How to be an How to be an Epistemic Epistemic ExpressivistExpressivist

Michael RidgeMichael Ridge

October, 2011October, 2011

Structure of my Structure of my presentation:presentation: What is expressivism?What is expressivism? Why be an expressivist in the moral case? Why be an expressivist in the moral case? Do the arguments for expressivism carry over from the Do the arguments for expressivism carry over from the

moral case to the epistemic case?moral case to the epistemic case? I argue that they carry over much better for ‘all things I argue that they carry over much better for ‘all things

considered’ judgments than for pro tanto reason considered’ judgments than for pro tanto reason judgments.judgments.

A (very tentative) Hypothesis: perhaps in the epistemic A (very tentative) Hypothesis: perhaps in the epistemic case, we should be expressivists about the all things case, we should be expressivists about the all things considered ‘ought’ but cognitivists about judgments considered ‘ought’ but cognitivists about judgments about pro tanto reasons.about pro tanto reasons.

This would be a strange asymmetry, but This would be a strange asymmetry, but perhapsperhaps an an intelligible one. I consider some challenges to its intelligible one. I consider some challenges to its intelligibility.intelligibility.

A further challenge: Explain why we would come to have A further challenge: Explain why we would come to have a set of epistemic concepts that is bifurcated in this way.a set of epistemic concepts that is bifurcated in this way.

What is expressivism? What is expressivism? (1)(1)

Expressivism is a form of non-cognitivism.Expressivism is a form of non-cognitivism. How should we understand non-cognitivism, How should we understand non-cognitivism,

though?though? First, draw a distinction between robust and First, draw a distinction between robust and

minimal beliefs.minimal beliefs. Metaethical Non-Cognitivism is then the Metaethical Non-Cognitivism is then the

defined as follows:defined as follows: For any claim M in which a moral predicate is For any claim M in which a moral predicate is

used, M does not express a robust belief such used, M does not express a robust belief such that M is thereby guaranteed to be true if that M is thereby guaranteed to be true if and only if the belief expressed is true. and only if the belief expressed is true.

What is expressivism? What is expressivism? (2)(2) Metaethical Metaethical ExpressivismExpressivism is Meta-ethical Non- is Meta-ethical Non-

Cognitivism plus the following positive thesis:Cognitivism plus the following positive thesis: Moral claims express desire-like states of Moral claims express desire-like states of

mind.mind. Most expressivists will also endorse the Most expressivists will also endorse the

following auxiliary thesis:following auxiliary thesis: Moral judgments are at least partly Moral judgments are at least partly constitutedconstituted

by desire-like states of mind.by desire-like states of mind. Epistemic expressivism makes the same Epistemic expressivism makes the same

claims, claims, mutatis mutandis, mutatis mutandis, about epistemic about epistemic claims.claims.

What is expressivism? What is expressivism? (3)(3) Note that this conception of expressivism allows Note that this conception of expressivism allows

that the relevant class of judgments might also that the relevant class of judgments might also be be partlypartly constituted by even robust beliefs. constituted by even robust beliefs.

This will be compatible with expressivism so long This will be compatible with expressivism so long as those robust beliefs do not thereby fix the as those robust beliefs do not thereby fix the truth-conditions for the sentences which express truth-conditions for the sentences which express them.them.

One way of putting this is that moral claims One way of putting this is that moral claims might express beliefs, in a robust sense of belief, might express beliefs, in a robust sense of belief, so long as those beliefs do not thereby count as so long as those beliefs do not thereby count as having moral content. So long as there is no having moral content. So long as there is no distinctively moral representational content.distinctively moral representational content.

Ditto, mutatis mutandis, for epistemic claims.Ditto, mutatis mutandis, for epistemic claims.

What is expressivism? What is expressivism? (4)(4) This opens the way for a kind of “Ecumenical This opens the way for a kind of “Ecumenical

Expressivism,” according to which the relevant Expressivism,” according to which the relevant claims express both desire-like states of mind claims express both desire-like states of mind and and beliefs.beliefs.

The key ideas are that (a) the desire-like states The key ideas are that (a) the desire-like states of mind have a kind of logical priority and (b) of mind have a kind of logical priority and (b) any robust beliefs expressed do not thereby fix any robust beliefs expressed do not thereby fix the truth-conditions of the claim which express the truth-conditions of the claim which express them.them.

So we can have Ecumenical Epistemic So we can have Ecumenical Epistemic Expressivism.Expressivism.

On my own version of Ecumenical Expressivism, On my own version of Ecumenical Expressivism, it is important to also distinguish expression it is important to also distinguish expression de de re re and expression and expression de dictode dicto..

Why be an expressivist Why be an expressivist in the moral case? (1)in the moral case? (1) Moral propositions seem problematic.Moral propositions seem problematic. Such propositions seem to be about Such propositions seem to be about

moral properties, but however we moral properties, but however we understand moral properties we face understand moral properties we face problems.problems.

Suppose we understand such Suppose we understand such properties as irreducible.properties as irreducible.

Such properties would, however, seem Such properties would, however, seem to be ‘queer’ in at least some of the to be ‘queer’ in at least some of the ways Mackie discussed.ways Mackie discussed.

