Herman Hausheer - Augustine on Time.pdf

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504 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW [VOL. XLVI.

On the otherhand,Augustinepresupposes hatthe present sonlyinextensive f subjected to a logical analysis,that n reality

itis stillfelt s duration.n generalhe admits hat hepresenthasno extension n abstraction.t cannot remain for long as an in-divisible nstant; for, howeversmall the extension n duration,the present nstantlyurns tself nto a past which is no longerand a futurewhich s notyet.

The threedimensions hatwe customarily istinguishhus re-duce themselveso one, thepresent,n whichthepast survives n

memory nd the future reexists n someway in theform f ananticipation. ut the indivisible resentdoes not cease to vanish,neither s it inreality ntirely evoidof any extension f duration.The individualdurationsdovetail,so to say, because theyhavediversecontents. he number f isolated ntervals an be readilynoted, nd thusone is in possessionof a remembered r an ex-pectedtotaldurational resent.

Time thusreduces tself o the impermanent,eingmade of asuccessionof indivisible nstants. t has therefore o relevancetothe table mmobilityfdivine ternity:tempus utemquoniammutabilitate ranscurrit eternitati mmutabilinon potest essecoaeternum"De Civ.Dei XII I5). BetweenGod andthecreatureis thesamedifferences between consciousness nwhichall thenotesof a melody re simultaneouslyresent,nd a consciousness

whichperceives hem nly n succession. n itsnormaloperationsthehumanmind hroughmemorynsomemeasure ranscendsime,as, for example,when we apprehend s a whole a metreor amelody, hough he ndividualnotesand soundsare successivenotsimultaneousConf.XI 33).

The difficultys notonly to accountforeternity, hichescapesus; fortime tself,whichsweeps us offour feet, s a mysterious

reality. he essenceoftime s the ndivisiblenstant fthepresent,whichknows itselfto be neither ong nor short.How thencanwe speak of a longer or shorter ime,or even of a timedoublethe other?However,we measuretime.That is a stubbornfact.Buthow canwe measure he ength f a pastwhich s nomore, fa futurewhich s notyet,or of an instantaneous resent?Whatwe measure s theabsenceof thepresent. t is therefore ot cor-

rectto say thatthepast or the future s long.We rather ay of

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No. 5.] ST. AUGUSTINE'S CONCEPTION OF TIME 505

the past that twas long, nd of thefuture hat t will be long. Butcanonetruly ay of thepresent hat t s long? Can it bemeasured

A century annotbe present, either year, nor a month, or aday, nor an hour.Time is neversimultaneously resent n all itsparts,but only in an indivisible nstant.Aristotle lready said:"Nothingexists of time except thepresentwhich is indivisible"(Physics II 2). Thereforeneither hepresent or the past nor thefuture anbe called longor short.

Nevertheless, he fact remains hatwe measuretime,that we

makecomparisons etween he ntervals f time. s itnothingwemeasure? Have past and futureno real existence?How is it thatoutof an unrealizedfuture, ut ofnot-being, he present merges,and that the present n turn nstantaneouslyubmerges nto thepast, where t is annihilated?f the past has no real existence,henall historywouldbe false,and if thefuturehas no real existence,predictionwould be impossible.They both have an objectiveex-

istence n the sense that they are being discerned n the mind.While I neither erceivethe past nor the future, know wherethey re. For whenwe recall the past,we do not recallthe actualevents,which re no more,butthe thoughts nd imagesthesehaveleft n our mind.Our infancy anished ntothepast,but we seepresent ts imagewhen we revive t in our memory.But if thefuture cannot be foreseenby means of images, how is it pre-

dicted? Justas we infer the future unrisefromthe aurora bymeansofsigns, o we learntoknow thefuture. rediction r pre-vision s a refinednference rom ause-and-effectelations Conf.XI 19).

Augustine s quite aware that one of the most intricatediffi-cultiesof the problem f time s the questionhow time s meas-ured.This phaseof theproblem aisesmoreriddles han solutions.

