Special Speech Zones and Diversity in the Chinese-Written Internet

Han-Teng Liao han-teng.liao@oii.ox.ac.uk Oxford Internet Institute

University of Oxford

1 Introduction

The Internet as a whole has increasingly become a major case in evaluating

the economic and political achievement of the Beijing’s "reform and opening" that

begins earlier in the 1970s. Usually the central question is whether politics in

China become more open because of the Internet during the economic reform.

Zheng (2007) argues that the Internet contributes to political liberalisation but not

necessarily democratisation. Less optimistic and more critical, Zhao (2008) and

Schiller (2008) argue that the Internet, as part of the larger media and cultural

industry, has been appropriated by China’s urban middle class, not to oppose

authoritarian state, but to prevent and contain domestic social conflicts. Such two

views seem to be both correct as if one were to collect drops of evidence of “opening”

into a glass called China’s Internet. One can both see the political freedom online

in China as either “the glass half full” or “the glass half empty”1, which usually be

quickly judged as either supportive or dismissive for Beijing’s governance of

Internet. This article proposes the concepts of “speech zoning” and “dynamic

orders” to better evaluate political openness online that goes beyond the usual

dichotomy of control versus freedom.

Rather than aggregating the scores of control versus freedom into the glass

called China’s Internet, this article suggests that the diversity inside Chinese-

written Internet requires closer scrutiny. Damm (2007) criticizes the two Western

mainstream discourses of liberation versus control, proposes that “the fragmenta-

tion and localization of the Internet … mirrors contemporary Chinese society”(288).

Damm rightly points out the diverse development of the increasingly commercial-

ized China’s society and the corresponding special “zone of freedom”(285) that the

Internet has created. However, Damm’s (2003) borrowing of Sustein’s (2001)

fragmentation-because-of-commercialization hypotheses, though avoiding the usual

pitfalls of overgeneralizing Chinese Internet through the lens of freedom versus

control, may herald the arrival of ”consumerist postmodernity” too soon. Indeed,

commercialization is an important factor, but the commercialization process in the

larger political economy history of Chinese-written Internet needs further scrutiny

as Beijing has played an active role in shaping the landscape, particularly through

1 MacKinnon (2008) observes that bloggers in China tend to see political freedom online

as “the glass half full” as opposed to half empty.

CIRC2009

the “zoning technologies” such as institutions of special economic regions and

household registration (Ong, 2004). In other words, the observed fragmentation

phenomenon of Chinese-written Internet may not be resulted simply from the

identity politics in postmodern consumer society, but also from the actual Beijing’s

"reform and opening" policies.

In order to take into accounts both the observed fragmentation and Beijing’s

active role in shaping Chinese-written Internet, we need to read the dynamics

between China’s Internet and the rest of Chinese-written Internet (mainly in Hong

Kong, Taiwan and Singapore). The metaphor of the Great Firewall should be

rephrased as the Great Dam that aims to manipulate the flow of information, both

surface and underground, which is recently rechanneled through the Great Canal

of Chinese-written Internet that reconnects the Chinese-speaking regions. To

analyze such a dynamic and diverse development, the concepts of “speech zoning”

and “dynamic orders” are analytically designed to enrich the concepts of control

and freedom in this article. The first half of the article develops the conceptual

framework of “zoning technologies” and “dynamic orders” based on the political

economy of "reform and opening" and Chinese-written Internet. The second half of

the article includes a comparative case study on two major user-generated Chinese-

written encyclopedias, Baidu Baike and Chinese Wikipedia, in order to use the

proposed framework to generate hypotheses that go a bit deeper than the control-

versus-freedom and integration-versus-fragmentation dichotomies. It is hoped that

the proposed conceptual framework can provide better insights to understand the

political opening and closure in Chinese-written Internet in specific and Chinese

speaking regions in general.

2 Zoning Technologies and Dynamic Orders

It is my personal belief and assumption that Beijing’s success in the political

discourse on freedom-versus-control depends on the idea of unfettered freedom will

lead to political “instability” or “chaos” (luan). The dichotomy of two Chinese characters ‘luan’ (乱, meaning disorder, instability and chaos) and ‘zhi’ (治, meaning

order, governance, control and cure) is instructive here. It suggests a plausible

explanation why a series of surveys (Guo, 2007) has shown that the majority of

China’s Internet users hold the opinion that Internet should be managed or

controlled, and preferably by the government. Damm’s (2007) empirical research,

based on interviews conducted in 2002 and 2003 with users in southern coastal

cities of China, further shows that Russia and Taiwan are often referred as

notorious examples of ‘luan’ by interviewees. These findings are also confirmed by

my personal observation online as a student of media studies. For example, one

commentator from China has argued that Taiwan needs a leader like Russia’s Putin

CIRC2009

to solve the “mess” in Taiwan (Zhou, 2008). We should not ignore the elephant in

the room, which is exactly the struggle for political freedom in the Tiananmen

Square protests of 1989, which has been described by Beijing as unnecessary

disorder in contrast to the later economic achievement and de facto political

stability. Beijing’s selection of Russia and Taiwan is a rational calculation because

around 1989 Russia and Taiwan took on different paths of political transformation.

Taiwan’s achievement in freedom and democracy is downplayed. The disintegra-

tion of the Soviet Union is read as a warning sign for China. Thus, the struggle for

political freedom and democracy is portrayed as creating unnecessary disorder or

‘luan’, whereas Beijing’s action is regarded as providing necessary stability for

economic growth and prosperity. Beijing has successfully, to some extent,

replaced the dichotomy of freedom versus control with that of disorder versus order,

which is an important lesson for researchers on China’s political censorship.

2.1 Theoretical Framework

As a deliberative strategy to combine the two dichotomies (freedom-control

and ‘luan’-‘zhi’) without taking sides with Beijing authority or western observers,

this article proposes a synthesized theoretical framework of “zoning technologies”

and “dynamic orders”. First, I borrow liberal philosopher Michael Polanyi’s concept

of “dynamic order”, to describe the emergent order formed by “mutual adjustment”

(1941:432) of the free-moving units. Given the fact Polanyi’s theories of liberty

have some interesting connections with Hayek’s “spontaneous order”2, this article

chooses the concept of “dynamic order” to highlight the possibility that some order

can emerge freely from mutual adjustment of individuals. It should be also noted

that Polanyi’s concept “dynamic order” is a critique against central planning by

totalitarian states. Thus according to Polanyi, the foundation of “Liberalism” and

thus “Liberal Society” is the faith that “society may confide itself to a variety of

principles, which guide systems of co-operation by individual adjustment” (454).

Polanyi’s formulation of public liberty based on dynamic order can be regarded as

one of the anti-theses of the doctrine that freedom leads to chaos. Freedom can

lead to a dynamic order of diversity. As shown later in this article, the concept is

closer to how online communities such as Wikipedia organise themselves.

Second, to describe Beijing’s new modes of control through partial "reform

and opening", I borrow anthropologist Ong Aihwa’s notion of “zoning technologies”,

with which Beijing aims to “economically integrate disarticulated political entities as

2 The distinction between Polanyi’s “dynamic order” and Hayek’s “spontaneous order”

has been discussed between scholars such as Bladel (2005), Jacobs & Mullins (2008), Fischer & Mandell (2009), Thorpe (2009), etc. I prefer Polanyi’s concept here simply because it is closer to how academic community and Internet community organise themselves, whereas “spontaneous order” is closer to market mechanism.

