How Merchant Towns Shaped Parliaments:From the Norman Conquest of England to the Great Reform Act

Charles Angelucci, Simone Meraglia, Nico Voigtländer(Columbia) (Exeter) (UCLA and NBER)

March 3, 2020

Angelucci, Meraglia, Voigtländer How Merchant Towns Shaped Parliaments Mar 3, 2020 1 / 46

Motivation

Political institutions are important drivers of economicdevelopment (North and Thomas 1973; North, Wallis and Weingast 2009;Acemoglu and Robinson 2012)

Historically, institutions were shaped by “coalition of powerholders”

I Medieval period: king, nobility, high clergyI Early modern period: towns ascended to coalition of power holders

– and gained representation in parliaments across Western Europe

Towns’ (and thus merchants’) foothold on power crucial duringlater critical junctures – e.g., major trade expansions (AJR 2005;Pascali 2017)

⇒ How did merchant towns gain direct representation inparliaments?

⇒ How did they interact with parliaments over subsequent centuries?

Angelucci, Meraglia, Voigtländer How Merchant Towns Shaped Parliaments Mar 3, 2020 2 / 46

Motivation

Political institutions are important drivers of economicdevelopment (North and Thomas 1973; North, Wallis and Weingast 2009;Acemoglu and Robinson 2012)

Historically, institutions were shaped by “coalition of powerholders”

I Medieval period: king, nobility, high clergyI Early modern period: towns ascended to coalition of power holders

– and gained representation in parliaments across Western Europe

Towns’ (and thus merchants’) foothold on power crucial duringlater critical junctures – e.g., major trade expansions (AJR 2005;Pascali 2017)

⇒ How did merchant towns gain direct representation inparliaments?

⇒ How did they interact with parliaments over subsequent centuries?

Angelucci, Meraglia, Voigtländer How Merchant Towns Shaped Parliaments Mar 3, 2020 2 / 46

Motivation

Political institutions are important drivers of economicdevelopment (North and Thomas 1973; North, Wallis and Weingast 2009;Acemoglu and Robinson 2012)

Historically, institutions were shaped by “coalition of powerholders”

I Medieval period: king, nobility, high clergyI Early modern period: towns ascended to coalition of power holders

– and gained representation in parliaments across Western Europe

Towns’ (and thus merchants’) foothold on power crucial duringlater critical junctures – e.g., major trade expansions (AJR 2005;Pascali 2017)

⇒ How did merchant towns gain direct representation inparliaments?

⇒ How did they interact with parliaments over subsequent centuries?

Angelucci, Meraglia, Voigtländer How Merchant Towns Shaped Parliaments Mar 3, 2020 2 / 46

Motivation

Political institutions are important drivers of economicdevelopment (North and Thomas 1973; North, Wallis and Weingast 2009;Acemoglu and Robinson 2012)

Historically, institutions were shaped by “coalition of powerholders”

I Medieval period: king, nobility, high clergyI Early modern period: towns ascended to coalition of power holders

– and gained representation in parliaments across Western Europe

Towns’ (and thus merchants’) foothold on power crucial duringlater critical junctures – e.g., major trade expansions (AJR 2005;Pascali 2017)

⇒ How did merchant towns gain direct representation inparliaments?

⇒ How did they interact with parliaments over subsequent centuries?

Angelucci, Meraglia, Voigtländer How Merchant Towns Shaped Parliaments Mar 3, 2020 2 / 46

This Paper: Overview

1 How towns obtained self-governance during the CommercialRevolution (11-13th century)

2 Self-governing towns ⇒ direct representation in parliament(13-14th century)

3 Self-governing towns ⇒ resisted patronage andstrengthened parliament

Angelucci, Meraglia, Voigtländer How Merchant Towns Shaped Parliaments Mar 3, 2020 3 / 46

This Paper: Overview

1 How towns obtained self-governance during the CommercialRevolution (11-13th century)

2 Self-governing towns ⇒ direct representation in parliament(13-14th century)

3 Self-governing towns ⇒ resisted patronage andstrengthened parliament

Angelucci, Meraglia, Voigtländer How Merchant Towns Shaped Parliaments Mar 3, 2020 3 / 46

This Paper: Overview

1 How towns obtained self-governance during the CommercialRevolution (11-13th century)

2 Self-governing towns ⇒ direct representation in parliament(13-14th century)

3 Self-governing towns ⇒ resisted patronage andstrengthened parliament

Angelucci, Meraglia, Voigtländer How Merchant Towns Shaped Parliaments Mar 3, 2020 3 / 46

This Paper: England

Study England – “the mother of parliaments”

Starting point: England in medieval times, before parliamentI Norman Conquest in 1066 ⇒ ‘strong’ monarchy, imposes

homogeneous formal (de jure) institutionsI “Commercial Revolution” starting in 12CI First (‘Model’) Parliament in 1295

Create novel dataset for 554 towns (boroughs) 1066-1832

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Step 1 of the Argument: (Period: 1086-1348)

merchanttowns

⇒ local self-governance

||

inefficient administration(judicial and fiscal)

Royal officials (sheriffs) run towns’ administrations: “Tax Farming”

But trade required specialized administration ⇒ distortions

⇒ Farm Grants (“Charters of Liberties”): Mutually beneficialcontracts between monarch and merchant towns

I Self-administered tax collectionI Election of local officials (legal and fiscal) Diagram

I Often granted during wars

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Step 1 of the Argument: (Period: 1086-1348)

merchanttowns

⇒ local self-governance

||

inefficient administration(judicial and fiscal)

Royal officials (sheriffs) run towns’ administrations: “Tax Farming”

But trade required specialized administration ⇒ distortions

⇒ Farm Grants (“Charters of Liberties”): Mutually beneficialcontracts between monarch and merchant towns

I Self-administered tax collectionI Election of local officials (legal and fiscal) Diagram

I Often granted during wars

Angelucci, Meraglia, Voigtländer How Merchant Towns Shaped Parliaments Mar 3, 2020 5 / 46

Step 2 of the Argument:

merchanttowns

⇒ local self-governance ⇒ institutional

outcomes

1. Parliament: direct representation of towns (1295-1348)I Farm Grants: Fiscal and judicial autonomy (separated from shire

administration) ⇒ monarch summons Farm Grant boroughs toParliament as separate constituencies to coordinate extra-ordinarytaxation Diagram

2. Local institutions: Persistent effects until 1830sI Medieval Farm Grants ⇒ history of electing local officials ⇒ resist

royal attempts to introduce patronage

3. Nationwide institutions: Strengthening ParliamentI Farm Grants ⇒ support parliamentarians during Civil War in 1640sI Farm Grants ⇒ support for Great Reform Act of 1832

Angelucci, Meraglia, Voigtländer How Merchant Towns Shaped Parliaments Mar 3, 2020 6 / 46

Step 2 of the Argument:

merchanttowns

⇒ local self-governance ⇒ institutional

outcomes

1. Parliament: direct representation of towns (1295-1348)I Farm Grants: Fiscal and judicial autonomy (separated from shire

administration) ⇒ monarch summons Farm Grant boroughs toParliament as separate constituencies to coordinate extra-ordinarytaxation Diagram

2. Local institutions: Persistent effects until 1830sI Medieval Farm Grants ⇒ history of electing local officials ⇒ resist

royal attempts to introduce patronage

3. Nationwide institutions: Strengthening ParliamentI Farm Grants ⇒ support parliamentarians during Civil War in 1640sI Farm Grants ⇒ support for Great Reform Act of 1832

Angelucci, Meraglia, Voigtländer How Merchant Towns Shaped Parliaments Mar 3, 2020 6 / 46

Step 2 of the Argument:

merchanttowns

⇒ local self-governance ⇒ institutional

outcomes

1. Parliament: direct representation of towns (1295-1348)I Farm Grants: Fiscal and judicial autonomy (separated from shire

administration) ⇒ monarch summons Farm Grant boroughs toParliament as separate constituencies to coordinate extra-ordinarytaxation Diagram

2. Local institutions: Persistent effects until 1830sI Medieval Farm Grants ⇒ history of electing local officials ⇒ resist

royal attempts to introduce patronage

3. Nationwide institutions: Strengthening ParliamentI Farm Grants ⇒ support parliamentarians during Civil War in 1640sI Farm Grants ⇒ support for Great Reform Act of 1832

Angelucci, Meraglia, Voigtländer How Merchant Towns Shaped Parliaments Mar 3, 2020 6 / 46

Data Collection

Cover all 554 English boroughs (towns) that existed by 1348I Timing and extent of Charters of Liberties (Farm Grants)

Royal Rolls

I Timing of Parliamentary enfranchisement (1295-1832)I Geography, ownership, commercial importance of boroughs

We also collect data on:I Incorporation of boroughsI Boroughs’ franchise types and openness of local electionsI Volunteer troops during the Civil War in 1642I MPs’ voting behavior during Great Reform Act of 1832 (Aidt and

Franck 2015).

Detail

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Empirical Implementation

tradegeography ⇒ Farm

Grants⇒ institutional

outcomes

Checking validity of the exclusion restriction:For historical reasons, boroughs owned by lords almost never gotFarm GrantsUsing subsample of lords’ boroughs:

tradegeography ��HH⇒ institutional

outcomes

Angelucci, Meraglia, Voigtländer How Merchant Towns Shaped Parliaments Mar 3, 2020 8 / 46

Empirical Implementation

tradegeography ⇒ Farm

Grants⇒ institutional

outcomes

Checking validity of the exclusion restriction:For historical reasons, boroughs owned by lords almost never gotFarm GrantsUsing subsample of lords’ boroughs:

tradegeography ��HH⇒ institutional

outcomes

Angelucci, Meraglia, Voigtländer How Merchant Towns Shaped Parliaments Mar 3, 2020 8 / 46

Related Literature and ContributionEmergence of constraints on executive

I Merchant interests and institutions (North and Thomas 1973, Barzel1989, Stasavage 2014, Puga and Trefler 2014)

I “Administrative power” (González de Lara, et al. 2008, Greif 2008)I Parliament as coordination device (Levi 1988, Root 1994)I This paper: establishes link between trade and municipal autonomy,

and between autonomy and parliamentary representation

State Capacity and Institutional Divergence ⇒ England vsContinental Europe (Epstein 2000, North, Wallis and Weingast 2009,Besley and Persson 2009, Van Zanden et al. 2012, Gennaioli and Voth 2015)

I This paper: Interaction between local and ‘national’ institutions

Org. Econ: Incomplete contracts (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart andMoore, 1988, 1990)

I Farm Grants = incomplete agreements that did not describetaxation during extraordinary events (e.g., wars).

I Parliament = “court of justice” where king and representativesnegotiated and coordinated extra-ordinary taxes

Angelucci, Meraglia, Voigtländer How Merchant Towns Shaped Parliaments Mar 3, 2020 9 / 46

Outline of the Talk

1 Background: Norman Conquest and Tax Farming

2 Farm Grants and Self-Governance

3 Parliament

4 Long-run ResultsI Local elections in 15C to 1830sI Civil War in 1640sI Great Reform Act of 1832

Angelucci, Meraglia, Voigtländer How Merchant Towns Shaped Parliaments Mar 3, 2020 10 / 46

The Norman Conquest of 1066

Coalition of power holders ‘reset’ throughout England

Existing ruling elites (incl. clergy) replaced by Norman lordsNormans implemented homogeneous feudal institutions acrossEngland

I Land ownerships = military service to the kingI Manorial system: serf labor

“The Norman conquest...was the single greatest political change England hasever seen.” [Economist Dec 2016] Farage

pre-Conquest

Angelucci, Meraglia, Voigtländer How Merchant Towns Shaped Parliaments Mar 3, 2020 11 / 46

The Norman Conquest of 1066

Coalition of power holders ‘reset’ throughout England

Existing ruling elites (incl. clergy) replaced by Norman lordsNormans implemented homogeneous feudal institutions acrossEngland

I Land ownerships = military service to the kingI Manorial system: serf labor

“The Norman conquest...was the single greatest political change England hasever seen.” [Economist Dec 2016] Farage

pre-Conquest

Angelucci, Meraglia, Voigtländer How Merchant Towns Shaped Parliaments Mar 3, 2020 11 / 46

Organization after the Norman Conquest

Boroughs divided between feudal lords:

1. The King (25%)2. Mesne lords: Lay (50%), and ecclesiastical (25%). Map

Balancedness Royal-Mesne:I Similar taxable wealth in 1086 Distribution

I Geography: Use Entropy Balancing / Matching Table

Angelucci, Meraglia, Voigtländer How Merchant Towns Shaped Parliaments Mar 3, 2020 12 / 46

Organization after the Norman Conquest

Boroughs divided between feudal lords:

1. The King (25%)2. Mesne lords: Lay (50%), and ecclesiastical (25%). Map

Balancedness Royal-Mesne:I Similar taxable wealth in 1086 Distribution

I Geography: Use Entropy Balancing / Matching Table

Angelucci, Meraglia, Voigtländer How Merchant Towns Shaped Parliaments Mar 3, 2020 12 / 46

Tax Collection in Royal and Mesne Territories

Inefficient local administration ⇒ Farm GrantsI Particularly severe in royal territoriesI Mesne lords rarely issue Farm Grants

Back to Talk

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Tax Collection in Royal and Mesne Territories

Farm Grants separated towns from shire’s jurisdiction⇒ Difficult to assess wealth and enforce extra-ordinary taxation

Back to Talk

Angelucci, Meraglia, Voigtländer How Merchant Towns Shaped Parliaments Mar 3, 2020 14 / 46

Tax Collection in Royal and Mesne Territories

Farm Grants separated towns from shire’s jurisdiction⇒ Difficult to assess wealth and enforce extra-ordinary taxation

Back to Talk

Angelucci, Meraglia, Voigtländer How Merchant Towns Shaped Parliaments Mar 3, 2020 14 / 46

Outline of the Talk

1 Background: Norman Conquest and Tax Farming

2 Farm Grants and Self-Governance

3 Parliament

4 Long-run ResultsI Local elections in 15C to 1830sI Civil War in 1640sI Great Reform Act of 1832

Angelucci, Meraglia, Voigtländer How Merchant Towns Shaped Parliaments Mar 3, 2020 15 / 46

Step 1 of the Argument: Farm Grants

merchanttowns

⇒ local self-governance|

|self-administeredtax collection ismore efficient

Inefficient fiscal and judicial administration ⇒Efficiency-increasing contracts: Farm Grants

I Self-administered tax collection and contract enforcementI Right to appoint local officials: mayor, bailiff, constable, market

viewer, ale-taster, etc.

