IBN SINA AND SUHRAWARDI ON SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS: SOME ...

IBN SINA AND SUHRAWARDI ON SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS:

SOME COMPARATIVE REMARKS

Haruo KOBAYASHI*

I. Introduction

The epistemic explanation of "self-consciousness" is one of the main

topics in Islamic philosophy.(1) Ibn Sina (Avicenna, d. 428/1037) is most

probably the first Muslim philosopher who took it up as a main subject

and treated it in detail.(2) Since this problem holds a special place in such

his later writings as Isharat wa Tanbihat, Mubahathat and Ta'riqat, it seems

to be in his late years that he came to be more concerned with it.(3) This

problem was one of the most important concerns in the whole philosophicalcareer of Suhrawardi (Shaykh al-Ishraq, d. 587/1191) who was an acute

critic of the Muslim Peripatetics (al-Mashsha'un) and their chief, Ibn Sina,

in particular. Consequently "self-consciousness" is a key philosophical concept

in his celebrated Hikmat al-Ishraq as well as in his "propaedeutic" writings

described within the limits of Peripatetic philosophy such as Talwihat and

Mashari' wa Mutarahat.(4) In this paper, I try to analyze this important but

complicated concept in these two philosophers mainly through their arguments

for its "self-evidence" and its "apriority," and thereby I would like to shed

light upon the similarity and difference between the two.

II. Ibn Sina

What is "self-consciousness"? Introspection seems to be a first and

indispensable step to clarify the notion of "self-consciousness." I therefore

would like to start my analysis by quoting a passage from Isharat wa Tanbihat

where Ibn Sina describes his procedure of introspection explicitly:(5)

Return to your self (nafs) and reflect whether, being sound, or even

* Graduate Student, University of Tokyo.

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IBN SINA AND SUHRAWARDI ON SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS: SOME COMPARATIVE REMARKS

in another state, as far as you discern a thing correctly, you would be

oblivious to the existence of your self (dhat) and would not affirm your

self. To my mind, this does not happen to the perspicacious (mustabsir).

Therefore the sleeper in his sleep or the drunk in the state of his

drunkenness will not be unconscious of his self, even if his representation

(tamaththul) of his self does not remain in his memory.

In this passage it is clearly stated that human being can never become

oblivious to the existence of his self. But one may say, "Certainly, every

human being will be aware of his self even in such states, but it is as far

as he can see, hear, feel, or think about something other than his self, and

thus 'self-consciousness' is reflexive and it can occur only as a by-product

of consciousness of others." Against this kind of objection, Ibn Sina replies:(6)

If you imagine that your self (dhat) has been created whole in mind

and body at its first creation (awwala al-khalq) and it finds itself in the

physical circumstance where it does not perceive its parts, and its limbs

do not touch each other being spread apart and suspended in temperate

air, you will find that it is unaware of everything except the fixedness

(thubut) of its individual existence (anniyyah).

This is a version of the famous "Flying Man" argument,(7) where Ibn

Sina asserts that even in the case of "Fying Man" lacking for every kind

of sensations and experiences it is inadmissible for him to lack his "self-

consciousness" as well. For this assertion, however, Ibn Sina assignes no

reason. On this point Fakhr al-Din al-Razi (d. 606/1209), a theologian-

philosopher and a commentator on Ibn Sina's Isharat wa Tanbihat, writes:(8)

The gist of the argument in this section is that human being is never

oblivious to his self-consciousness even in such states. Though he [i. e.,

Ibn Sina] does not remark whether this proposition is primary (aw-

waliyyah)(9) or not, this proposition seems not primary. The reason is

the following. When we subject this proposition ... to a close scrutiny

of our intellect ('aql) and next we subject [a primary proposition such

as] "the whole is bigger than its part" to the same scrutiny, we do not

find the first proposition equal to the second in its clearness and its

Vol, XXVI 1990 63

distinctness but we find it questionable. That proposition thus needs

confirmation by proof (hujjah).

As Fakhr al-Din al-Razi rightly points out, Ibn Sina has not offered

in this section any "proof" concerning the reality of this proposition except

the "fixedness" of "self-consciousness" confirmed by the introspection, much

less established it through "demonstration" (burhan) in a strive manner.

However, It is not because he is unaware of the "hypothetical" nature of

this argument,(10) but rather because he considers that the reality of "self-

consciousness" is indemonstrable and thus it must be grasped intuitively.

