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• DEPARTMENT 04' STATE

WAIHINGTOH

'

Our Lesatioo ot Stookbolm, whi ch bos shown outs t anding 1D1t1et1ve 1n procuring ene~ publ1o~t1ons t or use by our wor ageno1oa , recently sent t o tbe Department a Gorman propaean4a book eot1tleddrR~i%~fl! Wee 14 den Kricp• wbicb contains tacsicile o r eprOJuCiions o "aeoret doougeate bearing on the ball1serent pol1oJ or tho l'rooUeot ot the United States• . I enclose a copy ot the book, a traosl~tion or tbe table ot contenta, an4 a tow pages of translated extracts tram the 1nt.ro4uctton. You e.a,. wish to b;1Ag this readicg matter to tbe President's attention.

Tho doouo;oou printed 1n the book e.re a,llege41J d1plo:at1c notes an4 reports ot Freccb , Poltsb, Belsian, aa4 other or1&1DI which have f allen ia~ Ge~ han4a . The volw::e 11 4eecr1bo4 1D ita to·reword e.s tb.l firs t ot a series •bleb ta to be publ1tbe4 by the Arcblvea Commiaaioo ot the Oerman 7ore1gn Ottice and wbioh ts intended to ol~rity the or1&1n ot the war •by QAkiA& eecret documeotl trom European arohivea available" .

Some ot tbo dooumeota 1n the book ore adm1tte417 r eprinted trom the German ·,';bite Book issued after the Pol ish arohivee were oapture4 by the Nazi s . Tho

stat ement

·-- .e -

statecea~ whiob tbl Seoreta.r)' or State isaued oa t.be auppose4. coo•ereaUoca reported 1.4 that :J'hlt·e Book 1a pr1au4 1.o \ho ooolosec oopy or \he l:a.rch 30, 1940 issue ot the w.eklr Dep.r~ent £(State Bulletla.

Eccloaurea:

1 . Rooa•••lta ~eg in dec Krieg. 2. Table or Cont4ota (trans1Bt1oa) . '· Intro4uot1oc (excerpts , translatlo~ ) . •· Dej)&l'tcect ot Stat.e Bulletin,

March 30, 1940 .

- •

ln r o:>}J r ( ter to .d• lO~. 7/7!&9 Fi!'bru.\t'Y 18, 1944.

ou.r Losatlon .. t. ~t.ockhola , ,.h1ch h:::• ot.ovn out't.~n41nt 1nit1wt 1•• in ~ rocurJns occ~ ~ubl1o_t1ona ror u:Je by our \l,.r ~~conc1ct1 , roountl)' Gent to t:.o Copurt :;.Unt ~ J.or :;41.n ;.rop~1sun~u boo"' oc t 1 tl oc1 .:c:o~{ volt~ •. ca !A ~~n . rio~ , ~hich cun t ... lno tuo3 1~1o ~r ~'x~~:x r c rrO'Juo t!on:s i.l1 .. Jccrot ~oe~eotA b<t.1r i n,o on t.t.e bollicor~nt. ~~licy ot ~to . re4J~ ent. ot ~o ~nl~cJ -t."' t.e~· . J '"'nclo~o 4 oo;.•Y o.t t l.o too-.: , a t.r .. csl ... t 1on or the t.c.ble of cont~o~o • ...r.d o tc·~ p ... ges o t t.r .. r.:.l(lte4 ext.r~ota fro: t.ho 1ntr~uct1on . You cJ1 ~iob t o ~ring t.b i u ro ... li1 1nt; ::wt.tor t o t ho .~roolch:nt' a !•t ton tton .

'l'be d t~cw::ent5 ;rlr.t eoi 1n t ho 'book are lle~cl!ly 41ploc...t1c nc~t-:a .,.r.J r epor t!! vt : r·cttc.h , .oU.;h , ~.el;;t o.n , ~nd otter ~r1~~n1 ~bleb ~~•• r ~l len into ~r-.n h-n:a . Tbo vol~ ia Ccacrlbo4 1n i ts ror,nord ~• the first of c aer1t.ta ub1cb 1 ~ t o be r.c.blh r.oo 'by ttc ht c hhc• Co~lo•1on or tte Ctr%ao . orc1en ~ r r ice .n4 · h i e~ t a 1nton4cd to ol .or U'y tho or 1~1n ot t h e wur '"by :...:1:1ce aeoro t. docw:ent o trom •. c.rop&.., n urohtveo evo1luble" .

~:e or t t o ~oc~onta 1D the book ere o4eltto~l7 ~rr1nte~ tro: t he ~r:nn .hite Jook l~~ued c ttor t~• lollt4 &lr cb11'e a \tUr• O.!pt.ured 'b7 tbe lt4.Zl a . ":'t.e

I

I a t.: tc=ent ~h1oh u.o ... ecr«tt .-r y ~r -~t:~ t.o 1o:Juod. on th• ayp~ ....... c:c.mvur "3 t1o:~a, r••rc:-uel l n t b..:.t. . !:.1~a • ..cok 1c p-l .ntoJ 1n &. .. .c- cnclouc..: co~'/ c-t t.!':.o ~ ~~:,. ...0 , 1940 1••"-- ot ~oho no .. lJ Sri r ; · e~t !![ - t. to :.ullt t.tn .

:... • . U dor ... ;_ul J illg ,.Otlt\g ..;hh f t ... 1\' l!tlon Ot

i\cav ~r ch c.nd. l~;bl!.o .. t1on

Wlcl oeuros :

l .

~· ... ••

Roooe• olu . O!J l .n den .. r lc:;. 1' .~lo ot ..:..::U .. ~t•t.O ( tra.n:»l.tt1e n ) . lnt roduotlon ( '=xcor ; t o , tr~.nol~tlon) • U.;-rt=.ont o r -t. ... to Bul l e tin , 1.:..\rcb. ~c:. 1940 .

.. - ·:

• !neloaure no. 1 to deapetth no. 2470 1 dated ~o••~~r 19,

194), rroe the A~trlean Lecat1on 1 St oekhola , Sweden,

ontl tl t dl "Re• l o• or Book Publ lahod ln Germany, En· t1 t l ed 1 ' Rooaevel t ' a Way to War . Secret Ooeuaent a

Boortne on tho ~1leoront Polley or tho Pr t t l 4ont or

tto Vnl t od Statoo (or ~rico)' " •

tRANSLATION [89V Q!RKAH•

Tt t l et Roosevelt' s Way to War (Rooae•el t a Wee tn den Xrte, ), Secret Docuctnta Boar1ns on tho Bo1ll toroot Polley or tho Prooldont or tl.o Unlttd Sta tu (or Ulertca).

Tabls oC Contcnt a.

r ore .. ord.

la.ul

5 1 SUmmarized Introduction

Docuaetlt.s Nos.

1. January 26, 193• 1 tho French Aabossador tn ••st~&ton to th~ French forettn ~nisttr. Roosevelt (S v1tws) concerntn, Qer~any. 29

2. Oet obor 30, 1935: the Yr•nch Chtrlf d' Arralroa 1n Costa Rica to the French Foretcn ~lnlster. Rooseve tt•s ~tasure cruise" to Cocos Island. 30

3. October 22, 1937: tho french Chorcf d'Arra.1ru

in Washlnfton to the french ~1n~ater Pr esident. Roose7elt s influence on the attitude ot the Pr·eneh y1s-d-y1 3 t,he Slno-Joranese conflict . 33

• · r.ove:ber 7, 1937• tho Fr•nch c ort• d'Arral r oa

ln Weshtn~ton to the French Foreltn ~tn1ster. RooJe~elt s influence on the attitude or the

Fr ench v1a · t·Y1 3 th• ~lno.Jap:nese conflict. P.oosevelt ( s vte·ws) concerntnc the lnte rna· ttonal Jltuatton. ~oral suppor t or the French.34

~.