Angelucci, Meraglia, Voigtländer How Merchant Towns Shaped Parliaments Mar 3, 2020 16 / 46

Farm Grants: Royal Boroughs0

100

200

300

400

500

600

Num

ber o

f bor

ough

s

All Royal MesneBoroughs included

All boroughsBoroughs with Farm Grant ⇒ Farm Grants almost

exclusively granted to royalboroughs

I 51.0% of royal boroughsget farm grants

I 3.9% of mesneboroughs

Likely explanation: Stronger need to delegate tax collection inroyal territories

I Much larger territory controlled by kingI Question for the king was: delegate to whom – either a private

individual (sheriff) or local communityI In contrast: No need to delegate for local mesne lords

Not driven by taxable wealth, soil suitability, pre-existing kingdomsTable

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Farm Grants: Royal Boroughs0

100

200

300

400

500

600

Num

ber o

f bor

ough

s

All Royal MesneBoroughs included

All boroughsBoroughs with Farm Grant ⇒ Farm Grants almost

exclusively granted to royalboroughs

I 51.0% of royal boroughsget farm grants

I 3.9% of mesneboroughs

Likely explanation: Stronger need to delegate tax collection inroyal territories

I Much larger territory controlled by kingI Question for the king was: delegate to whom – either a private

individual (sheriff) or local communityI In contrast: No need to delegate for local mesne lords

Not driven by taxable wealth, soil suitability, pre-existing kingdomsTable

Angelucci, Meraglia, Voigtländer How Merchant Towns Shaped Parliaments Mar 3, 2020 17 / 46

Farm Grants: Royal Boroughs0

100

200

300

400

500

600

Num

ber o

f bor

ough

s

All Royal MesneBoroughs included

All boroughsBoroughs with Farm Grant ⇒ Farm Grants almost

exclusively granted to royalboroughs

I 51.0% of royal boroughsget farm grants

I 3.9% of mesneboroughs

Likely explanation: Stronger need to delegate tax collection inroyal territories

I Much larger territory controlled by kingI Question for the king was: delegate to whom – either a private

individual (sheriff) or local communityI In contrast: No need to delegate for local mesne lords

Not driven by taxable wealth, soil suitability, pre-existing kingdomsTable

Angelucci, Meraglia, Voigtländer How Merchant Towns Shaped Parliaments Mar 3, 2020 17 / 46

Which (Royal) Boroughs got Farm Grants?

Efficiency gains due to self-administration strongest formerchant towns

Particularly strong need for efficient administration and lawenforcement

Lots of historical evidence... Statute of Merchants Bristol’s petition

⇒ Use trade geography to predict merchant activity

Location on sea coast

Navigable river

Roman roads

Map Farm Grants

Angelucci, Meraglia, Voigtländer How Merchant Towns Shaped Parliaments Mar 3, 2020 18 / 46

Which (Royal) Boroughs got Farm Grants?

Efficiency gains due to self-administration strongest formerchant towns

Particularly strong need for efficient administration and lawenforcement

Lots of historical evidence... Statute of Merchants Bristol’s petition

⇒ Use trade geography to predict merchant activity

Location on sea coast

Navigable river

Roman roads

Map Farm Grants

Angelucci, Meraglia, Voigtländer How Merchant Towns Shaped Parliaments Mar 3, 2020 18 / 46

Trade Geography and Farm GrantsBoroughs at locations that favored trade were more likely to receive Farm GrantsThis relationship holds only for royal boroughs

Dependent variable: Indicator for boroughs that obtained Farm Grants by 1348(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)

Boroughs included: all royal mesne mesne all all all allNote on Balancing Royal Balanced by Balanced by:and Mesne Boroughs: Trade Geo‡ Trade Geo‡ Trade & Wealth‡

Navigable River 0.210∗∗∗ 0.289∗∗∗ 0.002 0.012 0.002 0.012 0.012 0.021(0.050) (0.079) (0.028) (0.032) (0.028) (0.037) (0.032) (0.043)

Sea Coast 0.143∗∗∗ 0.422∗∗∗ -0.009 -0.005 -0.009 -0.011 -0.005 0.006(0.043) (0.081) (0.023) (0.024) (0.023) (0.029) (0.024) (0.040)

Roman Road 0.104∗∗∗ 0.207∗∗∗ -0.020 -0.015 -0.020 -0.013 -0.015 -0.044∗∗(0.035) (0.076) (0.019) (0.020) (0.019) (0.024) (0.020) (0.021)

p-value joint significance [<0.001] [<0.001] [0.730] [0.687] [0.732] [0.866] [0.688] [0.064]River, Coast, RoadRiver x Royal 0.288∗∗∗ 0.289∗∗∗ 0.278∗∗∗ 0.278∗∗

(0.083) (0.088) (0.084) (0.116)Sea Coast x Royal 0.431∗∗∗ 0.416∗∗∗ 0.428∗∗∗ 0.537∗∗∗

(0.084) (0.088) (0.084) (0.122)Roman Road x Royal 0.227∗∗∗ 0.258∗∗∗ 0.222∗∗∗ 0.259∗∗

(0.078) (0.080) (0.078) (0.103)Royal borough 0.171∗∗∗ 0.161∗∗∗ 0.175∗∗∗ 0.173∗∗

(0.062) (0.060) (0.062) (0.081)County FE XMean Dep. Var. 0.16 0.51 0.04 0.04 0.16 0.16 0.27 0.16R2 0.09 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.42 0.46 0.41 0.40Observations 554 145 409 409 554 554 554 354

Notes: All regressions are run at the borough level. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

E-weights detail

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Trade Geography and Farm GrantsBoroughs at locations that favored trade were more likely to receive Farm GrantsThis relationship holds only for royal boroughs

Dependent variable: Indicator for boroughs that obtained Farm Grants by 1348(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)

Boroughs included: all royal mesne mesne all all all allNote on Balancing Royal Balanced by Balanced by:and Mesne Boroughs: Trade Geo‡ Trade Geo‡ Trade & Wealth‡

Navigable River 0.210∗∗∗ 0.289∗∗∗ 0.002 0.012 0.002 0.012 0.012 0.021(0.050) (0.079) (0.028) (0.032) (0.028) (0.037) (0.032) (0.043)

Sea Coast 0.143∗∗∗ 0.422∗∗∗ -0.009 -0.005 -0.009 -0.011 -0.005 0.006(0.043) (0.081) (0.023) (0.024) (0.023) (0.029) (0.024) (0.040)

Roman Road 0.104∗∗∗ 0.207∗∗∗ -0.020 -0.015 -0.020 -0.013 -0.015 -0.044∗∗(0.035) (0.076) (0.019) (0.020) (0.019) (0.024) (0.020) (0.021)

p-value joint significance [<0.001] [<0.001] [0.730] [0.687] [0.732] [0.866] [0.688] [0.064]River, Coast, RoadRiver x Royal 0.288∗∗∗ 0.289∗∗∗ 0.278∗∗∗ 0.278∗∗

(0.083) (0.088) (0.084) (0.116)Sea Coast x Royal 0.431∗∗∗ 0.416∗∗∗ 0.428∗∗∗ 0.537∗∗∗

(0.084) (0.088) (0.084) (0.122)Roman Road x Royal 0.227∗∗∗ 0.258∗∗∗ 0.222∗∗∗ 0.259∗∗

(0.078) (0.080) (0.078) (0.103)Royal borough 0.171∗∗∗ 0.161∗∗∗ 0.175∗∗∗ 0.173∗∗

(0.062) (0.060) (0.062) (0.081)County FE XMean Dep. Var. 0.16 0.51 0.04 0.04 0.16 0.16 0.27 0.16R2 0.09 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.42 0.46 0.41 0.40Observations 554 145 409 409 554 554 554 354

Notes: All regressions are run at the borough level. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

E-weights detail

Angelucci, Meraglia, Voigtländer How Merchant Towns Shaped Parliaments Mar 3, 2020 19 / 46

Trade Geography and Farm GrantsBoroughs at locations that favored trade were more likely to receive Farm GrantsThis relationship holds only for royal boroughs

Dependent variable: Indicator for boroughs that obtained Farm Grants by 1348(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)

Boroughs included: all royal mesne mesne all all all allNote on Balancing Royal Balanced by Balanced by:and Mesne Boroughs: Trade Geo‡ Trade Geo‡ Trade & Wealth‡

Navigable River 0.210∗∗∗ 0.289∗∗∗ 0.002 0.012 0.002 0.012 0.012 0.021(0.050) (0.079) (0.028) (0.032) (0.028) (0.037) (0.032) (0.043)

Sea Coast 0.143∗∗∗ 0.422∗∗∗ -0.009 -0.005 -0.009 -0.011 -0.005 0.006(0.043) (0.081) (0.023) (0.024) (0.023) (0.029) (0.024) (0.040)

Roman Road 0.104∗∗∗ 0.207∗∗∗ -0.020 -0.015 -0.020 -0.013 -0.015 -0.044∗∗(0.035) (0.076) (0.019) (0.020) (0.019) (0.024) (0.020) (0.021)

p-value joint significance [<0.001] [<0.001] [0.730] [0.687] [0.732] [0.866] [0.688] [0.064]River, Coast, RoadRiver x Royal 0.288∗∗∗ 0.289∗∗∗ 0.278∗∗∗ 0.278∗∗

(0.083) (0.088) (0.084) (0.116)Sea Coast x Royal 0.431∗∗∗ 0.416∗∗∗ 0.428∗∗∗ 0.537∗∗∗

(0.084) (0.088) (0.084) (0.122)Roman Road x Royal 0.227∗∗∗ 0.258∗∗∗ 0.222∗∗∗ 0.259∗∗

(0.078) (0.080) (0.078) (0.103)Royal borough 0.171∗∗∗ 0.161∗∗∗ 0.175∗∗∗ 0.173∗∗

(0.062) (0.060) (0.062) (0.081)County FE XMean Dep. Var. 0.16 0.51 0.04 0.04 0.16 0.16 0.27 0.16R2 0.09 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.42 0.46 0.41 0.40Observations 554 145 409 409 554 554 554 354

Notes: All regressions are run at the borough level. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

E-weights detail

Angelucci, Meraglia, Voigtländer How Merchant Towns Shaped Parliaments Mar 3, 2020 19 / 46

Additional Results on Geography

Farm Grants strongly correlated with commercialimportance in 14C Table

Angelucci, Meraglia, Voigtländer How Merchant Towns Shaped Parliaments Mar 3, 2020 20 / 46

Outline of the Talk

1 Background: Norman Conquest and Tax Farming

2 Farm Grants and Self-Governance

3 Parliament

4 Long-run ResultsI Local elections in 15C to 1830sI Civil War in 1640sI Great Reform Act of 1832

Angelucci, Meraglia, Voigtländer How Merchant Towns Shaped Parliaments Mar 3, 2020 21 / 46

Step 2: From Farm Grants to Parliament

representationin parliament↗merchant

towns⇒ local self-

governance ↘

Note: All boroughs represented via knights of the shire (electedby all freeholders in the shire)

Farm Grants ⇒ autonomous jurisdictions (separated from shirecourts) with administrative capability

⇒ King summoned Farm Grant boroughs as separate constituencies(direct representation) to ensure:

I cooperation of local authorities in collecting extra-ordinary taxesI coordination of extra-ordinary taxation with the rest of the realm

Background Parliament Early vs. Late Enfranchisement Historical Evidence

Angelucci, Meraglia, Voigtländer How Merchant Towns Shaped Parliaments Mar 3, 2020 22 / 46

Step 2: From Farm Grants to Parliament

representationin parliament↗merchant

towns⇒ local self-

governance ↘

Note: All boroughs represented via knights of the shire (electedby all freeholders in the shire)

Farm Grants ⇒ autonomous jurisdictions (separated from shirecourts) with administrative capability

⇒ King summoned Farm Grant boroughs as separate constituencies(direct representation) to ensure:

I cooperation of local authorities in collecting extra-ordinary taxesI coordination of extra-ordinary taxation with the rest of the realm

Background Parliament Early vs. Late Enfranchisement Historical Evidence

Angelucci, Meraglia, Voigtländer How Merchant Towns Shaped Parliaments Mar 3, 2020 22 / 46

Step 2: From Farm Grants to Parliament

representationin parliament↗merchant

towns⇒ local self-

governance ↘

Note: All boroughs represented via knights of the shire (electedby all freeholders in the shire)

Farm Grants ⇒ autonomous jurisdictions (separated from shirecourts) with administrative capability

⇒ King summoned Farm Grant boroughs as separate constituencies(direct representation) to ensure:

I cooperation of local authorities in collecting extra-ordinary taxesI coordination of extra-ordinary taxation with the rest of the realm

Background Parliament Early vs. Late Enfranchisement Historical Evidence

Angelucci, Meraglia, Voigtländer How Merchant Towns Shaped Parliaments Mar 3, 2020 22 / 46

Direct Representation in Parliament by 1348Boroughs with Farm Grants were more likely to have seats in Parliament

Dependent variable: Indicator for borough enfranchised in Parliament by 1348(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)

Boroughs included: all all royal royal mesne mesne all allNotes: E-weights§ 2SLS† 2SLS‡

Farm Grant 1348 0.466∗∗∗ 0.451∗∗∗ 0.558∗∗∗ 0.718∗∗∗ 0.639∗∗∗(0.063) (0.064) (0.069) (0.162) (0.174)

Royal borough 0.154∗∗∗ 0.159∗∗∗ 0.035 0.063(0.050) (0.049) (0.091) (0.092)

Navigable River 0.197∗∗ -0.006 -0.024 -0.002(0.084) (0.052) (0.048) (0.041)

Sea Coast 0.264∗∗∗ 0.078 0.031 0.055(0.094) (0.048) (0.044) (0.041)

Roman Road 0.280∗∗∗ -0.021 -0.058 0.039(0.080) (0.036) (0.037) (0.033)

p-value joint significance [<0.001] [0.366] [0.291] [0.398]River, Coast, RoadCounty FE XSoil Quality XMean Dep. Var. 0.23 0.23 0.51 0.51 0.14 0.13 0.23 0.23R2 0.26 0.36 0.31 0.13 0.01 0.01Observations 554 554 145 145 409 409 554 554

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.† Two-stage least square regression that uses the three trade geography variables in levels and interacted with Royal .‡ Two-stage least square regression that uses only the three interaction terms and controls for the variables in levels.