On this point Nasir al-Din al-Tusi (d. 672/1274), a philosopher-scientist

and another commentator on Isharat wa Tanbihat, supports Ibn Sina's opinion:(11)

The absolutely first and clearest cognition (idrak) is the self-consciousness

of human being. It is clear that this kind of cognition can be neither

acquired through definition (hadd) or description (rasm)(12) nor established

by proof (hujjah) or demonstration (burhan). Therefore the remark of

the eminent commentator [i. e., Fakhr al-Din al-Razi]-the chief [i. e.,

Ibn Sina] has not explained whether this proposition is primary or

demonstrable (burhaniyyah), his judgement that it is demonstrable,

his fruitless effort to establish it by demonstration, and his fogery of

demonstrations for it, all of them are sheer nonsense, and thus it is

useless to deal with.

Now it would become clear that in this "Flying Man" argument the

proposition "human being cannot be oblivious to his self" is not its conclusion

but its premise, and it is no longer possible to establish this premise by

definition or description, nor proof or demonstration because, as Nasir al-Din

al-Tusi precisely comments, "self-consciousness" is self-evident and prior

to all other kinds of cognition.

Ibn Sina, however, is not content only with this kind of "hypothetical"

argument, but he goes further to elaborate the reality and the property of"self-consciousness" from quite a different point of view in other places.

Hence I turn to the analysis of "self-consciousness" by comparison with other

kinds of cognition.

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According to Ibn Sina, cognition (idrak) consists in "occurrence"(husul)

and "representation" (tamaththul) of the essence (haqiqah), or form (surah),of object known (mudrak) in knowing subject (mudrik)(13). The object can beanalyzed into internal and external from the viewpoint of its subject, but

the object in the primary and strict sense is what is internal and representedin the subject.

This internal object, though the essence or form of its external object,

cannot be the same as its external correspondent in its "individuality" (shakhs),

but it is the same in its "species" (naw') or in its "nature" (tabi'ah). If these

two objects were identical in "individuality" and thus the "occurrence" of

internal object in knowing subject were useless, then everything should be

known simply because it exists externally, and the essence of "what has

actually no being among external existents" (al-a'yan al-kharijiyyah)(14) could

never become known. Hence, the external object, if material, needs the"occurrence" by means of abstruction from matter in order to become internal

object and mentally represented. Further if the object is immaterial from

the beginning, such as active intellect, it is not active intellect itself but its

representative that becomes an internal object.(15) Even if the object is fictitious

and something only mentally posited, such as 'anqa' or a regular pentahedoron,

the "occurrence" as internal object is still needed. The object, therefore, as

far as the cognition of others is concerned, should "occur" in the subject

as internal object.(16)

For instance, "sensation" (ihsas) consists in receiving the form which

is abstructed from matter and to which the sense-subject' (hass) comes to

be assimilated. In this case, the "first and real sense-object" (al-mahsus

al-awwal bi-al-haqiqah) is not an external and material thing, but the form

which is impressed in sense organ (alat al-hiss) and which the sense-subject

actually perceives.(17)

Necessary as it is, "occurrence" is not sufficient, but "representation"

is also needed in cognition because it is probable that the subject, as a

result of its illness or devotion to something else, does not perceive an

essence occurring in it. Therefore it is no less important that the essence

occurs in "knowing" subject (mudrik) and thus the essence comes to be"represented" (mutamaththil) in it. Concerning this importance Nasir al-

Din al-Tusi explains as follows, though here he uses "presense" (hudur) in

place of "occurrence" almost synonymously:(18)

Vol. XXVI 1990 65

Presence (hudur) is not sufficient [in cognition of a thing] because the

thing present to sense (hiss) is not perceived unless the subject-soul

(al-nafs) pays attention to it.... Cognition therefore does not consist inthe presence of a thing in sense, but rather it consists in the presence

of a thing in knowing subject (mudrik) by virtue of its presence in

sense.(19) (emphasis added)

In the light of cognition in general, what kind of feature does "self-

consciousness"(20) have? Can the analysis of the cognition into three elements-

external, internal objects and subject-be sustained also in the case of"self-consciousness"? In the following passage Ibn Sina explains" self-

consciousness" from this viewpoint:(21)

Suppose, in the same manner as I perceive something other [than my

self] on the ground that its effect (athar) exists in my self (dhati), I

perceive my self when some effect of my self exists in my self. It is insofar

as the effect by which I perceive my self exists in me that it can exer-

cise any influence on my perception of my self, Because I exist always

in me, however, it is not necessary for perceiving my self that besides

my self another effect exists in me, and hence [when I perceive my

self] I am influenced neither by my self nor by any other effect.