6.

1·

Novezbor 18, 19)7: tho Pronch Chore• d'Arra!rta tn Wash1n~ton to tho French roreien ~lnlster .

Wtlrulness or k~osevelt ' s rore1tn policy. ~old~nc or public opi nion . 37

February 9, 19)81 tho Polloh Ambossodor In Wa shlntton to the Polish Forelcn ~lnister. Inr luencw or the Jew, . Je.t s~ war .aneertn,. 39

~oreh 1•, 19)81 tho Poli sh A~b•••ndor In Wash tnr;t:m to the PoHs"J ~orelcn :Jtntster. """r:aaeont poUf'7 or t he Unl t.ed States . • 1

s.

• 110 1 ·

8. Vay 26, 19)81 tho Froneh &.boas ador In Wathlncton to tht Trench rort 1Cn ~tnl t t•r •

Hoatlllt y or Rooso•o1t toward tho Tota ll• tartan Sta tet .

9. Juno 11, 19)51 tho Yroneh A:bas sador In Wathlncton to the French 1oretcn C1n1ttt r. l ooaevelt' a lntluonct on the a tt!tudt or tht Fr~nch yla·A-y1a the Stno-Japantst con• Cllet. Throats acalnst Garmany, Solidarity with Franca or tho Onl t ad Stat as .

10. September 27, 19)81 the French AMbassador in Washtncton to the French "orelcn t.!1n1st.er. Roost•tlt'J txPrts JlOns or tfmpathy ~ th tht Wttttro Powers dQrtnc the Sude~n crla1a .

11. Hovo~ber 9, 19)81 tho french A~bassador In Washlnct on t o t ho French Porel&n ~lnlster. The conference 1n L1:a. Penetra tion 'ol1cy

(~r~er;n~capol ltlk) of the United States y __ ·-=--- etln A:tr ca .

fa.ul

12. Hove~ber 21, 19)8: the Be1tlan Amba ssador in London to t~e Belctan ~1n1ster Pres ident and Foretcn t=.1n1ster. 1nclo-Merlcan trade treat7 as a moans or Roose•elt' s anti-German poltcy. S6

1).

14.

16.

17.

January 9, 1939• the Polish A~b>ssador In 'lathlntt :m to t.."te Polis~ "oretcn !.:1n1Jt·er. •Ba4 ntl&hbor policy• ( •Po}ttlk d,r b§3ea rrashbg3sho Ct" ) Vl!-4-vis the Totalttar1an Sta te s . Woblll zct1on or public opinion. J ewi sh war ~oncerlnc.

1anuary 11, 19)91 the ?rench ~lntsttr ln Ciuda4 tru!lllo to the rrench ?oret en ~tntster . Untted ~tates • rtnanc1al d1c­tatorsb1p ln San :o~tn,o .

January 12, 19391 the Polish A~bossodor In Washington to the PoHsh 'orel,n !:1nl&o.ter. Kate propaaands 4lalnGt Cer~any by Roosevelt and the Je• t· Creation or a war psychosis .

January 1), 19)91 the French ~ lnlster In Chi l e to the French rorel ' n ~lnlster . ~~

conter·ence or Lloa. Hull .s acttatlon (l!tW) acalnst the Ad s Ponrs •

. Tonuarr 16, 19)91 the Po11Jh Aabu.-dor In Woshlntt on to the PollJh Torel'n ~lnl a ter .

Do tolled derlnl tlon or the ottltude or tho ro.1 ted Sta tts tn r•ca rd to the European crlslo. Bullltt.

18.

'

58

61

63

66

67

i

l oa .

18.

20.

;n.

2).

• fail I

Pobruory 1939• tho Polloh Amba soa4or In Pt rl t ~ tho ~olt ah Foret en ~1n1sttr. The rorol&n polltT or tho Uollo4 Stotoo ao4 tho luropoan oltuotlon. Bull1tt.

Uoreh ?, 1939• tho Pollth Asbassador In Waah tn~tc~ to ~~~ Poltah Foretrn ~tnJ a ter.

!OOJIYelt'a 1Ct1Yat1on Of (Ortllft poltt1Ct • H1 o workln£ =ethods.

Vorch 18, l9J9• the Belcten Special envoy, EsbassT Counse lor Prtnce Ltcne to the Belctan rort1cn ~nla ter. Explanation concerntnc tht attltud• or the Unlttd Statas t o t ho faeo or a conflict in wet•trn Europe .

~arch 29, 1939• tho Polloh Acbaso odor In Parte to the Polish Foreltn ~!nlster . In· flutnce or the Untted States on Enclan4 tn ftYOr Of a CU&ranty to Poland .

Way 8, 1939• tht french ~oretgn ~lnls ter to the French Am~assador ln Wa shtncton. !n­ctrclt~ent policy or the Uni ted States.

June 14, 1939• t~t French ~bass~dor ln Washington to the French ~ort16n ~1nl ster. Roosevelt's lnrluenee on the French attitude r1•-• ·t11 the Stno-Japantst cootllct .

?0

?3

76

??

81

83

24, July 11, 19)91 t he Polish Char,. d' Arrolros in Washlncton to tha Pol lsh rorel&n ~lnister. Stlrrln.g-up (Autbet:unc) of Poland by leadln, poltUclant or t.he Sta t4 Oepart.:tnt. 84

2~. October 4, 1939• tho french ~1nlstor Prosldont and Foreltn ~lnlster to t~t ~lnlster tor t he HaYy, the -lnlster tor t."'e "lerc:l':.ant :.:.arlne and U.c BlocKade ~lnlster. ~on-neutral =eas~r•

26.

rt.

by tho 01'11 to4 Stattl. 87

Oc~ber 20, 1939• the French • tnlster l n Central A&erlca to the Yrtnch Foretcn ~ln• later. Conference ot Panaaa . Non-neutral aoasuros by the Vnltod Statos. SS

Kove~btr ' • 1939• the french !mblasa4or ln Washlncton to tho P'r'tnch Forel tn :.:tnlst,er. Picht or the Oovera£ent or the Unl ttd States ocalnst tho Neutrality Act . 90

January 22, 19401 tht :roneh bbaasador ln

London to the Fr ench Porelcn ~lntster. The .. anlnc or tht Roosereltlan policy or securi t y &ODIJ •

92

29 • .

• loa.

29. February 10, 19401 the French labaaaador i n Waahi ncton to the French Foraicn ~lniatry. The a1aaion ot Suaaer We l l••· Roosevelt acainat a comprouaa peace. 93

30. February 14, 19401 the President ot the United States t o t~e french ~inl s ter President . Su&ner J e1laa ' mission. ~oo;eve1t against a eomproa1se peace. 95

31. March 11, 19401 memorandum by the Chief or the North A..., riean Sect<.on or t he French Com­lliuariat General for lntorr·ation. Suoner ~elles' a1soion. French intelli gence service in the Un1 ted State~. 96

32· 1£&7 24 0 19401 note from the French Foreign Uinistry. Reports concerning alleged German a trocities de~ended by Bullltt. 98

33 . ~eptember 5, 1941: the Finance ~lnister of Ecuador to the State S•cretary of the General !d~inistration. Pressure on Ecuador by the United States. 99

Facsimile appendices•

Telegrem ot the French Ambassador In Was~1ng­ton to the French Foreign ~tniste r of ~ay 26 1 1938 (doa~ent no. 9) . 103

Report or t~e French Acbassador in ~ashington to the French f oreign >:1n1ster or llove:tber 9 1 1938 (docu.cent no. 11). 104

Report or t he P.:>lts~ .l:!>bossador in Wuhinr; tDn to the Polish Foreig~ ~1nister of January 16, 1939 (document no. 17). 106

Lethr ot t t e French :.lnlster President and :oreign ~inister to the ~lnister or the ~.vy, the :.:inister or the :.:erchant :;arine and t he ~:inister Cor Jloc~ade, of October 41 1939 (doeW!>ent no. 25). lOS

Contents. 109

J • lno1oauro no. ) to despatch no . 24?0 1 da ted "••••bar

191 194), fro" tho A•orleon wr,a Uon, Stoc~holm, Swf>Cion,

ocUtlodl "Rovlow ot Boot Pllblhhod 1n Cof'81DT, latltlodl

'Rooee•elt'• ••r to War . Secret Oocu..n t e 8ear1nc on the

Boll1coront Pol cy ot tho Prot14ont or tho Ul\1ted Statoa

Cot AMrtca••.

ar.cpnp.