Entropy Balancing Map Enfranch. Illustration DD

Angelucci, Meraglia, Voigtländer How Merchant Towns Shaped Parliaments Mar 3, 2020 23 / 46

Direct Representation in Parliament by 1348Boroughs with Farm Grants were more likely to have seats in Parliament

Dependent variable: Indicator for borough enfranchised in Parliament by 1348(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)

Boroughs included: all all royal royal mesne mesne all allNotes: E-weights§ 2SLS† 2SLS‡

Farm Grant 1348 0.466∗∗∗ 0.451∗∗∗ 0.558∗∗∗ 0.718∗∗∗ 0.639∗∗∗(0.063) (0.064) (0.069) (0.162) (0.174)

Royal borough 0.154∗∗∗ 0.159∗∗∗ 0.035 0.063(0.050) (0.049) (0.091) (0.092)

Navigable River 0.197∗∗ -0.006 -0.024 -0.002(0.084) (0.052) (0.048) (0.041)

Sea Coast 0.264∗∗∗ 0.078 0.031 0.055(0.094) (0.048) (0.044) (0.041)

Roman Road 0.280∗∗∗ -0.021 -0.058 0.039(0.080) (0.036) (0.037) (0.033)

p-value joint significance [<0.001] [0.366] [0.291] [0.398]River, Coast, RoadCounty FE XSoil Quality XMean Dep. Var. 0.23 0.23 0.51 0.51 0.14 0.13 0.23 0.23R2 0.26 0.36 0.31 0.13 0.01 0.01Observations 554 554 145 145 409 409 554 554

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.† Two-stage least square regression that uses the three trade geography variables in levels and interacted with Royal .‡ Two-stage least square regression that uses only the three interaction terms and controls for the variables in levels.

Entropy Balancing Map Enfranch. Illustration DD

Angelucci, Meraglia, Voigtländer How Merchant Towns Shaped Parliaments Mar 3, 2020 23 / 46

Direct Representation in Parliament by 1348Boroughs with Farm Grants were more likely to have seats in Parliament

Dependent variable: Indicator for borough enfranchised in Parliament by 1348(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)

Boroughs included: all all royal royal mesne mesne all allNotes: E-weights§ 2SLS† 2SLS‡

Farm Grant 1348 0.466∗∗∗ 0.451∗∗∗ 0.558∗∗∗ 0.718∗∗∗ 0.639∗∗∗(0.063) (0.064) (0.069) (0.162) (0.174)

Royal borough 0.154∗∗∗ 0.159∗∗∗ 0.035 0.063(0.050) (0.049) (0.091) (0.092)

Navigable River 0.197∗∗ -0.006 -0.024 -0.002(0.084) (0.052) (0.048) (0.041)

Sea Coast 0.264∗∗∗ 0.078 0.031 0.055(0.094) (0.048) (0.044) (0.041)

Roman Road 0.280∗∗∗ -0.021 -0.058 0.039(0.080) (0.036) (0.037) (0.033)

p-value joint significance [<0.001] [0.366] [0.291] [0.398]River, Coast, RoadCounty FE XSoil Quality XMean Dep. Var. 0.23 0.23 0.51 0.51 0.14 0.13 0.23 0.23R2 0.26 0.36 0.31 0.13 0.01 0.01Observations 554 554 145 145 409 409 554 554

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.† Two-stage least square regression that uses the three trade geography variables in levels and interacted with Royal .‡ Two-stage least square regression that uses only the three interaction terms and controls for the variables in levels.

Entropy Balancing Map Enfranch. Illustration DD

Angelucci, Meraglia, Voigtländer How Merchant Towns Shaped Parliaments Mar 3, 2020 23 / 46

Direct Representation in Parliament by 1348Boroughs with Farm Grants were more likely to have seats in Parliament

Dependent variable: Indicator for borough enfranchised in Parliament by 1348(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)

Boroughs included: all all royal royal mesne mesne all allNotes: E-weights§ 2SLS† 2SLS‡

Farm Grant 1348 0.466∗∗∗ 0.451∗∗∗ 0.558∗∗∗ 0.718∗∗∗ 0.639∗∗∗(0.063) (0.064) (0.069) (0.162) (0.174)

Royal borough 0.154∗∗∗ 0.159∗∗∗ 0.035 0.063(0.050) (0.049) (0.091) (0.092)

Navigable River 0.197∗∗ -0.006 -0.024 -0.002(0.084) (0.052) (0.048) (0.041)

Sea Coast 0.264∗∗∗ 0.078 0.031 0.055(0.094) (0.048) (0.044) (0.041)

Roman Road 0.280∗∗∗ -0.021 -0.058 0.039(0.080) (0.036) (0.037) (0.033)

p-value joint significance [<0.001] [0.366] [0.291] [0.398]River, Coast, RoadCounty FE XSoil Quality XMean Dep. Var. 0.23 0.23 0.51 0.51 0.14 0.13 0.23 0.23R2 0.26 0.36 0.31 0.13 0.01 0.01Observations 554 554 145 145 409 409 554 554

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.† Two-stage least square regression that uses the three trade geography variables in levels and interacted with Royal .‡ Two-stage least square regression that uses only the three interaction terms and controls for the variables in levels.

Entropy Balancing Map Enfranch. Illustration DD

Angelucci, Meraglia, Voigtländer How Merchant Towns Shaped Parliaments Mar 3, 2020 23 / 46

Use Mesne Boroughs to Check Exclusion Restriction

Almost no Farm Grants in mesne territories

Mesne lord towns otherwise similar to royal townsI Equally affected by extra-ordinary taxationI Similar number of mesne boroughs represented in ParliamentI Same administrative procedure to summon boroughs to Parliament

Plausibility/Robustness checks:I Geography predicts economic outcomes in both royal and mesne

I Wealth as confounding factor?F Matching by Borough Wealth and SizeF Different parts of the wealth distribution

I Trade potential as confounding factor? Exact MatchingI Unobservable characteristics? Domesday Boroughs

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Use Mesne Boroughs to Check Exclusion Restriction

Almost no Farm Grants in mesne territories

Mesne lord towns otherwise similar to royal townsI Equally affected by extra-ordinary taxationI Similar number of mesne boroughs represented in ParliamentI Same administrative procedure to summon boroughs to Parliament

Plausibility/Robustness checks:I Geography predicts economic outcomes in both royal and mesne

I Wealth as confounding factor?F Matching by Borough Wealth and SizeF Different parts of the wealth distribution

I Trade potential as confounding factor? Exact MatchingI Unobservable characteristics? Domesday Boroughs

Angelucci, Meraglia, Voigtländer How Merchant Towns Shaped Parliaments Mar 3, 2020 24 / 46

Use Mesne Boroughs to Check Exclusion Restriction

Almost no Farm Grants in mesne territories

Mesne lord towns otherwise similar to royal townsI Equally affected by extra-ordinary taxationI Similar number of mesne boroughs represented in ParliamentI Same administrative procedure to summon boroughs to Parliament

Plausibility/Robustness checks:I Geography predicts economic outcomes in both royal and mesne

I Wealth as confounding factor?F Matching by Borough Wealth and SizeF Different parts of the wealth distribution

I Trade potential as confounding factor? Exact MatchingI Unobservable characteristics? Domesday Boroughs

Angelucci, Meraglia, Voigtländer How Merchant Towns Shaped Parliaments Mar 3, 2020 24 / 46

Robustness of Results on Parliament

Ability to Coordinate

Model Parliament

Angelucci, Meraglia, Voigtländer How Merchant Towns Shaped Parliaments Mar 3, 2020 25 / 46

Additional Charters of Liberties

Some boroughs negotiated additional liberties: Royalofficials forbidden from entering the borough...

I In judicial functions (non-intromittat)I To enforce royal orders (return of writs)I In financial functions (direct access to the Exchequer)

This reinforced their separation from that shireadministration

Angelucci, Meraglia, Voigtländer How Merchant Towns Shaped Parliaments Mar 3, 2020 26 / 46

Additional Charters of Liberties

Some boroughs negotiated additional liberties: Royalofficials forbidden from entering the borough...

I In judicial functions (non-intromittat)I To enforce royal orders (return of writs)I In financial functions (direct access to the Exchequer)

This reinforced their separation from that shireadministration

Angelucci, Meraglia, Voigtländer How Merchant Towns Shaped Parliaments Mar 3, 2020 26 / 46

Constraints on Entry of Royal OfficialsBoroughs that also had constraints on the sheriff entering the town were even morelikely to be enfranchised

0.2

.4.6

.81

Shar

e of

Enf

ranc

hise

d Bo

roug

hs

Farm Grant, constr. sheriff Farm Grant, no constr. no Farm Grant

Boroughs included

Share95% CI

Constraints on sheriff in judicial functions (non-intromittat), in financial func-tions (direct access to the Exchequer), or enforcing royal orders (return ofwrits).

Angelucci, Meraglia, Voigtländer How Merchant Towns Shaped Parliaments Mar 3, 2020 27 / 46

Outline of the Talk

1 Background: Norman Conquest and Tax Farming

2 Farm Grants and Self-Governance

3 Parliament

4 Long-run ResultsI Local elections in 15C to 1830sI Civil War in 1640sI Great Reform Act of 1832

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Brief Historical Background for England after 15C

By the 16th century, the Crown faced rising costs of war andincreasing debt

Crown attempted to weaken both Parliament and municipalliberties

I Municipal level: Patronage – Widespread attempts to install narrowoligarchies in boroughs and strike bilateral deals with them

I Parliament: Attempts by the Crown to influence elections of MPs;surge in “rotten boroughs”

We show: Farm Grant boroughs resisted royal patronageand strengthened Parliament

I Broad local elites in Farm Grant boroughs had more to lose underpatronage and restriction of voting rights

I These broad elites were also able to resist Crown’s interferencedue to their local autonomy

Angelucci, Meraglia, Voigtländer How Merchant Towns Shaped Parliaments Mar 3, 2020 29 / 46

Brief Historical Background for England after 15C

By the 16th century, the Crown faced rising costs of war andincreasing debt

Crown attempted to weaken both Parliament and municipalliberties

I Municipal level: Patronage – Widespread attempts to install narrowoligarchies in boroughs and strike bilateral deals with them

I Parliament: Attempts by the Crown to influence elections of MPs;surge in “rotten boroughs”

We show: Farm Grant boroughs resisted royal patronageand strengthened Parliament

I Broad local elites in Farm Grant boroughs had more to lose underpatronage and restriction of voting rights

I These broad elites were also able to resist Crown’s interferencedue to their local autonomy

Angelucci, Meraglia, Voigtländer How Merchant Towns Shaped Parliaments Mar 3, 2020 29 / 46

Independence in Appointing Local Officials and MPs

representationin parliament↗merchant

towns⇒ local self-

governance ↘ more openlocal

institutions

Self-governance leads to more open and independent localinstitutions:

We examine two dimensions:I King’s influence on appointment of town officials after towns’

incorporation in 15-17C Detail

I Openness of local MP elections in 1690-1830

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Influence of the King on Local Politics, 15C-17CThe king had less influence on appointing officials in towns with Farm Grants.This limited the king’s ability to engage in patronage (bypassing Parliament)

Dep. Var.: Dummy for strong influence of the king on appointment of local officials

(1) (2) (3) (4)Note: royal only 2SLS†

Farm Grant 1348 -0.222∗∗ -0.277∗∗ -0.345∗∗∗ -0.539∗∗(0.104) (0.128) (0.122) (0.215)

Royal borough 0.120 0.164 0.316∗∗(0.103) (0.133) (0.158)

County FE XSoil Quality XMean Dep. Var. 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42R2 0.03 0.28 0.10Observations 158 158 77 158

Note: All regressions are run at the borough level. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.† Two-stage least square regression that uses the following variables to predict Farm Grants by 1348 in the first stage: locationon the sea coast, on a navigable river, and on Roman roads, and the interaction of these three variables with status as royalborough. Since the dependent variable reflects royal influence, the status as royal borough is included as a control. The first-stageF-statistic is 9.16 (corresponding to a max. 10% relative bias)

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Election of MPs at the Borough (Town) Level

We examine:

1. how open were elections to candidates2. how broad were voting rights

Important because open local elections limited patronage inParliament

more background

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Election of MPs at the Borough (Town) Level

We examine:

1. how open were elections to candidates2. how broad were voting rights

Important because open local elections limited patronage inParliament

more background

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Openness of MP Elections in 1690-1832

Data from the History of Parliament for all enfranchised boroughs

Dummy for MP candidate opennessI Indicates open elections for a borough’s MPs (as opposed to MPs

chosen by patron)

Dependent variable: Indicator for Open MP elections(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)

Period considered 1820-31 1790-1820 1754-90 1715-54 1690-1715

Farm Grant 1348 0.149∗∗ 0.172∗∗ 0.188∗∗∗ 0.149∗ 0.248∗∗(0.063) (0.068) (0.070) (0.076) (0.100)

County FE X X X X XMean Dep. Var. 0.15 0.20 0.23 0.25 0.37R2 0.30 0.34 0.31 0.33 0.29Observations 185 184 185 185 161

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Franchise Rules in MP Elections in 1604-1831

Data from the History of Parliament

Dummy for broad franchise in voting for a borough’s MPcandidates

I Indicates how broad the local electorate was in MP elections

Dependent variable: Indicator for Broad Franchise over the indicated period(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)

Period considered 1820-31 1790-1820 1754-90 1715-54 1690-1715 1660-90 1604-29

Farm Grant 1348 0.143∗∗ 0.208∗∗∗ 0.200∗∗∗ 0.199∗∗∗ 0.237∗∗∗ 0.300∗∗∗ 0.147∗∗(0.071) (0.067) (0.067) (0.067) (0.057) (0.064) (0.073)

County FE X X X X X X XMean Dep. Var. 0.69 0.71 0.72 0.73 0.76 0.71 0.70R2 0.28 0.32 0.32 0.30 0.32 0.38 0.33Observations 185 185 184 186 185 184 176

Note: All regressions are run at the borough level. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Thenumber of observations varies across the different time periods, depending on the availability of the necessary information in thesources.

Alternative measures for ‘openness’ of MP elections yield verysimilar results detail

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Franchise Rules in MP Elections in 1604-1831

Data from the History of Parliament

Dummy for broad franchise in voting for a borough’s MPcandidates

I Indicates how broad the local electorate was in MP elections

Dependent variable: Indicator for Broad Franchise over the indicated period(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)

Period considered 1820-31 1790-1820 1754-90 1715-54 1690-1715 1660-90 1604-29

Farm Grant 1348 0.143∗∗ 0.208∗∗∗ 0.200∗∗∗ 0.199∗∗∗ 0.237∗∗∗ 0.300∗∗∗ 0.147∗∗(0.071) (0.067) (0.067) (0.067) (0.057) (0.064) (0.073)

County FE X X X X X X XMean Dep. Var. 0.69 0.71 0.72 0.73 0.76 0.71 0.70R2 0.28 0.32 0.32 0.30 0.32 0.38 0.33Observations 185 185 184 186 185 184 176

Note: All regressions are run at the borough level. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Thenumber of observations varies across the different time periods, depending on the availability of the necessary information in thesources.

