How Israel wins its Wars

HOW ISRAEL WINS ITS WARS THROUGH THE STRONG ALIGNMENT OF ITS CLAUSEWITZIAN TRINITIES, ITS

WESTERN WAY OF WARFARE AND ITS PRACTICAL DOCTRINE - A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR WINNING WARS -

NICOLAAS VAN MIERLO UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM

Military History 11388838

25 FEBRUARI 2018

“The trinity is a uniquely powerful framework for understanding the

phenomenon of war. It cannot hope to answer all the strategic problems we face

today – that was simply not what Clausewitz intended – but rather constitutes a

mental guide for anyone interested in the subject, from commanders to university

students. It focuses attention on the central underlying forces of war in their

endlessly complex interaction” (Waldman).

Introduction

The writing of this paper has been an interesting journey that started with a curiosity on why a country

that fights wars against all odds can be very successful. David always (or at least often) seems to win

against Goliath. We were not satisfied with the answers to be found in the literature so far, mainly

because it is descriptive or analytical only in one of the aspects that provides an explanation. This did

bring us to the question if it would be possible to develop an encompassing and powerful theoretical

framework to explain results in warfare. A framework that would describe the three most important

levels that affect and are affected by warfare i.e. the interplay between the relevant actors in a nation-

state, the basic principles how that nation approaches warfare and the practical execution in the

political and military arenas. That would benefit a description of the Israeli military history and provide

us with a strong analytical and comparative tool.

A decisive factor for success in warfare is the strength of the unity of a nation-state within the derived

Trinity of the People-Army-Government in the primordial violence, hatred, and enmity against a

common enemy or threat. We will call that the alignment of the People-Army-Government. The second

factor is the way in which a country approaches warfare, the basic principles, and for our theoretical

framework we have chosen the Western way of warfare as primarily described by Parker. The Trinities

and the Western way of warfare need to be translated to the political and military arenas. This is the

third factor that we will call the practical Doctrine. Therewith we have united society, strategies and

tactics into a powerful descriptive, analytical and comprehensive theoretical framework. This has not

been done before and will substantially contribute to another view on the military history of Israel.

As with the Trinity the other two factors have to show internal strength and unity which we will also

call the alignment. Actually, there is an implicit 4th factor and that is, apart from the alignment within

each factor, the alignment between the three factors. There can be no success when the three factors

are not aligned as we saw e.g. in the Vietnam War. We will unite these three factors and the derived

fourth factor into an encompassing theoretical framework and test it to explain the successes of a

nation-state that wins wars against all odds i.e. Israel.

We will first describe the three levels of the theoretical framework. Are we able to decompose the

original Trinities of von Clausewitz and use the elements as building blocks for our theoretical

framework? It has to be kept in mind that von Clausewitz has only provided a very short description of

the Trinities and therewith only provides a skeleton. Moreover, as confirmed by Waldman, von

Clausewitz believed that his theories were always ‘work-in-progress’.

There are linking pins between the Trinities and the Western way of warfare that can be considered as

a blue print for effective and successful warfare. These are, amongst others, the role of the army in the

forming of a society, the direct link between the society and the army in the delivery of the soldiers and

the priority of politics in warfare. What are these linking pins and how can they be operationalised? We

will lard the description of the theoretical framework using the Israeli circumstances and occurrences.

Actually, in On War there is an implicit link between the Trinities and Doctrine. Von Clausewitz describes

elements that can be considered doctrinal e.g. on centres of gravity, defence. It therewith links the

Trinities to doctrines. Moreover, it shows that we need to operationalise the Israeli Doctrine and

describe the constant factors over time. What are the linking pins between the Israeli Trinities and its

Doctrine? An effective and practical Doctrine does translate all this to the battle fields.

It is the strength within and between these three different levels that determine the potential for

success in warfare. We need an understanding of the kinds of wars that Israel has been fighting to be

able to apply our theoretical framework to different circumstances and situations. It allows us to show

the robustness of the theoretical framework. Finally, we will summarise a carefully selected number of

armed conflicts as case studies and we will draw our conclusions. This will provide an alternative

approach to describe the military history of Israel.

Contents

Introduction........................................................................................................................................2

List of Tables .......................................................................................................................................4

List of Figures ......................................................................................................................................4

A Theoretical Framework for Warfare .................................................................................................5

Contribution to Field of Military History ..............................................................................................8

Historiography ....................................................................................................................................9

Trinities – the Level of the Society ..................................................................................................... 12

Western Way of Warfare – the Basic Principles ................................................................................. 21

Doctrine – the Political and Military Arenas ....................................................................................... 26

The Nature of Israeli Wars and Operational Strategies ...................................................................... 31

Israeli Wars ....................................................................................................................................... 35

1947-1948 War – The Beginning of the Trinities ............................................................................ 36

The 1967 War – Alignment of Trinities, Western way of warfare and Israeli Doctrine .................... 38

The 1967-1970 War of Attrition – Counter Doctrinal Behaviour and the Weakening of the Trinities

..................................................................................................................................................... 41

The 1973 War – Cracks in the Doctrine and Blurring of the Roles ................................................... 43

The Gaza War 2014 – Adaptation of the Practical Doctrine ............................................................ 46

Conclusions....................................................................................................................................... 49

Abstract ............................................................................................................................................ 51

Appendix 1: Qibya (1953) – Always Retaliate Excessively .................................................................. 52

Appendix 2: Israel – Facts and Figures ............................................................................................... 55

Bibliography...................................................................................................................................... 57

List of Tables

Table 1 Examples of Israeli Politicians with Military Backgrounds ...................................................... 18

Table 2 Major Wars of Israel ............................................................................................................. 34

Table 3 1947-1948 War ..................................................................................................................... 36

Table 4 1967 War .............................................................................................................................. 38

Table 5 1967-1970 War of Attrition ................................................................................................... 41

Table 6 1973 War .............................................................................................................................. 43

Table 7 Gaza War 2014 ..................................................................................................................... 46

Table 8 Qibya Raid ............................................................................................................................ 52

List of Figures Figure 1 - Theoretical Framework for Warfare – Levels of Alignment ..................................................7

Figure 2 & 2a - 1947-1948 War ......................................................................................................... 36

Figure 3, 3a & 3b - 1967 War............................................................................................................. 38

Figure 4 – 1967-1970 War of Attrition ............................................................................................... 41

Figure 5, 5a, 5b & 5c - The 1973 War................................................................................................. 43

Figure 6 - The Gaza Strip ................................................................................................................... 46

Figure 7 - Rocket Ranges from the Gaza Strip .................................................................................... 47

Figure 8 - Population Density Israel ................................................................................................... 55

Figure 9, 9a & 9b - Rocket Ranges ..................................................................................................... 56

A Theoretical Framework for Warfare

In this chapter we will introduce the three levels of the theoretical framework and the interactions

within and between the levels. We will argue that the strength of the interactions, the so-called

alignment, explains the level of success in warfare.

It seems remarkable that a country of the size of Israel and with its geographical and socio-economic

features has been able to survive since its creation in 1948. The balance-of-power seems to be in favour

of the combined Arab states but they have not been able to defeat or destroy Israel. Actually, Israel

has developed into a major player for the hegemony in the Middle East, has not been involved in any

major interstate wars since 19821 and even the threat from Palestinian and other groups seems to be

under control.

Are we able to develop an encompassing theoretical framework to explain success in warfare? Our

main aim is to provide an alternative approach for describing and analysing the military history of Israel

by using a three-level theoretical framework. This will allow us to understand Israeli military successes

and will also provide us with a better framework for comparative analyses. Arab-Israeli wars have

already been described very comprehensively but for several reasons lack comparative analyses which

could actually give us better insights in and understanding of the nature of the conflicts between Israel

and its neighbours2. It also allows us to identify the historical factors that show continuity in the way

Israel approaches armed conflicts apart from what is widely mentioned as the Israeli Doctrine.

The success of Israel from a military perspective in winning many crucial wars since 1947, however not

all of them and albeit not always perceived as such because of the interference with political and public

views, will be analysed by using a tree level approach: the Clausewitzian trinities, the Western way of

warfare and a practical Doctrine. We will look at the alignment within each of these levels and between

the different levels3.

This approach can be used for describing the history of and analysing all the armed conflicts of Israel

but we will limit it to the wars of 1947-1948, being a founding war in every aspect, the 1967 war of

manoeuvrability and of strong alignment of the three levels, the war of attrition (1967-1972), being a

low-intensity war that would eventually led to the lesser alignment of the levels, the 1973 war, showing

a strong realignment and finally the Gaza War of 2014, a war of low-intensity and showing the

adaptability of the practical Doctrine. We have chosen wars with a different nature to demonstrate the

applicability of the theoretical framework and to demonstrate how the Trinities have been built,

established and how they changed4.

Moreover, we will use the Qibya operation, being a reprisal mission and considered a watershed in the

Israeli reprisal policies to demonstrate the pervasiveness of some elements of the Doctrine in this case

‘always retaliate excessively’ and for the interested reader we have described that case that can be

found in Appendix 2. We are not describing other conflicts that Israel was or is involved in such as the

Intifadas. They may be interesting for the shifts in the Trinities and the applicability of the Doctrine but

are e.g. considered as situations of civil unrest. However, the impact of the Intifadas is important for

1 It can be argued that the 2nd Lebanon wars is not an interstate war but an engagement in a civil war. 2 (Rodman, 2000). Page 116. Rodman provides several reasons: “the Arab-Israeli wars are quite different from each other in a number of readily apparent respects. Not only do their particular diplomatic backgrounds and consequences vary, but they also display evident dissimilarities with respect to duration and intensity”. 3 Of course, Israel did face serious problems in the 1982 and 2006 wars in Lebanon and that can actually also be explained by our theoretical framework e.g. in 1982 amongst others the ‘blurring’ of the political and military roles had a negative effect. Besides, Israel for quite some time was not able to suppress the Intifadas. However, our focus is on armed conflicts and not on violent uprisings and its suppression. Although we believe that the framework can also be operationalised for these conflicts. Something worthwhile for further investigation. 4 The intention is to eventually use the tool to describe the complete military history of Israel.

the way the IDF innovates its Doctrine and that again is seriously affecting the results of the Gaza War

of 2014.

Israel is a parliamentary democracy, based on Western political, cultural and philosophical principles.

However, it has adapted its political, economic and military strategies to encounter the specificities of

the region. Moreover, it has to cope with closed borders and very limited economic and social

interaction with its neighbours, with the exception of the Palestinian territories and the Gaza Strip5.

Israel controls the latter in almost every military and economic aspect. Israel differs, as we will see,

from its Arab adversaries in its strong alignment between the Trinity People-Army-Government

towards the Trinity of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity towards the ‘Arab Threat’. This is the

first level of the three-level framework.

The second level is the way in which the country prepares for and fights its wars. The so-called Western

way of warfare is based on the analyses of Parker. He identified what he called five essential aspects

of the Western way of war: a combination of technology, discipline, an aggressive military tradition,

an extraordinary capacity to respond to challenges and the optimal use and mobilisation of resources

to fight these wars e.g. capital and capital providing structures6. These will be applied to the Israeli

situation e.g. the use of capital could be replaced by the optimal mobilisation of resources and the

society at large. Actually, this fifth aspect explicitly links the Western way of warfare to the trinities.

The third level is how Israel actually fights its wars and is called the Doctrine. It can be interpreted as a

further operationalization of the Western way of warfare but it differs per country because of the

adaptation to the specific Israeli situation, the specificities of its adversaries and the alignment with its

allies. The Israeli Doctrine is foremost a practical doctrine and not a theoretical concept. The design

finds its origins in the 1950s and has been further developed since then7. The Doctrine has two aspects

that link it directly to the Trinities: the alignment with the People and the Government and the

unambiguous and unquestioned primacy of the authority and final decision making of the civilian

leadership i.e. the continuation of politics with other means.

At the same time there are situations or trends that could require a realignment of the Trinity People-

Army-Government, the underlying principle of a successful Doctrine. The Israeli Doctrine, that is built

on the Trinities (strategic level), the primacy of the politicians taking the decisions (strategic level), an

offensive-defensive military strategy (operational level), strong deterrence (strategic level), always

fighting on enemy soil (operational level and tactics), never lose a battle (operational level and tactics),

always retaliate extremely (tactics), although never officially proclaimed, is always adhered to even in

the light of shifts in the Trinities e.g. from the old civil religion to the new civil religion as we will see

below. It does apparently not affect the constants that can be identified and that constitute the

practical Doctrine in the Israeli encounters in the political and military arenas.

Apart from alignment within each level it is also important for success that there is an alignment

between the three levels (see figure 1). It is difficult to have success in warfare when there is no

alignment between e.g. the first and third level as we have seen in the Vietnam War. It is widely

recognised that the public opinion in the USA has substantially contributed to the ending of the war.

Summer made a good analysis and was one of the first to use the derived trinity as a descriptive and

5 Egypt is the only country that has a kind of trade relation with Israel. But only ranked as 43th export partner and 53th import partner. 6 (Parker, 2005). Pages 1-11, Introduction. 7 As we will see Israel adopted the Western way of warfare and started developing the Doctrine at the same, shortly after the foundation of the state of Israel.

analytical tool8. However, he did not use the alignment with the other two levels. The difference is that

we are using a three-level approach by adding the Western way of warfare and a practical Doctrine.

Figure 1 - Theoretical Framework for Warfare – Levels of Alignment

On a final note in this section. As none of the adversaries seems to be able to dominate the region and

become the hegemonic power, the conflict(s), both armed and political will indeterminate continue

including major wars9. The Arabi-Israeli conflict still continues and also the risks of both High Intensity

and Low Intensity wars remain substantial. Although there are peace arrangements with Egypt and

Jordan that does not guarantee that war is not a realistic option anymore for the continuation of

politics with other means10. In that respect the theoretical framework stays relevant for the case of

Israel.

8 (Summers, 1982). Summers provides a thorough analyses of the Vietnam War in which he used von Clausewitz to explain the results of the American war efforts. The conclusion that can be drawn is that whatever claim to success the USA made afterwards it is clear that it did not reach its political and military objectives. Communism ruled the country and although the combined Vietcong and North Vietnamese Forces were seriously weakened and even considered beaten, they eventually won the war, politically and military, by conquering South Vietnam 9 (Ben-Horin & Posen, 1981). Page 4. 10 (Eilam, Israel's Future Wars: Military and Political Aspects of Israel's Coming Wars, 2016) and (Eilam, The Next War Between Israel and Egypt: Examining a High Intensity War Between Two of the Strongest Militaries in the Middle East, 2014). Interesting in this respect is that Eilam has described possible scenarios of future interstate wars with Egypt and Iran and he seems to conclude that these wars may be inevitable in the future.

Israeli Levels of Alignment (illustrative)

Wes

tern

Way

of

War

fare

Basi

c Pr

inci

ples

Trin

ities

Nat

ion

in A

rms

Prac

tica

l Doc

trin

eRu

les

PeopleArmy

Goverment

TechnologyDiscipline

Challenge & Response

Agressive Military

Tradition

RuleDeterrence

RuleRetaliation

RuleOffensive-Defensive Strategy

RuleNever lose

a Battle

RuleAuthority of Civilian

Leader

RuleFight on

Enemy Soil

Capital

LegendaLines of Alignment

Contribution to Field of Military History

The objective of this study is to develop and test a new and innovative theoretical approach to describe

the military history of a country and we will test the hypotheses to the case of Israel. Therewith we also

contribute to a better understanding of the results in the military history of Israel. This has not been

done before. In the next chapter we will give an overview of the literature and therewith justify that

our approach is different and adds to the understanding of the factors that explain successes of Israel

in warfare. It will allow for a better description and explanations because it combines the actors in the

nation-state, the basic principles of its warfare and its operational strength. This will lead to an

innovative view on the military history of Israel.

Military history is a very broad discipline and can be approached from many different angels as we do

see from the historiography below and the description of the subsequent relevance for this study. It

can be approached from almost every other discipline that involves e.g. human and societal

interactions, innovation and technology, psychology. It can be descriptive from the tactical levels, to

operational art, strategy and to the impact on societies and mankind11.

Also, it has as much to do with the interest in a particular aspect as with personal taste, political beliefs

and sometimes with conceptual rigidness. Does this mean that also scientists often approach the

discipline with blinkers? The answer is always yes and this is not strange because war and violent

conflicts touches upon every aspect of a society and does affect the emotions and motivations of

people in a very strong but different way. Even historians are human beings embedded in their

personal environment and their societies at large. However, the greatest asset of a historian is that he

is able to judge insights, observations and conclusions from others on its merits.

That is what we do with our description of the military history of Israel and what are actually our

contributions and achievements to the field. We want to use a deeper theoretical approach to describe

the military history of a country and therewith create a better understanding of how the violent

interactions developed, resulted in the described results and show some ‘consistency’ in the approach

to warfare. We do this by developing an all-encompassing theoretical framework that is not only

different from Parker’s i.e. not drawing conclusions from the facts afterwards (also nothing wrong with

that) but testing a beforehand described framework, which is actually touching upon every aspect of

a nation and its approach to war. This has never been done before and provides us with valuable

insights in the military history of Israel. It describes the history of the interwovenness of a society, the

‘war machines’ and the actual implementation of politics with other means, war, before, during and

after. It has moreover some side effects that may not be considered military history e.g. relevance for

war games/planning but so be it. Relevant science always has applied effects.

11 (Huges & Philpott, 2006). Bourke elaborates in chapter 13 on the different schools of war writing and in particular on what is called new military history.

Historiography

In this chapter we will give an overview of the literature and therewith justify that our approach is

different and adds to the understanding of the factors that explain successes in warfare. Besides, we

will build on the findings in the different fields and disciplines for our innovative description of the

military history of Israel12.

There are many popular and scientific publications on Israeli wars that we will use for our description

of the Israeli military history each within their respective fields accordingly i.e. to use an encompassing

theoretical framework for our description of the Israeli military history.

Descriptive publications often provide a very detailed historiographic narrative of one of the wars e.g.

Oren on the 1967 War in which he provides facts and motives. He also clearly puts the 1967 as a war

of history and provides the effects on the aftermath1. Others provide descriptions of all the conflicts

often as a continuation of the ongoing conflict between the Arabs and Israelis e.g. Bregman. He

provides an in-depth analysis of each conflict and interestingly he also gives, to a certain extent, the

impact on the Israeli society13. More recently Eilam as provided an extensive overview of the military

history of the Israeli strategy and Doctrine but he does not sufficiently analyse the interaction between

the society, the army and the government in the development of the strategy and Doctrine14. The same

can be said of Murray (and others) on the development of the Israeli strategy by the state and the

rulers15. However, it gives us a good insight on the strategic level.

