Hegemons, Political Power and Demographics · 2010. 1. 21. · The purpose of this dissertation is...
Transcript of Hegemons, Political Power and Demographics · 2010. 1. 21. · The purpose of this dissertation is...
Module Number: P23199
Title: Hegemons, Political Power and Demographics
Name: Viktor Nemeth
Student Number: 07077765
Date of Submission: 4th September 2008
A dissertation submitted in part fulfilment of the regulations for the degree of Master of
Arts in International Relations, Oxford Brookes University
School of Social Sciences and Law
Department of International Relations, Politics and Sociology
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Hegemons, Political Power and Demographics Examining Changes in the USA’s Political Power in the Past Decades with a Comparison to the PRC from a Demographic-Economic View
2008
07077765 – Oxford Brookes University MA in International Relations
Wednesday, 03 September 2008 Version 1.01 rev. 75
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Abstract
The purpose of this dissertation is to investigate the relevance of demographics in
regards of International Relations and to examine whether or not it should be devoted more
relevance than currently. The basis of examination is a non-mathematical framework which
looks at the different elements that are needed for gaining and holding power, and which
specifically stresses out the importance of different resources. This framework is
constructed as a matrix/pyramid hybrid and is based on secondary research of various
academic works. The framework is applied to a comparison of historical power overview of
the USA and PRC as well as an examination of forecasted changes in global economy and
population and their interdependences.
One of the important finds of the research is that demographics has not been counted
as a highly relevant element of political power so far because up to the latest periods
practically no countries could match up the political/military/technological power of the
USA. Nonetheless it is predicted that the economies of the PRC and India will outperform
the economy of the USA in 30 years, and with the PRC’s heavy investments into military, its
growing economy will help to match up this gap.
It is also found that the changes that are predicted to occur in the coming 50 years will
have great effects on the Western and Chinese economy as well as a number of other
countries’, mostly because of governmental and corporate health-spending and derived
changes in the consumer society, which will create both local and global viscous circles as
the examined developing countries are economically highly dependent on the developed
ones, and as a growing part of the GDP is spent on social/healthcare, citizens will have lesser
capabilities of spending on merchandise/services.
The conclusions of the dissertation outline further research possibilities into a more
quantifiable framework as well as a comprehensive study of the paper’s subject on further
countries; mostly including the BRIC group’s other members.
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Table of Contents
ABSTRACT ........................................................................................................................... 3
TABLE OF CONTENTS ........................................................................................................... 4
TABLE OF FIGURES ............................................................................................................... 5
COMMONS LICENSE AND DEED ............................................................................................ 6
1 INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 7
1.1 THE RESEARCH QUESTION ...................................................................................................... 7 1.2 STRUCTURE ......................................................................................................................... 8 1.3 DEFINITIONS ........................................................................................................................ 9
1.3.1 Measuring Economic Power .............................................................................................. 10 1.3.2 Political Power - Theme with Variations ............................................................................ 11 1.3.3 Hegemony .......................................................................................................................... 14 1.3.4 Invert Pyramid of Power .................................................................................................... 15 1.3.5 The ‘R’ Word ...................................................................................................................... 16
1.4 RESEARCH METHODOLOGIES ................................................................................................. 19 1.4.1 Sources used ...................................................................................................................... 19 1.4.2 Limitations and validity, notes ........................................................................................... 19
2 HISTORICAL POLITICAL OVERVIEW OF THE USA AND THE COALITION ......................... 21
2.1 POST-WW2 PERIOD ........................................................................................................... 21 2.1.1 Rebuilding after the World War and the Second Red Scare .............................................. 21 2.1.2 Breaking of the fellowship ................................................................................................. 25
2.2 1990S ONWARDS ............................................................................................................... 25 2.2.1 Changes in the global values and economies .................................................................... 25 2.2.2 War on Terrorism and 9/11 ............................................................................................... 26
3 THE PRC’S POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC FORCE ............................................................ 29
3.1 THE POST WORLD WAR II PERIOD ........................................................................................ 29 3.2 THE POST-MAO ERA (REFORMS) .......................................................................................... 31
3.2.1 Outsourcing and FDI .......................................................................................................... 32
4 FUTURE OUTLOOKS - HAS AMERICA ACTUALLY LOST ITS POLITICAL STRENGTH? ......... 36
4.1 RESOURCES EXAMINED ........................................................................................................ 37 4.2 POPULATION AND DEMOGRAPHICS ........................................................................................ 40
4.2.1 American demographics .................................................................................................... 42 4.2.2 The ‘Yellow Peril’ ................................................................................................................ 46
5 CONCLUSIONS .......................................................................................................... 51
5.1 POSSIBILITIES FOR FURTHER STUDIES ...................................................................................... 52
6 BIBLIOGRAPHY ......................................................................................................... 54
ENDNOTES ........................................................................................................................ 60
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Table of Figures
FIGURE 1-1: INVERT PYRAMID OF POWER ..................................................................................................... 16
FIGURE 3-1: CHINA'S POPULATION GROWTH AFTER 1960 (FAOSTAT, 2005) .................................................... 30
FIGURE 3-2: FDI TO CHINA BY SECTORS IN 1995 ........................................................................................... 34
FIGURE 4-1: PREDICTED CHANGES IN GLOBAL ECONOMIES (SOURCE: IBID) .......................................................... 38
FIGURE 4-2: OBSERVED AND FORECASTED PERCENTAGES OF THE ELDERLY (65+ YEARS) IN SELECTED AREAS, REGIONS,
AND COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD: 1950, 2000 AND 2050 (UN, 2000) ............................................................. 41
FIGURE 4-3: OBSERVED AND FORECASTED PROPORTION OF WORKING AGE POPULATION IN SELECTED COUNTRIES
BETWEEN 2000-2050 (GOLDMAN & SACHS (WILSON, DOMINIC; PURUSHOTHAMAN, ROOPA), 2003) ................. 42
FIGURE 4-4: USA'S CURRENT AND PREDICTED POPULATION PYRAMIDS ............................................................. 44
FIGURE 4-5: MEDIAN PERSONAL INCOME /YR FOR THE VARIOUS ETHNIC GROUPS IN THE USA (2005) (U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, 2006) ........................................................................................................................................ 45
FIGURE 4-6: CHINA'S CURRENT AND PREDICTED POPULATION PYRAMIDS (U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POPULATION
DIVISION, 2008) ....................................................................................................................................... 48
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1 Introduction
1.1 The Research Question
The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the reunification of
Germany and after all Europe, the rise of the Japanese economy, and more recently China
are shaping the global politics and economy to an extent that have not occurred for a very
long time. In fact, globalisation and its diverse aspects; the way they are today have
probably never existed. While parts of the world reunite and move forward, new powers are
born and old powers cease. The USA’s situation has changed considerably in the last two
decades. Its global leading position of economy and politics, while previously were
unquestioned, recently however one can speculate if it’s still lasting and if so, how long.
But is it just money and the exploitation and availability of natural resources that
govern international politics and IR or should there be more focus on the examination of the
much less popular subject of demographics? Changes in global demographics (the growth of
population in the newly developed countries and the ageing of population in the West) will
have significant effects on how the global economy will be shaping, and what need there
will be for raw materials, food and other items (UN, 2004). This seems to be an unavoidable
fact, unless humanity invents a sort of technical miracle which prevents this from happening
– which is rather improbable. And then of course the military capabilities of a larger nation
have not even been mentioned. The question this dissertation will try to examine – mostly
through studying existing literature and the history of the post-WW2 period – is whether
the USA is losing its status as a global leader or hegemon and whether there are other
countries that can step in its place; will the issues of ageing population and immigration
threaten its further development and/or give a leap to other countries or will this issue
hinder the competitors’ growth instead? Or the whole hype on the subject is non-viable and
everything will remain the same?
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1.2 Structure
Amongst my primary aims is the examination of demographic issues because I feel
that this is a subject that is not being given enough importance at the moment in the subject
of IR, even though managing the domestic population both politically and in sociological
terms can and as I will point out does have vast effects on a country’s international political
performance, both in positive and negative terms; therefore the structure will primarily aim
at pointing out links between political power and sociological/demographic matters.
In order to evaluate whether the USA or China counts to be a hegemon or not it is
necessary to set up a basic framework that tries to measure this. I do know that there have
been many before me who were more knowledgeable and have set up frameworks; I
reviewed a number of them and found that creating a mix of them could be more fruitful.
Since I’m not able to create a mathematical system I will instead outline a more general but
at the same time generally applicable one that will serve well for the purposes of this
dissertation and might be useful for further examinations and/or expansion. The framework
will also review a number of existing values related to political power and will try to
combine their positive aspects.
The Second Chapter will examine the USA’s rise to global leadership after the Second
World War with regards to economic management of investments, global finances, creating
interdependencies on its self; in other words making sure that while its own economy
prospers the global allies were drawn into an ultimate dependence on the USA, mostly
because of economic and political reasons. Further parts of this chapter will also look at how
this situation has changed during and after the Cold War when the international threat of
Communism was still strong and then lessened; how the American allies turned to and then
away from the American politics and policies and how the international economy has slowly
gotten somewhat free of the American pressure to find new areas of investment and
prosperity. In this chapter I will also make references to the sociological management of the
domestic American population and their effects on the USA’s global political power, as well
as pointing out differences between the current situation and the one which existed while
the Soviet Union was still a global power, also pointing out how these differences give a
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completely different shape to the current American power and what their importance is to a
possible loss of the position of primary global influencer.
Chapter 3 will look at a slightly similar historical review of the PRC with the difference
that it will focus more on the domestic history of the country and will be somewhat shorter
than the preceding chapter because the PRC did not have such an international political
importance as the USA did up until the last few decades. At the same time because of this I
will examine how China became more important on the international arena by looking at
trends related to outsourcing and FDI towards the region and making some references to
my framework that has been set up previously.
Finally, Chapter 4 will attempt to draw preliminary conclusions on the historical
findings on whether or not the USA has lost part of its political strength and if so then
whether this was to the gain of China or not. As it will be seen this question cannot be
answered with a simple yes or no at the moment and therefore much of this chapter will be
devoted to pointing out the possible future role of demographics in both countries and how
they may influence the economies of these countries and in a bit wider sense the combined
global changes with special regards to the previously mentioned factors of aging, social and
health care, living standards and their effect on consumption and economy, immigration
and their similar effects, etc.