No one shows a keener ppreciation f the contradictionsnvolvedin theproof of the objectivity f time. f time s nothing,f thepast and future aveno real existence, ow canone measure hem?For inorder omeasure nythingheremustbe something. o onemeasures the non-existent.While no part of time is, we yetmeasure t. The solution f theparadox is thattime s presentnandmeasuredbythe mind.There are thusproperly ot three imes-a past and a futurewhich are not,withan immediate resent







506 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW [VOL. XLVI.

which s a mere pointof transition etween wo non-entities; utthere re threepresents, present f thingspresent, present f

things ast, nd a present fthings uture. he present f thepres-ent s attention,he present f the past is memory, nd thepresentof the futures expectation. his triplemode of the present xistsin our mind,or not at all. The only answerAugustinecan giveto the one who asks himhow he measuresthe non-existingndnon-spatial imes s: "I know. . . " In otherwords, the questionstill s, is timemeasured fit s notspace.? t is a profound nigma.

Withrenewed estAugustine ttemptsnce more to giveverbalprecision o the natureof timebeforehe tells how we measure t.To resolvethe problemwe may identify ime with motion.Togrant uch a solution eemsan excessive implificationfAristotle.For if time s notmotion,tmustbe its ownmeasurement.huswe can measure timewithtime,motionwithmotion.However,the motionof a bodyis essentiallyts displacement etween wo

points ituated n space. This spatial displacement ontinues o beidenticalwhatever he timeconsumedby thebody.Moreover, fthebodyremains mmobile t the same point,there s no motionwhatever;yet can still stimatewithmoreor less rigorous xacti-tude the timeof its mmobility.hus themotionwhich imemeas-ures is one thing, nd thetime which time tselfmeasures s stillanotherthing.Time is thusnot the motionof bodies (Conf. XI

24).Feeling thatthemind n some sense transcends heprocessof

time t contemplates, ugustinecould not rest satisfiedwith thenaive objectivism f Greekscience,which dentifiedimewiththemovement f theheavenly odies.For if themovement f bodiesis the onlymeasure ftime,howcan we speakofpastand future?A movement hichhas passedhas ceasedto exist, nd a movement

which s to comehas notyetbegunto exist.There remainsonlythepresent f the passingmoment, movingpoint nnothingness.Therefore,Augustine oncludes, hemeasureof time s not to befound n things, ut in thehumanmind.

But how do we measure time tself Do I measure t by com-paringa largermovementwith a more imitedmovement?f it iswithtime that measuremotion,with whatdo I measuretime?With

time?n a

certainense

yes;for canmeasuretheduration







No. 5.] ST. AUGUSTINE'S CONCEPTION OF TIME 507

of a longsyllablewiththatof a short ne,or thatof a poemwiththenumber fverses tcontains,whichversesmeasure hemselves

in their urnby thenumber f feet, heduration f theirfeetbythat of their yllables, nd thoseof their ongsyllablesfinally ythose of the shortones. But what can I say about it? If it is aquestionof their engthon paper,that s space,not time,that Imeasure. f it is a question fversespronounced ythevoice,thedissociationof timeand motionreappearsunder anotherform;for a shortversecan be pronounced o that t lasts a longer ime

than longverse, ndvice versa. t is thesame with poem, foot,a syllable.

Measurementsof this kind are spatial, not temporal.ThusAugustinedoesnot gnore he factthattime s notonly functionofthe mplitude fmotion, ut also of speed. t is above all inour-selvesthatwe must eek themeasurementf time.

In orderto discover heconnection etween hepermanent nd

thetransitory,hichforAugustine s after ll thewholeproblem,he has recourse o a metaphor ccording owhichhe conceives ftime as somethingnalogousto space, as a kindof distension fthemind,whichalone renderspossible thecoexistence f the fu-ture nd thepast nthepresent. uch a solution s characteristicfAugustine. n every question he findsthe trialwithin. Here itis inmemorynd thoughthathe catches ight f his quarry.Not

unlikeBergsonhe defines he mind n terms f attention. nd asthehumanmind s but a dispersed mageof theOne, it is naturalthat t shouldhave to stretchtself ut in recollection f the pastand strain o thefuture.