It should have been expected from Herzog that he could have provided an insight in the alignment of

People-Army-Government towards the Arab threat but he mainly provides a narrative of the Israeli

wars and its consequences for the landscape of the Middle East16. Others provide an extensive

narrative but are choosing sides e.g. Filiu. He describes the history of Gaza from a Palestinian society

perspective. Well written with interesting angles and therewith providing an insight in the thoughts

and motives of the Palestinians. There are many historiographical descriptions of Israel in which the

armed conflicts often have a prominent place e.g. Shapira who tries to provide an analysis of the

changing character of the Israeli society as a result of the wars and vice versa17. This provides valuable

insights for understanding the Trinities.

Although descriptive publications may address both military and political considerations and objectives

they hardly address it from a point of view of explaining the results by the alignment of the People-

Army-Government perspective. They lack a theoretical framework that allows for a comprehensive

explanation of the results of the Israeli wars necessary to provide an explanatory description of the

Israeli military history.

Then there are historians that, often comprehensively focus on the Israeli Way of Warfare and the

Doctrine e.g. Oren who provides an explanation of the shift towards an offensive-defensive military

strategy18. Others provide an overview of what they consider as the Israeli Doctrine and often explain

12 We used a very elaborate table to assess the state of the art of the historiography, show the relevance and usability for this study. The format that we used:

Source Descriptive Trinities Western Way Doctrine Other

Oren XX Relevance society Blurring

Olsen Technology

Eilam1 X X XX

13 (Oren, Barak, & Shapira, 2013) 14 (Eilam, Israel's Way of War - a Strategic and Operational Analysis, 1948-2014, 2016) 15 (Murray, Knox, & (eds.), 1994). Pages 534-578 16 (Herzog, 2010) 17 (Shapira, 2014) 18 (Oren, Barak, & Shapira, 2013)

the military successes e.g. Ben-Orin19. Interesting is that it gives the impression that the description

can also be used as a guideline of a successful doctrine. Also, again Eilam gives us some clues on the

Israeli Doctrine and relevant is that he links it to the different kinds of armed conflicts Israel was and is

engaged in. Also, his definition of the kinds of war is useful for our purposes20.

Sometimes it leads to interesting approaches e.g. Kober who focuses on the formative factors of the

Israeli military thought and tries to quantify this by looking at the number of publications on the

different subjects, drawing conclusions on the intellectuality of the IDF21. In that respect his publication

on the Wars of attrition is more relevant for our approach as it gives insights in elements of the

alignment of People-Army-Government. He explains the successes amongst others from the society

perspective22.

There are also publications that focus on a single aspect of the Doctrine without placing this in the total

Doctrine e.g. Catagnani who describes Israeli counterinsurgency23. Another example is Olsen who

focusses on the air superiority of the IAF and explains its strategy and Doctrine from a Western way of

warfare. He even goes back to the experiences of both the RAF and Luftwaffe during WWII. However,

for our purposes relevant is that he links the Western way of warfare to a doctrine24. Both very useful

from a descriptive and impact point of analyses25. However, although some provide a theoretical

framework as a starting point, they mainly focus on only a limited number of aspects.

It is worthwhile to look at publications that focus on the future sustainability of the Israeli Way of

Warfare as these often provide an insight in the durability of the Western way of warfare and the

Israeli Doctrine. Especially again Eilum has published interesting insights on the future wars of Israel in

general and in particular with Egypt and Iran26.

Some writers are considered authorities on the Israeli military history. Van Creveld provides us with

valuable insights27. He and also Eilum and Kober provide us with interesting links between military (and

political) theoreticians e.g. von Clausewitz, Jomini. Moreover, Van Creveld describes the development

of the IDF and that is important for our analyses because the IDF is not only a war machine build on

Western way of warfare principles but also the building block in the alignment of People-Army-

Government and the building of the nation-in-arms Israel28.

There are many publications on von Clausewitz but we find Waldman very useful as he provides us

with an elaborate treatise on the Trinities and gives insight in the interrelations of the Trinities he does

not link this to the way of warfare and the battlefields29. What is lacking is that there is no clear

theoretical framework that links the three levels together that explain the results of the Israeli wars30.

The three-level approach combines all of the above insights and allows us to explain situations from

the level of alignment within and between the three levels. It explains that a nation-state, with crucial

inferiority in certain strategic fields can survive and even have historical victories in wars. It is because

19 (Ben-Horin & Posen, 1981) 20 (Eilam, Israel's Way of War - a Strategic and Operational Analysis, 1948-2014, 2016) 21 (Kober, Practical Soldiers - Israel's Military Thought and Its Formative Factors, 2016) 22 (Kober, Israel's Wars of Attrition, 2009) 23 (Rich & Duyvesteyn, 2012) 24 (Olsen, 2010) 25 (Wilson, 2013) 26 (Eilam, Israel's Future Wars: Military and Political Aspects of Israel's Coming Wars, 2016) & (Eilam, The Next War Between Israel and Egypt: Examining a High Intensity War Between Two of the Strongest Militaries in the Middle East, 2014) 27 (Creveld, More on War, 2017) & (Creveld, The Transformation of War, 1991) 28 (Creveld, The Land of Blood and Honey, 2010) 29 (Waldman, 2009). 30 (Summers, 1982). Although Summer is providing some evidence that such an approach is feasible.

of the alignment of the Trinity People-Army-Government in the primordial violence, hatred, and enmity

towards a perceived existential threat. It is because it has adapted to the Western way of warfare and

made the necessary innovations. It is because of the adherence to a practical Doctrine adapted to all

the circumstances. And, most importantly, it is because these three levels are aligned and are all

geared to the military and often political ‘defeat’ of the Arabs.

We believe that it is important to use a comprehensive three level theoretical framework of these

factors that determine the level of success and allow us to contribute to a better description of the

Israeli military history and the scientific validation of the explanations of the military successes of

Israel.

There are so many further interesting research questions arising in many directions. Can the

theoretical framework also be used for describing and explaining the military history of other countries

and in other time frames? Moreover, how could we add extra evidence by quantifying the different

alignments? A more statistical approach as for example has been done by Kober would be interesting31.

Imagine that you would be able to measure the effect of changes in one level, keeping the others

constant. That would lead to a tool to actually design the levels in such a way that it will lead to success.

31 (Kober, Practical Soldiers - Israel's Military Thought and Its Formative Factors, 2016). On some of the aspects of the Western way of warfare and Israeli Doctrine but not on the Trinities.

Trinities – the Level of the Society

In this chapter we will answer the question how to operationalise the (derived) Trinities of von

Clausewitz. It is allowed to further elaborate on his very short description in On War because it is only

a skeleton. We will specifically elaborate on the position of the IDF and the blurring of the roles between

politics and military in the Israeli military history.

In On War Carl von Clausewitz provides a descriptive theory on the art and nature of war. This resulted

in a standard work that even as of today has validity and is still widely used in academic and (military)

practical discourses. It is proposed to use his concept of the trinities, and in particular the alignment

of the derived Trinity People-Army-Government, to describe the Israeli military history.

In ‘Vom Kriege’32 van Carl von Clausewitz addresses what he regards as the paradoxical trinity

(Dreifaltigheit) of war in a concise section of merely 300 words33. In summary:

1. ”Ursprünglichen Gewaltsamkeit seines Elementes, dem Haβ und der Feindschaft die wie ein blinder

Naturtrieb anzusehen sind ….

Die erste dieser drei Seiten ist mehr dem Volke

2. aus dem Spiel der Wahrscheinlichkeiten und des Zufalls, die ihn zu einer freien Seelentätigkeit

machen ….

Die zweite mehr dem Feldherrn und seinem Heer

3. aus der untergeordneten Natur eines politischen Werkzeuges, wodurch er dem bloβen Verstande

anheimfällt….

Die dritte mehr der Regierung zugewende”34.

Moreover, it is important that ... “Diesen drei Tendenzen, als ebenso viele verschiedene

Gesetzgebungen erscheinen…”35. This provides us with the first indication of the derived Trinity.

Besides, it should be realised that von Clausewitz intention is to elaborate on a descriptive theory not

as a guideline for warfare. Our purpose however is to be theoretical (theoretical framework),

descriptive (case of Israel) and even evolve into practical (guidelines)36. This will be the starting point

for the use of the trinities to describe the factors that are constituting the success of Israel, a country

in many aspects the underdog in its armed conflicts with its neighbours.

We have further developed these trinities into the following derived trinities, and already applied to

the Israeli situation, in which we consider what von Clausewitz names “dem Spiel der

Wahrscheinlichkeiten und des Zufalls” as being on the operational level i.e. the Doctrine and the others

on the level of the Society:

32 Vom Kriege was written after the Napoleonic wars and published posthumously in 1832. However, just up to his death von Clausewitz was still reviewing and amending it. 33 (Clausewitz, Vom Kriege, 1832). The original text because it is felt that in the leading translations some of the meaning is lost in the best translation to date (Clausewitz, On War, 1989). The concepts of e.g. Feldherrn und seinem Heer are not properly translated. 34 (Clausewitz, Vom Kriege, 1832). Book 1 section 28, Resultat für die Theorie. Many treatises have been written on this particular section and there is also discussion on the translations and interpretations. Therefore, at this particular point the original text is used. Further on mainly the translated text and interpretations of Howard/Paret will be used. 35 (Clausewitz, Vom Kriege, 1832), Book 1 section 28. 36 (Waldman, 2009). Page 382. He provides an explanation of the trinities and its relevance in every aspect of warfare. He actually says that: “These three tendencies are like three different codes of law, deep-rooted in their subject and yet variable in their relationship to one another. A theory that ignores any one of them or seeks to fix an arbitrary relationship among them would conflict with reality to such an extent that for this reason alone it would be totally useless…. The task, therefore, is to keep our theory [of war] floating among these three tendencies, as among three points of attraction”.

1. The Israeli People, the IDF and the Israeli Government are unconditional aligned and united in the

Trinity of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity towards the ‘Arab Threat’

2. The elements of the Israeli strategic and military Doctrine (explicitly and implicitly) address the

‘Spiel der Wahrscheinlichkeiten und des Zufalls’

3. In Israeli war situations the Government is the owner and the final decision maker of the political

and military objectives.

In that respect war and violence are considered instruments. War indeed seems to be a real

continuation of politics with other means in which the political object is the goal and war a means of

achieving that goal.37.

On the first characteristic it is important that this is a derived trinity from von Clausewitz although he mentions “dem Volke, dem Feldherrn und seinem Heer and der Regierung” when he introduces the paradoxical trinity. This has apparently evolved in an understanding of the trinity as being People-Army-Government, however not mentioned as such by von Clausewitz38. According to him it is the task of the military theorist to develop a theory that maintains a balance among the trinity of war i.e. the people, the government, and the army39. It looks like he actually introduces the concept of alignment. The friction between these three and the way they stay aligned actually explain the successes in conflicts. It is argued by Kober to expand this trinity because von Clausewitz underestimated the importance of technology and according to him it is or at least as become a decisive factor40. This is however, to our opinion, a misconception of the trinities as the latter is about the interplay between the fundamental aspects of a society during armed conflicts, between the people, being the justification for the existence of the state, the government as the guardians and executors of the objectives of the state and the army, the executors in times of war. Moreover, changes in society, economy, (military) technology and politics do enter the equation through People-Army-Government. Also, the existence of a Military Industrial Complex will automatically align with the eventual alignment of People-Army-Government as we will see below. Moreover, in our three-level approach technology does have a prominent place as it is within the Western way of war level. However, it should not be considered as the most important factor for explaining the successes as can be illustrated by the 1973 War in which the Arab states had the availability of large quantities of sophisticated technology and substantially more than Israel41. However, after a difficult first phase of the war the odds returned to Israel and it managed not to be defeated, evaporate the military objectives of the Arab states and keep the spoils of the 1967 War. Apart from the trinities on the Society level Clausewitz provides other interesting insights on the strategic, operational and tactical levels. These insights will be used were appropriate e.g. the genius of Israeli military leadership. Other aspects can be found in the Doctrine. The strong alignment of the Trinity People-Army-Government contributes and is essential for the successes of Israel in its armed conflicts in the Middle East. However, the IDF seems to have a central position in the Trinity as it has been instrumental, even leading in the building of the nation-state.

37 (Clausewitz, On War, 1989). Page 87. 38 (Summers, 1982). On www.clausewitz.com Bassford and Villacres explain: “Definition of the trinity as "people, army, and government" seems to have originated in Harry Summers's important and influential study, On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War (1982). This version of Clausewitz's concept was derived from a secondary discussion in which Clausewitz developed a linkage between his "remarkable trinity" of war (violent emotion, chance, and rational policy) and the social trinity of people, army, and government. It appears in the introduction to Summers’s book: "The task of the military theorist, Clausewitz said, is to develop a theory that maintains a balance among what he calls a trinity of war—the people, the government, and the Army””. 39 (Summers, 1982). Introduction 40 (Kober, Practical Soldiers - Israel's Military Thought and Its Formative Factors, 2016). Page 27. 41 (Parker, 2005). Page 2. Parker rightly concludes: “Even in the twentieth century, the outcome of wars has been determined Iess by technology than by better war plans, the achievement of surprise, greater economic strength and, above all, superior discipline”.

http://www.clausewitz.com/

Yigal Allon (1918-1980)42 was very clear on the position of the IDF as he stated that: “Considering the unorthodox composition and values of the underground movements which had so recently coalesced into an army, it was perhaps only natural that the Israel Defence Forces be chosen to serve as an important instrument for the rehabilitation and acclimatization of the newcomers. Granted, it was not the standard job of an army to teach immigrants to read and write or to master a new language, to man playgrounds for children, to run soup kitchens or to act as a living bridge between different cultures; but then, this was not destined”43. These diverse and often large non-military functions made it not only the ‘builder’ of the Israeli nation-state but also ensured a symbiotic relation between the army and the people. By all these functions e.g. training paramilitary youth, setting up kibbutzim, emergency relief, absorbing immigrants and even archaeological expeditions it became the school of the Israeli Nation, sometimes considered even more or at least equally important than its military functions44. Yitzhak Rabin (1922-1995)45 confirmed this by saying that: “the world has recognised the fact that the Israeli Defense Forces are different from other armies… [it] … undertakes numerous tasks of peace, tasks not of destruction but of construction and of the strengthening of the Nation’s cultural and moral resources”. However, more striking are his last remarks of the speech in which he clearly indicates the alignment of People-Army: “This Army ... came from the people and will return to the people”46. There is another important aspect to all this and that is the feasibility to successfully engage in the Western way of warfare. This requires that it should be adopted on all levels as is summarised in the Trinity People-Army-Government and in the Doctrine. The IDF had a crucial role in building the other levels and therewith assured an aggressive military tradition as mentioned in the sections on the Western way of warfare. There is a reason to start with the Armed Forces that initiated from the transfer of the paramilitary organisations Irgun and the Lehi (Hagana, Palmach) into the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF). The first actually being the military victors of the 1947-1948 War, a paramilitary organisation driven by full commitment to Zionism and strong motivational drives. At the formation of the IDF it became clear that it would have another important role in the formation of the Israeli nation-state. After the 1947-1948 war the new state experienced the influx of a large number of immigrants from several different countries, with different cultural and historical background and speaking different languages. In 1949 more than 20 European and Asiatic language were listed. All this formed a very fragmented community that the Israeli government wanted to transform from individuals embedded in specific groups to an integrated, cohesive society47. Even a society that could be considered as a continuous nation-in-arms. Ben Gurion (1886-1973)48 saw two major tasks for the newly established IDF. First to create an armed

force that would win future wars and second an instrument to transform the fragmented community

into a nation-state and a cohesive Society. It would act as the educators of people coming from

different backgrounds and cultures and therewith create national unity. The IDF would be the place

where they meet, integrate and create a mutual understanding both newcomers and Jews born in

Israel/Palestine, the so-called Sabra49.

This indeed became the back bone of the Israeli society and together with the fact that the IDF ‘owned

(and still owns)’ the citizens, both men and women, for a long period of their lives it contributed to the

42 (1918-1980). Commander of the Palmach, General in the IDF, acting Prime Minister of Israel, Member of the Knesset and Government Minister. 43 (Allon, 1970). 44 (Creveld, The Land of Blood and Honey, 2010). Page 380 electronic version. 45 Then Israeli Chief of Staff. 46 (Laqueur & (editors), 2008). Pages 110 onward. Speech of Israeli Chief of Staff Yitzhak Rabin (1922-1955) on the occasion of receiving an honorary doctorate: The Right of Israel (June 28, 1967). 47 (Bregman, 2016). Page 44. 48 Both the Prime-Minister and Minister of Defence of the newly founded nation-state of Israel. 49 (Bregman, 2016). Page 45.

successful integration of the different groups. Moreover, it is quite natural that there is a very strong

bond between the society and the military and is actively created as every male serves for at least six

years and females up to two years in the IDF. This implies that the IDF is replicated in the society and

that the IDF can be seen as mirror of the society: “the IDF is the people of Israel in uniform”50’. Even

youth between the ages of 14 and 18 are exposed to military training through a semi-military

framework (Gadna).

This together implied that the Israeli society was enlisted for almost everybody between 14 and in

their 50s51. This is more than interwovenness because it involves also what Parker identified as the

replication of the army into the society, and we would even say the total integration of the social and

economic structures of a society to the way of warfare of a nation and therewith the capacity of

reacting to threats quickly and be able to innovate continuously52. However, it goes further as it also

involves the strong motivation of a whole society to engage in war when needed.

Together with the broadly perceived Trinity of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity towards the

feared ‘Arab Threat’ this strongly contributed to the creation of the Israeli nation-state and established

the IDF in the middle of it. Moreover, this created a strong alignment of the axe People-Army that

lasted up to the end of the 1970s, and is still strong today but to a lesser extent. It could even be argued

that the existence of the nation-state of Israel has only been able to survive because of the ‘Arab

threat’ and the extraordinary role of the IDF. It was and is a nation-in-arms and continuously united in

‘killing the Arab threat’.

The threat enforces the symbiotic relationship between the People-Army. This provides Israel with a

competitive advantage as was seen in the 1967 War were the characteristics of the society enabled

the IDF to create a qualitive advantage, to mobilise effectively and fast and were its soldiers were well

aware of the military strategies and the Doctrine. A highly professional army with well trained and

highly motivated soldiers53. To a great extent this is still valid today.