The fifth and last Chapter will draw final conclusions and will offer some ideas for
further research including references to the extension of the framework that I outlined, as
well as the studying of other countries that may become relevant in the future.
1.3 Definitions
First off, in order to clarify the ways of this dissertation, defining a number of
significant terms, especially political power and hegemony are of key importance and I will
start out by looking at power. Power, as in general can be held by different individuals,
groups or authorities. While there are many synonyms of power, (even in sociological terms)
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ranging from coercion and oppression to influence, (Encarta® Online (Microsoft
Corporation), 2008) the definition of political power as such is rather difficult.
Hay (Political analysis, 2002) elaborates on the limitations of political analysis:
generally the basic problem is that political analysis can be based on a multitude of schools
and views, therefore it’s difficult to define something that's truly common in understanding
amongst experts. This is one of the problems; another and maybe more relevant and visible
question is: what makes political analysis political. (ibid) Hay explains that in his view
political analysis is named so because its emphasis on the political aspects of social
relations. This at the end means that a political analysis should after all include notions of
cultural and sociological elements, and should not be narrow-focused on the distribution
and use of power. Hay specifically mentions the extra-political variables as key elements in
the analysis; in short, these factors are interdependent, and should be handled as such. In
the coming subchapters, I will also try to gather some of these elements myself and point
out how and why they are important in the definition of political power and in more general
for international relations.
1.3.1 Measuring Economic Power
Measuring economic power is somewhat easier than measuring political power
because domestic and global financial flows are to some extent more transparent and
visible than the reasons behind the shaping of politics and decision-making. Since it is
money (and its convertible equivalents) that run(s) the global life as such, the economic
performance of a state can be – to some extent - linked to its political power (Hay, 2002). In
this paper I will not specifically go into economic power’s measurement in terms of billions
of dollars but instead I will try to fit the question into a dependency theory which
constitutes part of the political analysis. The reason for this is that it more effectively serves
my purposes, and at the same time allows me to devote more space to the political and
demographic analysis which I consider more important for this paper, due to the word
count limitation.
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1.3.2 Political Power - Theme with Variations
Hay (2002, p. 174) again makes a comparison between two ‘classical’ debates on how
power should be viewed. His basis for examination is the faces of power vs. the Foucault-
Habermas debate which in short tries to compare whether political power should be
measurable and if power is ever-present. On this matter, I think that power is in fact ever
present, and as Hay explains the work of Polsby, the ‘second face of power’ (agenda-setting)
and Luke’s ‘third face of power’ (preference-shaping) make power itself Janus-faced: people
apply tactics and strategy in decision-making because this may yield better results in the
long term (ibid); face it: this is human nature, and is such hardly predictable, yet rather non-
transparent, which makes it relatively hard of power being measurable on a mathematical
basis. Also, still linking power to human nature, it does need to be ever present in my
opinion because if we assume that power would cease to exist then we’d also need to
assume that all people would become equal, as there would be nothing that differentiated
between them.
Susan Strange (1988, p. 24) argues that in her opinion there are two kinds of powers,
structural and relational, where relational means getting somebody doing something that
they do not want, and structural meaning the ability to set future occurrences in favourable
terms for self. I think that these two should not necessary be separated because if we
examine the question of agenda-setting vs. relational power it can be seen that they do not
rule out each other: her (but also Hay’s and Lukes’) example for relational power is Person A
selling a car to Person B at a sub-market price while both knowing that this is only good for
Person A. This however does not mean that Person A could not have arranged the situation
so that Person B had another choice! While this might be temporarily favourable to Person
A, the other can possibly ask favours in the future to equalise the situation. (Lukes, 1974)
So how can power be measured? As Torres elaborates, Seligman probably is right
when he says that "no one as yet has been able to quantify per capita influence or aggregate
power" (A New (And Partial) Approach to Measurement of Political Power in Latin American
Countries, 1973). I think both were right: power is a measure created by humans and is
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based on criteria of behaviour which therefore makes difficult to measure. Nonetheless
there is still a need to agree on a standard set of aspects which can examine power.
Here it is important to discuss the similarities and differences between domestic and
global political power. Torres tries to explain domestic political power by the means of
concentration, i.e. measuring the number of participants who have access to domestic
decision-making against of those who do not. His main focus is based on his experiences of
the Latin American world and suggests considering the following elements:
(1) foreign interests; (2) the landed oligarchy; (3) industrialists; (4)
rural labour; (5) urban blue-collar workers; (6) urban white-collar
workers (including professionals such as doctors, lawyers, engineers,
etc., as well as government office workers); (7) the military; and (8) the
Church. (ibid)
Members of each of these groups would then be graded based on their (assumed)
political awareness and readiness for action. He tries to set up a mathematical equation that
provides how much influence these groups have on the way domestic politics work although
in my personal opinion he fails to explain convincingly how these people can influence
higher level of politics, instead he rather briefly points out (though by using different
phrases) that classes that are being able to think better outside the box can influence those
who are unable to do so. (ibid) It is true of course that these two things have much in
common but he seems not to make a deliberate connection between them. Another
thinker, Herbert A. Simon (Notes on the Observation and Measurement of Political Power,
1953) approaches the question from a similar but more deliberate view: he suggests that
measuring power should be in fact based on someone’s (say Person A’s) capability to
influence others, but not on the basis of values. He writes:
The difficulty is revealed when we try to state what we mean by a
"value.” If we list specific values; wealth, wisdom, or what not - then
the statement that "A possesses certain of these values" is not what we
mean when we say "A has power." (Simon, 1953)
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This is important because what makes someone be influential; the fact that a person
bears values that are regarded as desirable by the others? To some extent this is true, just
to mention a non-political example of TV celebrities. They are famous, often rich, and
seemingly successful and many people want to be like them. Still they would be unable to
make a political influence unless those who have the political power would allow them do so
(i.e. a celebrity is not usually able to campaign for too long for or against political values
effectively unless someone who already has influential political power supports this). It can
therefore be assumed that people who are value leaders only influence a specific group of
the society and are usually not powerful in other means; moreover, their power is not
always lasting. Simon also argues that values that are perceived as powerful are not always
so, and those that are thought to be weak can be really powerful. (ibid) Ghandi is a good
example of what he has meant by these thoughts.
Based on his views then, this means that in order to have power it is necessary that
the beholder needs to have ultimate capabilities of influence so that they cannot be
overridden by others. While of course we can assume that we do not have gods walking
amongst us, power as such is only effective if it cannot be overridden by others on a given
level. Taking everyday examples, the parents have the power at home to influence their
child’s behaviour but these parents are subordinates to other people at the workplace who
are influenced by others again higher in the hierarchy, etc. The same applies to political
power: regional forces are controlled by hierarchically stronger forces which at the end lead
to the level of global power. It should be noted though that these controlling forces are not
set in a strictly pyramid-shape but much rather are part of a pyramid/matrix-based hybrid
system of interdependencies (making it even more difficult to quantify them) which I will try
to portray later. Another important element that yields power to one is the system’s
dependency on the individual element; if an element can be eliminated without having
major negative side effects on the whole system then this element was not fit enough to
survive.
Gathering the thoughts of others so far and looking at the underlined words a
definition starts to take shape. Add a final keyword now: resources. Resources (not
necessarily in the exclusive sense of raw materials) are the key to every kind of power,
without them, there’s no power; this is evident in my opinion. Still, just by themselves they
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do not help: they must be used effectively, strategically. Resources as the key ingredient
however does not simply relate to raw natural resources but also to financial, military,
people, etc; the question of what resources I deem necessary will be discussed in the next
chapter. Finally, merging all the outlined thoughts a definition can be constructed: the one
who has political power of a given hierarchy is the one who is capable of exercising
ultimate influence on the others with the sound use of resources, out of the box
thinking and strategy that can be peaceful or via force, or by making one’s
environment to depend on the influence (like the “fear and togetherness” that I’ll explain
later) and in global-economic terms these measures are still viable.
1.3.3 Hegemony
Concentrated power on a global level can lead to the creation of hegemons. Dictionary
definitions vary for the exact description of hegemony but they all match in the sense that
hegemons are leaders (mostly states) with dominating capacity of power that they can and
do use to influence other nations. (As we can see it’s rather similar to the definitions of
power itself except for the state’s addition). Gramsci (1971) offers a more academic
definition, which is in essence that hegemons are those groups or entities that have a set of
additional powers (such as socio-political, intellectual, moral, etc) and a capacity to lead
others so that the scenario does not simply serve the interests of the leading group or entity
but also the ones that are being lead perceive it as a common good.
While I personally agree with this definition and will use it in the course of this paper,
there are some thoughts that need to be addressed. The definition questions whether the
Cold War superpowers were in fact hegemons or dictatorships: it is said that both the USA
and the Soviet Union have become hegemons at that time, even so, especially the countries
of the Eastern Bloc were not necessarily delighted by their leader being the Soviet Union –
nonetheless they did not have many other viable choices. On the other hand the existence
of additional powers showed through the creation of the NATO and Warsaw Pact as the
leaders and countries who were members of these tried to overcome the other group not
only politically and in military sense but also and through the above mentioned set of
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cultural, socio-political, intellectual, etc ways. So we can differentiate between entities that
are hegemons and others that are dictatorships. I recommend defining hegemons as
Gramsci did “[...] interests of the leading group or entity but also the ones that are being
lead perceive it as a common good” whereas defining dictators as “[...] interests of the
leading group or entity but also ensuring that the subordinates either perceive it as a
common good or by the various means of power those subordinates have no other choice
but to accept.”
As it can be seen based on this differentiation there is a really small line between the
two, and although it might not be small for those who live in them, in global political terms,
these can overlap.
Mearsheimer and Nye are two of the well-known thinkers who disagree in the USA
being a true hegemon (Nye Jr, Understanding International Conflicts: An introduction to
Theory and History, 2002). They argue that the USA is not in fact a hegemon because it
cannot impose its will on a global basis especially not in cultural terms. I think their
prescription of global influence in culture is mistaken because first of all hegemons are not
deities in a monotheistic religion: there can be more of them, and secondly hegemons are
not necessarily dictatorships as it has been discussed.
