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published online 12 April 2011Social Psychological and Personality ScienceBianca Beersma and Gerben A. Van Kleef

How the Grapevine Keeps You in Line: Gossip Increases Contributions to the Group  

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How the Grapevine Keeps Youin Line: Gossip IncreasesContributions to the Group

Bianca Beersma1 and Gerben A. Van Kleef1

AbstractGossip is often characterized as bad and immoral. The authors challenge this view and propose that gossip constrains self-servingbehavior that harms the group. When people expect their group members to gossip and their decisions are identifiable, they willbe concerned about group members’ opinions, and this should lead them to contribute more resources to the group. Whenpeople believe their group members are unlikely to gossip, identifiability of decisions should have less impact on group opinionconcerns and contributions to the group. Participants were led to believe that their fellow group members had a low or hightendency to gossip, and that their contribution to the group was identifiable by the group or not. Results confirmed ourhypotheses, demonstrating that gossip is a powerful tool to control self-serving behavior in groups. Indeed, the grapevine keepsgroup members in line. Although mostly viewed negatively, gossip may be essential for groups’ survival.

Keywordsgossip, contributions to group, dictator game

Gossip, or the exchange of evaluative information about

absent third parties (Foster, 2004), has acquired a very negative

reputation. There are accounts of severe punishments for gossip

in the Middle Ages; in Britain, those who violated the law

against gossip that was in place at that time were condemned

to wear an iron mask with spikes that protruded into the

mouth. Moreover, it has been suggested that the burning of

women for engaging in witchcraft actually had more to do

with these women practicing gossip than with their alleged

supernatural powers (Emler, 1994). Nowadays, gossip is

still condemned by the moral guidelines of most societies

(Goodman & Ben-Ze’ev, 1994).

Although gossip is frowned upon, many people engage in

gossip with a remarkable frequency and appetite. According

to some studies, as much as two thirds of conversation time

involves gossip (Dunbar, Duncan, & Marriott, 1997; Emler,

1994). The frequent occurrence of gossip in everyday life

points to the possibility that, despite its bad reputation, gossip

may serve some rather useful functions for those who engage in

it. Indeed, people report that gossip is a relaxing and enjoyable

activity (Ben Ze’ev, 1994; Rosnow, 1977; Spacks, 1982;

Stirling, 1956). Gossip occurs within various kinds of social

networks and has been argued and found to be a form of ‘‘social

cement’’ in groups (Burt & Knez, 1996; Grosser, Lopez-

Kidwell, & Labianca, 2010; McAndrew, Bell, & Garcia,

2007). Moreover, it has been argued that gossip is an efficient

means of transmitting information about the rules, norms, and

guidelines for living in a group or culture (Baumeister, Zhang,

& Vohs, 2004).

More specifically, Dunbar (2004) suggested that gossip

might serve as a tool to constrain people from behaving in a

self-serving manner at the cost of their group. Group interac-

tions constitute mixed-motive situations (Shelling, 1960).

Although groups, and therefore the individuals composing

them, benefit most when all individuals contribute equally to

the attainment of group goals, it is tempting for a group

member not to contribute, while still reaping the benefits of

other group members’ contributions (Dawes, 1980; Van Dijk

& Wilke, 1999; Van Vugt, 2009).

To prevent individuals from engaging in self-serving

behavior at the cost of the group, groups need norms that pre-

scribe how group members should behave (Campbell, 1975).

Coleman (1988) claimed that the exchange of information

within networks of acquainted individuals leads to the forma-

tion of and compliance with such social norms. In line with this

idea, various authors have suggested that gossip operates as a

1 Department of Work and Organizational Psychology, University of

Amsterdam, Netherlands

Corresponding Author:

Bianca Beersma, Department of Work and Organizational Psychology,

University of Amsterdam, Roetersstraat 15, 1018 WB Amsterdam, Netherlands

Email: b.beersma@uva.nl

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mechanism to construe such group norms and discourage

defection (Dunbar, 2004; Gluckman, 1963; Keltner, Van Kleef,

Chen, & Kraus, 2008). Gluckman (1963) proposed that gossip

constitutes a social sanction (see also Wilson, Wilczynski,

Wells, & Weiser, 2000) and that the threat alone that one may

be gossiped about by group members is enough to prevent

members from behaving in a self-serving manner at the

expense of the group. When the threat of gossip exists, group

members can expect that they will be talked about if they

decide to deviate from the group norm by taking a free ride.