This was certainly the case up to the eighties of the twentieth century when some indicators showed

that the Trinity was becoming less aligned. Interesting are the conclusions of Levy and others that there

was a shift in the models of citizenship and in particularly regarding the then considered backbone of

the military the Ashkenazi54. They were apparently less motivated to carry the burden of military

conflicts55. The shift in the model of citizenship from obligatory militarism to contractual militarism,

from the perception of an unconditioned, mandatory duty to the fulfilment of the individual’s

ambitions and interests looks as a fracture in the Trinity. Therewith it may seriously have affected the

Trinity and the existing strategic Doctrine of the government. However, as the 2014 Gaza War shows

when the ‘threat’ is perceived existential then the Trinity realigns quickly and becomes even stronger.

We consider these fractures merely as renegotiations between People-Army-Government to ensure

again its strong unity.

50 (Bregman, 2016). Page 47. 51 The provisions of the national service law were approved in the Knesset in 1949 and has been amended but actually remains mostly unchanged up to today. The Israeli society is enlisted on the following levels: 1. A standing army of 30% of the available manpower i.e. conscripts, 2. A reserve body providing the quantitative component that can be mobilised quickly, is well trained, are highly motivated and enabling to give a numerical advantage 3. Professional component consisting of career personnel of whom most serve in the navy and the air force. 52 (Parker, 2005). Page 8. 53 (Horowitz, 1970). Pages 203-204. 54 Ashkenazi are Jews that mostly originate from Eastern Europe. 55 (Levy, Lomsky-Feder, & Harel, 2007). Page 127.

In the fog of war matters get blurred, communication lines are getting distorted, emotions enter rational thinking and people and therewith institutions fall back into their natural habitat and comfort zones. Moreover, People-Army-Government have different internal lines of communication, very often other means of communication and very often speak a different ‘language’. All this can lead to serious misconceptions and miscommunication between People-Army-Government and therewith seriously affect the outcome of armed conflicts and subsequent actions in the aftermath. However, since its inception in 1948 a very substantial number of the politicians and top-administrators have their roots in the armed forces or before had extensive and intensive battle field experience in their countries of origin. Israeli general staff and politicians therefore have a common language and perception of the strategic political and military objectives, possibilities, limitations and opportunities. The IDF, had the responsibility of providing language training to newcomers and during the conscript periods must have infected this training with military concepts and jargon. The intermingling can be best illustrated by the military background, battle experience and military leadership of prominent Israeli politicians. Although during the 1967 War, which is often regarded as Israeli most successful, the Prime-Minister was Eskol, with hardly any military experience. However, the then Minister of Defence was Moshe Dayan, although only appointed on the 5th of June, and this ensured the tradition of military leaders becoming politicians. In the circumstances of Israel, the intermingling of the military with politics and the central position of the IDF in the building of the nation-state, never resulted in the establishment of a totalitarian dictatorship, as in some of the Arab countries. The population enjoyed a large level of freedom to express itself, although there was often military censorship on press releases and communication from the front to the home front, universities have freedom of education and research56. It is argued that Israel contained a strong division of roles and tasks between the People-Army-Government according to Western democratic traditions and that this in fact contributed to the strong alignment of the Trinities. The alignment was not enforced but was and is built from the strengths of the three parts and the strong perception of common objectives to counter the anticipated threats. It is the result of free and unrestricted ‘negotiations’ to reach a strong alignment. Contrary to most of its Arab adversaries Israel has seen Military Commanders that have substantially contributed to the successes of the Israeli high and low intensity wars. They were trained in the Western way of warfare, very motivated, having tactical battle experience and also strongly believed in the case of Zionism. The intermingling of the roles at least assured that on the Army-Government axe there was knowledge and understanding of the Western way of warfare and the Doctrine. However, that does not mean that there was always agreement on the implementation as is clearly described in several publications57. Several Israeli military leaders have shown, what von Clausewitz considers crucial for successes in warfare and that is geniality58. Ariel Sharon (1928-2014) is considered an example of someone that reached his position by virtue of practice combined with his character and was able to make the step from knowledge to capability. That made him the most successful military in Israeli military history59. However, also others have shown these capabilities e.g. in particularly Moshe Dayan. He is actually considered one of the greatest generals since 1945 and appears as such in several listings. However, geniality does not always work in another area as was clearly demonstrated when Dayan was involved in politics before and during the 1973 War. The same applies for Sharon looking at his roles and

56 (Creveld, The Land of Blood and Honey, 2010). Page 521 of 1109 57 (Bregman, 2016); (Eilam, Israel's Way of War - a Strategic and Operational Analysis, 1948-2014, 2016); (Herzog, 2010); (Stein, 1988) and so on. 58 The military power of the modern State of Israel is acknowledged worldwide, even by its enemies. The ranks of the Israel Defense Forces have produced extraordinary warriors like Moshe Dayan, Ariel Sharon, Yitzhak Rabin, Yonatan Netanyahu, and many others. The Israeli system, whatever it is, seems to deliver Clausewitzian geniuses. 59 (Creveld, More on War, 2017). Page 32-33 of 1109.

behaviour in the 1982 War. The intermingling of his role as a politician with his former military role did lead to serious problems. The 1982 War is a clear example of the blurring of the roles and the effects on the implementation of

the Doctrine. Sharon, at that time Minister of Defence, did plan a military campaign by the IDF with

extensive objectives of which one was entering Beirut. He acted as if he was the military commander,

understandable of course with his background, but that seriously affected his political strategic

considerations and intentionally that of the other cabinet members. Furthermore, in this self-induced

role of ‘military commander’ he did at no time inform the political leader (Begin), only casually

informed the other unsuspecting cabinet ministers and did not leave decisions to the political leader

in accordance with the Doctrine60. However, this did not only affect every aspect of the Trinity in a

negative way. Sharon may have reached his ‘personal’ objectives but the aftermath of this war did

seriously harm Israel. It was the starting point of the rise of Hezbollah, an enemy that became

eventually better organised and more determined than the PLO. Below an overview of a selected

number of persons to illustrate the intermingling of Army-Government.

Lewin argues that there is a fundamental shift in the paradigm of Israeli politics. A shift from the old civil religion of Mamlachtiut61 to the new civil religion based on a liberal set of religious values as in different settings mentioned by its proponent Shimon Peres. The old civil religion sees ‘taking civic responsibility’ as a virtue that does allow the nation-state to mobilise quickly and effectively the population for both military and state building purposes. On the other hand, the new civil religion is built on liberal beliefs and mobilises the population for peace.62 It could be argued that it also aims for peaceful coexistence. Interesting is that this confirms the validity of the Trinities and the subsequent formulation of the Doctrine up to the earlier mentioned fissure. It is contested that the fissure leading to a “Peres” civil religion seriously affected the strong alignment of People-Army-Government and Doctrine taking into consideration the realities of the ongoing conflicts. If this shift is true than it is actually leading to new negotiations of the Trinity and not a weakening. Besides, culminating in 1977 and in the Lebanese wars of the eighties, it became clear that the

alignment of the People-Army-Government was affected by the long-lasting occupation by Israel of the

West Bank and the Gaza strip, containing the nuclei of the Palestinian society. Moreover, that resulted

in an unexpected outcome of the 1977 elections and the subsequent decline of socialist Zionism and

the uprising of religious militancy, a major landslide63. This is still the case up to the present day.

However, a closer elaboration of the constant values that can be identified in the strong alignment of

the Trinity and the Doctrine will show that these are still leading in the decision-making processes. It is

the Trinity of People-Army-Government that seems to undergo fundamental changes and needs to be

60 (Stein, 1988). Pages 826-829 of 1891. 61 (Oren M. B., Is "Jewish state" a contradiction in terms?, 2003). Oren, at that time ambassador in the USA, but also writer of standard works on the Israeli wars provides an explanation for the term in a lecture he provided at the Shalem Centre in New York in December 2013. He says: ‘The term was first used by Ben-Gurion. Yet, as Ben-Gurion realized, knowing this and acting on it were not synonymous. He understood that the transformation from a people recoiling from power to a people capable of embracing it would be the single greatest challenge facing Israel. “We must adopt a new approach, new habits of mind,” he told listeners shortly before the state’s founding. “We must learn to think like a state.” He even coined a Hebrew word for that challenge, mamlachtiyut, a neologism which eludes English equivalents but which roughly translates as “acting in a sovereign-like manner.” By mamlachtiyut, Ben-Gurion meant the Jews’ ability to handle power—military power as well as democratic and political power—effectively, justly, responsibly. The Jews of Israel, Ben-Gurion knew, might succeed in repelling Arab armies, in absorbing many times their number of new immigrants, and in creating world-class governmental and cultural institutions, but without mamlachtiyut, without the ability to deal with power and take responsibility for its ramifications, they could not ultimately survive”. 62 (Lewin, 2013). Page 81. 63 (Cleveland & Bunton, 2016). Pages 337-338.

newly aligned. However, it will lead to new ‘negotiations’ on the alignment but it is argued that this

will not fundamentally change its alignment: the Israeli People, the IDF and the Israeli Government

are still unconditional united in the Trinity of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity towards the ‘Arab

Threat’. The Gaza wars from 2005-2014 are clear examples were the threat that was actually exercised

did lead to strong pressure on the government for ‘tackling’ the problems and strong support from the

public opinion for the actions of the IDF64.

Table 1 Examples of Israeli Politicians with Military Backgrounds

Name Political Capacity65 Military Capacity Wars / Relevant Military Operations

Remarks

1 Ben Gurion (1886-1973)

PM (1948-1954, 1955-1963) MoD (1948-1963)

Jewish Legion 1947-1948 1956

1. Founder of the State of Israel 2. Founder of the IDF 3. Commissioning Western way of

war

2 Moshe Dayan (1915-1981)

MoD (1967-1974) Various other cabinet positions

Many positions CoGS (1953-1958)

Arab Revolt in Palestine World War II 1947-1948 (Commander) 1956 (CoGS) 1967 (MoD) War of Attrition (MoD) 1973 (MoD)

1. Considered Clausewiztian Genius

2. Important role in Peace negotiations with Egypt

3 Ariel Sharon (1928-2014)

PM (2001-2006) MoD (1981-1983) Various other cabinet positions

Many positions 1947-1948 1956 1967 1973 Reprisal operations 1950’s

1. Created ‘Unit 101’ (led many reprisal operations)

4 Yitzak Rabin (1922-1995)

PM (1974-1977, 1992-1995) MoD (1984-1990, 1992-1995) Various other cabinet positions

Many positions CoGS (1964-1968)

1947-1948 1967

1. Instrumental in shaping the Doctrine in 1950s

5 Benjamin Nethanyahu (1949)

PM 1996-1999, 2009-present) Various other cabinet positions

Special forces (Sayeret Matkal)

1967-1970 1973

1. Highly operational commands 2. Many cross-border raids

6 Ehud Barak (1942)

PM (1999-2001) MoD (1999-2001, 2007-2013) Various other cabinet positions

CoGS (1991-1995) 1967 1973 Operation Entebbe

1. Most decorated soldier in Israeli modern history

This is supported by research findings of Avi Kober, who tested the Israeli society’s perseverance in

wars of attrition using a set of indicators. His conclusion is that it is a myth that the Israeli society is

averse and cannot stand the burdens of long wars of attrition and that it actually showed what he calls

a “high degree of staying power”. It has actually been strengthened because of the continued

experience with this kind of wars and by the successes also in these wars. The perseverance of the

Israeli society actually even became stronger66. He even concludes this contrary to the perceptions of

e.g. Chief of Staff Yallon that the weakest link in Israeli defence is the lack of stamina of the public67.

64 (Bregman, 2016). Pages 326-327. 65 PM=Prime Minister, MoD=Minister of Defence, CoGS=Chief of General Staff 66 (Kober, Israel's Wars of Attrition, 2009). Pages73- 93. 67 (Kober, Israel's Wars of Attrition, 2009). Page 92-93. He provides the following five explanations (at least for wars of attritions): “1. These wars are imposed on Israel and therefore do not cause much public debate on legitimacy 2.Several of these wars, even recent ones like the Intifada’s are regarded as existential threats by the public 3. Israel inflicted the costs and damage most on its adversaries. It fought these wars Post-heroic. Actually, it proves that the earlier mentioned development in the Western way of warfare was effective in some of these wars.

Although the Israeli Trinity may change in the roles and its mutual perceptions, it always stayed

strongly aligned in the ‘Trinity of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity towards the ‘Arab Threat’.

In war and battle the results also depends on how the enemies perform and amongst others on their

strategic, operational and tactical strength, their perseverance and organisational adaptability. We

explain the successes of Israel by the strong alignment of three levels i.e. the alignment of the Trinities,

the Western way of warfare and a practical Doctrine. It is argued that this has led and leads to military

success in all of Israeli conflicts with its neighbours and their alliances. However, this success is only

possible because Israeli enemies are not able to align their three levels in the same way. This provides

an imbalance to the advantage of Israel. Moreover, the enemies have an additional disadvantage that

they also have to align these levels between the different allies. Very often the alliances have worked

counterproductive and allowed Israel to benefit from it by focussing first on one front and thereafter

on the other fronts as is clearly demonstrated in all of its High Intensity wars of 1948, 1956 and 1967.

This was even the case in 1973 when the Arab coalition seemed to have initial success. Moreover,

there was always mistrust between the partners that often resulted in the counterproductive

measures and even measures against each other. ‘Internal’ rivalry has seriously hampered the results

of the different alliances. The common objective of ‘freeing Palestine and helping the Palestinians in

reconquering their home land’ seemed nothing but a political token, although believed by many as

real and genuine. Apparently, the Arab People-Government were not well aligned on this common

objective. There is no alignment in their trinity towards the Israeli threat to the Palestinians. If the Arab

nations would act on what they preach than the actions of the Israeli should have been considered as

casus beli.

The more striking is the behaviour of the Arab states in regard to the Low Intensity wars of Israel

against the Palestinians. There was no military support or very limited interference by Arab nations in

the two Intifadas of 1987-1993 and 2000-2005 and the Gaza wars of 2008-2009, 2012 and 2014. It

even looked that condemnations and economic support were mainly used for propaganda reasons.

Whatever reasons for hardly any interference, the fact is that Israel could go ahead with its military

operations during these Low Intensity wars. It actually reached its political and military objectives and

seems to have matters strongly under control. It is argued that deterrence may work but more that

the Arab states have only a token interest in the liberation of Palestine.

Analysing this behaviour of the Arab states and Arab coalitions supports the following conclusions that

are positively affecting the Israeli political and military strength. The Palestinians are by the majority

of the Arab states considered a threat to their own stability. Jordan faced serious threats to its stability

in 1970-1971 which resulted in the expulsion of the PLO (Black September). In Lebanon the PLO tried

to take power which resulted in a civil war and an invasion by Israel. Moreover, the Palestinians living

on the West Bank and Gaza are considered militant and difficult to keep under control. Why did Egypt

no push harder to have the Gaza Strip to return under its rule in the negotiations after 1973? Why did

it never annex the Gaza Strip during Egyptian occupation? What better then to leave these problems

with Israel and actually therewith Israel becomes de facto an ally of the Arab states. It is even not

unlikely that in case of an eminent defeat of Israel in a war with Iran (not unlikely at present) may

fundamentally alter the alliances as Egypt and Saudi Arabia cannot tolerate the latter threatening its

borders.

There is also another reason for Arab states to ‘tolerate’ Israel and not taking any action (yet). It

increases their operational depth against each other and provides a strong buffer against hegemonic

efforts of the different states in the Middle East e.g. Iran, Iraq (until the Gulf Wars), Saudi Arabia.

4.The more remote the fighting the less it affects the moral in the country 5. The existence of national unity government eased friction in the society and even increased solidarity.”

Actually, Israel being economically, politically and military becoming more the dominant power in the

Middle East and with the strong presences of other Western states seems to stabilize the situation.

Some of Israeli severest enemies of the past are coping with huge internal problems, civil wars,

warlords and so on and are considered failed states68. In 2017 three countries in the region were in the

top 20 of the Fund for Peace: Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan. Especially the first two have been major

players in the High Intensity wars with Israel and often played a more then supportive role in facilitating

and financing its adversaries in Low Intensity wars.

However, the nature of the relationship and interaction between these countries and Israel has

fundamentally changed and therewith also of its military strategic, operational and tactical

engagements: from being facing active military encounters to the danger of spill-over of the troubles

in these countries and terrorist threats. In these cases, some aspects of the Doctrine are less effective

e.g. certain deterrence levels but the Trinity stays strongly aligned. Israel has been able to keep the

problems of the failed states of Syria and Iraq relatively within their respective boundaries. This also

implies that the main military concerns of Israel are with Low Intensity wars and conflicts directly

affecting the content of its Western way of warfare and its Doctrine and having an impact on the

People-Army-Government. However, whatever happens e.g. publicity on atrocities of the IDF, when

the threat becomes imminent the Trinity realigns and unites.

68 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Failed_state. For the purpose of this publication the following definition suffices and can be found on

Wikipedia:

“A failed state is a political body that has disintegrated to a point where basic conditions and responsibilities of a sovereign government no

longer function properly. Likewise, when a nation weakens and its standard of living declines, it introduces the possibility of total governmental

collapse. The Fund for Peace characterizes a failed state as having the following characteristics:

1. Loss of control of its territory, or of the monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force therein

2. Erosion of legitimate authority to make collective decisions

3. Inability to provide public services

4. Inability to interact with other states as a full member of the international community”

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Failed_state

Western Way of Warfare – the Basic Principles

In this chapter we will describe the Western way of warfare considered as an explanation for the

successes of the West in warfare and for its world dominance. We will introduce these basic principles

that have been adopted by Israel and is an explanation for its successes in warfare.

The Western way of warfare, which can be considered as ground rules or a philosophical approach,

combined with the unique Israeli geographical and geopolitical positions are the foundation for the

Israeli Strategic and Military Doctrine. This again combined with the nature of the Israeli nation-state,

a strong alignment of People-Army-Government explains the successes of Israel in armed conflicts.

Culturally, philosophically and politically Israel has its deep roots in Europe. The organisation of the

state is based on European liberal principles: a democracy with a balance of power based on the Trias

Politica. More important in this context is that also its military strategies, doctrines, operational art

and tactics are ‘Western’ which explains its major success in armed conflicts. The Israeli political and

military strategists and the countries leadership explicitly recognized that a modern, Western,

democratic and industrialised nation-state would provide an overriding military advantage. It would

allow for the creation of a technically more competent but also better trained and motivated armed

force69. Moreover, and fundamentally essential, it allows for the replication of the society and the

army. The Israelis did therefore from the start actively embrace the ideas of Western scholars and

military practitioners like Liddell Hart and Orde Wingate70.