Therefore in my opinion the possibility of a small number (2-3) of hegemons and/or
global dictatorships existing at a given time in a world is important: if the whole globe
followed one leader then the individual countries would cease to exist in sovereignty to a
certain extent, which could then raise the question of the continuing of existence of states
as such or their decline into colonies.
1.3.4 Invert Pyramid of Power
The previous subchapters have outlined the different definitions of power given by
others and I tried to define power in my own terms as well. While my definition’s elements
are all important, in my opinion the most relevant of all is resources, which needs to be
stressed out separately. The reason for this choice is that all elements of power are part of a
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system that should be imagined as an invert pyramid, where one can differentiate needs
that are necessary for having power as such, while others are necessary for developing long
term hold of power, ultimate power and hegemony/dictatorship. Each of the elements can
be grouped into a 3+1 set of ‘needs’, (where the plus one stands for additional powers for
hegemons) where the basic needs constitute the ones that are necessary for having power
in general: the capability of influencing others and making sure that the others at a basic
level depend on us.
By itself of course, these are not enough to keep one empowered, if one cannot make
sound use of the situation and enhance these basic needs, which is where it is important to
come up with ideas that strengthen the basic level elements and also to handle
Figure 1-1: Invert Pyramid of Power
The hierarchical power is a constantly existing necessity at all levels but it comes the
strongest around the top: the concentration of power and its wielding at global level are
necessary to develop a country into a global power and most countries do not have the
appropriate basics for this.
1.3.5 The ‘R’ Word
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As the pyramid shows resources are the basic building blocks of power. Torres (1973)
tried to define political power on a domestic level; still his original idea of concentration
could be reflected onto a global scale if we imagined that instead of the concentration of
raw decision-making participants a country would need natural, demographic and financial
resources such as1:
Access to and extraction of raw materials that are processed domestically and are
reinvested into the domestic manufacturing or create wealth as part of the
financial resources. Domestic control of extraction and processing is important: a
counter-example of this is the access and extraction of precious stones in Africa:
while some countries have large unexcavated reserves of expensive stones, mining
and refining are being controlled by foreign companies that provide a boost to
their own nation’s GNP and leave a small proportion of the profit in local hands.
Demographic factors such as the sheer size of population (that can be weighted
according to portions of children [future workers], working, and non-working), and
scale of level of education. It is a controversial issue but as it will be seen still
belongs to the question of demography is the ability to create a need within the
environment (population in case of domestic politics) to follow the guidelines set
by the political leaders, though this is not always a positive asset.
Financial investments that have positive effect on a country’s GNP and GDP. GNP
in this case is probably more important because in nowadays globalized world
much of a country’s income is derived from investments that are physically placed
outside the domestic borders but after all mostly stimulate the domestic economy,
rather than the local (see the example of Africa again).
Military power, which included a mix of all the three listed so far. The number of
soldiers, technological advancement, nuclear capabilities, etc. This issue will be
dealt with at a minimal level in this paper because I lack expertise in the matter
and because I’m not able to make predictions on the subject for the coming
decades.
Parts of the previously outlined pyramid consist of ‘hard powers’ others are ‘soft
powers’ as well; both are needed for the success (Nye Jr, Soft Power and Leadership, 2004).
Soft powers in other terms is preference shaping and has already been touched upon with
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the faces of power. As Nye explains, “in behavioural terms, soft power is attractive power.
Soft power resources are the assets that produce such attraction”. These resources can and
do exist at both domestic and international levels as they will be pointed out in the coming
chapters.
Nonetheless I still think that hard power capabilities are more important than soft
power resources and potential: if attraction does not work as a method of influencing, force
can still prove useful if the oppressor is appropriately placed in the hierarchy level of power,
i.e. there is no likelihood of retaliation. While human behaviour can be considered as soft
power, as one could argue that after all the execution of political will occurs in the minds of
the individuals, I still think that coercion is ultimately a more effective tool in assuring the
execution of will than words, especially if political leaders are committed to an aim and they
have the resources to satisfy this. Practically the reason behind my argument is that people
who dare to actively oppose a political will are usually scattered amongst those who are
passive or supporting about it and therefore rarely group up to an appropriate level to
influence the execution of political will; it happens, but rarely.
There are two more things that were not added by Torres, still need pointing out:
As for the hegemons, there’s the additional power that was deemed necessary.
The factor of absence, i.e. what happened to the world if the country ceased to
exist?
Neither of these can be really quantified but they can be exemplified nonetheless.
Additional power can mean the global spreading of a language, or for example holding the
Summer Olympic Games, reaching successes in science and space exploration, etc. The
factor of absence is while not a strictly politics-related issue, it’s important to mention
because influence is derived from it; practically it’s a key to survival. It is the dependency on
the element which is needed for its survival. China manufactures about 75% of the toys
being sold in the USA and about 70% of the global market. They also manufacture about
70% of the global microwave ovens, 90% of kettles, 30% of portable media players, 75% of
USB flash drives, and 50% of Notebook and PC accessories, just to mention a few things
(Trade Media Holdings Ltd, 2008)2. The reports also point out that most of the
manufacturing companies are expanding at about 20% or more annually. So if China ceased
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to exist, the rest of the world would be missing all these things. While this is improbable as
such to occur it well shows the dependence of the global economy on some key players, and
therefore is relevant for IR and political measures.
1.4 Research methodologies
1.4.1 Sources used
As it will be and can be seen my research is completely based on secondary elements,
books, publications that are print and/or web-based. I tried to make use of the different
publications from the past and near-present as they characterize different viewpoints of the
times they were written in. At the same time I aimed at gathering various sources that
represent different ideologies so that the research is not one-sided or biased. Supporting
evidence for statistical data comes from relevant international organizations’ publications
that are affected in the given question.
The chief reason for the lack of primary research is mostly that while this topic could
be researched more deeply, such results would not fit into a roughly 15,000-words-long
paper, but should rather constitute to be part of a larger work, such as a book. Also one of
my aims with this paper is to ring the bell in the readers’ minds whether this issue is in fact
as important as I’m portraying it, in other words to encourage some discussion, regardless
of whether or not this work ever makes it outside the walls of Brookes; because of this, it
touches upon a wide range of elements and due to the word and my resource limitation it
does so sometimes superficially.
1.4.2 Limitations and validity, notes
One of my original aims was to try to go against previous experience and set up a
measurement scale that could be applied to global political power, but after much trying, I
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forfeited it because there are simply too many factors that cannot be quantified, such as
personal influence, or luck; and there are many other questions that are not discussed
publicly and would be necessary to set up a fair and valid system of equations (such as
truths behind conspiracy theories, which factor may sound like unprofessional to mention,
but it does make a whole lot of difference to way history and power is shaped whether for
example it was Hitler who burned the Reichstag, or was maybe was it the Americans who
ignored the warning signs before the attack on Pearl Harbour or New York to go into war
later).
There are some other things that could be mentioned but into which I will not be
getting too deeply, such as scientific research capabilities, space race, etc. These are factors
that after all had a large impact on the history of the 20th century, however they cannot be
measured and just as with the case of conspiracies, they cannot be fully studied either
because their relation to political power is neither always obvious, nor their documentation
full and credible. Nonetheless these can be classified as the part of the additional powers
that are important for hegemons.
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2 Historical Political Overview of the USA and the Coalition
Since the end of the Second World War, for a long time the “political foundations of
the international economy have rested on American leadership, close cooperation among
the USA and its Cold War allies” with little efforts from these allies to create a global and
open economy (Gilpin, 2001). Due to the fact that the global economy has been controlled
by a minimal number of important countries up till the very latest years, these countries’
economic and political influence has grown to the levels of hegemonic, with the USA at first
place. This chapter will review the important events that have lead to the USA’s primary
position of the world politics and economic power. It will also provide some links that are
recurring and are worth mentioning.
2.1 Post-WW2 Period
2.1.1 Rebuilding after the World War and the Second Red Scare
It is now history and widely known that the USA could take the role of the global
helper because of its luck in the Second World War. Luck from the point that except for the
bombing of Hawaii its territory was unharmed and because it’s manufacturing economy
became very powerful during the years of the war – and which afterwards was turned to
manufacture the rebuilding of the European continent and the building of the American
dream.
2.1.1.1 International economic influences
After the War, the American economy had large reserves of unused capacities and raw
materials. Much of the American industry has therefore turned towards the rebuilding of
Europe, which was often sponsored by American corporations frequently via the Marshall
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Plan. This was necessary because continuing the American expansion of its economy would
not have been possible without a market that was able to make use of the American goods
and services. Also, to stabilize the global economy, the European currencies were pegged
against the dollar and interest rates were set to keep up international economic growth.
This was very important for the USA because previously the British pound or the gold was
the basis of measurement, but with the dollar taking their places; it gave the USA an
outstanding possibility to influence the world economies which still lasts. (Braithwaite &
Drahos, 2000)
The dollar became so important in the financial world that it became the reserve
currency, and although the USA has slipped from the positive side to being a deficit country;
leaving some liquidity for the others. Becoming a political hegemon and the most important
currency was a good combination for the US; practically, this meant that the USA was not
only the sole relevant power besides the Soviet Union in political terms, but it had an
unpunished influence over the monetary (and therefore political) systems of its
international allies (Braithwaite & Drahos, 2000). The dependence on the dollar and the
spreading of American based multinational organizations created a lift in the performance
of the American economy. (Seabrooke, 2001)
On the international level however the US did not manage to continue achieving such
success for an extended period of time. By the mid 60s the economies of EEC and Japan
have strengthened to the extent that the USA’s economic hegemony could be questioned.
The other problem was that the relationship between the Soviet Union and the capitalist
countries has eased by the 60s therefore it seemed that the need for military spending was
less burdening than before. This encouraged trade between the European countries
(without an American influence) and thus the importance of the dollar and the American
influence weakened. The dollar soon became overvalued while the European and Japanese
currencies undervalued. This created tension in the import/export systems and with huge
spending on the Vietnam War, the American economy has slowed down.