CIRC2009

a detour toward eventual political integration” (2004:70). Though I may differ from

Ong’s assessment of Beijing’s success, I agree with Ong that Beijing’s "reform and

opening" is selective and partial in a way that freedom (or privilege) is granted

through exceptions implemented by zoning technologies such as economic zones,

science parks, and administrative regions. To illustrate the new modes of control

by deploying zoning technologies that make freedom as exceptions, my favourite

example is the “free speech zones” in the US mostly during the presidency of George

W. Bush (Fuller, 2005). “Free speech zones” policies in effect regulate the time,

location and forms of expressions: when, where and how one can be granted the

privileges to protest. In this article, I modify the term into “special speech zones” in

the context of China’s Internet to highlight the aspect that “freedom is special”. In

short, zoning technologies often treats freedom as exceptions granted by authori-

ties. Hence, the notion of “zoning technologies” and the concept of “dynamic order”

contain both the element of freedom and control, but their difference cannot be

overlooked. Although it is equally possible to have some orders emerge out of the

exceptional freedom granted by authorities and the dynamic mutual adjustment by

individuals, the orders that emerge can be different.

2.2 China’s Internet and Chinese-written Internet

The history of Beijing’s “reform and opening” practices can now be reframed

as a series of experiment to introduce some dynamic orders under Beijing’s zoning

technologies. The first decade (1979-1989) of “reform and opening” features the

creation of four “special economic zones” (SEZs) (Dietrich, 1997). Figure 1 shows

the location of the current six SEZs (Arabic numerical 1 to 6), which are close to

Hong Kong (symbol A), Macau (symbol B) and Taiwan (the purple-coloured island

near numerical 2 and 3), where the dynamic orders of global market are practiced.

Thus, it is not comprehensive “reform and opening” but rather selective and partial

exceptions. The second decade (1989-1999) begins with the disappointing

development of the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989, especially for people in

Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan. A series of missile tests is conducted in 1995 and

1996 by Beijing in the waters around Taiwan, before the run-up to the first ever

direct election for President in Taiwan. Also politically, it is the last decade of Hong

Kong and Macau’s colonial status before their return to China in 1997 and 1999

respectively. The last decade (1999-2009) begins with China's internet population

surpassing Hong Kong’s in 1998 (UNdata, 2008) and Taiwan’s in 1999 (Executive

Yuan of Taiwan), along with the beginning of the Golden Shield Project in 1998, the

Internet censorship and surveillance project. From these major milestones in the

history of Beijing’s “reform and opening”, researchers need to acknowledge the

economic and political complexities involved in locating the sources of orders

emerged in the Chinese-written Internet.

CIRC2009

Figure 1. Special Administrative Regions and Special Economic Zones of China (Wikimedia

Commons, 2006).

From the history of Beijing’s “reform and opening” above, the distinction

between China’s Internet and Chinese-written Internet cannot be overlooked.

Indeed, China’s Internet (defined as the Internet segment that is completely under

Beijing’s control, thus excluding even Hong Kong and Macau) was connected

through the pre-existing Chinese-written Internet, which corresponds to a larger

economically integrated area. Infrastructure-wise, by comparing submarine

network maps in 1980 (Figure 2) and 2005 (Figure 3), it can be observed that Hong

Kong and Taiwan have remained crucial, while Shanghai and Shantou played an

increasing role (Gale Group, 2000). It should be noted that before China is

reconnected to the world’s Internet, the pre-existing Chinese-speaking Internet link

of Singapore-Hong Kong-Taiwan symbolises the corresponding sea trade links, east

to Japan and the US, west to India and Europe. In terms of consumer society and

cultural industry, Hong Kong and Taiwan have enjoyed commodity and popular culture much earlier, and the so-called GangTai culture (港台文化, Hong Kong-

Taiwan popular culture), due to cultural affinity and cosmopolitan aspirations (Gold

1993; Baranovitch, 2003; Kang, 2004; De Kloet, 2005), has played a significant role

in the production and consumption of music and video, which according to the

CIRC2009

CNNIC (2008) report, are the major usage of mainland users. However, these

historical facts do not necessarily suggest China’s Internet does not have its

autonomous development path. On the contrary, it must have some departures

from the rest of Chinese-written Internet in order to keep the “special political

development” in Hong Kong and Taiwan at bay. The mere freedom-virus-control

framework may fail to take into account the fact that Beijing has secured some

legitimacy from its economic performance and national confidence to maintain its

preferred political order and arrangement.

Figure 2. East Asian Part of the Pacific Region

Submarine Cable Map in 1982 (Burns, 2008)

Figure 3. East Asian Part of the Global

Subsea Network in 2005 (CyTRAP Labs, 2006)

It is thus essential to understand the nature of censorship and political

freedom in China in the context of other Chinese-speaking regions including Hong

Kong, Singapore and Taiwan. Table 4 not only indicates that Chinese-speaking

regions enjoy a better-than-half-of-the-world “digital opportunity” and “network

readiness”, but also shows the uneven development in areas such as democracy,

free speech, human rights, and Internet filtering. In these areas, Taiwan and the

mainland serve as two extreme cases with other regions in between. While Taiwan

is perceived to be a pro-free-speech democratic country, Mainland China’s rankings

in democracy and free speech are near the bottom. A similar contrast can be

observed in human rights violations and political Internet filtering. Mainland

China is the only region with major human rights violations and political Internet

filtering among the Chinese-speaking regions. Here although the economic

integration through zoning technologies may work, the political tensions seem

inevitable, as exemplified in the China-Taiwan relationship (Hughes, 2000; Hughes,

2006). Thus, the issues of censorship and political freedom in Chinese-written

Internet are bound to involve some regional comparison if not outright rivalry.

CIRC2009

Table 4. Selected Political Indexes for Regions with Sizable Chinese-speaking Population

Regions Digital

Opportunity Index Ranking (See NOTE 1)

Networked Readiness

Index Ranking (See NOTE 2)

Democracy World Ranking (See NOTE 3)

Free Speech World Ranking (See NOTE 4)

Major Human Rights Violation

(See Note 5)Political Internet

Filtering (See Note 6)

Mainland 77 59 138 163 Yes Pervasive

Singapore 5 5 84 141 No No

Hong Kong 8 22 78 61. No No

Taiwan 7 13 32 32 No No

NOTE 1 Data from the Digital Opportunity Index Ranking of 181 entities (ITU&UNCTAD, 2007). NOTE 2 Data from the Networked Readiness Index 2006-2007 Ranking among 122 countries surveyed (World Economic Forum, 2007). NOTE 3 Data from the Economist Intelligence Unit's index of democracy 2006, with 167 countries are ranked from the top democracies to authoritarian regimes (Economist, 2007). NOTE 4 Data from the Worldwide Press Freedom Index 2007, with 169 countries are ranked (Reporters Without Borders, 2007). NOTE 5 It is nominally determined whether the region in question is substantially mentioned in the Human Rights Watch World Report (2007). NOTE 6 Data from the OpenNet Initiative about Internet filtering of political content (OpenNet Initiative, 2007).

