Haas - Epistemic Communities

8/10/2019 Haas - Epistemic Communities

1/36

Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy CoordinationAuthor(s): Peter M. HaasSource: International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 1, Knowledge, Power, and International PolicyCoordination (Winter, 1992), pp. 1-35Published by: The MIT PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706951.

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2/36

Introduction:

pistemic ommunities

and international

olicy

oordination

Peter M. Haas

The growing echnical

uncertainties nd complexities f problemsof global

concern

have made international olicy coordinationnot only increasingly

necessary

ut

also increasingly

ifficult.

f

decision

makers re unfamiliar ith

the technical spectsof

a

specific roblem,

how do theydefine tate nterests

and

develop

viable

solutions?

What factors hape their

behavior?

Under

conditions f

uncertainty,

hat

are

the

origins

f internationalnstitutions?

And how

can

we

best study he processes through

which nternational

olicy

coordination

nd

order merge?

While a varietyof analytic approaches have been used to address the

problems of international

ooperation, the approaches have yielded

only

fragmentarynsights.

t itscore,thestudy fpolicy

oordination

mong

tates

involves rguments

bout determinism ersusfree

will and about the ways

n

which the international

ystem

s maintained

nd

transformed. mong

the

overlapping opics

of

debate are whethernationalbehavior

s determined r

broadly onditioned y

ystem-levelactors, nit-level

actors,

r

some complex

interplay etween the

two; whether tate policymakersan identify ational

interests nd behave

independently f pressures

rom he social groupsthey

nominally epresent; ndwhether tatesrespond onsistentlyoopportunities

to

create,defend,

r

expand

their

wnwealth nd

power,

o enhancecollective

material

benefits,

r

to

promote

nonmaterial alues.'

A

related

question

of

For their omments n earlier versions

f this article, am grateful o Pete Andrews,

Peter

Cowhey, arbara Crane, George Hoberg,

RaymondHopkins,

than Kapstein,Peter

Katzenstein,

StephenKrasner,Craig Murphy,

ohn

Odell,

Gail

Osherenko,

M. J.Peterson,Gene Rochlin, nd

RichardSclove.

1.

See, for example, Alexander

E.

Wendt,

"The

Agent-Structure

roblem,"

ntemational

Organization

1

(Summer

1987), pp.

335-70; Margaret S. Archer, "Morphogenesis

Versus

Structuration: n Combining tructure nd Action,"British oumalof Sociology 3 (December

1982), pp. 455-83;

David Dessler, "What's

at Stake n theAgent-Structureebate?" Intemational

Organization

3

(Summer1989),pp.

441-73; PeterGourevitch,

The Second Image Reversed:

The

International ources

of Domestic Politics," ntemational rganization

2 (Autumn

1978), pp.

881-912; Peter

J.

Katzenstein, d.,

BetweenPower and Plenty:ForeignEconomic

Policies

of

Intemational rganization

6, 1, Winter 992

?

1992 bythe WorldPeace Foundation nd

the Massachusetts nstitute

f Technology


3/36

2 International

rganization

debate

is the extent o

which tate actorsfully ecognize

nd appreciate

the

anarchic

natureof the

system

nd, consequently,

whether

rationalchoice,

deductive-typepproaches r nterpretivepproaches remost ppropriate or

the study

f nternational

ooperation.2

In

focusing

n the structure

f international

r domestic

power

in their

explanations

f

policy

coordination,many

uthors gnore

the possibility

hat

actors

can learn new

patterns

f reasoning

nd may consequently

egin

to

pursue

new

state

nterests.While

others

mention his

possibility,

ew

nvesti-

gate the

conditions hat

foster change

nstate

nterests

nd themechanisms

through hich

he new nterests

an be realized.3

In

this volume

of articles,we

acknowledge

hatsystemic

onditions nd

domesticpressures mposeconstraints n statebehavior,but we arguethat

there

s still widedegree

of atitude

or tate ction.

How

states dentify

heir

interests

nd recognize

he atitude f actions

deemed

appropriate

n specific

issue-areas f

policymaking

re functions

f the

mannernwhich he problems

are understood

ythepolicymakers

r are represented y

those to whom

hey

turn

for

advice under conditions

of

uncertainty.

ecognizing

that human

agency

ies at

the interstices etween systemic

onditions,

knowledge,

nd

national ctions,we

offer

n

approach

that xamines he

role

that

networks

f

knowledge-based xperts-epistemic

communities-play

n

articulating he

cause-and-effect

elationships

f

complexproblems,

helping

states

identify

their nterests, raming

he issues

for collectivedebate, proposing

pecific

policies,

and

identifying

alientpoints

for

negotiation.

We argue

thatcontrol

over

knowledge

nd information

s an

important

imension

f

power

and

that

Advanced ndustrial tates

Madison:

University f WisconsinPress,

1977);

Peter J. Katzenstein,

Small States

n WorldMarkets Ithaca,

N.Y.: Cornell

University ress,

1986);

Robert Putnam,

"Diplomacy

nd Domestic Politics:The

Logic

ofTwo-LevelGames," ntemational rganization

2

(Summer1988), pp. 427-60; PeterB. Evans, DietrichRueschemeyer,nd Theda Skocpol,eds.,

Bringinghe StateBack In

(Cambridge:

CambridgeUniversity ress, 1985);

Eric A. Nordlinger,

"Taking

the State Seriously," n Myron

Weiner

and

Samuel

P. Huntington, ds., Understanding

PoliticalDevelopment

Boston: Little,Brown,

1987), pp.

353-90; Roger Benjamin and

Raymond

Duvall, "The

CapitalistState in Context,"

n Roger Benjamin

and Stephen L. Elkin,

eds., The

Democratic

tate Lawrence: University

ress of Kansas,

1985), pp. 19-57; Stephen D.

Krasner,

"Approaches

to

the

State,"

Comparative

olitics16

(January

984), pp.

223-46; and Howard M.

Lentner,

The Conceptofthe State:A Response

to

Krasner,"Comparativeolitics 6 April

1984),

pp. 367-77.

2.

See

Robert0. Keohane,

"International nstitutions:

wo Approaches," ntemational

tudies

Quarterly

2

(December

1988), pp.379-96.

3.

Krasner cknowledges

he mportance

fsharedbeliefs

n

explaining

he

Group

of 77 (G-77)

cooperationand also discussesthe role of shared understandingn regime creation.See the

following

works of Stephen

D. Krasner: Structural

onflict

Berkeley:

University f California

Press, 1985),

p. 9; and "Regimes

and the Limits f Realism:

Regimes as

AutonomousVariables,"

in StephenD. Krasner, d., Intemational

egimes Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell

University ress,

1983),

p.

368. Keohane notes

the

possibility

hat

tates

may

earnto recalculate

heir

nterests,

nd

Gilpin

also acknowledges

hat states occasionally

learn to be more enlightened

n

their

definitions f

their nterests

nd

can

learn to

be more

cooperative

n

their ehavior."See Robert

0.

Keohane,

After egemony

Princeton,

.J.:Princeton niversity

ress,1984),pp.

131-32;andRobertGilpin,

War

nd Change

n World olitics Cambridge:

CambridgeUniversityress,

1981),p.

227.


4/36

Introduction 3

thediffusionf new

deas andinformationan lead to newpatterns f

behavior

and prove o be an importanteterminantf

nternational olicy oordination.

An epistemic communitys a network f professionalswithrecognized

expertise

nd

competence

n

a

particular

omain

nd an

authoritative

laimto

policy-relevant

nowledge

withinthat domain or issue-area.4Although

an

epistemic ommunity ayconsist f professionals

rom

variety

f disciplines

and

backgrounds, hey

have (1) a shared set

of

normative

nd

principled

beliefs,whichprovide value-based rationale

for he social actionof commu-

nitymembers; 2) shared

ausal beliefs,which

re derived rom heir nalysis f

practices eading or contributingo a central

et of problems

n

their

domain

and which hen erve s thebasis for lucidating

hemultiple inkages

etween

possible policy ctionsand desiredoutcomes; 3) shared notions f validity-

that s, intersubjective,

nternally efined riteria

orweighing nd validating

knowledgein the domain of their expertise;

and (4) a common

policy

enterprise-that s,

a set of

common ractices

ssociatedwith set ofproblems

to which their professional

ompetence s directed,presumably

ut of the

conviction

hathumanwelfare

willbe enhanced s a

consequence.5

The

causal logic

of epistemic policy

coordination

s

simple.