By the 70s most of the currencies were floating, although the USA did most of what it
could to prevent this from happening; however its declining productivity and reserves
helped foreign banks to exploit the possibilities in the international markets and free
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trade/currencies. Soon the gold was set from its original $35/oz to $38 (1971), then $44
(1971 again), then $70 (1972) but this did not help either, as countries decided to abandon
the pegging and the Bretton Woods agreement was closed.
2.1.1.2 American domestic politics
On the domestic level, with interest to the subject of this paper, the Red Scare defined
much of the post-WW2 period. It was an important step in strengthening domestic political
power and control over the population via a set of means.
The Soviet Union developed its first nuclear bomb in 1949, while during the first part
of the 1950s the USA made some fragile attempts to block the spreading of Communism
and instead encourage the spreading of the American values, the Soviet breakdown of the
1956 Hungarian revolution and later the failure on the Korean War has shown the world
(and the USA) that its efforts in their current means were fruitless (Maynes, Charles William
- Strategic Studies Institute U.S. Army War College , 1993). The Vietnam War was also part of
the plans to counter the spreading of Communism, though its success was rather limited.
These occurrences pointed out that the USA was not after all capable of a total global
influence, and the US Government could not allow itself to be defeated or at least
weakened in domestic terms in front of the American population. Soon the ways of the
allies broke separate, and the Communist threat was portrayed as evil.
First, committees were set up to oversee the loyalty of the party members towards
the American values and then later the loyalty of the common people was examined. People
who failed to pass the ‘exams’ were practically made impossible of getting a job (Schrecker,
1998). Children were taught what to do in case of a nuclear attack; people were mailed
personalized fallout shelter construction guides, as well as the booklet Survival under
Atomic Attack, and generally were told how to focus their lives on surviving the Communist
threat, to stock food and supplies at home and to keep their eyes open for anything
suspicious. Airing of commercials such as the Daisy Girl3 (connecting a girl picking daisies
and being destroyed by an enemy nuclear bomb), the Duck and Cover4 (explaining what to
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do in case of a nuclear attack and how to prepare for it) and numerous movies enhanced
the citizens’ patriotism by picturing the Communist threat and/or the nuclear threat, and
developing games and activities helped maintaining the feeling of threat and the need of
acceptance of government actions. Patriotism became a very important question not only
via the employment of fear (the common enemy, and the public sweeping out of those who
were allegedly connected to it) but also via the feeling of togetherness. Organizations that
gathered people based on different factors (such as group of men, women, religion, like the
Minute Women of the U.S.A. or YMCAs, and many others) became popular as people found
networking possibilities and thus strengthened their feeling of togetherness and patriotism.
The system was nonetheless effective: looking at these advertisements of the past
(like the D&C) it is obvious that if there was in fact a need to duck and cover because the
citizen has seen the nuclear flash, it probably made no difference to them anymore because
they died before they could duck. Still they believed that they were living in a dangerous
environment and the government had been doing a fine job in defending them, enhancing
their lives, and they were thankful for this. Also as it was mentioned already that the
government was active in enhancing the standards of living in the USA at the time and were
fed with technologies and activities that kept them busy. This was an important move for
many reasons, especially because happy people are ignorant and they can be easier
blindfolded against underlying political wishes and political activities that can be otherwise
questioned on being fair; this I will get into later on.
Nevertheless, many of the American allied countries have taken on similarly
influencing their own population; the American values were spread and the American
Dream as a phrase became a key target for many who immigrated to the States. This, the
spreading of influential values can be considered as an additional power, which at the time
none of the global ‘competitors’ could reproduce; while there is probably no data on the
ratio of Communist Bloc citizens wishing to live the Western way of life vs. the other way
around, probably everyone can guess the general thoughts on this.
In summary the anti-Communist era was important in the global politics because its
originally American domestic roots have strengthened the global need for a democratic
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leader and the successful American propaganda helped the States to become and remain
this leader that the world had seemed to need.
2.1.2 Breaking of the fellowship
By the end of the Cold War, the American domestic politics became incoherent, and
the other leading developed countries tried to build up their alliances. (Braithwaite &
Drahos, 2000). America’s European allies started to look for new ways of managing their
money. The European Monetary System came to existence in 1979 with the purpose of
stabilizing the European exchange rates. One of the challenges the EMS posed was that the
participant countries had to have a level of stability in order for the system to work, and the
answer for this challenge later lead to the creation of the Euro which will be analysed in
Chapter 2.2.1. Nevertheless, for the time being, France, Germany, and other West-European
countries have achieved considerable successes in forging a European economic unity, even
if it was and still is not perfect. (ibid)
2.2 1990s onwards
2.2.1 Changes in the global values and economies
There are different views on why the early 1990s brought a positive turn in the global
economy. Gilpin explains, that the American economy was growing faster than ever during
most of the 1990s and by the middle of the decade, the USA has become – instead of the
world’s biggest creditor that it was a decade before – the world’s biggest debtor. The
problems started to occur when the Americans began to finance their ever-high
consumption from personal savings on a personal level, and foreign credit on a global level,
but the investment levels within the country did not match up to the spending. Gilpin (The
Challenge of Global Capitalism, 2001) explains that by the turn of the millennium the
07077765 P a g e | 26
American trade deficit grew to about $1bn per day, which resulted in the USA’s foreign debt
to reach more than 20% of its GDP (Madrick, 2000).
Others think that the upturn in the economy was due to the restraints of the system.
Brenner explains that the reasons why there was a slowdown between the 1970s and 1990s
was because the economies that were originally devastated by the wars have reached an
optimal level of output and therefore they created an overcapacity of supply which has lead
the waning profits. By the 1990s however the source of oversupply was eliminated which
brought the economy back to a positive level (The Economics of Global Turbulence, 2006).
However developing new processes and technologies is expensive and in the times of
depression it may be a risk; therefore, many companies turned to moving the production to
less expensive places. This was sustained by legislative measures as well: during the late
1980s a number of laws were passed in the US that hindered the imports of foreign, mostly
East-Asian goods into the USA but at the same time prescribed that these economies would
need to open their markets to direct foreign investment which in the long run would help
the US-based companies create profits and ease the existing problem of the over dollar
(Brenner, The Boom and the Bubble: The US in the World Economy, 2002). Although he
does not specifically point out, but this has marked the dawn of what is now being referred
to as outsourcing.
2.2.2 War on Terrorism and 9/11
Previously, as this has been mentioned the USA’s global political and economic power
was greatly enhanced by an anti-Communist coalition that was made out of countries that
were willing to give up a part of their decision making power to help the ‘world to fight
Communism’. It has also been identified that the domestic American political life and
generally the American population was in large agreement of the necessity of the financial
and political actions that were taken in those years, however as the Soviet Union collapsed,
America's power has weakened because the old allies became less willing to follow the
guidelines and set their own courses.
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As Webster Tarpley (9/11 Synthetic Terror: Made in USA, 2006) historian points out
Carl Schmidt’s theory (on Neo-conservatism), a state needs to have an enemy image
projected towards the society to keep it coherent. This lines up with the patriotic and happy
society image that I elaborated on before. He goes on further explaining that the dangers of
this method is that people who do not question the central ideology can focus a lot of their
lives around it, which causes economic changes as well. The reason why the USA’s War on
Terror is important to mention is manifold. Generally, the 9/11 attacks partially created, or
more rather partially recreated the global image of enemy that previously existed in the
picture of the Soviet Union, this time however it was Bin Laden, Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, and
a number of others that were targeted. (ibid)
While I’d like to avoid getting into why a governmental action instead of a real
terrorist attack would have been imaginable in 2001, it is still an important issue: during the
Cold War the Communist threat was visible from the point of the Soviet Union vs. USA arms
race and the world became deeply divided on the matter. It is documented and is known
that both countries had an arsenal weapons that could have destroyed the world, and the
US. Government did its job in creating patriotism and fear in the domestic population which
has been explained already.
On domestic levels, the Cold War tactics worked almost perfectly: the case of the 9/11
attacks followed a similar situation as the Cold War’s times, regarding nationalism and
patriotism at least. According to a CNN/Gallup/USA Today poll taken 16th September 2001,
after the attacks took place, the Bush administration’s popularity has grown to 86%, with
other findings of
“Overwhelming support for a military response even if it were to
cost thousands of U.S. troops' lives, last months or years and require
revival of the military draft [...] strong support for a long war, even if it
meant less spending on education, Social Security and other popular
programs, an increase in taxes and a prolonged recession [...] a deep,
profound sense that the country needs to pull together and that now's
the time to reach out to family, friends and neighbours.” (USA TODAY
(Richard Benedetto and Patrick O'Driscoll), 2001)
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Not much longer, legislations were passed to give more power to the anti-terrorist
forces and the Administration, with regards to personal freedom and similarly to the Red
Scare, people were prisoned because they were allegedly connected to Al Qaeda, or
because they were propagating views different from the government’s.
Fear and togetherness once again came to be the centre of everyday's for the
Americans and to some extent the Western World. Terrorist attacks around the world and
continuous news coverage on heightened state of alertness5 with the danger of a
(continuously) imminent terrorist attack provided excellent soil for the governments to pass
regulations on limiting individual liberty. The reason why this is important to mention is
because it did not only enhance America's domestic political power but also its global
power. Looking at the current situation, the EU is fighting a losing battle on issues like visa
and biometric identification of the European tourists wishing to travel to the USA.
Besides arranging favourable international legislations like the one mentioned above,
the USA did not have an overwhelming international success in convincing the world about
its new problems; partially due to the rather blurred evidence of terrorist attacks and the
American government’s reluctance on clearing up some of the gray spots related to the
events, generally a proportion of people and nations questioned the truth behind the
situation from the very beginning. Also, many countries felt that on the contrary to the
previous World Wars and the Cold War, it’s America's personal matter, and not the world’s.
The wars on Iraq and Afghanistan have not been a real success for many reasons either: the
number of states that lined up in the long term behind the USA was small. Even with
reference to the current events, America's legitimacy of probing Russia's use of force in
Georgia is being questioned in reference to their own acts in Iraq. Seemingly, the USA has
lost a visible part of its power to dictate on a global level.