What starts with gossip may eventually lead to exclusion from

the group, and this prospect inhibits group members’ tendency

to behave in a self-serving manner, even though they might be

tempted to do so (Baumeister et al., 2004; Dunbar, 2004).

Although these considerations suggest that gossip may play

an important role in shaping group dynamics, empirical

research on gossip is lacking, as has been lamented by many

interested in this phenomenon (e.g., Emler, 1994; Foster,

2004; Morreall, 1994). Recent research by Beersma and Van

Kleef (in press) indicates that people do indeed use gossip to

punish norm violators or free riders. Specifically, they found

that people are especially inclined to engage in gossip under

circumstances where gossip can be used to warn one’s group

members against norm violators who exploit the group. Like-

wise, Logli, Keltner, Campos, and Oveis (2008) argued that

gossip is likely to be targeted at individuals who are disposed

to harm the interests of the group. Indeed, in a study on sorority

sisters, they found that frequent targets of gossip were typically

cold and aggressive and characterized by high levels of

Machiavellianism, which captures the tendency to harm others

in the selfish pursuit of status and power (see Keltner et al.,

2008). Interestingly, in a mathematical modeling study, Enquist

and Leimar (1993) found that informing interaction partners

about the behavior of free riders counteracts free riding in the

long run. Moreover, Sommerfeld, Krambeck, Semmann, and

Milinski (2007) demonstrated that gossip influences individuals’

decisions: Participants in their study cooperated less with part-

ners about whom they had received negative gossip than with

partners about whom they had received positive gossip. Thus,

gossip may be used to sanction free riders.

An important question, however, is whether people realize

that gossip has this effect, and whether they would alter their

behavior to prevent the negative consequences that gossip

could entail for them. If so, this would mean that the threat

alone that one would become the target of gossip by group

members would reduce free riding and that gossip therefore

effectively controls norm violations in groups, as proposed

by Gluckman (1963). In this study, we focus on this early phase

in the social dynamics of gossip: the belief that others in one’s

group have the tendency to engage in gossip. We test the

proposition that believing that group members will gossip

about one’s actions discourages people from engaging in

self-serving behavior at the expense of their group and thus

increases contributions to a group goal.

Previous research on resource contributions to groups has

shown that identifiability, or the fact that others know about

one’s contribution, can influence actual contributions (e.g.,

Andreoni & Petrie, 2004; Charness & Gneezy, 2008; Hoffman,

McCabe, Shachat, & Smith, 1994; Hoffman, McCabe, &

Smith, 1996; Nowak & Sigmund, 1998; Panchanathan & Boyd,

2004). Although some studies have shown that identifiability

increases cooperation, other studies have failed to find such

an effect (for a discussion, see De Cremer & Bakker, 2003;

Kerr, 1999). Kerr (1999) suggested that a number of conditions

have to be met for identifiability to increase contributions to the

group. One important moderator is that group members must be

convinced that others can and will deliver sanctions for the

violation of the cooperative norm—they have to believe that

the rest of the group can and will do something if one fails to

comply with the norm. In other words, they have to expect a

social sanction (Kerr, 1999). Interestingly, gossip has been con-

ceptualized as precisely such a social sanction (Dunbar, 2004;

Gluckman, 1963; Keltner et al., 2008; Wilson et al., 2000).

We argue that, therefore, the possibility that one’s group

members may gossip about one’s decisions is an important

moderator of the identifiability effect. Through gossip, group

members can influence the target’s social reputation: They can

paint an image of a person as trustworthy and likable, or, in

contrast, selfish and immoral. Ultimately, such gossip can lead

to social exclusion, an outcome that people fear and strive

to prevent (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Williams, 2007).