T1tle a Roooe¥olt'• Way to War (Roosovolta Woe 1o don lr1oc), Socret Documonta 8oor1n~ on tho Bolllcoront Polley or tho Proa1doot

ot tho Unltod Stotoa (ot A£or1ca),

8ubt1tloa ~ri~od Introduction.

Attitude yl 3·A·yls Ger;anx.

Tho rot1conco d1oployed by Presldont Rcosovolt on

bh usua1uc ottlco ln 1933 In reserd to roretcn poll t1eol

101ttor. did not prevent hia ~roa c1v1nc public vor£ to hh

~tl•Ger101n r•ellnta as eorly os ln Jonuary 1934

Pol1£Y oC Bases 1n Latin A~tr1s••

Pres!dent Roose•elt ••• ketnll lntereatad 1n build·

lnf up a network or bases exten41n' over the Caribbean

1a ands and t he area or t ht Peneca Canal. A crulst taken

by the Prooldent ln 1935 to Cocoa Island, allocodly tor

recreation ~urposes, proved the personal interest taken

by hlm ln the poss1b! l1t1oo oxistlnG ln Latin ADorlca

Cor an extension of naval and elr bnsta.

•Qucrentinr• ~ps peh of Octgbr~ 5· 1~17.

As a !'trst attempt to clea•t or •to lenore t he stror.c

1solat1oniat tendencies ra~pant i n tht On1ttd St at.es, Pre­

sident noosovtlt delivered a speech t n Chicaco tn whieh

be called the nAtion to arws against • t t e e pideoir ot

world an.archy• and threat,ened t o !ntroduee a •quarantine•.

Thla speech ~roved a cllestone ln Roosevelt's carter. for

heneerort~ . he openly ventured on a policy or 1n~errerence

ln European and wa!d CAtters. To quote Count Potocki,

Polish Ambessador in Washtnr ton at tho t1=e, this was a

welcooe deviation oC attP.ntlon dC the Anvrlcan public troc

internal problems.

Pre~tdent Roose•tlt 1r&ed1ately threat~ntd Japan .

In add!tf')n to ~torally support'nE Ch! na, t he t'ntted St .. tes•

Covernc.ont broutht. pres s ure to bear nn othor rowt~r s, par­

Uct~lo rly ~·ranct, wlth a vte, to saree;unrJLnc C!tlnt 's

SUP11 1Y

- ·

• -2-

aupply or ••••· Who~ in 19371 tho Fr ench ~o•ornaeot pto­h1b1te~ the sen~tnr or aras an~ cun1tiono rro• In~o.Chioa to China, tho Proa1dont intorotdo~ poroonallr. In thio connection, the French Cherc• 4'Atra1rea tn Wa•hintton felt called upon to warn hi1 GoYern&ent tro• attaehlnc ex.ggerete4 1•port~nce t o the aaturancea ot Roo• eYelt dnco ~ tho .. lor1 ty 1n tho CO' IIItry do not ahare hit poraonal Yiowa 1n rocard to Coroicn pol1 t1co•.

I n purou1t or h1s ant1-Japonooo policr, tho Proa1· dont • •• olao quito w1ll1nc to roroco tho idoolocical and Other approhona1ona ox1at1nc 1n rocard to SoYiat Ruula.

•Education" or Public Opinion.

In l i a ac tive policy ot a determined rejection ot eYer1thing the Totalitarian Powers s tood tor, the Pre• e14ent was tar •ahead" or hit Oo•er~ent and, to an oYon greater extent, or publio opinion 1n h1s eountrr. To educate the latt·er 1n the desired direction, numerous speeches were 1toda1 with tl".o help- or which the Pres!d.ent ende&vored to instil l hatred against Fascism ~nd 41ctator­ah1po. 8eg1nn1ue •ito tho spring or 19381 the President's interest in European affai r s becaEe even more marked.

Influence or the Jews.

In his d&termined drive to Redueate" public opinion, tho President was ably assisted by the Jews, who, 1n the words or the above-quoted Polish A=bassador, constituted •the ~ost able champions or the crea tion or a war psycho­sis• . The virulence of their teeltne:s i n recard to Cer­lt&I>T and tho Caet th at alC>ost 100 pereent or t he r odio, !11m, daily press, et cetera, were in Jewish hands, con­stituted a po e rful factor in favor of the President' s anti- German (and anti- totalitarian) pol1ey.

The Adherence or Auatrip.

The a4he~~~ce or Austr ia be1n~ rega~~~d as a con­cession "" tho part ot" the Chamberlain Cabinet, Presi­dent Roosevel t redoubled his e::·orts to bring about the consolidation or the striking power or the Western De­mocracies. In pursuit ot thh aim, France was givea 1r­rorutable av1denee of tho attitude of the Pres ident bT the l a tter's s1fn1t1cant atateoent that 1 "were France to perish, A~erica woulO also perish".

NeytroU ty Ast.

The attitude or the President end the consequances evolvtne therefrom could in no way be reconcile4 with the Neutra lity Act. However, the latter was never taken seriously by the President. ~oreover 1 by various ways or circucvantton, the etr tcacy or th1 t law was rendered problemot1oal. In this polley , tho President •a• Cul l y eupported by hi s ~ovcrna.ent.

l:Olillllll·

tro• hcre was there ,,;ore bitter disoppo1ntm<'nt over

• the

• · 3-

tho treaty .. do at Munich t han at tho White KOOJo , not ~tnr. ln • positi on to t urn bact the wheel or hJetory, tho Prooldant dld bio utooot ln order to brine to noutht tho futuro ruulto ant :ctpatod t roa tha t treaty.

•coo4 Nglrhbor• Pollex.

Bec1nn1nc with 19)71 thoro was also an actl•• tion In t ho Pres1dont'o policy r ls -'1&• Latin A•or1ca. Under the pretax~ or heV ,~t to beware of Nat1 conap1rat1ons ln that continent, everythlnt was done ln order to promote tho policy or trade treaties which, thrcucb Secretary or State Cordell Hull, had bocomo o sort or ldooloctcal dOCCO• t his policy O f ponotret1on 1 Which 'O'OS 1Dparla• llot end ' en-AIIor1 can throuehout, resulted In

The ConCcrcnc;c lo Llae ' ' ' Pcee;ber 1938.

This conterence-pro•ed a succeas in so ~ar a s lt resulted ln a Joint procla~at1on to the effect that all Latln-A: .et ican States were declared eo-tuarantors or tho Conroe Doctrlne1 ot cetoro . Por the root! tho Soc­r otary o! State used tho opportunity tor opan y ac1tat-1nc aca1nst tho Axl s Powora.

lort1nr riethOd! oC the Nblte Rou; e .