The

major

dynamics re uncertainty,nterpretation,

nd institutionalization.

n

interna-

tional policy

coordination, he forms

f

uncertainty

hat tend to stimulate

demandsfor

nformationre thosewhich rise from

he

strong ependence

of

states

on each other'spolicy hoices

for

uccess

n

obtaining oals

and those

4. The term "epistemic communities" as been

definedor used in a variety f ways,most

frequentlyo refer o scientific

ommunities.n thisvolume,we stress hat pistemic

ommunities

need not be made up ofnatural cientists r of professionals

pplying he same methodology

hat

natural cientists o. Moreover,

when referringo epistemic ommunities onsisting

rimarilyf

natural cientists, e adopt a stricter efinitionhan

do, for xample,Holzner and

Marx,who use

the term epistemic ommunity"

n reference o

a

shared

faith n the scientific ethod s

a

wayof

generating ruth.This ignoresthat such faith can still bond togetherpeople with diverse

interpretationsf ambiguousdata. By our definition,

hat bonds membersof

an epistemic

communitys their hared

beliefor faith n the veritynd the applicability f particular

orms f

knowledge r specific ruths. ur notionof "epistemic

ommunity"omewhat esemblesFleck's

notionof

a

"thought ollective"-a

sociologicalgroup

with

a common tyle

f

thinking.

t also

somewhatresemblesKuhn's

broader sociological definition

f a paradigm,which s "an entire

constellation f beliefs,

alues, techniques, nd so on shared by members f

a

given

ommunity"

and which

governs not

a subjectmatter ut a group

of practitioners."ee Burkhart olzner

and

John

H.

Marx,Knowledge

pplication: he Knowledge ystemn Society Boston: Allyn

&

Bacon,

1979), pp. 107-11; Ludwig

Fleck,Genesis nd Development

f Scientificact (Chicago: University

of

Chicago Press,1979;

translated rom he 1935

editionprinted

n

German);

and

Thomas S.

Kuhn,

The Structure

f

Scientific

evolutions, d ed. (Chicago: University

f

Chicago

Press, 1970), pp.

174-210, with quotes drawnfrompp. 175 and 180. Regarding cientific ommunities, ee also

Michael Polanyi, The Republic of Science,"Minerva,

ol. 1, 1962,pp.

54-73.

5. Other

characteristicsf

epistemic

ommunitieshatwere mentioned r discussedduring he

preparation f

this

volume

included

the

following:

members

f

an

epistemic

ommunity

hare

intersubjective

nderstandings; ave a sharedwayofknowing;

ave shared

patterns

f reasoning;

have a policy project drawing n shared values, shared

causal beliefs,

nd

the

use of shared

discursive

practices;

and have a shared commitment

o

the application

and

production

of

knowledge.These phrases

were not incorporated

n the formaldefinitionisted here; they

re

simply rovided

o

evokeadditional

notions hat re associated

with

pistemic

ommunities.


5/36

4 International rganization

which involve multiple

and

only partly

estimable consequences

of

action.

Examples drawn from he studies presented

here include the uncertainties

about strategiesoavertnucleardestructionnd theuncertaintiesbout howto

respond o the hypothesized

hreats oan invisibleayer f ozone located

seven

to

fifteenmiles

above the earth's urface. hese forms f

uncertaintyive

rise

to

demandsfor

particular

orts

f

information.

he information eeded does

notconsist

f

guesses

about others' ntentions,bout

the

probability

f discrete

events

ccurring,

r about a state'sown

ability

o

pursueunilaterally

ttainable

goals that

are

amenable

to treatment y variouspolitical

rules of thumb.

Rather,

t

consists

f

depictions

f social or

physical

rocesses, heir nterrela-

tionwith

ther

processes,

nd

the

ikely onsequences

of actionsthat

require

application f considerable cientificrtechnical xpertise. he informations

thusneither

uesses

nor "raw"

data;

it s the

product

f

human

nterpretations

of social

and

physical henomena.

Epistemic

ommunities

re

one possibleprovider

f this ort f nformation

and

advice. As demands

for uch nformationrise, networks r communities

ofspecialists apable

of

producing

nd

providing

he nformation

merge

nd

proliferate. he members f

a

prevailing ommunity

ecome strong ctors

t

the

national

nd

transnational

evel as

decision

makers olicit heir nformation

anddelegateresponsibilityothem.A community'sdvice, hough,s informed

by ts

own broaderworldview. o the extent

o

which

n

epistemic ommunity

consolidates

bureaucratic

ower

within ationaladministrations

nd

interna-

tional

secretariats,

t

stands to institutionalizets

influence nd

insinuate ts

views nto

broader

nternationalolitics.

Members

of

transnational

pistemic

ommunities

an

influence tate

nter-

ests either

by directly

dentifying

hemfordecisionmakers r

by

lluminating

the salient

dimensions f

an

issue

fromwhich

the decision

makers

may

then

deduce their nterests.

he

decisionmakers

n

one

state

may,

n

turn,

nfluence

the nterestsndbehavior fother tates, herebyncreasinghe ikelihood f

convergent

tate behavior

nd

international

olicy

oordination,

nformed

y

thecausal beliefs

nd

policy

references

fthe

epistemic ommunity.

imilarly,

epistemic

ommunities

may

contribute o the creation and maintenance f

social institutionshat

guide

international

ehavior.

As a

consequence

of the

continued nfluence

f

these

nstitutions,

stablished atterns

f

cooperation

n

a

given

ssue-area

maypersist

ven

though ystemic

ower

concentrations ay

no

longer

e sufficiento compelcountries o coordinate

heir ehavior.

By focusing

n the

various ways

n which new ideas and informationre

diffusednd taken nto ccountbydecisionmakers, heepistemic ommunities

approach suggests nonsystemic rigin

for state interests

nd

identifies

dynamic

or

persistent

ooperation ndependent

f the distributionf

nterna-

tional

power.

t assumes that state actors

are

uncertainty

educers

s

well

as

power

and

wealth

pursuers.

t also

seeks

to

explain

the

substantive ature

of

coordinated

olicy rrangements, subject

on which

many

tructural

nalysts

are

notably

ilent.Yet to some

extent,

he

approach

supplements

tructural


6/36

Introduction

5

theories f nternational

ehavior:

n

response o

new

knowledge rticulated y

epistemic ommunities, state mayelect to pursue entirely ew objectives, n

which ase outcomesmaybe shaped by the distributionf nformations well

as by the distribution

f

power capabilities.Table

1

presents schematized

outline of

the epistemic ommunities pproach

and

compares t withother

approaches

to

the study of policy change that have been advanced by

internationalelations cholars.

Pursuing he epistemic ommunities pproach,contributorso thisvolume

analyze the impactof five pistemic nd two epistemic-like ommunities n

decision making

n

a variety f issues concerning he international olitical

economy, nternational ecurity,

nd

the environment.

n

analyzing the

processes eading to policycoordination n a specific ssue-area, ach author

describes he membership nd shared beliefsof an expert ommunity,races

the

community'sctions, nd discusses

ts

mpact.By comparing hebeliefs nd

behavior

f policymakersn one country ver time nd by comparing hem n

countries

n

which

xpert

ommunities

ere activeversus hose

n

which

hey

were

not, the

authors

tryto specify he extent to whichdecision-making

processes

were nfluenced

y

he

community

s

opposed to thepolitical actors

and

actors mphasized

n

other pproaches o internationalelations.

The articles yWilliamDrake andKalypsoNicolaidis, manuel Adler,M. J.