Therefore, we predict that the effects of identifiability will be

especially pronounced when one believes that one’s group

members are prone to engage in gossip.

Previous research showed that the tendency to gossip is a

reliable individual difference variable that pertains to how

much individuals are prone to discuss others’ achievements,

physical appearance, and social information (Nevo, Nevo, &

Derech Zehavi, 1993). When one believes one’s group mem-

bers have a high rather than low tendency to gossip, being iden-

tifiable rather than anonymous should increase one’s

contribution to the group, because not contributing enough

might elicit gossip. We therefore predict an interactive effect

between group members’ tendency to gossip and identifiabil-

ity, such that identifiability increases contributions to the group

when group members are believed to have a high tendency to

gossip, but not when they are believed to have a low tendency

to gossip (Hypothesis 1).

We expect the interactive effect of group members’ ten-

dency to gossip and identifiability on group contributions to

be mediated by group opinion concerns. These concerns refer

to both the inclusion of a person as a member of the group

by other group members, as well as his or her reputation: ‘‘the

beliefs or opinions that are generally held about someone’’

(Pearsall, 1998, p. 1576). Both concerns—need to belong and

concern about reputation—are important to people’s social

self-concepts (Sedikides, 2002), and because of ‘‘their connec-

tion to identity issues, both concerns are strongly related to one

another’’ (De Cremer & Tyler, 2005a, p. 125). The impression

that one makes in a certain social interaction can be communi-

cated through gossip, thus possibly leading to exclusion from

groups and reputation damage (see De Cremer & Sedikides,

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2008; De Cremer & Tyler, 2005a, 2005b; Hardy & Van Vugt,

2006; Van Vugt & Hardy, 2010). Both concerns are therefore

prone to be affected by gossip.

Group opinion concerns have been shown to be related to

contributions to group goals in public goods dilemmas (Milinski,

Semmann, & Krambeck, 2002). Participants should be espe-

cially concerned about the opinions of their group members

when they believe these group members to be prone to gossip and

their behavior is identifiable by group members (Hypothesis 2),

and therefore, group opinion concerns should mediate the

interactive effect of group members’ tendency to gossip and

identifiability on contributions to the group (Hypothesis 3).

In short, when group members’ resource contribution deci-

sions are identifiable (such that other group members will know

how much they contributed to the group), and they believe their

group members to have a high tendency to gossip, they will be

especially concerned about group members’ opinions. If gossip

indeed serves as a mechanism to constrain self-serving

behavior at the cost of the group, it is under these conditions

that individuals should contribute most to their group.

Method

Participants and Design

Participants were 147 undergraduate students at a large

university in the Netherlands (47 males and 100 females, mean

age 22 years), who participated in the study for course credits

or 7 Euros. The experiment had a two (group members’

tendency to gossip: high vs. low) � 2 (identifiability: absent

vs. present) full-factorial design. Participants were randomly

assigned to conditions using a double-blind procedure.

Procedure

Upon arrival at the laboratory, participants were seated in sepa-

rate cubicles behind a computer. Participants learned that the

purpose of the experiment was to compare computer-mediated

interaction with face-to-face interaction in groups (see Van

Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2006). They read that three other

participants with whom they would interact in a group were

seated in separate cubicles during the first part of the experiment,

and that in the second part they would interact with their group

face-to-face. After these instructions, participants filled in a

questionnaire containing a number of general questions, includ-

ing items that measured the tendency to gossip (see below) and

some filler items about their proficiency with computers.

We used an established procedure to enhance the salience of

the group for participants (adapted from Homan, Greer, Jehn,

& Koning, 2010). To make participants feel that they belonged

to a group, we took their photos with a webcam and then

displayed their photo along with those of three other people

who were introduced as their group members. For female

participants, the photos of the other participants included two

pictures of male students and one picture of a female student.