It was already on 4 November 1948 that Ben-Gurion asked his military to study Western warfare, its

doctrines, and patterns of fighting71. This was not remarkable, taking into consideration his background

and of his fellow political leaders at that time. It can be further illustrated by the fact that IDF officers

and also citizens were send to France and England for studies at universities and for the best military

training72. Moreover, it will give an understanding of how Israel has been approaching warfare. It is

even argued that this created the cultural and philosophical foundations of Israeli warfare up to the

present day.

The Western way of war is based on superiority in strategy and quality. However, the aspect of

quantitative superiority should not be underestimated as it is essential to have quantitative superiority

at the right moment and place in order to strike against the centres of gravity, to blitz the adversary

and to occupy strategic positions and territories. The 1973 War started as a war of attrition by the Arab

states but through an effective mobilisation and employment of resources, by putting effective war

plans in place, Israel did turn it into a war of manoeuvrability and won the war.

Contrary what is often stated about Israeli inferiority in military and economic capacity the country has

often been able to gain a kind of military quantitative superiority in the crucial phases of its wars by its

‘Prussian’ organisation of mobilisation and the ability to keep its population under arms, well trained

and highly disciplined. In 1967 the success of the Israeli was possible because it had an army that was

trained and developed to Western ideas and standards in which soldiers and officers worked in

integrated teams. Moreover, it is an army based on well-trained professionals with the intellectual

69 (Ben-Horin & Posen, 1981). Page 10. 70 (Ben-Moshe, 1981). Page 369. It is often proclaimed by the Israeli (military) leaders that in particularly they found their inspiration with Captain B. H. Liddell Hart (1895-1970) and the British Army officer Orde Charles Wingate (1903-1944). Ben Moshe’s starting point for a reappraisal of the impact is that ... “It is generally believed that the teachings of the military historian and theoretician, Basil Liddell Hart, had a considerable influence on Israeli military thought and planning. This opinion was spread by Israeli officers, by historians and newsmen and finally by Liddell Hart himself”. 71 (Ben-Gurion, 1972). Page 311. 72 (Allon, 1970).

ability and willingness to study, embrace innovation, use the latest technologies and able to deploy

these73.

Moreover, at the outbreak of the 1967 war the IDF was far superior to the Arab armies’ qualitatively

because of its well trained and highly motivated staff and soldiers. Moreover, it not only possessed but

also integrated and effectively utilised the most modern weaponry. Besides it was able in no time and

efficiently to have a quarter of a million soldiers in the field. Contrary to the Arab states74.

The above is about military superiority and successes in military warfare but it does not explain political

success. Although it may be understood from Clausewitz’ ‘continuity of politics with other means’ that

there is a self-evident link of success in military objectives and political objectives but this is not always

evident. The outcome of the 1956 War was that, although Egypt lost the War, that Nasser was able to

gain substantial and crucial political benefits and gaining a huge prestige in the Middle East as the

leader of the Arab world for the next 11 years75. The same applies for the 1973 War that resulted in

military defeat of Egypt but provided it with some political success.

However, in recent years there has been a fissure in the way Western countries approach armed

conflicts by relying heavily on technology, increased firepower and unmanned encounter. This is called

a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) also embraced by Israel with all the consequences for success in

its Low Intensity conflicts76. Although Israel implemented this, it only had its effects on the innovation

on the tactical levels in dealing with asymmetric warfare and trying to achieve quick results on the

battle fields. However, that innovation did not take place at the strategic and operational level which

had sometimes devastating impact on the military and political results77. However, still the alignment

of the Trinities and the strength of the Doctrine remained stable.

Moreover, although it has been argued that Western democracies tire in wars of attrition and that its

societies are becoming more and more war averse compared to other societies empirical evidence

does not support this. Western democracies keep on winning their wars because their political systems

are more geared to choose wars that they can actually win, a kind of strong alignment of the Trinities

or as Kober states “relatively harmonious civil-military relations”. Moreover, they are still superior in

military strategy, operational art and tactics and the other aspects of the Western way of warfare as

identified by Parker. It is however misperceptions of the resilience of the population when politicians

see this differently78.

Even today Israel has no problem in mobilising its reserves and resources against the ‘Arab threat’.

However, that does not mean that there is no room for criticism. Israel has also the common practice

that after every war an investigating commission is established that puts recommendations in place

that are most of the time followed. However, that does not imply that it always contributed to the

factors that explained the successes of the Israeli in warfare and was clearly shown by implementing

73 (Parker, 2005) 74 (Creveld, The Land of Blood and Honey, 2010). Page 396. (Electronic version). He mentioned that the Israeli army had the availability of the latest of modern weapons e.g. supersonic fighters, fighter bombers, tanks, and self-propelled artillery. 75 (Parker, 2005). Pages 385-386. 76 (Kober, From Heroic to Post-Heroic Warfare, 2016). Therewith it changed the nature of the battlefield. The underlying principles of what is often called Post-Heroic warfare are according to Kober: “1. Avoid casualties among own forces 2. Avoid innocent civilian casualties 3. Avoid the use of excessive force 4. Bridging effectiveness and morality 5. Sparing the life of enemy troops” 77 (Rich & Duyvesteyn, 2012). Page 264. 78 (Kober, Israel's Wars of Attrition, 2009). Pages 72-73

the concepts emerging from the RMA. However, implementing RMA is not sufficient because it also

requires a theoretical and strategic framework to fully benefit from the possibilities of this so-called

revolution. It took Israel too long to develop this79. The heavy reliance on RMA and firepower, did not

lead to the expected success in the 2006 War mainly because of the lack of this.

However, thereafter Israel has been successful in adopting its strategies, operations and tactics using

the developments in RMA and in the changed predominance of its adversaries being non-state actors

in Low Intensity wars. Especially its successes in the Gaza war from 2012 do illustrate this. They are

illustrative for the long-lasting policy and typical for the Western way of warfare in regard to these

wars:

1. Preventive offensive operations against counterinsurgent and terrorist organisations

2. Pre-emptive defensive operations to disrupt attacks and

3. Punishing reprisal operations also to deter80.

An important principle of the success of the Western way of warfare is the ability to change and

reproduce the new, often new and innovative techniques into strategies, operational art, tactics and

techniques that are often unfamiliar to practice81. Innovation is the key. Rosen defines military

innovation as “a change in the concepts of operation of [a] combat arm, [in] the ideas governing the

ways it uses its forces to win a campaign...[and] in the relation of that combat arm to other combat

arms”. It seems to be widely believed that especially combat experience is responsible for innovation

by military learning and subsequent innovation82. However, for the Arab-Israeli conflicts it is mainly

Israel that is putting this into practice as we will see below.

The next principle is not only the possession but also the effective use of superior technology often

necessary to compensate inferior numbers as sometimes was the case with Israel. However,

technology is not the most important factor of the five principles and should always be seen in

comparison with the level of technology of the adversaries. Interesting is that Israel did not always

have (unlimited) access to channels to acquire the latest technology and sufficient military equipment.

It suffered heavily from weapon embargo’s as is clearly demonstrated in the 1950s, 1960s and to a

certain level in the 1970s. Its adversaries were often receiving massive arms deliveries especially up to

the 1980s from the Soviet bloc. Even after the massive loss of military equipment in the 1967 war the

losses of Egypt were replenished within a few months83. However, the Israeli-USA alliance became

stronger as of the 1970s and therewith the level of economic and military aid increased substantially84.

Israel being almost continuously in a state of war used the following alternative sources to replenish

its weaponry. In the first place Israel benefited from large volumes of war booty. The advantage of Blitz

is that adversaries often leave substantial number of arms behind as was the case in the 1956 war in

which the casus belli actually was the huge Egyptian-Czech arms deal. It provided Egypt with a large

79 (Adamsky, 2010). Summary. 80 (Rich & Duyvesteyn, 2012). Pages 264-265. 81 (Parker, 2005). Page 6-7. 82 (Rosen, 1991). Pages 27-28. Also interesting is that his conclusions are based on 21 cases with empirical evidence and all based on the Western way of warfare. This definition is a good starting point but seems to focus on military innovation in warfare. It is argued that this should be expanded with political innovations in respect to warfare being in line with the concept of von Clausewitz of war being the continuation of politics and the alignment of the trinities. 83 (Oren M. B., Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East, 2003). Page 251. 84Recent developments show that the alliance is even becoming stronger in the mutual enmity against Iran. This was clearly demonstrated by the speeches of both Trump and Netanyahu during the opening of the 2017 UN General Assembly. There was no doubt who the enemies are and how strongly both countries are aligned in this perception. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rTGMu8BrzS8 Trump. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_JF9cWmjgEc Netanyahu.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rTGMu8BrzS8

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_JF9cWmjgEc

quantity of (high quality) arms which it was not able to utilise to the fullest. Egypt had failed to

assimilate these weapons and moreover Israel eventually captured great quantities of these weapons

and weapon systems85. War booty is useful if a country is able to assimilate it within its own systems

as is the case with Israel and also shows its ability to innovate.

In the second place there are ‘alternative’ sources. During the 1973 war e.g. the Netherlands secretly

delivered military equipment to Israel as it did in almost every Israeli war86. However, most important,

because it provides a structural solution, is the creation of a Military Industrial Complex (MIC). Going

away from dependence on external sources and therewith being a victim to the lumen of foreign

politics and alliances can be reached by creating a MIC87. The Israeli MIC has established itself even

more firmly as one of the pillars of the economy, substantially contributes to its own needs and

through this strong link to the Israeli economy and society it enforces the alignment of the Trinities88.

The next principle is a combination of superior war plans, surprise often by Blitz, and a strong and

replicated economy. Moreover, the Western way of warfare emphasises and realises superior

discipline that allows fighting in highly motivated and well-organized combat units89. It allows for

superiority on the strategic level as soldiers understand it, on the operational art level as units are

interchangeable and understand how to work together and on the engagement level.

In the case of Israel, it was this and the doctrinal cohesion that led to a very effective military90.

Actually, it contributed to an effective highly militarised nation-in-arms and a strong alignment of the

Trinities. This superiority was the case in 1956 and in every other Arab-Israeli conflict up to the present

day: superiority by training and discipline especially on the operational and tactical levels and through

the Trinities most often at the strategic levels. In the Arab-Israeli conflicts and mainly during the High

Intensity wars of 1948, 1956 and 1967 the Arabs failed to coordinate their efforts, military strategies,

operational plans and even showing strong determination. Moreover, and this is another element, it

is that the aim is always to (military) completely defeat and destroy the enemy by all means available

and this often with utter ruthlessness91.

The fifth principle that Parker identified is fundamental. It is the replication of the economic, social and

military systems by developing financial institutions or for our purpose the ability to quickly mobilise

resources to be able to finance armies and war efforts92. The Western way of war is expensive and

therefore it is crucial that all (financial) resources are effectively and efficiently organised. Taking into

consideration that Israel managed to increase its official defence spending in 1976-1980 to around 28%

of its GDP it must have done a remarkable job to mobilise resources from its population, allies and also

from the Diaspora Jewish communities93.

85 (Bregman, 2016). Page 62. 86 (Peeters, 1997) 87 (Mintz, 1985). 624-629. He provides the following explanation what a MIC is: “The military-industrial complex is defined most frequently … as a coalition of powerful groups and bodies that share economic, institutional, or political interests in intensifying defense expenditure … Israeli decision makers, experienced with frequent interruptions in arms supply to Israel, considered the establishment of a sophisticated defense industry as a vital security need” 88 (Mintz, 1985). Page 629. In the Israeli case this was actively pursued after 1967 and eventually resulted in Israel becoming a prominent arms exporter. Already in 1982, 25% of the labour force in Israel was employed in the defence sector and a quarter of all Israeli exports was defence related. 89 (Parker, 2005). Page 2. 90 (Parker, 2005). Pages 384-389. 91 (Parker, 2005). Page 5. 92 (Parker, 2005). Page 7-9. Quote from summary of the book on http://www.hnet.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=11887 93 (Aroni, 1991). Page 87 and 255.

The earlier mentioned development of the Israeli MIC could also be considered under this 5th principle.

Israel has been able more than any other country to replicate the whole social and economic structure

with the military that underpinned the capacity to innovate and respond swiftly94. Going to the next

level, the Doctrine, it should be emphasised that the Western way of warfare constitutes some of the

fundaments for this Doctrine.

94 (Parker, 2005). Page 8. One of the essentials of the Western way of warfare.

Doctrine – the Political and Military Arenas

The strength of a nation-state through the alignment of the derived Trinity and adopting the principles

of the Western way of warfare can only be successful when it is effectively translated to the realities of

the battlefields through a practical Doctrine. Below we will describe the Doctrine of Israel. We will in

particularly focus on deterrence as that seems to be pivotal in its Doctrine95.

Doctrine is about how the armed forces are supposed to fight and it is therefore a mixture of political

and military warfare strategies, operational art and tactics. It is argued that the elements of the

Doctrine have not fundamentally changed since its creation in the 1950s and 1960s.

A doctrine should be, in line with the fundamentals of the Western way of warfare, adaptable to

changing circumstances. However, it is only infrequently that armed forces learn the right lessons and

systematically and effectively incorporate these in their military strategic, operational and tactical

conduct and therewith in an existing doctrine. The Israeli political and armed forces have shown such

adaptability because it considers its Doctrine not being doctrinal but practical. The sense of urgency to

adapt sometimes comes after a situation that takes the military by surprise and is considered counter-

Doctrine but the lessons learned are always implemented in the case of Israel. Examples are the IDF

campaigns in 2006 against Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Intifadas and applied to the Gaza campaign

in 201496. However, adaptability does not mean that we cannot identify constant factors as it is merely

the adaptations within these constant elements that are implemented.

The Doctrine that was developed after the 1948 war and that was operationalised in the national

security policy, contained already the constant factors that we will describe. In this respect any defeat

in a high-intensity war, is considered to jeopardize the existence of the nation-state of Israel97. It is

obvious that with the independence of Israel and being technically (and often operationally) in war

with the surrounding Arab states it had to give highest priority to defence (with offensive strategies)

and security. Israel used a high proportion of its resources to build up, strengthen and expanding its

armed forces. As “Ben-Gurion proclaimed that to survive, Israel had to become “a nation in arms”, and

he set out to make that goal a reality …. full popular mobilization … active reserve until their late

forties…The system was …. nearly universal and so widely perceived as necessary for the nation’s

survival … and source for national pride”98.

The Doctrine was mainly formed after the 1956 War but already with the establishment of the IDF

some of the elements became eminent in the early 1950’s. After having tested the principles of pre-

emptive strike/war and always fight on enemy soil in two crucial exercises in 1951 the Israeli

incorporated these into their Doctrine. These principles were fully executed after the 1956 War and

are still valid today99. Therewith pre-emptive strike/war became an element in the Doctrine and was

actually only in the 1973 War not implemented. The Doctrine favours pre-emptive strikes and on a

strategic level pre-emptive wars because it counters any existential real or perceived threat to Israel.100

Moreover, it is perceived by the Israeli politicians and military that this is the only option and superior

than biding its time until the enemies attack101. The 1956 and 1967 wars can be seen as pre-emptive

strikes. In 1956 this was due to the massive build-up of the Egyptian military capacity as result of the

arms deal with Soviet Union. In 1967 due to the mobilisation of Egyptian troops in the Sinai.

95 Doctrine in this section is the Israeli Doctrine. Therewith we operationalise the third level of our theoretical framework. 96 (Lambeth, 2012). Page 82-83. 97 (Eilam, Israel's Way of War - a Strategic and Operational Analysis, 1948-2014, 2016). Page 4. 98 (Cleveland & Bunton, 2016). Page 336. 99 (Bregman, 2016). Page 50. 100 (Oren, Barak, & Shapira, 2013). Page 358. 101 (Stein, 1988). Page 114 electronic version.

An important development in the formation of the Doctrine appeared in the formative years of the

IDF, the decade after the War of Independence of 1947-1948. There were several factors and geo-

strategic, demographic and economic considerations that severely raised doubts of the earlier

anticipated ‘defensive-offensive’ strategy. This strategy implies that the first stage are defence

operations by the regular forces and the second is the launching a full offensive operations and fight

on the territories of the enemy after the reserves are quickly and effectively mobilized102. This is very

often a matter of only hours.

The result of the discussions was that in 1953 the ‘offensive-defensive’ strategy was adopted and

therewith it became a lasting element of the Doctrine and it also contributed to the strong alignment

of the People-Army-Government. The other mentioned element of the Doctrine to never have battles

on Israeli soil the nation also enforced the believe of Israel for the need to be continuously ‘in arms’.

The 1956 and 1967 wars are clear examples of the implementation of the ‘offensive-defensive’

strategy and fighting on enemy soil.

Moreover, Israel perceives the ‘Arab threat’ as existential and that the objective of the Arabs and their

allies is always to destroy or truncate the country with all means. Therefore, a single defeat can already

destroy the country but also a single victory will not stop the conflict103. So, it is important to never

lose a single battle in any confrontation, another derived element of the Doctrine. It is also important

to note that Israel would never be able to destroy the military capacity of the Arab states without

executing a total war and employing its nuclear capabilities. This because the Arab states are able to

refill their ranks again and again due to their large populations104. This unites the country and drives

the earlier mentioned alignment of the Trinity.

Moreover, a fundamental element of the Doctrine is that it is always the government i.e. the politicians

that makes the final decisions. That does not mean that the military have no substantial influence and

sometimes de facto make political decisions. The strong interrelatedness of the military and politicians,

as we have seen before, makes it sometimes blurry from which point of view and positions decisions

are made. Many leading politicians in Israel started their careers in the military as has been shown in

the case of Ariel Sharon105.

Another pivotal and important element are deterrence and coercive diplomacy which is actually

different from defence106. Defense is physical e.g. by placing trenches, barbed wire, space defence

shields. Deterrence has strong mental components by creating in the minds of the enemies a belief

that e.g. excessive retaliation will follow on certain actions and behaviour107. To strengthen this believe

the strategy may be to have limited military pressure to emphasise the seriousness of the threat. It is

therewith often also part of coercive diplomacy, a strategy actively used by the Israeli. Deterrence is

about denying certain behaviour of adversaries and coercive diplomacy is about changing the

102 (Oren, Barak, & Shapira, 2013) Page 359. 103 (Ben-Horin & Posen, 1981). Page v. 104 (Eilam, Israel's Way of War - a Strategic and Operational Analysis, 1948-2014, 2016). Page 4-5. Apart of course when the country would use nuclear strategies. 105 ‘Qibya’ would be a leading principle in his military and political career from the perspective of the element regarding reprisals. 106 (Freedman, The Evolution of Nucear Strategy, 1983). Page 193. For our purpose we use the explanation of Freedman what he considers deterrence. He states that deterrence “is generally achieved by presenting a putative adversary with a credible threat to exact a high price should aggression be attempted. Deterrence is being concerned with exploitation of potential [Italics] force, using it to persuade a possible enemy that in his own best interest he should avoid certain courses of action” 107 (Wilson, 2013). Report written for the UK Parliament. This is important to note because this implies that this is the information of political and military decision makers how to understand deterrence. Page 1.

behaviour by sometimes limited use of force. The operations against the Palestinians are considered a

success of Israeli coercive diplomacy108. We will focus on deterrence.