Why be an expressivist Why be an expressivist in the moral case? (2)in the moral case? (2) An obvious solution is to understand An obvious solution is to understand

moral properties in some reductionist moral properties in some reductionist way.way.

However, this approach faces Moore’s However, this approach faces Moore’s OQA and its successors.OQA and its successors.

By ‘its successors’ I have in mind By ‘its successors’ I have in mind Horgan and Timmons’ work on ‘moral Horgan and Timmons’ work on ‘moral twin earth’.twin earth’.

So we have a kind of dilemma for the So we have a kind of dilemma for the cognitivist, with reductionists facing one cognitivist, with reductionists facing one sort of objection and anti-reductionists sort of objection and anti-reductionists facing another.facing another.

Why be an expressivist Why be an expressivist in the moral case? (3)in the moral case? (3) The expressivist avoids both horns of this The expressivist avoids both horns of this

dilemma by starting not with the moral dilemma by starting not with the moral proposition, but with moral judgment itself.proposition, but with moral judgment itself.

On a standard expressivist view, moral judgments On a standard expressivist view, moral judgments are constituted by pro-attitudes, which explains are constituted by pro-attitudes, which explains the Moorean intuitions underwriting the OQA.the Moorean intuitions underwriting the OQA.

For one can always coherently admit that some For one can always coherently admit that some action has a given set of descriptive features yet action has a given set of descriptive features yet not adopt a suitable pro- (or con-) attitude toward not adopt a suitable pro- (or con-) attitude toward that action.that action.

This is one motivation for metaethical This is one motivation for metaethical expressivism: avoiding ontological or expressivism: avoiding ontological or epistemological extravagance without implausible epistemological extravagance without implausible reductionism.reductionism.

Why be an expressivist Why be an expressivist in the moral case? (4)in the moral case? (4) A second argument for expressivism A second argument for expressivism

emphasizes the practicality of moral emphasizes the practicality of moral judgment.judgment.

Moral judgment seems to motivate Moral judgment seems to motivate action directly.action directly.

Further, changes in a person’s moral Further, changes in a person’s moral judgment over time are tracked by judgment over time are tracked by changes in her corresponding changes in her corresponding motivations.motivations.

Why be an expressivist Why be an expressivist in the moral case? (5)in the moral case? (5) Yet ordinary descriptive beliefs are Yet ordinary descriptive beliefs are

plausibly construed as motivationally plausibly construed as motivationally inert, in and of themselves.inert, in and of themselves.

So, prima facie, at least, cognitivists So, prima facie, at least, cognitivists have trouble explaining the practical have trouble explaining the practical character of moral judgment.character of moral judgment.

The expressivist, by contrast, can The expressivist, by contrast, can explain how this is so by construing explain how this is so by construing moral judgments as (at least partly) moral judgments as (at least partly) constituted by pro-attitudes.constituted by pro-attitudes.

Why be an Why be an epistemicepistemic expressivist?expressivist? Prima facie, one might think that there is Prima facie, one might think that there is

some unity across the different areas of some unity across the different areas of normative thought and discourse.normative thought and discourse.

Plausibly, epistemic discourse is Plausibly, epistemic discourse is normative.normative.

This is not, however, simply because we This is not, however, simply because we use ‘ought’ and ‘reason’ when making use ‘ought’ and ‘reason’ when making epistemic claims.epistemic claims.

The sort of normativity entailed by that (if The sort of normativity entailed by that (if any) is too thin to support expressivism.any) is too thin to support expressivism.

Interlude on context-Interlude on context-sensitivitysensitivity Etiquette and the law are, in my view, not plausible Etiquette and the law are, in my view, not plausible

candidates for an expressivist treatment.candidates for an expressivist treatment. Yet we do talk of what one ‘legally ought to do’, or Yet we do talk of what one ‘legally ought to do’, or

‘ought to do as a matter of etiquette’.‘ought to do as a matter of etiquette’. Those terms – ‘ought’ and ‘reason’, are in my view Those terms – ‘ought’ and ‘reason’, are in my view

context-sensitive.context-sensitive. More specifically, they allude to sorts of standards, More specifically, they allude to sorts of standards,

where the sort in play is fixed by a context of where the sort in play is fixed by a context of utterance.utterance.

They are used to make robustly normative claims only They are used to make robustly normative claims only in in certaincertain sorts of contexts: Those in which the sorts of contexts: Those in which the standards invoked are those compatible with wisdom.standards invoked are those compatible with wisdom.

[I argue for all of this at length elsewhere][I argue for all of this at length elsewhere]

Why be an epistemic Why be an epistemic expressivist? (2)expressivist? (2) The appeal to wisdom is my own The appeal to wisdom is my own

conception of normative thought and conception of normative thought and discourse.discourse.

I offer the following more abstract shared I offer the following more abstract shared concept of the normative:concept of the normative:

I propose (and elsewhere argue) that the I propose (and elsewhere argue) that the relevant contexts are ones in which the relevant contexts are ones in which the claims express judgments which function to claims express judgments which function to fix our “judgment sensitive attitudes” on fix our “judgment sensitive attitudes” on pain of irrationality.pain of irrationality.

They in this sense They in this sense settlesettle the “thing to do,” the “thing to do,” the “thing to think,” and the “thing to feel.”the “thing to think,” and the “thing to feel.”