For male participants, the photos included two pictures of

female students and one picture of a male student. In reality, the

participants did not interact with anybody else; the photos of

the other group members were always the same and the

responses that allegedly came from the other group members

were preprogrammed.

After participants had seen the photos, they received instruc-

tions about the group task: a modified dictator game (Eckel &

Grossman, 1996; Van Dijk & Vermunt, 2000). Participants

read that they had been randomly selected by the computer to

make a decision. Specifically, they would receive 100 lottery

tickets. Each ticket represented a chance on a 75 Euro prize.

Participants were told that they were free to contribute as many

tickets as they wanted into two accounts: A group account and

a personal account. The total number of tickets contributed to

the group account would be split equally among the members

of the group; the number of tickets they decided to keep would

accrue completely to themselves.

To manipulate identifiability, the instructions included

information about whether the participant’s group members

would or would not be informed about how many tickets the

participant had contributed to the group and how many he or

she had kept for himself or herself. To manipulate group mem-

bers’ tendency to gossip, we used the general questions about

social behavior that participants had filled out before they

engaged in the decision-making task. A number of these ques-

tions were about the tendency to gossip. We told participants

that we were interested in how information about group

members shapes social interaction, and that they had been

randomly chosen to receive information about their group

members. They were informed that their group members would

not receive information about them. Participants received the

information about their group members in the form of a ‘‘gen-

eral communication profile,’’ which presented the mean scores

of their three group members on four dimensions: ‘‘Tendency

to talk about others,’’ ‘‘Proficiency with computers,’’ ‘‘Prefer-

ence for communication through the computer,’’ and ‘‘Ten-

dency to gossip.’’ The scores on the second and third items

(which were unrelated to gossip) were the same in the two ten-

dencies to gossip conditions (2.7 and 3.3, respectively). The

scores on the first and fourth items (which were related to gossip)

differed across conditions, such that the group members scored

4.7 on both items in the high tendency to gossip condition, and

1.3 on both items in the low tendency to gossip condition.

Next, participants engaged in the modified dictator game.

After making a decision about how many lottery tickets to con-

tribute to the group and how many to keep for themselves, they

filled out a final questionnaire, which contained measures of

group opinion concerns and manipulation checks. Thereafter,

participants were informed that the interactive part of the

experiment would not actually take place, and they were

thanked, debriefed, and given their credit points or money.

Measures

To measure contribution to the group, we recorded the number

of tickets the participant contributed to the group account,

which could range from 0 to 100. All other measures consisted

Beersma and Van Kleef 3

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of Likert-type items, which participants answered on 5-point

scales (1 ¼ totally disagree, 5 ¼ totally agree). Reliability

coefficients are reported in Table 1.

We measured group opinion concerns with six items (e.g.,

‘‘During the decision-making task, I thought about how my

group members would think about me’’; ‘‘It is important to

me that my group members accept me’’). We used three items

to check the adequacy of the identifiability manipulation (e.g.,

‘‘My group members could see how I distributed the tickets

between myself and the group’’) and three items to check our

manipulation of tendency to gossip (e.g., ‘‘My group members

like to talk about other people’’).

Results

Descriptive Statistics and Treatment of the Data

Table 1 shows the correlations between variables. As can be

seen, the manipulation checks correlated with the manipula-

tions in the expected ways. Also, group opinion concerns

correlated with contribution to the group (r ¼ .54, p < .001).

We analyzed the data with 2 (tendency to gossip: low vs.

high) � 2 (identifiability: absent vs. present) analyses of

variance (ANOVAs), using directional hypothesis tests. Signifi-

cant interaction effects were decomposed using simple-effects

analysis (Winer, 1981). We tested for mediated moderation using

a series of regression analyses (Muller, Judd, & Yzerbyt, 2005).

