
towards general instability that already exists in
such societies and regions. States can and do play
a critical role in creating stable conditions and
providing people with the means to respond to
adversity. But, in general, wealthier countries and
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individuals will be better able to adapt to the
impacts of climate change; whereas societies with
weak adaptive capacity will be most severely
affected. It is the poorest countries, in particular,
that are the most vulnerable, meaning that climate
protection measures must be integrated into their
development policies.
Projected Regional Climate Change
The 2009 Asian Development Bank study estimates
temperature increases throughout the Southeast Asia
region and water resources to become increasingly
unstable. Indonesia, Thailand and Vietnam are
particularly vulnerable, and while no measures have
been taken to control climate change, rice
production in these countries could fall by 50
percent. There is a great deal of natural climate
variability in Southeast Asianatural variations in
monsoon frequency and intensity are tied to the El
Nino Southern Oscillation (ENSO), but future
changes to ENSO remain uncertain. Variations in the
intensity and occurrence of tropical cyclones due to
climate change will impact precipitation changes in
affected areas, but again there is significant
uncertainty to potential changes in tropical cyclone
occurrence and intensity. Sea levels also rose in
Southeast Asia at rates of up to 3cm per year
between 1993 and 2001, and sea levels are
projected to rise up to 40 cm in the 21st century.
Climate change induced increases in sea level are
problematic for Southeast Asia as highlighted
earliersince the region is comprised largely of low
lying coastal and island nations. Increases in sea
level will also impact river deltas, increasing flooding,
coastal erosion, and salt intrusion.
Impacts of Climate Change
Southeast Asia is reported to be one of the worlds
most vulnerable regions to climate change due to
several geographical factors. These include long
coastlines, concentration of people and economic
activities near coastal areas, and heavy reliance on
climate-sensitive sectors such as agriculture,
fishing, forestry, tourism, and natural resources.
Climate change impacts on natural and human
systems are interrelatedfor instance rising sea
levels cause salt intrusion into river deltas, which
adversely affect agricultural activities, drinking
water availability, and population patterns. The
socio-economic consequences at macro and
micro levels will, in turn, affect human livelihoods.
The economic implicationssuch as loss of
agricultural land and the need to re-engineer port
facilities, energy infrastructure, and transportation
systemsare enormous.
The 2009 Climate Change Vulnerability Mapping for
Southeast Asia identified the most vulnerable areas
to climate change: all regions of the Philippines;
the Mekong Delta region of Vietnam; almost all of
Cambodia; North and East Lao PDR; the Bangkok
region due to exposure to sea level rise; and west
and south Sumatra, as well as western and eastern
Java in Indonesia. The Philippines is uniqueit is
exposed to many elements including tropical
cyclones in the northern and eastern parts of the
country, floods in central Luzon and Southern
Mindanao, and landslides due to the terrain as well
as droughts. Although Cambodia is relatively less
exposed to direct climate hazards, except for areas
bordering the Mekong Delta, the study finds that all
provinces in Cambodia are vulnerable because of
their low adaptive capacity. Central Jakarta, despite
having the highest adaptive capacity, ranks first in
overall vulnerability because it is at the intersection
of virtually all the climate-related hazards, and is
among the most densely-populated. Vietnam is
susceptible to cyclones, but because of its high
adaptive capacity is not listed. Adaptive capacity
certainly has an important role in changing the
spatial pattern of vulnerability, but that ways in
which countries respond will be important.