Tho enerc1eo da•otad by tho President to tho pur ­suance or ht s polltlcal alzs, were, to quote Count Po­toek1, ~rely a cra•tn, for s elr- assertlon. By aasU&~ tn' persor.al control over roretcn a!Cairs, throuch •P?~lnt­lnt trus ted Cr1tnds to the posts or !ore1,n ubaaaadore , et cetera, the President soon landed •on the danttroas path to~ar4 world pol1t1cs.•

RtattAC:ent.

Pa'rallel with hls policy or agitation (Hct•oollt1k), the PreSident mon,.od to carry out his policy o~ rear:oa­=ant which was ~e~ered accept •blo by the peop!e throuzh the wolehty 1:pl1cat1on t ha t t his • •• In the lntarosto or the country's dt~tnse.

Cer;an- Pol td'l CpnClls t. 'Xsr 1'on"'f'r!nr by Bullt tt.

• ,\ft . ., .... t he sttb3ck surrered by tnt 1:un1ch a creeeent , ~OOJtYtlt de•otef. h1S p~lcul ar lntereat to the StUdy O( t he Cercan-Pollsh rel nttons, whlch see~d sutt1e1~n tly tense ror tho dedred explosl :m. The report• o~ Count Potockt throw a ~l r.nlrlcant 1\ ch t on the ea rernest snd detor~lnotlon d1srl oyed by soveral le•dlnr. o~~1c1als ot the Sta te Derartcent en thelr Pnd -avors t o prevail uoon Poland ( throuch 1 ts rorro sento t1 vos) thot on uny1old-1nt ottaude ohould be adopted by tho la tter country yl;-4-yt, r,eroany.

Con~nrtrd Astl ?D !lth t~~ ~~st~rn ro;.rr,.

To cletlr t he rteld ror ectlon, e ven nt-utrat itel rtu~ t : r.tvon to under,t~n~ how •~ tttor~ wt ll be In the caso

or

. .

• or • ee:\l'llet. .leeordl nt t o llr. Cordell Rull , " I t ...,14 t .aka three daJs , t hrae waatt or three Mntha perhape , bot

•• would ~:o•a•.

Propaure upgo :or l and .

Tho polle,. adopted y1~f-~1t Encland wu that or rel ent l aaa rre ssura -- ote the t a•orabla t rade t r ea ty • • • but ona et ant -- to dr 1•• that country aca1n1t OoraanJ• In this eonnoe t lon , Ambossador Bulll tt woo able to •••ura the Pol1ah •~ba ttador 1n Par1 t that ~tr1ca had •&ost erraett•a .. ans or coercion•, the threat alone or whleh would be surr lclt nt t o Insure tho pll anc1 or In& land.

11r o-pyller s or tho Enstrs l s ;rnt Ppl1£I •

DeJpl t c th~ cost rar- reachtnc pro:1 t ts, t or e xample, to Fr anco, the President eoul ttod hlestlt to no Jingle blndlnc pro~l ae. Thi s was t ol t strongly b1 Foreign Ulnlster Bonnet, who (In doeu=ont no. 22) expressed tho hope that the pro=lsos or support would be followed b1

&Oro tanclbl e ~root 0~ cood wi ll.

Qutbrcak or tho Eur opean l or.

Deep Jotl•factlon su•t hoYt ruled In tho White RoUJt wban, on Se~te~ber 1, 1939 , the European war brot e out.

ftch t erain3t the lJeutrt U ty Ast.

Soon aft er t he outbreak or war , Concr ess was con­•ened ror the ~urpose or brinctnc a~ut certain uend­a:.enta or the Neutr aU ty taw. whlct:. resul t.ed tn the e• olu­tlon o: tho Ca•h-a~d-Ca rf)' Clau•• · Neutro ltty hod ~~u•

bocomo but an •~Pt7 phrase .

Non-ntptt el ~tesurr:.

In proof or the non- neutrol a t titude of tho Un1to4 St • t••• tho faet that A~artcs a;re•d to re1ard shiP• ot t he ~erchcn t carlnt Which were armed ln detense 11 not belonctnc to the N•Yf• cay be quoted. ~Orto•er, a notlce to thl t effect ••• rece ived •tn coalldence• b7

the French :!tn1Jt.e r President, while no auch not1t 1caUon ••• sent to Gercany.

tbt Pon•F• Confcrcns r oC Stptc~ber 1919.

The !xtraordlnary P~-A&erlcen Conterenc~ held on that d&te 1n Panama was a rur t htr ster by Pre s i dent ~ooaevelt towar d consol1det1nr. the re~ulta achieved in Ltaa a.nd coorll1naU!'\l u ·.c work accrued therefro~n. The dependence o!' the Centrnl Ar~:· lcen States on t he O.S • .l . bece&.e ~Jbsolntt .

Zone of Sacurtty.

The $CCur1ty ton~ r roc le teod ot tho P~naaa ~onrerence ....

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Wal lu•t • turthar atara in the "education• or public opinion, since i • • practical realization was foredoomed t o taUure i n YhW Ot the i •pouibil1 ty to tna•u ·a the 1n­YiOlr.bility or so enor•ous an expanse or water.

the •a•a1on or Sumner ltllos in Pe brusrx 1940.

I n ~ebruary 19401 Under Soeretory or State Bu&Dar Wal~es lett tor ~~rope allecedly tor the pur po1a or peace .. diation. However, while RooaeYelt 'a poliey before the war had been under the slogant "Rathe r war than a policy ot ~utua l understandtn,•, it was now suided by the pr1n­ei plet "No peaee or mutua l understanding (~ein Vtr­stfndiguncstr1r~)l

Proporonda ~cttods.

Uora tnergetiea:ly evPn t han t he President, A»bassador Bullitt in Paris had 8doptad a eourse the only outcoc:e ot whieh was war . Nume~ous notes fro~ those crltieal t1Dea haYe been round a!X'ont the !'rench documents which tes tify t o the unremitting zeal or L:r. Bullit t .

The Joy into the Wor.

~be dlS3P?Ointins impressior. made by the collapse ot !'ranee ~•• not o~ lone du:a t i on. Other problacs 1n eor~ect1on wi th the Slstem, tic pursuit o: the fixed fOal arose. ~o,ard t his end, cooper ation wi th Eneland had t o ba intensir1ed, et ceter a .

In the c:eant1c:a 1 rurtl'.er steps towa rd global war were underta'-en. Yueoslavia and Oreeee were enticed in to beeomine bell1eerents ar.d the Sovie t Union was hailed as a weleoa:e ne,., p..r tner. The "educotion" or public or 1r.ion progressed 1n t he desired "aYJ the Lease-Lend 3i ! l opened new vistas (or ~3terial clel1Ye­r1es, et cetera.

On Deee~ber ?, 1141, . t lonr lG~t. the master or t!.e l'h1 t e !!ouse r.nd ~eoehed t l'e des~ red ~:oal - - in a war or the d ~r~nsl~ns ant lc l r ct - d by the Presid•nt. ~e shall boar t~e res~ons1 b1llty.

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ouou u 1 ·---RP~~------­ow=sKul --

ENCLOSURE TO

Letter dratted .•.•... )l/?.Lil .. ___ ·····-·

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TH& WHIT K HOUSE

WASH I N GTO N

llor 11, l i 44

thie .... to • cooct. Colilld it. co mer o.:.t. thort. . ... ,,

J.R.

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or•telf 0#

1'MI eiCitCTAIItY 0 , AOAIC:IJI.TUtlll

De~r Nrt. Rootevelt: , ,o .,,i-'1

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,.,P.

Recent ~1acuaa1ona w1th !r1enia on tbelr reect1ona t o Mr. F.ull 1 & recent «•n•~ p~llcy at ~~~~ent lei t o an Attea~t to re!onauU.te thue 1\leP.O in t~na• 'If wbrt th~7 mtl'ln t o the ordl.Dilry oeo?lft 1n e:oe1:7 or oceuolei countrlet . Ati~ched 11 ~ cooy of the at•t em•nt thlo resultei ln.