It seems to be impossible to prove that deterrence work as can be illustrated by the Yom Kippur War

of 1973. During that war the USA puts its nuclear forces on alert to deter the USSR from intervening

by sending troops to Egypt and they did not. However, it was more than common knowledge that the

Israeli were having a strategic nuclear arsenal mainly for retaliation and deterring its adversaries.

However, that did not stop Egypt and its allies, which were fully aware of the Israeli nuclear capacity,

from launching a massive attack that surprised the Israeli and started the 1973 War109. The Israeli at

the start could have easily employed its nuclear arsenal in the fog of the war.

It can be concluded that there are strong indications that (nuclear) deterrence sometimes works and

sometimes does not work110. However, more important is how a nuclear nation perceives the threat

to its mere existence, perceives its ‘nuclear’ casus beli and how this is perceived by the adversaries.

Employing Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) by the Arab nations would certainly lead to a nuclear

reaction of Israel as confirmed by Dayan111. Israel possesses nuclear weapons, which it developed

during the fifties with the help of the French. It is even suggested that Egypt started the 1967 war to

stop Israel from producing nuclear weapons and it explains why the 1967 War was still limited as the

Egyptians had limited war objectives112.

Therefore, to understand deterrence in the case of the Arab-Israeli hostilities the following division is

made in which military and political deterrence is seen as an escalation process. It will give an

indication of the different levels of deterrence and its mechanisms. The following levels of deterrence

strategies are identified.

In the first place there is nuclear deterrence (and maybe other arms of mass destruction). In the case

of Israel this implies the counterbalancing of its numerical military and economic inferiority. It is also

acts as a last resort when all other strategies fail113.

Then there is non-nuclear deterrence. It has been argued by Peow that it is the denial of the enemy to

reach its objectives and making the military, economic and social costs and the loss of allies of the

enemies’ actions as high as possible that deter and that aggressors act rational to these perceived

108 (Byman & Waxman, 2002). Page 41. Byman and Waxman also provide a description of the difference between deterrence and coercive diplomacy. 109 (Delpech, 2012). Page 85. 110 (Wilson, 2013). Page 3. It has been argued in the rapport from the British parliament that “nuclear deterrence has three vulnerabilities. 1) It relies on deliberative thinking. People who are out of their minds or emotionally overwhelmed cannot be deterred. 2) Deliberative thinking can be easily being undermined or influenced by emotion. 3) Your adversary must be able to imagine a nuclear war”. This does less apply to other forms of deterrence. 111 (Stein, 1988). Page 490-491 of 1891. It seems obvious that non-nuclear deterrence did not work but nuclear deterrence did, at least as perceived by Israel and from the fact that Egypt did not use its weapons of mass destruction i.e. gas as it did in Yemen. Stein states: “What is known is that Dayan discounted Egyptian use of chemical weapons… [and quotes Dayan:] that Israel has a nuclear capacity and that they know that we are not Yemen”. 112 (Creveld, The Transformation of War, 1991). Page 56-57. 113 (Group, 1993). Page 63-65. ‘Israel, widely believed to have a clandestine nuclear arsenal of approximately 100 weapons.’ In 1993 it was assessed by the U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment that Israel has a serious stock of weapons of mass destruction including 100 nuclear warheads and stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons. Moreover, it has the capacity to deliver these weapons through advanced longer range ballistic missiles and other MIRVS

threats114. There are cases in the Arab-Israeli conflict were Israel actively approached potential

adversaries with the threat to retaliate excessively when entering a war and especially towards Jordan

this may have had its effects.

Moreover, there are political and economic sanctions. In the case of Israel that relates to the denial of

political recognition of a Palestinian State and the economic dependence of the West Bank.

At the same time also in the case of Israel there are indications that deterrence works even in situations

that are considered as heavily ‘fogged’ and lead to irrationality and emotions. What are now the factors

that make the deterrence policy of Israel trustworthy even when situations are ‘fogged’ or that so

called ‘mad men, not hampered by rationality’ are on the other side of the conflict. Apparently also in

these situations there seem to be a kind of picture of fear of deterrence imprinted in their thoughts.

Iraq attacked Israel during the first Gulf War and this was designed amongst others to provoke Israel

and drag it into the war. Moreover, Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction at that time and the

carriers to deliver these weapons but did not use that capacity. It is assumed that this is because of the

threat of nuclear retaliation by Israel.115. Deterrence is based on the perceptions of the Arab

adversaries of the mental strength and the operational capacities of Israel. The following aspects

contribute to these perceptions:

1. The proven superiority of the strategies, operational art and tactics of the IDF, not losing a single

battle and fight were the IDF chooses to fight.

2. The full commitment of the nation-in-arms to fight to the bitter end. The Trinity of People-Army-

Government is not only realistic but also fully utilised in propaganda. This also meant that Israel

was often very clear and outspoken on a casus beli that would endanger its existence and the way

it would react and by what means including pre-emptive strikes116.

3. The only strategy of the IDF in combat is to come to decisive, clear-cut military victory. Actually, it

is perceived by the Israeli as the only means of war termination because the Arab states in the end

possess greater resources e.g. financially and manpower.

4. The fact that the country is always fully mobilized in the conflicts with the Arab states.

5. Lastly the nuclear option still only available to Israel and that is perceived by the Arab countries as

serious in case of escalations to total war117.

As mentioned Qibya (see appendix 1) was different in scale and savage but it also can be seen as the

starting point of the confirmation of another element of the Doctrine that was put in place by Ariel

Sharon118 and is essential for the element of Deterrence. The feature of this policy was not only to

strike hard in response to the smallest provocation but also to strike in retaliation to the countries

from which provocations came. This to deter countries that host groups (e.g. PLO) from allowing

violence on Israeli soil119. Although it is mentioned that Qibya was a watershed and that the Israeli

policy of retaliation was amended into the discriminate use of force. The latter forbids the direct

114 (Peow, 2014). This seems to work for the city-state Singapore. Interesting is that Singapore publishes its military, political and social strength with the purpose of deterring adversaries in the past. A strategy that is actively pursued by Israel, apart from the ‘fog’ around its capacity of weapons of mass destruction 115 (Herzog, 2010). Page 410. Interesting is that this book is written originally by the former president Chaim Herzog and later up-dated by Brigadier General Michael Herzog. Combined perceptions of the political and military echelons. 116 (Ben-Horin & Posen, 1981). Page vii. 117 Although some Arab states possess other weapons of mass destruction as was proved e.g. by the use of poison gas of Egypt in Yemen, Iraq against the Kurds. However, there is a difference in the level of deterrence as nuclear arms are conceives as potentially more destructive and that less (if any) strategies are available to protect population and armed forces against such an attack. 118 And that Sharon would embrace during his whole career as a military and a politician: retaliate with excessive military action. 119 (Bregman, 2016). Page 52-53.

targeting of and intentional harm of non-combatants. However, reality shows differently120. Kober

provides empirical evidence that the number of non-combatant causalities are still high after Qibya

and that it is indeed difficult to avoid this as the enemy is hiding behind civilians. It is the bridging of

morality and effectiveness121.

It is argued that whatever justification is used to defend civil casualties the policy stays unchanged

even after Qibya and that is to retaliate excessively, whatever costs. If this is not as such perceived by

the adversaries then this will seriously affect the policy of deterrence because these are undoubtedly

linked to each other. Actually, there is a consistency on how Israel reacts to low-intensity threats and

that is to always retaliate excessively and disproportional. This has not changed since 1967 and

together with the threat of pre-emption it is to the present-day part of its deterrence policy and of its

military Doctrine122. This can be illustrated by the instructions of Barak to massively retaliate after the

lynching of two Israeli reservist during the Al-Aqsa Intifada of 2000-2005 and that was in line with the

opinions of the majority of politicians, military and the public123.

It is only when international and national pressure becomes too high and would seriously harm other

political and military objectives that Israel would excuse for actions of this kind or refrain from

continuing actions. It is however argued that the possible public Israeli resistance, therewith affecting

the alignment between People-Government, dominates the equation. The conclusion is that excessive

retaliation is strongly embedded in the Doctrine up to this day.

The last element is to always fight on the enemies’ soil. Military operations on Israeli soil would be

extra disadvantageous for Israel because of its very limited space of manoeuvrability and not having

the option to trade space for time. It would also bring war into the communities and this is politically

unacceptable. It is therefore military essential that Israel always increases its strategic depth. This

implies that the defence of the country is based on offensive strategies or forward defence.

120 (Kober, Israel's Wars of Attrition, 2009). Page 124. He emphasised that: ‘Israeli policy changed in the wake of Qibya notwithstanding, throughout the years innocent civilians have been killed during the Israeli wars of attrition. It seems that Israel has been acting upon the so-called doctrine of double effect. The doctrine accepts that intended harm to civilians is illegitimate, but also assumes that if evil done brings about something good…it is not less permissible than trying to do something good…’ 121 (Kober, Israel's Wars of Attrition, 2009). Pages 123-126. 122 (Rich & Duyvesteyn, 2012). Page 263-264 123 (Bregman, 2016). Pages 226-228.

The Nature of Israeli Wars and Operational Strategies

This chapter provides a description of the nature and strategies of the Israeli wars. This is necessary to

understand the impact of the theoretical framework in different situations of our interpretation of the

Israeli military history. We will distinguish wars of High Intensity, Low Intensity and Hybrid Wars and,

in the pursued strategies Wars of Attrition and Wars of Manoeuvrability.

It is important to understand the nature of the Israeli wars in order to assess the alignment of the

Trinities, the effectiveness of the Western way of warfare and the applicability of the Doctrine in

different situations. We will use the division used by Eilam of High Intensity, Low Intensity and Hybrid

wars124. Moreover, although (partially) covered in his definitions, it is also important to elaborate on

the differences between Wars of Manoeuvrability and Wars of Attrition, a distinction that is used by

Rodman and also applied to the wars between the Arab nations and Israel125.

Israel has fought several High Intensity Wars with its Arab neighbours that are often based on

Clausewitzian elements such as concentration of force, the culminations point, the decisive battle126.

The wars of 1949, 1956, 1967, 1973 and 1982 were huge conventional collisions, often involving

hundreds of thousands of troops that took place on the ground, in the air and at sea, involving huge

numbers of military platforms and always involving combat over territory. The result of these wars was

that Israel conquered huge territories and destroyed military forces of its adversaries but not their

military build-up capacity127. We will see below that Israel has a preference for High Intensity Wars

combined with operational manoeuvrability.

Israel has also fought several Low Intensity Wars at and within its borders e.g. the first Intifada in 1987-

1993 and the second Intifada in 2000-2005128. Moreover, also the War of Attrition (1967-1970), the

Palestinian insurgency in South Lebanon (1971-1982), the Gaza Wars (2005, 2008-2009, 2014) were

Low intensity conflicts that are characterised by fluid positions, diffusion and an often-protracted

struggle not only military but also as considered by the public opinion and the home front129. It is often

a conflict between an aggrieved group or part of the population against a nation-state or other

recognised authority and often with not only military but also economic, political and psychological

objectives130. However, also interstate Low Intensity Wars exist as the War of Attrition shows.

The operations on a tactical level were often short and involving substantially less military then the

High Intensity Wars. However, contrary to the High Intensity Wars these conflicts continued for years.

Although the conflict could drag on for a long time the military clashes are often short. The actions

were diverse: ambushes, placing explosive devices, combat encounters, infiltrations, suicide bombings

but also exchange of fire131. The Arab states have a preference for this kind of warfare with an emphasis

on strategies of attrition as we will see below.

Hybrid Wars are often described as combining the strength of irregular fighting forces by adversaries

that often have or are in the process of developing advanced state military. Eilam considers the clashes

between the IDF and Hezbollah in 2006 but also between the IDF and the PLO in Lebanon in 1982 as

Hybrid Wars132. However, it is argued that the fight against Hezbollah can also be viewed in the light

124 (Eilam, Israel's Way of War - a Strategic and Operational Analysis, 1948-2014, 2016) 125 (Rodman, 2000). 126 (Townshend, 2005). Page 19. 127 (Eilam, Israel's Way of War - a Strategic and Operational Analysis, 1948-2014, 2016). Page 4. 128 We do not define what is considered at and within the Israeli borders as this is often a very complicated political matter and not relevant for our purposes. Also for easy reference we will consider the armed collusions with the Palestinians as Low Intensity Wars. 129 (Townshend, 2005). Page 19. 130 (Huges & Philpott, 2006). 131 (Eilam, Israel's Way of War - a Strategic and Operational Analysis, 1948-2014, 2016). Page 4. 132 (Eilam, Israel's Way of War - a Strategic and Operational Analysis, 1948-2014, 2016). Page 111.

of the evolving of Hezbollah along the lines of the theory Mao on warfare. The first stage involves

organisation, consolidation and preservation, the second stage seeking a progressive expansion and

finally and very much a Western way of warfare the decisive destruction of the opponent133.

The division between Wars of Manoeuvrability134 and Wars of Attrition is also important as there are

clear preferences of the adversaries and therewith affects the respective doctrines. It has often

emphasised that Israel favours Wars of Manoeuvrability and that the Arab nations favour Wars of

Attrition135. This is not entirely correct because Israel has both the capacity and willingness, as we will

see later on, to adapt its strategy taking into consideration the specific circumstances, the nature of

the adversaries and the possible alliances. A crucial aspect of the Western way of warfare is the

adaptability of Israel to innovate/change its strategies and Doctrine. However, that does not mean that

it always made the right decisions as we can see from the 2nd Lebanon War in 2006. It intended to start

a War of Manoeuvrability but ended up in a prolonged War of Attrition.

An attrition strategy is based on the principle of completely defeating an opponent in a static and slow-

moving campaign in which the armed forces of the enemy are gradually destroyed136. This kind of

strategies are based on a limited number of short battles, protracted efforts to wear the enemy out

and disable the enemy to continue fighting both economically and military137. This because of physical

collapse or strongly eroded morale. However, there is some manoeuvrability in this as well138

With the Arab nations and also with Arab non-state groups it is obvious. They prefer Wars of Attrition

and their strategies are focused on wearing down the Israeli ability to fight for several reasons139.

Firstly, the superior quality of the IDF that provides a (proven) advantage in Wars of Manoeuvrability

as it requires high quality staff in often fluid battlefields. Attrition takes away this advantage. Secondly

the Arab nations have more resources and are often able to quickly replenish losses as was

demonstrated after the 1956 and 1967 wars. The Russians armed Egypt again within a couple weeks

and more than compensating the losses. They also can absorb more causalities at least according to

their own believes. Thirdly Israel depends on reserves that, when fighting for a longer period, has a

serious and anticipated devastating effect on the economy and society. Fourthly, the Arab states had

the opinion that a longer war would wear down the alliances of Israel and enhance theirs140. All these

considerations are actually still valid up to the present day and are deeply rooted in the strategies of

the Arab countries and even in the wars against each other.

The reasons for Israel for its preference for Wars of Manoeuvrability are actually a mirror of the

reasons of the Arab nations: quantitative inferiority, qualitative superiority, preference for avoiding

133 (Huges & Philpott, 2006). Page 113. Therefore, it is suggested that the Mao roadmap is considered as the underlying principle of this kind of warfare. Interesting is that Mao has based is strategies on the principles of the Western way of warfare. 134 We will continue using the term Wars of Manoeuvrability as it better explains the nature of the Israeli preferred strategies. 135 (Rodman, 2000). Provides an overview of the preferences of both the Arab states and Israel. 136 (Rodman, 2000). Page 118. 137 (Mintz, 1985). Page 118. 138 Because important is that you optimally position yourself towards the enemy. Napoleon Bonaparte was a

genius in this. It is also that Wars of Attrition sometimes starts as wars of manoeuvrability and that because of

no clear victory during this phase it develops into a war of attrition. The most speaking example in the modern

history has been World War I on the Western and Italian fronts. 139 (Kober, Israel's Wars of Attrition, 2009). According to Kober Nasser started the 1969 War as a war of Attrition in order by inflicting ever mounting casualties to wear out the Israeli society. 140 (Mintz, 1985). Page 119-120

human loss, the effects on the Israeli economy. Apart from these: lack of defensible borders and lack

of strategic depth141.

The 1956 War was a confirmation for the Israeli political and military leadership that the best strategy

was manoeuvrability and in particularly in the form of Blitz Krieg. It further developed this on a

strategic, operational and tactical level. A strategy that was of course not new and proven in war by

the German Wehrmacht against the French and the Soviets in 1940 and 1941. The Israel strongly

believed in this concept that was actually already used in the 1956 War and fully implemented in the

1967 War142. This led to a huge success in the 1967 War in which the enemies were beaten in six days

and the Israeli territory was substantially expanded with the Sinai, the Gaza Strip, the West Bank and

the Golan Heights.

It is highly usable in the situation of Israel because of the relatively small battle field. In the case of the

Soviets they were able to make the battle field large and at a certain point able to apply attrition

strategies in combination with ‘guerrilla techniques’. However, the main contribution to their success

was that they were able to create a continuous frontline and deep penetrate into enemies’ forces and

attack the rear143. Certain elements of this operational art e.g. the continuous front is also utilised by

the Israeli e.g. in their movements from the Egyptian to the Syrian to the Jordan front in the 1973 War.

A War of Manoeuvrability, or a 'blitzkrieg', has the strategy of a fast campaign to defeat the enemy by

deep penetration in its rear areas. It manoeuvres the enemy’s armed forces into ‘lost’ positions144. For

a long time, and in particularly for interstate wars, Israel had a very strong preference for this kind of

wars in the conflicts with the Arab States. The nature of the country, the nature of its adversaries, the

defensible borders, the resources and the strategic depth are amongst other the reasons for this

preference.

However, when the balance of the resources, both qualitatively and quantitively, is in favour of Israel

it has engaged in Wars of Attrition with the argument ‘to bleed them to dead’. This is clearly

demonstrated in the Gaza Wars, although sometimes short but clearly conducted with attrition

strategies. It even can be argued that the present situation is still a continuation of an attrition strategy

with the continuing blockage of the borders and the strong military presence, even over the border

(see description on the 2014 Gaza below).