Peterson, nd Peter Haas investigateheways

n

which pistemic ommunities

initially

ramed he ssuesfor ollective

ebate,therebynfluencingubsequent

negotiations

nd

bringingbout theirpreferred utcomes o theexclusion f

others n

the

cases

involving

rade n

services,

uclear

arms

control,manage-

ment

of

whaling,

nd

protection

f

stratospheric

zone.

In

the

whaling

nd

ozone

cases,

the

authors

also outline the role that

epistemic

communities

played

n

identifying

pecific olicies

for

national

and

collective doption.

n

the

study egarding

he

principles

nd

practices

ffood

aid, RaymondHopkins

traces the changes in the beliefs and understandings f the epistemic

community

hat

had a

hand

in

the food aid

regime

nd links hese

changes

to

regime eforms.

than

Kapstein's analysis f banking egulators

nd

G. John

Ikenberry's nalysis

of

economists nvolved

n

the

Anglo-American ostwar

economic

ettlement

oth

shed

light

n

the

epistemic

ommunities

pproach

by discussing

actors hat

differentiate

hese

expert roups

from he

epistemic

communities

iscussed n the other

case

studies ncluded

here.

And

James

Sebeniusadds

an

additional

iewpoint

n

his

commentary

n

thecommonalities

and

differencesetween

he epistemic

ommunities

pproach

and

negotiation

analysis.

While all ofthecase studies

n

this olume onsider

he

array

f

political

nd

systemic

onstraintswithin

which

expert

communities

perate, Ikenberry

focuses n

particular

n

how

political

actors

an

impede

the

application

f

the

consensualviews

of

specialists.

n

his

analysis

f

postwar

conomic

manage-

ment,

he thus offers

limiting ase, indicating

hat

epistemic greement

was

possible only

in

those areas

removed

from he

political

whirl.One

of

the


7/36

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Cld

0

O.,

w z

a)

A4 (Z4


8/36

Introduction 7

conclusions hatcan

be

drawnfrom kenberry's

tudy, s well as from arlier

studies

of

epistemic-like

ommunities

resented

lsewhere,6

s thatwhile the

form f specific olicy hoices s influenced ytransnational nowledge-based

networks,he extent

o which tate behavior

reflects he preferencesf these

networks emains trongly

onditioned y hedistributionfpower nternation-

ally. Thus, the range of impact

that we might expect of epistemic

and

epistemic-likeommunities

emains onditioned nd boundedby nternational

and

national tructural

ealities.The extent f

that onditioning-the mount

of

flexibility

n the

nternationalystem

vailablefor eflection

nd

understand-

ing

n the

face of power

nd structure-is hefocus f

this

olume.

The internationaletting or pistemic ommunities

The modern administrative tate: expansion,

professionalization,

and deference

o

the "knowledge elite"

Many

of

the major

dimensions

f

contemporary

nternational

elations an

be

traced o the ate

nineteenth

entury,

hen

crafts

nd

guilds

weredeclining

6. A number f earlier studies focusing n the interplay etween expertise, echnical ssues,

consensualknowledge, nd state

powerhave considered

he role of epistemic-likeommunities

n

the decision-making

rocess. At the level of international

rganizations,

uch studieshave been

undertaken

ith egard o wide

variety f ssue-areas nd have demonstrated

hatwebs

ofnonstate

actorsprovided nformation

nd were nvolved n

the shaping f agendas and the defining

f state

interests.While

all of these studies

annotbe listedhere, few xamples

how the range

of areas

analyzed: Robert W. Russell,

"Transgovernmental

nteraction n the International

Monetary

System,

960-1972," ntemational rganization

7

(Autumn 1973),

pp. 431-64; WilliamAscher,

"New Development

Approaches

and the Adaptability f nternational

gencies:

The Case of the

World Bank," Intemational

rganization 7 (Summer

1983), pp.

415-39; Barbara B. Crane and

Jason

L.

Finkle, Population

Policy nd WorldPolitics," aper presented

t the FourteenthWorld

Congress

of

the International

olitical

Science

Association,Washington, .C.,

28 August to

1

September 988;PeterM. Haas, Saving heMediterranean:hePolitics f ntemationalnvironmen-

tal Protection

New York: Columbia University ress,

1990); Barbara

Johnson, Technocrats nd

the

Management

of International isheries," ntemational

rganization

9 (Summer 1975), pp.

745-70; and

Warren S. Wooster, "Interactions

Between Intergovernmental

nd Scientific

Organizations

n Marine

Affairs,"ntemational

rganization

7

(Winter1973), pp.

103-13.

For

examples

of studies

n

comparative

olitics

hat

discuss the role

of

epistemic-like

ommunities

n

the

development

nd enforcementf commonpolicies,

ee Margaret

Weir and Theda Skocpol,

"State Structures

nd the Possibilities or Keynesian'Responses

to the

Great Depression

in

Sweden,Britain,

nd the United

States,"

n

Evans, Rueschemeyer,

nd

Skocpol,Bringing

he

tate

Back n, pp. 107-68;PeterA. Hall, Goveming

he

conomy Cambridge: olity ress,

1986),pp. 275

ff.;

nd

Anthony

ing, Ideas, Institutions,nd Policies

of Governments:

Comparative

nalysis"

(in 3 parts),British oumal

fPolitical

cience3 (July nd October

1973), pp. 291-313

and 409-23.

Withrespectto policycoordination,t is worth tressing hateven if actorsbelieve thattheir

commonunderstandings

ill

contribute o

enhancing

he collective

good,

serious

unanticipated

consequences

re

possible;

see

Stephen

Van Evera,"Cult of

the

Offensive

nd the

Origins

f

the

FirstWorldWar," Intemational ecurity (Summer

1984), pp.

58-107.

For

examples

of

purely

national

studies

that discuss the role

of

epistemic-like

ommunities

n

transforming

tate

preferences,

ee John Odell,

U.S. IntemationalMonetary olicy

(Princeton,N.J.:

Princeton

University ress, 1982);

Emanuel

Adler,

"Brazil's Domestic

Computer ndustry,"

nternational

Organization

0 (Summer1986),pp. 673-705;

and Dennis

Hodgson,

Orthodoxy

nd

Revisionism

in AmericanDemography," opulation nd

Development

eview

4

(December 1988),pp. 541-69.


9/36

8 International

rganization

and

scientificnd engineering

xpertisewere ncreasinglypplied to

commer-

cial research,development,

nd governance.7 cientific ationality

egan to

prevail over alternative aradigmsof knowledgeas a model fordecision-

making

cience as

well, lthough

t did

notreach ts

peak

until bout

fiftyears

later,when ogical

positivismndthe deas oftheVienna

Circlewere

embraced

and

the

entry

f white-coatedprofessionals

nto the

public policy

process

became more

widespread.As

HarveyBrooks observed

n

1965, "Much

of the

historyf social progress

n

the

Twentieth entury

an

be

described

n terms f

the

transfer f wider

and

wider

areas of

public policy

from

politics

to

expertise."8With

the

proliferation

f

government

ministries nd

agencies

to

coordinate

nd handle

many

new

tasks, egulation

as become

an

increasingly

importantureaucratic unction,9nd theexpertise equiredhas extended oa

widerrange

of disciplines

han

ever

before.

The domainof publicgovernance

as also grown orrespondingly

echnical.

Despite the fact that numerous

ministries stablished

for conductingWar

World

II

were

decommissioned

n

subsequent

years,

the total number of

ministries

ripledduring

the

period

fromthe late

1940s

to the

mid-1970s.

Around 1950,

there

were 70

independent

ountries

with 850

ministries,

r

roughly

12

ministries er

country.By 1975,

therewere 140 independent

countrieswith ,500ministries,rnearly 8 ministrieser country,ndicating

strong

shift

toward

more active social

regulation.10

he

rapid

growth

of

governmentgencies

was

particularly

vident n

the

United

States,

wheretwo

economic

regulatory

gencies

and

five

major

social

regulatory gencies

were

7.

