Historical InvestigationThe Missile Crisis and the Cold War in Cuba

Unit: CHALLENGES OF THE POST WAR WORLD (1946-1968)High School United States History“The World on the Brink of Destruction: The Cuban Missile Crisis”

U.S. History State Curriculum:5.4.1.d Analyze the impact of Cold War events in Cuba, including the Bay of Pigs Invasion (1961) and Cuban

Missile Crisis (1962) and the expansion of the Cold War into the Western Hemisphere

C3 Frameworks:HISTORYD2.His.11.9-12. Critique the usefulness of historical sources for a specific historical inquiry based on their maker, date,

place of origin, intended audience, and purposeD2.His.16.9-12. Integrate evidence from multiple relevant historical sources and interpretations into a reasoned

argument about the past.D2.His.17.9-12. Critique the central arguments in secondary works of history on related topics in multiple media in

terms of their historical accuracy.

EVALUATING SOURCES AND USING EVIDENCED3.1.9-12. Gather relevant information from multiple sources representing a wide range of views while using the

origin, authority, structure, context, and corroborative value of the sources to guide the selection.D3.2.9-12. Evaluate the credibility of a source by examining how experts value the source.D3.3.9-12. Identify evidence that draws information directly and substantively from multiple sources to detect

inconsistencies in evidence in order to revise or strengthen claims.D3.4.9-12. Refine claims and counterclaims attending to precision, significance, and knowledge conveyed through

the claim while pointing out the strengths and limitations of both.

Common Core State Standards for Literacy in History/Social Studies:ReadingRH.9-10.1 Cite specific textual evidence to support analysis of science and technical texts, attending to the precise

details of explanations or descriptions.RH.9-10.2 Determine the central ideas or conclusions of a text; trace the text’s explanation or depiction of a

complex process, phenomenon, or concept; provide an accurate summary of the text.RH.9-10.7 Translate quantitative or technical information expressed in words in a text into visual form (e.g., a table

or chart) and translate information expressed visually or mathematically (e.g., in an equation) into words.

RH.9-10.8 Assess the extent to which the reasoning and evidence in a text support the author’s claim or a recommendation for solving a scientific or technical problem.

WritingWHST.9-10.1 Write arguments focused on discipline-specific content.WHST.9-10.7 Conduct short as well as more sustained research projects to answer a question (including a self

generated question) or solve a problem; narrow or broaden the inquiry when appropriate; synthesize multiple sources on the subject, demonstrating understanding of the subject under investigation.

WHST.9-10.8 Gather relevant information from multiple authoritative print and digital sources, using advanced searches effectively; assess the usefulness of each source in answering the research question; integrate information into the text selectively to maintain the flow of ideas, avoiding plagiarism and following a standard format for citation.

WHST.9-10.9 Draw evidence from informational texts to support analysis reflection, and research.

I. Engage the Students

Provide students with the following background information:

On October 14, 1962, an American U-2 reconnaissance aircraft flew over the province of San Cristobal in Cuba on a routine mission to gather data. The pictures the aircraft took of the ground disclosed developments that were far from routine. The photos revealed Soviet efforts to install approximately forty nuclear missiles, each capable of devastating an American city.

Since Cuban leader Fidel Castro’s first appeals to Moscow in 1960, U.S. officials had repeatedly warned the Soviets against attempting to put missiles in Cuba. The Soviets had assured the United States that they did not intend to give the Cubans nuclear missiles. They pledged that Cuba would receive only nonnuclear weapons to defend the island from attack.

“There is no need for the Soviet Union to shift its weapons for the repulsion of aggression, for a retaliatory blow, to any other country, for instance Cuba. Our nuclear weapons are so powerful in their explosive force and the Soviet Union has such powerful rockets to carry these nuclear warheads, that there is no need to search for sites for them beyond the boundaries of the Soviet Union.”—TASS [Official press agency of the USSR] September 11, 1962

The discovery of evidence that nuclear missiles had been sent to Cuba forced U.S. leaders to respond. The crisis that began when the reconnaissance photos were examined on October 15 was the most dangerous confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States of the Cold War.