As far as the cognition of others is concerned, the internal object is"representative," or "effect," which occurs from an external object in its

subject, or which is only mentally posited. The internal object, even though

it exists in the subject and is represented in it, is still its object, and thus

the dichotomy of subject and object can never disappear. As for "self-

consiousness," on the contrary, the object is nothing other than its knowing

subject, and no split exists between its subject and its object. Therefore

it is impossible as well as useless that something other than the self-

subject, such as a "representative" or an "effect," occurs or comes to be

posited in the subject as its object. This fact suggests that the object is

the same as its subject not only in "species" but also in "indi-viduality,"(22)

and thus the analysis of cognition into three elements can no longer be

sustained and even the dichotomy of subject and object disappears. This self-

66 ORIENT


objectivity in "self-consciousness" Ibn Sina explains as follows:(23)

The self (al-dhat) is present (hadirah) to its self in any state and there

is no oblivion (dhuhul) of its self. The existence (wujud) of the self

is none other than its consciousness (idrak) of its self. It is needless for

the self to become conscious of its self, since there is no separation

between its subject and its object when the self is conscious of, and

present to, its self. As long as the self exists, it is inevitable for theself to be conscious of its self.

In this passage, the identity of "self-consciousness" with "existence" of the

self, or with its "presence" to its self, is explicitly stated.

Next I turn to other reductio ad absurdum types of argument for the

property of "self-consciousness."First, Ibn Sina discusses that "self-consciousness" cannot be acquired

through perceiving an effect of the self in the following manner:(24)

If it were due to an effect occurring in me that I perceived my self,

how could I perceive that the effect was ascribed to my self unless I

had already known ('alimtu) my self and recognized ('araftu) through

some sign ('alamah) or other that the effect was of my self. And, again,

if I presented (ahdartu) an effect of my self to my self or to its organ

(alah) and I judged thus the effect to be ascribed to my self, then Ishould first connect the effect with my self and thereby judge and say

that it was an effect of my self. Hence my perception of my self is

prior, not dependent on [the perception of] the effect.

In other words, as one cannot connect and identify honey and its effects

such as yellow or sweetness unless one has known honey beforehand,

"self-consciousness," similarly, if it were the identification between one's

self and its effect, one should have known his self anyhow without "self-

consciousness."(25)

Second, Ibn Sina argues that "self-consciousness" cannot be acquired

through one's action (fi'l), which means that "self-consciousness" is not

to perceive the agent of one's action. If, then, anyone say, "I confirm my

self (dhati) by means of my action," since action is either general (mutlaq)

Vol. XXVI 1990 67

or specific (khass), the following cases can be supposed:(26)

If you acknowledge (athbatta) your action as general, you must acknowledge

through it a general, not specific agent as your very self [which is

apparently absurd]. If you acknowledge it [i. e. your action] as your

action, it is not through it that you acknowledge your self, but your

self is a part of the concept of your action inasmuch as it is your

action. Thus it [i. e., the agent] has been acknowledged in such compre-

hension before it [i. e., its action] or, at least, simultaneously, not

through it, and thus your self is not acknowledged through it. (emphasis

added)

"Self-consciousness," furthermore, cannot be established through the

consciousness of others, either that of actions or that of other cognitions,

because one must express his consciousness, explicitly or not, by means

of the term indicating the knowing self-subject. When one says, for example,"I am doing such and such," he has already expressed his cognition of his

self. "Unless," writes Ibn Sina, "I considered my self first and then its action,

how could I know that it was I who was doing such and such?"(27)

Setting forth these arguments Ibn Sina insists on the self-evidence and

the apriority of "self-consciousness," whose characteristics he explains in

the following manner. For human being "self-consciousness" is "first" (awwali),"by nature" (bi-al-tab'), "innate" (gharizi), "instinctive" (maftur), "essential"

(dhati), "constituent" (muqawwim), "concomitant" (lazim), "absolute" ('ala

al-itlaq, la shart), and "always in actuality" (bi-al-fi'l da'iman). It is identical

with "existence" (wujud) or "presence" (hudur) of the self, and therefore

it is unobtainable a posteriori by "acquisition" (kasb, iktisab).(28)