Whilethetransferf

authority

o

the phere

fthe ecular nd

therational

an

be traced ack

to the eighteenth entury

nd thegrantingf

Noblesse

de la

Robe in

France,

the

ntegration

f

scientists

nd

engineers

nto a new rationalized orporate tructureeally egan with he

second

industrial evolution

f the 1880s. For background

nformation,ee Franklin . Ford,

Robe and

Sword New

York:

Harper, 1953), pp.

248-52. Regarding he acceleration f technically rounded

formsof governanceand decision making, ee David C. Mowery and Nathan Rosenberg,

Technologynd the

Pursuit f Economic Growth

Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity ress,

1989);

JoAnneYates, Control

hrough

ommunicationBaltimore,Md.: JohnsHopkinsUniversity

ress,

1990);

AlfredD.

Chandler,

trategynd Structure:

haptersn theHistoryftheAmerican ndustrial

EnterpriseGarden City,N.Y.: Doubleday,

1966);

Alfred

D. Chandler,

The VisibleHand: The

Managerial

Revolution n AmericanBusiness Cambridge,

Mass.: Belknap Press, 1977); and

A.

Hunter Dupree, ed., Science and the

Emergence f Modem America,

865-1916 Chicago: Rand

McNally, 963).

8.

Harvey

Brooks,

Scientific

oncepts

nd Cultural

Change,"

Daedalus 94

(Winter

965),p. 68.

9. See Ezra N. Suleiman, ed., Bureaucrats

nd

PolicyMaking:

A Comparative verview

New

York:

Holmes & Meier, 1984); Joel D.

Aberbach, Robert D. Putnam, nd Bert A.

Rockman,

Bureaucrats nd Politiciansn Westem emocraciesCambridge,Mass.: HarvardUniversityress,

1981); James

Q.

Wilson, d., ThePolitics fRegulationNew York:

Basic Books, 1980); and Terry

M. Moe,

"The Politics f Bureaucratic tructure,"

n

JohnE. Chubb and Paul E. Patterson,

ds.,

Can theGovemment ovem? Washington,

.C.:

Brookings

nstitution,989),pp.

267-328.

10.

See

Jean

Blondell,

The

Organization

f GovemmentsBeverlyHills,

Calif.:

Sage,

1982), pp.

195-96. For data on the professional ackgrounds

f

ministers

nd individuals ccupying

ther

ministerial osts,

ee

JeanBlondell,Govemment

inisters

ntheContemporary

orld

Beverly

Hills,

Calif.:Sage, 1982).

Blondell

notes

that .5

percent

f

the ministers

erving

etween1945

and 1981

could

be

considered

specialists,"

withmost

of this

groupconsisting

f civil

ngineers,

lectrical

engineers,ndagronomists.


10/36

Introduction

9

created

during

hefive-year

eriod

from

970

to

1975,

while

he

federal

udget

allocations

for

economic

and social

regulation

rew

by

157

percent

nd

193

percent, espectively.11

Governments

f

ndustrialized

ountries

lso

developed

a

greater

nterest

n

planning

and began

to

establish

futures-oriented

esearch

bodies."2

With

decolonization

and the

frequent

emulation

of the

Western

development

models,

he

attitudes

f these

governments

pread

to those

of

the

ThirdWorld

as

well.13

This

was reflected,

or

xample,

n

thefact

that

the

governments

f

118

countries

stablished

genciesresponsible

or

environmental

nd

natural

resources

etween

1972and

1982.

The process

of

professionalization

ccompanied

heexpansion

f

bureaucra-

cies in manycountries. n the United States, forexample,the numberof

scientific

nd

technical

personnel

mployed

bythe

federal

government

rew

from

23,927

n 1954

to 189,491

n

1976

to238,041

n1983.

This mere

doubling

of the

number

ver

nearly hree

decades

obscures

other

pertinent

hanges

n

individual

xpertise

n

U.S.

government

mployees.

rom

1973to

1983

alone,

the proportion

f

scientists

nd engineers

with

doctoral

degrees

grew

by

51

percent,

nd

the

proportion

with

masters

egreesgrew

by

44 percent.

During

the ame period,

hegovernment

as increasing

ts taff

f

cientists,

ngineers,

and computer

pecialists

by

4

percent

peryear,

while

the increase

for

other

personnel

was

only

2

percent

per year.

By

1983, scientists,

ngineers,

nd

computer

pecialists

comprised

15

percent

of the government

white-collar

work orce,

n contrast

o

13

percent

n 1973

and

in contrast

o6

percent

f

the

nongovernment

ork orce

n1983.14

11. See

Giandomenico

Majone, "Regulatory

olicies

n

Transition,"

ahrbuch

ur

neue

olitische

Okonomie

Tubingen:

J.

C. B.

Mohr, 1984),

p. 158.

For discussions

fthe

progressive

xpansion

and

professionalization

f

bureaucracies

n

the

UnitedStates,

ee StephenSkowronek,

uilding

NewAmerican tate:The Expansion fNationalAdministrativeapacities, 877-1920 Cambridge:

Cambridge

University

ress,

1982);

Charles

Maier,

ed., Changing

Boundaries

of

the

Political

(Cambridge:

Cambridge

University

ress, 1987);

Louis

Galambos,

ed.,

The

New

American

tate:

Bureaucracies

nd

Policies

Since

World

War

I (Baltimore,

Md.: Johns

Hopkins University

ress,

1987);

Bruce

L. R. Smith,

AmericanScience

Policy

Since

World

War

II

(Washington,

D.C.:

Brookings

nstitution,

990),

pp.

28-35;

Robert

Gilpin

ndChristopher

Wright,

ds.,

Scientists

nd

National

olicy

Making

New

York: Columbia

University

ress,

1964);

and

George

Kistiakowsky,

Scientist

t theWhite

ouse (Cambridge,

Mass.:

Harvard

University

ress,

1976).

12.

Yehezkel

Dror,

Policymaking

nder

Adversity

New Brunswick,

.J.:

Transaction

Books,

1986).

13. Jawaharlal

Nehru,

arguing

hat

ess developed

countries

must

also turn

toward

cience,

offeredhe following

ationale:

"It

is science

alone

that can

solve theproblems

f

hunger

nd

poverty,

f nsanitation

nd

illiteracy,f superstitionnd deadening ustom nd tradition,fvast

resources

unning

owaste,

of

a rich ountry

nhabited

y starving eople....

Who

indeed

could

afford

o

ignore

cience

today?

At every

urn

we have

to

seek its

aid....

The

future

elongs

to

science

and those

who

make

friends

ith cience."

Nehru s quoted by

Max F.

Perutz

n s

Science

Necessary?

New

York:

E. P. Dutton,

1989),

p.

vii.

14. See

National

Science

Foundation,

Federal Scientific

nd

Technical

Workers:

umbers

nd

Characteristics,

973

and 1983

(Washington,

.C.:

National

Science Foundation,

1985),

pp.

1-2.

During

he

period

from

973to

1978,

he

ncrease

n scientists,

ngineers,

nd computer

pecialists

occurred

argely

utside

he

Defense

Department.


11/36

10

International

rganization

These trends

contributed

o the emergence

of

what

Dorothy

Nelkin

has

called "the

policy role of

the knowledge

lite."'5The proliferation

f new

agencies nd thepractice f staffinghemwith rofessionalslsocontributedo

the

erosion

of centralized

control

over public

bureaucracies,

which has

occurreddespite

widespread

ffortsince World

War

II to

curbthe discretion

of

bureaucratic dministrators.

s Joel Aberbach,

Robert Putnam, nd

Bert

Rockman

found

in their surveyof

public

servants n the

major

Western

industrialized

ocieties,

the overwhelming

majority f civil servants

regard

themselves

s technicians, olicymakers,

nd brokers,

nlikeelected officials,

who primarilyegard

themselves

s

advocates and partisans."6

n the case

of

professionals,

hedegree

to which hey

re

sympathetic

ith hemissions

fthe

agencies nwhich heywork s influenced ya variety f factors,ncludinghe

extent

f their pecialized

training,

he field

n

whichtheywere

trained, nd

theirpersonal

views."7

n

otherwords,

where

they

tand"

is

associated

with

factors ther

han where

hey

it."

