Gordon - Foucault's Subject (1999)

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Northeastern Political Science ssociation

Foucault's Subject: An Ontological ReadingAuthor(s): Neve GordonSource: Polity, Vol. 31, No. 3 (Spring, 1999), pp. 395-414Published by: Palgrave Macmillan JournalsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3235247 .

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Foucault's

Subject:

An

OntologicalReading*

Neve Gordon

University

of Notre

Dame

From the mid-1970s

until his

death,

Michel

Foucault

sought

to

develop

an

account

of

the

subject

that would avoid both

regarding

he

subject

as

merely

the

passive product

of

power

relations

and

regarding

t as

entirely

self-

creating. Following

Foucault's

inal

cues

focused

on his

discussion

of

the

ethics

of

the

self

and rooted

in

a

conception

offreedom

as

an

ontological

condition

of possibility

rather than

as humanwill drawn

mainly

rom

Heidegger,

I

argue

that Foucault

sought

to

develop

an account

of

humansas

beings-in-the-world

ituated

within

an

existing

web

of

relations

occurring

within a context

of backgroundpractices,

all the while

possessing

an

ontological

freedom

that is not molded

by

power

relations but is instead the

condition

of possibility

of

power

itself

In this

way,

Foucault

sought

to

achieve a balance between

activity

and

passivity, agency

and structure n

his account

of

the

subject.

Neve Gordon s a Ph.D. Candidate

n

the

Departmentof

Government,

Universityof

Notre

Dame,

Notre

Dame,

IN.

In The

Subject

and

Power

Foucault reformulates

the

Kantian

question

What s

man?,

to

give

it a historical slant. Who are we? Foucault

asks;

What are we

in our

actuality? '

These

questions

are

intimately

related to

Foucault'spoignantcritiqueof the humanist raditionof Man 2 nd to his

refusal to

privilege

an a

priori conception

of the

subject.

Foucault does not

*I would

like to thankFred

Dallmayr,

John

Reiger,

and

Polity's

anonymous

reviewers

for

their

comments

and

suggestions.

In

addition,

I

wish to

acknowledge

the financial

support

pro-

vided

during

he summerof 1997

by

the

University

of Notre Dame's

Department

f

Government

and International

tudies.

1.

Michel

Foucault,

The

Subject

and

Power,

appeared

as

an Afterword in

Hubert

L.

Dreyfus

and

Paul

Rabinow,

Michel

Foucault

Beyond

Structuralism

nd Hermeneutics

Chicago:

University

of

Chicago

Press,

1983),

212

(emphasis

added).

2.

Particularly

Michel

Foucault,

The Order to

Things,

(New

York:

Vintage,

1994).

Also

interesting

s James

Berauer's

interpretation

f

Foucaulton this

issue,

Michel Foucault's

Force

of Flight (London:

Humanities

Press

International,

1990).

Polity Volume

XXXI,

Number

3

Spring

1999

Polity

Volume

XXXI,

Number

3

Spring

1999








396 Foucault's

Subject

subscribe o an ideal humannatureand

introduces he idea that the

subject

s

produced

by

power.

When

discussing

theFoucauldian

ubject

most commen-

tatorsrecount

this idea

and thus accentuate

he

subject's

passivity.

Although

Foucault

never

developed

a

general theory

of the

subject

(such

a

theory

would be antithetical o

his

project),

in

what follows

I

argue

that

in

his later

work

Foucault

strove to

resituate

the

subject,

seeking

a

balance

between

agency

and

structure,

activity

and

passivity.3

While

scholars tend to

discuss his

philosophy

via

the

concepts

of

power

and

truth,

I

follow

Fou-

cault's final cue and

proceed through

an

analysis

of the

subject

and freedom.4

I

adopt

Arnold Davidson's differentiationbetween three

periods

in

Foucault's

thought5-archaeology, genealogy

and ethics-to

suggest

that an

ontological

reading

clarifies a number of claims Foucault advanced

during

his ethical

period

and to a certainextent even his

genealogical

period.

I

begin

by highlighting

the

structural

motif

in

Foucault's

work

and the

ubiquitous

nature

of

power,

both of which

underlie he

conception

of

the

pas-

sive

subject.

I

then discuss Foucault's notion of

freedom, first,

by

outlining

some of the

scholarly nterpretations

f

Foucault's

understanding

f

freedom,

and

second,

by presenting

an alternative

reading

which

emphasizes

the onto-

logical

elements

in

his later

work

and accentuates he idea

that freedom s the

condition of

possibility

of

power.

It is

in this

context that

I

attempt

o unravel

the

idea of care of one's

self which

Foucaultdiscussed

in

considerable

ength

during

the

last

years

of his life.

I

argue

that

Heidegger's ontological

concep-

tion of freedom is

compatible

with Foucault's notion of

care

of

the self and

enables us to

articulatea

cogent

idea of

agency.

I

conclude

by

suggesting

that

it is untenable

o conceive of the Foucauldian

subject

as an

artifact

produced

by

power,

and that an

ontological reading

of

Foucaultcan sustain a constant

tension between

agency

and

power.

Thus,

the

analysis

indicates how

the

sub-

ject can maintainagency withina structure hat not only restricts,constrains

and delimits

action,

but also

produces

modes

of

behavior,

fabricates

objects

3. Thomas

McCarthy

also

claims thatFoucault's

conception

of the

subjectchanged,yet

he

concludes that Foucaultends with

a

self-constituting

ubject,

rather han a middle

notion balanc-

ing

agency

and structure. The

Critique

of

Impure

Reason,

Foucaultand the

Frankfurt

chool,

Political

Theory

18

(August

1990):

437-69.

4. Michel

Foucault,

The Ethic

of

Care

for

the

Self as a Practiceof

Freedom

n

The

Final

Foucault,

ed. James Berauer and

David Rasmussen

(Cambridge,

MA:

MIT

Press,

1988).

5. Arnold

I.

Davidson,

Archaeology,Genealogy,

Ethics,

n

Foucault,

A

Critical

Reader,

ed. David Couzens Hoy (Oxford:Basil Blackwell, 1986), 221-34. As I understandt, the first

period-archaeology-ends

with

The

Archaeology of Knowledge,

around

1969,

and the

second

period-genealogy-ends following

the

publication

of the first volume of The

History

of

Sexu-

ality,

in

the

late

1970s.

Davidson's differentiation etween the

periods

corresponds

with the

three

axes Foucault

mentions

n

the

introduction o the Second Volume

of the

History

of Sexuality:

he

formationof sciences

(savoirs),

systems

of

power,

and forms

with

which

individuals

recognize

themselves as

subjects.

The

History

of

Sexuality,

Vol.

2

(New

York:

Vintage,

1990),

5.








Neve Gordon

397

of

knowledge,

and constructs

reality.

It shows how the tension between

struc-

ture and

agency

can be

preserved

withoutone

undermining

he other.