Alternative measures for ‘openness’ of MP elections yield verysimilar results detail

Angelucci, Meraglia, Voigtländer How Merchant Towns Shaped Parliaments Mar 3, 2020 34 / 46

Franchise Rules in MP Elections in 1604-1831

Data from the History of Parliament

Dummy for broad franchise in voting for a borough’s MPcandidates

I Indicates how broad the local electorate was in MP elections

Dependent variable: Indicator for Broad Franchise over the indicated period(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)

Period considered 1820-31 1790-1820 1754-90 1715-54 1690-1715 1660-90 1604-29

Farm Grant 1348 0.143∗∗ 0.208∗∗∗ 0.200∗∗∗ 0.199∗∗∗ 0.237∗∗∗ 0.300∗∗∗ 0.147∗∗(0.071) (0.067) (0.067) (0.067) (0.057) (0.064) (0.073)

County FE X X X X X X XMean Dep. Var. 0.69 0.71 0.72 0.73 0.76 0.71 0.70R2 0.28 0.32 0.32 0.30 0.32 0.38 0.33Observations 185 185 184 186 185 184 176

Note: All regressions are run at the borough level. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Thenumber of observations varies across the different time periods, depending on the availability of the necessary information in thesources.

Alternative measures for ‘openness’ of MP elections yield verysimilar results detail

Angelucci, Meraglia, Voigtländer How Merchant Towns Shaped Parliaments Mar 3, 2020 34 / 46

Nationwide Institutions

representationin parliament↗ ↘merchant

towns⇒ local self-

governance ⇒ nationwideinstitutions↘ ↗more open

localinstitutions

Civil War in 1640sGreat Reform Act of 1832

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Civil War of 1642-51: Background

Conflict between Royalists (supported personal rule by Charles I)and Parliamentarians (“Roundheads”)

March 1642: Parliament splits; royal faction moves to Oxford

Parliamentarians raise volunteer troops, often from townsI Rely on local administration to do soI June-Sep 1642: 31 towns raise volunteer troops to defend

parliamentarians (data from Russel, 1990)

more detail

Angelucci, Meraglia, Voigtländer How Merchant Towns Shaped Parliaments Mar 3, 2020 36 / 46

Farm Grants and Parliamentarian Volunteer TroopsBoroughs with Farm Grants were more likely to raise volunteer troops in support of theparliamentarians

0.0

5.1

.15

.2.2

5.3

.35

Shar

e of

Bor

ough

s w

ith M

ilitia

Farm Grant no Farm GrantBoroughs included

Share95% CI

Angelucci, Meraglia, Voigtländer How Merchant Towns Shaped Parliaments Mar 3, 2020 37 / 46

Support for Parliamentarians during the Civil WarMedieval Farm Grants are a strong predictor of pro-parliamentarian volunteer troops

Dependent variable: Indicator for pro-Parliamentary volunteer troops raised by borough in 1642

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)Notes: Enfranchised by 1640

royal only royal only 2SLS† 2SLS‡

Farm Grant 1348 0.201∗∗∗ 0.188∗∗∗ 0.242∗∗∗ 0.224∗∗∗ 0.244∗∗∗ 0.259∗∗∗ 0.275∗∗(0.045) (0.042) (0.053) (0.066) (0.068) (0.065) (0.126)

Royal borough 0.019 0.014 -0.022 -0.033(0.022) (0.025) (0.055) (0.052)

County FE XSoil Quality XRiver, Coast, Road XMean Dep. Var. 0.055 0.055 0.139 0.148 0.209 0.055 0.055R2 0.12 0.24 0.12 0.08 0.08 0.12Observations 550 550 144 189 91 550 550

Note: All regressions are run at the borough level. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.† Two-stage least square regression that uses the following variables to predict Farm Grants by 1348 in the first stage: location onthe sea coast, on a navigable river, and on Roman roads, and the interaction of these three variables with status as royal borough,as well as the status as royal borough itself. The first-stage F-statistic is 20.5 (corresponding to a max. 5% relative bias).‡ Two-stage least square regression that uses only the interaction terms and controls for all level variables. The first-stage F-statistic is 13.5 (corresponding to a max. 5% relative bias).

Reduced Form

Angelucci, Meraglia, Voigtländer How Merchant Towns Shaped Parliaments Mar 3, 2020 38 / 46

Why did Farm Grant Boroughs support Parliament?

Weakening of Parliament would have jeopardized towns’ libertiesand ability to collectively negotiate taxes

Administrative autonomy of Farm Grant boroughs enabled them toorganize military action independently

⇒ Interaction between local and ‘nationwide’ institutions

Angelucci, Meraglia, Voigtländer How Merchant Towns Shaped Parliaments Mar 3, 2020 39 / 46

The Great Reform Act of 1832Reduced patronage in Parliament by adopting homogeneous rules

Redistribution of Seats: enfranchise newly industrializedboroughs; disenfranchise small boroughs

I Boroughs with less than 2,000 inhabitants to be disenfranchisedI Boroughs with between 2,000 and 4,000 to lose one MPI Boroughs with > 10,000 to be enfranchised (e.g., Manchester)

Extend the Franchise: uniform borough franchise based onwealth and residency

I Population with voting rights goes from 3% to 6-7%I Occupiers of a house worth at least 10 pounds per yearI Existing electors to retain votes if residents

more detail

Angelucci, Meraglia, Voigtländer How Merchant Towns Shaped Parliaments Mar 3, 2020 40 / 46

Data on MP Voting during the Great Reform Act

Examine two voting rounds on the Reform Act:

1. March 1831: a First Bill passes in the Commons (302 to 301),but is rejected by the House of Lords

I New parliament elected in April 1831

2. December 1831: the (revised) Bill passes in the Commons(324 to 162), and is then approved also by the Lords

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MP Votes Supporting the Great Reform ActMedieval Farm Grants are a strong predictor of support for the Great Reform Act

Dependent variables: Share of votes in favor of the Reform Act at different points in 1831(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)

Vote in: March 1831 — December 1831 —Notes: royal only 2SLS† 2SLS†

Farm Grant 1348 0.023 0.157∗∗ 0.117∗∗ 0.176∗∗ 0.111∗ 0.231∗∗ 0.158∗∗(0.062) (0.070) (0.055) (0.078) (0.064) (0.096) (0.075)

Disenfranchise -0.286∗∗∗ -0.304∗∗∗ -0.168∗∗∗ -0.098 -0.189∗∗∗ -0.283∗∗∗ -0.179∗∗∗(0.060) (0.073) (0.058) (0.092) (0.071) (0.076) (0.063)

March 1831 votes 0.737∗∗∗ 0.686∗∗∗ 0.735∗∗∗ 0.734∗∗∗(0.057) (0.091) (0.076) (0.066)

Swing Riot within 10km 0.107∗∗ 0.180∗∗ 0.098 0.096(0.053) (0.078) (0.112) (0.096)

County FE X XSoil Quality X XAdditional Controls# X XMean Dep. Var. 0.47 0.56 0.56 0.70 0.56 0.56 0.56R2 0.13 0.16 0.57 0.56 0.64Observations 175 175 175 79 175 175 175

Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.# Additional controls: market integration (travel distance between any given constituency and the 243 other constituenciesweighted by the population); Distance to urban center (travel days from each constituency to the nearest of the 13 largest towns in1831); Connection to London (geographical, economic, and informational connections to London).

Explanations for support

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MP Votes Supporting the Great Reform ActMedieval Farm Grants are a strong predictor of support for the Great Reform Act

Dependent variables: Share of votes in favor of the Reform Act at different points in 1831(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)

Vote in: March 1831 — December 1831 —Notes: royal only 2SLS† 2SLS†

Farm Grant 1348 0.023 0.157∗∗ 0.117∗∗ 0.176∗∗ 0.111∗ 0.231∗∗ 0.158∗∗(0.062) (0.070) (0.055) (0.078) (0.064) (0.096) (0.075)

Disenfranchise -0.286∗∗∗ -0.304∗∗∗ -0.168∗∗∗ -0.098 -0.189∗∗∗ -0.283∗∗∗ -0.179∗∗∗(0.060) (0.073) (0.058) (0.092) (0.071) (0.076) (0.063)

March 1831 votes 0.737∗∗∗ 0.686∗∗∗ 0.735∗∗∗ 0.734∗∗∗(0.057) (0.091) (0.076) (0.066)

Swing Riot within 10km 0.107∗∗ 0.180∗∗ 0.098 0.096(0.053) (0.078) (0.112) (0.096)

County FE X XSoil Quality X XAdditional Controls# X XMean Dep. Var. 0.47 0.56 0.56 0.70 0.56 0.56 0.56R2 0.13 0.16 0.57 0.56 0.64Observations 175 175 175 79 175 175 175

Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.# Additional controls: market integration (travel distance between any given constituency and the 243 other constituenciesweighted by the population); Distance to urban center (travel days from each constituency to the nearest of the 13 largest towns in1831); Connection to London (geographical, economic, and informational connections to London).

Explanations for support

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Placebo: Obstruction of Trade after Farm Grants

Code boroughs where trade was obstructed after Farm GrantsSilting of rivers and harborsConstruction of watermills along river → hampered transport

Dependent variable as indicated in table header

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)Plausibility checks Long-run institutional outcomes

Pre-1348 outcomes Post-1348 outcomesDependent variable: ln(Taxable Commercial Im- Trade employment Population in Volunteer troops Openness of MP Vote share for Great

Wealth in 1086) portance 14C† share in 1831 17th century during Civil War elections 1820-31‡ Reform Act 1832Trade not obstructed after Farm Grant 0.592∗∗∗ 1.546∗∗∗ 0.086∗∗∗ 1.027∗∗∗ 0.230∗∗∗ 0.731∗∗∗ 0.252∗∗∗

(0.211) (0.185) (0.021) (0.150) (0.052) (0.171) (0.073)Trade obstructed after Farm Grant 0.987∗∗∗ 1.632∗∗∗ 0.004 0.093 0.157∗ 0.488∗∗ 0.246∗

(0.353) (0.279) (0.032) (0.263) (0.093) (0.202) (0.130)p-value: test for [0.323] [0.796] [0.020] [0.002] [0.488] [0.303] [0.966]

equality of coefficients

Mean Dep. Var. 1.69 [s.d.=1]† 0.39 6.89 0.05 [s.d.=1]‡ 0.56R2 0.04 0.33 0.09 0.17 0.13 0.11 0.07Observations 354 554 190 403 549 184 175

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.† First principle component of two indicators for commercial importance: “Freedom from tolls” (a grant of liberty that exempteda borough’s burgesses from tolls throughout the realm) and an indicator variable for whether a borough was a commercial hubduring the 14th century.‡ First principle component of our four proxies for open MP elections.

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Placebo: Obstruction of Trade after Farm Grants

Code boroughs where trade was obstructed after Farm GrantsSilting of rivers and harborsConstruction of watermills along river → hampered transport

Dependent variable as indicated in table header

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)Plausibility checks Long-run institutional outcomes

Pre-1348 outcomes Post-1348 outcomesDependent variable: ln(Taxable Commercial Im- Trade employment Population in Volunteer troops Openness of MP Vote share for Great

Wealth in 1086) portance 14C† share in 1831 17th century during Civil War elections 1820-31‡ Reform Act 1832Trade not obstructed after Farm Grant 0.592∗∗∗ 1.546∗∗∗ 0.086∗∗∗ 1.027∗∗∗ 0.230∗∗∗ 0.731∗∗∗ 0.252∗∗∗

(0.211) (0.185) (0.021) (0.150) (0.052) (0.171) (0.073)Trade obstructed after Farm Grant 0.987∗∗∗ 1.632∗∗∗ 0.004 0.093 0.157∗ 0.488∗∗ 0.246∗

(0.353) (0.279) (0.032) (0.263) (0.093) (0.202) (0.130)p-value: test for [0.323] [0.796] [0.020] [0.002] [0.488] [0.303] [0.966]

equality of coefficients

Mean Dep. Var. 1.69 [s.d.=1]† 0.39 6.89 0.05 [s.d.=1]‡ 0.56R2 0.04 0.33 0.09 0.17 0.13 0.11 0.07Observations 354 554 190 403 549 184 175

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.† First principle component of two indicators for commercial importance: “Freedom from tolls” (a grant of liberty that exempteda borough’s burgesses from tolls throughout the realm) and an indicator variable for whether a borough was a commercial hubduring the 14th century.‡ First principle component of our four proxies for open MP elections.

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Placebo: Obstruction of Trade after Farm Grants

Code boroughs where trade was obstructed after Farm GrantsSilting of rivers and harborsConstruction of watermills along river → hampered transport

Dependent variable as indicated in table header

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)Plausibility checks Long-run institutional outcomes

Pre-1348 outcomes Post-1348 outcomesDependent variable: ln(Taxable Commercial Im- Trade employment Population in Volunteer troops Openness of MP Vote share for Great

Wealth in 1086) portance 14C† share in 1831 17th century during Civil War elections 1820-31‡ Reform Act 1832Trade not obstructed after Farm Grant 0.592∗∗∗ 1.546∗∗∗ 0.086∗∗∗ 1.027∗∗∗ 0.230∗∗∗ 0.731∗∗∗ 0.252∗∗∗

(0.211) (0.185) (0.021) (0.150) (0.052) (0.171) (0.073)Trade obstructed after Farm Grant 0.987∗∗∗ 1.632∗∗∗ 0.004 0.093 0.157∗ 0.488∗∗ 0.246∗

(0.353) (0.279) (0.032) (0.263) (0.093) (0.202) (0.130)p-value: test for [0.323] [0.796] [0.020] [0.002] [0.488] [0.303] [0.966]

equality of coefficients

Mean Dep. Var. 1.69 [s.d.=1]† 0.39 6.89 0.05 [s.d.=1]‡ 0.56R2 0.04 0.33 0.09 0.17 0.13 0.11 0.07Observations 354 554 190 403 549 184 175

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.† First principle component of two indicators for commercial importance: “Freedom from tolls” (a grant of liberty that exempteda borough’s burgesses from tolls throughout the realm) and an indicator variable for whether a borough was a commercial hubduring the 14th century.‡ First principle component of our four proxies for open MP elections.