Announce to the students that today, they will conduct an investigation centered on this compelling question: How did the relationship between the leaders of the U.S., Soviet Union and Cuba in the early 1960s relate to the placement of missiles in Cuba by the USSR and why these missiles in Cuba were a matter of concern to the U.S?

II. Conduct the Investigation

Teachers and/or students collect relevant and sometimes conflicting primary sources that provide intrigue. Students do an initial read and analysis individually and prepare notes and evidence for discussions in small

groups. The following questions can be used:

Sourcing What is the text? Who created it and when?

Close Reading and Asking Supporting Questions What does the text say explicitly? What claim does the author/creator make? What evidence does the author/creator make? What is the author’s/creator’s perspective? What is its purpose? Does this text seem credible? Why or why not?

Contextualizing What else was going on at the historic time this source was created? What else was going on during this time (historic setting)? How did the historic setting influence the creation of the text?

Corroborating Where do the multiple texts agree and disagree? Which texts are more reliable? Which are the best texts for answering the compelling question?

Students should individually generate interpretations of the documents based on the compelling question. Teacher and or students may construct supporting questions.

III. DISCUSSIONS

Students will work together in small groups and share their interpretations of the compelling question citing documents as evidence. Supportive questions may be addressed at this time. Multiple interpretations can emerge and may or may not be accepted by all.

IV. REPORT FINDINGS

Formulate an argument/opinion that answers the compelling question citing evidence from the sources:

When you write an opinion piece/argument, remember: Reasoning used in building an argument should be logical and clear. Arguments should have a beginning, middle, and end; beginning with author’s claim. Cite evidence from multiple sources. Some arguments can include an opposing or alternative opinion (elementary students will need

support to identify this element).

Compelling Question:How did the relationship between the leaders of the U.S., Soviet Union and Cuba in the early 1960s relate to the placement of missiles in Cuba by the USSR and why these missiles in Cuba were a matter of concern to the U.S?

Historical Investigation Resource Sheet

DIRECTIONS: As you analyze the primary source documents in your packet, complete the organizer below.

COMPELLING QUESTION: How did the relationship between the leaders of the U.S., Soviet Union and Cuba in the early 1960s relate to the placement of missiles in Cuba by the USSR and why these missiles in Cuba were a matter of concern to the U.S?

Sourcing What is the text? Who created it and when?

Close Reading and Asking Supporting Questions What does the text say explicitly? What claim does the author/creator

make? What evidence does the

author/creator make? What is the author’s/creator’s

perspective? What is its purpose? Does this text seem credible? Why or

why not?

Contextualizing What else was going on at the

historic time this source was created?

What else was going on during this time (historic setting)?

How did the historic setting influence the creation of the text?

Corroborating Where do the multiple texts

agree and disagree? Which texts are more reliable? Which are the best texts for

answering the compelling question?

Historical Investigation Resource Sheet (cont’d)Sourcing What is the text? Who created it and when?

Close Reading and Asking Supporting Questions What does the text say explicitly? What claim does the author/creator

make? What evidence does the

author/creator make? What is the author’s/creator’s

perspective? What is its purpose? Does this text seem credible? Why or

why not?

Contextualizing What else was going on at the

historic time this source was created?

What else was going on during this time (historic setting)?

How did the historic setting influence the creation of the text?

Corroborating Where do the multiple texts

agree and disagree? Which texts are more reliable? Which are the best texts for

answering the compelling question?

Historical Investigation Resource Sheet (cont’d)Sourcing

What is the text? Who created it and when?

Close Reading and Asking Supporting Questions

What does the text say explicitly?

What claim does the author/creator make?

What evidence does the author/creator make?

What is the author’s/creator’s perspective?

What is its purpose? Does this text seem credible?

Why or why not?

Contextualizing What else was going on at

the historic time this source was created?

What else was going on during this time (historic setting)?

How did the historic setting influence the creation of the text?

Corroborating Where do the multiple

texts agree and disagree? Which texts are more

reliable? Which are the best texts for

answering the compelling question?

Source 1.