Though "self-consciousness" is a priori and always in actuality, this

does not mean that one is always and exclusively conscious of one's self

and that "self-consciousness" is incompatible with other cognitions. How is

the relation between them? On this point, Ibn Sina remarks in the passage

below:(29)

You know that whoever intellectually perceives (ya'qul) something

perceives in the state of potentiality near to actuality (bi-al-quwwah

68 ORIENT


al-qaribah min al-fi'l)(30) that he perceives that thing, which means that

he perceives his self. Therefore whoever perceives something perceives

his self.(31)

My primary concern in this passage is the fact that Ibn Sina has distin-

guished here two kinds of "self-consciousness:" (1) to perceive one's selfand (2) to perceive one's self perceiving something other. In order to

perceive one's self perceiving something other, as already discussed, onemust have perceived one's self as an agent of that perception. "Self-conscious-

ness" (1) therefore is indispensable to "self-consciousness" (2), but not

vice versa. "Self-consciousness" (2), which, I suppose, is "self-consciousness"

in the ordinary sense, is neither a priori nor always in actuality, but it

accompanies other perceptions "in the state of potentiality near to actuality,"

which suggests the possibility that other perceptions may occur without"self-consciousness" (2) in actuality. Ibn Sina writes, "consciousness of

self-consciousness" (al-shu'ur bi-al-shu'ur) is in potentiality (bi-al-quwwah),

then sometimes it occurs and sometimes not,"(32) and "if it were in actuality,

it were incessant and its consideration with intellect (i'tibar al-'aql) were

unnecessary,"(33) and thus it is obtained by "acquisition" (kasb, iktisab).(34) The

self-evidence and apriority therefore are applicable only to "self-consciousness"

(1).

Ibn Sina's analysis of "self-consciousness" is closely linked with the ex-

planation of the immateriarity of human soul, from which follow his manyfundamental doctrines such as the theory of intellect or the immortality

of human being as an individual. As discussed above, if "self-consciousness"

depends on such bodily perceptions as sensation or imagination, human being,

after his body perished, cannot identify his self, which means his annihilation

as an individual, and hence one of the main concerns of Ibn Sina's analysis

of "self-consciousness" seems to lie in denying its dependence on body and

thereby indicating that the human "self-consciousness" will continue after

his bodily death."Self-consciousness" (1) at least, independent of the other bodily

perceptions, can remain after the separation of human soul from his

body. Before the separation, however, "self-consciousness" cannot exist

exclusively of other perceptions because "adhesion" (mulabasah) of human

soul to his body disturbs his "return to the very self" (ruju' ila khass

Vol. XXVI 1990 69

dhatiha) and "verification of his self" (tahaqquq bi-dhatiha).(35)

III. Suhrawardi

Concerning the reality of "self-consciousness," Suhrawardi's view is

clearly stated in the following passage:(36)

You are absent neither from your self (dhat) nor from your self-conscious-

ness (idrak). Since the self-consciousness cannot be by form (surah)

or superaddition (zayid), in your self-consciousness you do not need

anything other than your self which is apparent to your self (zahirah

li-nafsiha), or rather, which is not absent from your self (al-ghayr

al-ghayib 'an nafsiha).

I would like to analyze his theory of "self-consciousness" in four types of

argument.

"Self-consciousness," says Suhrawardi, is a kind of "intellection" (ta'aqqul).

"Intellection" means "presence" (hudur) of a thing known to the immaterial

self-subject (al-dhat al-mujarradah 'an al-maddah) or "non-absence" ('adam

ghaybah) of a thing known from the immaterial self-subject. In these twofomulae Suhrawardi considers the latter more perfect because of its

applicability to "self-consciousness" as well as to the cognition of others.

Self-soul (nafs), for instance, is conscious of its self in proportion to its

immateriality, but one cannot say that the self-soul comes to be present to

its self (yahdur li-nafsihi) because its self is always present to its self. Thus

it is proper to say that the self-soul is not absent from its self. As for the

cognition of others, when its object is absent from the self-subject and

cannot be present in itself to the self-subject, "to make present" (istihdar),

or "representation," of its form (surah) is necessary. "Intellection," therefore,

denotes not only the cognition of universals by means of "representation" of

forms, but also the cognition of the self by virtue of its immateriality and

its "non-absence" from the self.(37)

Why "self-consciousness" cannot be a cognition by form? Suhrawardi

answers this question on a reduction ad absurdum type of argument:(38)

Suppose that the self-soul perceived its self by form. Every form

70 ORIENT


occurring in the self-soul is universal, and its application to many

individuals is not prevented. Even if the form were a bundle of universals

(majmu' kulliyyat) which were proper as a whole to an individualself-soul, it would not cease to be universal. Human being, however,

perceives his self as something unassociable with others, and hence it is

never admissible that the intellection of his individual self (dhatihi

al-juz'iyyah) is by form.