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Placebo: Obstruction of Trade after Farm Grants

Code boroughs where trade was obstructed after Farm GrantsSilting of rivers and harborsConstruction of watermills along river → hampered transport

Dependent variable as indicated in table header

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)Plausibility checks Long-run institutional outcomes

Pre-1348 outcomes Post-1348 outcomesDependent variable: ln(Taxable Commercial Im- Trade employment Population in Volunteer troops Openness of MP Vote share for Great

Wealth in 1086) portance 14C† share in 1831 17th century during Civil War elections 1820-31‡ Reform Act 1832Trade not obstructed after Farm Grant 0.592∗∗∗ 1.546∗∗∗ 0.086∗∗∗ 1.027∗∗∗ 0.230∗∗∗ 0.731∗∗∗ 0.252∗∗∗

(0.211) (0.185) (0.021) (0.150) (0.052) (0.171) (0.073)Trade obstructed after Farm Grant 0.987∗∗∗ 1.632∗∗∗ 0.004 0.093 0.157∗ 0.488∗∗ 0.246∗

(0.353) (0.279) (0.032) (0.263) (0.093) (0.202) (0.130)p-value: test for [0.323] [0.796] [0.020] [0.002] [0.488] [0.303] [0.966]

equality of coefficients

Mean Dep. Var. 1.69 [s.d.=1]† 0.39 6.89 0.05 [s.d.=1]‡ 0.56R2 0.04 0.33 0.09 0.17 0.13 0.11 0.07Observations 354 554 190 403 549 184 175

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.† First principle component of two indicators for commercial importance: “Freedom from tolls” (a grant of liberty that exempteda borough’s burgesses from tolls throughout the realm) and an indicator variable for whether a borough was a commercial hubduring the 14th century.‡ First principle component of our four proxies for open MP elections.

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Placebo: Obstruction of Trade after Farm Grants

Code boroughs where trade was obstructed after Farm GrantsSilting of rivers and harborsConstruction of watermills along river → hampered transport

Dependent variable as indicated in table header

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)Plausibility checks Long-run institutional outcomes

Pre-1348 outcomes Post-1348 outcomesDependent variable: ln(Taxable Commercial Im- Trade employment Population in Volunteer troops Openness of MP Vote share for Great

Wealth in 1086) portance 14C† share in 1831 17th century during Civil War elections 1820-31‡ Reform Act 1832Trade not obstructed after Farm Grant 0.592∗∗∗ 1.546∗∗∗ 0.086∗∗∗ 1.027∗∗∗ 0.230∗∗∗ 0.731∗∗∗ 0.252∗∗∗

(0.211) (0.185) (0.021) (0.150) (0.052) (0.171) (0.073)Trade obstructed after Farm Grant 0.987∗∗∗ 1.632∗∗∗ 0.004 0.093 0.157∗ 0.488∗∗ 0.246∗

(0.353) (0.279) (0.032) (0.263) (0.093) (0.202) (0.130)p-value: test for [0.323] [0.796] [0.020] [0.002] [0.488] [0.303] [0.966]

equality of coefficients

Mean Dep. Var. 1.69 [s.d.=1]† 0.39 6.89 0.05 [s.d.=1]‡ 0.56R2 0.04 0.33 0.09 0.17 0.13 0.11 0.07Observations 354 554 190 403 549 184 175

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.† First principle component of two indicators for commercial importance: “Freedom from tolls” (a grant of liberty that exempteda borough’s burgesses from tolls throughout the realm) and an indicator variable for whether a borough was a commercial hubduring the 14th century.‡ First principle component of our four proxies for open MP elections.

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Long-Run Results: Additional Robustness Checks

Clustering and Spatial Correlation

Controlling for Taxable Wealth in 1086

(Exact) Matching by Trade Geography

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Conclusion

We study merchant towns’ ascent to coalition of power holders

Economic development ⇒ institutions

trade andcommerce

⇒ local self-governance ⇒ parliament

Virtuous interaction between municipal self-governance andParliament in England

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Conclusion

We study merchant towns’ ascent to coalition of power holders

Economic development ⇒ institutions

trade andcommerce

⇒ local self-governance ⇒ parliament

Virtuous interaction between municipal self-governance andParliament in England

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Conclusion – European ComparisonContinental Europe: Similarities with England

I Town autonomy emerged during Commercial Revolution (e.g.,fueros in Spain, commune in France)

Continental Europe: Differences to EnglandI Continental monarchs were initially weaker vis-à-vis lords ⇒

fragmented jurisdictionsI To expand their influence, monarchs made ad-hoc bilateral deals

with narrow town oligarchiesI Narrow elites in towns provided fertile ground for patronage ⇒

absolutism

Can explain institutional divergence b/w England and Continent

⇒ Self-governance in the hands of broad local elites with a venue tocoordinate (parliament) ⇒ constraints on monarchs

Cross-country comparison

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Conclusion – European ComparisonContinental Europe: Similarities with England

I Town autonomy emerged during Commercial Revolution (e.g.,fueros in Spain, commune in France)

Continental Europe: Differences to EnglandI Continental monarchs were initially weaker vis-à-vis lords ⇒

fragmented jurisdictionsI To expand their influence, monarchs made ad-hoc bilateral deals

with narrow town oligarchies

I Narrow elites in towns provided fertile ground for patronage ⇒absolutism

Can explain institutional divergence b/w England and Continent

⇒ Self-governance in the hands of broad local elites with a venue tocoordinate (parliament) ⇒ constraints on monarchs

Cross-country comparison

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Conclusion – European ComparisonContinental Europe: Similarities with England

I Town autonomy emerged during Commercial Revolution (e.g.,fueros in Spain, commune in France)

Continental Europe: Differences to EnglandI Continental monarchs were initially weaker vis-à-vis lords ⇒

fragmented jurisdictionsI To expand their influence, monarchs made ad-hoc bilateral deals

with narrow town oligarchiesI Narrow elites in towns provided fertile ground for patronage ⇒

absolutism

Can explain institutional divergence b/w England and Continent

⇒ Self-governance in the hands of broad local elites with a venue tocoordinate (parliament) ⇒ constraints on monarchs

Cross-country comparison

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Conclusion – European ComparisonContinental Europe: Similarities with England

I Town autonomy emerged during Commercial Revolution (e.g.,fueros in Spain, commune in France)

Continental Europe: Differences to EnglandI Continental monarchs were initially weaker vis-à-vis lords ⇒

fragmented jurisdictionsI To expand their influence, monarchs made ad-hoc bilateral deals

with narrow town oligarchiesI Narrow elites in towns provided fertile ground for patronage ⇒

absolutism

Can explain institutional divergence b/w England and Continent

⇒ Self-governance in the hands of broad local elites with a venue tocoordinate (parliament) ⇒ constraints on monarchs

Cross-country comparison

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Conclusion – European ComparisonContinental Europe: Similarities with England

I Town autonomy emerged during Commercial Revolution (e.g.,fueros in Spain, commune in France)

Continental Europe: Differences to EnglandI Continental monarchs were initially weaker vis-à-vis lords ⇒

fragmented jurisdictionsI To expand their influence, monarchs made ad-hoc bilateral deals

with narrow town oligarchiesI Narrow elites in towns provided fertile ground for patronage ⇒

absolutism

Can explain institutional divergence b/w England and Continent

⇒ Self-governance in the hands of broad local elites with a venue tocoordinate (parliament) ⇒ constraints on monarchs

Cross-country comparison

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BACKUP

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Coalition of Power Holders in 1215Magna Carta

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Coalition of Power Holders in 1295Model Parliament

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Farm Grants and External Wars

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Extraordinary Taxation, Complaints about Officials,and Charters of Liberties

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Data Source: Royal Rolls

Entry for the farm grant of Bristol, 1224

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Corrupt tax collectors:“Sheriffs and reeves, whose office was justice and judgment, were moreterrible than thieves and plunderers, and more savage than the most savage.”[Henry of Huntingdon (ca. 1088-1154), in Bisson (2009), p. 178.]

Robin Hood:Typically seen as contemporary of king Richard I “Lionheart”(1157-99)Driven to outlawry during period of misrule in England whileRichard I was away at the Third Crusade (1189-92)Greatest enemy: sheriff of Nottingham

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Corrupt tax collectors:“Sheriffs and reeves, whose office was justice and judgment, were moreterrible than thieves and plunderers, and more savage than the most savage.”[Henry of Huntingdon (ca. 1088-1154), in Bisson (2009), p. 178.]

Robin Hood:Typically seen as contemporary of king Richard I “Lionheart”(1157-99)Driven to outlawry during period of misrule in England whileRichard I was away at the Third Crusade (1189-92)Greatest enemy: sheriff of Nottingham

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The Commercial Revolution

Rapid growth of commercial activity starting in 12CI 136 markets exist in 1086I More than 1000 new markets and 150 fairs created by 1348 (Lopez

1976, Britnell 1981, Masschaele 1997)

Local administration (tax collection) grew in size; taxation ofmovables became centralSurge of complaints about extortions by public officials

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Statute of Merchants (1285) states that:(i) speedy justice is needed to support trade(ii) the sheriffs meant to provide it abused their position(iii) justice to merchants is therefore the responsibility of mayors

elected by burgesses

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The farm of the borough was composed of:Taxes on trade (merchandise was taxed at town gates and within marketswhenever there was a transaction)

The gable (the rent for the “burgage tenement” – the piece of land owned bythe burgess)

Profits from jurisdiction (fines and amercements imposed in courts)

Without farm grant:Sheriff farms the borough: offers a fixed amount (customary farm+ increment) to the king for the right to collect variable duesSheriff appoints the borough administration: bailiff (who also runsthe borough court), constable, market viewer, ale-taster, etc.), whorun courts, markets, and tax collection

With farm grant:Burgesses appoint borough administrationTax the same items and pay the agreed-upon farm to the king

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The farm of the borough was composed of:Taxes on trade (merchandise was taxed at town gates and within marketswhenever there was a transaction)

The gable (the rent for the “burgage tenement” – the piece of land owned bythe burgess)

Profits from jurisdiction (fines and amercements imposed in courts)

Without farm grant:Sheriff farms the borough: offers a fixed amount (customary farm+ increment) to the king for the right to collect variable duesSheriff appoints the borough administration: bailiff (who also runsthe borough court), constable, market viewer, ale-taster, etc.), whorun courts, markets, and tax collection

With farm grant:Burgesses appoint borough administrationTax the same items and pay the agreed-upon farm to the king

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The farm of the borough was composed of:Taxes on trade (merchandise was taxed at town gates and within marketswhenever there was a transaction)

The gable (the rent for the “burgage tenement” – the piece of land owned bythe burgess)

Profits from jurisdiction (fines and amercements imposed in courts)

Without farm grant:Sheriff farms the borough: offers a fixed amount (customary farm+ increment) to the king for the right to collect variable duesSheriff appoints the borough administration: bailiff (who also runsthe borough court), constable, market viewer, ale-taster, etc.), whorun courts, markets, and tax collection

With farm grant:Burgesses appoint borough administrationTax the same items and pay the agreed-upon farm to the king

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Brexit and the Norman ConquestNigel Farage, leader of the Brexit Party

Section of the Bayeux Tapestry showing thedeath of King Harold in 1066

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England Before the Norman Conquest

No self-governance of cities/boroughs (Maitland 1921)“To trace an institution beyond the Norman Conquest is to findoneself in an atmosphere of dimmer conceptions and lesswell-defined boundaries than prevailed afterwards” (Tait, 1964)No distinction between royal land (terra regis) and mesne land(terra baronum)Arrangement for collecting taxes: 2/3 for king and 1/3 for earl →earl’s “third penny”

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Inefficiencies in Tax Collection

Monitoring Problems: Hard to keep tax collectors in check(especially when king absent during wars)

I Widespread complaints about local officials (especiallysheriffs)

F “Sheriffs and reeves, whose office was justice and judgment,were more terrible than thieves and plunderers, and moresavage than the most savage.” [Henry of Huntingdon (ca.1088-1154)

Asymmetric information: Frequent replacement of royalofficials ⇒ lack local knowledge.

I Distortion of local economy, especially with onset of theCommercial Revolution

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Inefficiencies in Tax Collection

Monitoring Problems: Hard to keep tax collectors in check(especially when king absent during wars)

I Widespread complaints about local officials (especiallysheriffs)

F “Sheriffs and reeves, whose office was justice and judgment,were more terrible than thieves and plunderers, and moresavage than the most savage.” [Henry of Huntingdon (ca.1088-1154)

Asymmetric information: Frequent replacement of royalofficials ⇒ lack local knowledge.

I Distortion of local economy, especially with onset of theCommercial Revolution

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Inefficiencies in Tax Collection

Monitoring Problems: Hard to keep tax collectors in check(especially when king absent during wars)

I Widespread complaints about local officials (especiallysheriffs)

F “Sheriffs and reeves, whose office was justice and judgment,were more terrible than thieves and plunderers, and moresavage than the most savage.” [Henry of Huntingdon (ca.1088-1154)

Asymmetric information: Frequent replacement of royalofficials ⇒ lack local knowledge.

I Distortion of local economy, especially with onset of theCommercial Revolution

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Andover’s Charter of 1205

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Andover’s Charter of 1205

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Benefits of Farm Grants to Local Merchants

Bristol’s petition to the King in 1283:“Since none can know so well as those whose work is con-

cerned with merchandise...how to regulate the affairs of mer-chants properly and honestly, the Commonalty of Bristol en-treats the Lord King that, if he should wish to grant his town atfarm to anyone, he should concede it to them, since they wouldbe prepared to give as much for it as any outsider. For an out-side farmer would not seek it except for his own personal gain,which would be to the serious loss of the Commonalty. Andthe Commonalty seeks it to farm, not for the sake of profit, butto safeguard, according to the law merchant, both themselvesand others coming there.” (Cronne, 1946, pp. 42–3).

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Charter of Ipswich / Ipswich Dom-Bok of 1281

On Thursday following the festival of the Nativity of St.Johnthe Baptist in the second year of the reign of King John [29June], the whole town of the borough of Ipswich gathered inthe churchyard of St. Mary at Tower to elect two bailiffs andfour coroners for the town, according to the specifications ofthe charter of the aforesaid lord King, which that king recentlygranted to the the borough. On which day the burgesses, bycommon assent and with one voice, elected two upright andlaw-abiding men [probos et legales homines] of their town, viz.,John fitz Norman and William de Beaumes, who were swornto the administration of the ballivalty of the town and that theyshall behave well and faithfully to both poor and rich.

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Ipswich’s Charter of 1200

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Data on 554 English boroughsFor each borough, we record:

I Ownership (royal vs mesne), geography (rivers, roads, seacost).I Date and extent of liberties.I Commercial Importance (e.g., lay subsidy).

Sources:I Foundation years: Beresford and Finberg (1973), Letters et al.