2.3 Zoning, Opening and Flow Control

The question of freedom-versus-control can thus be rephrased as such: Does

the economic and regional “reform and opening” lead to political opening? Media

events such as SARS (Tai, 2006, Tai & Sun, 2007) and Toxic Milk may prove that

Internet facilitates the flow of information against Beijing’s will, particularly

information originated from Hong Kong and Taiwan. On the other hand, some

politicians and commentators in Hong Kong and Taiwan express their concerns that

pro-Beijing news media and capital threaten the free speech they enjoyed (Lo 1998;

The Pied Piper of Beijing, 2001; Ni, 2005; Cheng & Tam, 2005; China and Martin

Lee, 2007). In addition, it could be argued that the regional factors have contrib-

uted to the making of more liberal media such as Guangzhou-based Nanfang Daily

Newspaper Group (including Nanfang Zhoumo and Nafang Dushi Bao). Thus,

though I start with the assumption that Beijing has successfully used the luan-zhi or disorder-order dichotomy to fend off possible demand for free speech or democ-

racy, some political openings do exist. I argue that it is exactly these potential

openings, usually in alignment with the economic and regional “reform and

opening”, that requires Beijing to dam effectively the undesired flow of ideas and

information. It should be remembered that after the first decade of China’s “reform

and opening”, the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989 had garnered sympathy and

support from both Hong Kong and Taiwan. Hence, not only can and should

Internet filtering in China be read as part of the zoning practices, but also must the

democratic achievement in Hong Kong or Taiwan be portrayed by Beijing as foreign,

CIRC2009

not practical or even desirable in China to avoid potential political competition.

In addition to its rich historical connotation, the term “zoning” is also neutral

and practical enough to capture the essence of speech regulation within a certain

jurisdiction. Lessig & Resnick (1999) also use the term “zoning speech on the

Internet” to understand how speech regulation is possible the Internet across

different jurisdictions. Although they rightly conclude that the Internet architec-

ture is difficult for governments to exercise access control, Beijing’s relative success

in zoning speech in Chinese-written Internet across jurisdictions proves that it is

still doable. Zoning speech online may be financially expensive and technically

ineffective as Lessig & Resnick (1999) suggest, but it can still be politically effective.

In contrast to the economic goal of special economic zones to provide buffers

between the foreign (usually non-mainland Chinese) capital and mainland interior

labor, the political goal of zoning speech may not be thorough and complete

censorship. Rather, zoning speech aims to block the sensitive political exchanges

across Chinese-speaking jurisdictions that may challenge the status quo. Thus,

the concept of zoning technologies could be strangely political in the end. It is not

all-or-nothing political control of speech, but part of the larger flow control across

zones of jurisdictions. Dissents’ voice may still be heard across different zones but

at much lower volume and with much smaller constituencies.

Even within mainland China, the concept of zoning technologies can be used

to encompass the practices of household registration (or Hukou system), rural-

urban migration, and associated discriminative policies. Zoning technologies are

indeed semi-opening strategies to control flows of people, resources and discourses.

The concept provides a relevant socio-political context for digital exclusion and

empowerment research. Although ethnic, dialect or regional stereotypes may pre-

exist before governments’ policies, the proposed framework of zoning technologies

and dynamic orders demands an analytical distinction between state action and

societal reaction. With his research on the migrant workers’ use and environments

of ICT, Qiu et al. (2009) find that the emergent “translocal networks” has guided

migrants with social support. Such “translocal networks” should be regarded as

dynamic orders that alleviate some of the socio-political tensions resulted from the

unhelpful zoning technologies that treat them as second-class citizens. Qiu et al.

(2009) provides a powerful explanation why migrant dearth (mingonghuang), a

temporary labor shortage, can occur: The dynamic exchange between workers

across different economic zones about wages and benefits help them to “vote with

their feet” (120). However, these translocal networks may not be able to change

the zoning technologies that set the boundary conditions for the flow of labor and

social resources. For example, they cannot form a political constituency under the

zoning regime that dictates the tax and benefit regime, at least not yet.

CIRC2009

2.4 Questions in Reading the Orders Online

Since "reform and opening" practices is selective within China and connected

to other non-Mainland Chinese-speaking regions, Beijing’s zoning technologies

make exceptions of freedom for regulated flows of information, people, capital, and

political discourse. Although Hong Kong and Taiwan have been seen by interna-

tional observers as relatively positive examples of political freedom and free speech,

they has been constantly portrayed in China as cases of democracy in disorder,

economy in turmoil, and renegade regions under foreign influence. It should also

be emphasized that choosing between individual freedom versus government

control may suggest many things to citizens in China, which often involves the

historical interpretations of the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989. The dichot-

omy can suggest ‘luan’ (chaos and disorder) -‘zhi’ (order and stability), pro-

Foreigners or pro-China, or even pro-Taiwan and pro-Beijing. Dissents can thus

be politically quarantined by zoning technologies such as Internet filtering. Thus

analytically, one should not simply measure the level of freedom in China as

absence of government control since the "reform and opening" practices are about

giving out exceptional freedoms by authorities. The proposed framework of zoning

technologies and dynamic order thus provides a pragmatic, non-political and yet

historical alternative to study post-Mao China. Is the new principles organising

political, economic and social activities influenced by Beijing’s zoning technologies

or other emergent social order?

A series of questions can thus be asked to examine the sources of order in

Chinese-written Internet. Rather than relying on snapshots of the opinions of

mainland citizens or questioning the autonomy of their support for governmental

control, we can instead examine the outcome from actual cases: How does a

particular order emerge from different makeup of its participants? Is it heavily

influenced by market players or state authority? Or does it simply reflect the

dynamic interactions between the self-selecting participants with the shared belief

or sense of purpose? Is it heavily conditioned by zoning technologies such as

Internet filtering along the line between mainland and non-mainland regions?

What impact does it have on the dynamics of Chinese-written Internet? These

questions are particularly important when one tries to understand the user-

generated content in Chinese-written Internet. While user-generated content are

supposed to be bottom-up and some dynamic order is expected to emerge, the

coordination does not emerge in a vacuum. What follows is a comparative case

study on two major user-generated Chinese-written encyclopedias, Baidu Baike and

Chinese Wikipedia, situated into the bigger context of “reform and opening” by

profiling its participants, Beijing’s zoning technologies, and their position in

Chinese-speaking world.

CIRC2009

3 A case study of Baidu Baike and Chinese Wikipedia

As prominent example of user-generated content, Wikipedia can be regarded

as a case of unplanned collaboration and dynamic order emerged from Chinese-

written Internet. The appropriation of and resistance to Wikipedia in Chinese-

written Internet can be studied as a case study of the struggle between Beijing’s

zoning technologies and Internet users’ dynamic order. Indeed, the “special”

treatment Wikipedia received from Beijing is a proof of that struggle in its short

history of localisation, blockade and competition3. From 2003 to 2005, the

Chinese Wikipedia community gradually took shape with contributors from

Mainland, Hong Kong, Taiwan and overseas, with some localised editorial policies

and extra software codes in order to overcome some linguistic and regional barriers.