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3 The PRC’s Political and Economic Force6
This subchapter will review the economy of the PRC and the historical advancements
since the end of World War II. On 2007 numbers, the PRC had the second largest GDP in the
world; currently after the USA in PPP measure, and third in exchange-rate measure, after
the USA and Japan (IMF, 2008), although the average GDP per capita is still low; which ranks
the country 107th on the nominal, and 82nd on the PPP global rank.
3.1 The Post World War II Period
After the Second World War the Chinese government focused on the building of the
socialist structure of the industry; heavy industry was preferred and consumption was kept
at low levels. (Worden, Savada, & Dolan, 1988)
The post-war recovery process also included changes in the banking system, which
mostly meant nationalisation and economic system, which in turn meant the nationalisation
of enterprises. Food production was centralized as much as it was possible to control and
distribute food as necessary. The government tried to overcome food supply problems,
which were very grave at times by restructuring the supply chain within the country and by
importing food and resources from other countries. (ibid)
The recovery period lasted until roughly 1952 when the first Five Year plan was
executed. China ‘imported’ the knowledge from the Soviet Union who provided economic
planning experts, scientists and a number of other professionals who assisted in bringing the
plans to life. By 1956, all of the economic ventures were either nationalised or brought into
a public-private partnership structure. Light industries were merged into large cooperatives
as well as farming was. Agriculture was also modernized. This was very much necessary
because even though the country has somewhat recovered from the war, food shortages
kept posing serious problems because the population was growing steadily.
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By 1958 the government realized that unless it started to put further stress on the
enhancement of the agricultural output, the industrial output would be endangered
because of demographic reasons. The plan did not work: undesirable weather conditions
had struck the poorly constructed mechanical systems necessary to keep up irrigation and
water supply, and agricultural output fell further. Making things worse, industrial output
rose steadily for a while but then it was struck by famines and starvation as people were
overworking. (ibid)
Figure 3-1: China's population growth after 1960 (FAOSTAT, 2005)
Soon the government set up new plans and put agriculture and its supporting services
first, and heavy industry last. Fertilizers came to be used, hydro power plants were to be set
up and the importing of advanced Western technologies as well as planning instead of
political needs helped the agriculture to recover slowly. In the first part of the 1960s both
agricultural and industrial output grew by almost 10% per year. The new plans worked much
better than the old ones and they were not changed for almost a decade therefore.
The first part of the 1970s brought mostly continuing increased economic output and
also the first international agreements to China as the PRC was contracted to produce
chemicals in extensive amounts related to fertilizing and oil production. The rest of the
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decade was spent on political issues and power struggles that slowed the economic
performance. (ibid)
3.2 The Post-Mao Era (Reforms)
After Mao’s death modernisation became faster than previously. Foreign technologies
were imported to fuel the economy and the political leadership became more willing to
open towards the importing of foreign expertise and exchange of knowledge. A family
planning (one child policy) program was also initiated to counter the high population growth
with which the agriculture still had problems keeping up. Smaller farmers were given
incentives to enhance their productivity by giving them money and a part of their produces
to be kept if they met certain targets. Unemployment was tackled by giving more freedom
to the common people in setting up joint ventures. Larger, state owned enterprises were
also given back parts of their profits that could be spent at their free will or on investments.
Bonus schemes were set up at large companies to encourage meeting higher targets.
Policies were initiated to allow international trade and ease the existing policies for the
involved partners. First the textile export started growing steadily which was followed
petroleum and food related goods. (ibid)
Foreign trade grew quickly, in a few years it tripled. Commercial regions were set up
where foreign companies could trade more easily and under more favourable financial
terms. The standards of living also grew as GDP did, and as people were able to source more
foreign goods into their everydays. (ibid)
Changes occurred in the pricing systems. The importing of foreign goods caused issues
in the economy because the price gap was rather wide between the domestic and imported
goods; therefore the state issued a control on some of the prices, while others were let to
be driven by the market. The control lessened as the years past and market driven economy
was allowed to prevail, the consumer society started to develop. (ibid)
In the second half of the 1980s inflation, corruption and the mixed nature of state and
private owned market started to create serious problems. Also, about 60% of the total
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population was still employed within the agricultural industry although it only accounted for
30% of the economic output. This was tackled by urbanization and investment into better
automatisation of the agriculture. In the 1990s after Deng Xiaoping’s death the processes
sped even further up. (ibid)
3.2.1 Outsourcing and FDI
As it has been discussed previously, companies have realized that in order to cut costs
and remain competitive in a period of negative economical performance, they need to find
new processes that are profitable and sustainable. This was helped by the changed
legislation in the USA which encouraged outgoing FDI and changes in the international
trade. During the 1990s, the outsourcing or ‘offshoring’ of many services to other, most
often far away countries have become a popular and feasible solution to cut corporate costs
not only in the USA but also in some parts of Western Europe. The positive effects of
outsourcing were easy to see: the skilled workforce in the off shore countries was 60-90%
less expensive than in the originating country (PriceWaterHouseCoopers, 2005), whereas
jobs, such as data entry or back office tasks were derogatory in the West, they were well
paying opportunities in local terms and were respected and sought after, resulting in higher
motivation and better performance (McKinsey Global Institute, 2003). Another economic
positive of outsourcing is that since these jobs are often – as mentioned – well paying jobs
in India or other parts of the world, the local workforce will have more money to spend and
their investment/spending fuel the local economy, and often American or other Western
firms’ subsidiaries (such as of purchasing computers and high-tech electronics).
The above mentioned report quotes Forrester, a major research and analytics
company who projects that from the 2003 level of 400,000 American outsourced jobs, by
2015, there will be around 3,300,000, saving about $136bn in wages for the American
companies. It is therefore a relevant question to ask, what will happen to these 3 million
jobs that will be lost within the domestic market, and how the domestic economy will be
able to tackle the newly developed situation. MGI suggests that as of now, about two thirds
of the services sector is made up by jobs that cannot be outsourced (e.g. hotels, restaurants,
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etc). Still, it’s important to examine the numbers from a wider sense. The loss of three
million jobs over a twelve year period would average to an annual 250,000 or so, which is
not that much if one takes into account that the during the late 1990s the average jobs lost
in the USA due to layoffs were around 1.1-1.2 million per year (Kletzer, 2001)7, which MGI
argues the USA can recreate ‘easily’. Nonetheless the question is more complex than the
simple recreation of jobs.
Offshoring creates wealth for U.S. companies and consumers and
therefore for the United States as a whole: that is why companies
choose to follow this course. (MGI)
The problem with this statement is that the MGI study fails to recognize that though
jobs might be recreated; losing a job has several negative effects. As specific examples,
Kletzer mentions the decreased loyalty towards a new employer after losing a job, as well as
the inability or unwillingness to adapt to the new environment and the simple fact that in
many cases finding a new job is not immediately successful, therefore the workers still
suffer from a temporary loss of income. This would also hinder sectors as hotels,
restaurants, etc. because people would cut down on eating out or on holidays if they have
less income; therefore simply because those sectors cannot be outsourced it does not mean
that outsourcing others would not have negative effect on the economy’s performance.
Furthermore the fact that American corporations are being made more lucrative with
outsourcing does not necessarily mean that the process actually creates wealth for the
consumers. As mentioned previously outsourced jobs are often regarded as low-prestige
jobs, which are domestically often being handled by people who have limited possibilities.
For them, the wealth that’s being created for the outsourcers is often far away.
Outsourcing has been more important in the economic upturn in India and some
other countries than China. Although it is predicted that China may take over India’s first
place on global outsourcing by 2015 (Vembu, 2007), what gave China an economic boost in
the last decades were the exports and FDI.
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Historically speaking there are three main phases of the Chinese FDI development,
mostly based on political policy changes, which are: 1979-83, 1984-91 and 1992 ongoing.
The first phase incorporated the setup of Special Economic Zones (SEZ), which enabled the
incoming FDI to become more important for the overall national economy as investors were
given extra rights in these areas. Still, in these five years, a total of $1.8bn (annual $360mn)
of FDI arrived into the country, mostly into the SEZ provinces. In 1984, fifteen, mostly
coastal cities were opened for FDI which caused a rocketing in the inward FDI, averaging of
an annual $2.1bn which was hindered by the 1989 events at Tiananmen Square. The trends
took about 3 years to recover when Xiaoping visited most of the relevant FDI-target cities
and ensured investors that the country was committed to open markets. New legislations
were passed to enhance FD investors’ wellbeing in the country and alleviate them from
some restraints. Between 1992 and 1999, the average annual inwards FDI was $36bn with a
32% annual increase (OECD/OCDE, 2000). By the new millennium (2002) FDI in China has
reached 22%, even though the East Asian economic crisis crippled the rest of the region, and
on global levels, FDI was stagnating at around 1%. GDP has been growing around the rate of
9-10% annually continuously.
As of 1995, most of the FDIs went into Labour intensive sectors, which was followed
equally by Technology intensive and Capital intensive markets.
Figure 3-2: FDI to China by Sectors in 19958
Labour Intensive, 50.42%
Technology Intensive, 26.85%
Capital Intensive, 22.73%
FDI to China by Sectors [1995]
Labour Intensive Technology Intensive Capital Intensive
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Figure 3-2 shows how the FDI was allocated in the different sectors in 1995. While this
data is by no means ‘new’, still it gives an overall idea on how the world could have become
so dependent on Chinese manufactured goods in some specific sectors, of which some
examples are mentioned in subchapter 1.3.5 on page 16.
Nonetheless there are many underlying problems in the Chinese society. The high
inequalities, negative side effects of the One-Child Policy and the ageing population will also
affect China, just as it now starts to affect the West, albeit in China’s case this may come a
bit later than with the USA and Europe.
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4 Future Outlooks - Has America actually lost its political strength?
Analysing a question that has so many background reasons is never easy. Lost as such
is an extreme word because it assumes a result of zero against whoever won with a result of
(say) 100. The USA is not at a zero level by any means and nobody else is at a 100-level
either, especially because a mathematical equation for measuring power had not been set
up. Still I do wish to say that in my opinion and based on the previous chapters there has
been a shift and it resulted in weakening American influence.
As it could be seen from the comparison the main factors that helped the USA dictate
in the past years are very different from the ones that enhance China’s growing power.
