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Hawa Kombian s3023036

Professor Andrej Zwitter

Geopolitics in Humanitarian Action

22 November 2015

UN Regional Task Sharing Variance in Post-Cold War Internal Conflict

Introduction

The post-cold war period ushered in an era for enhanced United Nations (UN) missions

focused on prevention and maintenance of peace. In 1992 UN Secretary General (SG) Boutros

Boutros-Ghali brought forward the notion that the organization should serve as a mechanism to

predict and prevent conflict before escalation in what he termed “Preventive Diplomacy”

(Bercovitch, and Jackson 88). “Regional Task Sharing” has been a proposed means of preventive

diplomacy wherein states are “empowered” to cooperate to meet regional peace and security

needs. Viewed as an international division of labour between regional states and the UN

governance system, its terms and parameters can be ambiguous to determine (Bercovitch, and

Jackson 121). Ranging from supreme UN leadership to minor oversight, the balance of decision

making, power and control can result in diverse outcomes in the fluidity of an operation and its

long term consequences.

This paper will answer the following research question: How are UN regional task-

sharing operations affected by political will, legality and operational mandate development

in post-Cold War internal conflicts? An exploratory case study will compare the UN Mission

in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) alongside the Economic Community of West African States

Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) from 1996-2002 in contrast with the Saudi-led coalition

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intervention in Yemen from 2014-present. The self-interests of regional actors, UN system

legality, mandate development and long-term action consequences on population casualties and

displacement will be investigated to assess aspects of responsible response.

Context, Methods & Mission

To convey the applicability of the missions in Sierra Leone and Yemen, a context

comparison will conducted. Sierra Leone and Yemen are examples of post-Cold War, internal

conflicts wherein armed groups revolted against government. In Sierra Leone, the armed group

Revolutionary United Front (RUF) seized power and eventually worked with military dissidents,

the Armed Force Revolutionary Council (AFRC), to overthrow the sitting government in 1997

(Ero). Similarly, Yemen witnessed the rise of the Houthi armed group over since 2004 and its

growing support from former members of the Yemeni military (“Yemen Country Profile” 5).

Both conflicts have seen sitting Presidents flee the state to seek refuge in neighbouring countries

(Ero) (“Yemen Country Profile” 4).

There has also been alleged backing of support for armed factions from external actors.

Where Charles Taylor supported RUF from Liberia (Ero), reported foreign intervention from

Iran has been accused of providing similar support for the Houthis in Yemen (Black) (“King

Salman”).

Social

Yemen has a population which is nearly four times as large as that of Sierra Leone at 25

to six million people. Both societies are predominantly Muslim with low urban population

representation - 40% in Sierra Leone to 34% in Yemen (“Yemen Country Profile” 2) (“Sierra

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Leone: Country Profile” 1). Over half of the populations of Sierra Leona and Yemen live below

the poverty line - 70% in Sierra Leone to 54% in Yemen (“Yemen Country Profile” 1) (“Sierra

Leone: Country Profile” 1).

Economics

Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita sits low at $2,000 (US) and $3,800 (US),

leaving Sierra Leone and Yemen to experience low levels of development, respectively. Military

spending is varied between the contexts with Sierra Leone spending 0.7% of its GDP while

Yemen spends nearly 4%. (The World Factbook: Yemen) (The World Factbook: Sierra Leone).

Politics

Political tensions were driven by cultural divides within society. In Yemen the Houthis

represent the Shia Muslim minority’s struggle for a share of political power, in Sierra Leone the

tension was tied to colonial divides between tribes and access to resources like diamonds. Both

countries are recent democracies with Sierra Leone gaining independence in the 1960s and

Yemen unifying as nation in the 1990s. (“Yemen Country Profile” 4) (“Sierra Leone: Country

Profile” 2).

Methods & Missions

The analysis of the type of regional task sharing arrangement is a key factor in the divide

between the operations cycle and outcomes. The UN refers to task sharing as “hybrid operations”

which fall into scopes of partnership:

“Integrated : regional organizations and the UN in one chain of command

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Coordinated : separate but coordinated command structures

Parallel : UN alongside others but no formal coordination

Sequential : UN preceding or following regional deployment”

(Bercovitch, and Jackson 123)

In these two scenarios the divergence of approaches becomes more evident as the basis of

comparison of actions and outcomes. A mission outline will situate the context of UN

engagement within these regions.