Why be an epistemic Why be an epistemic expressivist? (3)expressivist? (3) Epistemic discourse, though, does seem to play a Epistemic discourse, though, does seem to play a

distinctive role in settling an agent’s “judgment distinctive role in settling an agent’s “judgment sensitive attitudes” on pain of irrationality.sensitive attitudes” on pain of irrationality.

So it does look like the hunch that the normative So it does look like the hunch that the normative has some underlying semantic unity would has some underlying semantic unity would support expressivism about the epistemic, support expressivism about the epistemic, conditional on expressivism about the ethical.conditional on expressivism about the ethical.

This consideration provides only prima facie This consideration provides only prima facie support for epistemic expressivism, though.support for epistemic expressivism, though.

Does this prima facie case withstand scrutiny?Does this prima facie case withstand scrutiny? In particular, do the In particular, do the arguments arguments from the moral from the moral

case carry over smoothly to the epistemic case?case carry over smoothly to the epistemic case?

A problem with carrying A problem with carrying over the “Open Question over the “Open Question Argument.” (1)Argument.” (1) An asymmetry:An asymmetry: In the moral/practical case, even the most plausible In the moral/practical case, even the most plausible

candidate reasons for action can intelligibly be candidate reasons for action can intelligibly be challenged.challenged.

Even the normative relevance of physical pain can Even the normative relevance of physical pain can without conceptual confusion be challenged.without conceptual confusion be challenged.

Examples of intelligible views which do this:Examples of intelligible views which do this:A. Certain forms of Stoicism.A. Certain forms of Stoicism.B. Certain religious moral outlooks.B. Certain religious moral outlooks.C. First-Order Nihilism.C. First-Order Nihilism.D. Holists about reasons.D. Holists about reasons.

So even asking a question like, “Granted, it would cause So even asking a question like, “Granted, it would cause great physical pain, but is that any reason at all not to great physical pain, but is that any reason at all not to do it?” does not betray conceptual confusion.do it?” does not betray conceptual confusion.

A problem with carrying A problem with carrying over the “Open Question over the “Open Question Argument.” (2)Argument.” (2) However, the analogous hypothesis does However, the analogous hypothesis does

not seem to hold up in the case of not seem to hold up in the case of reasons for belief.reasons for belief.

For the following actually For the following actually doesdoes seem to seem to betray conceptual confusion:betray conceptual confusion:

““Granted, the fact that he has chocolate Granted, the fact that he has chocolate all over his face makes it very probable all over his face makes it very probable (given the context), that my son has been (given the context), that my son has been into the cookies, but is that any reason at into the cookies, but is that any reason at all to believe he has been into the all to believe he has been into the cookies?”cookies?”

A problem with carrying A problem with carrying over the “Open Question over the “Open Question Argument.” (3)Argument.” (3) This may reflect a deeper difference between the This may reflect a deeper difference between the

moral and the epistemic.moral and the epistemic. For the arguments for expressivism in the For the arguments for expressivism in the

moral/practical case suggest that neither intention nor moral/practical case suggest that neither intention nor action have any interesting telos.action have any interesting telos.

Perhaps intention has its own fulfilment as its Perhaps intention has its own fulfilment as its intention, but that does not look to provide the basis intention, but that does not look to provide the basis for a plausible theory of the very concept of a reason for a plausible theory of the very concept of a reason for action.for action.

[Aside: This is why constitutivism as a fully [Aside: This is why constitutivism as a fully freestanding meta-normative view in the practical freestanding meta-normative view in the practical realm is implausible. The norms constitutive of realm is implausible. The norms constitutive of agency are too thin to capture everything we can at agency are too thin to capture everything we can at least least intelligibly intelligibly think about what we ought to do]think about what we ought to do]

A problem with carrying A problem with carrying over the “Open Question over the “Open Question Argument.” (4)Argument.” (4) Whereas belief does plausibly have Whereas belief does plausibly have truthtruth

as a kind of telos.as a kind of telos. Belief in some sense aims at truth. This Belief in some sense aims at truth. This

is how we distinguish believing that p is how we distinguish believing that p from imagining that p, supposing that p from imagining that p, supposing that p for the sake of argument, etc.for the sake of argument, etc.

Moreover, the idea that reasons for belief Moreover, the idea that reasons for belief can be understood somehow in terms of can be understood somehow in terms of truth conduciveness is not so implausible.truth conduciveness is not so implausible.

A problem with carrying A problem with carrying over the practical over the practical argument (1)argument (1) The basic problem: Judgments about our reasons for The basic problem: Judgments about our reasons for

belief do belief do not not seem to directly motivate action.seem to directly motivate action. At most, such judgments seem to directly influence At most, such judgments seem to directly influence

one’s beliefs.one’s beliefs. This, however, is no argument for non-cognitivism or This, however, is no argument for non-cognitivism or

expressivism.expressivism. For beliefs in general can directly and rationally For beliefs in general can directly and rationally

influence one’s beliefs. That is just rational inference.influence one’s beliefs. That is just rational inference. For example: My belief that the cup is blue can For example: My belief that the cup is blue can

directly and rationally lead me to believe that the cup directly and rationally lead me to believe that the cup is not red.is not red.