In

international

ureaucracies, uch

as the United

Nations UN),

technical

responsibilities

ave

proliferatedince

the

inauguration f

the International

Geophysical

Year

in

1957,yet

thetraining

f

personnel

within he

UN

system

has

not

kept

pace. Only

13

percent

f the staffmembers

ave doctorates,

nd

less than50 percent

holdmore than

a

first

niversityegree."8

n 1986,

when

the

UN employed

54,000 people

worldwide,

bout

18,000

were

serving

"professional"

functions, ,000

to 5,000

of which were

"substantive"

n

nature.19

evertheless,

he

budgeting

f funds

n

the

UN indicates

shiftway

from

he more traditional olitical

nd

security

onsiderations

f the General

Assembly

nd toward he

moretechnical oncerns

f

specialized

agencies.20

15. See Dorothy

Nelkin,

"ScientificKnowledge,

Public

Policy,

and Democracy,"Knowledge

Creation,

iffusion,

tilization (September

1979),p.

107. See also DorothyNelkin,

The

Political

Impact

of

Technical

Expertise," ocial

Studiesof Science 5 (February

1975), pp.

35-54. For

a

critical iew ofthe role of scientistsndecisionmaking, ee JoelPrimack nd FrankVon Hippel,

Advice nd

Dissent New York: Basic

Books, 1974).

16.

See Aberbach, utnam,

nd Rockman,

ureaucratsnd Politiciansn Westem

emocracies.

17. See Samuel P. Hays,

Beauty,

Health, nd Permanence: nvironmental

olitics n the United

States,

1955-1985

(Cambridge:

Cambridge

University ress,

1987), pp. 357-59;

William T.

Gormley, r., Professionalism

Within

nvironmental ureaucracies:

The

Policy mplications

f

PersonnelChoices," La

Follette nstitute

fPublicAffairs,ccasional

paper no.

1, Madison,Wisc.,

December

1986; and Thomas

M. Dietz and Robert

Rycroft,

he Risk ProfessionalsNew

York:

Russell Sage, 1987).

18. See

Peter Fromuth

nd Ruth Raymond, U.N.

Personnel

Policy ssues," in UnitedNations

Management

nd Decision-Making

roject

New

York: United Nations, 1987), p.

13. See also

Douglas

Williams, he

SpecializedAgenciesnd the

United ations

London: C. Hurst, 987),p.

254.

19.

See AnthonyMango,"The Role ofSecretariats f nternationalnstitutions,"n Paul Taylor

andA. J.R. Groom, ds., ntemational

nstitutionst Work New

York: St.

Martin'sPress, 1986),

pp.

40-43. Based

on his

survey

f

75percent

f the

UN's professional

taff, ango concluded

hat

about 4,000servedkey

functions

in all areas

of

human

ndeavorfrom eace

and disarmamento

health,

nutrition,ndustry,

ommunications,

nd the environment." hus,

for he full

100 percent

of

the

staff,hefigure

mayhave reached5,000.

20.

The percentage f

the

UN

budget

llocated

for

pecializedagencies

teadily ose

from 5.1

percent

n 1950 to 60.5 percent

n 1985. With

theadoptionof the Kaasebaum

amendment,

he

percentage

has remained

at

the 1985

level. Two

specialized

areas

involving

cience and


12/36

Introduction

11

Thus, the expansion

and professionalization

f bureaucracies

and the

growing

technical

nature

of problems

have

fosteredan increase

in the

deference aid to technical xpertisend, nparticular,o that fscientists.In

modern ocieties,"

Barry arnes

and

David

Edge

have

argued, science

s near

tobeing

he

ource

of

cognitive

uthority:

nyone

whowouldbe

widely

elieved

and trusted

s an interpreter

f

natureneeds

a license

from he scientific

community."21

As several

studies

have pointed

out,

policymakers

nd leaders typically

expect

o remain

n control

ven

whendelegating

uthority.22

uestions

arise,

then,

bout the effects

hat

the

nteraction fexperts

nd politicians

have

on

policy

hoices.

Manyexpected

hat cientists, ecause

of their ommon

aith

n

the scientificmethod,wouldmake policymakingmore rational.Yet even in

cases involving

hat s regarded

s

a

technical ssue, policymaking

ecisions

generally

nvolve

heweighingf

a number fcomplex

nd nontechnical

ssues

centering

round

who is to

get

what

n

society

nd at what cost. Despite

the

veneer

of

objectivity

nd

value neutrality

chieved

by pointing

o the

input f

scientists, olicy

choices remain highly

political

in their allocative

conse-

quences.23

specially

n cases

in which cientificvidence

s

ambiguous

nd the

experts

hemselves

re

split

nto

contending

actions,

ssues

have tended

to

be

resolved less on theirtechnical meritsthan on theirpolitical

ones. That

scientists

orking

ithin he

bureaucracy

ave

a

common

aith n the

scientific

methoddoes

notguarantee

heir olidarity,

or

does it make them

mmune o

pressures

rom

he nstitutions

n which heywork r

from

olitical

emptation.

Studies

of science

policy

and of

scientists' ffects

n American

policy

nd

regulation

have been at

best

equivocal,

finding nly

slightand

transitory

technology-that

f foodand

agriculture

nd that

f

health-have

come

to control ver25 percent

of the resourcesof the UN system. ee UN documentnos. A/1312,A 3023, A 6122, A 7608,

A/42/683,

nd

A/10360,

UN,

New York,

1951,1956,1967,1971,

1976,

nd 1986,respectively.

he

highest

postwarrates of growth

or

new internationalcientific

nd

professional ssociations

(ISPAs)

was also in the areas

of science

and technology,ollowed

y

economics nd

finance. ee

Diana

Crane,"Alternative

Models of

SPAs,"

in

William

M. Evan, ed., Knowledge

nd Power n

a

Global

Society BeverlyHills,

Calif.: Sage, 1981), p. 30;

and Werner

Feld,

"Nongovernmental

Entities nd the

nternational

ystem," rbis15 Fall

1971),pp. 879-922.

21. See Barry

Barnes and David

Edge, "General Introduction,"

n BarryBarnes

and

David

Edge, eds., Science

n ContextCambridge,

Mass.:

MIT Press,1982), p.

2. For an argument

hat he

influence f scientificpecialists

ften

xtends o areas beyond

heir

ormal raining,ee Alvin

M.

Weinberg, Science

and Trans-Science,"

Minerva

0 April 1972),pp.

209-22.

22. See TerryM. Moe, "The New EconomicsofOrganization," mericanJoumalofPolitical

Science

28

(November

1984), pp. 739-77;

and

Jonathan

Bendor, Serge Taylor,

nd Roland

Van

Gaalen, "Stacking

he Deck: Bureaucratic

Missions nd PolicyDesign,"

American

olitical

cience

Review 1 (September

1987),

pp. 873-96.

23.

See Yaron Ezhrahi,

Utopian and Pragmatic

ationalism:

he

PoliticalContext

f Scientific

Advice,"

Minerva18 (Spring

1980), pp.

111-31; Robert F.

Rich,

"The Pursuitof

Knowledge,"

KnowledgeCreation,

Diffusion, tilization

(September

1979), pp.

6-30; Robert

H. Socolow,

"Failures of Discourse,"

in

Harold

A. Feiveson,

FrankW. Sinden,

nd Robert H. Socolow, eds.,

Boundaries

fAnalysisCambridge,

Mass.: Ballinger, 976);

and PeterdeLeon,

Advice nd Consent:

The

Development

fthe olicy ciences

New York:

Russell Sage, 1988).


13/36

12

International rganization

24

influence

by

scientists.