On the same ground Suhrawardi denies the possibility that "self-consciousness"

is the representation of the concept "I" (mafhum ana).(39) "Intellection" in the

case of "self-consiousness" thus does not mean "representation" of form.(40)"Self-consciousness," furthermore, cannot be the perception of any kind

of "representative" (mithal). Since, in "self-consciousness" the subject and

the object being utterly identical, "representative" of the self, however,

insofar as it is "representative" of the self, cannot be identical with its

self-subjest in its "individuality." In the following sentenses, Suhrawardi

explains the self-objectivity in "self-consciousness," and thereby he denies

the theory of "self-consciousness" by "representation:"(41)

A thing subsistent in itself (al-shay' al-qayim bi-dhatihi) and conscious

of its self does not know (la ya'lam) its self through a representative

of its self in its self. Suppose the knowledge ('ilm) were through the

representative. The representative of I-ness (ana'iyyah) is not the same

as it [i.e., I-ness] but it [i.e., representative of I-ness] is it in relation

to it [i.e., I-ness], and the object known (mudrak) here [i.e., on this

supposition] is the representative. Heuce it follows necessarily that the

perception (idrak) of I-ness were nothing but the perception of what itis, and thus the percertion of the reality of it [i.e., I-ness] (dhatiha)

were exactly the same as the perception of what it [i.e., I-ness] is not.

This is absurd. As for [the perception of] external things, however,

[this kind of absurdity does not follow] because both the representative

and the thing to which the representative is ascribed [i.e., external

object] are it. (emphasis added)

"I-ness" is the essence or reality of a self -subsisting and self-conscious

being, and then it is not a mere concept applicable to all selves but the

Vol. XXVI 1990 71

very self-subject to which such a being can never be oblivious. If human

being, a member of such beings, knew his self through "representative,"

this self-subject "I" should perceive and indicate the "representative" with

the pronoun "it" which can denote all selves other than the self-subject "I,"

and hence the cognition of the self-subject "I" were the same as the

cognition of another self "it," which means the synonymity or inter-

changability between "I-ness" and "it-ness." As for the cognition of external

objects, however, the situation is quite different because it is an external

object "it," whether "representative" or not, that the self-subject "I"

perceive. Hence there is no conversion between the subject "I" and the object"it."(42)

In the next argument, Suhrawardi discusses further the impossibility

that one cannot know one's self by means of anything superadded to one's

self:(43)

Suppose ["self-consciouness" of a self-subsistent and self-conscious thing]

were by a representative, and if it did not know that the representative

were ascribed to its self, it could not know its self, but if it knew that

the representative were ascribed to its self, it should have already known

its self without the representative.

It is inconceivable, furthermore, that anything knows its self by

means of a superaddition to its self on the grounds that it [i.e., the

superaddition] is an attribute (sifah) to its self; because, if it [i.e., the

knowing thing] judges that every attribute superadded to its self, whether

knowledge ('ilm) or another it may be, belongs to its self, it has

already known its self before these attributes and even without them,

and hence it is not by means of the attributes superadded that it knows

its self.

Now we return to the passage previously quoted concerning the reality

of "self-consciousness," which approximately runs: "You are absent neither

from your self nor from your self-consiousness, and since self-consciousness

cannot be by form or superaddition, you need in your self-consciousness

nothing other than your self apparent or not absent from your self."(44)"Human being," writes Suhrawardi in other words, "when he is

conscious of

his self and points it out, he find only a self-conscious thing (amrun yudrik

72 ORIENT


dhatahu)."(45) It is exactly this "self-conscious thing" that Suhrawardi means

by "I-ness" which is the essence and the real self-subject of human being,(46)

and hence it is evident that the existence of this real self-subject means

nothing other than its "self-consciousness."