Not all inference is mediated by normative judgments Not all inference is mediated by normative judgments about what one ought to believe.about what one ought to believe.

A problem with carrying A problem with carrying over the practical over the practical argument (2)argument (2) This objection is too swift, though.This objection is too swift, though. For perhaps our For perhaps our epistemicepistemic judgments judgments

do directly influence our do directly influence our actionsactions (and (and not just our other beliefs) after all.not just our other beliefs) after all.

In particular, our epistemic In particular, our epistemic judgments may directly influence judgments may directly influence both our mental actions and our both our mental actions and our external actions.external actions.

A problem with carrying A problem with carrying over the practical over the practical argument (3)argument (3) On the first count, an epistemic judgment On the first count, an epistemic judgment

that one has sufficient reason to believe that that one has sufficient reason to believe that p might motivate one to stop thinking about p might motivate one to stop thinking about whether p is the case. whether p is the case.

Thinking about whether p is the case is a Thinking about whether p is the case is a mental mental actact one can one can choosechoose to perform. to perform.

This is unlike believing that p. This is unlike believing that p. On the second count, an epistemic judgment On the second count, an epistemic judgment

that one has sufficient reason to believe that that one has sufficient reason to believe that p might motivate one to stop seeking further p might motivate one to stop seeking further evidence – which is clearly an action.evidence – which is clearly an action.

A problem with carrying A problem with carrying over the practical over the practical argument (4)argument (4) A first objection to this modified practical A first objection to this modified practical

argument:argument: Perhaps belief alone, even in a robustly Perhaps belief alone, even in a robustly

representational sense, can directly motivate representational sense, can directly motivate action in these specific senses.action in these specific senses.

Perhaps on a classical functionalist story, this Perhaps on a classical functionalist story, this is part of why beliefs count as having a is part of why beliefs count as having a representational direction of fit with a given representational direction of fit with a given content.content.

HoweverHowever we explain this fact about belief, we explain this fact about belief, though, its truth undermines the idea that the though, its truth undermines the idea that the practicality of epistemic judgments practicality of epistemic judgments in this in this specific sensespecific sense somehow undermines their somehow undermines their status as robust beliefs.status as robust beliefs.

A problem with carrying A problem with carrying over the practical over the practical argument (5)argument (5) A reply to this first objection:A reply to this first objection: Plausibly, when we think about p or seek Plausibly, when we think about p or seek

evidence regarding the truth of p, it is because evidence regarding the truth of p, it is because we we wantwant to know whether p is the case. to know whether p is the case.

If we believe that we already know that p then If we believe that we already know that p then we will thereby take that desire to be satisfied.we will thereby take that desire to be satisfied.

Someone who does not want to know whether Someone who does not want to know whether p, after all, will not seek evidence, etc.p, after all, will not seek evidence, etc.

So belief, even in these cases, does not So belief, even in these cases, does not directlydirectly and rationally influence action. At least, there and rationally influence action. At least, there is a plausible Humean story which does not is a plausible Humean story which does not require us to concede this.require us to concede this.

A problem with carrying A problem with carrying over the practical over the practical argument (6)argument (6) What about a case in which one believes What about a case in which one believes

withoutwithout taking oneself to know? taking oneself to know? In that case, one might well still be motivated In that case, one might well still be motivated

(e.g. by a desire to know) to seek more (e.g. by a desire to know) to seek more evidence or think more about p. So in that evidence or think more about p. So in that case, the belief does not case, the belief does not blockblock such such epistemic activities.epistemic activities.

It is still a desire to know that does provides It is still a desire to know that does provides Humean motivational Humean motivational oomph oomph though.though.

So this objection fails.So this objection fails. So perhaps the practical argument does So perhaps the practical argument does

carry over after all?carry over after all? Not so fast!Not so fast!

An objection from An objection from pragmatic encroachment pragmatic encroachment (1)(1) There is a better objection to the proposed There is a better objection to the proposed

account of the distinctive motivating power account of the distinctive motivating power of epistemic judgment, one which I adapt of epistemic judgment, one which I adapt from David Owens’ work.from David Owens’ work.

Stage One of the objection:Stage One of the objection: Pragmatic Encroachment: The judgment that Pragmatic Encroachment: The judgment that

one has one has sufficientsufficient reason to believe that p is reason to believe that p is informed by pragmatic considerations.informed by pragmatic considerations.

How important it is to form a belief about p How important it is to form a belief about p at all, how much time one has to gather at all, how much time one has to gather more evidence, how important it is to get it more evidence, how important it is to get it right are all relevant to whether one’s right are all relevant to whether one’s reasons are sufficient.reasons are sufficient.

[Quick and dirty [Quick and dirty argument for pragmatic argument for pragmatic encroachment]encroachment] Without Without somesome pragmatic component, it is hard pragmatic component, it is hard

to see how to fix the level of justification to see how to fix the level of justification required for knowledge unless we fix that level required for knowledge unless we fix that level at “certainty” – at least, it is hard to see a non-at “certainty” – at least, it is hard to see a non-pragmatic alternative which is not implausibly pragmatic alternative which is not implausibly arbitrary.arbitrary.