Similarly,

arly

studies

of

policy

coordination

n

technical

reas

have demonstrated

hat state decision

makerswere no

more

willing o sacrifice utonomyn theseareas than n issues of security;hat as

theirgovernments

rew

cognizant

f the political

osts of technical

oordina-

tion,

theygrew

more unwilling

o coordinate

their

actions; and

that many

foreign

ministries

roved

resistant

o any ncroachment

y echnical

unctional

ministries n

their

phere

ofresponsibility.25

hus,

in

spite

of

the increasing

involvement

f technocrats

n

government

nstitutions

nd contrary

o the

hopes of functionalists

uch

as David Mitrany,

utcomes

n

technical

ssues

proved

ittle ifferent

rom hoseof

moreconventional

ighpolitics.

Unlike

the

functionalists,

ho turned

heir ttention

o the

development

f

common ctivitiesnd the transferf technocraticoyaltyo a superordinate

authority,

he concern

of the contributors

o this

volume

is with styles

of

policymaking

nd changes

in

the

patterns

of

policymakers'

easoning.

As

argued

below,

the increasing

uncertainties

ssociated

with many

modern

responsibilities

f

international overnance

have led policymakers

o turn

o

new

and different

hannels

ofadvice,often

with heresult

hat nternational

policy

oordination

s

enhanced.

Decision-makingprocesses: complexity, ncertainty,nd

the

turnto

epistemic

communities or

advice

Among

the factors

that have contributed

o the uncertainties

aced by

decision

makers

are the

increasinglyomplex

and technical nature

of

the

ever-wideningange

of ssues

considered n the nternationalgenda,

nclud-

ing

monetary,

macroeconomic,

echnological,

nvironmental,

ealth, and

population

ssues;

thegrowth

n the

complexity

f

the international

olitical

system

n

terms

f the

number f

actors

nd

the

extent

f

nteractions;

nd the

expansion f theglobaleconomy nd themodern dministrativetate.26orced

24. See

DorothyNelkin, d., Controversy:

olitics fTechnical ecisions

BeverlyHills,

Calif.:

Sage, 1979);

Michael Mulkay, cience

and

theSociology

f Knowledge London:

Allen & Unwin,

1979); WilliamKornhauser,

cientistsn ndustry

Berkeley:University

f California ress, 1962);

and Peter

Weingart, The Scientific ower

Elite:

A

Chimera,"

n Norbert lias, Herminio

Martins,

and Richard Whitley, ds.,

Scientific stablishments

nd Hierarchies

Dordrecht,Netherlands:

Reidel, 1982),

pp. 71-88.

25. See

JohnG. Ruggie,

CollectiveGoods and Future

nternational

ollaboration," merican

PoliticalScience

Review66

(September 1972), pp. 874-93;

Henry R.

Nau, National Politics nd

Intemational

Technology

Baltimore,Md.:

Johns Hopkins University

ress, 1974); and Roger

Williams, uropeanTechnology: hePolitics fCooperationNewYork:Wiley, 974).

26.

For discussions of

these changes and the increasing

ocial, economic, and

political

interdependencehat ccompanied

hem,

ee, for xample, odd

R. La Porte, d., Organizedocial

Complexity

Princeton, .J.:

Princeton niversityress,

1975); Marion Levy,Modemization

ndthe

Structuref Societies Princeton,

N.J.:

PrincetonUniversity ress, 1966);

Alex

Inkeles,

Emerging

Social

Structure

f

theWorld,"

World olitics 7

(July

975), pp.

467-95;

Karl

Polyani,

The Great

Transformation

Boston:Beacon Press,

1944); Richard

Cooper, TheEconomics f nterdependence

(New

York: McGraw-Hill,

968); Robert 0. Keohane

and

Joseph

S. Nye,Power nd Interdepen-

dence:World olitics n

TransitionBoston:

Little,Brown, 977);

Edward Morse,Modemization

nd


14/36

Introduction

13

to deal

with broader

rangeof ssues than

they

were traditionally

ccustomed

to, decision

makers

have

turned

o specialists o

ameliorate

heuncertainties

andhelp themunderstandhecurrentssues andanticipate uturerends.27

Complexity

ests the limits

f human understanding.

lthough

knowledge

may

be better

han twas

in

the

past about

thedynamics

f anyofthe

ndividual

issues,

the natureof the

interactionsetween

them

s particularly

ifficult

o

grasp nd deal

with ffectively

n thepolicymaking

rocess.For example,

o

the

extent

hat conomic

nterdependence

nd a globalized conomy

equirepolicy

coordination

mong

countries o

pursuedomestic

oals,the domestic

gendas

and international

gendas

have become

increasingly

inked,

yet decision

makershave

oftenfailed to comprehend

he complex

inkages.

The result, s

some analysts avecomplained,sthat to a fargreater xtent han nthepast,

the individualswho

mustmake the difficult

conomic

choices inWashington

are

inthe dark."28

Similarly,

n the

case

of nternational

nvironmental

ssues,decision

makers

are seldom

certainof

the complex

nterplayf

components

f theecosystem

andare therefore

nable

toanticipate he

ong-termonsequences

of

measures

designed

to

address

one

of

the

many

environmental

ssues under

current

consideration.

Without he help

of

experts,

hey

iskmaking

hoices

thatnot

only

gnore

the

interlinkages

ith

other

ssues but

also

highly

iscount he

uncertain future,

with the

result that

a

policy

choice

made now

might

jeopardize

future hoices

and threaten

uture

enerations.

Conditions

f

uncertainty,

s characterized

y

Alexander

George,

are

those

underwhich

ctors

mustmake choices

without

adequate

informationbout

the situation

t hand"

or

in

the face

of "the inadequacy

of

available

general

knowledge

eeded for

ssessing

he expected

outcomes

f

different

ourses

of

theTransformationf Intemational elations New York: Free Press, 1976); JohnG. Ruggie,

"Continuity

nd Transformation

n theWorldPolity,"

World olitics

5

(January 983),pp.

261-85;

and

Stephen

Toulmin,Cosmopolis:

The HiddenAgenda

of Modemization

New

York: Free Press,

1990). For discussions

f ncreasing cological

nterdependence,

ee W. C. Clark

and R.

E. Munn,

eds.,Sustainable

evelopment

f heBiosphere

Cambridge:

Cambridge

Universityress,

1986); and

Organization

for

Economic Cooperation

and

Development OECD),

Economic and

Ecological

Interdependence

Paris: OECD,

1982).

27. Regarding

ncertaintynd the

turn o

specialists or

dvice, ee Dror,Policymaking

nder

Adversity,p.

60-61;

Harold

Wilensky, rganizational

ntelligence

New

York:

Basic

Books,

1967);

Guy

Benveniste,

he Politics f Expertise

San

Francisco:Boyd

&

Fraser, 1977);

William

Ascher,

"New

Development

Approaches

and

the Adaptability

f International

gencies";

J.Hirshleifer

andJohnG.

Riley,

TheAnalytics f

Uncertainty

nd nformation:

n Expository urvey,"

oumal

of

Economic Literature

7 (December 1979), pp. 1375-1412;Geoffrey rennanand JamesM.

Buchanan,

The

Reason

of

Rules Cambridge:

Cambridge

University

ress,1985),

chap. 2;

Zdenek J.

Slouka,

"International aw Making:

A View

from

echnology,"

n NicholasGreenwood

Onuf,

d.,

Law Making n

the Global CommunityDurham,

N.C.: Carolina

Academic Press, 1982), p.

149;

Langdon

Winner,

Complexitynd

the Limits f

Human

Understanding,"

n La Porte,

Organized

Social Complexity,p.

40-76;

and

Ina Spiegel-Rosing

nd Derek

De Solla

Price, eds.,

Science,

Technology

nd Society

Beverly

Hills,Calif.:

Sage, 1977).

28. C.

Michael

Aho

and

Marc

Levinson,

fter eagan:

Confronting

he

Changed

World

conomy

(New

York: Council

on ForeignRelations,1988),

p. 8.