I. The Passive

Subject

Most scholars

emphasize

the

contrastbetween Foucault's

relationalcon-

ception

of

power

and

the

more

prevalent

understanding

f

power

as a

prop-

erty

which can be

possessed.

They

stress

his

sensitivity

to the

fluctuating

net-

work of

power

relations,

his

development

of

the

capillary onception

of

power-a micro-powerwhich permeatesall social strataproducingand thus

constrainingsubjectivity-and

his

notion of

bio-power,

which he

considered

to be an

indispensable

lement

in

the

development

of

capitalism.

Some under-

score his constantendeavor o

problematize

he

normal,

raising

Foucault's

success

in

showing

that

phenomena

which

society

deems

permanent,

inevitable,

and

universal,

are but

a

specific

period's

fabrication.

Moreover,

commentators end to

agree

that

Foucault

has

opened

a new

path

of critical

inquiry.

Debates

concerning

Foucault's work

emerge,

not as a

consequence

of his

disclosure that social practices pertaining o the insane or criminals are his-

torically

contingent

and

arbitrary,

or as a direct result of his

critique

of the

human

sciences'

on-going production

of

normalcy.

Rather,

nearly

all dis-

agreements

revolve around

his

analysis

of

background

practices

and,

more

particularly,

ddress

his

conception

of both truthand

power,

and the difficul-

ties

arising

from

the

relationship

between the

two.

Despite

the

plethora

of

diverse

views

advanced

on both sides of these

debates,6

he

majority

of

schol-

ars

agree

that,

according

to

Foucault,

subjects

are

produced

by

power.7

6.

Foucault'scritics

include Charles

Taylor,

Foucault

on

Freedomand

Truth,

n

Couzens

Hoy,

Foucault,

A Critical

Reader, 69-102;

Edward

Said,

Foucault

and

the

Imagination

of

Power,

n

Couzens

Hoy,

ed.

Foucault,

A

Critical Reader:

149-156;

Nancy

Fraser,

Foucault

on

Modem Power:

EmpiricalInsights

and Normative

Confusion,

Praxis International

1981):

272-

87;

and Harold Weiss The

Genealogy

of Justice and

the

Justice

of

Genealogy: Chomsky

and

Said

vs.

Foucaultand

Bove,

Philosophy Today,

Spring

1989):

73-94. For

Foucault's

defenders,

consult

William

Connolly,

Taylor,

Foucault,

and

Otheress,

Political

Theory

13

(August

(1985):

365-76;

Paul

Patton,

Taylor

and

Foucault

on Power and

Freedom,

Political

Studies,

37

(1989):

260-76;

Thomas

Dumm,

Michel Foucault and

the Politics

of

Freedom

(Thousand

Oaks,

CA:

Sage,

1996);

Andrew

Lamb,

Freedom,

he

Self,

and Ethical Practice

According

to Michel

Foucault, InternationalPhilosophical Quarterly35 (December 1995): 449-67; and Brent L.

Picket,

Foucault

and

the Politics

of

Resistance,

Polity,

27

(Summer 1996):

445-66.

7. Charles

Taylor,

or

example, says

that Foucault

wants

to

explain

the

modem

notion of

individuality

as one of

[technology's] products,

in

Foucault on Freedom and

Truth,

75.

William

Connolly

states thatFoucault's

Power

produces

he

subject

hatbecomes not

a

mere

fic-

tion

of

theory

and

law,

but

a

real

artifact,

n

Taylor,

Foucault,

and

Otherness,

371. Leslie

Thiele

states that

in

Foucault's

opinion power

traversesand

produces subjects

n

Foucault's








398 Foucault's

Subject

The

scholarly

consensus that Foucault

regards

subjects

as an effect of

power

can be traced o his

rejection

of the

constituting ubject.

In the Archae-

ology of Knowledge,

he

tells his readers

hat

the

authority

of the creative

sub-

ject,

as

the

raison d'etre

of an

ceuvre

and the

principle

of its

unity,

is

quite

alien

to

[archaeology].

A

few

years

later,

n

a more

emphatic

tone,

he

states

that one

has

to

dispense

with

the

constituting

subject,

to

get

rid of the sub-

ject

itself,

that's to

say,

to arriveat

an

analysis

which can account for the con-

stitution of

the

subject

within a historical framework. 8Hubert

Dreyfus

and

Paul

Rabinow

point

out

that Foucault's

criticism of the

constitutingsubject

was

triggeredby

what he

believed to be

an

unworkableKantian dea

which

attributes

o man

sovereignty

in

spite

of his

being

enslaved.9

Foucault's disavowal of the

constitutingsubject

is

also

at

the

core of the

criticism

he directs

against

phenomenology

and existentialism.

Claiming

that

human

beings

are

always

thrown

nto an

existing

web of

constraints,

Foucault

denounces both

the

idea that the

subject

is the

sovereign

of

power

and the

notion that one

is

nothing

but what one

makes of oneself.

This

standpoint

has

been noticed

by

practically

all critics and has

frequently

been linked

to the

influence of structuralism.When

mentioning

the Foucauldian

ubject,'0

om-

mentators

often

evoke

passages

in which Foucault

suggests

that the

individ-

ual,

with

his

identity

and

characteristics,

s

the

product

of

a

relation

of

power

exercised over

bodies,

multiplicities,

movements,

desires,

forces ;

or Disci-

pline

'makes'

individuals;

t

is the

specific technique

of a

power

that

regards

individuals

both as

objects

and

instruments

f its exercise.

The Foucauldian

Triple

Murderand

the Modem

Development

of

Power

CanadianJournal

of

Political

Science

19

(June,

1986)

257. HaroldWeiss

points

out

that

Foucaultviews

the

subject

or 'human

nature'

as

constituted,

whether

discursively, nstitutionally,

r

autonomically,

n The

Genealogy

of

Jus-

tice

and the Justice of

Genealogy,

77. Paul

Patton

claims that it

has been

one of

Foucault'scon-

stanttheses since

Discipline

and

Punish,

that

power

creates

subjects,

n

Taylor

nd Foucaulton

Power

and

Freedom,

264. In

Michel Foucault and the Politics

of

Freedom,

Thomas Dumm

says

thatFoucault

exposes

the

techniques

hrough

which individualsare

produced,

1,

see

also

101.

8.

Michel

Foucault,

The

Archaeologyof Knowledge

(New

York:Barnesand

Noble,

1993),

139. Michel

Foucault,

Power/Knowledge,

ed. Colin

Gordon

(New

York:

Vintage,

1980),

117.

9.

Hubert L.