From 2004 to 2008, Chinese Wikipedia has been blocked and then unblocked

several times by Beijing. Sometimes the complete website is blocked and some-

times several specific articles are blocked. From April 2006, China’s leading search

engine company Baidu created its own version of Chinese user-generated encyclo-

pedia, Baidu Baike, while Chinese Wikipedia was inaccessible for most of mainland

users during one of the blockade period. The fact that Beijing has attempted to

block Chinese Wikipedia while another user-generated encyclopedia is created as a

major competitor suggests a need to direct or shape emergent dynamic order online,

more than just simple censorship. It is essential to compare how different dynamic

order formed in the two and how they respond to Beijing’s zoning technologies.

Before presenting some evidence from their editorial policies, webometric

data and interactions with “grass mud horse” event, I have summarised some basic

information below (also see Table 5). Since its inception in 2002, Chinese Wikipe-

dia had become increasingly popular, whereas Baidu Baike was launched when

Chinese Wikipedia has been blocked for a year (BBC, 2006). Thus, Baidu Baike is

a service provided by a pro-profit company, which is the first Chinese company to

be included in the NASDAQ-100 index (Chmielewski, 2007), whereas Chinese

Wikipedia is a separate language version hosted by the non-profit charitable

organization. When Baidu Baike is subject to Chinese laws and regulation

whereas Wikimedia Foundation has to follow laws and regulations as a charity

based in San Francisco, USA. Although some has alleged that Baidu Baike has

been copying some content from CW from the beginning (Nystedt, 2007), Baidu

Baike now boosts one million entries, six times higher than CW (see also Table 5).

Their different starting point (one as national online encyclopedia, another as part

of the global online encyclopedia project) may also explains why Baidu Baike is

simplified-Chinese-only with the language encoding standard of “gb2312’” whereas

3 See the summary in the entry of “Chinese Wikipedia” in English Wikipedia:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chinese_Wikipedia

CIRC2009

Chinese Wikipedia accommodates both Simplified and Traditional Chinese with its

adaption of the universal language encoding standard of “Unicode”.

Table 5: Basic Facts of Chinese Wikipedia and Baidu Baike

Baidu Baike Chinese Wikipedia

Operator Baidu.com, Inc. Wikimedia Foundation Inc.

Physical Location Beijing, China San Francisco, USA Number of Entries

(2009/04/14) 1,538,837 246,317

Major Language Simplified Chinese Only (gb2312)

Both Simplified and Traditional Chinese (Unicode)

To further substantiate the significance of the two user-generated encyclope-

dias in Chinese-written Internet, Figure 6 provides an indicator of search popularity

that is based on Google’s search data4. Baidu Baike’s popularity, represented by

the red line, catches up with Chinese Wikipedia around mid 2008. Although

another Beijing-based user-generated encyclopedia, HuDong.com, claims to be the

largest Chinese-written encyclopedia online, it seems not yet to be popular accord-

ing to Google’s search data. Even the similar search keyword measurement

provided by Baidu.com has similar outcome: Baidu Baike and Chinese Wikipedia

both have users’ attention number over 3000 while Hudong Encyclopedia’s number

is around 4005. Although it is open to debate whether search data provided by

search engine companies could be used as a proxy for actual traffic, the data

provided by two competing search engine companies should conclude without

major biases that Baidu Baike and Chinese Wikipedia are the major two online

encyclopedias in Chinese-written Internet. In addition, some regional information

provided by Google also indicates some degree of separation of Chinese language

usage online. At the bottom of Figure 6, one can clearly see where the Chinese-

written keywords are submitted, from Chinese-speaking regions to regions with

sizable overseas Chinese. Also, since the term Chinese Wikipedia is written

4 The Google’s Search Volume Index is based on the data collected by Google Search,

which is often used as an indicator the popularity of a given search term. The hyperlink of this graph is provided here: http://trends.google.com/trends?q=%E4%BA%92%E5%8A%A8%E7%99%BE%E7%A7%91%2C%E7%99%BE%E5%BA%A6%E7%99%BE%E7%A7%91%2C%E7%BB%B4%E5%9F%BA%E7%99%BE%E7%A7%91%2C%E7%B6%AD%E5%9F%BA%E7%99%BE%E7%A7%91&ctab=0&geo=all&date=all&sort=0

5 The Baidu’s Index is based on the data collected by Baidu.com. The hyperlink of this service is provided as follows. For Chinese Wikipedia (simplified forms): http://index.baidu.com/main/word.php?word=%CE%AC%BB%F9%B0%D9%BF%C6 For Baidu Baike: http://index.baidu.com/main/word.php?word=%B0%D9%B6%C8%B0%D9%BF%C6 For Hudong Encyclopedia: http://index.baidu.com/main/word.php?word=%BB%A5%B6%AF%B0%D9%BF%C6

CIRC2009

slightly differently in simplified Chinese and in traditional Chinese, the search

keyword in Hong Kong and Taiwan is thus predominately traditional Chinese (see

the green bar), compared to that in China where simplified Chinese dominates (see

the yellow bar).

HuDong

Encyclopedia

Baidu

Baike

Chinese Wikipedia

(in simplified forms)

Chinese Wikipedia (in

traditional forms)

Figure 6. Google’s Search Volume Index for four keywords of three Chinese-written user-

generated encyclopedias.

3.1 Editorial Policies and Processes

Both Chinese Wikipedia and Baidu Baike claim to embody the Internet’s

open spirit of sharing and freedom, or “every one can edit”, Baidu Baike is influ-

enced more by the zoning technologies set by Beijing. First, in terms of editing,

any new edit is moderated by Baidu employees by default whereas Chinese

Wikipedia automatically reflects latest edits in most instances. Thus, although

both supports software functions such as editing, commenting and edit-history

tracking, the actual editorial practices differ. Baidu Baike requires its employees

CIRC2009

to moderate any new contribution according to its editorial policies, which leads to

the second point of policies-setting. The rules in Baidu Baike are decided centrally

and exclusively by Baidu.com6, whereas the guidelines in Chinese Wikipedia are a

set of policies and guidelines7, some of which are localized from the rules used in

the English version. All of the policies and guidelines in Chinese Wikipedia are

written, maintained and executed by the participants of Chinese Wikipedia. In

contrast to Baidu’s role in Baidu Baike, the global Wikipedia Foundation has in

effect minimum to none influence over how Chinese Wikipedia is run daily8. Thus

the centralized rules in Baidu Baike are more prone to Beijing’s preferences (Woo,

2007) whereas the policies and guidelines in Chinese Wikipedia tend to reflect the

dynamic orders among the participants from different Chinese-speaking regions,

which lead to the third point about regionalism and zoning technologies. Of Baidu

Baike’s seven categories for deletion, the third category refers to “reactionary content” (反动内容), which is ideologically loaded in the Chinese-speaking world.

This category specifically ban any content that “maliciously criticize the current

system of the state”, “disrupt social and public order”, “provoke disputes over

nationalities, ethnicities, religions and regions”, “maliciously attack state agencies

and officials”, “promote superstition and cults”, and “provide any hyperlinks to

aforementioned content”.9 Third, though it is not specifically mentioned, but it is

clearly assumed that the state in Baidu Baike’s policies is Beijing. In contrast,

Chinese Wikipedia has a policy that does not exist in English Wikipedia called “Anti-Regionalism Policy” (避免地域中心). It mandates that any Beijing-centric,

Han-centric and Chinese-centric statement should be avoided. Hence, although

both recognize the potential issues of regionalism, Baidu Baike’s operational

framework is more national (and thus potentially Beijing-centric) while Chinese

Wikipedia’s is more transnational.