But such high standards lead very quickly to But such high standards lead very quickly to global or nearly global scepticism.global or nearly global scepticism.

The purely theoretical high standard sense The purely theoretical high standard sense might be might be one one sense of ‘knows’ and cognate sense of ‘knows’ and cognate terms.terms.

However, it had better not be the only one, on However, it had better not be the only one, on pain of ‘knows’ not being a very useful concept pain of ‘knows’ not being a very useful concept in our cognitive economy.in our cognitive economy.

An objection from An objection from pragmatic encroachment pragmatic encroachment (2)(2) Note that this is not a crude pragmatism which Note that this is not a crude pragmatism which

holds that reasons for belief just are reasons of holds that reasons for belief just are reasons of the desirability of one’s so believing.the desirability of one’s so believing.

Owens correctly notes that these sorts of Owens correctly notes that these sorts of considerations are not reasons to believe, but considerations are not reasons to believe, but perhaps reasons to get oneself to believe.perhaps reasons to get oneself to believe.

Instead the idea is that whether one’s reasons Instead the idea is that whether one’s reasons for belief, where reasons for belief must be for belief, where reasons for belief must be recognizably epistemic, are recognizably epistemic, are sufficientsufficient can can depend on practical considerations.depend on practical considerations.

An objection from An objection from pragmatic encroachment pragmatic encroachment (3)(3) Owens on pragmatic encroachment:Owens on pragmatic encroachment: ““However abstruse the issues…each of us must However abstruse the issues…each of us must

strike a balance between believing truths and strike a balance between believing truths and avoiding falsehoods (James 1956: 17-19). How avoiding falsehoods (James 1956: 17-19). How much risk of error are we willing to run in order much risk of error are we willing to run in order to relieve ourselves of the burdens of to relieve ourselves of the burdens of agnosticism? The curiosity of the amateur agnosticism? The curiosity of the amateur astronomer about the origins of the universe will astronomer about the origins of the universe will not be satisfied until he has a view on that not be satisfied until he has a view on that question…while to a professional astronomer, the question…while to a professional astronomer, the frustration of curiosity may be less important frustration of curiosity may be less important than the risk of making a mistake.” (than the risk of making a mistake.” (Reason Reason Without FreedomWithout Freedom, p. 26), p. 26)

An objection from An objection from pragmatic encroachment pragmatic encroachment (4)(4) This is compatible with the balance of evidence This is compatible with the balance of evidence

determining whether to believe p or not-p determining whether to believe p or not-p ifif you believe either:you believe either:

““The evidentialist may be right to insist that The evidentialist may be right to insist that whether I believe p rather than not-p is whether I believe p rather than not-p is something that should be fixed purely by the something that should be fixed purely by the balance of evidence for and against p. But balance of evidence for and against p. But where and when I form a view as to whether p where and when I form a view as to whether p is true will be determined by my sense of how is true will be determined by my sense of how important the issue is, what the consequences important the issue is, what the consequences of having a certain belief on the matter would of having a certain belief on the matter would be, and how much of my limited cognitive be, and how much of my limited cognitive resources I ought to devote to it before resources I ought to devote to it before reaching a conclusion.” (pp. 26-27)reaching a conclusion.” (pp. 26-27)

An objection from An objection from pragmatic encroachment pragmatic encroachment (5)(5) So certain sorts of practical considerations are So certain sorts of practical considerations are

relevant to whether one’s reasons for believing relevant to whether one’s reasons for believing that p are that p are sufficientsufficient..

Prima facie, this might seem to Prima facie, this might seem to supportsupport the idea the idea that the arguments for expressivism carry over that the arguments for expressivism carry over to the epistemic case.to the epistemic case.

For now we have precisely the same kinds of For now we have precisely the same kinds of reasons (practical reasons) in the epistemic case reasons (practical reasons) in the epistemic case that we found in the moral/practical case.that we found in the moral/practical case.

We can learn something relevant here from We can learn something relevant here from considering how Owens uses the idea of considering how Owens uses the idea of pragmatic encroachment to undermine the pragmatic encroachment to undermine the thesis that our epistemic judgments are directly thesis that our epistemic judgments are directly motivating.motivating.

An objection from An objection from pragmatic encroachment pragmatic encroachment (4)(4) Owens argues that one cannot rationally Owens argues that one cannot rationally

decide to form a belief decide to form a belief on the basis ofon the basis of needing needing to come to a view.to come to a view.

Indeed, one can no more form a belief on the Indeed, one can no more form a belief on the basis of a view about the urgency of coming to basis of a view about the urgency of coming to a view than one can form a belief on the basis a view than one can form a belief on the basis of the practical desirability of so believing of the practical desirability of so believing more generally.more generally.

The reason would be ‘of the wrong kind’ to The reason would be ‘of the wrong kind’ to rationally determine one’s belief.rationally determine one’s belief.

In coming to a view about p, our focus is on the In coming to a view about p, our focus is on the world – specifically on that part of the world world – specifically on that part of the world that seems relevant to whether p is the case.that seems relevant to whether p is the case.

An objection from An objection from pragmatic encroachment pragmatic encroachment (5)(5)

I want to see whether this argument I want to see whether this argument might also be relevant to the debate might also be relevant to the debate over epistemic expressivism.over epistemic expressivism.