Dreyfus

and Paul

Rabinow,

Michel Foucault

Beyond

Structuralismand

Hermeneutics,

31,

suggest

that,

according

to

Foucault,

the Kantian

understanding

f the human

subject

creates three

major paradoxes:

Man

is

considered

1)

as

a fact

among

other facts

to

be

studied

empirically,

and

yet

as the transcendental onditionof the

possibility

of all

knowledge;

2)

as surrounded

by

what he cannot

get

clear about

(the

unthought)

and

yet

as

a

potentially

lucid

cogito, sourceof all intelligibility;and3) as theproductof a long historywhosebeginninghe can

never reach and

yet, paradoxically,

s

the

source

of

that

very

history.

10. One should note that often

Foucault does not

distinguish

clearly

between the

concepts

individualand

subject,

and uses them

alternately.

Unless

I

am

quoting

Foucaultor one

of his

com-

mentators will restrict

myself

to the term

subject.

11.

Foucault,

PowerlKnowledge,

74;

Michel

Foucault,

Discipline

and Punish

(New

York:

Vintage,

1979),

170.








Neve Gordon 399

subject

has

no

inherent

characteristics,

and

seems to

gain

meaning only

through

ts

relationships

with otherunitsin the structure. notherwords,sub-

jects acquire identity

as a

result of

the

interplay

of

power

relations

taking

place

within

the

system.

A

paradigmatic xample

of

this idea is

Foucault'streatment

f

the

panop-

ticon architectural

igure designed by Jeremy

Bentham.'2The

perpetual

gaze

of

an unverifiable observer situated inside the

panoptic

tower acts

directly

on

prisoners

without the

necessity

of

physical

instruments.The con-

straints

and norms which this

gaze projectsupon

the

person sitting

in a

cell,

permanently

visible,

render

a

prisoner

docile.'3

Moreover,

the

prisoner

nter-

nalizes the

disciplinary

requirements.

This

becomes

even

clearer

through

he

analysis

of the confession

practice,

n

which Foucault llustrates

hat not

only

exterior

relationships

mpose

an

objective

mold

upon

the

subject;

t is as

if

the

gaze

penetrates

he

subject, ensuring

that

the

soul conforms to the exist-

ing

rules,

codes,

and

mores,

which

are considered to

correspond

with

the

soul's essence.

In

The

Subject

and Power Foucaultstates that he has

studiedthe differ-

ent

dimensions of

power

in order

to understandhow the

subject

is

objec-

tivized. We read that the form

of

power applies

itself to

immediate

everyday

life which

categorizes

the

individual,

marks

him

by

his own

individuality,

attaches

him

to his

own

identity, mposes

a

law

of

truth

on

him

which

he

must

recognize

and which others have to

recognize

in

him. '4

This

idea

is

discussed

in

great

detail

in

Discipline

and

Punish,

where Fou-

cault

analyzes

not

only

surveillancebut

other

techniquesby

which the

subject

is

constituted-e.g.,

normalization nd examination. The

power

of

nor-

malizationdetermines he

acceptable

imits of

behavior

by demarcating

he

normal

and

respectable.

Normalization

imposes homogeneity

on the

sub-

ject both in thoughtandcomportment;but at the same time it individualizes

the

subject by making

t

possible

to measure

gaps,

to determine

evels,

to fix

specialties,

and to render the

differences

useful

by fitting

them one to

another.

Examination establishesover individualsa

visibility

through

which

one differentiates hem

and

judges

them.

It

enables the

teacher,

or

example,

to transmit

pecific

information

and

to transformhis

pupils

into a whole

field

of

knowledge,

while each individual receives

as

his

statushis own individ-

uality

thus

marking

him

as

a case.

Foucault

concludes

that a

new

modality

12.

Foucault,

Discipline

and

Punish,

200ff.

13. C. Colwell

points

out that

the

flaw of the

panopticon

model

is

that the

gaze

is central-

ized,

while in the ideal structure he

gaze

is

fragmented.

Power,

according

to

Foucault,

is

not

located

in

one identifiable

site. The Retreat of the

Subject

in

the Late

Foucault,

Philosophy

Today

Spring

1994):

56-69.

14.

Foucault,

The

Subject

and

Power,

212.








400 Foucault's

Subject

of

power

is introduced

hrough

discipline

whose

procedures

and

techniques

constitute he individualas an effect andobjectof power,as effect andobject

of

knowledge. '5

So it seems that

power

makes

human

beings

into

objects

by

giving

them

identities

to which a set

of

categories

are attached:

woman/passive/lack,

rim-

inal/illicit/dangerous,

nd sane/reason/normal.

he

categories

or

attributes

re

concatenated

to the

subject

and are conceived

of as

natural,

normal and/or

essential;

they

become the standards

f the

existing

social

practices.

The nor-

malization

of attributes

permeates

social

practices

via a

complex

networkof

power

relations,

which

in

his later

years

Foucaultalso described

via

the

term

games

of truth. Scientific

models,

medical and

legal

discourses,

economic

institutions,

etc. are constituted

by games

of truth.

It is

precisely

the vivid

images

which

depict

the

subject

as an effect that

have led

many

scholars

to recite

Foucault's claim that

power

produces

the

subject.

This claim

postulates

a

passive

subject

and accentuates the struc-

turalist

motif

in

Foucault's

hought.'6

Yet it raises

a

serious

question.

If

power

is the condition

of

possibility

of the

subject,

f

it

precedes

and creates

the

exis-

tence

of

subjects,

how can we

explain

the

escape

of a

subject

from a

given

system

of

powerrelations,

not

in

the sense

of mere

difference-being

a delin-

quent

or insane-but rather

opening

a new

direction

that

is not within the set

binaries

and definitions

integral

to that

system?

Thomas

Flynn

recounts the

occasion

on which Sartrereminded

he Marxisteconomists

that Flaubert

may

be a

petit

bourgeois,

but not all

petit

bourgeois

are Flauberts.'7

II. Foucault's

Notion of Freedom?

The

question

we need to address

is whether Foucault

actually

conceives the

subjectas an objectwhichpowerhasengendered.WilliamConnollyseems to

believe

that

he does. He

says:

Power

produces

the

subject

that becomes not

15.

Foucault,

Discipline

and

Punish, 184,

186,

192.

16. One

commentator

uggests

that,

according

to The Order

of Things,

the class of sen-

tences

that can be uttered

n

a

specified

time and

place

is not determined

by

the conscious wishes

of the

speakers.

The

possibility

of

being

true-or-falsedoes not reside

in

a

person's

desire

to

com-

municate.Hence the authorhimself is

irrelevant o the

analysis

of

the

conditions of

possibility.

Ian

Hacking,

The

Archaeology

of

Foucault,

n

Couzens

Hoy,

Foucault,

A

Critical

Reader,

32.

17. ThomasFlynn, Foucaultas Parrhesiast, n Bemauer et al., The Final Foucault, 114.

John

Rajchman,

Michel Foucault: The Freedom

of Philosophy

(New

York:Columbia

University

Press,

1985),

10,

points

out that Flaubert

perhaps

irst

exemplifies

the

'antibourgeois'

aims of

modernist

iterary

culture,

for he

envisaged

a

new

aristocracy

of letters

opposed

to the 'revolt of

the

masses' and to the idea of

progress,

to the

journalism,

sentimental

magazines,

and middle

brow culture

which was

ruining

the

language

and

keeping

the

great

writer from his

sovereignty

over it.