Following a raging civil war between RUF and the government since 1991 in Sierra

Leone, the ECOMOG task force, mandated by the Economic Community Of West African States

(ECOWAS), intervened in the conflict following the collaborative coup attempt by RUF/AFRC

in March 1997 (Goldmann 462). The coup followed the peace process outlined in the 1996

Abidjan accord. ECOMOG began as a mission to re-stabilize the country and enforce the UN

Security Council’s (SC) decisions on embargoes following the October 1997 Conakry peace

agreement. Following a breakdown in this agreement, action by ECOMOG successfully

reinstated President Kabbah in March 1998 (Goldmann, 470).

Following the President return the UN had an increased presence in the operation. This

included the development of the UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) in June

1998, and which worked alongside ECOMOG until the Lomé agreements when larger

UNAMSIL took over in October 1999 (Sierra Leone - UNAMSIL – Background). Peacekeeping

forces had ground presence and participated in peace building initiatives with a range of security

and humanitarian objectives. In this instance, the mission moved from parallel towards integrated

before a general UN take over.

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In Yemen, underlying tensions between Houthis and the government escalated quickly in

2014 (“Yemen Country Profile”). In the struggle for political recognition, the Shia Houthis

mounted a military campaign and seized the capital in challenge to the Sunni led government. In

January 2015 a draft new constitution was rejected by the Houthis and by February President

Hadi fled to Saudi Arabia. Upon President Hadi’s request, a Saudi Arabian led coalition

launched operations “Decisive Storm” and “Renewal of Hope” in March and April. The diagram

illustrates the nations for and against the military operations.

(“Military

action in

Yemen”)

Decisive Storm was the military arm of the campaign and its goals included protecting

Yemen and neighbours from a mounting Houthi assault by destroying their weapons arsenal and

troop capacity. Conversely, the ongoing Renewal of Hope is the assigned humanitarian arm

which is focused on civilian protection, provision of aid and a continuous counter-terrorism

measure (“Operation Decisive Storm Ends”).

The military operations, ground combat, naval presence and aerial bombardment have

received no formal backing from the UN SC and would generate tension given the loyalties of

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the SC permanent members as outlined in the figure above (Dyke) (Al Jazeera). The current UN

presence constitutes Special Envoys Jamal Benomar (2014/15) and Ismail Ould Cheikh Ahmed

(2015-present). In this instance operations are at best sequential, with any concrete UN

engagement still imminent in light of the ongoing coalition campaign.

Discussion

Political Will

Determining the scope of regional task sharing and UN leadership hinges on the political

will of major actors. Unique and central to the cases is the fact that the internal conflicts had

increased potential to disrupt the peace and stability of neighbour states.

Both ECOMOG and the Saudi-led coalition were reeling from recent regional crises.

West Africa with the Liberian civil war and the Middle East with the 2011 Arab Spring fallout,

the Syrian civil war and the emerging threat of the Islamic State (IS).

Given that the Sierra Leone war began in 1991 and intervention did not occur until 1997,

it was clear that intervention from the international community was not forthcoming. Adebajo

and Keen note that SG Annan had pushed for peacekeeping presence in Sierra Leone but

following debacles in Somalia, key players like the United States were unwilling to rush lend

support (252). The displacement from the Liberian war had affected countries like Guinea and

nations which had contributed troops understood the importance in participating in a shared,

regional force (253).

Following the years mandating ECOMOG oversight for sanctions, the UN SC finally

approved the formation of the UNOSMIL observer mission in June 1998 (“Sierra Leone -

UNAMSIL – Background”). SG Annan’s situation report in 1998 calls for an explicit increase in

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un-armed military observers with a primary mission to assist the Special Envoy and the

ECOMOG forces at the time in light of mounting human rights and humanitarian atrocities

occurring (Annan 12).

Sharing boarders with Yemen, Saudi Arabia was eager to participate in a military

offensive with the mounting influence of the Houthi forces. In the YouTube clip of a press

conference by the Saudi Arabian ambassador to the United States Adel Al-Jubeir, states that that

the military operation was designed to “eliminate the threat that was facing the kingdom of Saudi

Arabia” (saudiembassyus) - which consequently protected Yemen from a forced takeover.

As a Sunni nation, Saudi Arabia and Gulf Co-operation Council members are interested

in protecting the political strength of their religious majority. Allowing for the forced takeover of

a fellow Sunni state by a religious minority could set a dangerous precedent in a fragile region

where extremist groups, such as Al Qaeda and the IS are actively seeking political economy. Al-

Jubeir reiterates peace is within reach as long as the Houthis engage in political solutions

(saudiembassyus).