To be clear, this was not Owens’ own To be clear, this was not Owens’ own topic. He was interested in whether topic. He was interested in whether this point undermined theories of this point undermined theories of epistemic responsibility based on some epistemic responsibility based on some form of robust epistemic freedom.form of robust epistemic freedom.

An objection from An objection from pragmatic encroachment pragmatic encroachment (6)(6) Owens develops his argument in the context Owens develops his argument in the context

of the work of John Locke.of the work of John Locke. He argues that our epistemic judgments He argues that our epistemic judgments

might rationally influence what seems salient might rationally influence what seems salient to us, and thereby influence our deliberation.to us, and thereby influence our deliberation.

However, this would at best allow for a kind However, this would at best allow for a kind of of indirectindirect control over our mental life. control over our mental life.

Such indirect control seems insufficient for a Such indirect control seems insufficient for a pragmatic argument for epistemic pragmatic argument for epistemic expressivism.expressivism.

After all, cognitivists can, should, and After all, cognitivists can, should, and typically do allow that our moral judgments typically do allow that our moral judgments can can indirectlyindirectly motivate us. motivate us.

An objection from An objection from pragmatic encroachment pragmatic encroachment (7)(7) In that context, Owens considers the In that context, Owens considers the

following rejoinder to his argument:following rejoinder to his argument: ““A Lockean might reply that while only A Lockean might reply that while only

reasons for reasons for ΦΦ-ing can get me to -ing can get me to ΦΦ, the desire , the desire to deliberate about whether to to deliberate about whether to ΦΦ can prevent can prevent me from me from ΦΦ-ing. Equally a strong desire to be -ing. Equally a strong desire to be right about whether p can ensure that I right about whether p can ensure that I continue to worry about whether p and fail to continue to worry about whether p and fail to form the belief that p, even if only evidence form the belief that p, even if only evidence for p can convince me of p. Now these for p can convince me of p. Now these desires directly motivate the person whose desires directly motivate the person whose desires they are.”desires they are.”

An objection from An objection from pragmatic encroachment pragmatic encroachment (8)(8) Owens’ reply is instructive:Owens’ reply is instructive: ““I have direct control over my belief if my I have direct control over my belief if my

judgment about whether I ought to believe that p judgment about whether I ought to believe that p helps determine whether I acquire that helps determine whether I acquire that conviction. But there is nothing in what Locke conviction. But there is nothing in what Locke says to indicate why these higher-order says to indicate why these higher-order judgments should have any direct influence over judgments should have any direct influence over what happens. On Locke’s model, what what happens. On Locke’s model, what determines whether I form a belief or not is determines whether I form a belief or not is whether I whether I desiredesire to deliberate further, not to deliberate further, not whether I judge that I ought to.” (p. 98)whether I judge that I ought to.” (p. 98)

The argument allows that desires can directly The argument allows that desires can directly guide one’s mental actions (whether one guide one’s mental actions (whether one deliberates, say) but denies that this is of any deliberates, say) but denies that this is of any help to the Lockean.help to the Lockean.

An objection from An objection from pragmatic encroachment pragmatic encroachment (9)(9) Indeed, the parallel with a debate in metaethics is quite Indeed, the parallel with a debate in metaethics is quite

striking.striking. For against the background of an assumed cognitivism, he For against the background of an assumed cognitivism, he

effectively offers a kind of Michael Smith-style fetishism effectively offers a kind of Michael Smith-style fetishism objection to certain strategies for explaining the alleged objection to certain strategies for explaining the alleged motivating power of the relevant judgments:motivating power of the relevant judgments:

““Should Locke restore reflective control by postulating a Should Locke restore reflective control by postulating a desire to believe and act in accordance with these higher-desire to believe and act in accordance with these higher-order judgments? Such a desire seems strange: why should order judgments? Such a desire seems strange: why should I desire to believe what I think I ought to believe (rather than I desire to believe what I think I ought to believe (rather than what the evidence supports)?” (p. 98)what the evidence supports)?” (p. 98)

This is similar to Michael Smith’s suggestion that being This is similar to Michael Smith’s suggestion that being motivated by a desire to do what is right, where this desire motivated by a desire to do what is right, where this desire is is de dictode dicto, would be a kind of ‘fetishism’., would be a kind of ‘fetishism’.

The biggest difference is that Smith is arguing against one The biggest difference is that Smith is arguing against one model of motivation to make way for another; Owens is model of motivation to make way for another; Owens is arguing against the idea that our epistemic judgments are arguing against the idea that our epistemic judgments are directly motivational directly motivational tout courttout court..

An objection from An objection from pragmatic encroachment pragmatic encroachment (10)(10) Owens’ argument simply assumes that Owens’ argument simply assumes that

normative judgments are not themselves a normative judgments are not themselves a species of desire; otherwise his argument is a species of desire; otherwise his argument is a non-sequitur.non-sequitur.

The crucial space opened up here is for the non-The crucial space opened up here is for the non-cognitivist to hold that the relevant normative cognitivist to hold that the relevant normative judgments just judgments just areare desires. Or just states of desires. Or just states of mind at least partially constituted by desires.mind at least partially constituted by desires.