Neve Gordon401

a mere iction

of

theory

and

aw,

buta realartifact.

y imposing

anartifi-

cial

reality

n materialot

designed

o receive t,

power

reates rtifacts,.e.,

criminals,

omosexuals,cademics,

tc.This

material,

ccording

o

Connolly,

is

the

self

and

power

ransformsheself intoa

subject.

Theself is

not

designed

to receive

he artificial

eality

because t is

recalcitrant,

hich

explainswhy

power

s

often

an act of

imposition.'8 onnolly ersuasively

rgues

hat

Fou-

caultunderstands

he

subject

o be

embodied,

nd hat bodies nd

pleasures

canresist

power.'9

onetheless,

Connolly's uggestion

hat he self is a

recal-

citrantmaterial

eemsto be

foreign

o Foucault's

hought

nd, urthermore,

creates

problematic

ubject/self

inary.

More

mportantly,

onnolly's nalysis

does not seem

to

concurwith the

thoughts

oucault dvanced

uring

his ethical

eriod,

nddoes not enable

us

to

relate o

the issuesaddressed

uring

hose

years,particularly

he idea

of

care f

the

self. 20

y

leaving

he

notion

of recalcitrant

aterial

paque,

Con-

nolly'sdescription

oesnot

help

answer

he

basic

guidingquestion

osed

ear-

lier:how

does

Foucault's

nalysis

of

the

subject

differ roma

rigid

formof

structuralism

hereone can account

nly

for differenceswithin he

existing

system?

n

a late

nterview,

oucault

sserts:

In

my

books

have

really

ried

toanalyze hanges,

ot

n

order o find he materialausesbut o showall the

factors hat nteractednd hereactions

f

people.

believe

n the

freedom f

people.

To the same

situation,

eople

react

n

very

different

ways. 2'

Foucault's

uvre

s not

only

an

analysis

of

historical

hange,

as he

states

in

the

interview,

or it

has also

helped

reate he

conditions eeded

or

trans-

formation

nd

alteration.

n

this

way

he is

a

follower

of the

early

Marx

who

pointed

utthat

poverty

s

notnatural

it

is

not

a

resultof

scarcity

utof vio-

lenceand

violation)

nd

suggested

hat he mechanisms hich

produce

t can

andshould

be resisted.Foucault as also

attempted

o undermine

otionsof

necessityand naturalness hich havepermeatedur socialpractices.His

underlyingssumption,

s the

passage

bove

ndicates,

s that

people

are

ree.

This

point

has been discussed

by

several

commentators,

he

majority

f

whom, believe,

misconstrue

hatFoucaultmeanswhen

he

says

that he

sub-

ject

is free.

Thomas

Dumm,

or

example,

iscusses

Foucault'sdea

of

freedom xten-

sively.

He

uses

Isaiah

Berlin'sTwo

Concepts f Liberty

s a

point

of

reference,

18.

Connolly, Taylor,

Foucault,

and

Otherness,

371.

19. Michel Foucault,TheHistory of Sexuality,Vol.1 (New York:Vintage,1990), 157.

20.

In his recent book The Ethos

of

Pluralization

(Minnesota:

University

of Minnesota

Press,

1995),

Connolly promotes

an

ontological reading

of

Foucault

which

stresses

the notion of

care

. I take

up

this treatment ater.

21. Michel

Foucault, Truth,

Power,

Self: An

Interview

with Michel

Foucault,

n

Tech-

nologies of

the

Self,

ed. Luther

H.

Martin,

Huck

Gutman,

and Patrick

H.

Hutton

(Amherst:

The

University

of

Massachusetts

Press,

1988),

14.








402 Foucault's

Subject

to which he contrasts and

opposes

Foucault's notion

of

freedom.22Dumm

begins by underscoring

he differences between Berlin and Foucault

regard-

ing

their

conception

of

space,

and its relation

to

freedom.

Dumm

points

out

that Berlin starts rom the liberalnotion of neutral

pace

which can be divided

into

public

and

private,

and from the idea that human

beings embody

a nat-

ural 'status.

Berlin then cultivates a notion of

normalcy

vis-d-vis

neutral

space

and

the

natural tatus of

humanity.

Foucault,

Dumm

says,

exposes

the

contingent

and

open

character

of

both

agents

and

the

space they

inhabit,

while

showing

how the

quality

of

imagination

n

a

given society

is

intimately

related

to the external

organization

of that

society's space. 23 agree

with

Dumm's

critique

of Berlin and

appreciate

his

attempt

o

highlight

Foucault's

notion

of

space.

Nonetheless,

I

find his

interpretation

f Foucault's

freedom

misleading

and

ultimately

flawed.

Dumm

tells

his

readers

hat

Discipline

and

Punish is

at

root

a book about

the

practices

of

freedom and

the

conditions that bear

upon

those

practices

n

the

moder

era

... a book

that sets an

agenda

for

uncovering

not

only

the

terms of

our

imprisonment

but

the

conditions

of

our

freedom

(emphasis

added).

Quoting

Foucault,

he

claims

that

mechanisms

of

power

create nor-

malization, 24

ut

suggests

that

disciplinary

order

is, nonetheless, always

incomplete.

Precisely

because

discipline

is

always incomplete

the existence of

freedom is not

in

question

(an

idea reminiscent of Berlin's

negative

free-

dom).25

or

Dumm,

then,

freedom is

dependent

on

the

incompleteness

of dis-

cipline,

and identified with the lack of

discipline.26

Paul

Patton,

who also

analyzes

Foucault vis-a-vis

Berlin,

provides

the

readerwith a

much

more nuanced

argument.

He

avers that it is insufficient

o

represent

Foucault's

work as

concerned with

expanding

the

sphere

of

nega-

tive

freedom

open

to

individuals ;

ather

t is

directedat

enlarging

a

sphere

of

positivefreedom.Positive freedom attainsa differentmeaning n thiscontext,

for

Patton

equates positive

freedom with the existence

of a human

capacity

22. Two

Concepts

of

Liberty,

n

Isaiah

Berlin,

Four

Essays

on

Liberty

(Oxford:

Oxford

University

Press,

1969),

118-72.

23.

Dumm,

Michel

Foucault and the Politics

of

Freedom,

41.

24.

Dumm,

Michel Foucault and the

Politics

of

Freedom,78,

101-02.

25.

Dumm,

Michel

Foucault and the Politics

of

Freedom,

108.