The linguistic practices and regional demographic of the two also reflect the

difference of national versus transnational approach, which hints at the presence of

Beijing’s zoning technologies. Traditional Chinese users, mainly from Hong Kong

and Taiwan are de-facto excluded by Baidu Baike since it adopts the national

encoding standard of GB-2312, which does not include Tibetan language for

example. In contrast, Chinese Wikipedia has accommodated diverse Chinese-

6 Baidu Baike’s editorial polices can be accessed here:

http://www.baidu.com/search/baike_help.html 7 Chinese Wikipedia’s editorial guidelines and policies are maintained here:

http://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:%E6%96%B9%E9%87%9D%E8%88%87%E6%8C%87%E5%BC%95

8 As a proof of the autonomous decision making in Chinese Wikipedia, some western oberservers have questioned the content differnces between English Wikipedia and Chinese Wikipedia as suspicious cases of self-censorship (French, 2006).

9 The translation of the categories is done by the author and the list of categories can be found at the source provided at footnote 6.

CIRC2009

speaking contributors, despite the linguistic, regional, and political differences

between four regions (Mainland China, Hong Kong/Macau, Taiwan, and Singa-

pore/Malaysia) with its innovative automatic conversion technologies that exploit

the user-generated vitality of wiki technology (Liao, 2009). Thus, Chinese Wikipe-

dia can be presented, according to users’ preferences, in simplified Chinese,

traditional Chinese, simplified Chinese used in Mainland, simplified Chinese used

in Singapore/Malaysia, traditional Chinese used in Hong Kong/Macau, orthodox

Chinese used in Taiwan, or non-converted original format where the diversity of

contribution can be shown. Although actual regional demographic data of Baidu

Baike’s contributors remains a research challenge because they are automatically

part of the larger Baidu users by design, my own personal observation is that non-

Mainland contributors are rare. In contrast, the users in Chinese Wikipedia are

regionally diverse. Based on the traffic statistics collected in March 2005, 46% of

users connect from mainland China, 22% from North America, 12% from Taiwan,

9% from Hong Kong, 3% from Japan, 3% from Europe, 2% from Southeast Asia,

and 3% from other regions (Wikipedia English, 2009). As a proxy for active

contributors, the regional distribution of the current eighty-eight administrators in

Chinese Wikipedia also reflects similar diversity: 27 (31%) from mainland, 20 (23%)

from Hong Kong/Macau, 2 (2%) from Singapore, 18 (20%) from Taiwan and 21

(24%) from other regions.10 It should be noted that because the current Chinese

Wikipedia is a historical outcome of the combination of two originally separate

Chinese versions (simplified and traditional) it has to maintain a delicate balance

not to favor one regional preference over the other (Liao, 2009). It is in direct

contrast to Beijing’s suspicious favoritism for Baidu, which is substantiated by

incidents of directing traffic to Baidu from major websites such as Google, Microsoft

and Yahoo in 2002 and 2007 (Metz, 2007). Different zones are thus created in

Chinese-written Internet by Beijing’s active zoning technologies such as traffic

directing, linguistic exclusion, content moderation and informal favoritism.

The order is different as well in the hierarchy of the membership: Baidu

Baike exhibits, in Polanyi’s term, “corporate order” (planned or bureaucratic), as

opposed to the “dynamic order” (Polanyi, 1941:431). In Baidu Baike, a hierarchy of

membership system is established with eighteen levels and five categories of

professions, akin to the online role-playing games, where users are upgraded to the

next level by earning points. In addition, although moderation power remains a

Baidu-employee-only privilege, some users can be selected by Baidu into a special group called “Tadpole Group” (蝌蚪团) to enjoy the privilege of “green channel” (绿色

10 Data compiled by the author from the list published by Chinese Wikipedia:

http://zh.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Wikipedia:%E7%AE%A1%E7%90%86%E5%91%98%E5%90%8D%E5%8D%95

CIRC2009

通道), meaning that the contributed content can pass through without usual

moderation process. According to an incomplete list11 provided by Baidu.com,

there are currently thirty two members, with sixty four members have resigned or

left. Thus, the overall order in Baidu Baike is built upon a combination of penalty

and reward systems. The reward system is characterized with titles and give-

aways issued by Baidu, and penalty system is the subtraction in the reward system

which includes Beijing’s need to filter the undesired content. In contrast, although

Chinese Wikipedia is not free from the usual hierarchy of administrators and

common editors, there is no points-earning reward system but rather a reputation

system that acknowledges the fact the editing statistics could be manipulated. In

addition, the authority of administrators in Chinese Wikipedia is not absolute and

rules are designed to avoid any potential conflicts of interest12, which is different

from the absolute authority of Baidu employees in Baidu Baike. All the privileged

actions taken by the administrators are open to public scrutiny in Chinese

Wikipedia, whereas the Baidu Baike’s moderation done by its employees is only

visible to the parties involved. It follows that the authority in Baidu Baike is more

centralized and the order in Chinese Wikipedia is more dynamic. It does not

suggest that policing in Chinese Wikipedia does not exist, but rather it is closer to

the concept of “dynamic order” that emerge freely from mutual adjustment of

individuals, rather than that of “corporate order” that originated from a central

point of authority.

3.2 Webometric Coverage

"There's, in fact, no reason for China to use Wikipedia, a service based 'out

there’…It's very natural for China to make its own products," claimed by William

Chang, the chief scientist of Baidu in the WWW2008 conference in Beijing (Webster,

2008). As shown in the comparative analysis in the previous section, whether the

Chinese Wikipedia is “out there” depends on personal views whether these partici-

pants, mostly from Chinese-speaking regions including mainland China, are “out

there” in the sense of “outside China”. However, William Chang could be right if

indeed the content of Baidu Baike is good enough to serve Chinese-speaking people

in mainland China (if we ignore people from Hong Kong and Macau for a moment).

The topic coverage of general-purpose encyclopedias should be comprehensive. As

part of my content analysis of Baidu Baike and Chinese Wikipedia, the webometric

coverage, meaning the distribution of the linking/citing external resources over

different languages and regions, can provide a useful proxy for the actual coverage

11 See the webpage on http://baike.baidu.com/view/881001.htm 12 See the section of “restrictions” in Chinese Wikipedia’s page on administrators:

http://zh.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Wikipedia:%E7%AE%A1%E7%90%86%E5%91%98&variant=zh#.E9.99.90.E5.88.B6

CIRC2009

of encyclopedia content, and thus the effects of Beijing’s zoning technologies.

The webometric results, based on respective 1,100 entries randomly-selected

from Baidu Baike and Chinese Wikipedia, have conclusively supported that Baidu

Baike’s outlinks are less diverse in both linguistic and regional terms. Figure 7

shows that Baidu Baike’s outlinks are mostly (69%) in simplified Chinese, and the

number will be as high as 93% (183 out of 196) if the inaccessible (or broken)

outlinks are excluded. In contrast, as shown in Figure 8, the outlinks in Chinese

Wikipedia are relatively diverse, with sizable portion of them linking to web pages

written in both simplified Chinese and traditional Chinese. A similar contrast

could be found in the regional diversity based on country codes extracted from the

URLs of the outlinks. Although the generic top-level domain names (TLDs) such as

“.com”, “.net”, “.org” and so on may constitute some challenges for analysis, the

contrast shown in Figure 9 and Figure 10 is clear: While the mainland top-level

domain name “.cn” dominates the BB’s outlinks, CW’s outlinks distribute across

Chinese-speaking regions such as Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore and other

countries.