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Focus on the Energy-Food-Water
Security Nexus
In terms of energy security, it is often said that
nuclear is the only option because of its proven
power production. Serious complications cannot be
denied, however, ranging from increasing costs to
security against nuclear terrorism and illegal trade of
nuclear materials. Within ASEAN alone, Indonesia,
Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Thailand, and
Vietnam have all declared plans to develop nuclear
power. Following the recent nuclear incident in
Japan, however, several countries have begun
reviewing such plans. Vietnam, considered the
advancerwith eight reactors planned, has
indicated that it will go forward with its nuclear
plans. Indonesia, which has four nuclear reactors
planned, has done likewise. China has suspended
approval for new nuclear power stations and is
carrying out checks at existing reactors under
construction. China is reported to be currently
building 27 new reactorsabout 40% of the total
number being built around the world. Within
ASEAN, Agreement on Southeast Asian Nuclear
Weapon Free Zone (SEANWFZ) needs to be better
enforced, along with work on an early warning
system for nuclear accidents, and regional
emergency preparedness and response plan.
Food insecurity has strong implications on the
political stability and security of states, both as a
cause and effect. A lack of political or social
stability can jeopardize long-term food security.
Likewise, food insecurity can lead to political and
social instability and, in turn, threaten a regimes
survival. The food riots in Indonesia and the
Philippines are prime examples. It is important to
highlight that food security embodies a complex
set of intertwined concerns and issues. Climate
change has the potential to exacerbate competing
demands for water and land for agriculture. In
addition, there is a disturbing trend of increased
rural-urban migration creating wider disparities
between urban and rural populations, especially
within the Southeast Asian region. It has also been
observed that many households are small farmers
who have become net food consumers rather of
producers. Climate change and weather variability
would also impose significant stress on and
exacerbate vulnerabilities to water supply
throughout the region.
Strategic Response to Security Aspects
of Climate Change
As a first step, it is necessary to shift our thinking
on the relationship between climate change and
security, and reassess priorities and hotspots
regarding security impacts of climate change on a
regional level, such as the followings: (1) Climate-
induced degradation of freshwater resources (2)
Climate-induced decline in food production (3)
Climate-induced increase in storm and flood
disasters and (4) Notable rise in environmentally-
induced migration. The next step is to identifyno-
regretspolicies, i.e. those we would not regret
having pursued even if the consequences of
climate change prove less severe than predicted.
This translates into planning for adaptation, but
therein remains a critical dilemmait is impossible
to prepare for all potential threats and warn about
all potential catastrophic impacts. How will security
concerns address the issue? It is important that
support for adaptation measures related to
hotspots and vulnerabilities be provided in key
areas. A sensible adaptation strategy is to develop
capacity to cope with change. Some adjustments
are therefore necessary and depend not only on
the physical or geographical location, but even
more so on the level of social and economic
development, existing capabilities, institutional
support, and social organization. In order to
respond appropriately, systematic assessment of
possible risksin terms of time frame, scale, and
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Security Aspects of Climate Change 19
frequency of threats, as well as the degree of
vulnerability must be carried out.
The threat of climate change creates opportunities
for constructive engagement for capacity building
and stability operations. There is a need to build
the nations militarys capabilities to support
civilian government agencies and enhance good
governance. As observed in the recent disaster in
Japan, providing aid in the aftermath of such a
disaster can help preserve stability in the nation
and region. Hence, deployments of the military to
provide disaster relief, humanitarian assistance and
stability operations would mean that the military
must be prepared. At the same time there must be
arrangements for policymakers and intelligence
analysts to use informational systems to gather
environmental data. Increasing the knowledge
base will help to create a better understanding of
the security concerns. Adaptation initiatives overlap
considerably with disaster risk reduction by
employing similar tools to analyze and address
climate-related impacts.
The challenge posed by climate change is beyond
what any one country can address on its own,
requiring cooperation at all levels. Countries within
the region are also very diverse in terms of
development, governance, administrative capacity,
expertise, and know-how. At the same time,
countries are facing challenges of sustainable
development, poverty reduction, management of
water and energy resources, and so forth.
Commitment and cooperation through multilateral
climate diplomacy must be pursued, including
regional dialogue on climate change scenarios and
strategies. Engagement in preventive diplomacy
and taking proactive measures will be important in
dealing with mutual threats. The way climate
change policies are framed is also important. South
Korea has successfully framed climate change in
terms of opportunities forgreen growthand
winning public support as well as international
prestige. Thelow carbon, green growthstrategy
of creating new jobs and promoting technology is
the basic recipe for addressing the root cause of
climate change. The launching of theGreen New
Dealstimulus package aimed at promoting low
carbon green growth has caused a ripple effect
around the region.