15/36

14 International

rganization

action."29 growing

umber

f ssuesand problems

aced by

decisionmakers

fit hisdescription.

hat this

s true ndeed undermines

he

utility fmany

conventional pproaches to international elations,whichpresume that a

state'sself-interests

re clear

and thatthe ways

n which ts nterestsmaybe

most fficaciouslyursued

re equally

clear.30

s several uthors

have

warned,

however,misperceptions

f thenature

of the international

etting,s well

as

misperceptions

f

others'

ntentionsndactions,

re most

ikely o occurunder

conditions f

uncertainty.3"

Decision

makers do not always

recognize

that their understanding

f

complex

ssues

and

linkages

s limited,

nd it often

akes a crisisor

shock to

overcome

nstitutional

nertia

nd

habit and

spurthem

to seek

help

from

n

epistemic ommunity.n some cases, information eneratedbyan epistemic

community ay

n fact reate a shock,

s often ccurs

with

cientific

dvances

or

reports

hat

make their

way

into

the

news,

simultaneously apturing

he

attention

f the public

and policymakers

nd pressuring

hem nto action.

n

estimating

he effect

hat shocks

or crises have on decision makers,

the

contributors

o thisvolume

are influenced y two

schools of thought. hose

informed

by organizationtheory

presume

that decision

makers will

seek

information

nd defer to actors

who

are

able to

providecredible technical

advice. Those applying he political iterature resume

that

eaders

will

only

defer o

technical dvice

thatwill enable them

o

pursue

preexisting

nds and

to

expand

political

oalitions.

This does not,however,

ule out

the

possibility

that eaders

would defer o

specialists nder circumstances

n

which hey

re

uncertain

bout what course

of action

s in their

ownpolitical nterests,

or

does

it

exclude

the

possibility

hat heir elegation

f

authority

ill

persist

ast

the

nitial risis

r

shock:

The

concept

of

uncertainty

s thus

mportant

n

our

analysis

or

woreasons.

First, n the face of

uncertainty,

nd more so

in

the

wake of

a

shockor crisis,

many f the conditions acilitatingfocus npower re absent. tis difficultor

leaders

to identify

heir potentialpolitical

allies and to

be sure of

what

strategies

re most

likely

to

help

them

retainpower.And,

second, poorly

understood onditionsmay

create

enough

turbulence

hat stablished

perat-

ing procedures

may

break down,

making nstitutions nworkable.

Neither

power

nor nstitutionalues

to behavior

will

be

available,

nd new

patterns

f

actionmay nsue.

29.

Alexander George,

Presidential ecision

Making n ForeignPolicy:The Effective se of

Information

ndAdvice

Boulder,Colo.: Westview

ress,1980),

pp. 26-27.

30. Armen A. Alchian, "Uncertainty,

volution, nd EconomicTheory,"

Joumal

of

Political

Economy,

ol. 58, 1950,

pp. 211-21.

31.

See Arthur

A.

Stein,Why

ationsCooperate

Ithaca,N.Y.: CornellUniversity

ress, 1990),

chap. 3;

Robert Jervis, erception

nd Misperception

n Intemational

olitics Princeton,

N.J.:

PrincetonUniversity

ress, 1976); Glenn H. Snyder

nd Paul

Diesing, Conflict mong

Nations

(Princeton,

N.J.: PrincetonUniversity

ress, 1977); and Yaacov

Y. I.

Vertzberger, heWorld n

TheirMinds

Stanford, alif.:Stanford

niversityress,1990).


16/36

Introduction 15

Under conditions

f uncertainty,hen,decision

makers have a

variety

f

incentives nd reasonsforconsulting pistemic

ommunities,32ome

of them

more politicallymotivatedthan others. First, following shock or crisis,

epistemic ommunities

an elucidate the cause-and-effectelationships

nd

provideadvice about

the likely esults f

various courses of action. n some

cases, they an help

decisionmakers ain

a

sense

ofwho thewinners nd losers

would be as the result

of a particular ction

or event, as was the case in

considerations bout banning chlorofluorocarbon

se

or

facing

a possible

environmental

isaster.Decision

makers

eldom

applythetypes f decision-

makingheuristics hat scientists pply under

conditions of

uncertainty.33

Indeed, as JonElster

argues,decisionmakersgenerally are unable

to assign

numerical robabilitieso thevarious nswers fwhatwillhappen.Theycan at

most ist the

possible

answers,

not

estimate

heir

probabilities."34

hile they

may

desire

probability

tatistics nd similardata forpurposes

of

determining

thegravityf a situation, heymay lso

use

the

nformationor therpurposes,

such as

justifying

"wait

and

watch"

policy

nd

deferring esponsibility

ntil

thefuture, hen

other ctors

may

be

held

responsible.

Second, epistemic

ommunities

an shed

light

n the nature

f the

complex

interlinkages etween

ssues

and on the chain

of

events

that

might roceed

either

fromfailure to take

action

or

from

nstituting particular

policy.

Informations at a

premiumn theface of possible systemic

olatility,

hen

efforts

o

solve

or curb

a

problem

n one

domain

or issue-area

may

have

unanticipated egative

eedback ffects

n

others.

Third, pistemic

ommunities

an

help

define he self-interests

f a stateor

factions

within t.The process

ofelucidatinghe cause-and-effectelationships

of

problems

an

in

fact ead to

the

redefinition

f

preconceived

nterests r to

the

dentification

f new nterests.

Fourth, pistemic ommunities

an

help

formulateolicies.

Their

role

n

this

regardwilldepend on the reasons forwhichtheir dvice is sought. n some

cases,decisionmakers

will

eek

advice

to

gain

nformation hich

will

ustify

r

legitimate policy

that theywish to pursue

forpoliticalends.

An

epistemic

community's

ffortsmight

hus be limited o working

ut

the

details of the

policy,helping

decision makers

nticipate

he conflicts

f

interest

hatwould

emerge

with

respect

to

particularpoints,

and then

building

coalitions

in

support

of the

policy.

f

the

policy

is

instituted

nd

problemsensue,

the

decisionmakers

have the

option

f

pointing

o

the

nformation

iven

o

them

y

32. In Markets

nd HierarchiesNew York: Free Press, 1975), OliverWilliamson rgues that

underconditions f uncertainty,rganizations

re likely

o develop nternalmethods o generate

more nd better

nformationnstead

f turning o external ources.

33. See

Daniel

Kahneman,

Paul

Slovic, nd

Amos

Tversky, ds., Judgement

nder

Uncertainty:

Heuristicsnd Biases

(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity

ress,1982).

34. See Jon Elster, Explaining

Technical Change (Cambridge:

Cambridge University ress,

1983), p. 185. See

also JohnD. Steinbruner, he Cybernetic

heory f Decision

Princeton,N.J.:

PrincetonUniversityress, 1974), pp.

17-18; and Herbert

imon, Rationality s Process and

as

Product fThought," merican conomic

Review 8 (May

1978), pp. 1-16.


17/36

16 International

rganization

experts

nd

spreading

heblame.35

gain,

however,

t s

mportant

o stress hat


alled

in

for

political

reasonsmay

ucceed in

imposing

their iews ndmovingoward oalsother han hose nitiallynvisioned y he

decision

makers.

In less politicallymotivated ases, epistemic

ommunities

ave a greater

hand

n thevarious tagesof the policymaking

rocess, ncluding he ntroduc-

tionof policy lternatives,

he selection f policies,

nd thebuilding f national

and international oalitions

n

support

f thepolicies."The definition

f the

alternatives,"

s E.

E. Schattschneider oted,"is thesupreme

nstrumentf

power."36 y pointing ut

which lternativesre notviable on thebasis of their

causal understanding

f the

problems

to be

addressed,

the

community

members an limit he rangeof alternatives nder consideration.While the

actual choice of

policies

remains he

domainof the decisionmakers, t can also

be influenced

y

community embers.

As Herbert imonpoints ut, lmost

ll

organizations ngage

n

some form f

"satisficing"

r

procedural

ationality

n

their onsideration f policy lternatives.37

f

rationality

s bounded,epistemic

communities

may

be responsible

for

circumscribing

he

boundaries and

delimiting

he

options.