China had practically no relevant influence on the global IR after the Second World War, at
least definitely nothing similar to the USA’s.
With the fall of the Soviet Union however the strong American domestic support has
weakened as the national unity against the ‘evil forces’ was not anymore necessary in the
way it previously was (Gilpin, 2001).
China on the other hand grew because it had and still has a pool of resources that
others can hardly match to and with seemingly sustainable and strategic development the
Chinese government managed to bring the county to the level where it cannot be anymore
disregarded on the international field, by means of economy, population and military. Still
the common link between the USA’s and China’s monetary growth is the market-driven
economy and what the OECD report calls market-oriented and export-oriented FDI (2000, p.
11). China is so vast the investors firstly realized the export-oriented FDI is a good
investment because labour is cheap. Later they also realized that market-oriented
investments are good because there’s a growing need and enormous market for it, whereas
many other places of the world were (or are) in recession. This gave China a significant place
in the global economy which then quite quickly shifted to not just economic importance but
also to political and military importance.
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4.1 Resources Examined
In the early chapters I marked resources as the key element in developing and keeping
power. It has been also pointed out later that the USA could become a hegemon because it
had access to resources (mainly technological and financial) that were unavailable at the
time for other countries for various reasons. Furthermore, the USA had access to natural
resources within its own territory or through the allies that enabled it to keep up the growth
and reinvest its economy, military, research, which partially points out why IR has not really
considered in depth if other countries could rise to challenge the US in its position because
resources and their derivatives haven’t been available for the others, while plenty for the
US. Practically if we aim at examining hard power the technological advancements in
finance and its supporting industries, as well as in military created such a gap between the
USA and any other state that so far could not have been bridged. The resources that I
named key were Access to and Extraction of Raw Materials, Financial Investments, Military
Power (including technological background) and Demographic Factors which will now be
looked at, at an overview level of the first three and detailed level of demographics as the
main subject of this paper.
Technically the USA to a large extent depends on oil supplies that are imported from
areas of the world which are politically volatile (Energy Information Administration, 2008),
and although it is itself the third largest oil producer, its actual production is declining,
having to import roughly 2/3s of its total consumption. Strictly theoretically, (by military
terms) the USA could get hold of important oil reserves through Canada, if it ever became
necessary though. By coal production terms, the USA is self sufficient and exports most of its
production.
China also imports about half of its oil consumption but its own production is still
growing. Nonetheless the Chinese imports of oil even more heavily relies on the same
political area (Middle East) as the USA’s does, which can be accounted as a threat for both
countries, but especially the PRC. China is also the largest producer and consumer of coal in
the world, but the country is self sufficient (ibid). Furthermore, while the country currently
07077765 P a g e | 38
takes relatively small use of renewable energy sources, it has the world’s largest
hydropower potential (CIA , 2008).
There are many other raw materials that can be used as resources, like iron ore/steel,
etc, but it is not the aim of this paper to analyze each of them.
As a section summary, whether or not access to raw materials can hinder the USA’s
hegemonic position is not simple to answer. China currently has access to necessary amount
of raw goods that are needed for its ongoing future development. Nonetheless if oil supplies
become short, it will definitely alter the global scenario of exports, imports and
development.
Financial investments and operations had a major impact on the USA’s rise as
hegemony. It has also been mentioned that while outsourcing would presumably have a
hindering effect on the growth on the American economy and in turn a positive effect on
the economy of the country to where offshoring investments are targeted, just by itself this
would not endanger the hegemonic situation of the USA; however FDI does have a
significant effect on the shaping of economies and in turn the domestic investment
capabilities of a country. China and India have become major targets of FDI in the last
decades and India is predicted to grow to be the 3rd largest economy in the world by 2030
(Goldman & Sachs (Wilson, Dominic; Purushothaman, Roopa), 2003). The Goldman Sachs
report carries numerous predictions for the state of global financial scenario. The report
outlines that by 2040, China would replace the USA as the largest economy in the world,
and India, which will be #3 by that time, would later on replace it at the second rank.
Figure 4-1: Predicted changes in global economies (source: ibid)
Brazil China India Russia France Germany Italy Japan UK US BRICs G6
2000 762 1078 469 391 1,311 1,875 1,078 4,176 1,437 9,825 2,700 19,702
2005 468 1724 604 534 1,489 2,011 1,236 4,427 1,688 11,697 3,330 22,548
2010 668 2998 929 847 1,622 2,212 1,337 4,601 1,876 13,271 5,441 24,919
2015 952 4754 1411 1232 1,767 2,386 1,447 4,858 2,089 14,786 8,349 27,332
2020 1333 7070 2104 1741 1,930 2,524 1,553 5,221 2,285 16,415 12,248 29,928
2025 1695 10213 3174 2264 2,095 2,604 1,625 5,567 2,456 18,340 17,345 32,687
2030 2189 14312 4935 2980 2,267 2,697 1,671 5,810 2,649 20,833 24,415 35,927
2035 2871 19605 7854 3734 2,445 2,903 1,708 5,882 2,901 23,828 34,064 39,668
2040 3740 26439 12367 4467 2,668 3,147 1,788 6,039 3,201 27,229 47,013 44,072
2045 4794 34799 18847 5156 2,898 3,381 1,912 6,297 3,496 30,956 63,596 48,940
2050 6074 44453 27803 5870 3,148 3,603 2,061 6,673 3,782 35,165 84,201 54,433
BRIC2003$bn
G6 Totals
Projected US$ GDP
07077765 P a g e | 39
Nonetheless as the countries grow they lose some of their speed as they become less
competitive against the already developed nations. In case of China, the current 8% annual
GDP growth is predicted to slow to 4% by 2030 and 3% by 2050, whereas India will still grow
at a 5% annual rate (ibid).
The important finding of this section is that America will not specifically lose its
economic power, however others will probably outperform it. This will be due to India’s and
China’s continued position of being a good investment target both for consumer and
manufacturing purposes.
Probably the most important but most derivative element of the resources subject is
the military power, as far as hard power goes: having raw materials and strong financial
background does not safeguard a country if it lacks military power; neither do they by
themselves ultimately enhance the bargaining power of a country. Nonetheless in order to
develop significant military strength a country needs both raw and financial resources, as
well as technological and personnel capital. Since IR is to a large extent currently prefers
hard power against soft power in its measurements and predictions, this is actually a reason
why countries such as China, India, or Russia haven’t been brought up as possible short-
term challengers to the USA’s primary hegemony position; these countries do not, or did
not have the appropriate mix of resources to create and keep up a significant military force.
This question is also the most difficult to reliably evaluate. While the number of
personnel in the US. Army and the People's Liberation Army (PLA) are public, it is a country’s
vital interest that its possible enemies do not have access to its military secrets, may that be
the actual number of nuclear bombs, biological weapons and level of technological
advancement. In statistical terms, the PLA is the largest standing army of the world with
roughly twice as many active troops as in the US Army (Center for Strategic and
International Studies, 2006), (Department of Defense, 2006). Many of the Chinese land
forces (weapons, tanks, etc) are based on Soviet technologies and are often outdated in
comparison to the American counterparts; however the PLA is in the process of
modernization and transformation (Department of Defense, 2007). Currently, the PRC has a
somewhat higher spend on its military than the US by proportion of the GDP (4.3% vs. 3.9%)
but due to the differences between the economies of the two countries, in actual numbers
07077765 P a g e | 40
the PRC’s spending is around 10% of the USA’s (ibid). It should be noted though that China’s
military spending has doubled in the 2000-2005 period and is probable that growth has
continued since (ibid). This points out an important strength: as long as the economy keeps
growing at such a pace the country will have growing resources to spend on it already
enormous military, and modernize it.
4.2 Population and demographics
As the major part of this paper the following subchapters will be examining in deeper
details the predictions of America’s and China’s demographic changes in the coming
decades and their possible effects on the countries’ political power. Aside from military
questions and findings of yet unknown resources, probably the biggest influence on the
future of global political and economic power will be made by the sheer demographic
changes of the planet.
While the world is currently growing in population, the Western world is already
facing issues related to the ageing of population (United Nations Development Programme,
2005). Demographics as such have not been dealt with in details by IR academics, as it
seems to be a subject regarded as of secondary importance. I think this is wrong because
changes in the population can have major influence on how a country develops and as such
its behaviour in politics and IR. Just to mention a few general examples in a nutshell:
changes in population and the number of citizens can and does influence industrial output
both civilian and military production, research capacity, mining capacity, military power
(number of soldiers and spec. ops.), but also have possible hindering effects, like ageing
population’s problems (pensions, healthcare, social security burdens, etc), agricultural
burdens (need of food supply and supporting logistics), etc. Another one of the reasons why
previously demographics was not considered as a primary issue was that most of the
population issues came from LDCs which were – let’s face it - fairly irrelevant in terms of
influencing global politics and IR if we disregard their need for aid. The wake of the East and
South Asian region (China, India, and to some extent Japan) and its rise to a possible
07077765 P a g e | 41
challenger of the USA as world hegemon, as well as the Western world’s ageing population
and emigration issues do however provide a reason for examination.
Figure 4-2: Observed and Forecasted percentages of the Elderly (65+ years) in Selected Areas, Regions, and Countries of the World: 1950, 2000 and 2050 (UN, 2000)
Figure 4-2 shows the observed and predicted changes in global population between
1950 and 2050. As it is known the Western countries are already facing problems of the
ageing population, however as the chart shows neither Europe nor the USA have doubled its
proportion of elderly people in the last 50 years, whereas Europe and Japan will double the
proportion of elderly people in the coming 40-50 years, and so will the USA but China for
example will triple it (also see Figure 4-4 and Figure 4-6). This will pose a very serious burden
on the rest of the society which will lead to changes in economies simply because of the
different needs of older people both by terms of consuming habits and by health issues.
Naturally if a state will be required to spend a larger amount of its money on health and
social care then 1) it can spend less on production and military and/or 2) it needs to raise its
income (taxes) to sustain expenditure which means that the population will have less to
spend on consumption which would then lead to economic slowdown.
As it will be outlined, the population growth will also be a problem in the USA
especially because they also face emigration issues, whereas China does not at the moment;
World Africa
Latin Americ
a & Carib.