Grey-area Unicode

114%

Mostly Simplified

3614%

Traditional2

1%

Simplified14755%

other197%

#N/A49

19%

Figure 7: Linguistic Distribution of BB's Out-links

g y

Mostly Simplified

953%

Simplified37011%

Grey-Area Unicode,

555

Korean1

0%

#N/A54215%

other97227%

Japanese1234%

Traditional61917%

Mostly Traditional

2317%

Figure 8: Linguistic Distribution of CW's Out-links

Generic TLDs,

165

.cn, 94#N/A, 2

.tw, 3

Figure 9: Regional Distribution of BB's Out-links

#N/A, 79U.S. TLDs,

224.tw, 646

.cn, 271

Pacific Ocean, 3

.sg, 7

East Asia, 137

.hk, 169

Generic TLDs, 1640

Americas, 12

Commonwealth,

179Middle-East, 2

Europe, 137

Figure 10: Regional Distribution of CW's Out-links

Thus, it is safe to argue that BB is surprisingly much more “focused” on the

simplified Chinese content and on the content hosted inside China, even though

ideal encyclopedia content may require more balanced and diverse sources.

Though a firmer conclusion can be reached in the near future with the comprehen-

CIRC2009

- 17 -

sive webometric analysis of all entries, the results so far unmistakenly suggest that

Baidu Baike is less diverse than Chinese Wikipedia. Several hypotheses can thus

be generated to be tested in the future about the purpose and effects of Beijing’s

regulation of online speech. Is the difference between the diversity in Chinese-

written Internet and that in China’s Internet direct results of Beijing’s zoning

technologies? The fact that Baidu Baike’s outlinks have low proportion in linking

to pages written in traditional Chinese or with regional domain names such as “.tw”

and “.hk” suggests a discrepancy regarding the effects of zoning in fragmenting and

integrating. If Beijing keeps undesired information from Hong Kong and Taiwan,

does it undermine its ultimate political goal to unite Hong Kong and Taiwan? To

put it bluntly, how could Beijing integrate Hong Kong or, even more problematically,

Taiwan as ‘same here’ rather than ‘out there’? Of course, one can argue the results

merely imply that the information demand in mainland China is at best self-

sufficient and at worst inward-looking. However, it cannot explain away why some

people in mainland China still want to take the extra effort to use or even partici-

pate in Chinese Wikipedia, which in Baidu’s eyes is the service “out there” that

Chinese do not “naturally” need. If Beijing’s zoning technologies as Ong (2004)

suggested will integrate disjoint regions inside and outside China, has Internet

played an integrative or a divisive role under Beijing’s policies? One could argue

that zoning technologies at the very least help Beijing to maintain an integrative,

“harmonious” China’s Internet. Then is it at the expense of keeping the “chaotic”

Chinese-written Internet outside?

3.3 Interaction with the “Grass Mud Horse” event

This leads to an alternative interpretation of the “Grass Mud Horse” event,

which represents, in the eyes of many western observers (Elegant, 2009; Wines,

2009), the subversive tactic against authoritarian censorship regime. This article

argues instead that the “Grass Mud Horse” event demonstrates both the limits and

strengths of zoning technologies, not necessarily a direct confrontation with

Beijing’s censorship. Some relevant background information is summarized as

follows. First, the “Grass Mud Horse”, a dirty pun that refers to penetrative sex

with a close female relative as one of the vulgar Chinese curse phrases, was

generated online against Beijing’s “Anti-vulgarization of Internet” policy in early

2009. Interestingly enough, Beijing named and shamed Baidu for its hosting

vulgar content (mainly about “beautiful girls”13) of in its photo and post sharing

13 See the exposure list of websites and their specific offenses, summarized in the entry

of “the Action Project of Anti-Vulgarization of Internet” in Chinese Wikipedia: http://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E6%95%B4%E6%B2%BB%E4%BA%92%E8%81%94%E7%BD%91%E4%BD%8E%E4%BF%97%E4%B9%8B%E9%A3%8E%E4%B8%93%E9%A1%B9%E8%A1%8C%E5%8A%A8

CIRC2009

- 18 -

services as early as in November 200814. Given what we have learned about

Baidu’s cooperation with Beijing in political speech online, the November warning

was hardly about political freedom in a traditional “human rights or free speech”

sense. Second, it is true that Beijing’s actual crack-down on vulgar content has

overreached, stretching to other innocent websites from animation fan sites to

political blogs such as Bullog.cn (Reporters Without Borders, 2009), but it remains

to be seen whether any collective action will be made among the pro-beauty and

against-political-censorship crowds before we can call the “Grass Mud Horse” as a

symbol of resistance to Beijing’s Internet censorship. Third, given the fact that the

short history of the “Grass Mud Horse” did heavily involve Baidu and Baidu Baike,

we need to re-examine this event from the proposed conceptual framework in order

to understand both Beijing’s governance rationale of luan-zhi (order-disorder)

dichotomy, and the actual dynamic order emerge online.

It is instructive to revisit first in greater detail from Guo’s (2007: 13) survey

about what “types of Internet content should be managed or controlled”. Although

more than 80 percent of the respondents believe Internet should be managed and

controlled, preferably by government, Figure 11 shows the overwhelming support

for controlling pornography and violence content online (over 85 percent for Internet

users), in contrast to controlling politics content (less than 41 percent for Internet

users). From this contrast, it can be argued that the “Anti-vulgarization of

Internet” has its policy legitimacy and that its overreach to political blogs is indeed

problematic. What is more significant is the contradiction if not outright hypocrisy

that Baidu has censored political content while keeping “vulgar content”.

Figure 11: What types of Internet contents should be managed or controlled (Guo, 2007:13).

The way Baidu Baike and Chinese Wikipedia interact with the “Grass Mud

14 See the official announcement by the China Internet Illegal Information Reporting

Centre: http://net.china.com.cn/qzl/txt/2008-11/28/content_2604476.htm

CIRC2009

- 19 -

Horse” event demonstrates the successes and failures of zoning technologies and

dynamic order. Despite Baidu Baike’s strict moderation mechanism, the entry of

“Grass Mud Horse” was approved, as if they are real animals, along with other nine

fictional animals with similar level of vulgarity and “kuso” (an East Asian subcul-

ture of parody). That is why these animals are now collectively called as “the Baidu

10 Mythical Creatures”15. It only shows that the zoning technologies do not

produce the order that mainland Chinese wants (more control over pornography

and relative less control over politics). In reality, it was chaotic inside Baidu Baike

and now all these entries are now deleted. It seems to be a choice between chaos

and sterile, not between chaos and order. In contrast, the dynamic order of

Chinese Wikipedia has documented, in great detail and accuracy, both the mythical

creatures and anti-vulgarization crack-down correctly from the start. It does not

mean that “kuso” and creative use of vulgarity does not exit in the larger Chinese-

written Internet. In fact, with its motto “the Kuso encyclopedia”, a Chinese-written website called Uncyclopedia, or literally “Fake Wikipedia” (偽基百科) in Chinese, has

existed since 200616. It uses similar technology, license and basic editing princi-

ples as the normal Wikipedia. Thus, it can be argued that some order is still

possible without zoning technology because the normal and kuso content is

dynamically built and separated. In contrast, Beijing’s zoning technology and

Baidu’s cooperation fails to build similar order, perhaps simply because their quest

for order is different: a certain political order for Beijing and a certain market order

for Baidu. If it is true, then zoning technologies in China’s Internet works only for

Beijing and Baidu, with occasional conflicts of interest, but it seems to be working

against China’s citizens expectations about brining in the desired order they want.