Concluding Remarks
The challenge for the region and for those with
interests or stakes in the region is to build greater
collaboration among nations. Many of the
problems will not be solved unless there is
coordinated action at the regional level, as well as
an exchange of information and joint-capacity
building initiatives. The security implications of
climate change cannot be tackled unless security
discourses which outline the problems,
information, and means to deal with the issues are
addressed. In the West, more traditional security
actors are involved in discussions on the issue but
this is not the case in Southeast Asia. The framing
of climate security issues must also be judiciously
carried out to encourage the region to respond to
future challenges.
Id like to express my gratitude for participating as
a discussant in this session. I have read the two
papers and they were very well-written and very
well updated on the nexus between climate
change and security threats. I agree with multiple
points they have made; I agree that we need a
whole government approach, and agree that we
Dr. LEE GeunProfessor,
Seoul National University, Korea
SESSION DISCUSSION
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need greater international cooperation,
enhancement of mitigating and adaptive
strategies, government capacity, more
infrastructure investment, a well-functioning robust
global market, development of technologies, and
all the challenges we have discussed. However, I
studied this issue until about 4-5 years ago, and
for the past decade, have unfortunately not found
any new findings to be particularly theoretical.
Security threat analysis related to climate change
has been discussed for many years and here lies
the problem; there has been no further
advancement of the discussion. Before I go on
about this issue, I have two questions.
First, there is the issue of nuclear energy. Climate
change will bring about more natural disasters,
while economic change will demand more energy
and nuclear plants. It is therefore problematic that
nuclear disasters could occur due to nuclear
energy. Nuclear energy is not compatible with
natural disaster, as we have experienced with
Japanese case, and this exposes the
contradiction. I see this is in the context of a policy
problem, and would like to ask how we can solve
this problem.
Second issue is the contradiction of the security
implication in military preparedness. As we are
discussing both traditional and non-traditional
security, I would like to make the connection
between the two. A military consumes a lot of
energy, as well as an enormous amount of fossil
fuels. It also destroys the environment through
training, drills, bombings, and such. They not only
create natural disasters but artificial disasters as
well. Can we expect the military to quickly shift
from fossil fuels to alternative energy resources?
How can we catch both rabbitsmilitary
preparedness and climate changeat the same
time?
I also have two comments. One is a very
interesting observation related to the earthquake in
Japan. Many people are saying that Northeast Asia
is the most uncertain area in terms of security
threats. Japan was almost paralyzed by the
earthquake. Its government was not well
functioning. Japan is surrounded by many hostile
nations; North Korea and China. However, North
Korea gave aid to Japan and China also
cooperated with Japan. As such, the natural
disaster in Japan and its malfunctioning
government did not create any new security threat
in the region. Perhaps the Northeast Asia may not
be that unstable as we believe, because one
nation was hit by a natural disaster, yet every
nation around that particular country helped.
Secondly, security threats of climate change are
particularly intertwined with both risks and
opportunities. We see many opportunities for
construction companies, insurance companies,
environmental industries, related technology, and
so forth. Therefore, I am quite optimistic that
market forces, its actors and activities, will adapt to
these changes.
Finally, I would like to suggest not using security
terminology, but to use safety terminology. Rather
than to have security discourses, policy makers
should engage the issue of climate change as a
safety discourse. First, this is due to mismatch of
time frames, as Andrew Holland stated. Climate
change issue should be treated in the long-term,
in other words, as safety discourses. Secondly,
people do not have the same sense of reality when
climate change issue is handled as a security
issue. Therefore, for government operations be
more compatible with the reality, safety terminology
seems more appropriate.