Suhrawardi, however, seems to go further when he writes, "When I

devote myself exclusively to my self (tajarrattu bi-dhati) and gaze at my self,

I find my self exactly the same as real being (anniyyah) or existence

(wujud),"(47) because he seems to mean here that the self of human beingis "existence." On this "self-conscious thing" Suhrawardi states as follows:(48)

[This self-conscious thing] is the apparent to its self in itself (al-zahir

li-nafsihi bi-nafsihi) and it has no property (khusus) [besides its apparent-

ness] so that its apparentness can be a state (hal) of it, but it is nothing

other than the apparent, and thus it is a light for its self (nur li-nafsihi)

and a genuine light (nur mahd). As for your being conscious (mudri-

kiyyatuka) of the other things, it is subsequent to your self, and accordingly

the readiness (isti'dad) for your being conscious of the other things is

accidental to your self.

Suhrawardi thus concludes, "self-consciousness of the thing is nothing other

than its apparentness to its self,"(49) that is, "self-consciousness" is the essence

or reality of self-subsistent and genuine light.

IV. Conclusion

Although the main discussion being limited to its "self-evidence" and"apriority." my analysis of "self-consciousness" in Ibn Sina and Suhrawardi has

made the following points clear. First, both of the two consider "self-

consciousness" of human being self-evident and a priori. Ibn Sina states that"self-consciousness" is synonymous with "existence" or "presence" of his

self. He also uses such terms as "by nature," "first," "constituent," "essential,"

"always in actuality" and so on. Suhrawardi, on the other hand, states that

"self-consciousness" is "self-apparentness" or "non-absence from its self" of

a self-subsistent and self-conscient thing, that is "I-ness," "real being" or

"genuine light."

Second, in favor of its "self-evidence" and "apriority," both of them bring

Vol. XXVI 1990 73

up several arguments, most of which are on reductio ad absurdum. Ibn Sina

argues that "self-consciousness" can be acquired neither through "effect" of

one's self nor through one's "action." Suhrawardi also argues the impossibi-

lity that "self-consciousness" depends on "form" or "representative." The

similarity, or influence, among these arguments seems evident.

Difference, however, exists between the two even within the limited

scope of this research. Ibn Sian's arguments, on one hand, though they are

detailed as a whole, they seem to be fragmentary and confusing in part.

Suhrawardi's arguments, on the other hand, though they seem sometimes to

be too concise for their thorough comprehension, they are consistent as a

whole. This difference seems to result from the following matter. Ibn Sina's

main concern is to explain the "self-evidence" of "self-consciousness" and its"apriority" consistently with the "Peripatetic" psychology already established

in such a work as Kitab al-Nafs of al-Shifa'.(50) For Suhrawardi, on the contrary,

the explanation of "self-conciousness" lies in the very foundation of his whole"Oriental Theosophy" and fills the role of a criterion of other theories.(51)

Notes

(1) See F. Rahman, Avicenna's Psychology, Oxford, 1952 (rep., 1981), pp. 12-19,a concise but useful survey on this subject in the pre-Islamic period. As for the Islmic

period, general survey has not been done. For special studies, see below.(2) See S. Pines, "La conception de la conscience de soi chez Avicenne et chez

Abu'l-Barakat al-Baghdadi," in Archives d'histoire doctrinale et litteraire du moyen age,29 (1954), pp. 21-56, a detailed and valuable study. Abu al-Barakat al-Baghdadi (d. ca.560/1164), whom S. Pines has also treated in the same study (ibid., pp. 57-98), isimportant also as a mediator from Ibn Sina to Suhrawardi, on whose subject close

study is needed.(3) See S. Pines, op. cit., pp. 43-45. For the chronology of Ibn Sina's writings,

see D. Gutas, Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition: Introduction to Reading Avicenna'sPhilosophical Works, Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1988.

(4) For the general accounts on Suhrawardi, see H. Corbin, Histoire de la philosophieislamique, Paris: Gallimard, 1986, pp. 285-305, and S. H. Nasr, "Shihab al-DinSuhrawardi Maqtul," in A History of Muslim Philosophy, ed. M. M. Sharif, 2 vols.,Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1961, vol. 1, pp. 372-398. For his theory of "consciousness,"see M. Ha'iri Yazdi, Knowledge by Presence, Tehran: Cultural Studies and ResearchInstitute, 1982, pp. 121-182 in particular.