Manipulation Checks

ANOVA on the manipulation check for identifiability revealed

that participants in the identifiability condition indicated their

decisions to be more identifiable (M ¼ 4.01, SD ¼ .12) than

participants in the no identifiability condition (M ¼ 1.96,

SD ¼ .13), F(1, 143) ¼ 134.29, p < .001, Z2 ¼ .48. No other

effects were significant. ANOVA on the manipulation check

for group members’ tendency to gossip only revealed a main

effect of tendency to gossip, F(1, 143) ¼ 1178.70, p < .001,

Z2 ¼ .89, indicating that participants in the high tendency to

gossip condition indicated that their group members had a

higher tendency to gossip (M¼ 4.55, SD¼ .06) than participants

in the low tendency to gossip condition (M ¼ 1.49, SD ¼ .06).

No other effects were significant. Thus, both manipulations

were successful.

Contribution to the Group

ANOVA revealed a significant effect of identifiability on con-

tribution to the group, F(1, 143) ¼ 3.80, p ¼ .027, Z2 ¼ .03,

indicating that participants in the identifiability condition con-

tributed more to their group (M ¼ 61.86, SD ¼ 2.81) than did

participants in the no identifiability condition (M ¼ 54.03,

SD ¼ 2.87). This effect was qualified by the predicted

Identifiability � Tendency to Gossip interaction, F(1, 143) ¼4.33, p ¼ .020, Z2 ¼ .03. Simple-effects tests demonstrated

that whereas in the low tendency to gossip condition, identifia-

bility did not significantly affect contribution to the group,

F(1, 144) < 1, ns; Midentifiability ¼ 57.03, SD ¼ 4.01, Mno identifia-

bility ¼ 57.57, SD ¼ 4.12, in the high tendency to gossip condi-

tion, participants whose decisions were identifiable contributed

more to their group (M¼ 66.68, SD¼ 3.95) than did participants

whose decisions were not identifiable (M ¼ 50.49, SD ¼ 4.01),

F(1, 144) ¼ 8.35, p ¼ .002. Simple-effects tests within the

two identifiability conditions showed that whereas in the low

identifiability condition, tendency to gossip did not affect

contribution to the group, F(1, 144) ¼ 1.59, ns, contribution to

the group in the high identifiability condition was higher when

tendency to gossip was high rather than low, F(1, 144) ¼ 2.95,

p ¼ .04 (see Figure 1). These results support Hypothesis 1.

Group Opinion Concerns

ANOVA showed a significant Identifiability � Tendency to

Gossip interaction on group opinion concerns, F(1, 143) ¼6.76, p ¼ .005, Z2 ¼ .05. In the low tendency to gossip condi-

tion, identifiability did not significantly affect group opinion

Table 1. Intercorrelations Between Variables (Cronbach’s a ReliabilityCoefficients Are Depicted on the Diagonal for Variables Measured WithScales)

1 2 3 4 5

1. Identifiability2. Tendency to gossip �.013. Manipulation check

identifiability.69** .04 .95

4. Manipulation checktendency to gossip

�.01 .94** .03 .95

5. Group opinion concerns .06 �.04 .02 �.07 .616. Contribution to group .16* .03 .19* .02 .54**

Note: N ¼ 147.*p < .05. **p < .01.

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

HighLowGroup members' tendency to gossip

Con

trib

utio

n to

gro

up

No identifiabilityIdentifiability

Figure 1. Contribution to group as a function of group members’tendency to gossip and identifiability

4 Social Psychological and Personality Science 000(00)

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concerns, F(1, 144)¼ 1.84, ns; Midentifiability¼ 3.26, SD¼ 0.09,

Mno identifiability ¼ 3.44, SD ¼ 0.10. In the high tendency to gos-

sip condition, participants whose decisions were identifiable

reported greater group opinion concerns (M ¼ 3.45, SD ¼ 0.09)

than participants whose decisions were not identifiable

(M ¼ 3.15, SD ¼ 0.09), F(1, 144) ¼ 5.39, p ¼ .011. These

results support Hypothesis 2.