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Security Aspects of Climate Change 21
I assume unanimous consent that we will have to
pay attention to and cooperate for the growing
challenges from climate change, the environment,
and energy as a combined issue. I would like to
discuss this non-security agenda from the
perspective of a traditional security researcher. It is
necessary to discuss ways to utilize traditional
security methods to respond to non-traditional
security issues.
Our approach has to begin from the fact that
traditional and non-traditional securities are highly
interconnected. Climate change has influenced the
military and national security to a great extent. The
United States has claimed this issue as important
to its security through Quadrennial Defense Review
(QDR) and National Security Strategy (NSS), and
the Korean military has taken a similar approach.
Climate change also affects the customs and
traditions that were commonly practiced in the field
of traditional security. In a military operation, the
most decisive factors are preparation for battle,
weather (climate), and geography. Considering
that climate change has modified two of these
factors, I estimate that militaries will come up with
new measures and tactics to cope with the effects
of climate change.
The second problem concerns the roles military
forces can take in natural disasters and ways to
pursue cooperation among countries. Historical
examples have shown that a military force can play
a crucial role in case of a natural disaster. Although
the primary mission of the military is military
operation, it has recently been extended to
humanitarian affairs. It is necessary, therefore, to
extend the role of the military into non-traditional
areas and to seek cooperation between states.
Militaries also should practice joint-operations to
build not only operational capacity but also trust
between states. The Korean military has
participated in a number of humanitarian
operations and is planning to increase its own
contribution.
The third point is that the very concept of security
has to change. Traditional security emphasizes
military threats; but now is the time to expand this
scope to a more cooperative and comprehensive
one. Unfortunately, I do not see much cooperation
being made, likely because of differing
circumstances that countries face. It is crucial,
however, to overcome these differences, and I
expect that cooperation can be built once
countries reach a consensus based upon shared
experiences. Governments also need to seek
cooperation with non-governmental sectors so
that responses can be more multi-dimensional
and effective.
Fourth, I get the impression that climate change is
something inevitable. If so, potential measures will
be narrowly confined to reducing the pace and
impact of climate change. I would like to hear
expertsopinions regarding this idea. Lastly, it is
inappropriate to deal with climate change from a
regional perspective because it is indeed an
international concern. It is necessary to find the
best approach for international and regional
societies to maximize cooperation and adjust to
climate change.
Dr. CHOI KangProfessor,
Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security, Korea
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SecurityImplicationsofClimateChangeintheAsia-
Pacific
Introduction
Indonesia is perhaps one of the most vulnerable
countries to climate change in the Asia Pacific
region. It is the biggest archipelagic country with an
expansive coastline stretching 81,000 km, a total
area of 790 Ha of which only one-third is land; a
total population of 237 million people, and large
metropolitan cities located mostly in the coastal
areas. Indonesias tropical climate conducive to
monsoons, and geographic location extending
across the Inter-tropical Convergence Zone (ITCZ)
results in strong squalls, frequent and heavy rainfall,
Current Responses to Climate Change
in the Asia-Pacific
V
Session II
was chaired by Ms. Wan Portia HAMZAH, Senior Fellow,
Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS)
Malaysia and the topic of this session wasCurrentResponses to Climate Change in the Asia-Pacific.
Climate change in the Asia-Pacific region has vast security implications on its social and economic
infrastructure. The influx of recent natural disasters and their accompanying side effects has caused
countries in this region such as Indonesia, China, and Singapore to begin implementing domestic and
transnational strategies to counter climate change. Efforts in the Asia-Pacific thus far have proven
successful in limited spheres, but a consensus among all parties involved is yet to be seen. Key topics
in this session include the following:
Efforts related to climate change need to be multifaceted, including both policies for mitigation
and adaptation.
Climate change policy needs to address all affected parties, particularly the marginalized
populations most vulnerable to climate changes negative impacts.
A consensus on the actual nature and influence of climate change must be reached before any
major policy measures can be pursued.