China India Japan Europe ItalyGerma
nySwede
nU.S.A.
1950 5.2% 3.2% 3.7% 4.5% 3.3% 4.9% 8.2% 8.3% 9.7% 10.3% 8.3%
2000 6.9% 3.3% 5.4% 6.9% 5.0% 17.2% 14.7% 18.1% 16.4% 17.4% 12.3%
2050 19.3% 6.9% 16.9% 22.7% 14.8% 36.4% 29.2% 35.9% 31.0% 30.4% 21.1%
0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
35.0%
40.0%
Ove
r 6
5 y
ear
s
Ageing Population
07077765 P a g e | 42
at the same time the price of food is rising steadily and we’re far probably far from the peak
of it, which will also pose threats to the national economies.
Figure 4-3: Observed and Forecasted Proportion of Working Age Population in Selected Countries Between 2000-2050 (Goldman & Sachs (Wilson, Dominic; Purushothaman, Roopa), 2003)
Figure 4-3 shows the observed and forecasted proportion of working age population
in selected countries between 2000 and 2050. As it can be seen, while G6 countries will be
hit earlier with the possible effects of the ageing population, China will also be affected.
While my aim with this chapter is not to find solutions to the population issues I do
wish to outline a few important elements that can and will influence the shaping of
economies and have possible effects on the changes of political powers.
4.2.1 American9 demographics
The USA currently spends the largest proportion of its GDP on a per capita basis on
healthcare in the whole world, about 16% (World Health Organization, 2008), which is
predicted to rise a further 3.2% in ten years (Department of Health & Human Services,
50
52
54
56
58
60
62
64
66
68
70
2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
% o
f p
op
ula
tio
n
Predicted Working Age Population Trends
Brazil Russia India China G6
working age population = share of population aged 15-60
07077765 P a g e | 43
2008). While the country currently spends more on healthcare than food (Krugman & Wells,
2006), the three percent rise by itself almost equals to the current spending on military (that
is 3.9% of the GDP (Department of Defense, 2008)). Health insurance costs have risen faster
(78% increase for family covers since 2001) than salaries (19%) and inflation (17%) (Kaiser
Family Foundation, 2007) in the last few years and while the American health care system is
ranked first in its responsiveness and cost (being the most expensive) but 37th in
performance and 72nd level of health, out of 191 examined (World Health Organization,
2000). Currently about two thirds of the coverages are funded by the employers, which is
partially subsidized by the government via tax exemptions that account to about $150bn per
year (Krugman & Wells, 2006) and when in 2005 the government tried to cut the tax
exemptions, the political upheaval was so heavy that they needed to back off (ibid). A
further study (Hartman, Catlin, Lassman, Cylus, & Heffler, 2007) found that spending on
senior healthcare is much higher than on child healthcare and the cost has been rising
steadily in the last two and half decades.
These issues indicate several weaknesses that will become even more important in
the future: although the country is spending record-high amounts on healthcare, its
effectiveness is at best mediocre, and as mentioned the spending is on the rise.
Furthermore, as it has been pointed out, most of the people receive their insurance as an
employee benefit, which means that if healthcare costs rise further (as they most probably
will) it strains employers because they’ll need to spend more of their profits on employee
benefits, and if they cannot handle these rising costs they can go bankrupt, forcing them to
make a choice between their own survival against the health (care) of their workforce. GM
is a good example of such a company at the moment, struggling to keep itself afloat in the
economic downturn while having large amounts of employees who are on health benefits
(Krugman & Wells, 2006). Naturally, laid-off workers often need to be supported by aid.
The same study points out an interesting but politically important fact: Medicaid, the
American health insurer for the poor people takes care of roughly as many patients (about
15% of the population) as Medicare (the company for elderly people’s medical insurance),
however Medicaid patients are usually undereducated, always poor and mostly the ones
who do not vote. This at the end means that their healthcare is completely driven by the
goodwill of politicians and from political point of view, almost in vain. Also, out of the
07077765 P a g e | 44
current 35 million covered by Medicaid, 8 million were newcomers to the company between
2000 and 2004; had they not been taken on board, these people would have gone
uninsured and in poor health. This in the long term could mean that they’d be the first to be
cut off from the state-funded healthcare.
Figure 4-4: USA's Current and Predicted Population Pyramids
While I do not wish to engage too deeply in the possible solutions of the healthcare
problem in America – simply because it is not the primary subject of the essay, I do wish to
point out that there seem to be no perfect solutions. Some suggest that instead of having
employer funding for healthcare, people should pay more (out-of-pocket). This in my
opinion does not help the question of economic slowdown because if the population spends
more on healthcare then they spend less on other consumption. Also as it has been pointed
out, currently about 30% of the population is state-funded on healthcare because these
people cannot receive insurance from other sources. For the sake of simplicity, assuming
that the proportion of poor people will not change by 2050 and Medicaid will serve 15% of
the population, still the 10% absolute growth amount of elderly would result in 40-45% of
07077765 P a g e | 45
people being state-funded. And considering the 8-million-rise in Medicaid customers
between 2000 and 2004 even this is improbable, especially if we consider that from the
current about 300 million the American population is expected to rise to 440 million in
2050, and by then the proportion of non-white population will account for 54% of the total
American population (of which 30.3% [absolute] is predicted to be Hispanic) (BBC News,
2008). In the light of lower living standards and health level within the Hispanic population,
this is very important.
Figure 4-5: Median personal income /yr for the various ethnic groups in the USA (2005) (U.S. Census Bureau, 2006)
Figure 4-5 shows the 2005 rates of median personal incomes for the different ethnic
groups within the USA; as it can be seen the Hispanic population under indexes heavily on
the average salaries which assumes a lesser standard of living. This is supported by the 2004
ACS – Hispanics report pointing out that Hispanics have higher fertility rate (about 1.5x
higher than amongst the non-Hispanic USA citizens), but they have lower education
attainment (about 60% of Hispanics aged 25 and older were high school graduates and
about 13% had a bachelor’s degree or more education. Among non-Hispanic Whites aged 25
$0
$10,000
$20,000
$30,000
$40,000
$50,000White Male
White Female
White Both sexes
Black Male
Black Female
Black Both sexes
Asian Male
Asian FemaleAsian Both sexes
Hispanic Male
Hispanic Female
Hispanic Both sexes
All racial/ethnic demographics Male
All racial/ethnic demographics …
All racial/ethnic demographics …
07077765 P a g e | 46
and older, about 89% were high school graduates and about 30% had a bachelor’s degree or
more education) and most importantly, about 22% of Hispanics live under the poverty line,
whereas this is 8.8% for non-Hispanics (U.S. Census Bureau, 2004).
And these are just two major elements of a number of issues that exist. The Western
world faces problems from obesity which also count towards healthcare costs as well as
derivative costs which at the end hinder the economy.
4.2.2 The ‘Yellow Peril’10
Martin Wolf wrote in the Financial Times in 2003 the following:
Should [the rise of East Asia] proceed as it has over the last few
decades, it will bring the two centuries of global domination by Europe
and, subsequently, its giant North American offshoot to an end. Japan
was but the harbinger of an Asian future. The country has proved too
small and inward-looking to transform the world. What follows it-
China, above all-will prove neither... Europe was the past, the US is the
present and a China-dominated Asia the future of the global economy.
That future seems bound to come. The big questions are how soon and
how smoothly it does so. (Wolf, 2003)
This is in fact a brave – but looking at the past few decades – feasible statement. So
what has caused the East’s and most of all, China’s rapid and continuing rise when just a few
years earlier, at the end of the Second World War, it was the poorest country of the world?
Arrighi explains, that the countries of the Third World had resources that were in high
demand by the ‘First World’ countries, which paired with their ‘abundant and cheap labour
supplies’ caused a major expansion in cash flows (investments in modern terms) originating
from the West, which caused rapid industrialization that started fuelling what Arrighi calls
the ‘New International Economic Order’ (Adam Smith in Beijing, 2007).
07077765 P a g e | 47
Still, China’s economy greatly depends on the American economy’s capacities, i.e. its
capacity to ‘receive’ the goods that are being manufactured in the East; and the rest of the
world (Europe and others) plays a secondary role in the situation. Although it has been
pointed out that the market-oriented FDI in China has grown considerably in the recent
years, still a lot of China’s actual income is derived from the export. Because of this, it’s
important for the country how the trading partners’ economies will shape in the future. In
the last subchapter I predicted that the current First World’s economy is deemed to slow in
the future partially because of demographic reasons, and it has also been shown that the
proportion of working age population will decrease in China as well.
4.2.2.1 When size simply matters...
China is currently the largest country in the world, by the means of population and
grows further. Nonetheless the problem of aging and some economic question will soon be
re-shaping the Chinese economy and politics just as well as this will happen in Europe and
the USA; the government’s One Child policy will soon have burdening effects on the society.