Whlle doubtleaa lt la not exActly wh• t ouch a atftterocnt ahouli sey , it <loe• llluotr11te the k1ni or aicple &n~ iireet st•tenent whic!> couli holll to rea .. ur~ tht co....,n peoole ot the en6QT •n~ occunlei ~tlooe, ~ni thereb~ hftlo thor~en the v•r ~c4 t ftYO 11vea aa a result of spllttln4 the~ froa t heir rulere.

Sincerely,

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~,.. ~ ~~ \,IM.Aiff .. ,.,.,,._.,.,.,., """' .., .

fO 'tR~ Pl.OPL.~S :~:SL!o.r:D liT D:Cl.'~'i'ORSI

SortiO\ Unioa, ""4 tb Ullltod. St...teo, dhr coaoultdioa with o·ao ruaother1

'l'o tho p eoploo of Goi'IIHID;r, .Tapaa, tl>eir &lUeo, lllli to oll of!Oploo

of DJOUoao oc""Plod. 117 th•, ve 01171

· I, lie ore tlghU.»g to deotro:r t he dlct• ton vile hne ouln•w! 70D, lie •z• not 1'1~:hUng to 1 eotro:r t ho people vhoa thq h<l ... aola•ed and oopreooed ~11 o•er tho vorld,

U, lie "Ul t1eht W>Ul tho 11chtoro lwro ourrn1.ore<i uncondiUoDnll:r,

III, Att• r the ~ict~toro ODrTeD~ or , ve vlll ot~rt ~t once to help TOD J"e<l<)DOti'\ICt & vorl:!. 1n which you •.nd your chiH1•en c"" lho vitb. d1£D1t7, honor, prooperl\7, 011:1 freedoa,

IT, ~ t bia en<l ,. Ylll ooo tblot thooe '!Olittcd n~ru .. vhlch """" OUl'J)Orted the dlct~toro • nd ltblch hA•~ pro•.chod d•otrucUon, heh, tl1ld enslo.vn~&at , nre rooted ODt l!lld reai orod lvo.Milen. .\U 1ndt..1-cl.UAJ.o 1D. t hooe !>"rtl•o ~ho ~»>•e ben rer.>oadbl e for crlmeo of terrorioa tad deotructton vill be punished by courts of the 1nT~ded ~tiono vhero their crimes vere eommittod, or b7 courto eotPbliohod 117 \he United ll•tiono, ·:'hoy vill be h old in t he custod7 of tho endoo of oceupnUoa until their trials cu bo hold,

T, lo ae•ber of tbo i'esc1ot on rt l "" olw\11 be oeraltted to retda propert:r vhlah hu bee lootei fro• you, So r , r ... l>O tdble, tllot propert y vill be r eturned to r esnons11>le locPl goYern&ente for dietributiOD ~~ thotf f~a vboa tho f~oclota etole it,

TI. Ao pro89tly ao Fasciot el•••nto hr.Tt beem e~1coted, you vill be f:lTOm the ouncrtunUy to eot~tblhh loc&l t:•••rna""t orK"JJo by 4eaocr~t1c proc•••••• for mun1cipal1t1ee, t owaa, Yilla~ea, ADd oountleo.

Til. lm due couroe you vlll b~ ne r.oitted to eote bllob vhnteYer fora of a • tlonal goTernmont :rcu •~l~ct 10 len~ At lt is booed on tho vill of the ~eonle, proY1dea tor free cl~etlo~a, tree .oeech, ~ ad religloua freedom of vorohi~, ond lDODrea ogftlnot the creeti on of nev dlc\atorahipa.

Till, Tou rtll be aided to reeatnblhh )"our pro:luctioa of food &Dd h~uotr1N. .J>roducto s a c ro,.,tlT •• poulble r.fhr t he !1ghtln& ato;>o. RftUPf fooi vill bo proY1ded to check nctur.l ' '"" ' Uon, but • ft•r t hr.t your future food ounoly vlll io~~ni l r rgely on :~our o"" 'lfforh, ~ . will do nll th~t h neee .. · ry to aooht TOD in the reh~bilit~tion of your • gricultazo, in-~uotry, oAi t~de a o pro~~pUy e.o ooulblo.

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IX. !he Ual\P.d Ko\ione v1ll O~ftrPte ~be r. ilroP.de r~d otb~r t~ncno~e­tlou tn your ~r~~ uniPr e~mMoa United n~tton•' control until more peni&Deot tor111 ot o rttP.ni! l'tlon• h~•e 'be!"G d fll'Yeloned. ' .. hen 'JO\l M 'l'e ectA~llehod reo~onel~l e ~OTPrna•nt e, 70U will ~ r l•oa on~~nai\7 t o p~t1c1p• te • • one of t bt United Nntioae in th~ di rection of tbeee e ni other Unlhil lletloao' actbiU ...

X. Ve r eoo&nl•e ~hAt 1f the vorld ie to ~· pe~oetul l n the fut ure, 1\ IN.st r.lso be n rot,.,erous, M"i ve unierl,ke to eee t hnt tbe oe.cettt\.1'7' lte!)e nrft bken after t he " "" oo th• t tho cltheno of ec cb 11!\Uoa vill be.ve the op9o~un1t7 t o e!ll'Jt. proner1t7.

Xl. fo thU en.d ve vill ••• -

1. That 110 n 'ltion 1o ~.,.J"rei! froa at.lt ace•• • t o the raw Mhrialo of t bt vorB.

). Tbet wotler--l.OTelo"Ped ar.U ou. or t ho .. vh~h hno hlthe~o l>HII

exololtei !or the b rnef1te of ot hnre . vill be •ffordod the onnor­tun1t7 to 1n!uctr1al1'e their oWD eeono~ ~d develop their r eeoiii'Cee for t~lr ovn benefit ae vell a- tbooo at otb ~r ccUIItriu, aDd will be a ee1eted l n oetrbl1ob1ur, a decent eoclal orier.

II. The Unlted 1!1\tlonc are now 111 the 1>roce .. of i!nelo.,inl: org!lDe of 1nterur. t1onal collnbo~tlon ond acc1at•~• in th~ tleldc ot r elief , ~grlculture, l a bor, monet •~ otnblli:ntioo, ~d lon~ t iae 11n~c4. l n dua courae, ~h~D 70ur n~t1ou ~~11!1•• ~• a aU~Pr of th~ r iU11}¥ of n:-.Hone, :roo. vlll ~e 11ble t o Jo lo - tbua orsnnhetione ... one or t ho pl'rticlpo.tin& Unl\ed ll ~tlODio

XII. 1\ lo r~coo>hed \1\_" t the peoolea o f all DAU one 111\n ~ co10aoa inter­eo\ wblcb cu not be dleregard.od wU hout 6dV<!r tel7 •ffoctln!t t he 11>01t taTorod. Our ultlm• h 110&1 11 to estpblleb a world or1er C<>nchHac of 6 f~il7 of nc tionc, ekch ba•ing due ro~&~ tor the ~elt•r• eAd righh o t t be othera,

!o t he poool01 of Gol"lMI!i!' o J~nNI, a nd. tbelr All1••· "" l!!ll

Ve recognize tho\ 700. ba•• beea ahled or oa al!\n d b7 tbe raocht dlc\11ton

and tho l!ti'Oil]ll a round t b.... ':'bo proll1 .. 1 Jv.tt aade appl7 t o 70"' a a well ac t o the

people or ot her Dlltlona,

Jt1JI, After 70a. h'\VO reeat •~llehod the functlonillg Of 70UJ' 1nnllOtJ'7 I!Dd nerlcuHuro, :roo. will be "-"l)ootcd to 111:1. in tho Tebulld1~>~: of t hoc e portion• of tho countr1oe vhlch 70ur pTecnnt ruler• hove deTaatated.