INDONESIAS RESPONSES TO CLIMATECHANGE
Ms. Emma RACHMAWATYAssistant Deputy Minister,
Ministry of Environment, Indonesia
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Current Responses to Climate Change in the Asia-Pacific 23
and severe thunderstorms. In addition to these
factors, Indonesia also lies in one of the most
active regions in the Pacific Ring of Fire, where
many active and mordant volcanoes exacerbate the
risks of any natural disaster. The following section
will address the nature of climate change in
Indonesia by examining three critical areas:
Impacts of climate change in Indonesia
Indonesias response to climate change through
regulation policies and mitigation plans of action
Challenges in implementing climate change
measures in Indonesia
Impacts of Climate Change in Indonesia
According to the 2010 Second National
Communication (SNC) report, the number of
climate-related hazards in Indonesia has steadily
increased from 1955 to 2005. Climate-related
hazards described in the report include higher
intensity and frequent floods, land slides, water and
vector borne diseases, wind storms/cyclones,
forest fires, droughts, and higher tides/surges. The
city of Semarang, for example, has lost 584 Ha of
its coastal area as a result of rising sea levels and
floods, and is expected to lose another 266 Ha due
to land subsidence. On top of environmental
damages incurred, flooding across Indonesias
islands and high tides in fishing zones has resulted
in massive economic losses which threaten the
livelihoods of Indonesias people. The marginalized
population suffering from poverty and poor living
conditions have very limited access to clean water
and sanitation, and are the most vulnerable to the
environmental and economic impacts of climate
change. In this regard, the security implications of
climate change in Indonesia are both social and
economic as food and water scarcity, health risks,
and large-scale migration are all likely to occur in a
natural disaster. These impacts have already been
experienced with lower production levels of rice,
decreasing domestic water resources, erosion in
major cities, increased cases of diseases such as
dengue fever, and deteriorating infrastructure in
roads and bridges.
Indonesias Response to Climate
Change
Indonesia has developed several measures to
combat, mitigate, and adapt to the negative
impacts of climate change. As natural disasters
have plagued Indonesias urban centers and
agricultural heartlands over the past decade, the
Government has felt an increasing pressure to
address both the causes and results of erratic
environmental circumstances. Within this context,
Indonesias government is currently pursuing
counter measures towards climate change through
policies for regulation, mitigation, and adaptation.
In response to the imminent threats of climate
change, Indonesias government has begun
implementing regulations and policies to minimize
negative environmental and social impacts. For
example, during the past two years Law No. 32
Year 2009 on the Protection and Management of
Environment, and Medium-term Development
Plan 2010~2014a policy which integrates climate
change into the development agenda and
planning processes at the local and national
levelshave been pushed through legislation. The
Law of No. 32 Year 2009 mandates that the local
and national government provide, among others,
strategic environmental assessment, an
environmental protection and management plan,
and a GHG inventory. Additionally, in 2007 the
Government established a National Action Plan on
Climate Change followed up by the Indonesia
Climate Change Sectoral Road Map in 2010. Both
of these were indented to provide a comprehensive
response to counteract climate change through
means of integrated and sectoral action.
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Mitigation has become another important area of
focus for handling the effects of climate change in
Indonesia. For example, the Government has
engaged in a multifaceted approach which seeks
to address mitigation issues based on the
reduction of carbon emissions. The measure
includes monitoring GHG emissions, reducing
emissions from a number of economic sectors
(energy, forestry, industry, waste, transportation),
the implementation of Clean Development
Mechanism (CDM), and controlling Ozone-
Depleting Substances (ODS). In order to boost
implementation on a macro level, Indonesia
decided to implement Reducing Emissions from
Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+)
and to provide a voluntary commitment to reduce
GHG emissions by 26% by 2020 through the use
of domestic resources, and to cut an additional
15% with international support.