(2003).I Medieval Geography (navigable rivers): Edwards and Hindle

(1976), Jones (2000), Langdon (2014).I Ownership and Liberties: digitized version of original medieval

documents (e.g., Pipe Rolls, Charter Rolls, Fine Rolls, Close Rolls,and Patent Rolls). Also, Ballard (1913), Ballard and Tait (1923).

Summary statistics:I Out of the 554 boroughs in existence by 1348: 145 were royal, or

have been under royal control for an extensive period of time.I As of 1348, 90 boroughs obtained Farm Grants

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Taxable Wealth in 1086, by Borough Ownership

Evidence from Domesday Book (1086)

All boroughs with available data (354 obs)

0.0

2.0

4.0

6.0

8Ke

rnel

den

sity

0 50 100 150Taxable Wealth in 1086

Royal boroughs (85 obs)Mesne boroughs (269 obs)

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Balancedness of Royal vs Mesne Boroughs

Raw Data Values after Entropy Balancing‡

Panel A: Trade-related geographic features of boroughsRoyal Boroughs Mesne Boroughs p-value for Mean for Mean for p-value for

boroughs with data: (overall 145) (overall 409) difference Royal Boroughs Mesne Boroughs difference#boroughs share #boroughs share in share in share

Navigable River 45 31.0% 52 12.7% <0.001 31.0% 30.7% 0.95Sea Coast 37 25.5% 84 20.5% 0.230 25.5% 25.5% 0.99Roman Road 67 46.2% 116 28.4% 0.001 46.2% 45.8% 0.93

Panel B: Taxable wealth of boroughs in 1086 (Domesday book data)Royal Boroughs Mesne Boroughs p-value for Mean for Mean for p-value for

boroughs with data: (overall 85) (overall 269) difference Royal Boroughs Mesne Boroughs differenceln(taxable wealth in 1086) 1.885 1.622 0.098 1.885 1.884 0.995

‡ Entropy balancing creates balanced samples by reweighing the observations in mesne boroughs to match the mean and varianceof covariates in royal boroughs. In panel A, these ‘covariates’ are all three geographic variables jointly; in Panel B, taxable wealthonly. See Hainmueller and Xu (2013) for details.

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All Boroughs in the Dataset. Royal and Mesne

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Boroughs with Farm Grants (by Ownership)

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Enfranchised Boroughs (by Ownership)

Boroughs

MesneRoyal

Transport

Roman RoadsNavigable Rivers

Legend

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More Evidence on Commercial Importance ofBoroughs with Farm GrantsBoroughs with Farm Grants were commercially more important in 14C

Dependent Variable: As indicated in table header(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

Dependent Variable: Freedom from Tolls by 1348† Commercial Hub in 14C‡

Boroughs included: all all royal all all royal

Farm Grant 1348 0.531∗∗∗ 0.543∗∗∗ 0.533∗∗∗ 0.381∗∗∗ 0.382∗∗∗ 0.417∗∗∗(0.052) (0.051) (0.070) (0.053) (0.053) (0.065)

County FE X XSoil Quality X XMean Dep. Var. 0.22 0.22 0.46 0.09 0.09 0.27R2 0.22 0.33 0.29 0.24 0.29 0.22Observations 554 554 145 554 554 145

Note: The table shows that boroughs with Farm Grants were commercially more important in the 14th century, using the twoindicators explained below. All regressions are run at the borough level. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, **p<0.05, *** p<0.01.† Indicator variable for “Freedom from tolls” – a grant of liberty that exempted a borough’s burgesses from tolls (taxes on trade).‡ Indicator variable for whether a borough was a commercial hub during the 14th century, based on Masschaele (1997). Criteriainclude the presence of merchant guilds, the classification as “urban” in the 1340 Nonae Rolls tax records, and the total tax ontradable goods levied in 1334.

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Self-governance and Commercial ImportanceBoroughs’ commercial importance by mid-14th century(Masschaele 1997)

Masschaele considers:I presence of merchant guild;I representation in Parliament under Edward I;I “urban” community in Nonae Rolls tax records in 1340;I “city” or “borough” in Nomina Villorum military census 1316.

Index for Commercial Importance in mid-14C:4 if borough satisfies at least 4 criteria, and pays at least £120 in lay

subsidy in 13343 if borough satisfies at least 4 criteria, and pays less than £120 in lay

subsidy in 13342 if borough satisfies 3 criteria1 if borough satisfies fewer than 3 criteria

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Farm Grants: Role of Royal BoroughsRoyal Boroughs were significantly more likely to receive Farm Grants

Dependent variable: Indicator for boroughs that obtained Farm Grants by 1348(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)

Boroughs included: — all boroughs — — boroughs with data on Taxable Wealth in 1086 —Notes: Taxable Balancing Royal and Mesne Boroughs by:

Wealth in Taxable Wealth Wealth and Trade Geography10-90 pctile E-weights‡ PS Matching† E-weights‡ PS Matching†

Royal borough 0.471∗∗∗ 0.469∗∗∗ 0.475∗∗∗ 0.450∗∗∗ 0.417∗∗∗ 0.456∗∗∗ 0.469∗∗∗ 0.465∗∗∗ 0.459∗∗∗(0.043) (0.043) (0.045) (0.055) (0.060) (0.054) (0.060) (0.055) (0.065)

Soil suitability 0.009 0.017(0.013) (0.016)

ln(Taxable wealth in 1086) 0.044∗∗∗ 0.026 0.068∗∗∗ [mv] 0.061∗∗∗ [mv](0.013) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)

Pre-Norman Kingdom FE Xp-value for kingdoms [0.66]

County FE XMean Dep. Var. 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.14 0.28 0.16 0.27 0.16R2 0.32 0.32 0.37 0.32 0.27 0.30 0.30Observations 554 554 554 354 296 354 354 354 354

Note: Regarding fixed effects (FE): There are 39 counties, and 4 pre-Norman kingdoms: Wessex, Mercia, Northumbria, and East-Anglia.‡ Entropy balancing reweights the observations in mesne boroughs to match the mean and variance of ln(Taxable Wealth) as wellas the three trade geography indicators. See Hainmueller and Xu (2013) for detail.† Propensity score matching with one nearest neighbor. Matching variable is taxable indicated by “mv”.

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Size of Lords’ Territory and Farm GrantsBoroughs owned by lords with larger territory are more likely to receive charters

0.1

.2.3

.4.5

Shar

e

1 2 3 4Lord Territory Size

Share of boroughs with Farm Grants in 134895% CI

Territory sizes:1=seigneur/abbot/nunnery2=bishop3=earl/archbishop4=king

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Difference-in-Differences IllustrationBoroughs without Trade Geography

p-value fordifference: 0.608

p-value fordifference: 0.507

p-value fordifference: 0.624

p-value fordifference: 0.449

(exclude FG Boroughs)

0.1

.2.3

.4.5

.6.7

.8.9

1W

ealth

rel.

to M

edia

n / S

hare

Taxable Wealth* Farm Grants Enfranchised Enfranchised

Royal BoroughsMesne Boroughs95% CI

Boroughs with Trade Geography

p-value fordifference: 0.094

p-value fordifference: <0.001

p-value fordifference: <0.001

p-value fordifference: 0.522

(exclude FG Boroughs)

0.1

.2.3

.4.5

.6.7

.8.9

1W

ealth

rel.

to M

edia

n / S

hare

Taxable Wealth* Farm Grants Enfranchised Enfranchised

Royal Boroughs Mesne Boroughs 95% CI

Note: The figure illustrates our difference-in-difference design (royal vs. mesne and trade vs. non-trade boroughs). To avoid thatdifferences in wealth may confound this analysis, we exclude relatively wealthy and very poor boroughs. The left panel of thefigure uses only the subset of boroughs without trade-favoring geography (i.e., boroughs without access to a navigable river, thesea coast, or an ancient Roman road – overall 74 boroughs); the right panel uses only boroughs with trade-favoring geography(overall 81 boroughs).∗ Taxable wealth is normalized, relative to the median across all boroughs with available data on taxable wealth in 1086.

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Sample Splits by Status as Domesday Borough

Dependent variable: Indicator for borough enfranchised by 1348(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

Boroughs included: All Domesday non-Domes- non-Domesday Royal Boroughs andBoroughs Boroughs day Boroughs Domesday Mesne Boroughs

Notes: Reduced Form for:Royal Mesne

Farm Grant 1348 0.466∗∗∗ 0.401∗∗∗ 0.428∗∗∗ 0.545∗∗∗(0.063) (0.114) (0.076) (0.092)

Royal borough 0.154∗∗∗ 0.204 0.037 -0.235∗∗∗(0.050) (0.127) (0.047) (0.082)

Trade Geography Dummy 0.203∗∗ -0.057(0.099) (0.157)

Mean Dep. Var. 0.23 0.58 0.15 0.31 0.31 0.32R2 0.26 0.30 0.16 0.22 0.04 0.00Observations 554 106 448 127 83 44

Royal boroughs 145 62 83 83 83Mesne boroughs 409 44 365 44 44Farm Grant boroughs 90 39 51 35 35 0

Note: All regressions are run at the borough level. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

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Sample Splits by Status as Domesday Borough

Dependent variable: Indicator for borough enfranchised by 1348(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

Boroughs included: All Domesday non-Domes- non-Domesday Royal Boroughs andBoroughs Boroughs day Boroughs Domesday Mesne Boroughs

Notes: Reduced Form for:Royal Mesne

Farm Grant 1348 0.466∗∗∗ 0.401∗∗∗ 0.428∗∗∗ 0.545∗∗∗(0.063) (0.114) (0.076) (0.092)

Royal borough 0.154∗∗∗ 0.204 0.037 -0.235∗∗∗(0.050) (0.127) (0.047) (0.082)

Trade Geography Dummy 0.203∗∗ -0.057(0.099) (0.157)

Mean Dep. Var. 0.23 0.58 0.15 0.31 0.31 0.32R2 0.26 0.30 0.16 0.22 0.04 0.00Observations 554 106 448 127 83 44

Royal boroughs 145 62 83 83 83Mesne boroughs 409 44 365 44 44Farm Grant boroughs 90 39 51 35 35 0

Note: All regressions are run at the borough level. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

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Balancedness of Royal vs. Mesne Boroughs in Cols4-6 of Above Table

Royal Boroughs Mesne Boroughs p-value forExcluding Domesday Only Domesday difference

(overall 83) (overall 44)

Charters of liberties (share)Farm Grants 42.2% 0.0% <0.001Other liberties‡ 46.9% 40.9% 0.516

Enfranchisement (share)Among all boroughs 31.3% 31.8% 0.955Among Farm Grant boroughs 62.9% [none] –

Trade Geography (shares):Any Trade Geography 66.3% 68.2% 0.829Navigable River 25.3% 20.5% 0.544Sea Coast 27.7% 25.0% 0.745Roman Road 32.5% 31.8% 0.936

Note: The table shows balancedness in royal vs. mesne boroughs for the subsample thatuses only non-Domesday royal boroughs and only Domesday mesne boroughs.

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Balancedness of Royal vs. Mesne Boroughs in Cols4-6 of Above Table

Royal Boroughs Mesne Boroughs p-value forExcluding Domesday Only Domesday difference

(overall 83) (overall 44)

Charters of liberties (share)Farm Grants 42.2% 0.0% <0.001Other liberties‡ 46.9% 40.9% 0.516

Enfranchisement (share)Among all boroughs 31.3% 31.8% 0.955Among Farm Grant boroughs 62.9% [none] –

Trade Geography (shares):Any Trade Geography 66.3% 68.2% 0.829Navigable River 25.3% 20.5% 0.544Sea Coast 27.7% 25.0% 0.745Roman Road 32.5% 31.8% 0.936

Note: The table shows balancedness in royal vs. mesne boroughs for the subsample thatuses only non-Domesday royal boroughs and only Domesday mesne boroughs.

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Balancedness of Royal vs. Mesne Boroughs in Cols4-6 of Above Table

Royal Boroughs Mesne Boroughs p-value forExcluding Domesday Only Domesday difference

(overall 83) (overall 44)

Charters of liberties (share)Farm Grants 42.2% 0.0% <0.001Other liberties‡ 46.9% 40.9% 0.516

Enfranchisement (share)Among all boroughs 31.3% 31.8% 0.955Among Farm Grant boroughs 62.9% [none] –

Trade Geography (shares):Any Trade Geography 66.3% 68.2% 0.829Navigable River 25.3% 20.5% 0.544Sea Coast 27.7% 25.0% 0.745Roman Road 32.5% 31.8% 0.936

Note: The table shows balancedness in royal vs. mesne boroughs for the subsample thatuses only non-Domesday royal boroughs and only Domesday mesne boroughs.

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Trade Geography and Economic OutcomesBoroughs at locations that favored trade had higher taxable wealth, were commerciallymore importance in the 14th century, and had larger population by 1832

Dependent variable: As indicated in table header(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)

Dependent Variable: ln(Taxable Wealth 1086) Commercial Importance 14C† ln(Tax payers 1377) ln(population mid-17C)Boroughs included: royal mesne royal mesne royal mesne royal mesne

Navigable River 1.189∗∗∗ 0.575∗∗∗ 1.068∗∗∗ 0.274∗∗ 1.558∗∗∗ 1.316∗∗∗ 0.920∗∗∗ 0.487∗∗∗(0.344) (0.211) (0.254) (0.122) (0.332) (0.319) (0.248) (0.136)

Sea Coast 0.105 -0.590∗∗∗ 0.902∗∗∗ 0.186∗∗ 0.620∗ -0.086 0.175 -0.101(0.297) (0.217) (0.250) (0.085) (0.335) (0.196) (0.246) (0.108)

Roman Road 0.203 0.153 0.721∗∗∗ -0.016 0.248 0.304 0.465∗∗ 0.210∗∗(0.258) (0.157) (0.215) (0.059) (0.304) (0.232) (0.186) (0.096)

p-value: joint significance [0.006] [0.003] [<0.001] [0.029] [<0.001] [<0.001] [<0.001] [<0.001]River, Coast, Road

Mean Dep. Var. 1.88 1.62 0.79 -0.28 6.29 5.60 7.19 6.75R2 0.17 0.05 0.22 0.05 0.36 0.18 0.17 0.07Observations 85 269 145 409 54 103 126 279

Notes: All regressions are run at the borough level. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.† First principle component of two indicators for commercial importance: “Freedom from tolls” (a grant of liberty that exempteda borough’s burgesses from tolls throughout the realm) and an indicator variable for whether a borough was a commercial hubduring the 14th century, based on Masschaele (1997).