26. For

example,

Dumm

suggests

that

according

o

society

the

delinquent

comes

close

to

being

the

emblematic

igure

of freedom which

puts

he

most elemental

aspect

of freedomon

the

marginsof a socialorder hatclaims freedomas its mostimportantalue. This,he says,contributes

to

an

impoverished olitical imagination

oncerning

reedom or it

marginalizes

nd

segregates

the most

free elements

n

society

(Michel

Foucault and the

Politics

of

Freedom,

111-112).

Rajch-

man,

who also

wrote

on this

issue,

disagrees.

He

says:

Foucault dvancesa new

ethic:not the ethic

of

transgression,

ut the

ethic

of

constant

disengagement

rom

constituted orms of

experience,

of

freeing

oneself for the

inventionsof new forms of life

(Michel

Foucault: The

Freedom

of

Philos-

ophy,

37).

The subtle

differencebetween the two

commentators

s,

of

course,

crucial.








Neve Gordon

403

for active self

transformation

nd

gives

it

the name

power

to.

Contrary

o

Dumm,

Pattonbelieves that

power

to is the condition of

possibility

of dis-

cipline,

which

he

regards

as

a

specific

form of

power

over,

the

power

that

confines and

produces

human

beings.

Power to is later

renamed

force,

meaning

the

capacity

to

act and

be acted

upon.

While

I

willingly

follow

Patton's

interpretation

his

far,

his notion

that

force,

power

to,

or

posi-

tive freedom can be increased eads me to

suspect

thathe too

conceives free-

dom as

a human

property.27

Both commentators

make

interesting

observations,

yet

fail to

disclose the

fundamentaldifferencebetween

Foucault

and

Berlin. Unlike

Foucault,

Berlin

treatsfreedom

as a

subject's

will,

that

is,

a

property

which can

either

be

con-

strained

negative

freedom)

or

amplified (positive

freedom).28

o make

sense

of Foucault's

ater

writings,

the

period

Davidson calls

ethics,

t

is advanta-

geous

to read Foucault

through

a

Heideggerian,29

nd to a lesser

extent

Sar-

27.

Patton,

Taylor

and Foucault

on Power and

Freedom,

266,

276.

28.

Foucault would have

probably

said that

by

using

the word

liberty

n

the

title

of

both

the

chapter

and the

book,

Berlin assumes

some kind of essential naturewhich

needs

to

be liber-

ated.

Foucault,

The Ethics

of the

Care of the Self as a Practice

of

Freedom,

n

Berauer

et

al.,

Final

Foucault,

2-3.

29.

I

do not claim that

Foucault

became

a

Heideggerian

n his final

years;

he had his own

agenda,

nsights

and innovations.

However,

I do

think

that

reading

Foucault's ater

work

through

Heidegger

helps

make his claims

more

coherent.One should

note that in his last interview Fou-

cault claimed:

For me

Heidegger

has

always

been the essential

philosopher.

A

number

of

sen-

tences later

he adds:

My

entire

philosophical development

was

determined

by

my reading

of

Heidegger.

I

nevertheless

recognized

that

Nietzsche

outweighed

him

(interview

with

Foucault

conducted

by

Gilles Barbedette

and Andre Scala

in

Michel

Foucault,

Michel Foucault:

Politics,

Philosophy,

Culture,

ed. Lawrence

D.

Kritzman

New

York:

Routledge,

1990],

250).

There is a

considerable

literature

discussing

the relation between

Foucault's and

Heidegger's

work. Neil

Levy points out that most of this literature ocuses on Foucault'scritiqueof Heideggerin The

Order

of

Things,

and

his

relationship

o the

early

Heidegger

in The

Prehistory

of

Archaeology:

Heidegger

and the

Early

Foucault,

Journal

of

the British

Society

or Phenomenology,

27,

(May

1996),

158. Some claim that

the

relationship

between Foucault

and

Heidegger

is

lax,

most

notably

Jacques

Derrida,

who

accuses Foucaultof

having

never

confronted

[Heidegger]

and,

if

one

may say

so,

never

explained

himself

on his relation o

him,

n

Desistence,

which

appeared

in P.

Lacoue-Labarthe,

ypography:

Mimesis,

Philosophy,

Politics

(Cambridge:

HarvardUniver-

sity

Press,

1989),

17;

quoted

from

Levy,

The

Prehistory

of

Archaeology:

Heidegger

and the

Early

Foucault.

Paul Rabinow

asserts that

Heidegger

is

concerned

with

truthas

being

and truth

as

destiny,

while Foucault

is

concerned

with truth

as techne

and truthas

presence,

in

Moder

and countermoder:

Ethos

and

epoch

in

Heidegger

and

Foucault,

n The

CambridgeCompanion

to Foucault,ed. GaryGutting Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress, 1994).Onthe other side

of

this

debate

are

scholars like

Rajchman

who claims

that

Heidegger

is

surely

the

central

philo-

sophical

influence

on

Foucault,

in

Michel Foucault:

The Freedom

of

Philosophy,

18. In the

aforementioned

article

Neil

Levy

illustrates hat Foucault's

criticism

of

objectification

and sub-

jectification

is rooted

in

his

reading

of

Heidegger,

and Hubert

Dreyfus

discusses

the

relationship

between

Heidegger's Being

and

Foucault's

power,

in

Being

and Power:

Heidegger

and

Fou-

cault,

InternationalJournal

of

Philosophical

Studies,

4

(1996):

1-16.








404

Foucault's

ubject

trian,

ens.

Foucault,

believe,

particularly

n

his

later

writings,

oesnot

con-

ceivefreedom sapropertyhatcanbeexpropriatedromhuman eings,but

rather

s the

condition f

possibility

f

human

eings.

III. Foucault'sFreedom:

An

Ontological

Reading

Examining

he similarities

etween he Foucauldian

ubject

and

a few

of

Sartre's

ntologicalnsightsproveshelpful.

n

his

famous ecture

Existential-

ism

and

Humanism,

artre

points

out

that

unlike

other

beings-in-the-world

whoseessenceprecedesheirexistence, he existenceof humanbeingspre-

cedes heir

ssence.

The

existence

f

a

table

s

preceded y

theform

and

qual-

ity

which

made ts

production

nddefinition

ossible.

The

essenceof

human

beings,

on the other

hand,

s

dependent

n

their

existence: man

irstof

all

exists,

encounters

imself,

urges

up

in

the

world-and defines

himself

after-

wards. 30

ince existence

precedes

ssence,

one

cannot

xplain

one's

action

by referring

o some

dea

of

human

ature.

Man,

according

o

Sartre,

s free-

dom. Sartre

goes

on to

explain

hat because

human

beings

do not

have

a

nature ach

person

s what

he

makesof

him/herself.

artre

s

aware f

exter-

nalandinternal onstraints n thesubject, et he thinks hatultimatelyhe

subject

as

the

capacity

o

overcomehemand ive

authentically,

.e.,

to

relate

to

him/herself

s

free.