Although mitigation efforts are important to ensure
a fundamental shift towards cleaner and more
efficient means of energy consumption, it is
impossible to reverse all the damage that has
occurred. Accordingly, Indonesias people also
need to be fitted with a method for adapting to the
current situation, and possible climate change
impacts for the future. Adaptation action that has
been developed to date is divided into priority
sectors; namely water resources, food, coastal
and fisheries, human health, and infrastructure. In
addition, several vulnerability studies have been
conducted in certain areas of Indonesia to gauge
the level of vulnerability, and to prepare
recommendations for appropriate action. As
climate change most directly affectscommon
peoplesuch as fishermen, farmers, and those
residing in marginalized urban areas, initiatives for
adaptation at the local level have also been
developed. To encourage and acknowledge these
local movements, Ministry of Environment (MOE)
launched the Program Kampung Iklim (PROKLIM)
or, Climate Village, which is designed to replicate
the best practices and lessons that can be
integrated in other areas in need of adaptive
measures.
Challenges of Implementing Measures
for Climate Change
Indonesia has made great strides in its efforts to
manage climate change issues; however, there
remain shortfalls in current policy, and challenges
that need to be overcome for more effective action
planning. First, climate change counter action
ultimately must begin at the individual level. Thus
far, climate change in Indonesia has been treated
primarily as a issue to be managed by the
government or other large scale organizations.
Climate change, as far as the ordinary population
is concerned, is a problem incomprehensible and
unmanageable by individual efforts alone. To
involve wider participation and a change of
behavior from the wider population, it is important
to define climate change in simple and culturally
appropriate terms. Both mitigation and adaptation
action can be initiated at the individual level and
progress toward collective action.
Taking into account the laborious negotiation
process in the UNFCCC when it comes to issues
of adaptation, although climate change is already
an existing problem, it is vital to encourage
alternative approaches and develop breakthroughs
for increased capacity. A heightened awareness
among the general public must also be formed,
and options for funding sources must be widened.
Lastly, a lack of regional cooperation is limiting
Indonesias climate change efforts to domestic
resources alone. Any degree of regional
cooperation will greatly supplement a stronger
institutional framework, as well as expand policy,
capacity, and funding options.
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Current Responses to Climate Change in the Asia-Pacific 25
Introduction
Over the past decade, climate change in China has
become an important, political, economic, and
security issue as its carbon emissions reached the
highest level among industrialized countries. The
following poses three questions concerning the
nature and domestic impact of climate change in
China: (1) Is climate change an issue of national
security in China? (2) In what ways and to what
extent does climate change threaten Chinas
national security? (3) How can the threat to Chinas
national security posed by climate changed be
addressed?
Climate Change: An issue of Chinas
national security?
No singular consensus exists in China on whether
climate change is a threat to the countrys national
security. Proponents of the idea that climate
change is a legitimate threat to Chinas security
come primarily from environmental and climate
community circles. Elite members of Chinas
military have also voiced concerns about the
security implications of climate change, but without
elucidating what shape such threats may take.
Opponents from the economic and international
relations sector, however, remain skeptical of the
correlation between climate change and security
risks. They point to two criticism in this debate: (1)
there is a lack of substantive data on GDP losses
incurred by climate change, and (2) the concept of
climate change risks in China was manufactured in
the west to postpone Chinas economic
development.
While the Chinese government has exhibited a
somewhat tepid response to climate change as a
security risk, leading states in the international
community have taken a more proactive stance on
this issue. In the past decade countries such as the
U.S., Germany, India, Australia, and the U.K. have
all conducted major studies which explore
correlations between national security and the risks
associated with climate change. Although no linear
conclusion was formulated between the countries,
they at least recognized climate changes potential
risk factors and its necessity as a field of serious
research.