Mediation Analysis

We predicted that the interactive effect of tendency to gossip

and identifiability on contribution to the group would be

mediated by group opinion concerns. To test this mediated

moderation model, we followed the procedure described by

Muller et al. (2005). Table 2 reports the results of three regres-

sion analyses which demonstrate that (a) the effect of tendency

to gossip on contribution was moderated by identifiability (see

also the ANOVA results regarding Hypothesis 1); (b) the effect

of tendency to gossip on group opinion concerns was moder-

ated by identifiability (see also the ANOVA results regarding

Hypothesis 2); and (c) the interaction effect between Tendency

to Gossip and Identifiability on Contribution is reduced to non-

significance when controlling for group opinion concerns and

the interaction between Group Opinion Concerns and Identifia-

bility, while the effect of group opinion concerns is significant

in this analysis (see Models 4 to 6 in Muller et al., 2005,

p. 855). These results indicate that group opinion concerns fully

mediated the interactive effect of identifiability and tendency

to gossip on contribution to the group (see Muller et al.,

2005, p. 856), thus supporting Hypothesis 3.

Discussion

Our results support the idea that gossip serves as a mechanism

to keep group members ‘‘in line.’’ Consistent with theorizing

by Gluckman (1963), we found that the threat that one might

be gossiped about by group members can increase contribu-

tions to the group and reduce free riding. Participants in our

experiment who had been led to believe that their group

members had a high tendency to gossip contributed more

lottery tickets to their group when they believed that their

decision was identifiable than when they believed other group

members would not know what they had decided. However,

when they believed that their group members had a low tendency

to gossip, identifiability of their decision did not affect their

behavior. Apparently, in this context, they did not care whether

group members knew or did not know how many tickets they

contributed. Knowing that one’s group members are unlikely

to discuss one’s behavior among each other thus seems to make

people less afraid to make self-interested decisions. In contrast,

knowing that one may become the subject of gossip when one

has to make a decision concerning how much to contribute to

one’s group and knowing that group members will learn about

this decision heightens group opinion concerns, and thereby

increases contributions to the group.

These findings resonate with the idea that gossip constitutes

a social sanction (Gluckman, 1963; Keltner et al., 2008; see

also Kerr, 1999). When the threat of gossip is low, making

a selfish choice in a social dilemma is just a stand-alone

action with few consequences, even if others come to know

about it. However, when the threat of gossip is high,

participants realized that a selfish choice could be used by

their gossiping group members as a basis to construe a neg-

ative social reputation that could have severe consequences

for them in the future. Interestingly, in our experiment, par-

ticipants in the high tendency to gossip condition may even

have considered the possibility that group members could

tell negative things about them to people not involved in the

study, such as fellow students, friends, and family members.

This strengthens the explanation that gossip constrains

undesired behavior because it is seen as a social sanction.

Future research should examine the boundary conditions

of this effect (although, considering the unpredictable and

uncontrollable nature of gossip, it is difficult to imagine a

study in which gossip can occur only within the boundaries

of the experimental session).

Table 2. Results of Regression Analyses Demonstrating Mediated Moderation

b t

Independent variables entered in Regression 1 Dependent variable: Contribution to groupTendency to gossip .03 .32Identifiability .16 1.95*Tendency to Gossip � Identifiability .17 2.08*

Independent variables entered in Regression 2 Dependent variable: Group opinion concernsTendency to gossip �.05 �.56Identifiability .05 .65Tendency to Gossip � Identifiability .21 2.60*

Independent variables entered in Regression 3 Dependent variable: Contribution to groupTendency to gossip .07 .99Identifiability .13 1.89***Tendency to Gossip � Identifiability .06 .80Group opinion concerns .61 6.31**Group Opinion Concerns � Identifiability �.14 �1.41

*p < .05. **p < .001. ***p < .10.

Beersma and Van Kleef 5

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All in all, our data provide important empirical evidence that

gossip is a powerful tool to control self-serving behavior in

groups. By doing so, our study contributes to knowledge about

the social dynamics of gossip. Results from a mathematical

modeling study (Enquist & Leimar, 1993) had already shown

that the opportunity to provide information about interaction

partners can reduce free riding, as this information can be

used to exclude free riders from future interactions.