Foucault, believe,

would

subscribe

o the

existence

recedes

ssence

formula

with

two

majorqualifications.

irst,

Foucault

would

reject

Sartre's

claim hat

humans re

responsible

or

what

hey

are.3' he

second,

and

surely

more

mportant

ualification,

elates o the status

r

notionof

existence.We

have

seen

thatFoucault elieves

hathuman

eings

are

ree.Yet

Foucault,

n

my

opinion,

wouldattribute

different enseto

freedom.While

Sartre

ays

that humanexistence s freedom,Foucault, s I will explainmomentarily,

seems

to

consider

reedom o

be the

condition f

possibility

f

human

xis-

tence.

The

majordisagreement

etween

Foucault nd

Sartre s

ultimately

related o their

different

onceptions

f

Being,

a

topic

which s

beyond

he

scope

of

this

paper.32

ere t is

sufficiento

say

that

Foucault's

deas

appear

o

correlate

morewith

Heidegger's

osition

hanwith

Sartre's.

Heidegger

uggests

hat

human

eings

are

hrown

ntothe

world

and hat

30. Jean-PaulSartre,Existentialism& Humanism London:EyreMethuenLtd., 1973), 28.

31.

Sartre,

Existentialism

&

Humanism,

29

32. In

his

critique

of

Sartre,

Heidegger

claims that

a reversal

of the

relationbetween

essence

and

existence still

conceives

being

in

its

traditional

ense,

as

presence.

Heidegger

wants

to

dis-

tinguish

between

beings

as

presence

and

Being.

See Martin

Heidegger,

Letter

on

Humanism,

in

Martin

Heidegger,

Basic

Writings,

ed. David Farrell Krell

(San

Francisco:

Harper

Collins,

1993),

213-66.








Neve

Gordon 405

their condition

of

possibility

is

freedom.

Freedom s used here

in the

ontolog-

ical sense and not as free will. In TheQuestion

Concerning

Technology,

Hei-

degger says

that the essence

of

freedom

is

originally

not connected

with the

will or even

with

the

causality

of human

willing. 33Heidegger

argues

that the

essence

of

the

being-in-itself

of all

beings

is

freedom, 34

nd that freedom

is

actualized

through

he

engagement

in the disclosure

of

beings;

man

should

be

understood,

within

the

question

of

being,

as

the

site

which

being

requires

in order to

disclose

itself. '

In

his discussion

on

Schelling's

Treatise

on the

Essence

of

Human

Freedom,

Heidegger

writes:

Schellingfinds it remarkablehatKant realizedin his practicalphiloso-

phy

that

the essence

of the

ego

is

freedom

and

thus

determined

he

essence

of this

being

in itself

in

its

own

being,

but

then declared

on

top

of

this in the

Critiqueof

Pure

Reason that

the essence

of

the

thing-in-

itself is

unknowable.

Only

one

step

was

necessary,

to

carry

over

the

insight

about

man's

being-in-itself

to the

being-in-itself

of

all

beings

in

general

and thus

to make

freedom

into a

positive

and

completely

uni-

versal

determination

f the

in-itself'

in

general.36

Elsewhere Heidegger explains that Freedom s the comprehensiveand

pervasive

dimension

of

being

in whose ambiance

man

becomes

man

in

the

first

place.

This means: the

essence

of man

is

grounded

n

freedom;

freedom

itself,

however,

is

a

category

transcending

human

Dasein,

that

is,

a

category

of

authentic

being

as such.

In

Schelling's

Treatise

Heidegger

stresses

that

ontological

freedom

is not

freedom

as a

property

of

man;

but the

reverse:

man

as

the

possibility

of

freedom.

Human

freedom

is a freedom

which

invades

and

sustains

man,

thereby

rendering

man

possible. 3

Heidegger,

Fred

Dallmayr

explains,

conceives

freedom

of

will to be based

on human

Dasein

construedas freedomor a mode of

'being

free', andnot vice versa.Viewed as

Dasein's

ontological

core,

'being

free'

is

neither

imposed

on

as an external

fate

or

destiny,

nor

can it

arbitrarily

e

chosen

or discarded. 38

As is all

too

evident,

the

Foucauldian

ubject

s

a

being-in-the-world,

nd

33. Martin

eidegger,

The

Question

oncerning

echnology,

n

Krell,

Basic

Writings,

30.

34. Martin

Heidegger,

Schelling's

Treatise

on the

Essence

of

Human

Freedom,

trans. Joan

Stambaugh

Athens:University

f

Ohio

Press,

1985),

93.

35. Martin

Heidegger,

nIntroduction

o

Metaphysics,

rans.

Ralph

Manheim

New

Haven:

YaleUniversity ress,1987),205.

36.

Heidegger,

Schelling's

Treatise

on

the

Essence

of

Human

Freedom,

93.

37. Martin

Heidegger,

Wesen

der menschlichen

Freiheit:

Einleitung

in die

Philosophie,

(Gesamtausgabe

ol.

31),

ed. Hartmut

ietjen

Frankfurt-Main:

lostermann,

982),

303.

This

passage

s

quoted

n Fred

Dallmayr,

olis

and

Praxis

Cambridge,

A:

MIT

Press,

1984),

121.

Heidegger,

Schelling's

Treatiseon

the

Essence

of

Human

Freedom,9,

translation

lightly

altered.

38.

Dallmayr,

Polis

and

Praxis,

114.








406

Foucault's

ubject

not

an autonomous

ational

eing

set

against

he world

as

Berlin

would

have

us think.Moreover, oucault'saterworkrevealsanunderstandingf free-

dom

similar o

Heidegger's.

woconditions

f

possibility

re

necessary,

ou-

cault

says,

for a

powerrelationship

o exist: That he 'other'

the

one

over

whom

power

s

exercised)

be

thoroughly

ecognized

nd maintainedo

the

very

end as a

person

who

acts;

and

hat,

acedwitha

relationship

f

power,

whole field of

responses,

eactions, esults,

and

possible

nventions

may

be

opened.

ower s characterizeds an action

whichmodifies he actions

of

others,

nd is exercised

nly

over

ree

subjects,

nd

only

insofar s

they

are

free. A

few

pages

ater,

he

adds:

For,

f it is true

hatat

the

heart

of

power

relations ndas a

permanent

ondition f theirexistence here s aninsubor-

dination nd

a certain ssential

bstinacy

n

the

part

of the

principles

f

free-

dom,

hen here s no

possibility

f

power

without hemeansof

escape

or

pos-

sible

flight. 39

hus,

t

seems

that reedom

s the

condition

f

possibility

f

power.

Power

does not act on

objects

ike

chairs,

but

only

on

human

eings,

and

only

insofar s theircondition

f

possibility

s

freedom.

In

the

final

years

of

his

life,

Foucault

eiteratedhat the

possibility

of

escape

from

the constraints f

power

s

power's

condition or

existence.

n

one of his

last

interviews,

e

says:

One

must

observealso that

here

cannot

be relations f

power

unless he

subject

s

free....