Finally, countries that favour any particular strategy are most likely to start a war when the conditions

are optimal or as such perceived to start e.g. a war of attrition or manoeuvrability. However,

sometimes with reverse and devastating results145. The 2006 war is clear example in which Israel did

perceive a War of Manoeuvrability but ended up in a war of attrition. The latter was more suitable for

reaching its political and military objectives. We saw that the strategy did not work for Israel in some

of its Low Intensity Wars which actually evolved in wars of attrition.

The conclusions are, as illustrated by the table 2, that in the High Intensity Wars, with the exception of

the 1967-1970 War of Attrition, Israel was able to change the playing field very quickly from attrition

into manoeuvrability and therewith secure victory. It was also able to do this because of its Western

way of warfare e.g. good war plans, changeability and adaptation, its strong alignment of the Trinities

and its practical Doctrine. This changeability and also the different nature from adversaries like Hamas

141 (Mintz, 1985). Page 120. 142 (Rodman, 2000). Page 123. 143 (Isserson, 2013). The Soviets saw the importance of Operational Art and especially between the two World Wars they studied, theorized and successfully implemented it. The Israeli must have been aware of the theories and studied the practical implication for the Israeli situation. It may be worthwhile to investigate this further. 144 (Rodman, 2000). Page 118. 145 (Mintz, 1985). Page 121.

and Hezbollah and the military strength of e.g. the Gaza Strip seems to have changed the preference

of Israel into Wars of Attrition. The results are summarised in the table below146.

Table 2 Major Wars of Israel

146 Levels of War The model could be further strengthened by adding the levels of intensity (1-5) and the levels of mobilisation of manpower and resources (1-5). In the table below a suggestion is provided for the armed conflicts Israel was engaged in. The following suggestion for classifying the levels of intensity and mobilisation are made for the sake of reasoning and possible further elaboration in another research project. Level of Intensity: 1. Reprisals 2. Air attacks, Artillery fire 3. Ground troops defensive actions 4. Ground troops offensive actions 5. Full use of Ground, Sea and Air Forces Level of mobilisation: 1. Use of already active units 2. Use of already active units and arming inactive units 3. Full Mobilisation of regulars 4. Mobilisation of regulars and conscripts 5. Full mobilisation of military regular, conscripts and reserve forces 147 (Filiu, 2014). Filiu has identified several Gaza wars and provides a description and analyses. For our purposes we cluster these as one ongoing war with a temporarily outcome that we place in 2014. However, it is worthwhile to analyse the different stages by using our theoretical framework. It will show interesting conclusions on the alignment of People-Army-Government and certain aspects of the Western way of warfare e.g. adaptability and innovation and on the Doctrine.

War Results Politically Results Military Nature Strategy

1. 1947-1948 War Victory Israel Victory Israel

High Intensity War From Attrition (Arabs) changing into Manoeuvrability (Israel)

2. 1956 War Victory Egypt Victory Israel High Intensity War Manoeuvrability

3. 1967 War Victory Israel Victory Israel High Intensity War From Attrition (Arabs) changing into Manoeuvrability (Israel)

4. War of Attrition (1967-1970) Victory Egypt Stalemate Low Intensity Border War

Attrition

5. 1973 War Arabs Victory Israel High Intensity War From Attrition (Arabs) changing into Manoeuvrability (Israel)

6. Palestinian Insurgency in Lebanon (1971-1982)

Victory Israel Stalemate Low Intensity War Attrition

7. First Lebanon War (1982) Victory Hizbollah Victory Israel Hybrid War Attrition

8. First Intifada (1987-1993) Stalemate Stalemate Low Intensity War Attrition

9. Second Lebanon War (2006) Stalemate Stalemate Hybrid War Attrition

10. Second Intifada (2000-2005) Victory Israel Victory Israel Low Intensity War Attrition

11. Gaza Wars147 Victory Israel Victory Israel Low Intensity War Attrition

Israeli Wars148

In the chapter we apply the above to describe the military history of Israel. How can we show that the

theoretical framework is robust as a means of describing the military history of Israel? That is by

applying it to the description of some of the wars that Israel fought. We have selected a number to use

the framework under different circumstances.

The table on the previous page shows that Israel between 1947 and 2014 has been involved in 11

major military conflicts149. The wars with the Gaza Strip after 2000 are considered as an ongoing war

of attrition but as mentioned before the 2014 eruption of violence will be considered as a separate

case because it clearly illustrates the adaptability of the strategy, operational art and tactics of the IDF

in fighting Low Intensity wars. In this section conflicts will be described in light of the Trinities, Western

way of warfare and the Doctrine and in that respect the aim is not to provide a comprehensive

narrative of all wars but give the history of a selected number of cases. However, the intention in the

(near) future is to describe a more elaborate and encompassing description of the Israeli military

history.

148 The maps are from sources on the internet and therefore it was not always possible to trace the original source. We mostly used sources such as https://www.westpoint.edu, http://www.zionism-israel.com, http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org 149 It can be argued that Israel is also involved in other wars e.g. Syria but we will stick with this division because we only want to show that the theoretical framework can be applied to describing the military history of a country.

https://www.westpoint.edu/

http://www.zionism-israel.com/

http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/

1947-1948 War – The Beginning of the Trinities

Table 3 1947-1948 War

The Declaration of Independence was proclaimed on 14th may 1948 while a civil war was going on in

Palestine between the Jewish and Arab populations. On 30th April 1948 the Arab states decided to

interfere and enter the region after it looked that the Arab Palestinians were going to be defeated and

the alleged accusations of atrocities of the Jews against the Palestinians150.

The result was that the then formed state of Israel conquered 60% of the territories that were before,

in the UN partition plan and formulated in Resolution 181 of the UN General Assembly of 29th

November 1947 allocated to the Arab Palestinians151. This can be considered the formation of the

Israeli territory as known today with the addition of the annexation of Jerusalem after the 1967 war.

Moreover, the war resulted in a major demographic change as 750.000 Arab Palestinians left Palestine

and only 160.000 remained152. Moreover, Jordan annexed the West Bank and Egypt occupied the Gaza

Strip.

It is argued that this is crucial in the creation of the Trinities of the Israeli state: People-Army-

Government becoming strongly aligned in the primordial violence, hatred, and enmity towards the

‘Arabs’. Prime Minister Ben Gurion was very clear on this in a meeting with his military commanders:

150 (Shapira, 2014). Pages 162-163. 151 (Shapira, 2014). Page 155. 152 (Bregman, 2016). Page 20-21.

1947-1948 War

Adversaries Yishuv, Israel Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Trans Jordan, Arab Palestinians

Political and Military Victory Israel

Trinities Foundation of strong alignment of People-Army-Government and established for several decades. IDF becoming leading in the process of nation building.

Western way of Warfare Western way of warfare and military thought actively pursued in the third phase of the Mao’s guerrilla way of warfare but still mainly guerrilla way of warfare. Acceleration of the second and third phases of Mao’s way of war.

Doctrine Not yet fully developed. However, elements e.g. not losing a battle, retaliation are already visible. Architects of the Doctrine are active in this war and will build on their experiences.

Nature & Strategy Started as a civil war between Yishuv and Arab Palestinians and evolved into a High Intensity War between the then proclaimed state of Israel and Arab countries. Mostly War of Attrition. Became War of Manoeuvrability when Arab countries attacked the new nation-state

Casus Beli Declaration of independence of Israel.

Figure 2 & 2a - 1947-1948 War

“in each attack it is necessary to give a decisive blow, ruining the place, kicking away the inhabitants

… [and continued on a later occasion] … “new immigrants we put in Arab houses”153. These were not

statements in the fog of war but more a result of a longer process leading to independence. Since the

end of World War II, he had been preparing the Yishuv154 and the efforts became only more intensive

after the UN resolution155.

More importantly is that during the period before the Declaration of Independence the fundamentals

for the alignment of the Trinities were created. Shapira describes the role of the (new) Yishuv and the

Zionist in the formation of the Jewish nation in Palestine, the establishment of pre-state organisational

structures, the patterns of thinking on the Jewish society, culture and ethos and therewith of the

fundamentals of the State of Israel156.

The most important conclusions from our perspective are that the Yishuv in the two decades before

the 1947-1948 war was instrumental in creating the embryonal governmental and military structures,

closely interlinked, and also created the cultural, philosophical and ethical arguments on which these

structures were based. In a way governmental and military structures and thinking came really from

the grass roots and was therewith strongly embedded in the Yishuv and later the Israeli population. It

is argued that this resulted in a strong and deeply embedded alignment of the Trinities until today.

The 1947-1948 War firmly established and strongly aligned the Trinity People-Army-Government of

which the Army and Government were first established. It had a long-lasting effect on the psyche of

the Israeli people, army and government for the following reasons. In the first place it was the bloodiest

and most felt in the cities and the communities. In the second place it was fought shortly after the

Holocaust and therewith it became very strong imprinted in the shared memory. Lastly, almost every

member of the Yishuv was on the frontline and/or involved in the war. This provided several

generations with material for mythology and legend. Also, the Israeli soldier was idealized and

portraited superior to their adversaries. All this and the enmity of the Arab states made the Israeli feel

that they were fighting with their backs to the wall and for the survival of both the nation and its

individuals157. It fed the later acknowledged fighting spirit of the IDF, the nation-building and the

creation of a shared (military) history.

153 (Bregman, 2016). Page 21. 154 Name for the group of Jewish residents in Palestine. 155 (Friling & Troen, 1998). Page 172. 156 (Shapira, 2014). Charters 5 and 6. 157 (Bregman, 2016). Pages 36-39.

The 1967 War – Alignment of Trinities, Western way of warfare and Israeli Doctrine

Table 4 1967 War

Figure 3, 3a & 3b - 1967 War

The 1967 War and 1973 War had the biggest effect on the shaping of the political and military

landscape of the Middle East and in particularly on Israel. Before 1967 the Israeli society was very

diverse but had a common perceived history when there was an urgent external danger158. This

became very prominent after 1967 and with the euphoria shortly after the victory and in particularly

the conquering of Jerusalem this created a very strong binding factor of the Israeli society. The Trinities

were never stronger than during this period but that would not last for long. The spoils of the 1967

War, the conquered territories, would also lead to a division in the Israeli society of those who were

for keeping the territories and those for giving these back159. It therewith disturbed the strong

alignment of the Trinities in such a way that it together with the blurring of the roles within the Trinity

and the non-alignment of the Doctrine would lead to a catastrophic start of the 1973 War.

The 1967 War is often considered as the shortest in recorded history, only, as Oren states, one hundred

and thirty-two hours that had a tremendous political and military impact on the Middle East. However,

confirming the above, the perception of a strong, dominant and invincible Israel would not last long

and return to a more apocalyptic self-view of the Israeli people160. Besides, he challenges that the 1967

War really changed the situation because the basic truth was that it did not lead to peace and

therewith did not lead to a solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict but to a continuation into a Low Intensity

War, the War of Attrition (1967-1970), and eventually the 1973 War161. Actually the 1967 War had

more prolonged and also global consequences: the Munich massacre, Black September, the 1st

Lebanon War, controversies over Jewish settlements and Jerusalem, the Camp Davis and Oslo Accords,

158 (Bregman, 2016). Page 97. 159 (Bregman, 2016). Page 96. 160 (Oren M. B., Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East, 2003). Page 309. 161 (Oren M. B., Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East, 2003). Page 327.

1967 War

Adversaries Israel Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon, Algeria, Kuwait, Libya, Morocco, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Tunisia

Political and Military victory Israel

Trinities Fully Aligned. Victory contributed to further strengthening of the alignment of the Trinities

Western way of Warfare Fully employed and instrumental in the military victory. Technology, aggressive military tradition, challenge & response, discipline, capital

Doctrine Fully adhered to.

Nature High Intensity War. War of Manoeuvrability (blitz)

Casus Beli Blockage Straits of Tiran. Border Wars with Syria and Jordan

the Intifada’s and so on162. Both wars would have a tremendous impact on the Trinities. It did seriously

further deteriorate the Arab-Israeli relations and intensify the conflict also in other areas involving

terrorist actions and international relations163.

Moreover, he mentions the following political results of the War: the collapse of pan-Arabism and

replacement with Islamic extremist ideas, Palestinian nationalism, an arms race, strengthening of the

strategic partnership between Israel and the USA and an Israeli society becoming dominantly Jewish164.

These are to our opinion the building blocks that would create a major shift in the nature of the Israeli

armed conflicts: Low Intensity wars involving non-state adversaries and terrorist groups.

The collapse of pan-Arabism was also caused by the weak coalition of the Arab states. Egypt, Jordan

and Syria had conflicts with each other which led to mistrust and counterproductive operational and

tactical actions. Jordan considered Egypt has a serious threat. All this seriously affected the joint

willingness of defeating Israel. Troops were not employed to the full or serving the general objective

of destroying Israel165. The rumour was that at a certain moment the Egyptians were marching against

Jordan but that is only from an oral source. However, it is clear that Arab alliances have always been

counterproductive even in the 1973 War. This does not apply to the USSR and the Arab nations. It

supplied equipment, advisors, intelligence and even combat power often in abundancy until 1973.

Also, the alliance between Israel and the USA started to become strategic and strong and last ever

becoming stronger until today.

From a military point of view the 1967 war had a huge impact apart from boosting the confidence of

the Israeli armed forces and the proof that the Western way of war works. The latter because as a

result of years of hard work and a very effective military planning, the high morale and discipline of

the troops. Furthermore, a very Western approach, the constant professional approaches of officers

and NCO’s at the head of their troops in battle166. The Western way of warfare that forms a fundament

of the Doctrine had together proven effective and leading to an unexpected level of victory.

The Trinity People-Army-Government was strongly aligned at the start of the war. The political situation

had stabilized and resulted in the first ever Unity Government that quickly organised joint sessions

with the General Staff and the Ministerial Defense Committee. The unity Army-Government was

further strengthened by the return of Dayan in the public function of Minister of Defense as he was

able to align again the People-Army-Government Trinity. The latter making again supreme decisions

due to this alignment. Moreover, he was because of its pre-1956 retaliatory actions and his

performance in the 1956 very popular with the public167. He was therewith and with his extraordinary

military skills a decisive factor in the strong alignment of the Trinity People-Army-Government and in

uniting it in the primordial violence, enmity and hatred against the Arab threat.

More importantly taking into consideration his military geniality he strongly stressed that the best way

to win the coming war is by pre-emptive strike/war and by fighting the war according to the Israeli

designs meaning the Western way of warfare and the Doctrine. He also knew that the Israeli armed

forces were ready and had regarded the ha-Hamtana168 as a blessing for their preferred strategy. The

Egyptians by more digging in allowed for a much-preferred War of Manoeuvrability. Moreover, Dayan

162 (Oren M. B., Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East, 2003). Page xiii and page 327. 163 (Shapira, 2014). Pages 307-310. 164 (Oren M. B., Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East, 2003). Page 337 with an interview of the writer. 165 (Eilam, Israel's Way of War - a Strategic and Operational Analysis, 1948-2014, 2016). Pages 57-58 166 (Herzog, 2010). Pages 189-190. 167 (Oren M. B., Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East, 2003). Page 148-150. 168 The 3-week waiting period from 15th May 1967 until 5th June 1967 after Egypt crossed the Suez Canal until the pre-emptive strike from Israel.

emphasised that when Israel would not stick to this strategy that the risk would be that the hostilities

would be fought on ‘vital territory’, most likely meaning the on Israeli soil169.

Within six days Israel started the war with a pre-emptive strike, used the culminating point to break

through the Egyptian defences and fought a successful War of Manoeuvrability. The same applied for

the Northern and Eastern fronts and it applied the strategy of a continuous front and showed that it

mastered the operational art of moving troop along the front lines and in depth170 It had however not

anticipated the spoils of the war, which caused feelings of euphoria and invincibility, but also not the

long lasting political consequences, both national and regional. The first would not last forever as

mentioned before and the second last up to the present day. Moreover, the weakening of the Trinities

afterwards or rather being less aligned and the blurring of the roles would have a serious impact on

the adherence to the Western way of war and the implementation of the Doctrine in the 1973 War.

Egypt had WMD in particularly poison gas that it used during its operations in Yemen. It goes without

saying that the situation during the 1967 War was more directly threatening for Egypt but it did not

resort to the use of poison gas. This is an indication that nuclear deterrence worked.

169 (Oren M. B., Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East, 2003). Page 148. 170 (Isserson, 2013). As strategy developed by the Russians between the two World Wars and successfully executed during WWII. The Israeli must have studies this and included in their operational art.

The 1967-1970 War of Attrition – Counter Doctrinal Behaviour and the Weakening of the Trinities

Table 5 1967-1970 War of Attrition

The Israeli and others believed that Israel did win this war but it would appear that this would actually

be a fateful illusion. Both for economic and political reasons. It is argued that the 1967-1970 War of

Attrition was a victory for the Arab nations and in particularly for Egypt when considered in light of the

1973 War and the subsequent return of the occupied Sinai. Moreover, Egypt would after the Peace

treaty have a long period of relative peace. It was not involved in direct confrontations with other

nation-in-arms, it was able to leave the burdens of having Palestinians within the borders of other

nation-in-arms and it benefited economically from

the return of the territories. It would also establish

and further increase the position of Egypt has a

major military power in the Middle East. Although it

has become a major military force in the Middle

East, Eilam concludes that the Egyptian forces are

still no match in certain kinds of warfare to the Israeli

forces171.

He further provides an interesting and elaborate

analyses of a future High Intensity war between

Egypt and Israel, although it is very unlikely that this

will happen. Egypt has learned from both the War of

Attrition and the 1973 War and that is not to engage

in a War of Manoeuvrability because Israel is still

superior in this kind of wars. There are actually two

options both involving massive deployment of forces

for a War of Attrition or a concluding first strike that

will destroy all military and economic infrastructure

of Israel, preferably using WMD.

The period also led to an accelerated arms race and

the fact that Israel had to fight this war on three

fronts, had a heavy burden not only on the society

but in particularly on its economy. This was further worsened by the fact that Israel adopted a policy

171 (Eilam, The Next War Between Israel and Egypt: Examining a High Intensity War Between Two of the Strongest Militaries in the Middle East, 2014).

1973 War

Adversaries Israel Egypt, Syria, Algeria, Cuba, Iraq, Jordan, Tunisia, Morocco, USSR

Military victory Israel, although Egypt reached its limited war objectives. Political victory Egypt

Trinities Blurring of the roles. Weakened alignment at the start because of War of Attrition. Strong (re)alignment of the Trinities at the moment that the war started.