Motivating the coalition’s approach was the lack of confidence in an UN solution to the

conflict amidst growing extremism in the region. Former Special Envoy Benomar had spent four

years in Yemen and was perceived as failing to re-establish peace and security via UN methods.

Eventually, he would step down in March 2015 as the coalition moved forward with Operation

Decisive Storm (“UN envoy to Yemen Resigns”).

Within the context of historical precedents for intervention and the timelines of

international engagement, regional bodies were a definitive solution to jump start the conflict

resolution process.

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Legality and Mandate Development

Understanding operation legality and mandate development is crucial to the legitimacy

and success of regional task sharing.

In Sierra Leone, the 1998 ECOMOG intervention not UN mandated embargoes turned

the tide following the military coup and removal of President Kabbah (Adebajo and Keen 255).

The Nigerian-led ECOMOG intervention was not technically approved by the UN SC, although

they unanimously deemed the mission a success (Goldmann 470). Alternatively, the Saudi led

coalition faced criticism over the lack of UN SC approval of Operation Decisive Storm (Dyke).

This points to the obscurity in regulation regarding regional actor intervention within

internal conflicts. Where most UN rhetoric refers to inter-state conflict instead of internal,

Bercovitch and Jackson explain that based on the UN Charter, regional actors are encouraged to

resolve local crises as deemed fit (255). Based on Chapter VIII, Article 52, regional actors are

encouraged to make every attempt to settle disputes before bringing issues forward to the UN

SC. Heightened by this loose process is the fact that the sovereign, legitimate governments in

Sierra Leone and Yemen both authorized and welcomed the intervention by the regional actors

(Adebajo and Keen 254) (saudiembassyus). This premise lends additional credibility and agency

to the legality of military operations.

UN involvement is a consensus driven exercise wherein states rarely intervene as swiftly

as possible. In both cases, the UN began with sending special envoys as a voice and

representative of neutrality and negotiation. In Sierra Leone, the UN only appointed Special

Envoy Berhanu Dinka as a negotiator in 1995, four years after the crisis first began. Following

failed Abidjan accords (1996) and the coup (1997), the UN began to operate as more of a hybrid

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mission with ECOMOG forces to oversee international embargos six years after the start of the

conflict. The UN then expanded their role (1998) to provide UNOSMIL observer expertise in

conjunction with ECOMOG and eventually took over the operation as UNAMSIL, an armed

branch of the operation (Sierra Leone - UNAMSIL – Background). UNAMSIL began 6,000

strong in 1999 and was upgraded to 11,100 by 2000 and expanded scope from protecting

civilians under threat to also providing security at key sites (Kandor and Vincent 16).

In Yemen, UN Special Envoy Ould Cheikh Ahmed is the second representative

attempting to bring all parties to an agreement while the coalition operations occur

simultaneously. Based on principles outlined by Bercovitch and Jackson, the coalition has the

ability to facilitate greater consensus in collective operations because of its smaller size which

facilitates consensus building and harmonization of interests (130). This liberty and lack of

accountability enables the coalition to engage in sophisticated combat including land, sea and air

tactics (Torchia). Operation Renewal of Hope came into effect three weeks after the military

campaign of Operation Decisive Storm with a focus on political and humanitarian goals within

Yemen while still securing and maintaining security in the region (saudiembassyusa).

Sierra Leone exposes the fact that UN mission and mandates are at the mercy of a process

involving multiple actors, extended timelines, and leadership fluctuations. Conversely, Yemen

points to the nimbleness of regional actors to mobilize and deploy but also to the ambiguity of

their legitimacy to act and the scope of their ad hoc mandates.

Long term Intervention Consequences

By 1999 ECOMOG witnessed a harmonization of its role in line with a refreshed UN

mandate under the role of UNAMSIL. However, after leading the effort ECOMOG forces began

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to dwindle in resources and will to sustain the operation. Nigeria, a main ECOMOG backer, was

spending $1 million daily, suffering extensive casualties and losing home support for their

participation (Adebajo and Keen 257).

International pressure for a peace agreement led to the signing of the Lomé agreement in

1999, which essentially traded impunity for peace as existing war lords were cleared of crimes

and wrongdoing in order to implement a sustainable peace (Sierra Leone – UNAMSIL –

Background). Eventually the ECOMOG forces withdrew from the region, but a contingent

remained and was folded into the expanded UNAMSIL mission. While the forces were removed

on the ground, ECOWAS was still involved in oversight of ongoing operations and refugee

management.