Insofar as the idea that we have some rational Insofar as the idea that we have some rational control over our beliefs has antecedent control over our beliefs has antecedent plausibility, this seems like an equally good plausibility, this seems like an equally good reply to Owens’ argument: Epistemic reply to Owens’ argument: Epistemic Expressivism allows us to hold onto “Reflective Expressivism allows us to hold onto “Reflective Motivation.”Motivation.”

An objection from An objection from pragmatic encroachment pragmatic encroachment (11)(11) Note, though, that this argument works only for Note, though, that this argument works only for

judgments about what one ought to believe judgments about what one ought to believe all all things consideredthings considered..

Pragmatic Encroachment itself comes into play Pragmatic Encroachment itself comes into play only when deciding whether one’s evidence is only when deciding whether one’s evidence is strong enough to warrant coming to a view, after strong enough to warrant coming to a view, after all.all.

All things considered epistemic judgments seem All things considered epistemic judgments seem to be directly motivating – they plausibly directly to be directly motivating – they plausibly directly influence deliberation (a mental act) and influence deliberation (a mental act) and evidence gathering and discussion with others evidence gathering and discussion with others (external actions).(external actions).

Judgments of mere pro-tanto reasons for belief do Judgments of mere pro-tanto reasons for belief do not seem to involve direct motivation in this way.not seem to involve direct motivation in this way.

A surprising upshotA surprising upshot

It seems that both (1) the OQA/Twin It seems that both (1) the OQA/Twin Earth and the (2) practical argument Earth and the (2) practical argument carry over smoothly to the epistemic carry over smoothly to the epistemic case case ifif, but only if, we focus on all , but only if, we focus on all things considered judgments.things considered judgments.

Neither argument looks so good if we Neither argument looks so good if we focus on judgments of pro tanto focus on judgments of pro tanto reasons for belief.reasons for belief.

This marks out a difference from the This marks out a difference from the moral/practical case.moral/practical case.

Where do we go from Where do we go from here?here? Several theoretical options to consider:Several theoretical options to consider:

(1) Use epistemic expressivism as a reductio for (1) Use epistemic expressivism as a reductio for moral/practical expressivism. The idea: Following the moral/practical expressivism. The idea: Following the arguments where they lead generates an incoherent sort of arguments where they lead generates an incoherent sort of divide between the pro tanto and the all things considered. divide between the pro tanto and the all things considered. So the arguments must go wrong somehow. The conclusion: So the arguments must go wrong somehow. The conclusion: cognitivism is true in both realms. cognitivism is true in both realms.

(2) Go for a more fully general form of epistemic (2) Go for a more fully general form of epistemic expressivism and either patch up the old arguments or find expressivism and either patch up the old arguments or find new arguments for epistemic expressivism about pro tanto new arguments for epistemic expressivism about pro tanto reasons for belief.reasons for belief.

(3) Follow the argument where it leads, and endorse a sort (3) Follow the argument where it leads, and endorse a sort of bifurcated view in the epistemic case: Expressivism of bifurcated view in the epistemic case: Expressivism about all things considered epistemic judgments, but about all things considered epistemic judgments, but cognitivism about judgments about pro tanto reasons.cognitivism about judgments about pro tanto reasons.

Throwing out the baby Throwing out the baby with the bath water?with the bath water? The first option – the “reductio of The first option – the “reductio of

expressivism line” - rests on the expressivism line” - rests on the premise that this sort of premise that this sort of bifurcated view is incoherent.bifurcated view is incoherent.

It is just not obvious that this is It is just not obvious that this is so, though, and it would be so, though, and it would be interesting to see how one might interesting to see how one might argue for it. [discussion?]argue for it. [discussion?]

A weaker reductio and A weaker reductio and how to meet it.how to meet it. One might instead argue that while such a bifurcated view is One might instead argue that while such a bifurcated view is

not literally incoherent, it looks somewhat ad hoc and not literally incoherent, it looks somewhat ad hoc and disjointed, and that this casts the burden of proof onto its disjointed, and that this casts the burden of proof onto its defenders.defenders.

Fair enough: But perhaps we can tell a suitable ‘just so Fair enough: But perhaps we can tell a suitable ‘just so story’ to explain this asymmetry between the pro tanto and story’ to explain this asymmetry between the pro tanto and the all things considered.the all things considered.

The common thread might be the element of practical The common thread might be the element of practical decision-making. Since judging whether the evidence if decision-making. Since judging whether the evidence if sufficient for making a judgment always involves a practical sufficient for making a judgment always involves a practical element, but not so judgments of pro tanto reasons for element, but not so judgments of pro tanto reasons for belief, this looks promising.belief, this looks promising.

The idea would be that practical reasoning has no The idea would be that practical reasoning has no telostelos which as a matter of conceptual necessity fixes what counts which as a matter of conceptual necessity fixes what counts as a reason (much less a sufficient reason), whereas what as a reason (much less a sufficient reason), whereas what counts as at least a pro tanto reason for belief is fixed by the counts as at least a pro tanto reason for belief is fixed by the telostelos of belief. of belief.