[I]n

he

relations f

power,

there

s

necessarily

he

possibility

f

resistance,

or if

therewereno

possibil-

ity

of

resistance-of violent

resistance,

f

escape,

of

ruse,

of

strategies

hat

reverse he

situation-therewould

be no relations

f

power. 40

o one

could

say

that he

subject,

onstrued

s thatwhose

condition f

possibility

s

free-

dom,

s the

condition

f

possibility

f

power.

This

amountso a new

reading

of the

earlier

ssumption

hat

power

produces

ubjects.

Following

uch a

line

of

thinking

few

scholarshave claimed

hatthe

laterFoucault eversedhis conception f the subject, ransformingt, as it

were,

rom

absolute

assivity

o

absolute

ctivity.4'

f

one

accepts

hata

rever-

39.

Foucault,

The

Subject

and

Power, 220, 221,

225.

Already

n

The

History of

Sexuality,

Vol.

1,

he

suggests

that

wherethere is

power,

there is

resistance.

See 95.

40.

Foucault,

The Ethics

of

the

Care of the Self

as a

Practiceof

Freedom,

n

Bernauer t

al.,

Final

Foucault,

12.

41.

Jiirgen

Habermasmakes

a

similar claim in his

essay

Taking

Aim

at the

Heart of the

Present,

in

Couzens

Hoy,

ed.

Foucault a Critical

Reader,

103-08.

A

number

of

years

later

Thomas

McCarthy

eaches the

same

conclusion. He

says:

Viewed from the

perspective

of criti-

cal social theory,Foucault'slaterframeworkof interpretationies in the oppositeextreme from

his earlier

social

ontology

of

power.

Then

everything

was

a

function of

context,

of

impersonal

forces and

fields,

from

which there

was

no

escape-the

end

of

man.

Now,

the focus is

on those

'intentionaland

voluntary

actions

by

which men not

only

set

themselves rules of conduct

but

also

seek to

transform

hemselves .. .

and to

make their life

into an

oeuvre -with

scant

regard

for

social,

political

and

economic context. In

The

Critique

of

Impure

Reason,

Foucault and

the

Frankfurt

chool,

463.








Neve Gordon

407

sal

actually

occurred,

one

must conclude that

an

irreconcilable issure exists

between the first two

periods

in Foucault'soeuvreandthe last. To reveal the

shortcoming

of such an

interpretation,

while

striving

o

attaina better

grasp

of

Foucault's

position

concerning

freedom and the

subject,

I

turn

to

other works

he

produced

during

his last

period.

In The Use

of

Pleasure,

the

Second Volume

of

The

History of

Sexuality,

Foucault discloses similarities between

antiquity

and

Christianityregarding

which sexual

activity

was sanctioned and

prohibited,

while

arguing

that the

Greeks

recognized

and

organized sexuality differently.Already

in

classical

Greek

thought

sexual

practices

were considered

to be

part

of

an

ethical

domain.

This

ethical

domain, however,

was not

governed by

rules or univer-

sal

interdictions

regarding

the

use

of

pleasure

as it

subsequently

did in the

Christian

morality

of sexual

behavior.

Nor did

the

Greeks think that

desires

lay

hidden

in

the

mysteries

of the heart

waiting

to be

deciphered.Antiq-

uity's

ethical domain

of

pleasure

was not determined

by

codes and/or a

hermeneutical

approach

which

assumes

a well

defined

yet

concealed mean-

ing,

essence,

or

nature,

that

needs

to be

revealed.

Rather,

sexual moderation

was considered

to

be

an exercise of freedom and

individualswere

expected

to

master themselves accordingto need, time, and status, so as to create and

recreatethe

rule of the self over self.

When

Foucault tells us that

mastering

the use

of

pleasure

was

characterized s an

active

freedom,

a freedom which

was indissociable

from a

structural, nstrumental,

nd

ontological

relation to

truth,

we notice

that

his

assumptions

are

beginning

to

change-the

struc-

ture/agency

relationship

s

brought

o the fore and

renegotiated.42

This

change,

however,

does not constitute a reversal of his

earlier

posi-

tion;

it is an elaboration.

n a seminar

given

at

the

University

of

Vermont,

Fou-

cault

begins

to

develop

what

he

called the

technology

of the

self,

suggesting

that in his earlierworks he had over-emphasized he technology of domina-

tion

and

power.

In his

analysis

of

technologies

of

the

self,

he finds that

the

notion

of care

of the

self,

which had been

prominent

n

antiquity,

had been

obscured

by

the

Delphic

principle

know

thyself.

Foucault claims

that

know

thyself'

became

dominant for two

major

reasons.

On

the

one

hand,

our

morality,

a

morality

of

asceticism,

insists

that the self is

that

which

one

can

reject,

while on the other

hand,

since

Descartes,

philosophers

have con-

sidered

the

thinking subject

to be the

cornerstone

of

epistemology,

and

con-

sequently emphasized

the

scrutiny

of

the

self.

Both observationsare

firmly

linked to his priorwork. As I have already suggested, Foucaultargues that

human

beings

do

not

have

a nature that can be

rejected,

liberated,

or

renounced

(as

some

Christian

teachings

would

have

us

think).

At the

same

42.

Foucault,

The

History

of Sexuality,

Vol.

2,

93.








408 Foucault's

ubject

time,

as

mentioned t the

outset,

he claims hat he self cannotbe simultane-

ouslythe transcendentalondition f possibility f knowledge ndanobject

of

empirical

nquiry.

The dominance f know

hyself'

is

an

inversion f the

hierarchy

f

the

two

principles

f

antiquity,

e

says,

and

setsout o disclose he ancient nder-

standing

of

taking

care

of

the self.

He

turns to Plato's

Alcibiades

and

Socrates's

Apology

and

finds

he notion hat o takecareof the

self,

one

has

to

takecareof one's

activities,

nd

not

over

the

soul-as-substance.oucault

takes

greatpains

o

emphasize

hatcareof the self

is

not a turn nsideone's

self,

it is

by

no

means

a

call for

quietism,

or if

it is a call for

anything

t

is a

call foraction.

Taking

areofone's

self,

as

opposed

o know

hyself,

ccen-

tuates

an

ontological

otion

of

freedom,

where

reedom

s not

a

property

f

the self.

Only

because

areof

one's

self assumes hat reedoms the

condition

of

possibility

f

being

human,

ndnothuman

will,

can t

coherently

tress he

ideaof

improving

ne's

self

and

ranscending

ne's

own limits.43

This is the

major

heme

n

the

third

volumeof

The

History

f Sexuality,

which s titledTheCare

of

the

Self.

Foucault

oints

outthat

n

Hellenistic nd

Roman

hought

ttentiveness

o one's

self

was

problematized

ven further.