The struggle between zoning technologies and dynamic order provides plausible

explanations how China’s Internet is trimmed into a “harmonic society” with hidden

contradictions if not hypocrisy.

4 Locating the Sources of Order Online

This article has proposed a conceptual framework of zoning technologies and

dynamic order. Its main and first concern is how order emerges and gets shaped

by zoning technologies. It is hoped the research results presented and analyzed in

the framework will be more readily and widely accepted by a wider audience,

especially those who have some higher principles than freedom, those who are more

comfortable with government control, and those who simply believes freedom means

chaos. It is not to say that the research on censorship and call for speech freedom

15 See the entry of “The Baidu 10 Mythical Creatures” in English Wikipedia:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Baidu_10_Mythical_Creatures 16 See the website at http://zh.uncyclopedia.wikia.com/

CIRC2009

- 20 -

no longer matter. They are still important. However, Chinese people’s longing for

a certain order cannot be overlooked; otherwise it will be appropriated or even

misused by politicians. This is my personal concern and basic rationale to

acknowledge Beijing’s previous success in using the political discourse of luan-zhi (disorder-order), and propose the conceptual framework of zoning technologies and

dynamic order to understand the intricate dynamics between freedom and control

online. Specifically, the proposed framework take into accounts the historical

context of Beijing’s “reform and opening” and its role in shaping Chinese-written

Internet and China’s Internet. Generally speaking, the concept of “zoning tech-

nologies” treats freedom as privileges granted by authorities whereas the notion of

“dynamic order” treats order as dynamic outcome resulted from the way free

elements or individuals who make their own decisions.

It is worth repeating Polanyi’s quote that the foundation of “Liberalism” and

thus “Liberal Society” is the faith that “society may confide itself to a variety of

principles, which guide systems of co-operation by individual adjustment” (1941:

454). The keyword here may be the “variety of principles” and “co-operation by

individual adjustment”. Thus, it is crucial how diversity is managed: either by

mutual adjustment, clashes of principles or by state’s zoning authority. It is

outside of the scope of the article to discuss the normative aspects of zoning

technologies and dynamic order. Still, the analytic power of the two concepts can

guide the freedom-versus-censorship research a bit further in asking: Can we

predict what kind of order will emerge given a certain set of decisions made between

employing zoning technologies and promoting dynamic order? The case study of

Baidu Baike and Chinese Wikipedia presented in this paper, with the comparison of

their editorial processes, webometric coverage and interaction with the “Grass Mud

Horse” event, is only an initial attempt in this direction. We need further analytic

tools to understand the possible causes of the diversity or fragmentation of

Chinese-written Internet. Diversity or fragmentation could be a healthy sign of

diversity or a warning sign of deliberative division by zoning technologies.

By locating the sources of order online, we may discover new understandings

and finer options beyond the useful but primitive dichotomy of freedom versus

control, both to citizens inside and outside China. Simply put, I am looking

forward a symbolic inclusion of the option “Internet communities” in the choices to

Guo’s survey question: “Who should play the most important role in Internet

management or control?” Currently, the multiple-choice answers available are

government (84.8%), Internet companies (78.8%), Parents (67.5%), Schools (64.1%)

and Internet Cafés (59.2%), and we have seen that the zoning technologies designed

by Beijing (the government) and implemented by Baidu (the Internet company) may

benefit themselves more so than the general users of Chinese-written Internet.

CIRC2009

- 21 -

References Baranovitch, N. (2003). China's New Voices: Popular Music, Ethnicity, Gender, and

Politics, 1978-1997. Berkeley: University of California Press.

BBC. (2006, May 11). Site launches 'Chinese Wikipedia'. BBC News Online. Retrieved March 19, 2008, from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4761301.stm.

Bladel, J. P. (2005). Against Polanyi-Centrism: Hayek and the Re-emergence of "Spontaneous Order". Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics, 8(4), 15-30. doi: Article.

Burns, B. (2008). Submarine Cable Route Maps. History of the Atlantic Cable & Submarine: from the first submarine cable of 1850 to the worldwide fiber optic network. Retrieved May 16, 2008, from http://www.atlantic-cable.com/Maps/.

Cheng, J. Y., & Tam, C. C. (2005). The Taiwan Presidential Election and Its Implications for Cross-straits Relations: A Political Cleavage Perspective. Asian Affairs, an American Review, 32(1), 3. Retrieved April 10, 2009, from http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=842622801&Fmt=7&clientId=15810&RQT=309&VName=PQD.

China and Martin Lee. (2007, October 29). The Wall Street Journal. Retrieved April 10, 2009, from http://www.zonaeuropa.com/20071026_1.htm.

Chmielewski , D. C. (2007, December 10). Search site moves at the speed of China. Los Angeles Times. Retrieved April 14, 2009, from http://articles.latimes.com/2007/dec/10/business/fi-baidu10.

CNNIC (China Internet Network Information Center). (2008). Statistical Survey Report on the Internet Development in China. Beijing: CNNIC. Retrieved April 20, 2008, from http://www.cnnic.net.cn/uploadfiles/pdf/2008/2/29/104126.pdf.

CyTRAP Labs. (2006, December 26). Reliability and dependability of information networks - lessons from the Taiwan earthquake. CyTRAP Labs - EU-IST. Re-trieved May 16, 2008, from http://blog.cytrap.eu/?p=153.

Damm, J. (2007). THE INTERNET AND THE FRAGMENTATION OF CHINESE SOCIETY. Critical Asian Studies, 39, 273-294. doi: doi:10.1080/14672710701339485.

Dietrich, C. (1997). People's China: A Brief History. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Elegant, S. (2009, March 25). As China's Olympic Glow Fades, So Do Hopes for Reform. Time. Retrieved April 15, 2009, from http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1887508,00.html.

Executive Yuan of Taiwan. (2004). The Statistics of Frequent Internet Users (經常上網人口數統計). Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Execu-

CIRC2009

- 22 -

tive Yuan, R.O.C. (Taiwan) (行政院主計處網站). Retrieved May 17, 2008, from

http://www.dgbas.gov.tw/public/Attachment/41021125671.xls.

Fallows, J. (2008, March). The Connection Has Been Reset. The Atlantic. Retrieved April 15, 2009, from http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200803/chinese-firewall.

Fischer, F., & Mandell, A. (2009). Michael Polanyi's Republic of Science: The Tacit Dimension. Science as Culture, 18(1), 23 - 46. Retrieved from http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/09505430802705889.

French, H. W. (2006, November 29). China News: Chinese-Language Wikipedia Presents Different View of History. The New York Times. Retrieved April 14, 2009, from http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2006/11/chinese-language-wikipedia-presents-different-view-of-history-howard-w-french/.