(5) al-Isharat wa al-Tanbihat (henceforth abbreviated Isharat), ed. S. Dunya,Misr: Dar al-Ma'arif, 2d ed., n.d., vol. 2, pp. 343f. This edition contains the com-

mentary by Nasir al-Din al-Tusi. For interpretation of this intricate passage, see M.E. Marmura, "Avicenna's 'Flying Man' in Context," The Monist 69-3 (1986), p. 391and A.-M. Goichon's french translation, Livre des directives et remarques, Beirut

74 ORIENT


and Paris, 1951, p. 303.

(6) Ibid., pp. 344-345.(7) "Flying Man" or "Suspended Man" (insan mu'allaq) appears thrice in his

writings. For their contexts and meanings, see M. E. Marmura, op. cit. pp. 383-395.

(8) Sharhay al-Isharat, reprinted ed., Qum, 1403 A. H., (original ed., Misr,〔1325

A. H.?〕), p. 122. This edition contains the text of Isharat with two commentaries by

Nasir al-Din al-Tusi and Fakhr al-Din al-Razi.

(9) "Primary" is applied to the self-evident and fundamental propositions likeaxioms or postulates (al-Najat, ed. M. Fakhri, Beirut, 1985, pp. 101f., 105). IbnSina also applies this term to some ideas such as "the existent" (al-mawjud), "the thing"(al-shay') and "the necessary" (al-wajib). These ideas, according to him, are impressedin the human mind in a "primay way" (irtisam awwali), that is, innate ideas, and thusit is needless, or rather impossible, to define them. See al-Shifa': al-Ilahiyyat, ed. G.C. Anawati and S. Zayid, vol. 1, Cairo, 1960, p. 29. For more details, see M. E.Marmura, "Avicenna on Primary Concepts in the Metaphysics of his al-Shifa'," inLogos Islamikos: Studia Islamica in Honorem Georgii Michaelis Wickens, ed. R. M.Savory and D. A. Agius, Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1984,

pp. 219-239.(10) See M. C. Marmura, "Avicenna's 'Flying Man' in Context," p. 388.(11) Isharat, p. 345. See also Sharhay al-Isharat, p. 122.(12) "Definition" is composed of genera (jins) and differentia (fasl) but "description"

is of genera and accidens proprium ('arad khass).

(13) Isharat, pp. 359-366. As Nasir al-Din al-Tusi has pointed out, this formula isnot a definition (ta'rif) but a specification (ta'yin) of idrak, because it contains thedefinienda, such as "knowing subject" (mudrik) or "object known" (mudrak).

(14) "Like many geometric figures", such as regular pentahedron, "which canbe supposed but cannot exist actually" (Isharat., pp. 362f.), and also fictitious

animals like 'anqa' or phoenix.

(15) Mubahathat, in Aristu 'inda al-'Arab, ed. A. Badawi, 2d ed., Kuwait, 1978,pp. 135 (par. 58), 193f. (par. 336).

(16) Mubahathat, pp. 183 (par. 302), 217 (par. 411), Ta'liqat, ed. A. Badawi,Cairo, 1973, p. 79.

(17) Avicenna's De Anima (Arabic Text): Being the Psychological Part of 'Kitabal-shifa", ed. F. Rahman, London: Oxford UP, 1959, pp. 61-62.

(18) Isharat, p. 360.(19) As al-Tusi adds, this does not mean that a thing, in order to be perceived,

must occur twice in subject, that is, once in sense-more precisely speaking, in senseorgan-and then in knowing subject because the real knowing subject is subject-mind,not sense organ. In the case of sensation, therefore, the object occurs in subject-mindby means of sense organ. See ibid., p. 360.

(20) "Self-consiousness" corresponds to shu'ur bi-al-dhat, but Ibn Sina also uses forit idrak or 'aql instead. Generally speaking, idrak denotes "cognition" or "perception"

in its most general sense and 'aql denotes "intellection." As S. Pines has proposed,shu'ur can be translated "aperception." See S. Pines, op. cit., p. 31.

(21) Ta'liqat, p. 79.(22) Mubahathat, pp. 135 (par. 58), 194 (par. 336).(23) Ta'liqat, p. 148.(24) Ibid., p. 79, see also p. 162.

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(25) Ibid., p. 147.(26) Isharat, p. 349.(27) Mubahathat, p. 207 (par. 370), Ta'liqat, pp. 147f. 161f.(28) Ta'liqat, pp. 30, 79, 147f., 160f.(29) Isharat, pp. 415f.(30) According to Nasir al-Din al-Tusi, the state of "potentiality near to actuality"

corresponds to "intellect in actuality" in Ibn Sina's theory of intellect, which meansan ability of an intellectual to perceive the intelligible which he has already acquiredwhenever he wants. See his commentary in Isharat, p. 416.