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Xlf . Vt hl't~ nhr a .,1-. u~trb.kL-c, bovner. t.h .. t. the 'tnl_.rd.tat of r.,•J'ft\ica vbicl\ II~ "M lftl4 V."JJD n• l'DS U't fh• Ad•l •M't'llrf. .. d h

DMt -!1....,. la the b!.a411AI; of tho .. ,.., .. ~lhtu vUl. aot \• M.d.t •

~._.., t h•\ l\ vlll oot "De tJOtd\ h " ' t t. •a~ tb• tor )'O'l t o u~h a .,,...,,,..., 11ft for ,..,.,.•elnt , ai ou wblc:b. wUt.ta a U a U ... oovt.t of 7n.l't. c_,. lea:n "• trH t o t d JO.\lhh hiebtr lrrdt o f .,..., ... u.,.. fi:O! 'bdhr a-ta a;l._"l..";i t or ll~ fo r ~·.tnt .a.. ,. • ..._. ltMva kfort tho ,_,.,

Xf. h ¥t hll.u alrnd7 PErt.-1 &\ )C.osoov, l'lD lobrQ.OtlOA.al St c\U'Uy Or~ijUl­

IA\lOD vtll 'be ••t~'bll the4. ~nc oth•r ~latt, thlt tec~\7 orc~al­•Atl on vll1 • •• t hAt tbt ~•• ln~Qt\r1~• ere not re•tlA~llthtd to "n7 of ro~ oo~trlet. NoveYer, ,oar o~tlon vlll b• ~r.itt•d lo ~rtlol~tt

at oat of the Uoih4 lrnUoa. vh•a 1'00. l!A'Yt ·haoaatr~ttU )"our rltM " t~t prb>Ut,ct,

XYI. At lblt lotera•tlo~l S•caTl\7 Or~lt!lloa 4.-oastr..let ltt •'lll\7 h -.18\alo ~C-e ui s~HN.t'l\1 ia Ut.e VOJ'l.i, l\ h oar b \ '11.\lo a cnwt:Uillllt h r dw:e our •"td fof'C.e'S. zto..,.,, r~\ioa or force \ bh U•e v·Ul collte dhr. 1a•ter.4 of -.tore. the ,_,.H, ht: • ~·• pro­tM'\e4 fro• h\~ "t.P' .. son.

.I

7E WHITE HOUSE

WASH INGTON

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J ul.;: 10, 1?1.4

;,l'!n'l"!"'tt.n~:o f'"r.o!l ~t•t£.inius M ,.. "'u'>""'o:'!d

';+~tl!, .. ::t+ ~·t t'-:"' ":.·~J-t•i!'nt , ~r~..:..e ::i r~ •.~t~r

Chu~c,•tl n:-:-:1 ·r..,:--!ml ~._~!.1~ rrt r':""t::d

to L ~r"":~!l l'.r'l:: ~bo~t ~rth· :- :" 'l::>!."" 't"ncn.

S'l!"oo;o-ed to :mva h~~r. f"er.~ o·t-::.· J 1.1r.e :ro.

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i!·~r-andua tl.!. t ed 7/lfJ/1.1. on t~l~t r...,., .. o Jt...Uon·rt ,

recdtnr "~eaornadua :ron ~t•tt!ntu~ r, • ~ro~r~j ·t ~ t~~n~

~ U. P:-e .. lde!lt, Pr1~ :.!• nt.t~r Cb:-c·,ul •rri t•~r•"':o.ll

Stalin ai~utd to C,.!"3.M ':::::r c.bollt J'Jrt.Pt--:- resht.c:-:9 .

Clu~~•d t.o ht•,., 'ottn sent. o~o-.r J une 'rd . l.t!·J1.•• LTt.tr.•lon

<119, St.&.t•, t.r :-e rc:ceivec.• . •trnt to A~t;:·,l -u •on S:-\, .. l'l,

u ~r pencllea no\4Ucm •A,t J.,1,L-sl !ro":n it b !v••·

7/ll/IJ..

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PsF:~-.c.rrr--<· ...... ). •C/"

TH & WHIT& HOU•C

WAaHINOTON

r. D. a.

~· • r ·sacret..

,

MDtORANDIJH J'OJ\ 1'11fi PRESI DEll!'

fbe ta~l"'l'blo pPOgrolt on \he Eaaurn, ~<eatern and

Southern tron\a reoalle a • usned1on ll&do 1n a aOQOrand ..

on J11111 3, 1 G44 regal'ding a 'Cr1part1U 1ta'Ceaant to \lle

O.l'SI&II Arrq. Yoll ana JOIIJ' ... oo1a101 bead I ot OoYarmaent

D41 41• n adY1N'ble to gl'll tbla further oonetdaraUon

a\ UU1 1t1.ge. ~r thst raaeon a re'l1114 draft,

abortanad and broucht up to data, 11 attaobe4.

It Ohlll'ch1U and Stalln are agl"'leabla to the ld1a,

J: vollld •uce••' t hAt t h 1 Ylev• ot the 1luu1an and .\nglo­

AaOl'loan DJ.ll\al'J leadeJ'I be obtalned both a1 to U a1nc

an4 IUblta!IOio

Elloloi\IJ'II Pratt 1tatea ant •

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' • PRAU S'!'A'fE/D:N'!' BY '!'RS PRESIDENt

Soldier• or Oerm&n7, attention\ Our aaaaulta tro~

the East, Weat and south continue relentleaal7 and with

eyer inereaaing roroa. Bew blowa will tall.

Your defeat ia ineYitabla. In 70ur hearta 70u know

thia ia true. Iou know that 70u haYe nothing to hope tor

trom prolonging the atruggle. Nothing 7011 oan do oan

ehange the outooiM.

Jour lazi leader• lod 70u into war to aatiat7 their

luat tor power and conqueat. The7 _told 7011 it would be

a quick and ea17 Yiotorr. You know now how wrong the7

were. You aarched aoroea Europe - to N&rY1lt, to Bordeaux,

to Stalin«rad, to .U.amein. '!'hat waa long ago. S1nca

then rou haYe begun to reel the roroe ot our oyerwhelaing

power. Your hoaea are noking ruJ.na. Your eoaradea haYa

died; You who haye aacaped from Ruaa1a, rroa Atrioa, rroa

Ital7, troa lloraan~, haYe known the long and bitter road

or defeat. llbere dou that road andt You know the

anawer. It enda in cruah1ng, total defeat, and 1n 70ur

own hoaeland.

ber7 GeNan lite loat tro• now on, aold1er or oiY1lian,

1a a needleaa loaa. You who w1ll die will 41e without hope,

w1th01lt

= a:n f'1lliQIW ~ W ~ a.~ \JUUJ'f't •

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-a-

without taith 1n JOur oauae. Por what?

tour onl.J e~cape l1ea in uncoDdiUonal IUM'ender.

Soldier• ot Oersan7, what tate awaita JOU and rour

countrr when roa laJ down rour ar.a7

We> proahe JOil nothing. GeMI&DJ hae aade terrible

and diaaatroue aiatakal. Ger&&n7 auat atone tor the

wanton deatruotion ot live• and propertJ ahe hal caused.

!hat atoneiHnt will be hal'd. !hi tal .. phlloaopb7 ot

»a~liam, whole talait7. evil and tutil1t7 must be now

be verr clear to 7ou, auet be totall7 deatro7ed. I

repeat, we promiee 70a notblng, but I tell 70u again

certain tund .. ental thlnga.