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Taxable Wealth in 1086: Different Samples

Sample 1:All boroughs with data on wealth in 1086

p-value for difference in ln(wealth): 0.0980.1

.2.3

Kern

el d

ensi

ty

-2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5ln(Taxable Wealth in 1086)

Royal boroughs (85 obs)Mesne boroughs (269 obs)

Sample 2:Only boroughs in 10–90 percentiles of

wealth

p-value for difference in ln(wealth): 0.685.1.2

.3.4

Kern

el d

ensi

ty-2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5

ln(Taxable Wealth in 1086)

Royal boroughs (72 obs)Mesne boroughs (224 obs)

Sample 3:Only boroughs in 10–50 percentiles of

wealth

p-value for difference in ln(wealth): 0.368.2.3

.4.5

.6Ke

rnel

den

sity

-2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5ln(Taxable Wealth in 1086)

Royal boroughs (37 obs)Mesne boroughs (118 obs)

Sample 4:Bottom 50 pctile royal and top 50 pctile

mesne

p-value for difference in ln(wealth): <0.0010.1

.2.3

.4.5

Kern

el d

ensi

ty

-2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5ln(Taxable Wealth in 1086)

Royal boroughs (43 obs)Mesne boroughs (131 obs)

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Coefficients on Farm Grants in the 4 Samples

0.1

.2.3

.4.5

.6.7

.8C

oeff.

on

Farm

Gra

nt

Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 3 Sample 4

Coefficient95% CI

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Reduced-Form Coefficients in the 4 SamplesCoefficients and CIs for an indicator for ‘any trade geography’

0.1

.2.3

.4.5

.6.7

.8C

oeff.

on

Trad

e G

eogr

aphy

Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 3 Sample 4

Royal BoroughsMesne Boroughs95% CI

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Background: Early vs. Late EnfranchisementFarm Grant boroughs were more likely to be enfranchised early. Later, the kingenfranchised non-autonomous boroughs

Before 1348 1349-17000

100

200

300

400

500

600

Num

ber o

f bor

ough

s

All Farm G. No Farm G. All Farm G. No Farm G.Boroughs included

All (initially not enfranchised) boroughsEnfranchised by end of period

Strategic Enfranchisement Back to talk

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Strategic Enfranchisement and Rotten BoroughsBoroughs enfranchised after 1348 were much more likely to become “rotten boroughs”

Rotten Boroughs: two seats in Parliament, but very smallelectorate that was controlled by patron Old Sarum

Enfranchised before 1348 Enfranchised after 13480

2040

6080

100

120

Num

ber o

f enf

ranc

hise

d bo

roug

hs

All Farm G. No Farm G. All Farm G. No Farm G.Enfranchised boroughs included

All enfranchised boroughsRotten boroughs

Quote Boroughs in Cornwall Back to talk 1/1

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Farm Grants and the development of parliament

Farm Grants made boroughs “areas locally within but administratively outsidethe counties” [Tait 1936, p. 346] “The separate representation of cities and

boroughs was, no doubt, due to the varying degrees of immunity from thejurisdiction of the shire courts which they enjoyed.” [Pollard 1920, p. 112]

“[...] mainly because consent to taxes was required, the Crown summoned

both knights for the shires and burgesses and citizens for the towns; that is tosay, the concept of communities of the realm was extended beyond theadministrative divisions [i.e., the shires] to the embedded lesser units [i.e., theboroughs]. Both shires and towns were, in fact, real communities in the sensethat they had self-consciousness, self-government, and self-purpose; and thecomposition of the House of Commons in the later middle ages quiteexceptionally reflected the reality.” [Elton 1974, p. 41]

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Farm Grants and the development of parliament

Farm Grants made boroughs “areas locally within but administratively outsidethe counties” [Tait 1936, p. 346] “The separate representation of cities and

boroughs was, no doubt, due to the varying degrees of immunity from thejurisdiction of the shire courts which they enjoyed.” [Pollard 1920, p. 112]“[...] mainly because consent to taxes was required, the Crown summoned

both knights for the shires and burgesses and citizens for the towns; that is tosay, the concept of communities of the realm was extended beyond theadministrative divisions [i.e., the shires] to the embedded lesser units [i.e., theboroughs]. Both shires and towns were, in fact, real communities in the sensethat they had self-consciousness, self-government, and self-purpose; and thecomposition of the House of Commons in the later middle ages quiteexceptionally reflected the reality.” [Elton 1974, p. 41]

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Old Sarum – A Rotten Borough

Uninhabited hill from 17th century2 seats in Parliament 1295-1832Served as ‘pocket borough’ for the Pitt familySold to Earl of Caledon in 1802

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Enfranchisement of Boroughs in Cornwall

“Nothing except the desire of the Crown [...] to con-trol the House of Commons [...] could account for theenfranchisement of such Cornish boroughs as Newport,Saltash, Camelford, West Looe, Grampound, Bossiney andSt. Michaels. Until the reign of Edward VI (1537-1553), Corn-wall had not been over-represented. [...] it was in the reignof Edward VI that Cornwall first began to attain notoriety asa county of many boroughs. It owed this notoriety to the factthat it was a royal duchy, a county over which the Crown exer-cised more direct control than over most of the other countiesof England.” (Porritt, 1909; p. 373-74)

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Background on the English Parliament

Model Parliament summoned by Edward I in 1295. ca. 100boroughs send representatives

I Enfranchised boroughs return two MPs (5 boroughs returnone MP)

I Enfranchisement is “customary”: boroughs that let theirfranchise expire, can claim right to re-enfranchisement

I Parliament discusses extraordinary taxation on movablewealth

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Matching by Wealth and Population

Dependent variable: Indicator for borough enfranchised in Parliament by 1348(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

Matching based on: Taxable Wealth in 1086 Taxpayers in 1377‘Treated’ boroughs:† All FG Royal FG Royal FG All FG Royal FG Royal FGMatched (‘control’) boroughs:‡ All non-FG Mesne non-FG Royal non-FG All non-FG Mesne non-FG Royal non-FG

Panel A: Matching using the full sample with available dataFarm Grant 1349 0.570∗∗∗ 0.633∗∗∗ 0.572∗∗∗ 0.475∗∗∗ 0.594∗∗∗ 0.611∗

(0.069) (0.084) (0.123) (0.087) (0.064) (0.337)Observations 354 300 85 157 128 54

Farm Grant boroughs 55 43 43 41 33 33Control boroughs 299 257 42 116 95 21

Panel B: Trimmed sample – see figure on next slide for distributionsFarm Grant 1349 0.554∗∗∗ 0.620∗∗∗ 0.542∗∗∗ 0.483∗∗∗ 0.607∗∗∗ 0.286∗

(0.067) (0.085) (0.115) (0.086) (0.061) (0.154)Observations 330 277 75 148 122 28

Farm Grant boroughs 52 40 34 36 29 9Control boroughs 282 237 41 112 93 19

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.† In cols 1 and 4, ‘treatment’ observations are all (royal and mesne) Farm Grant boroughs; in all other columns, ‘treated’observations are only royal boroughs with Farm Grants (FG).‡ ‘Control’ observations include the following boroughs: in cols 1 and 4 all boroughs without Farm Grants (FG); in cols 2 and 5 allmesne boroughs without FG; in cols 3 and 6 all royal boroughs without FG.

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Matching by Wealth and Population – Distributions forFarm Grant and Control Boroughs

Column 1

log-point difference in wealth in 1086: 0.009 (p-value: 0.198)0.1

.2.3

Kern

el d

ensi

ty

0 1 2 3 4 5ln(Taxable Wealth in 1086)

Farm Grant (FG) boroughsMatched non-FG boroughs

Column 2

log-point difference in wealth in 1086: 0.008 (p-value: 0.485)0.1

.2.3

.4Ke

rnel

den

sity

0 1 2 3 4 5ln(Taxable Wealth in 1086)

Royal FG boroughsMatched mesne non-FG boroughs

Column 3

log-point difference in wealth in 1086: 0.006 (p-value: 0.729).1.1

5.2

.25

.3.3

5Ke

rnel

den

sity

0 1 2 3ln(Taxable Wealth in 1086)

Royal FG boroughsMatched royal non-FG boroughs

Column 4

log-point difference in tax payers in 1377: 0.002 (p-value: 0.901)0.1

.2.3

.4Ke

rnel

den

sity

4 5 6 7 8ln(Tax Payers in 1377)

Farm Grant (FG) boroughsMatched non-FG boroughs

Column 5

log-point difference in tax payers in 1377: -.011 (p-value: 0.815)0.1

.2.3

.4Ke

rnel

den

sity

4 5 6 7 8ln(Tax Payers in 1377)

Royal FG boroughsMatched mesne non-FG boroughs

Column 6

log-point difference in tax payers in 1377: 0.032 (p-value: 0.611)0.1

.2.3

.4.5

Kern

el d

ensi

ty4 4.5 5 5.5 6 6.5

ln(Tax Payers in 1377)

Royal FG boroughsMatched royal non-FG boroughs

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Matching with Same Trade Geography – ResultsResults hold when matching by wealth and exactly the same trade geography

Dependent variable: Indicator for borough enfranchised in Parliament by 1348(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

Matching based on: Taxable Wealth in 1086, trimmed sample with further restrictions:Only boroughs with: Any Trade Navigable Sea Roman Freedom Freedom from Tolls

Geography River Coast Road from Tolls & Trade Geography

Farm Grant 1349 0.650∗∗∗ 0.549∗∗∗ 0.737∗∗∗ 0.784∗∗∗ 0.475∗∗∗ 0.440∗∗∗(0.082) (0.183) (0.131) (0.078) (0.150) (0.166)

Observations 145 41 38 88 44 36Farm Grant boroughs (treated) 34 11 13 20 21 21Control boroughs 111 30 25 68 23 16

Note: Estimates are from propensity score matching by wealth in 1086 with one nearest neighbor. Ro-bust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.‘Treatment’ observations are royal boroughs with Farm Grants; ‘control’ observations include all mesneboroughs without Farm Grants. The sample is trimmed, excluding all mesne boroughs that have lowertaxable wealth than the poorest Farm Grant borough, and excluding all Farm Grant boroughs with higherwealth than the wealthiest mesne borough. See figure on next slide for the corresponding distributions.

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Matching with Same Trade Geography – WealthDistribution for Farm Grant and Control Boroughs

Column 1

log-point difference in wealth in 1086: -.006 (p-value: 0.691)0.1

.2.3

.4Ke

rnel

den

sity

0 1 2 3 4 5ln(Taxable Wealth in 1086)

Royal FG boroughsMatched mesne non-FG boroughs

Column 2

log-point difference in wealth in 1086: 0.015 (p-value: 0.671).1.2

.3.4

Kern

el d

ensi

ty

1 2 3 4ln(Taxable Wealth in 1086)

Royal FG boroughsMatched mesne non-FG boroughs

Column 3

log-point difference in wealth in 1086: -.077 (p-value: 0.15)0.1

.2.3

.4.5

Kern

el d

ensi

ty

1 2 3 4 5ln(Taxable Wealth in 1086)

Royal FG boroughsMatched mesne non-FG boroughs

Column 4

log-point difference in wealth in 1086: -.025 (p-value: 0.592)0.1

.2.3

.4Ke

rnel

den

sity

0 1 2 3 4ln(Taxable Wealth in 1086)

Royal FG boroughsMatched mesne non-FG boroughs

Column 5

log-point difference in wealth in 1086: -.01 (p-value: 0.63).1.1

5.2

.25

.3.3

5Ke

rnel

den

sity

0 1 2 3 4ln(Taxable Wealth in 1086)

Royal FG boroughsMatched mesne non-FG boroughs

Column 6

log-point difference in wealth in 1086: .015 (p-value: 0.546).1.2

.3.4

Kern

el d

ensi

ty

0 1 2 3 4ln(Taxable Wealth in 1086)

Royal FG boroughsMatched mesne non-FG boroughs

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Alternative Interpretation: Ability to Coordinate?Are our results driven by (unobserved) ability to coordinate / solve collective actionproblems?

Two proxies for ability to coordinate:Right to elect officials (when obtained independent of FarmGrants)Right to collect taxes to pave streets or build/repair city walls(1200-1348)These additional rights were obtained by both royal and mesnetowns

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Proxies for Organizational Capacity: Right to ElectOfficials and Murage/PavageResults hold when controlling for organizational capacity, and within subset of boroughswith proven organizational capacity

Dependent variable: Indicator for borough enfranchised by 1348(1) (2) (3) (4)

Boroughs included: all all only boroughs with separate rights to...elect local officials Murage/Pavage

D1: Farm Grant 1348 0.492∗∗∗ 0.490∗∗∗ 0.425∗∗∗ 0.554∗∗∗(0.063) (0.064) (0.135) (0.126)

D2: Right to elect officials / no Farm Grant 0.229∗∗∗(0.073)

D3: Murage or Pavage / no Farm Grant 0.158∗∗(0.066)

p-value for difference between D1 and D2/D3 0.004 <0.001

Royal borough 0.147∗∗∗ 0.146∗∗∗ 0.176 -0.011(0.050) (0.051) (0.138) (0.131)

Number of boroughs with D1 = 1 90 90 50 49Number of boroughs with D2/D3 = 1 45 55Mean Dep. Var. 0.23 0.23 0.64 0.55R2 0.28 0.27 0.34 0.30Observations 554 554 95 104

Note: All regressions are run at the borough level. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01.

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Parliament – Additional ResultsResults also hold for first Parliament in 1295 (‘Model Parliament’)

Dependent variable: Indicator for borough enfranchised in 1295(1) (2) (3) (4)

Boroughs included: Boroughs founded by 1295all all royal mesne

Farm Grant 1295 0.360∗∗∗ 0.365∗∗∗(0.068) (0.067)

Royal borough 0.135∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗∗(0.050) (0.049)

Navigable River 0.286∗∗∗ 0.020(0.086) (0.056)

Sea Coast 0.217∗∗ 0.052(0.093) (0.052)

Roman Road 0.348∗∗∗ -0.030(0.078) (0.038)

p-value joint significance [0.000] [0.578]River, Coast, RoadCounty FE XTerrain Controls XMean Dep. Var. 0.21 0.21 0.42 0.12R2 0.19 0.31 0.19 0.01Observations 460 460 136 324

Note: All regressions are run at the borough level. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

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Self-Governance and Borough Franchise

In principle, initially, all male burgesses should assemble and electtheir MPs

But over time, enfranchised boroughs became heterogeneous inthe way they (s)elected their MPs...

In boroughs with early self-governance, merchant class wasrelatively large, powerful, and in control of the corporation.

I Merchant class was in power from the inception (and prior toParliament).

Government bodies (mayor and council) had influence over MPchoices and borough franchises (History of Parliament 2009 andSalmon 2005).