While during the 1970, the average fertility rate of a Chinese woman was around 5.0
children, by recent times this has fallen to around 1.8 (Bristow, 2007) or so (exact data is not
known). Originally the policy was launched for economic reasons rather than simply
counteracting overpopulation: less people had smaller demands for natural resources, as
well as prompted a decline of unemployment, which eased the need for governmental
spending on them (Yanjiu, 1983). While the policy has helped slowing the country’s
population boom, the long-term economic effects are not only positive and the policy is not
due to change at least for two more years from now. Currently the country enjoys
unprecedented economic growth partially because of its massively available workforce
which is further fuelled by the increased inclusion of women into the workforce (since if
they are not pregnant they can work), however as the supply of children will sooner or later
under index the number of aged population, the country will face similar problems but in
greater terms than the West currently faces. (ibid)
07077765 P a g e | 48
Figure 4-6: China's Current and Predicted Population Pyramids (U.S. Census Bureau, Population Division, 2008)
Figure 4-6 shows the overlay of the current and predicted Chinese population for
years 2000 and 2050. While the chart operates with percentages for the sake of
comparability, actual data shows11 that the population’s structure is predicted to change
considerably: currently the younger (<20) population is around 424 million people,
predicted to change to around 238 million, the middle aged (20-60) will change from 711 to
608, whereas the older (60+) generation will amount for, instead of 86 million, to 459
million. In addition to the general questions and issues raised by the ageing population,
there are additional caveats that the One Child policy holds: if for any reason the state
funded pensions do not prove to be supportive enough, in an ‘ordinary’ society the children
of the elderly may support the old members of the family, but there is certain dynamism in
the efficiency of the support given by the children, i.e. if there are numerous children who
may or may not support the elderly, there’s still a chance of the existence of a supporter
within the family. On the other hand, if the family has only one younger member, his/her
support is crucial to the elderly members as this person means 100% of the internal (from
07077765 P a g e | 49
within the family) support (Bristow, 2007). This raises a further economic problem: if the
supporter spends considerable amount of their resources on the elderly, they lose these
resources from being spent on their own family, or on any other means that can fuel the
economy, whereas in the ‘ordinary’ societies, the support may be divided amongst more
people, thus the individual contribution is less burdening. Also, if for whatever reason
(unwillingness, death, etc) the supporter is not helping the elderly members of the family
may become impoverished. This issue creates a similar picture of possible future healthcare
cost-related issues on the consumer society; people will simply need to spend their money
on supporting family members rather than consuming. (ibid)
Although the Chinese health care system is very different from the American, it still
has some common problems: in China, the majority of health insurances are handled and
paid by the state, whereas people do not have to pay anything or just a small proportion. On
the other hand, because in China the rural population is generally poorer than the urban,
and as the country is so vast in area, rural health standards are still far from those in Europe
or the USA. Food supplies are also still often short in rural areas and with the growth of food
prices and also the growth of population, this will cause problems in the future.
Another issue that will rise to considerable significance is the changes of living
standards in the country. Currently the economic success is a result of cheap labour and
growing living standards (one fuelling exports the other the imports and consumption),
however the two are contradictory in the long term because if people get paid more their
standards of living will rise but this will mean that workforce will become too expensive for
the investors who will look elsewhere; which is what happens currently in India from where
outsourced services are being moved to China because of cheap labour issues (discussed
previously). Furthermore, China is very much two-faced when it comes to living standards
and sociology: a small proportion of the urban population has gotten richer recently and
their living standards are growing, however still the majority of the country live in the
countryside and earn their money from agriculture; education levels are very low in rural
China, less than half of the children finishing middle school as they discontinue their studies
after the compulsory elementary education. This is important because it shows that much of
the population still lives at low standards and it makes them more reliant on state support,
which will add to the state’s burdens in the coming years.
07077765 P a g e | 50
Thirdly, global demographic changes will be important for the country as well: if the
major trading partners of the country will experience an economic slowdown because their
citizens will need to spend their money on social/healthcare rather than consumption then
there will be less need for manufacturing consumer goods, which, knowing what extent
China accounts for on a global level at the moment reveals a threat to their prosperous
future, unless of course the country finds new trading partners, that is if the current LDCs
would catch up to a new level of prosperity. As Figure 4-2 pointed out, by 2050 the USA and
China will have a roughly similar proportion of elderly population, and while there is a
prediction that the American economy will suffer because of healthcare issues and the
immigrants’ lower education level and its derivatives, China will face similar inconveniences
because its non-urban population is less educated and more frail of health problems.
07077765 P a g e | 51
5 Conclusions
The main question of this paper was to analyze how the USA has gained its status as a
hegemon and to make predictions for the future if it can keep its number one place on the
global political arena or if there is a threat of losing this towards China. There was special
focus dedicated to the importance of demographic changes. During the first part of this
paper I tried to set up a framework to measure political power in a way that it can be
applied generally, regardless of the hierarchical level in question, while attempting to bridge
differences between structural and relational power. It was also my aim to differentiate
major political powers from hegemons and dictatorships, although this differentiation was
made at a superficial level as my experiences are yet limited to make a valid and fair
mathematical system that stands its place against questioning. Nonetheless I think I
succeeded in my aim of bringing a new, mixed framework for measurement with a valid
explanation of my reasoning.
Based on the discussion of the previous paragraphs it can be concluded that USA
earned its hegemon status and global influential power because it had extensive access to
key resources during the second half of the 20th century and managed to strategically use
these to turn the global political scene to its favour. The country successfully managed to
develop a need for its own self on the international political palette so that the majority of
the lesser countries depended on it; practically most of the global financial systems are ever
since closely linked with the shaping of the American political and economy life. America
influences much of the world’s thinking and actions, not only on the financial markets, but
also by setting policies and rules. The US also wields one of the largest and most effective
armies of the world which currently ensures that the country is in relative safety from any
possible adversary armies.
China (PRC), compared to the USA today is a less powerful nation but it seems to be
on the appropriate course of developing itself to join the ‘band of hegemons’; it has access
to raw materials and natural resources to fuel its own development and other resources to
enhance technologies, economy and military forces. The sheer size of the Chinese
population and the domestic political system currently makes it possible to quickly
07077765 P a g e | 52
implement the political will within the country – build, manufacture, research the necessary
things. The PRC also makes good strategic use of its resources: the country has become
more open and market friendly in the last decades and reinvests the incoming FDI into
developing its own self, the urban education and military power.
At the same time, although it is predicted that China would take over the USA’s
current first place as the biggest economy, the question is not that simple. Both countries
depend on sourcing a considerable part of their raw materials from politically fragile
territories, which can become important later on. Demographic changes will inevitably play
an important role in shaping the political powers of these countries because the USA’s
population is ageing and they are facing immigration problems, which combined will cause a
slowdown in the American economy. China at the same time exports most of its
manufactured goods to the areas of the world which will probably face economic decline in
the future, also because of immigration and ageing, and their related costs, which in turn
will affect the Chinese economic output. The population of the PRC will also face problems
of healthcare, ageing and changes in the living standards, which will again affect the
country’s economy. Economic changes of course will have effects on technological and
military capacities.
Therefore in answer to the original research subject, the USA would weaken and
probably lose its overall first place as a global hegemon but probably would not cease to be
one; China and perhaps also India will rise to be hegemons, as I previously wrote that the
existence of a few (2-3) hegemons and/or dictatorships globally is possible, which with the
decline in natural resources and investments in military capacities would possibly portray a
politically more diverse and active 21st century than the last few decades have been.
5.1 Possibilities for further studies
This paper has set out a basic framework in the first chapter on how hegemons can be
separated from global political powers that are not hegemons and from dictatorships.
Gramsci (1971) identified that hegemons need to have what he called additional powers
07077765 P a g e | 53
which separate them from the rest of the relevant states. One of the key questions that
have remained unanswered is the creation of the de facto list of issues (additional powers)
that are necessary for a global political power to qualify as a hegemon. While I personally
lack the experience to create such a definitive list I nonetheless tried to come up with a
number of elements that could be part of it.
Examining the other global political powers I feel that Russia and India at the time
needs to be left out from the hegemon group because they lack the additional powers that
have been mentioned so many times, just as the pool and strategic use of resources.
Although it would worth studying how these countries can and might change their global
influence in the future I was not be doing so, mostly for the sake of word limit. Practically
Russia is a ruler in and partially around its own territory, with not many other countries
questioning its right to be so; the world’s passivity over the Georgian/Ossetia attacks in
early August 2008 exemplify this well. At the same time they do not currently have a global
influence over economy, politics, manufacturing, and even their military force seem to be
struggling with keeping itself financed and effective. Nonetheless things are changing
slowly. Mostly due to the price rise of crude oil, Russia has received extreme amounts of
profits on its oil exports, much of what was invested into military spending, which has
grown from about $6bn in 2002 to about $60bn so far this year, totalling an investment of
$190bn in the last 7 years (Toth, 2008). And if we look at it once again, we can see that the
country is rich in raw materials, has high population and a strong domestic political power,
which with sound planning can be merged into a new hegemonic power.
07077765 P a g e | 54
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Endnotes
1 This list is not based on specific sources or references but instead is my compilation; while I
understand that there may be further relevant elements I tried to list the most important ones only, for the sake of word limitation and analysability.
2 Based on various reports available on China Sourcing Reports (Trade Media Holdings Ltd, 2008) with
data from 2002-2007. Further about 60 reports are available on the website for informative convenience. 3 Video available on LBJ Library and Museum - Daisy Spot
http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/media/daisyspot/ 4 Video available on Cinemaniacal: http://cinemaniacal.com/video/duck-and-cover
5 As of 28
th August 2008, there are over 200 videos and 11,500 article hits for the word ‘terrorism’ on
cnn.com/search, which accounts for a roughly 1150 pages-long list of hits. The first 920 pages (i.e. 83%) of the list contain articles that were created after the 9/11 attacks, while the oldest article on page 1150 of the search is dated 1995. Statistically, between November 1995 and September 2001, CNN posted 1.08 articles per day relating to terrorism. Since September 2001 till today, this has grown to an average of 3.60/day. Source: (CNN.com, 2008)
6 Historical overview mostly based on the following material: China : Library of Congress Country
Studies - Federal Research Division, (Worden, Savada, & Dolan, 1988) http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/cntoc.html - Accessed 10 August, 2008
7 Using statistics from the US Bureau of Labour Statistics (BLS)
8 Labour-intensive sectors include Food processing, Food manufacturing, Textiles, Clothing & other fibre
products, Leather & Fur products, Timber processing, Furniture, Paper & Paper products, Printing, Cultural, Education & Sports goods, Rubber products, Plastic products, Non-metal mineral products, Metal products, and Others. Capital-intensive sectors include Beverage manufacturing, Tobacco processing, Petroleum refining & Coking, Chemical materials & products, Chemical fibres, Ferrous metal smelting & pressing, Non-ferrous metal smelting & pressing, and Transport equipment. Technology intensive sectors include Medical & Pharmaceutical products, General machinery, Special machinery, Electrical machinery & equipment, Electronics & Telecommunication equipment, and Instruments & Meters.- Source: (OECD/OCDE, 2000)
9 American throughout this chapter, unless otherwise mentioned refers to the USA.
10 Gilpin (2001, p. 38 (comment 17))
11 For the easier comparability I applied a -15% weighting to the 2050 data to equal out the change
from 1.2 bn to 1.4 bn, therefore numbers assume a roughly equal 2000 vs. 2050 population (in raw numbers)