Sommerfeld et al. (2007) also demonstrated that real people are

influenced by gossip statements: They used information

received about interaction partners’ reputation to adjust their

levels of cooperation with these partners. Our study extends

this literature by showing that people are apprehensive of the

social consequences of gossip. When people knew that their

contribution to a group goal was identifiable by the other

group members, the mere risk that these others might gossip

about their behavior was enough to increase contributions to

the group goal. As such, although mostly viewed negatively,

the current results show that gossip may be an essential factor

for the survival of groups.

There are of course questions that remain unanswered by the

current results. One direction for future research could be to

study whether group members consciously realize the power

of gossip for controlling self-serving behavior. As mentioned

earlier, Beersma and Van Kleef (in press) found that people

do engage in gossip to warn their group members against norm

violators, but the question is whether this is a conscious, rea-

soned decision. Another interesting question is whether the

recipients of gossip can distinguish gossip that benefits the col-

lective by punishing norm violators from self-interested gossip

that only aims to benefit the gossiper.

Future research could also delve more deeply into the

mediating mechanisms that are responsible for the effects

we observed. Although we demonstrated mediation by

group opinion concerns, we measured these after the depen-

dent variable (contributions to the group) because we were

concerned that measuring group opinion concerns before

group contributions might attenuate effects on the main

dependent variable. Future studies could directly manipulate

several aspects of group members’ opinions to increase

insight into the mediating processes at work here.

Additionally, whereas our manipulation of tendency to gos-

sip captures the ‘‘start’’ of the gossip process, it would be inter-

esting for future research to examine effects of this process in

its entirety. In ‘‘real’’ groups outside of the laboratory, gossip is

interactive and dynamic. Rather than just being passive observ-

ers of gossip, receivers can actively take part in it and distribute

gossip further among other group members. It would be

interesting to examine how these processes affect prosocial

behavior in groups. In this respect, it is important to note the

negative effects of gossip, which have, for example, been docu-

mented by Wittek and Wielers (1998), who found that gossip

relates to clique formation in organizations. Although gossip

may strengthen relationships between the gossipers, this

benefit may come at the cost of the person who is gossiped

about. Likewise, in their article titled ‘‘The Poison Grapevine,’’

Baker and Jones (1996) argued that gossip between employees

and managers in organizations is a form of dysfunctional

communication that leads to unhealthy work relationships. As

such, it is important to take a network approach to gossiping

in future studies and examine how the full process of gossip

affects group functioning (cf., Burt & Knez, 1996; Grosser

et al., 2010; McAndrew et al., 2007).

These considerations notwithstanding, our results clearly

add to previous theorizing and research that demonstrated that

the negative reputation of gossip may be in need of revision (cf.

March & Sevon, 1988; Waddington & Michelson, 2010). Our

findings suggest a more nuanced interpretation of gossip as

an activity that has both positive and negative sides. In fact,

it might very well be that the positive effects of gossip on group

contributions that we demonstrated here are due in part to indi-

viduals’ motivation to avoid the negative side of gossip, as the

observed mediation through group opinion concerns suggests.

We hope that our study will be followed by more empirical

work on the bright and dark sides of gossip at the group level

to increase our knowledge about this omnipresent social

phenomenon.

Acknowledgment

The authors thank Gunnhildur Sveinsdottir for her help with collecting

the data.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no conflicts of interest with respect to the

research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support

for the research and/or authorship of this article: grants of the

Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO) awarded

to Bianca Beersma (Grant 451.04.100) and Gerben van Kleef (Grant

451.05.010).

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Bios

Bianca Beersma is associate professor of organizational psychology at

the University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands. Her main research interests

involve group processes, teamwork, conflict, negotiation, and gossip.

Gerben A. Van Kleef is associate professor of social psychology at

the University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands. His main research

interests revolve around emotion, power, social influence, conflict,

and group processes.

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