Tbe Allied leader• - Stalin, Churchill and I - have

aa4e 1t abundanUJ clear that we do not eeelt the deatrue­

t1on ot the German people. I repeat, we do not eeelt the

dtltruoUon ot tbl German people.

lfe aeelt the goal ot human treedoa, tor all aen ~ ~

creater true libert7 - 1ntelleotual, political and

relig1oua; and a greater Justice, aoc1al and economlo.

We eeelt a world 1n which all aen &&J live and work together

1n troedoa .and 1n peace. In thd tree and peaceful world,

Germ&DJ, 1n due tlme and ae ehe maltea and prove• heraalt

wortb7, will have her plaoe.

Vnt11

. . - • UDt ll J OU otaat 70ur bOpelaaa tight, Until 70~

1tadara aurrender uncondU:lonall.:r, tM blowa ot the

._.rlcana, the Brltltb, tht Ruaalant &D4 our a aaoolatta

will lna.reaat ln nuber and 1.D 1ntena1tJ b7 l aM, b7

••• aa4 b7 air until our 1ne•1table Tlotor.r 11 oo•plete.

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•

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORAHDIDt FOR

THE St:CRF.TARY OF STATE t

Vhe.t do r ou think ot thiet

r.D.R.

f-',:l c--~'?~ l r~ t,~ l~ - :o ~h~ ....,-~s . , e _ ::.!,.-1 .. 1,. , f - :::: ·

•

.... lr:o-a:• r·, ~/ 1 J , - e : U"""llin·· D": ~!! C"*.~.A nt;:,I'J t~orr.

; •"'-l~uC!: ~ .. -~u1•"\.el 1

c-"'4"~.CQ nf =.i~c-£?tt -u f'lf

.~~ --·1c':.l~u-~ , C.-C..-!..L , g,~;~o~3~,: ~o :·- s . ?':>ose·J"t.~!.:. • ' ·t ':,h ~t!clcRe.l ::i ll,:' ·es~ inn ~~-r ~':- ·-.t o3r.~ nt. ~(\ t h P. '")eo .·les n . ~::!-:1 '"1~~ J·.r ~ !ctc.tr-s .

r.t.~,..._cho~ !s Cl)=:t.f?!'l~ ~0 :·~,.~ . rh'"li;;, t;-2? :":-oor: · '::llec'? Cc.:-··r.ll .

l

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• OFFICE OF WAR INFORMATION

WASHl NOTON

lle7 22 , 194.4

To : llr. El.Joer Davia , Director

From: Wallace Carroll , Deputy Director, 08

Ther e are some 4>"0d points in this memorandum but it 1a

unsuitabla for our use tor the followinc reesons:

1. 1 t lwops together the Gore~&ns , Japs, and our Allies in

occupied countrl.es . It would therefore cause bitter rasentl<ent emcng the latter .

2. It outlines a very •soft" line to the eneey count11.es .

For instance, it proaises the eoegy people that they will live in "dipty, honor , prosperH7, and treedoa . • Uoat of the United Nations would be unwilling to subscrl.be

to that •

.) . It draws a very sharp distinction between the ener~~y people

and the Fascia~ This is a very controversial subject and,

apin, it 110uld arouse objection.

1, . It promises relief as promptly as possible to enemy peoples .

Thie r uns counter to the UIIRRA a greement .

5 . It aays that the C.nuns and Jeps will first be allowed to

reeatebllsh their own industry and ap;riculture and onl7 then

will they be expected to aid in the reconstruction of

devas teted countries . V.'hat a howl this 110uld raise J

'!here are other crl. t1ci51:1s Which I could make but I think the

!oregoi.ng shows that it 1a not a practical matter to proceed with at the

present tiae .

j

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TH& WHIT& HOUaC

WASHINGTON

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The ?resident says t o tile .

SIR

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ICIC,_..,_ ... ,__. . ............. -- ~ OFFICE OF WAR INFORMAT~

WASHINGTON 2.5. 0 . C. /IfF

The President Tbe 17hJ. te House

Dear llr. Preaident 1

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D!OLASSIFIED S tu~o Dupt . l e tter . 1- 11-?B

Brf-Dato r' llll 2 1972

I return the enclosed suggestion with tho cor:ocnt.s ot tho hood ot our Qlropoan propaganda, 1n ..nicb I concur, Hcnrover, •hUe this progra.:. seel:lS unsuitnble, I thoroughlJ' agree w1 th l!r. Ezeld.el as to the urcent neod ot sC~~:~e statement to tho Cenw~ people, tell1nc them as pre­cisely as possible what -.ld &nd what -.ld not be done to thea at'ter tho unconditional su=elll:ler ot their anoies, No matter how severe it mcht be, 1! it were only precise 1 t would be likely to shorten the war in some degree, &nd thereb;y eave un unpredictable but probably considerable number ot American lives.

I reco¢ze that 1 t cd.ght be easy to shorten the war b;y sott torma lThich would save thousands of lives ncnr, at the cost ot hundreds ot thousands in the next war r.hich aott terms would make 1nov1table; and that no such sol ution would aerve the nationDl. interest. Nevertheless

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I am convinced that evon hard teras, if clearly stated, would go tar to counteract Coebbol' s propaganda or strencth through !ear. The CIY 1n the tall or 1918, ;you relllel>ber, was •Better a terrible end thAn endless terror. • There l:llst be Germans, and they will increase in number, who would !eel that wq again 1! the;y wore assured that the end, thOU!lh terrible enough and t1nal so tar aa their lllil1tu;r power was COilCornod, would be saoetbing elee t.b&D tbe c011plete obliteration which Coebbele pi'Kiote.

Attachlllent

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Ve17 respocttull;y,

Elmer Davia Director

THE U N DER S ECRETARY O F STATE

WASH INGTON

June 3, 1944

MEMQRANI>UM FS>R THE PRESIDEN'l'

Subject: Possible Statement to the German Armx

Since reoei•1ng your memorandum of May 18, we ha•e been gi•ing constant stud7 to the question ot a •tntement dealgned to weaken the German vi.U to reai•t.

We feel strongl)' that •ome such st atement should be issued. Generai Eiaenhover feels likeWise. Amba•sador Pblllips, who has given consi derable thought to it, ha• recently submitted a dratt prepared Jointl)' b)' him, Mr. Sherwood and ottioera or General Eisenhower's etatt and placing more emphasis on military !act ors. We have according!)' prepared a new draft, which takes into account Mr. Pb1ll ipe 1 and other euggest1one and which i a directed speci!icall)' at the German Arm)'. A cop)' is enclosed ' herew1~ t or your considerat ion.

It tbla etatea~ent meets w1 til )'our a!)pro•u, we would suggest subm1tt1ng 1t to the Prime M1n.1ater and probaolr also to Stalin. We r eel it woul d be w.lse to invite tnem to Join ~lith )'OU 1n maki ng i t or to follow it with state:~enu ot tlleir own, as the)' may tll1nk beat. We realize, or course, that a Rueaian call t or the German Army to surrender would not have much appeal but Stalin might consider such a 11essage by )'OU alone or by :you and Churcbill as an attempt to lighten onl:y the task of our Armies in the west.

Ye believe the beet timing tor the statement would be aa eoon after D-Day as substantial progress has been made on the various fronts.

Enclosure: Dratt statement.