Video Sources:

President Kennedy's 10/22/62 Cuban Missile Crisis speechhttps://archive.org/details/gov.archives.arc.51510Look at 08:20 – 11:30

Edited and annotated version of Kennedy’s speech:http://www.pbslearningmedia.org/resource/fdc9feb4-0de5-463a-bd32-8c5dcb75d88c/cuban-missile-crisis-three-men-go-to-war-clip-3/00:00 – 03:00

Personalities of Kennedy and Khrushchev http://www.pbslearningmedia.org/resource/72b4fbe3-5b9a-4f35-a58c-8894486a6527/cuban-missile-crisis-three-men-go-to-war-clip-2/ Look at 02:00 – 5:30

Personality of Castrohttp://www.pbslearningmedia.org/resource/72b4fbe3-5b9a-4f35-a58c-8894486a6527/cuban-missile-crisis-three-men-go-to-war-clip-2/Look at 06:00 – 08:18

Cuban Leader Fidel Castro’s communication with Nikita Khrushchev http://www.pbslearningmedia.org/resource/07caf68d-fada-4749-b123-07c499e3befd/cuban-missile-crisis-three-men-go-to-war-clip-4/Look at 00:00 – 03:05

Voice Recordings

Defense Secretary Robert McNamara on the options that the US has http://microsites.jfklibrary.org/presidentsdesk/#/secretTapes

Radio and Television Report to the American People on the Soviet Arms Buildup in CubaPresident John F. Kennedy, The White House, October 22, 1962http://microsites.jfklibrary.org/cmc/oct22/doc5.html

Source 2.

STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ON CUBA, September 4, 1962

All Americans, as well as all of our friends in this Hemisphere, have been concerned over the recent moves of the Soviet Union to bolster the military power of the Castro regime in Cuba. Information has reached this Government in the last four days from a variety of sources which establishes without doubt that the Soviets have provided the Cuban Government with a number of anti-aircraft defense missiles with a slant range of twenty-five miles which are similar to early models of our Nike. Along with these missiles, the Soviets are apparently providing the extensive radar and other electronic equipment which is required for their operation. We can also confirm the presence of several Soviet-made motor torpedo boats carrying ship-to-ship guided missiles having a range of fifteen miles. The number of Soviet military technicians now known to be in Cuba or en route—approximately 3,500—is consistent with assistance in setting up and learning to use this equipment. As I stated last week, we shall continue to make information available as fast as it is obtained and properly verified.

There is no evidence of any organized combat force in Cuba from any Soviet bloc country; of military bases provided to Russia; of a violation of the 1934 treaty relating to Guantanamo; of the presence of offensive ground-to-ground missiles; or of other significant offensive capability either in Cuban hands or under Soviet direction and guidance. Were it to be otherwise, the gravest issues would arise.The Cuban question must be considered as a part of the worldwide challenge posed by Communist threats to the peace. It must be dealt with as a part of that larger issue as well as in the context of the special relationships which have long characterized the inter-American System.

It continues to be the policy of the United States that the Castro regime will not be allowed to export its aggressive purposes by force or the threat of force. It will be prevented by whatever means may be necessary from taking action against any part of the Western Hemisphere. The United States, in conjunction with other Hemisphere countries, will make sure that while increased Cuban armaments will be a heavy burden to the unhappy people of Cuba themselves, they will be nothing more.

Source: U.S., Department of State, Bulletin, Volume XLVII, No. 1213 (September 24, 1962), p. 450. (Read to news correspondents on September 4, by Pierre Salinger, White House Press Secretary.)

Source 3.

Theodore Sorensen's memorandum from October 18, 1962

Two big questions must be answered, and in conjunction with each other:

1. Which military action, if any: -- Limited air strike: Rusk, probably Ball and Johnson, Acheson originally-- Fuller air strike: McNamara and Taylor (who convinced Acheson) Bohlen's 2nd choice-- Blockade: Bohlen, Thompson, probably Martin, probably McNamara and Taylor 2nd choice

2. Should political action -- in particular a letter of warning to Khrushchev -- precede military action? -- If blockade or invasion, everyone says yes-- If air strike -- Yes: Bohlen, Thompson (also K. O'Donnell)-- No: Taylor, McNamara, presumably Acheson-- Undecided: Rusk These questions could be focussed upon by considering either the Rusk or the Bohlen approaches.