Western way of Warfare Fully employed and instrumental in the military recovery and flexibility of the Israeli armed forces. Remarkable performance. Better war plans. Technology, aggressive military tradition, challenge & response, discipline, capital

Doctrine No pre-emptive strike. Focus on defence instead of offensive-defensive strategies pre-war and during the first days. Deterrence works. Fight on enemy soil.

Nature High Intensity War. Changed quickly from War of Attrition in War of Manoeuvrability.

Casus Beli Occupation Egypt and Syria territories by Israel (Sinai, Golan)

Figure 4 – 1967-1970 War of Attrition

of securing industrial autonomy with huge investment in its own defence industry172. Also, the direct

costs of the War of attrition were very high. This was however during that period balanced by a boost

in economic growth and foreign aid173. At a later stage also, the defence industry would become a

financially sound export product and leading to a substantial and sustainable increase in employment

as is still up to the present day. In that respect it can be argued that the 1967-1970 War of attrition

did eventually not lead to economic attrition on the contrary.

Besides this War of Attrition, that was started by the Egyptians, for all the reasons that were mentioned in the section of Wars of Attrition, became retroactively important to the Egyptians in the strategy that Sadat followed in the build-up to the 1973 War. It seemed to fit very well in the deceiving political and military strategy of Egypt because of its impact on the Israeli Trinity People-Army-Government. The effect on the morale both in the public as in the IDF was substantial. Moreover, it reinforced the tendency of the Israeli to move away from offensive-defensive strategies to partially defensive strategies as was shown with the building of the Bar-Lev fortifications. That this kind of defensive strategy was not in the genes of the Israeli politicians and military becomes clear as shown by the neglect of the Defense line and the limited operation ability as soon as it was established. It did not fit the offense-defensive element of its Doctrine.

172 In that period a heavy burden but the creation of a MIC had a major effect in the future and actually contributed to the regional dominance of Israel today. 173 (Kober, Israel's Wars of Attrition, 2009). Pages 101-102. Defense expenditure rose from 9.2% of GNP to 20.2% of GNP and so on.

The 1973 War – Cracks in the Doctrine and Blurring of the Roles

Table 6 1973 War

Figure 5, 5a, 5b & 5c - The 1973 War

In the war of 1973 the initiative was with the Arab nations that attacked Israel on 6th October 1973.

The main objectives of Egypt and Syria were to regain the territories that were lost during the 1967

through a long ranged (considered brilliant) strategy of political and military moves. The 1973 War was

in that respect for the Egyptian really a continuation of politics with other means. It is therefore argued

that this particularly conflict did not take 19 days but only ended with the signing of a peace treaty

between Egypt and Israel and the eventual return of a demilitarised Sinai. A clear political victory for

Egypt. This was not anticipated by the Israeli as Egypt and Syria could lose the war on the battlefield

and win it politically as they did. Israel did not see the combined political and military of its adversaries

and therefore the total outcome was that they did politically not benefit from their military victory174.

Of course, Israel also benefits from this apparently lasting peace but less than Egypt and surely not in

the direct aftermath of the war. It was Sadat who between 1970 and 1979 transformed the

international landscape in the Middle East and indirectly he therewith also changed the political and

military situation in Israel by making war and peace and chancing alliances175. It reshaped Israeli self-

image, its political and social space and the relation with its neighbours as described by Shapira176.

Sadat succeeded in uniting the Army and the Egyptian people in these processes and the trinity of

174 (Freedman, War, 1994). Page 346. 175 (Bregman, 2016). Pages 108-109. 176 (Shapira, 2014). Chapter 16.

1973 War

Adversaries Israel Egypt, Syria, Algeria, Cuba, Iraq, Jordan, Tunisia, Morocco, USSR

Military victory Israel, although Egypt reached its limited war objectives. Political victory Egypt

Trinities Blurring of the roles. Weakened alignment at the start because of War of Attrition. Strong (re)alignment of the Trinities at the moment that the war started.

Western way of Warfare Fully employed and instrumental in the military recovery and flexibility of the Israeli armed forces. Remarkable performance. Better war plans. Technology, aggressive military tradition, challenge & response, discipline, capital

Doctrine No pre-emptive strike. Focus on defence instead of offensive-defensive strategies pre-war and during the first days. Deterrence works. Fight on enemy soil.

Nature High Intensity War. Changed quickly from War of Attrition in War of Manoeuvrability.

Casus Beli Occupation Egypt and Syria territories by Israel (Sinai, Golan)

People-Army-Government was strongly aligned at that time in its violence, hatred and enmity towards

the ‘Zionist enemy’.

All this changed the nature of the alignment of the Israeli Trinity of People-Army-Government as is

described above but not the strength of the alignment. Important is what we called before the blurring

of the military and political roles seriously affected the pre-1973 war situation. Both Dayan and Sharon,

considered to be military geniuses as they had shown in previous wars, were engaged in politics.

Dayan, then minister of defence, was reluctant to comply with request for mobilisation because he

was also taking into consideration his political career and the effects on his electoral base177. Regarding

Sharon in his acting during the operations on the West bank of Suez is illustrative for his behaviour

before the start of the hostilities: he was more concerned with the political consequences and his self-

promotion than with military consequences and for both his military and political superiors178. It is

reasoned that this also blurred their conceptions and assessments of the military threats and seriously

affected the Israeli preparedness or even decisions to engage in pre-emptive actions.

It has been suggested in various narratives on the 1973 war that the Israeli were not expecting the

attack and were not ready for that but they would quickly regain and have the military units active179.

However, it is argued that it was not surprise but denial from the side of the Israeli mostly for internal

political reasons and the misconduct of the combined military and intelligence circles. This adds to the

argument of the blurring of the roles.

In military respect the immediate objective of Egypt was the seizure of a 12 miles wide strip along the

East Bank of the Suez Canal180. This seems to be a radical departure from earlier Egyptian strategies

that were built on all-out wars to Israel. However, it is argued that the strategy did not fundamentally

change but was now a better mix of political and military strategies with the ultimate aim of defeating

Israel. However, the Egyptian military strategy was brilliant and a combination of deception, a solid

integration of the large number and sophisticated (Russian) weapon systems, trained troops, better

command structures and a doctrine that counter balanced the Israeli strength and therewith its

Doctrine.

The Egyptians had learned from their previous experiences but still came to the conclusion that the

best strategy was attrition and in taking the initiative in order to set the playground for the war: an

attack, strengthening the gained 12 miles with fortifications and engage in a War of Attrition. This

would avoid being drawn into a War of Manoeuvrability in which they anticipated that Israel would

have the upper hand and win181.

Although it is challenged that the Israeli were caught by surprise they were certainly by the technology

and the Egyptian military goals and doctrine. Especially the effectiveness of the new technology

allowed Egypt and to a certain extent Syria to develop a new doctrine of an offensive strategy and a

tactical defence by which they could counter the offensive, often, superior strategy of in particular the

armoured forces of Israel. The advantage would however only last for a few days until the Israeli war

machine was fully operational182. The Israeli had the intelligence but did make the mistake to project

their Doctrine on the adversaries and did therefore not make amendments to it or use it in the

appropriate way.

Moreover, with the conquering of the 12 miles strip along the east bank and subsequently push the

military threat eastward Egypt would again be able to operate the Canal. This was important for all

177 (Stein, 1988). Page 441 of 1891. 178 (Stein, 1988). Page 532 of 1891. 179 (Bregman, 2016). Page 148. 180 (Stein, 1988). Page 595 of 1891. 181 (Rodman, 2000). Page 125. 182 (Freedman, War, 1994). Pages 345-346.

kind of economic and political reasons. It is argued that this would also allow Egypt to engage in a

continued War of Attrition between 1967 and 1970, allow to activate strong diplomatic efforts and

strengthen its alliances. This would then eventually lead to military and political victory and the return

of the Sinai. The Egyptians learned from the past experiences and Sadat was aware that any attack

would always lead to a massive response by Israel. That left Egypt with the option to mount the largest

attack possible and therewith engage in a prolonged war of attrition, at the start with limited military

objectives183.

The strategy that Egypt developed and eventually started implementing was brilliant and added to the

situation that Israel did not adhere to some crucial elements of its Doctrine during the first days of the

war. It did not start with a pre-emptive strike or started a pre-emptive war which left Israel with the

only option to engage in a reactive war of attrition.

Israel also left the policy of offensive-defensive strategies by creating a line of 31 fortifications over a

distance of 180km, the so-called Bar Lev Line184. This also seriously reduced the Israeli military ability

to engage in a preferred war of manoeuvrability instead of a war of attrition. This was recognised by

Ariel Sharon as he recognised that a line of defence would not work in a war with the Arabs and that

the strategy should stay on manoeuvrability by being offensive mobile185. It also would constrain the

Israeli forces because it would have to engage in a static warfare for which Israel was ill-suited186. He

removed resources from the Bar Lev Line and that made the line even more vulnerable. It also clearly

shows that fundamentally the Israeli were favouring offensive-defensive strategies.

However, Egypt was dragged into an expansion of the military operations to the rest of the Sinai,

mainly under pressure of its allies187. All this led to the military victory of Israel that was able to recover

the Golan Heights, crossed the Suez Canal and inflicted large losses188 and operationally and tactically

beat its adversaries. Israel had again better war plans, was able to create qualitative and quantitative

superiority at the pressure points and engage in a War of Manoeuvrability. The basic elements for

success in its warfare.

It seems obvious that non-nuclear deterrence did not work but nuclear deterrence did, at least as

perceived by the Israeli and in particular Dayan and from the fact that Egypt did not use its WMD i.e.

gas as it did in Yemen and that Dayan was of the opinion that Egypt would not. He even explicitly

stated: “that Israel has a nuclear capacity and that they know that we are not Yemen”189. Moreover,

there are indications from different sources that nuclear warheads were deployed in Egypt on Scud

missiles by the Russians. However, both adversaries were not looking for Mutual Assured Destruction

(MAD) apart in case of a last resort190.

183 (Herzog, 2010). Page 227. 184 (Stein, 1988). Page 293-294 of 1891 185 (Bregman, 2016). Pages 131-132. 186 (Stein, 1988). Page 298 of 1891 187 (Stein, 1988). Page 596 of 1891. 188 That were however in not time replenished by the Russians. 189 (Stein, 1988). Page 490-491 of 1891. 190 (Eilam, Israel's Way of War - a Strategic and Operational Analysis, 1948-2014, 2016). Pages 26-28.

The Gaza War 2014 – Adaptation of the Practical Doctrine

Table 7 Gaza War 2014

The Gaza strip is a kind of anomaly. It was never annexed even when it was (military) occupied by Egypt

or Israel. Therewith it can be seen as the only part of the historic Palestine that never lost its

independence and that contributed heavily to being it the carrier of Palestinian nationalism191.

It is argued that Israel has the following political and subsequent military objectives towards the Gaza

Strip:

1. To ensure that the Gaza Strip is not being used by strong adversaries e.g. Iran and Egypt as a

launching pad for political and military operations.

2. To ensure that in the Gaza Strip more militant groups i.e. the Islamic Jihad do not seize power and

therewith allow Iran to start a proxy war against Israel

3. To ensure that the Gaza Strip does not economically and socially prosper and therewith allow it to

start a strong military build-up. Moreover, Israel has substantial economic control over the Gaza

Strip

4. To ensure that the deterrence policy stays effective and therewith ensure that Hamas actively

embarks in policies in the interest of Israel

5. To completely seal of the Gaza Strip both military and economically.

The territory is small, 360 sq. km, borders Israel

(59 km) and Egypt (13 km) and the

Mediterranean Sea (40 km). The latter is

effectively blockaded by Israel since 2009.

Figure 2 is illustrative of the present situation.

The Gaza Strip is under siege by Israel without

the exchange of fire.

The result of this and the results of the Low

Intensity wars from 2005 onwards have

resulted in a military strategic, operational and

tactical victory of Israel. The lessons learned

from the operations against Hezbollah in

Lebanon in 2006 were incorporated in a

military strategy, operational art and tactical

actions that eventually led in 2014 to, what is

considered by Israel, as victory. There are

hardly any rocket attacks, the Gaza Strip is as

effectively as possible sealed off from the

191 (Filiu, 2014). Page 52.

Gaza War 2014

Adversaries Israel Gaza Strip/Hamas Military and political victory Israel

Trinities Strongly aligned

Western way of Warfare Technology, aggressive military tradition, challenge & response, discipline, capital

Doctrine Innovation of the Doctrine from lessons learned in wars against Hezbollah. Retaliation, Offensive-defensive, deterrence.

Nature Low Intensity War. War of Attrition

Casus Beli Rocket attacks Hamas.

Figure 6 - The Gaza Strip

outside world and life within the Gaza Strip is economically controlled by Israel. The IDF campaigns

were showing that it was able to adapt and at the same time improve it capabilities, strategies and

tactics. It did this by learning from the fighting with Hezbollah in 2006 and in did bear very good

results192.

The Gaza Strip is under control of Hamas that however has no conventional military forces in the Gaza

Strip193. It has security forces in addition to its military wing, the 'Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades and the

military wing reports to the Hamas Political Bureau leadership194. According, under the present

circumstances the territory could become uninhabitable by 2020195.

It is argued that during this continues cycle of violence there are eruptions that can be classified High

Intensity and/or Low Intensity wars. The High Intensity wars are 1948, 1956 and 1967 in which the

Gaza Strip was part of a larger conflict and

sometimes can be considered as contributing to a

(often small) reason for the start of these conflicts

and often considered by the wary parties as

collateral damage. However, interesting from

military strategic and operational perspectives.

The Gaza Strip penetrates deep into Israeli

territory and brings the main economic and social

central into very close range.

Moreover, the Gaza Strip can be considered as a

very threatening launching platform for attacks on

Israel as we have seen. In the 1950’s during the

Low Intensity war Palestinians regularly

penetrated from Gaza, and before the 1967 war

Gaza was considered a severe military threat to

the flanks of IDF. Hamas in later years kept on

penetrating Israel and this eventually led to the

Low Intensity wars from 2005 onwards.

The rockets of Hamas can reach almost every place in Israel as figure 7 shows. With the attacks it aims

at what is perceived as the vulnerabilities of Israel, its Home Front and in particularly its economy and

the demoralizing effects on its population196. The conclusion was right but the Palestinians severely

underestimated the resilience of the alignment of the Israeli Trinity of People-Army-Government that

perceived the threat and execution of the rocket attacks as existential and this resulted in unleashing

large offensives with an effect that resembled the outcome of the attack in the High Intensity war of

1956. After the clash in 2014 almost no assaults rocket from the Gaza Strip did take place197.

192 (Lambeth, 2012). Page 83. 193 In 2016 it harboured almost 1.8m people of which 1.3m are refugees. The population increases quickly with a birth rate of 32, 3 births/1000. Unemployment is high and the ongoing conflict with Israel has continued to degrade the economic conditions and elevate poverty rates. Israel has occupied the Gaza Strip for several years but eventually removed settlers and military personnel in September 2015. 194 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gz.html It is also that the leadership and forces remain spread over the region especially when HQ was relocated in 2012 from Damascus. 195 (Filiu, 2014). According to Filiu the Gaza Strip has been involved in twelve wars since 1948: 1948, 1948-1956, 1956, 1956-1957, 1967, 1967-1971, 1973-1979, 1987-1993, 2001-2005, 2005-2007, 2008-2009, 2012, 2014 196 (Bregman, 2016). Page 324. 197 (Eilam, Israel's Way of War - a Strategic and Operational Analysis, 1948-2014, 2016). Pages 104-105.

Figure 7 - Rocket Ranges from the Gaza Strip

https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gz.html

However, as Filiu argues Gaza is there to stay also because it has a very strong symbolic meaning. The

Gaza strip is the only Palestinian territory that survived the 1948 Nakba198. All other were absorbed by

Israel, or under direct control or annexed by Jordan. Therewith it is the collective embodiment of

Palestinian nationalism and many historical Palestinian events started from Gaza 199. This implies that

the struggle will continue and eruption of violence will continue. However, also that Israel and the IDF

have found an adjustment of its Doctrine in coping with this kind of circumstances.

Besides, Hamas is not entirely the Gaza Strip. The party has to cope with intense struggle within the

Palestinian society. First this was with the Palestinian Authority from which it took over control over

the Gaza Strip in 2007. A serious threat to Hamas is the Islamic Jihad that has a strong anti-Israel

ideology that does not allow for any political and military compromise.

In this respect Israel and Hamas may have a common objective in avoiding the Islamic Jihad controlling

the Gaza Strip. For Israel this would certain be a casus beli because it would allow the patron of the

Islamic Jihad, Iran, to turn the Gaza Strip into a base against Israel200. This would be invaluable in future

conflicts between Iran and Israel and in deterring Israel from taking pre-emptive strikes against Iran’s

facilities of mass-destruction.

198 Literarily it means the Catastrophe but it is the term for the exodus of Palestinians out of Palestine after the 1948 defeat. 199 (Filiu, 2014). Page 59. He mentions: “It is in Gaza that Palestinian independence was proclaimed, in Gaza that the fedayeen first arose, in Gaza that the founders of Fatah gained their know-how, in Gaza that the first intifada started, and in Gaza that Hamas was established. More importantly perhaps, it is in Gaza that the Palestinian resistance movement was able to cause an Israeli withdrawal after its first occupation of the territory in 1956–57”. 200 (Eilam, Israel's Future Wars: Military and Political Aspects of Israel's Coming Wars, 2016). Page 155-156.

Conclusions

We have described the Israeli military history by using an encompassing theoretical framework

combining the levels of the society, the strategic approach to warfare and the implementation in the

political and military arenas. This has led to interesting results and enabled us to provide a better

description but moreover we can conclude that it gives us a very interesting analytical tool.

It was almost obvious that we found our inspiration for the first level with von Clausewitz. His ‘war

being the continuation of politics with other means provided us with the starting point, because that

illustrates the Israeli situation of a nation-state for most of its history a ‘nation-in-arms’. There should

be something within that nation that explains is successes in warfare. We found that some of the

elements of the Trinities could be useful and in particularly the strength of the alignment between the

People-Army-Government, a derived trinity first to be used by Summer, in the primordial violence,

hatred, and enmity towards, in the case of Israel, the ‘Arab Threat’.

Every Israeli war that we have analysed has shown that this alignment was strong, much stronger than

of these of its adversaries. Even in the cases of the 1973 war and the Intifadas where we saw a kind of

disagreement, the Trinity always and very fast closed ranks when the situation became a threat to the

existence of the country. The alignment of the People-Army-Government is deeply embedded in the

Israeli society because of the perceived continuous existential threat but also because of the

exceptional circumstances under which that society was founded and further developed. We have

shown that the IDF played a more than crucial role in the foundation of the nation-state and therewith

established a strong link between People-Army. The same applies for Army-Government also

illustrated by the blurring of the roles. This brings us however to another conclusion on the applicability

of the derived Trinity. In this paper it has only been tested for the case were a complete society is at

war.