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Self-Governance and Borough Franchise

In principle, initially, all male burgesses should assemble and electtheir MPs

But over time, enfranchised boroughs became heterogeneous inthe way they (s)elected their MPs...

In boroughs with early self-governance, merchant class wasrelatively large, powerful, and in control of the corporation.

I Merchant class was in power from the inception (and prior toParliament).

Government bodies (mayor and council) had influence over MPchoices and borough franchises (History of Parliament 2009 andSalmon 2005).

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Independent Elections of Borough Officials: 15-17CStarting in 15th century, boroughs evolve into corporations

I A corporation can own property and issue by-lawsI Local government composed of mayor and aldermen/councilmen.

Influence of the king at the time of incorporation:First appointment : king appoints first members of the newlyformed corporation’s governing body

I 1 mayor, 12 aldermen, 24 councilmen

Co-Optation: initial council appointed subsequent councilmembers ⇒ maintain closed governing bodies

I Boroughs with early self-governance less subject to co-optation(Webb and Webb 1963)

Status quo until 1835.

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Independent Elections of Borough Officials: 15-17CStarting in 15th century, boroughs evolve into corporations

I A corporation can own property and issue by-lawsI Local government composed of mayor and aldermen/councilmen.

Influence of the king at the time of incorporation:First appointment : king appoints first members of the newlyformed corporation’s governing body

I 1 mayor, 12 aldermen, 24 councilmen

Co-Optation: initial council appointed subsequent councilmembers ⇒ maintain closed governing bodies

I Boroughs with early self-governance less subject to co-optation(Webb and Webb 1963)

Status quo until 1835.

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Inclusiveness of MP Elections in 1830s

MP candidate openness (from 1 to 3): = 1 if both MPs chosen bypatron, 2 if only one MP chosen by patron, and 3 if anyone couldrun for parliament (History of Parliament)

Contested Elections (from 0 to 4): the number of elections out ofthe last four for which at least one candidate stood a pole (Historyof Parliament)

Broad Franchise (0 or 1): = 0 if either corporation/burgage, or = 1otherwise Detail

Patronage index (from 0 to 2): = 0 if Rotten borough and closedconstituency (controlled by local patron), = 1 if either rotten orclosed constituency, = 2 (open) if neither of the two

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Inclusiveness of MP Elections at the Borough Level inthe 1830sMedieval Farm Grants are a strong predictor of more open borough-level elections ofMPs in the early 1830s

Dependent variables: Various indicators for openness of MP elections at the borough level in the 1820-31(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)

Dependent Variable: Openness Contested Broad Patronage — First Principal Component of (1) – (4) —Index Elections franchise index

Notes: royal only 2SLS†

Farm Grant 1348 0.385∗∗∗ 0.653∗∗∗ 0.190∗∗∗ 0.433∗∗∗ 0.671∗∗∗ 0.644∗∗∗ 0.521∗∗∗ 0.788∗∗∗ 0.828∗∗∗(0.112) (0.206) (0.066) (0.099) (0.149) (0.147) (0.167) (0.200) (0.194)

Additional Controls# X X X XCounty FE XTerrain Controls XR2 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.09 0.10 0.17 0.42 0.25 0.16Observations 185 185 185 185 185 185 185 82 185Mean Dep. Var.: 1.54 1.35 0.69 0.92 — [Principal Component: Mean 0, Std 1] —

‡ Additional controls include the following variables constructed by Aidt and Franck (2015): market integration (travel distancebetween any given constituency and the 243 other constituencies weighted by the population); Distance to urban center (traveldays from each constituency to the nearest of the 13 largest towns in 1831); Connection to London (graphical, economic, andinformational connections to London); a dummy for 13 boroughs controlled by the treasury.

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Angelucci, Meraglia, Voigtländer How Merchant Towns Shaped Parliaments Mar 3, 2020 53 / 46

Types of Franchises in 1832

As of 1832, 6 types of franchises:I Corporation (mayor, aldermen and councilmen can vote)I Burgage (right of voting attached to the tenancy of a house or property

designated as a burgage plot for parliamentary elections)I Potwalloper (all inhabitants qualified by six months residence could vote,

unless they were alms-men or paupers)I Scot and Lot (Inhabitants householders paying the (poor) rates are

entitled to vote)I Freeholder (owners of freeholds (similar to a burgage plot, but of a less

ancient origin) can vote)I Freemen (only freemen – those who enjoy the freedom of the borough,

e.g., they can trade – can vote)

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Civil War of 1642-51: BackgroundBy 1630-41: “Personal Rule by Charles I”. Parliament notsummonedDisastrous (military and religious) conflicts with Scotland andIreland.Need to raise extra-ordinary taxes ⇒ King summons ParliamentParliament consents to new taxes subject to conditions:

I Redress of grievances (bishops, monopolies and customs farming)I New prerogatives (king cannot unilaterally dissolve parliament)

King refuses to give in and conflict escalates: Long ParliamentParliament splits into Royalists and Parliamentarians

I Whole country divided; not a social class conflictI Boroughs mostly neutral out of fear for their liberties (Howell, 1982).

April-August 1642: military escalationKing relies on rural and county-level administration to raise army

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Civil War – Reduced Form

Dep. Var.: Indicator for pro-Parliamentary volunteer troops raised by borough in 1642

(1) (2) (3)— Reduced Form —

Boroughs included: royal mesne mesneNote: E-weights§

Navigable River 0.163∗∗ 0.016 0.011(0.069) (0.028) (0.025)

Sea Coast 0.027 0.015 0.030(0.061) (0.021) (0.027)

Roman Road 0.223∗∗∗ 0.004 -0.011(0.061) (0.017) (0.018)

p-value: joint significance [<0.001] [0.880] [0.512]River, Coast, Road

Mean Dep. Var. 0.14 0.02 0.03R2 0.14 0.00 0.01Observations 144 406 406

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.§Entropy balancing reweighs the observations in mesne boroughs to match the mean and variance of navigable river, sea coast,and Roman road in royal boroughs.

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Dynamics of the Reform Act

Corruption in local governance and in elections of MPs a constanttheme in 18th and 19th century (Webb and Webb 1963)

I Issue becomes more salient in 1820s

3 relevant general elections: 1826, 1830, April 1831I Reform is marginal issue during 1826 election. Reform is important

in 1830, but other 2 big issues (corn laws and slavery)I Election in April 1831 is essentially referendum on the bill. (Most)

Tories were against the reform. Radicals and Whigs were pro

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Explanations for Support of the Great Reform Act1 Change in the franchise rules affected boroughs with open and

closed voting rights differently:I Farm Grant boroughs ⇒ history of relatively open franchise: reform

made franchise less vulnerable to manipulationsI Boroughs with a narrow franchise: reform made patronage largely

unfeasible

2 Commitment to Public good provision:I Population growth after industrialization ⇒ deteriorated public

health and law and order (Webb and Webb 1963)I Incentives to end pork-barrel politics and improve the provision of

health and other public services (Lizzeri and Persico 2004)

3 Complementary Mechanisms:I Social Unrest (Aidt and Franck 2015)

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Angelucci, Meraglia, Voigtländer How Merchant Towns Shaped Parliaments Mar 3, 2020 58 / 46

Explanations for Support of the Great Reform Act1 Change in the franchise rules affected boroughs with open and

closed voting rights differently:I Farm Grant boroughs ⇒ history of relatively open franchise: reform

made franchise less vulnerable to manipulationsI Boroughs with a narrow franchise: reform made patronage largely

unfeasible

2 Commitment to Public good provision:I Population growth after industrialization ⇒ deteriorated public

health and law and order (Webb and Webb 1963)I Incentives to end pork-barrel politics and improve the provision of

health and other public services (Lizzeri and Persico 2004)

3 Complementary Mechanisms:I Social Unrest (Aidt and Franck 2015)

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Angelucci, Meraglia, Voigtländer How Merchant Towns Shaped Parliaments Mar 3, 2020 58 / 46

Explanations for Support of the Great Reform Act1 Change in the franchise rules affected boroughs with open and

closed voting rights differently:I Farm Grant boroughs ⇒ history of relatively open franchise: reform

made franchise less vulnerable to manipulationsI Boroughs with a narrow franchise: reform made patronage largely

unfeasible

2 Commitment to Public good provision:I Population growth after industrialization ⇒ deteriorated public

health and law and order (Webb and Webb 1963)I Incentives to end pork-barrel politics and improve the provision of

health and other public services (Lizzeri and Persico 2004)

3 Complementary Mechanisms:I Social Unrest (Aidt and Franck 2015)

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Angelucci, Meraglia, Voigtländer How Merchant Towns Shaped Parliaments Mar 3, 2020 58 / 46

Main Results: Clustering and Spatial Correlation

Dependent variable as indicated in table header(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)

Dependent variable: Seat in Parlia- Influence of king on Volunteer troops Openness of MP Vote share for Greatment by 1348 local elections 15-17C during Civil War elections 1820-31‡ Reform Act 1832

Panel A: Main Results (OLS with robust standard errors)Farm Grant 1348 0.466∗∗∗ -0.222∗∗ 0.201∗∗∗ 0.674∗∗∗ 0.157∗∗

(0.063) (0.104) (0.045) (0.148) (0.070)R2 0.26 0.03 0.12 0.10 0.16Observations 554 158 550 184 175

Panel B: Clustered Standard Errors (at the county level)Farm Grant 1348 0.466∗∗∗ -0.222∗∗ 0.201∗∗∗ 0.674∗∗∗ 0.157∗∗

(0.082) (0.098) (0.054) (0.126) (0.060)R2 0.26 0.03 0.12 0.10 0.16Observations 554 158 550 184 175

Panel C: Accounting for Spatial CorrelationFarm Grant 1348 0.466∗∗∗ -0.222∗∗ 0.201∗∗∗ 0.557∗∗∗ 0.162∗∗

(0.051) (0.101) (0.030) (0.135) (0.070)Observations 554 158 550 184 175

Note: The coefficients in Panel C are estimated by maximum likelihood, using each borough’s geographic location to derive theweighting matrix. All boroughs with distance less than 2 degrees (2̃20km) are considered spatially contiguous and are assigned anonzero spatial weight. Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.‡ First principle component of the four proxies for open MP elections.

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Angelucci, Meraglia, Voigtländer How Merchant Towns Shaped Parliaments Mar 3, 2020 59 / 46

Main Results: Controlling for Taxable Wealth in 1086

Table: Main Results: Controlling for Taxable Wealth in 1086Dependent variable as indicated in table header

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)Dependent variable: Seat in Parlia- Influence of king on Volunteer troops Openness of MP Vote share for Great

ment by 1348 local elections 15-17C during Civil War elections 1820-31‡ Reform Act 1832Panel A: All boroughs with data on taxable wealth

Farm Grant 1348 0.405∗∗∗ -0.297∗∗ 0.198∗∗∗ 0.486∗∗ 0.153(0.082) (0.120) (0.059) (0.190) (0.097)

ln(Taxable wealth in 1086) 0.022 -0.072∗∗ 0.008 0.078 0.060(0.018) (0.035) (0.011) (0.072) (0.036)

R2 0.25 0.11 0.13 0.08 0.16Observations 354 94 354 104 100

Panel B: Taxable wealth in 1086 between 10th and 90th percentileFarm Grant 1348 0.452∗∗∗ -0.269∗∗ 0.234∗∗∗ 0.396∗ 0.223∗∗

(0.089) (0.128) (0.069) (0.219) (0.106)ln(Taxable wealth in 1086) -0.006 -0.060 -0.003 0.120 0.104∗∗

(0.023) (0.061) (0.013) (0.099) (0.052)R2 0.27 0.07 0.17 0.06 0.24Observations 296 74 296 82 79

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.‡ First principle component of the four proxies for open MP elections.

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Long-Run Results: (Exact) Matching by TradeGeography

Dependent variable as indicated in table header(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)

Dependent variable: Seat in Parlia- Influence of king on Volunteer troops Openness of MP Vote share for Greatment by 1348 local elections 15-17C during Civil War elections 1820-31‡ Reform Act 1832

Farm Grant 1348 0.475∗∗∗ -0.142 0.139∗∗∗ 0.515∗∗ 0.248∗∗(0.084) (0.127) (0.034) (0.238) (0.112)

Mean of dep. var.: 0.231 0.378 0.058 0.092 0.597Observations 467 127 463 144 139‘Treated’ obs. (royal 74 55 73 59 58boroughs with Farm Grant)Pool of ‘Control’ obs. (mesne 393 72 390 85 81boroughs without Farm Grant)

Note: The table replicates our main results, performing propensity score matching with one (exact) match. The ‘treatment group’are royal boroughs with Farm Grants; the ‘control group’ are mesne boroughs (without Farm Grants) with the same trade geographyas each ‘treated’ borough. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.‡ First principle component of the four proxies for open MP elections.

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Cross-country comparison (France and Spain)Similarities to England

I Complaints about tax collectors, especially after CommercialRevolution

I General assemblies discuss extra-ordinary taxation

FranceI King in France (initially) much weaker than in EnglandI Rivalry between strong local lords ⇒ LocalismI Emergence of some town-level liberties, but more constrained

SpainI To finance the Reconquista, kings needed funding from

powerful bourgeoisieI Kings gave Fueros (grants of autonomy) to cities, and

admitted their representatives to the CortesI But: weak king(s) and localism of lords ⇒ liberties more

constrained than in EnglandBack to talk 1/1

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Cross-country comparison (France and Spain)Similarities to England

I Complaints about tax collectors, especially after CommercialRevolution

I General assemblies discuss extra-ordinary taxationFrance

I King in France (initially) much weaker than in EnglandI Rivalry between strong local lords ⇒ LocalismI Emergence of some town-level liberties, but more constrained

SpainI To finance the Reconquista, kings needed funding from

powerful bourgeoisieI Kings gave Fueros (grants of autonomy) to cities, and

admitted their representatives to the CortesI But: weak king(s) and localism of lords ⇒ liberties more

constrained than in EnglandBack to talk 1/1

Angelucci, Meraglia, Voigtländer How Merchant Towns Shaped Parliaments Mar 3, 2020 62 / 46

Cross-country comparison (France and Spain)Similarities to England

I Complaints about tax collectors, especially after CommercialRevolution

I General assemblies discuss extra-ordinary taxationFrance

I King in France (initially) much weaker than in EnglandI Rivalry between strong local lords ⇒ LocalismI Emergence of some town-level liberties, but more constrained

SpainI To finance the Reconquista, kings needed funding from

powerful bourgeoisieI Kings gave Fueros (grants of autonomy) to cities, and

admitted their representatives to the CortesI But: weak king(s) and localism of lords ⇒ liberties more

constrained than in EnglandBack to talk 1/1

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