Rusk favors the limited or "surgical" air strike without prior political action or warning. This is opposed by 3 groups.-- By the diplomats (Bohlen, Thompson, probably Martin) who insist that prior political action is essential and not harmful-- By the military (McNamara, Taylor, McCone) who insist that the air strike could not be limited-- By advocates of the blockade route Bohlen favors a prompt letter to Khrushchev, deciding after the response whether we use air strike or blockade -- All blockade advocates would support this, and some of the air strike advocates-- Taylor would oppose this, unless the decision had already been made to go the blockade route-- If you accept the Bohlen plan, we can then consider the nature of the letter to K.

Also ask Pentagon to develop: 1. Extent to which military problems are increased by the advance warning a note to Khrushchev would touch off2. Hard necessity of follow-up sortie to initial "surgical" attack3. Possibilities of commando-type raid by parachute or helicopter

http://microsites.jfklibrary.org/cmc/oct18/doc2.html

Source 4.

Excerpt

President Kennedy, October 22, 1962

Source 5.

Letter from Prime Minister Castro to Chairman Khrushchev, October 26, 1962Excerpt

Dear Comrade Khrushchev:

Given the analysis of the situation and the reports…, [I] consider an attack to be almost imminent—within the next 24 to 72 hours. There are two possible variants: the first and most probable one is an air attack against certain objectives with the limited aim of destroying them; the second, and though less probable, still possible, is a full invasion. This would require a large force and is the most repugnant form of aggression, which might restrain them.

You can be sure that we will resist with determination, whatever the case. The Cuban people’s morale is extremely high and the people will confront aggression heroically.

I would like to briefly express my own personal opinion.

If the second variant takes place and the imperialists invade Cuba with the aim of occupying it, the dangers of their aggressive policy are so great that after such an invasion the Soviet Union must never allow circumstances in which the imperialists could carry out a nuclear first strike against it.

I tell you this because I believe that the imperialists’ aggressiveness makes them extremely dangerous, and that if they manage to carry out an invasion of Cuba—a brutal act in violation of universal and moral law—then that would be the moment to eliminate this danger forever, in an act of the most legitimate self-defense. However harsh and terrible the solution, there would be no other.

Fraternally,

Fidel Castro

Source 6.

Letter From Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy Excerpt

Moscow, October 27, 1962.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT,

I understand your concern for the security of the United States…

You wish to ensure the security of your country, and this is understandable. But Cuba, too, wants the same thing; all countries want to maintain their security. But how are we, the Soviet Union, to [understand] the fact that you have surrounded the Soviet Union with military bases; surrounded our allies with military bases; placed military bases literally around our country; and stationed your missile armaments there? This is no secret. . . .Your missiles are located in Britain, are located in Italy, and are aimed against us. Your missiles are located in Turkey.

You are disturbed over Cuba. You say that this disturbs you because it is 90 miles by sea from the coast of the United States of America. But you have placed destructive missile weapons, which you call offensive, in Turkey, literally next to us.

I therefore make this proposal: We are willing to remove from Cuba the [missiles] which you regard as offensive. Your representatives will make a declaration to the effect that the United States, for its part, . . . will remove its [missiles] from Turkey.

We, in making this pledge, will promise not to invade Turkey. . .The United States Government will promise not to invade Cuba . . .

The greatest joy for all peoples would be the announcement of our agreement. These are my proposals, Mr. President.

Respectfully yours,

N. Khrushchev

Source: Letter from Soviet Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy. U.S., Department of State, FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1961- 1963, Volume XI, Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath.

Source 7.

Letter from President Kennedy to Chairman Khrushchev (Modified)

Washington, October 27, 1962

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I have read your letter of Oct. 26th with great care and welcomed the statement of your desire to seek a prompt solution to the problem. As I read your letter, the key elements of your proposals…are as follows:

1) You would agree to remove these weapons from Cuba under appropriate United Nations observation and supervision; and halt the further introduction of such weapons systems into Cuba.2) We, on our part, would agree…a) to remove promptly the [blockade] now in effect and (b) to give assurances

against an invasion of Cuba, I am confident that other nations of the Western Hemisphere would be prepared to do likewise.