Distinguishingpistemic

ommunities

rom ther

groups

As outlined earlier,members

of

epistemic

communities

not

only

hold

in

common set

of

principled

nd causal

beliefsbut also have shared notions

f

validity nd

a shared

policy enterprise.

heir authoritative

laim to

policy-

relevant knowledge

n a

particular

domain is based on their

recognized

expertise

within

hatdomain. These features

istinguish pistemic

ommuni-

tiesfrom ther

groups

ften nvolved

n

policy

oordination.

Epistemic ommunities eed not be made up of natural cientists; hey an

consist f social scientists

r individuals rom

nydiscipline

r

profession

who

have

a

sufficiently

trong

laimto

a

body

of

knowledge

hat s valued

by ociety.

Nor need

an

epistemic

ommunity's

ausal beliefsand notionsof validity e

based on the methodologymployed

n

the natural ciences; hey an originate

from haredknowledge bout the

nature f social or other

processes,

ased on

analytic

methods or

techniques

deemed

appropriate

to the

disciplines

or

professions hey

pursue.

In

this volume of

articles,

for

example,

while

the

community

nvolved

n

efforts o

protect

the ozone

layer

claimed

authority

35. See Lauriston

R.

King nd Philip

H.

Melanson,

Knowledge nd Politics: ome Experiences

from he 1960s,"Public

Policy 0 (Winter 972), p. 84. For similar bservations,

ee Martin

. Perl,

"The Scientific dvisory ystem: ome Observations," cience

173 September 971), pp. 1211-15.

36. E. E. Schattschneider,

heSemisovereigneople Hinsdale, ll.: DrydenPress,1975), p.

66.

37. See the following orks

by Herbert

A. Simon:

Reason

in Human AffairsStanford, alif.:

Stanford niversityress,1983);

and "Human

Nature

n Politics: he Dialogue

of

Psychology

ith

Political cience," TheAmerican

olitical cienceReview 9 (June1985),pp. 293-304.


18/36

Introduction

17

based on

knowledge

bout

atmospheric

cience,

ommunities

nvolved

n other

efforts

ad expertise

elated

to disciplines

nd professions

uch

as economics

and engineering.

While

national pistemic

ommunities

may merge

nd

direct

heir ctivities

largely

oward

singlecountry,

s

in the

case of the

U.S.

community

nd

the

Soviet community

escribed

by

Adler, they

may

in

some

cases become

transnationalver

time

s a result f

the

diffusion

f community

deas

through

conferences,

ournals,

research

collaboration,

and

a

variety

of

informal

communications

nd contacts.

ut

epistemic

ommunities

eednotbe

transna-

tional,nor need

theirmembers

meet

regularly

n a formal

manner.Collabora-

tion

n

the absence

of

material nterests

inding

ogether

ctors

n different

countrieswith ommonpolicy gendaswouldstronglyuggest he existence f

an

epistemic

community

with transnational

membership.

A transnational

community's

deas may

ake root

n an international

rganization

r

in various

state bodies,

afterwhich

they are

diffused

o other

states

via the

decision

makers

who have been

influenced

y

the deas.

As

a

result,

hecommunity

an

havea systemic

mpact.Because

of

ts arger iffusion

etwork,

transnational

community's

nfluence

s

likely

o be

much

more sustained

nd

intensethan

that f

a national ommunity.

The epistemic

community

members'

professional

raining,

restige,

nd

reputation

or expertise

n an

area highly

alued

by

society

r

elite decision

makers

ccord them

ccess to

the

political

ystem

nd

legitimize

r

authorize

their activities.

imilarly,

heir

claims

to knowledge, upported

by

tests of

validity,

ccord

them nfluence

ver

policy

debates

and serve

as their

primary

social power

resource.38

t the

same

time,

the

professional

edigrees

and

validity

ests

set the community

members

part

from ther

social

actors or

groups39

nd

not

only

erve

as

a barrier o their ntry

nto the

community

ut

also

limit he influence

hat these

other

actors or

groupsmight

have

in

the

38. See Wolfgang

chluchter,

Modes

of

Authority

ndDemocratic

Control,"

n

Volker Meja,

Dieter

Misgeld, nd

Nico

Stehr, ds.,

Modem

German ociology

NewYork: Columbia

University

Press,1987),

p. 297.

"It seems that

n

the case of functional

uthority,"

rites chluchter,

it s

the

'trust'

nstitutionalized

n the nternal

elations etween experts'

hat ommunicates

o outsiders

faith

n thevalue

of

specialized

knowledge."

39. According

o

the definition

f


mployed

n this

volume,

ommunity

members

have intersubjective,

nternally efined

alidity ests.

This contrasts

withErnst

Haas's

usage

of the concept

of epistemic

communities,

n

which he

explicitly

mentions

that

such

communities

profess

eliefs nextracommunity

eality

ests."

ee Ernst

B.

Haas,

When

nowledge

Is Power (Berkeley:

University

f

California Press,

1990),

p. 41. Although

there

are other

differences

etween

his and

our

usage,

they refairlyminor. believethat hisparticular ifference

in emphasis

n

intracommunity

ersus xtracommunity

ruth

ests prings

rimarily

rom iffering

overarching

istorical

isions.Ernst

Haas

seeks to demonstrate

he

evolution

f

rationality

ver

time,possibly

hrough

he

gradual

ntercession

fepistemic

ommunities

nto

collective

ecision

making.

For

such a normative

laim to

be sustained,

the

epistemic

ommunity

must

share

a

common

asis

for alidation

f tsunderstanding

ith hebroaderpolicy

ommunity.onversely,

am

muchmore skeptical

bout

such universal alidity

laims nd

am content o settlefor

he

ess

ambitious

nternal ruth

ests.While

n most ases

members utside

theepistemic

ommunity

ay

concur

hatvaliditylaims

xist,

t s less clear that

heywould

be able to identify

r evaluate

them.


19/36

18 International

rganization

Causal beliefs

Shared Unshared

a

;

Epistemic

ommunities

Interestgroups

nd

social movements

.= z

Disciplines

nd

Legislators,

ureaucratic

v

Disciplins

a

agencies,

nd

bureaucratic

professions

coalitions

Knowledge

ase

Consensual

Disputed

r

absent

Interestroups,

ocial

E

Epistemic ommunities movements,

nd

bureaucraticoalitions

i


20/36

Introduction

19

Epistemic ommunities

must lso be distinguished

rom he broader cien-

tific community s

well as

from

professions

and disciplines.40 lthough

members of a given professionor disciplinemay share a set of causal

approaches or orientations

nd have a consensualknowledge ase, they

ack

the shared normative ommitmentsf members

f an epistemic ommunity.

An

epistemic

ommunity'sthical tandards risefrom

ts

principled pproach

to the ssue at hand,

rather hanfrom professional

ode. Unlikemembers f a

profession r discipline,

who seldom limit hemselves o workthat s closely

congruent

with heirprincipled alues,41members

f an epistemic ommunity

tendto pursue

activities hat loselyreflect hecommunity'srincipled

eliefs

and

tendto affiliatend

identifyhemselves ith roups hat ikewise

eflect r

seek topromote hesebeliefs. n practice, owever,hort-termlliancesbased

on commonresearch nd concerns ften xist

betweenmembers f epistemic

communitiesnd professions.42

The point o be stressedhere

s

that

while

conomists

s a whole constitute

profession,members

of a particular ubgroup

of economists-for example,

Keynesians

r

followers

f one

of

the schoolsof development

conomics-may

constitute n

epistemic

ommunity

f their wn and

systematically

ontribute

to

a concrete

et of

projects

nformed

y

theirpreferred iews,

beliefs,

nd

ideas.

The beliefs and

goals

of

epistemic

communities

differ rom those

of

bureaucratic odies,

but

the approaches

to analyzing pistemic

ommunities

and bureaucratic

politics

share

a focus on administrative

mpowerment

f

specializedknowledge roups.

Bureaucratic

odies

Haas - Epistemic Communities

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