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THE UNDER SECR ETARY OF STAT E . ' . '" ' \ ./ l ~,,· \ \' •

WASHINGTON I • I , , \ " v 1\ 1\.. ' · ' V' '

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June ~. 1944 t.1 •

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SubJeot: Possible Statement to Germany

Betore Mr. Hull lett yesterday he handed me your memorandum ot May 31 enolosing Elmer Davia' letter ot the 24th and the statement prepared by Mr. Ezekiel, all ot which I return herewith. While there are some good points in this statement, we are inclined to agree with the pointe ot criticism made by the OWI otticials. In addition, in view ot our understanding ot the British reaction t o the statement recently submitted t o the Prime Minister, it would seem to be clear t hat they would consider thi s statement •too sott•.

We h&ve t or some time been giving serious thought to the whole quest ion ot a statement to Germany and I will be sending you almost 1mmed1atelr a separate memorandum on this subJect.

Enoloaurea: As stated above.

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DEPARTMENT Or STATE

WASHINGTON J uly 26 , 19·\4

lo!EIIlRANiml FOR THE PRESIDmT

SubJect: Reaction in Iraq to Republican Plank Regarding Palestine.

I believe that you will bo interested in the attached paraphrase ot a telegram from our tlinister in Ba(lhdad, Loy Henderson, summarizing conversations which he has had with members ot the Iraqi Government regarding the Palestine plank in the Republican platform. (This plank is similar to that Juet adopted by the Democratic Convention and in ettect provides for tree immigration into Palestine and the creation there ot a Jewish State.)

You will note that while the Iraqi Government appre­ciates the tact that a party platform is not the same as a Government policy, the Cabinet decided to ask Ur, Henderson to inform us that the Iraqi Government is deeply concerned lest the Zionist s take . advantage of the political situation in this country to cOJIWlit both maJor parties to a course which would not be in accord with the war aims ot the United Nations.

I have no doubt but that the reaction in the Arab world to the Democratic plank on Palestine Will be similar, and in view of the strategic iJ!lportanoe to us ot the Near East, I believe that it would be advisable tor leaders of both parties to retrain trom making statements on Palestine during the campaign that might tend to arouse the Arabs or upset the pre­carious balance ot to roes in Palestine 1 tselt . ·

Enclosure: Paraphrase ot telegram no. 167, dated July 18, 1 p.m., trom Baghdad.

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ENCLOSURE TO

LeUot drafl•d 7/25/44 . ···········~·--····--······- ....

A.OOIUM:.I) To

The President - ••••••-•·••-••••·•••uuooooooooooo••-• .. •-•••••-•·••••••

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nATJ:Ds liU'..:O;;R I

- .J~. 'LD 111\e Dept. lottor, 1-11-73

' 17~tMAB 2 1972

l'l~"W"'.!!li~ o!l T:aWWJ ru:caJ.....o

hl.J.::o:.nou, Dot)l<lad :.'looroto.rj' or llto.to, l:oshincton Jul>- 1 B, 1944, 1 p.~. 167.

On JUly 1 5 I woo told b>- t~~ Forolcn l.'.1nlotar , and on ,TUlj' 16 b;r tho l'ril:lo !:lniotor, tllAt tho incc:otion or a Zio:l­i ot plo.n!: in tho pl ntrom or tho nopubllcnn r·c.rt:r hall par­turbo<! t ho MJ:~boro or tho Covorn::~ont or Iraq ona t.hn t it vzaa t holr hope that tho truo oontir..ont a or tho lnrco nunbor or Uni ted ::>tat oo oiti::ono TlhO oro r.oobora or thO !lo;.ublicon :rc.rty wcro not axpr oooo<l in thin pl sn!:. I woo tol u by tho ~:iniotor ror Foro10l Atro i ro t b:lt thoro hod boon n dl ocuccion or this mttor in t ho Ir::q1 Cobinet , thnt o <loc1o1on bOll boon ro::~chcd to ban tho publicotion or thin itoll at l oaot tor tho tirno bo1na in t ho local prooo oo ao not to ot1r up nnJ rooont­rJJnt ond thot tho Cobinot had aeloctod him to .co!:o tho our,co:::tion t hat I inform my Covornnont or tho Iraqi Covornnont •a <loo;:> con­corn loot b>- t~cina ndvont or,o or tho internal poli t i cal cit Ul­tion in tho United ::;~utoo tho Zionioto r.llc;l\t bo cruoooontul in oo:r.Uttinc both or tho lend~ :..norican pol1t1onl pm·tioo to a oou.rDe or noti on which would not conroro to tho pr inciples ror which tho united llntiono ore wocin{; Vlc.r,

fl.lthoueb1 oo tho Foro1cn l!iniotcr pointed out, it wno approciatod t nnt t ho poli t ical partioa in tho United :.'lt nt oo clid not opook ror t ho Covarnocnt and t hot o party plnLfor~ 'tiOo quito on.othar thine !'roc a policy or t ho covorr:::ont1 it 'fins 1'nlt that CD-'Tiitr.onto JMdo before tho olootlon J:I!Olt ilU'luonco tho Covorncont •c polloioo rollowin::; tho aloction.

It 1·;oo t ho oonvioti on or tho Iraqi covarn:::ont thnt tho m:lintononoo or tl·uly rrionclly r clationo bot\ICOD Croat Drit:Un and thl'l United ::;tatoo on tho ono hand nn<l tho /.rob countrioo on tho other woo in\!lOl'tnnt to tbo dovolo;.mont or tho /.rob ,.,orld. It woo t ho policy or the Covcrn."lont or Iro<1 to oul t1-vuto t liooo r ol ntiono oooiduously, I f, honovor , tho /\Cor1cun and Dr1t1ab Covornmonto under tho · pros=o or :lioniot collcnora wcx·o to turn over ·x•ulootino t o Z1on1nt cont1•ol , it I'.'Ould bo i.llposolbl o tor any Iraqi Covornm<:>nt to oton tho 1'/UVO or 1n­cl1c;nat1on whi ch would nri oo cpontonoouoly 1n Iro<l, :;Donld.DG fr"-lll:l>- 1 tho Foroi(",D !:.1n1ntor od<lod, llo felt tllnt a ll that hlld boon naco:tt)liohod in orootiDG 1'ria:~dly 1•olnt1ono bot1:~on tho tlnitod ::;wtoo olld Croot llrito.1n and Iraq lo;ould i nctontly be dootroyed.,

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Since tlloro wna no a round tor a protest, tho !.'.ini otor tor i.'oreiOl Affairs r ernnrkod, ho was not oc.kin(; a protoot but ho !'clot it to be hio duty to 04pr coa the conce rn w11ich ho ond hiD colloacueo tolt and to inform the Covornmont or tho United St;ntoo of tho oor1ous oharnotor of tho problema Which tho Covornrnont ot Iraq would !'noe 11' the Hopublicon pro•Zioniot pl onlc wore to become tho policy ot the Covern­mont ot the United States.

In thnnkine tho L~nistor for his frnnknooo, I pointed out t htlt ho hod bean qui to correct i n drnwinc n diotinetion bot\'IOOD Covor=ont policies and party pl otfor.oe and thnt I hoped his CovorDJUont t:ould boor in Jaind tha t in tho United St ates there io no one o::ceopt tho Government \':ho spooks for t ho Government ot t he .United States. I nlao expressed the bopo that neither the Iraqi press nor the Irn~1 Covcrn~ont should become unduly excited durine tho cominG C:lr.lpaien at utterances t1h1ch would be mnde. In mnki ne this latter ob­oervnt1on , I lllOde i t clear 'that I had no intention ot im­plying t hat I woo civinc eny intimation or t1hat mieht ovcntuoJ.­ly be t ho l'nlestine policy of t ho lu:lorican Covern::~cnt . \':hat that policy would bo I did not know, ond I doubted whether anyone ell:e in tho United States !mow precisely. In any ovont , I added, at the present time l'nlootino policy 'I'IOB not boing either tormula~ed or carriod out by tho United Stat es.

BEillERSON