Fully general Fully general epistemic epistemic expressivism? (1)expressivism? (1) Another option would be to argue Another option would be to argue

that either the arguments do that either the arguments do somehow carry over to the pro tanto somehow carry over to the pro tanto or…or…

That anyway other arguments are That anyway other arguments are forthcoming. [discussion]forthcoming. [discussion]

Not sure how to patch up the Not sure how to patch up the practical argument, though. practical argument, though. [discussion][discussion]

Fully general Fully general epistemic epistemic expressivism? (2)expressivism? (2) PerhapsPerhaps the OQA can be patched for pro tanto the OQA can be patched for pro tanto

reasons.reasons. My argument at most showed that there are certain My argument at most showed that there are certain

criteria (being linked in the right way to the truth of p), criteria (being linked in the right way to the truth of p), such that any fact which meets that criteria is thereby such that any fact which meets that criteria is thereby conceptually guaranteed to be a reason for believing conceptually guaranteed to be a reason for believing that p.that p.

Perhaps, though, there are other sorts of reasons for Perhaps, though, there are other sorts of reasons for belief where the criteria are more “up for grabs.”belief where the criteria are more “up for grabs.”

For example, the simplicity of a hypothesis For example, the simplicity of a hypothesis mightmight be be understood as a reason for believing it independently understood as a reason for believing it independently of whether simplicity increases the likelihood of truth.of whether simplicity increases the likelihood of truth.

Whether and in what sense simplicity provides a Whether and in what sense simplicity provides a reason for belief looks like something about which reason for belief looks like something about which people can disagree without thereby betraying people can disagree without thereby betraying conceptual confusion.conceptual confusion.

Fully general Fully general epistemic epistemic expressivism? (3)expressivism? (3) Even if this is so, it would require a serious reworking Even if this is so, it would require a serious reworking

of the OQA, which does not seem to allow for such a of the OQA, which does not seem to allow for such a substantial or “core” range of paradigm cases.substantial or “core” range of paradigm cases.

It looks more amenable to a “cluster concept” It looks more amenable to a “cluster concept” account.account.

Or perhaps a Cornell-style account.Or perhaps a Cornell-style account. Here recall my invocation of the OQA “and its Here recall my invocation of the OQA “and its

sucessors.”sucessors.” I doubt that epistemic twin earth would be as I doubt that epistemic twin earth would be as

convincing as the Horgan and Timmons “moral twin convincing as the Horgan and Timmons “moral twin earth” examples. earth” examples.

Perhaps a community which gave Perhaps a community which gave no no weight to weight to considerations of simplicity in making judgments considerations of simplicity in making judgments about reasons for belief really is just talking past us.about reasons for belief really is just talking past us.

Not sure how to resolve this dispute.Not sure how to resolve this dispute.

A Bifurcated Epistemic A Bifurcated Epistemic Expressivism? (1)Expressivism? (1) The last option is surprising, but perhaps has a lot to The last option is surprising, but perhaps has a lot to

be said in its favour.be said in its favour. It would preserve a broad continuity about practical It would preserve a broad continuity about practical

normative judgments, since the epistemic all things normative judgments, since the epistemic all things considered involves ‘pragmatic encroachment’.considered involves ‘pragmatic encroachment’.

This might also explain why our practice would have This might also explain why our practice would have this shape.this shape.

Yet at the same time it would capture the sense of Yet at the same time it would capture the sense of unease that many philosophers (Cuneo, Kvanvig, and unease that many philosophers (Cuneo, Kvanvig, and Lynch, e.g.) have about epistemic expressivism, owing Lynch, e.g.) have about epistemic expressivism, owing to the seeming objectivity of epistemic reasons.to the seeming objectivity of epistemic reasons.

The objectivity reflects the telos of belief, and the way The objectivity reflects the telos of belief, and the way in which that fixes our reasons for belief.in which that fixes our reasons for belief.

Yet how strong our reasons must be before they are Yet how strong our reasons must be before they are decisive is not objective in this same way.decisive is not objective in this same way.

A Bifurcated Epistemic A Bifurcated Epistemic Expressivism? (2)Expressivism? (2) Some challenges here:Some challenges here: (1) To meet further objections to the coherence of such a (1) To meet further objections to the coherence of such a

hybrid view.hybrid view. (2) To work out a solution to the Frege-Geach puzzle which (2) To work out a solution to the Frege-Geach puzzle which

preserves the right sorts of inferential connections between preserves the right sorts of inferential connections between pro tanto and all things considered epistemic judgments.pro tanto and all things considered epistemic judgments.

E.g., ‘There is most reason to X’ entails that there is some E.g., ‘There is most reason to X’ entails that there is some reason to X.reason to X.

One strategy here: Analyze the all things considered One strategy here: Analyze the all things considered epistemic judgments as a kind of ‘thick evaluative judgment’ epistemic judgments as a kind of ‘thick evaluative judgment’ so that some suitable descriptive component is there to so that some suitable descriptive component is there to explain how you can in a sense derive an ‘is’ from an ‘ought’ explain how you can in a sense derive an ‘is’ from an ‘ought’ in this case.in this case.

My own hypothesis: A form of Ecumenical Expressivism will My own hypothesis: A form of Ecumenical Expressivism will be especially well-suited to this last strategy. That, be especially well-suited to this last strategy. That, however, is a story for another day…!however, is a story for another day…!

Thanks for your time Thanks for your time and attention…and attention…