Chinese government maintains that climate
change may have certain security implications, but
generally should be regarded as is an issue of
sustainable development. It argues that addressing
climate change through the Security Council would
undermine the collective efforts of the international
community, and be an ineffective means of
assisting developing countries in the creation of
adaptive measures. Its statement on National
Defense, however, designates sustainable
development for the safeguarding of national
interests as a basic goal for maintaining national
security. This contradictory stance contributes to a
lack of consensus building, and hinders productive
dialogue on necessary countermeasures and
pragmatic ways forward.
CLIMATE CHANGE AND CHINASNATIONAL SECURITY
Dr. ZHANG HaibinProfessor,
School of International Studies,Peking University, China
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How does Climate Change Affect
Chinas National Security?
In spite of internal conflicting positions on climate
security, China has already begun to experience
the destructive environmental impacts of
climate change. Rising sea levels, expanding
desertification, and frequent extreme weather
events have exacerbated Chinas water shortage
and food security problems, threatening the life
and living standards of the Chinese people. One
study, for example, projects that if trends in climate
change continue at the current rate, food
production in China will decrease by 5~10% by
2030. Other studies on current trends show a
quarter reduction in Chinas glaciers, the
displacement of 20,000 residents of Minqin due to
desertification, and 6,000 total deaths in the past
20 years from storm tides. Without any mitigation
efforts these patterns are expected to continue and
grow in severity along with their associated social
and environmental implications.
The current impacts of climate change in China
outline a number of likely traditional and non-
traditional security outcomes for the near future.
Studies predict an increase in extreme weather
patterns will lead to environmental catastrophes
and a rising scarcity in food and water. The rural
population will be most affected by these changes
as ethnic tensions, poverty, and social
disadvantages grow. This will have a destabilizing
effect on the entire country, and will likely spread to
neighboring states as environmental degradation
incites an exodus of rural areasa phenomenon
already being observed especially in southern
Chinese provinces.
Chinas densely populated cities will suffer equally
adverse circumstances from flood disasters that
will compromise economic activity and displace
millions living in urban residential areas. The
potential for conflict increases exponentially with
the combination of food and water shortages and
large scale loss in infrastructure. Border skirmishes
with India, Bangladesh, and China over mass
migration movements can be expected in the near
future, and persistent internal conflicts leading to a
civil war as a worst case scenario. Given Chinas
role as a key player in matters of international
climate policy, these anticipated problems will
present insurmountable challenges to the political
structure and legitimacy of the Chinese
government both internally and externally.
How to Address Climate Security
Threats
Apart from the issues mentioned above, there are
two major deficiencies in China and the
international communitys research. These include
(1) the lack of an analytic framework which can
address the major concerns of traditional and non-
traditional security perspectives, and (2) a lack of
systematic assessment of how and to what degree
climate change threatens Chinas national security.
The traditional security approach is anachronistic
and incapable of addressing new nonmilitary
threats. It was constructed on conventional realist
approaches to security studies, and confines the
range of security to military related threats alone.
As such human security within this framework,
which also encompasses environmental and
economic threats to the survival of a society,
remains all but unaccounted for.
In the post Cold War era national security needs to
be redefined within the context of modern day
threats and circumstances. Because Chinas
national security issues are not inherently military,
economic, or environmental, any problem that
meets one of the following criteria should be treated
as a matter of Chinas national security agenda:
SecurityImplicationsofClimateChangeintheAsia-
Pacific
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Current Responses to Climate Change in the Asia-Pacific 27
Threats to the territorial integrity of the state
Threatens to drastically degrade the quality of life
for inhabitants of the state
Threatens to significantly narrow the range of
policy choices available to the government of the
state
Threatens to cause serious political and social
instability
Threatens the functioning of key national defense
projects or key national projects of strategic
importance
The extensive studies on the impacts of climate
change to Chinas security have clearly demon-
strated that risks for each of these criteria are highly
plausible, and as shown above, are already being
observed throughout Chinas rural and urban
populations. Chinas government needs to reorient
its approach towards security to include climate
change variables, and develop a framework which
accounts for both traditional and non-traditional
threats.