There is no reason why we should not be able to complete these arrangements and announce them to the world within a couple of days. The effect of such a settlement on easing world tensions would enable us to work toward a more general arrangement regarding "other armaments", as proposed in your letter.

But the first step, let me emphasize, is the cessation (end) of work on missile sites in Cuba . . . . The continuation of this threat by linking these problems to the broader questions of European and world security, would surely [be] a grave risk to the peace of the world. For this reason I hope we can quickly agree along the lines outlined in this letter and in your letter of October 26.

John F. Kennedy

Source: Letter from President Kennedy to Chairman Khrushchev. New York Times, Oct 27, 1962, pg. 30.

Source 8.

Russian Ambassador Cable to Soviet Foreign Ministry (Modified)

Dobrynin’s (Russia’s Ambassador to the United States) cable to the Soviet Foreign Ministry, October 27, 1962.

Late tonight Robert Kennedy (President Kennedy’s Attorney General) invited me to come see him. We talked alone.

Kennedy stated that, “The US government is determined to get rid of those bases [in Cuba]—up to, in the extreme case, of bombing them, since, I repeat, they pose a great threat to the security of the USA. In response I am sure the Soviets will respond and a real war will begin, in which millions of Americans and Russians will die. We want to avoid that in any way we can, I’m sure that the government of the USSR has the same wish.”

“The most important thing for us is to get an agreement as soon as possible with the Soviet government to halt further work on the construction of the missile bases in Cuba and take measures under international control that would make it impossible to use these weapons.”

“And what about Turkey?” I asked R. Kennedy

“If that is the only obstacle to achieving the rules I mentioned earlier, then the president doesn’t see any difficulties in resolving this issue” replied R. Kennedy. “The greatest difficulty for the president is the public discussion of the issue of Turkey. The deployment of missile bases in Turkey was officially done by special decision of the NATO Council. To announce now a unilateral (one-sided) decision by the president of the USA to withdraw missile bases from Turkey—this would damage the entire structure of NATO and the US position as the leader of NATO. However, President Kennedy is ready to come to agreement on that question with Khrushchev. I think that in order to withdraw these bases from Turkey we need 4-5 months. However, the president can’t say anything public in this regard about Turkey.”

R Kennedy then warned that his comments about Turkey are extremely confidential; besides him and his brother, only 2-3 people know about it in Washington.

“The president also asked Khrushchev to give him an answer within the next day,” Kennedy said in conclusion.

Source: Russian Ambassador Dobrynin cable to Foreign Ministry, October 27, 1962. Russian Foreign Ministry archives; publicly released in the early 1990s

Source 9.

Message from Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy, October 28. 1962

Source 10.

http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/2009632463/

Source 11.

Illingworth, Leslie Gilbert, 1902-1979Daily Mail, 29 October 1962

Sources:

1. See attached links

2. U.S., Department of State, Bulletin, Volume XLVII, No. 1213 (September 24, 1962), p. 450. (Read to news correspondents on September 4, by Pierre Salinger, White House Press Secretary.) https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/jfkstate.htm

3. Theodore Sorensen's memorandum from October 18, 1962 http://microsites.jfklibrary.org/cmc/oct18/doc2.html

4. President Kennedy, October 22, 1962 https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/kencuba.htm

5. Letter from Prime Minister Castro to Chairman Khrushchev, October 26, 1962 http://www.choices.edu/resources/twtn/documents/choices-twtn-cuba-letter.pdf

6. Letter from Soviet Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy. U.S., Department of State, FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1961- 1963, Volume XI, Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath.http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v06/comp1

7. Letter from President Kennedy to Chairman Khrushchev. New York Times, Oct 27, 1962, pg. 30 http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v06/comp1

8. Russian Ambassador Dobrynin cable to Foreign Ministry, October 27, 1962. http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/cuba_mis_cri/621027%20Dobrynin%20Cable%20to%20USSR.pdf

9. Message from Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy, October 28. 1962 http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v06/comp1

10. http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/2009632463/

11. Illingworth, Leslie Gilbert, 1902-1979Daily Mail, 29 October 1962