The distension f the mind enables one to perceivedurationand makespossiblethemeasurementf time. t is impossible omeasurewhatdoes notendure nd whathas ceased to exist.Au-

gustinemeansbymental istension hefaculty f themind o knowsuccessively hepast bymemory, hefuture yprevision,nd thepresent y actualperception,odilate tself, o to say,byprevisionand memoryfromthe remotest uture o the mostdistantpast.

Augustine s stillnotsatisfiedwiththeprofferedolution f theproblem t hand. f thenon-existinguture nd pasttogetherwiththe nstantaneousresent re not menable omeasurement,either

can theuninterruptedassage of an eventbe measured, ormeas-








5o8 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW (VOL. XLVI.

urementmplies he conjunction f a beginningnd an end. Thatis, the mindhas to know at least two termswhich are simultane-

ously nthe presentn order o be able to measure ime.The solu-tion of the problem s in showingwhat the connection etweenthe beginning nd the end, between the two terms, s. Not thetransitionf thingsmeasurestime,but the impression heyhaveleft n themind. Time is nothingbut an impression, mode ofthought, reflex f things assed and passing, nd inparticularfunction f memory. he non-existentast is measured n mem-

ory. The impressionwhich preservesthe transitoryurvivesthethings hemselves,nd comparing hem certainmeasurementftheir ntervals r successions s made possible.What is true forthe memory f the past is also true for the anticipation f thefuture.

Time no longer divides itself nto a present,past and futureexisting utsideof us. Its threedimensions oincide, lthough he

present s the onlyone which s real and invisible.They coincideby the grace of the mind. The enduring ttention f the mindprovides he coincidence f thethreedimensions f time.Memory,"the ight f the ntervals f duration",s thesubsisting istensionof the present nto the future nd into thepast. It is interestingtonote theanalogieswhichBergson'sand Augustine'spsychologyofdurationhave in common.

Finally,Augustine ompares hetime-process ith he recitationof a poem whicha man knowsbyheart.Before it is beguntherecitationxistsonly nanticipation;when t is finished,t s all inmemory;but whileit is in progress, t exists, ike time, n three

dimensions.And what is true of the durationof a poem,holds

equally good of the duration f each line and syllableof it. It is

equallytrue forthe whole ifeofman,whoseactions re itsparts;

and, finally,t holdsgood for thewholehumanrace,which s thesum of individual ives (Conf. XI 28).

If this s so, whatmeaning s there othequestionwhatdidGoddo before the creation?For humanconsciousnessn bringing hefuture nd the past togethern attention,he words beforeandafterhaveno longer ny significance. hat tremendous ffortoesittaketoattain tolerable omprehensionf therelation f created








No.5.j ST. AUGUSVtINEJSONCEPTIONOF TIMP 509

time nd creative ternityMan can only ucceedon conditionhat

hewithdraws is thought rom hefluxof time, nd integratesn

a permanent resent he totalitywhich s no more and which snotyet.Thus alone mayhe and now pass fromtimeto eternity

(Conf.XI II; 29; 31).Thus themetaphysicallone in theend provides he solution f

thepsychological roblemof time.True,man knowsby analysis

as well as byintuition.n analysistime s succession. n intuition

time s nomore. t is eternity.imeis thedistensionf theeternal;

eternitys an immutable resent, hich s neither recedednorfol-lowed by anothermoment.Man's weakness in perceiving hings

simultaneouslyn the unityof an indivisible ct, prevents hings

fromexisting imultaneouslyn theunityof a fixedpermanency.

Whateversucceedseach other s incapableof coexisting De Civ.Dei XI 6; XII I5). Whereasmenknowthings emporally,hat s,

in succession, God knows eternally,that is, simultaneously.