(31) The whole structure of this passage can be analyzed as follows: Whoeverperceives something can perceive his self perceiving it whenever he wants, andwhoever perceives his self perceiving something perceives his self (since his perception"I perceive something" contains the representation of its subject "I," that is, the self),

therefore whoever perceives something perceives his self. See al-Tusi's commentaryin ibid., pp. 416f.

(32) Ta'liqat, p. 82.(33) Ibid., p. 161. The problem whether "self-consciousness" is intellection or not

is very confusing. For example, Ibn Sina writes as follows, "As long as the humansoul is connected with matter, he does not perceive his self with intellection. If he did,he were as perfect as the [active] intellects actually are" (ibid., p. 107); and also,"Self-consciousness consists in the intellection of the self and the intellection is proper

to abstracted [immaterial] things. Since the animal souls are not abstracted, they donot perceive their selves with intellection but with estimation (wahm)" (ibid., p. 82).This problem is more fully discussed in Mubahathat, which S. Pines has studied indetail, still its ambiguity exists. See Mubahathat, especially pp. 208f. (paragraphs 371f.),and S. Pines, op. cit., pp. 47-56.

(34) Ta'liqat, pp. 30, 79, 160.(35) Ibid., pp. 23, 81. For the problem of immateriality of human soul in Ibn Sina,

see also M. E. Marmura, "Ghazali and the Avicennan Proof from Personal Identityfor an Immaterial Self," in A Straight Path: Studies in Medieval Philosophy andCulture, ed, R. Link-Salinger, The Catholic University of America, 1988, pp. 195-205;T.-A. Druart, "The Soul and Body Problem: Avicenna and Descartes," in ArabicPhilosophy and the West: Continuity and Interaction, ed, T.-A. Druart, WashingtonD. C.: Georgetown Uriversity Press, 1988, pp. 27-49.

(36) Hikmat al-Ishraq, in Oeuvres philosophiques et mystiques, vol. 2, ed. H. Corbin,2d ed., Tehran and Paris, 1977, p. 112. For this work, see also Sharh Hikmat al-Ishraq

(which contains, besides the text, the commentary by Qutb al-Din al-Shirazi and thegloss by Sadr al-Din al-Shirazi), lithographed ed., Tehran, AH1315 and Le livre dela sagesse orientale, trans. H. Corbin, ed. C. Jambet, Lagrasse, 1987.

(37) Talwihat, in Oeuvres philosophiques et mystiques, vol. 1, ed. H. Corbin, 2d ed,Tehran and Paris, 1976, p. 72.

(38) al-Mashari' wa al-Mutarahat (abbreviated henceforth Mutarahat), in Oeuvresphilosophiques et mystiques, vol. 1, ed. H. Corbin, 2d ed, Tehran and Paris, 1976, p. 484.

(39) Talwihat, pp. 70f.(40) Suhrawardi also denies that the perceptions of one's own body and other

internal activities, such as estimation (wahm) or imagination (khayal), are acquired

through their forms. "If," writes Suhrawardi, "the self-soul perceived these things

by the universal form in its self-subject, the self-soul would be a mover of universal

76 ORIENT


body and a user of universal faculty," and since these bodily faculties cannot perceivethemselves, human being must perceive "his particular body present" (badanahu al-juz'ial-hadir) to his self-subject and "his particular faculties present" (quwahu al-juz'iyyahal-hadirah) to his self-subject, and there by he uses them. Mutarahat, pp. 484f. andalso see Talwihat, pp. 71f.

(41) Hikmat al-Ishraq, p. 111.(42) This argument of "I-ness" and "it-ness" in cognition seems original and

important, for its interpretation, see the commentary by Qutb al-Din al-Shirazi,op. cit., pp. 292f. and M. Ha'iri Yazdi, op. cit., pp. 130-146.

(43) Hikmat al-Ishraq, p. 111.(44) See note (36).(45) Mutarahat, p. 403f.(46) Hikmat al-Ishraq, p. 112.(47) Talwihat, p. 115.(48) Hikmat al-Ishraq, pp. 112f.(49) Ibid., p. 114.(50) See S. Pines, op. cit. pp. 43f., 46.(51) See H. Corbin, prolegomenon of Oeuvres philosophiques et mystiques, vol. 1,

pp. XXXIII-XXXVI.

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