The Arab adversaries have always shown in their statements that the ultimate aim is the destruction

of the nation-state of Israel and that seems to imply a strong alignment of their trinities. However, we

have shown that these are merely token statements and that very often the primacy of these countries

was with their internal balances of power or even between allies as was e.g. the case in the 1973 war.

A strong alignment of the Trinity does not suffice to be successful in warfare. It is also the basic

principles that are implicitly and explicitly applied in approaching warfare. We have described the

Western way of warfare also because right from its constitution, and even before, Israel has embraced

this way of warfare as we have demonstrated. It was not only that army officers have been enrolled in

other (Western) countries and fought their wars but also because army officers were actively studying

this kind of warfare and being trained abroad. The basic principles of the Western way of warfare as

identified by Parker are therefore strongly embedded in the Israeli political and military strategies and

thoughts. It is because of the above on the Trinities that this also finds its ways into the Israeli society.

Almost every Israeli citizen is familiar with these principles.

We have illustrated that at certain moments the Arab adversaries also used these principles e.g. the

use of technology but it seems that this did not bring military success. Apart from the earlier alignment

of the Trinity another reason is that the translation to the battlefield and the creation of practical

doctrines was different. This is because Israel has not only better war plans but because it has shown

that it will adhere to these constant factors that we called the Doctrine. Deterrence and ruthless,

excessive retaliation are very important and it can be concluded that this has actually deterred the

Arab adversaries to try to destroy Israel with WMD at hand. This was certainly the case in 1967 and

1973.

Von Clausewitz was very clear that his theoretical framework was purely descriptive and in no way a

guideline for warfare. We have however added two other levels that make our theoretical framework

also practical in the sense that it can be operationalised on the levels of political and military strategies,

operational and tactical development and implementation. In that respect, when further developed,

it can be used in ‘war games’.

We expect however that there is another parameter that has an important impact on the theoretical

framework and in particularly if we look at the 20th and 21st centuries. This has to do with the potential

for realignment for which it is necessary that there is room for (re-)negotiations between the People-

Army-Government on a more or less equal base. It is considered that this is potentially only possible

and effective in a democratic nation-in-arms based on the principals of the Trias Politica. Important is

that Israel has shown the robustness of its democracy because on several occasions and due to the

blurring of the roles it could have followed the roads of its neighbours and have established a (military)

dictatorship. Moreover, also the ability to quickly learn as is important in the Western way of warfare

is only possible when there is a balance in the Trinity.

It can namely become only effective, taking into consideration the continuation of politics with other

means and the primacy of the civil leadership, when there is balance in particularly on the Army-

Government axe. The most pregnant example of a successful military state that eventually was

defeated was Germany in WWI. Highly innovative on the battle field until the end but highly becoming

more divided on the Trinity People-Army-Government with no room for negotiations. The Army had

taken over. It was one of the reasons for surrender.

Abstract

The Israeli military history can be described by using a three-level theoretical framework combining

society, strategies and tactics into a powerful descriptive, analytical tool. The first level is the alignment

of the ‘von Clausewitzian’ derived trinity of the People-Army-Government towards the trinity of

primordial violence, hatred, and enmity towards a common, often existential, threat. In the case of

Israel, the ‘Arab Threat’. This combines the fundamental aspects of a society during armed conflicts,

between the people, being the justification for the existence of the state, the government as the

guardians and executors of the objectives of the state and the army, the executors in times of war. The

alignment on this level is the first explanatory factor for the results in warfare of a country.

The second level is the way in which a country prepares for and fights its wars i.e. the ‘philosophical’

approach and we use the adaptation of the Western way of warfare. It is a combination of five aspects

as identified by Parker of technology, discipline, an aggressive military tradition, an extraordinary

capacity to respond to challenges and the optimal use and mobilisation of resources to fight these wars

e.g. capital and capital providing structures201. The third level is the translation of this into a practical

political and military doctrine for engagement in the different arenas.

The theoretical framework has been used for describing the Israeli High and Low intensity and Hybrid

wars and Wars of Attrition and of Manoeuvrability.

201 (Parker, 2005). Introduction.

Appendix 1: Qibya (1953) – Always Retaliate Excessively The Qibya operation is not part of a war but we just provide a description in this appendix because it is interesting to see what the impact is of a single, military and rather small operation on the Doctrine.

Table 8 Qibya Raid

The Qibya operation was a reprisal action of the IDF for the killing on 12 October 1953 of a Jewish

family by a grenade thrown into their house in Yehud (inside the Green Line armistice border). The

savage attack shocked the Israeli public and it urged for retaliation202. The Israeli reprisal would shock

the world but still keep People-Army-Government aligned and even strengthen it. The concern of the

military that actually leaving this kind of reprisals would take the sting out of the IDF actions.

However, Qibya is considered a watershed in the Israeli discriminate use of force. The IDF was

instructed to shift to hitting counter-force targets only but this was only for practical reasons and

merely on moral grounds. There were doubts about the deterrent effect and the fear for diplomatic

pressures with ‘Qibya-kind’ of retaliatory actions and therefore it looks like that Israel has incorporated

the principle of discrimination in its strategies, operational art and operations203.

It is argued that the 1948 war was the most important and crucial military conflict of Israel as it led to

the forceful creation of the state, created a Middle Eastern refugee problem and created regional

political and military turmoil ever since204. The period after the armistice was characterized by fear,

uncertainty and continued hostilities, infiltrations from the West bank and the Gaza Strip. These

infiltrations were mainly for economic and social purposes but in certain and the minority of the cases

also to kill Israeli and destroy military infrastructure. 205.

The operational orders of the IDF for the operation were twofold: “the first was issued by the general

staff and was aimed at 'temporarily occupying the village of Qibya, with the objective of blowing up

houses and striking the inhabitants'. The second order was issued by the regional command in charge

of the operation and instructed the units 'to attack and temporarily occupy the village and carry out

destruction and inflict maximum loss of life in order to drive the villagers from their homes”206.

After the execution of the operation the IDF considered it as a successful retaliatory action. It also

fitted within Moshe Dayan preference to strike at civilians’ targets as a more effective tactics. Contrary

to what for some time was believed the operational orders were actually based on an earlier

governmental decision in a meeting were Pinhas Lavon (Defence Minister), Mordechai Makleff (Chief

of General Staff), Moshe Dayan (Chief Operations Officer) and Ben-Gurion were present and were

unanimous to retaliate excessively207.

202 (Morris B. , 1996) Page 40. The 1949 Green Line resulted from the Armistice Agreements in 1949 that formally ended the hostilities between the Arab states and Israel. 203 (Kober, Israel's Wars of Attrition, 2009). Pages 122-123. 204 (Cleveland & Bunton, 2016). Page 255. 205 (Morris B. , 1996) 206 (Kafkafi, 2002). Page 124. 207 (Khalidi & Caplan, 2002). Page 79.

Qibya Raid (1953)

Adversaries Israel Non-belligerents Victory Israel

Trinities Raid fully supported and acknowledged by Israeli public. Retaliation demanded by the public.

Western way of Warfare Not applicable although this kind or ruthlessness is not uncommon in the Western way of warfare.

Doctrine Always retaliate excessively.

Nature Retaliatory action that can be seen as a watershed. From then on discriminate use of force officially internalized into IDF policy. Even after Qibya excessive retaliation is still a crucial element of the Israeli Doctrine. Nothing changed in that respect.

‘Casus Beli’ Terrorist attacks Fedayeen.

Moreover, in case of the Qibya another important aspect became apparent. It was implemented by

the “101” unit of the IDF that was actually responsible for retaliation raids and actions208. This

commander unit was trained according to the tactics and skills of hand-to-hand fighting as developed

by Orde Charles Wingate209. A professional and ruthless instrument for excessive retaliation as it would

show over the years.

The “101” is considered a role model210. It is augmented that the “101” was established and formed to

serve the Doctrine: professional, fully armoured and able to quickly strike on enemy soil. The unit was

created by Ariel Sharon, not only a strong proponent of excessive retaliation, but also as military leader

involved in the implementation of the actions in Qibya211. He would stick to this policy during his

political career and when possible implement this part of the Doctrine as can be seen in the 1982

War.212 Therewith he strongly aligned the government and the army.

Although Jordan ensured the Israeli that they would deal with the matter of the terrorists, the decision

was already made. By the decision to retaliate excessively and the orders by the IDF General Command

to the units to impose maximum destruction and killing eventually 69 people were killed213.

The raid was in a period of power struggles in the government and related political arena’s and the

operation has been used in these struggles. However, the decision to retaliate was made at

government level, effectively still by Ben-Gurion as it was still in his preserve214. It does show two

aspects of the Doctrine: the alignment of Army-Government (later more on the people aspect of the

Trinity) and that of retaliation to the full. Most clarifying is a statement of politicians after the operation

that “this raises Israeli status among both the Arabs and the great powers…and there were many

Israeli’s who shared that view”215. This was a widely held opinion of the politicians at that moment.

Qibya was not unique as part of the retaliation policy of the Israeli government. There were almost

continuously retaliations the two previous years by both sides. It seems that this was leading to an

increasing escalation. The operation ‘Viper on the Way’ against Jordanian villages led to more killings

in Israeli villages by Jordan Arabs. However, the difference that emerged is that the Israeli actions

became military executed, more effective and acting from the adagio “do more harm to your enemy

than he does to you”, sometimes to the extreme. Therewith it also contributed to the policy of

deterrence that would become so effective in later years.

As Ben-Gurion explained for a committee of the Knesset that the “method was to kill some of the

villagers [apart from killing the terrorists] so that their fellows would influence the Arab government to

208 (Stein, 1988). Page 87-88 Electronic version. 209 (Angelim, September 2016). Politicians and military leaders of Israel have often expressed their appreciation and stressed the relevance of Orde Wingate up to the present day. 210 (Eilam, Israel's Way of War - a Strategic and Operational Analysis, 1948-2014, 2016). Page 8. 211 (Khalidi & Caplan, 2002). Pages 78-79. 212 (Khalidi & Caplan, 2002), Page 80. Khalidi and Caplan state it as follows: Even “fifty years after Qibya, Sharon’s frame of mind is firmly moored in that dawn of 14-15 October 1953, and for him Beirut in 1982 … are but grandiose elaborations of the same rationale”. 213 (Kafkafi, 2002). Page 119. 214 (Khalidi & Caplan, 2002). According to Khalidi & Caplan: “Ben-Gurion actually had taken a ‘vacation’ and left his position temporarily to Pinchas Lavon as acting Minister of Defence and Moshe Sharett as acting Prime Minister. However, he was still in power and had the mandate to make important policy decisions as in this case. He decided on 23 August 1953 that ‘from this day on (his vacation), I will handle General Staff and Ministry of Defence problems”. He was even send daily ministry of defence reports”. It has been argued by Kafkafi that he actually used the situation around the retaliatory action in his power struggle with Lavon. [They continue (page 78):] “Ben-Gurion’s formal leave did not start until 8 December 1953, and his prolonged transitional disengagement from his posts coincided with the weeks that preceded and followed Sharon’s raid on Qibya”. 215 (Kafkafi, 2002). Page 126.

stop infiltration”216. The order, although there is still not sufficient evidence, seemed to be very clear

in the case of the retaliation for the murders in Yahud namely to destroy the village and kill the

inhabitants217. It is clear now that this decision was made on the 13th October 1953 when Ben-Gurion,

Pinhas Lavon, Moshe Dayan and Mordechai Makleff met and took the decision and was passed on to

the Operations Department in General Staff Branch218.

Moreover, the IDF at that time facing serious problems that seemed to be recognised by Arab

infiltrates and so-called terrorists. So, it needed to show that it could effectively strike and, as Moshe

Dayan, then head of operations, made it clear that the IDF could never tolerate this kind of Arabian

operations. Qibya would demonstrate the effectiveness of the IDF by employing the ‘101’unit. This

‘101’commando unit was also build of volunteers of the villages. Although in that time information to

the public was limited that does not mean that there was no awareness or even practical involvement

of civilians in the retaliatory operations. Acting Prime Minister Moshe Sharett made this very clear by

agreeing to place responsibilities on the settlers for retaliation in borders areas on the settles219.

The operation caused outrage not only in the Arab world but also with the Great Powers and at the

UN. Although the events were used in internal power struggle the political establishment and the army

closed ranks and, in the Knesset, the outside world was even condemned for not reacting to the killing

of Jews by Arabs that caused the retaliation220.

Generally, the press was in favour of retaliatory strikes if deemed necessary and there was little

condemnation of the operation. It even put the blame to others, and in particular Western

Governments. They were not being able to hold the Arabs back from infiltrations221. As was also

concluded by the British ambassador in Tel Aviv who actually had a clear perception of the situation

in Israel, backed by several intelligence reports: “The Government of Israel has not very often

received from the Israel press so wide a measure of unanimity in their support as on this

outstandingly unworthy occasion…they have all devoted themselves at great length to justifying their

Government’s action and to attributing the blame to others”222. The press was therewith also voicing

the opinion of the Israeli people. This shows the strong alignment of People-Army-Government in this

case.

216 (Kafkafi, 2002). Page 122. 217 (Kafkafi, 2002). Page 124. 218 (Morris B. , 1996) Page 41. 219 (Kafkafi, 2002). Page 122. 220 (Morris B. , 1996)Page 42. 221 (Morris B. , 1996) An overview of the press coverage in Israel is provided in this article. 222 (Morris B. , 1996) Page 49. The ambassador at time was Francis Edward Evans who had both a military and diplomatic background.

Appendix 2: Israel – Facts and Figures

Since its creation in 1948 the State of Israel has been continuously involved in conflicts with other

states in the region, the Palestinians and so-called terrorist groups. Moreover, it has been involved in

intrastate conflicts e.g. Lebanon and a variety of wars e.g. high-intensity, hybrid and low-intensity wars.

This implied that it had to cope with many often basic strategic, operational and tactical challenges223.

In 2015 Israel spend 5.4% of it GDP on military expenditures and it is therewith number 7 in the

world224. Actually, it has been much higher in previous years and

in particular during the formative years of the nation-state.

Moreover, of the countries topping the list before Israel, 5 are

located in the region and are perceived as threats to the security

of the country225. In particularly the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

(KSA) is interesting in this respect as it is in a continuous race for

regional military, political and ideological hegemony with Iraq,

Iran, Egypt and Israel. Besides there is a strong military presence

in the region of the American forces, important to notice from a

geo-political view.

The country belongs to the top 20 of highly advanced countries

in the world and is by far the number 1 in the Middle East.

Discoveries of some of the biggest natural gas reserves before its

coast will brighten its energy security in the future226. However,

the continuous security threat does seriously affect the further

growth of the economy of the country and its prosperity.

Israel is small and important economic resources as well as its

population are within easy reach of its neighbours, near the

Jordan and Syrian borders. Although Syria, once one of Israel

severest enemies, is seriously destabilized and involved in a

ferocious civil war, the threat remains as jet fighters and

bombers can easily overfly the country and already rockets of

short range can find easy targets. Moreover, the situation allows

the present day arch enemy of Iran to build up long range rockets

capacity in Syria. Netanyahu has mentioned this particular threat

on 28th August 2017227 and it did not take Israel long to take

military action afterward. Israel continuously attacks military

objects and infrastructures in Syria.

223 (Eilam, Israel's Way of War - a Strategic and Operational Analysis, 1948-2014, 2016). Page 3. He states that “Hybrid warfare can be defined as the “employment of the combination of traditional, irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive tactics, techniques, and procedures in an effort to achieve success, across the full range of warfare, tactical, operational and strategic. High intensity warfare was for Israel its interstate confrontations with Arab states (1948, 1956, 1967, 1973, 1982) being huge conventional collisions. The low intensity wars of Israel were mainly border wars with Arab states and organisations”. 224 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Yearbook: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security. 2015. 225 Oman (14.2%), Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (13.5%), South Sudan (10.9%), Iraq (7.3%), Algeria (6.2%). Also, Israel’s direct neighbour Jordan is spending 4.2% of its GDP on military expenditure. 226 Exploitation is delayed because of political and environmental issues. 227 https://nos.nl/artikel/2190197-netanyahu-iran-bouwt-raketfabrieken-in-libanon-en-syrie.html

Figure 8 - Population Density Israel

https://nos.nl/artikel/2190197-netanyahu-iran-bouwt-raketfabrieken-in-libanon-en-syrie.html

Figure 9, 9a & 9b - Rocket Ranges

The consequences of a lack of strategic depth is shown by the operation of Hezbollah in 2009 when it

was able to fire e.g. Katyusha rockets into Israel for almost two months. Since then Hezbollah has

seriously gained in political and military strength228 and is sometimes considered a stronger, or better

a more serious, military adversary than some of the Arab states. However, in a full-scale war it is still

no real match in direct combat with the IDF. More interesting in this respect is that Hezbollah seems

to follow the phases of Maoism warfare (see below). Actual it is argued that this kind of warfare is very

much linked to the Western way of warfare as it combines all elements but has been adopted to the

evolution of a low-intensity and hybrid warfare into high-intensity warfare. This is not remarkable as

it is known that Mao studied the Western war philosophers and strategies.

Military operations on Israeli soil would be extra disadvantageous for Israel because of its very limited

space of movability and not having the option to trade space for time. It would also bring war into the

communities and this is politically unacceptable. It is therefore military essential that Israel always

increases its strategic depth. This implies that the defence of the country is based on offensive

strategies or forward defence.

Actually, the policy of Israel to control (and further colonizing) the West Bank fits within the military

necessity of increasing the strategic depth in particularly in regard to that part of the country were the

distance from the West Bank to the sea is only 18 km. Apart from political or ideological motives the

choice to control the West Bank makes sense from a military strategic perspective.

The same applies for the occupation of the Golan, and previously of the Sinai and the establishing of

security zones in Lebanon, which effectively was an occupation. It also shows that in these

circumstances the increase of the strategic depth can be military an advantage as can be illustrated by

the 1973 tank battles that took place on the Golan and in the Sinai. It also has its disadvantages because

there with Israel brings its fiercest arch enemy within its own ‘borders’. It is also to the advantage of

its adversaries like Egypt and Jordan who do not have to cope with a difficult and dangerous population

group within their borders. This was sometimes even threating a country’s mere existence as was

shown by the attempted coup d’état by the PLO in Jordan in 1970 and 1971 which eventually led to

the expulsion of the PLO (Black September).

228 (Perlo-Freeman, 2009). Page 5.

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