Whereas human consciousness lways knows exactly at whichpointof its unwinding ctivityt is, divineconsciousness s un-

changeablyelf-subsistingn its evel.Havingstartedwith ternity

in his study f time,Augustine lso endswitheternity.

For man ife s wastedbecauseit flows, ecause t dissipates nd

consumes tselfn time.The senseof this s itselfdue to thepres-

ence and operationof somethingwhichdoes not pass. For Au-

gustine hatsomethingwas no lifeless bstraction, ut a concretefullness f life,ever thesamebecause it contains n itself ll the

values produced t each passingmoment f time.This apprehen-

sion of eternitywas one of the major factorsthatmolded the

philosophy f Augustine.It is thus in keepingwiththe heritageof Neoplatonism hat

Augustineseeks to preservethe dignity f God by placinghim

outsideof time nd space. Hence eternitynd timeare absolutelyincompatible.heirdifferencesre absolute.Time implies hange,

movement, ransition, uccession, imperfection,nd improve-

ment. Eternity s all that time is not. It is the immutable,

quiescentpresent, he simultaneous nisonof thatwhichunfolds

in time.Time and eternityre incommensurable.hey are notof

the same dimension. hereis no comparison etween n everfixed








No. 5.] ST. AUGUSTINE'S CONCEPTION OF TIME 5I1

togethernGod'seternal resent,here reonlyminuteegmentsof eternityn man's imited onsciousnessf the present. he

distributionf the realitiesf the presentmongmen s due totheir initeness;hepassage fthe ouls fmen hroughhedivinecoexistences an arrangementntendedo procure orthefinitesoulsthe greatest ossible nrichment.ugustinemay giveanintimationf all this n hisexpressionwe pass through od'stoday".God thus ncompassesll souls.

As theres no timenGod,he doesnotcreate uccessivelyn

time.Augustineealizes hedifficultyf howGod coulddecreeeternallyhat here hould e a finitereationfa few housandyears. incecreation ad a beginningith ime,t alsowillhavea dramaticndwith ime. f thereforeime asnosignificanceorGod,howcanGodeternallyeterminefiniteeriod fcreation?Augustinetruggles ith he problem,ut s unable o solve tby he ools f the reekpeculativeradition.e couldhavemade

it plausible y ncludingimenGod, hats,byusing he ools fthe Hebrew radition.n the atter eritageternity eant hatwhichndureshroughlltime. ugustineften sesthe anguageof the Hebrew radition.Thouartthesameandthyyearsfailnot."But bymerelylludingo it,he failed owork t out, s itwas contraryohis basic ssumptions.

The inexorablerreversibilityf temporalequences an indis-

putable act.Reality s perpetuallylipped ff rom he durationofthepresent.he non-existentnawstself romhe ast nto hefuture. hepresentndlesslyssimilatesealityo thenon-exist-ingfuture. ow isone o escapefromhis bsolute act?Onemayassumean eternallyoexistingmanifoldwhich mplies ll thepossiblemomentaryorlds. ugustineeft his roblemlsounan-swered.n accordance ith is deashecouldhavemaintainedhatGodhas fixed he nilateralimensionftime ndthat he assagethroughhedivine owwas denticalor ll men.

The recognitionf theuniquenessnd irreversibilityf thetemporalrocesss oneof themost emarkablechievementsfAugustine. encetime s not a perpetual evolvingmageofeternity,ut sirreversiblyovingn a definiteirection.thasanorganic inality.reation ashad an absolute eginningnd trav-








5I2 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW

els to an absolutegoal.There canbe no return. hat which s begunin time s consummatedn eternity. ugustinewas therefore c-

tually he firstmantodiscover hemeaning f time, nspiteof thefact hatPlato,Aristotle, nd Plotinus,had writtenbout t.Whiletheirendeavor was primarily o explain it away, a typicalGreekcharacteristic, ugustine xplained hetime-processtself.He wasthe- irst hinker o taketime eriously.

HERMAN HAUSHEERLAMONI, IOWA

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