Under the agreement the UN was asked to expand its role and “over the course of its

mandate, the Mission disarmed tens of thousands of ex-fighters, assisted in holding national

elections, helped to rebuild the country's police force, and contributed towards rehabilitating the

infrastructure and bringing government services to local communities.” (Sierra Leone -

UNAMSIL – Background). The combined UN led force went on to disarmed and demobilized

over 75,000 former rebels and child soldiers (Sierra Leone - UNAMSIL – Background).

With nearly 70,000 killed and 2.6 million displaced (6) in Sierra Leone, Kaldor and

Vincent reveal that the initiative to disarm, demobilize and reintegrate former fighters into civil

society was not a sweeping success as the trained skills did not match the labour market demand

at the time. While the UNAMSIL forces were also inadequate at providing widespread civilian

protection and their forces suffered a RUF attack where up to 500 troops were taken hostage n

2000 (17).

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As leader of the coalition forces Saudi Arabia is an oil rich nation which has adequate

resources to lead a significant and sustained push throughout Yemen (Torchia). With ongoing

pledges and commitments to the humanitarian aspect of the conflict and support to aid

organizations, the mandate of the coalition’s Operation Renewal of Hope appears clear enough.

Saudi Arabia pledged $274 million dollars required for UN agencies to meet the humanitarian

need in Yemen in April 2015 (“Saudi Arabia to establish coordination centre”). However the UN

Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) stated that 21.2 million people, 82

% of the population, required humanitarian assistance and 2.3 million were displaced. OCHA has

only received $700 million of the $1.6 billion of funding which was requested in June 2015 (Van

Der Klauuw).

In the breadth of parallel humanitarian and security objectives, the coalition has

participated in acts deemed as breaches of international law against civilian populations despite a

substantial financial contribution to saving lives. The coalition has been accused of fracturing the

sanctity of the humanitarian space. In October 2015 at least 47 people were killed in a coalition

military attack which has been condemned by the UN OCHA’s Under SG Stephen O’Brien

(“UN demands probe”). Later that month, coalition forces mistakenly bombed a humanitarian

hospital operated by Medecins Sans Frontiers (MSF) which served a community of up to

200,000 people. The Saudi forces further blamed MSF for providing incorrect location

coordinates (Oakford).

These examples point to the lack of accountability and impunity within the scope of an ad

hoc regional mission. Despite calls for inquiries into the civilian attacks, it is unclear whether

follow up action will be taken. The level of Operation Renewal of Hope bloodshed also

questions the extent to which Operation Decisive Storm can be deemed a success. This

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shortcoming can be viewed as a failure to develop an actionable strategy outside of the rigor and

accountability of the UN system. Arguably, Operation Renewal of Hope could be a humanitarian

front for ongoing military operations with real and tangible consequences.

Conclusion

Regional Task Sharing is a relatively new concept in the field of geopolitical

intervention, especially within internal conflicts. As a core international decision-making body,

the UN has a pivotal role to play in organization and engagement with regional actors to better

secure long-term peace and security. Sierra Leone and Yemen illustrate the alternative

intervention outcomes possible given the level of UN interaction. Sierra Leone highlights a

protracted crisis wherein UN involvement began following nearly five years of inaction, built

slowly and steadily to the point of control and ultimately suffered some weaknesses in its

approach to peace building. Conversely, Yemen’s coalition intervention has witnessed swift

action and recourse, all within the realm of legality, but has been marred by ambiguous goals,

exit strategy and accountability. These issues could lead to a similar population causalities and

displacement as in Sierra Leone, but on a wider scale due to population size differences.

The largest divide between the two cases comes down to resources wherein Sierra Leone

required international support but Yemen had coalition backing from wealthy and willing

nations. With the framework of relaxed legal regulation, it is certainly easier to galvanize support

for an operation when concerned parties have control of resources. While political will and

mission sustainability might be the defining strength of the coalition’s approach, the lack of

operational clarity leaves its mission haphazard and open-ended.

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This analysis sheds light on the fact that there is still a need for greater accountability at

the UN SC table to develop concrete terms around the legitimacy of regional forces or at the very

least UN engagement and accountability mechanisms. The world needs accountability for the

sake of the human rights of the affected populations.

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