In 2007 Chinas National Climate Change
Programme devised a list of policies and measures
to address the tangible threats posed by climate
change. Composed of five areas this list includes
key areas for GHG mitigation, key areas for
adaptation to climate change, climate change
science and technology, public awareness on
climate change, and institutions and mechanisms.
These measures, however, are merely the
beginning of a movement that needs to be
implemented into Chinas national security
framework. This, of course, cannot be accom-
plished without first arriving at a consensus among
Chinas major constituents regarding climate
changes actual implications.
First and foremost China needs to abandon the
notion that climate change is a conspiracy
manufactured by the west. Chinese citizens have
already experienced firsthand the detrimental
effects of climate change, and scientists are in
near universal agreement that its influences are
indeed real. Once a domestic consensus is built
the government should give strategic priority to
Chinas international climate cooperation efforts.
Chinas role in forming international climate
change policy is vital, and without government
consent, it will be difficult to effectuate any
comprehensive measures. Also, Chinas national
leading group on climate change needs to include
representatives from the military, and in turn the
military needs to establish its own leading group on
climate change issues.
Introduction
Climate change is said to be one of the greatest
challenges facing the international community. As
athreat multiplier,it serves to exacerbate existing
socio-economic problems faced by states and
communitiesespecially those in least developed
regions. Southeast Asia is a case in point, where
several studies have noted the regions vulnerability
ASEANS RESPONSES TO CLIMATECHANGE
Ms. Sofiah JAMILAssociate Research Fellow,
Centre for Non-Traditional Security (NTS) Studies, S.
Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang
Technological University, Singapore
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to climate change, and increasing pressures on
water, food, and energy. Given the transnational
nature of the impacts of climate change and the
strong interdependence amongst Southeast Asian
economies, regional cooperation amongst ASEAN
countries is necessary to instil proactive and
coordinated responses across different sectors in
ASEAN member states. The following will address
the methods and challenges in building this
cooperative network in three sections.
What are the existing ASEAN frameworks that can
be built upon and integrated to address climate
change?
What is the viability of these policies in
addressing mitigation, adaptation and disaster
reduction risk mechanisms?
Other challenges in implementing these regional
frameworks.
ASEAN Frameworks for Climate Change
Environmental and energy issues have long been
brought to the table for negotiations by ASEAN
member states. Climate change is not mutually
exclusive from these issues and only stresses the
importance of catalysing existing ASEAN
environmental and energy related initiatives that
have lacked in progress. ASEAN leaders made this
point apparent in their ASEANs 2007 Singapore
Declaration on climate change, energy and the
environment, where they noted the need to
address climate change as a corollary of
sustainable development and energy security.
Since 1977 ASEAN has been creating initiatives to
address Southeast Asias vast environmental
issues. The protection of national parks and
biodiversity was the first of such efforts which led
to the inception of the ASEAN Ministerial Center for
Biodiversity. In 1981, the ASEAN Ministerial
Meetings on the Environment was established to
push environmental issues forward, and became
an important component in ASEANs blueprints for
future planning. ASEAN Vision 2020, which was
devised in 1997 outlines several goals for
sustainable development and regional
environmental protection measures for Southeast
Asian nations to carry out by the year 2020.
Efforts for sustainable development have also
been a core issue for ASEANs environmental
agenda. Since November of 2002 ASEAN
Environment Ministers have agreed to further
synergize regional environmental cooperation by
identifying ten priority areas based on the World
Summit on Sustainable Developments Plan of
Implementation. These include (1) global
environmental issues, (2) land and forest fires and
transboundary haze pollution, (3) coastal and
marine environment, (4) sustainable forest
management, (5) sustainable management of
natural parks and protected areas, (6) freshwater
resources, (7) public awareness and environmental
education, (8) promotion of environmentally sound
technologies and cleaner production, (9) urban
environmental management and governance, and
(10) sustainable development, monitoring and
reporting/database harmonisation.
With regards to energy security, ASEAN member
states have acknowledged the need to p