Fuller, J. R. (2005). America's Unpatriotic Acts: The Federal Governments' Violation of Constitutional and Civil Rights. Journal of Homeland Security and Emer-gency Management, 2(3). doi: 10.2202/1547-7355.1161.

Gale Group. (2000, January 17). China-U.S. Undersea Cable Placed Into Service: First Undersea Cable to Directly Link China, U.S. Transmits 4M Simultaneous Calls - Company Operations | Cambridge Telcom Report | Find Articles at BNET.com. Cambridge Telcom Report. Retrieved April 22, 2008, from http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0BFP/is_2000_Jan_17/ai_58630304.

Gold, T. B. (1993). Go with Your Feelings: Hong Kong and Taiwan Popular Culture in Greater China. The China Quarterly, (136), 907-925. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/655596.

Guo, L. (2007). Surveying Internet Usage and Impact in Five Chinese Cities. Research Center for Social Development, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.

Hughes, C. (2000). Nationalism in Chinese cyberspace. Cambridge Review of International Affairs,, 13(2), 195 - 209. doi: 10.1080/09557570008400309.

Hughes, C. (2006). Chinese Nationalism In A Global Era. London and New York: Routledge.

Human Rights Watch. (2007). World Report 2007. Retrieved December 20, 2007, from http://www.hrw.org/wr2k7/asia.htm.

Jacobs, S., & Mullins, P. (2008). Faith, tradition, and dynamic order: Michael Polanyi's liberal thought from 1941 to 1951. History of European Ideas, 34(1), 120-131. doi: 10.1016/j.histeuroideas.2007.10.003.

Kang, L. (2004). The Internet in China:Emergent Cultural Formations and Contra-dictions. In D. L. Li (Ed.), Globalization and the Humanities (pp. 187-212). Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press.

de Kloet, J. (2005). Popular Music and Youth in Urban China: The Dakou Genera-tion. The China Quarterly, 183(-1), 609-626. doi: 10.1017/S030574100500038X.

Lessig, L., & Resnick, P. (1999). Zoning Speech on the Internet: A Legal and

CIRC2009

- 23 -

Technical Model. Michigan Law Review, 98(2), 395-431. Retrieved December 3, 2008, from http://www.jstor.org/stable/1290343.

Liao, H. (2009). Conflict and Consensus in the Chinese Version of Wikipedia. IEEE Technology and Society Magazine. Retrieved March 30, 2009, from http://www.ieeessit.org/technology_and_society/default.asp.

Lo, S. (1998). Mass media and politics in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. East Asia, 16(3), 111. Retrieved from http://sfx7.exlibrisgroup.com/oxford?sid=google&auinit=L&aulast=Shiu-hing&atitle=Mass%20media%20and%20politics%20in%20the%20Hong%20Kong%20Special%20Administrative%20Region&title=East%20Asia&volume=16&issue=3&date=1998&spage=111&issn=1096-6838.

MacKinnon, R. (2008). Flatter world and thicker walls? Blogs, censorship and civic discourse in China. Public Choice, 134(1), 31-46. doi: 10.1007/s11127-007-9199-0.

Metz, C. (2007, October 18). China hijacks Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo! traffic? • The Register. Retrieved April 15, 2009, from http://www.theregister.co.uk/2007/10/18/china_hijacks_google_microsoft_yahoo_traffic/.

Ni , C. (2005, July 1). Self-Censorship Shifts Hong Kong Media Role - Los Angeles Times. Los Angeles Times. Retrieved April 10, 2009, from http://articles.latimes.com/2005/jul/01/world/fg-hongkong1.

Nystedt, D. (2007, August 6). Baidu May Be Worst Wikipedia Copyright Violator. IDG News Service. Retrieved March 19, 2008, from http://www.pcworld.com/article/id,135550-page,1/article.html.

Ong, A. (2004). The Chinese Axis: Zoning Technologies and Variegated Sovereignty. Journal of East Asian Studies, 4(1), 69-96. Retrieved December 7, 2008, from http://www.atypon-link.com/LRP/doi/abs/10.5555/jeas.2004.4.1.69.

Polanyi, M. (1941). The Growth of Thought in Society. Economica, New Series, 8(32), 428-456. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/2550108.

Qiu, J. L., Castells, M. (., & Cartier, C. (. (2009). Working-Class Network Society. Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press.

Reporters Without Borders. (2007). Annual Worldwide Press Freedom Index - 2007. Retrieved December 20, 2007, from http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=24025.

Schiller, D. (2008). An update on China in the political economy of information and communications. Chinese Journal of Communication, 1(1), 109-116. Retrieved April 15, 2009, from http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/section~fulltext=713240928~dontcount=true~content=a791459543~db=all.

Sunstein, C. (2001). Republic.com. Princeton University Press.

Tai, Z. (2006). The Internet in China: Cyberspace and Civil Society (1st ed.). London:

CIRC2009

- 24 -

Routledge.

Tai, Z., & Sun, T. (2007). Media dependencies in a changing media environment: the case of the 2003 SARS epidemic in China. New Media Society, 9(6), 987-1009. doi: 10.1177/1461444807082691.

The Economist. (2007, August 22). Democracy index: Liberty and justice for some. The Economist. Retrieved December 19, 2007, from http://www.economist.com/markets/rankings/displaystory.cfm?story_id=8908438.

The Pied Piper of Beijing. (2001, September 7). Taipei Times, 12. Retrieved April 10, 2009, from http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2001/09/07/101933.

Thorpe, C. (2009). Community and the Market in Michael Polanyi's Philosophy of Science. Modern Intellectual History, 6(01), 59-89. doi: 10.1017/S1479244308001947.

UNdata. (2008). Internet Users, filtered by China, Hong Kong and Macau. Internet users (ITU estimates/SYB51). Retrieved May 17, 2008, from http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?d=CDB&f=srID%3a29972%3bcrID%3a156%2c344%2c446%3byr%3a1994%2c1995%2c1996%2c1997%2c1998%2c1999&c=2,3,4&s=_crEngNameOrderBy:asc,yr:desc&v=1.

Webster, G. (2008, April 22). Baidu's William Chang: 'No reason for China to use Wikipedia'. CNET News.com, Tech news blog. Retrieved May 24, 2008, from http://news.cnet.com/8301-10784_3-9926474-7.html.

Wikimedia Commons. (2006). PR China-SAR & SEZ-English. Retrieved May 12, 2008, from http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Image:PR_China-SAR_%26_SEZ-English.png.

Wikipedia English. (2009). Chinese Wikipedia. Retrieved December 20, 2007, from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chinese_Wikipedia.

Wines, M. (2009, March 12). A Dirty Pun Tweaks China's Online Censors. The New York Times. Retrieved April 14, 2009, from http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/12/world/asia/12beast.html.

Woo, E. (2007, November 13). Baidu's Censored Answer to Wikipedia. Busi-nessWeek. Retrieved March 19, 2008, from http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/content/nov2007/gb20071113_725400.htm.

Zhao, Y. (2008). Communication in China: Political Economy, Power, and Conflict . Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield.

Zheng, Y. (2007). Technological Empowerment: The Internet, State, and Society in China (p. 272). Stanford University Press.