Whilefor

the

Greeks he care

of the self

was

an

ethics hat

pertained

o free

menand

was

firmly

inked

o their tatus

n

society,

n

these ater ras hecare

of the self could

no

longer

accord

with

one's status.Foucault

uotes

Seneca44

saying

hat

manneeds

o

seek

his

own

soul,

a soul that s

upright,

ood,

and

great.

What

lse,

Seneca

says,

should

you

call such

a

soul

than

a

god

dwelling

as

a

guest

in

a

human

body.

A

soul like this

may

descend

nto a

Roman

night ust

as

well

as into

a

freedman's

onor

a slave. 45oucault on-

43.

Foucault,

Technologies

f the

Self,

n Martin

t

al.,

Technologiesf

the

Self,

22,

25.

44. It is

interesting

o notethat

Heidegger

mentions eneca n his

discussion

f

the onto-

logical

history

f care.He

quotes

Seneca

aying

hat he

good

of

human

eings

s fulfilled

by

care.

Yet

Heidegger

lso asserts hat

f

onewere o constructhe

expression

care or oneself'

...

this

wouldbe a

tautology.

are,

e

says,

cannot

tand orsome

special

ttitudeowardshe

Self.

Unfortunately,

cannot,

n

this

context,

discuss he

difference etween

Heidegger's

nd

Foucault's otions f care.Martin

Heidegger,

eing

and

Time

Oxford:

asil

Blackwell,

988),

243

and

237,

respectively.

45. Foucault's iscussion f Seneca s

problematic.

eneca

sks

us

to seek

our

soul,

a

soul

that

s

upright, ood

and

great.

Yet,

we haveseen hat

Foucault

ejects

he

notion hat

aking

are

of

theself amountso

taking

are

of

one's

soul,

particularly

soul-as-substance.

nother,

erhaps

greater, roblem

s

that n his

discussion

oncerning

hecareof the self

Foucault

ses

the

Stoics

ashismajoreference.Hannah rendt aspointed utthatStoicism epresentsanescape rom

theworld nto

he

self

which,

t is

hoped,

will be

able o sustaintself

n

sovereign

ndependence

of

the

outsideworld

n

Men nDarkTimes

San

Diego:

Harcourt

race,

993),

9. While

Arendt's

assessment f Stoicism

s

probably

ver-conclusive,

t wouldhavebeen

beneficial

f

Foucault,

who

rejects uietism

r

any

ormof

escapism,

adaddressedhis

disturbingspect

f

Stoicism.

One

should, owever,

ememberhat

The

Care

of

the

Self

was

part

of

a

work

n

progress

utoff

by

Foucault's

remature

eath.








Neve Gordon409

cludes

that

during

his

period

he exercise

of

power

was

relativized

n

two

ways.

First,

while

political

activity

was considered life commitment,twas

no

longer

obvious

hat

one

had o

accept

his

responsibility

s

following

rom

the

particular

tatus

ne

heldat birth-one's

place

n the social

structure

as

no

longer

considered

o be

a causal

orce

eaving

no room

or recourse.

We

notice

that,

according

o Foucault's

eading,

he

subject

s

not an effect

of

external

onstraints,

uthas

the

opportunity

o act and

f needbe

defy

these

constraints.

econd,

and

more

mportant

n

this

context,

he Hellenistic

nd

Roman

hinkers

ecognized

hatone exercises

power

already

withinan exist-

ing

fieldof

complex

elations,

whichentails

hat

one s

simultaneouslylways

ruler

and

ruled.

Artistides,

oucault

ays,

sees

the

principle

f

good

govern-

ment

in

he

fact

thata man

s one

and he

otherat

the same

ime,

hrough

n

interplay

f directions

ent and

received,

of

checks,

of

appeals,

f

decisions

taken. 46

his,

I

think,

s

exactly

he balance

Foucault

was

looking

or

in

the

last

years

of his

life,

and

I will discuss

ts

implications

n the finalsection.

In

a

late

nterview,

oucault

haracterizes

he care

of theself

as thedelib-

erate

practice

f

freedom.Care

of

the self

means irst

and oremost

elating

o

one'sself

as a

non-slave,

s

free,

which,

n

turn,

s a

care or

theother.

To

us-

tifythe atter laim,FoucaultmentionsheGreeks'onceptionf thetyrant s

a

person

who s evil towards

is

subjects

ecause

e is a

slave o

his

appetites;

his immoral

omportment

owards thers

s a

consequence

f

neglecting

elf

care.47

n

another

nterview

romthe same

period,

Foucault

sserts

hat

the

care

of the

self is the

elaboration

f one's

ife as a

personal

work

of art. '4

Sartre,

owards

he

endof Existentialism

nd

Humanism,

trives

o answer

the

accusation

hatexistentialism

mounts

o

nihilismand

voluntarism.

The

moral

hoice,

he

says,

is

comparable

o the construction

f a

workof art.

There s

no a

priori

code or

rule

whichhuman

beings

must

ollow,

there

s

no pre-definedictureor [humans]o make. 49artrehas oneguidelineo

offer based

on

his

conception

f

human

ontology:

humans hould

relate

o

themselves

and others

as

free. This

advice,

ncluding

he

metaphor

f the

workof

art,

esembles

oucault's

nderstanding

f

theethic

of the

careof

the

self

as a

practice

f

freedom.

Thisconclusion

oesnot ndicate

hat

n his later

years

Foucault

spoused

a

constituting

ubject,

sovereign.

Consider

or a

moment

he ntroduction

f

the second

volume

of the

History

f

Sexuality,

where

Foucault

xplains

why

the

publication

f the

book

was

delayed.

The initial

plan

was

to

publish

ix

46. Michel

Foucault,

he

History

f

Sexuality,

ol.

(New

York:

Vintage,

990),

86,

87-88.

47.

Foucault,

The

Ethics f theCare

of the

Self as a Practice

f

Freedom,

n

Bernauer

t

al.,

Final

Foucault,

10-14. See also

Foucault,

The

History of

Sexuality,

Vol.

2,

80-81.

48.

Foucault,

An

Aesthetics

f

Existence,

n

Kritzman,

olitics,

Philosophy,

ulture,

9.

49.

Sartre,

Existentialism

&

Humanism,

48-49.








410

Foucault's

Subject

volumes

which

dealt with

the

history

of

the

experience

of

sexuality,

where

experience

is understoodas the correlationbetween fields of

knowledge,

types

of

normativity,

and forms of

subjectivity

n a

particular

ulture.

After

completing

the

first

volume,

Foucaultrealizedthat

n

order o

accomplish

this

objective,

he

had to

analyze

the

interrelations

along

the

three axes that con-

stitute

it:

1)

the

formations

of

sciences

(savoirs)

that refer

to

it,

2)

the

sys-

tems of

power

that

regulate

its

practice,

3)

the

forms

within

which

individu-

als are

able,

are

obliged,

to

recognize

themselves

as

subjects

of this

sexuality.

Foucault

ells

the reader hathe

had

mastered

he tools to

analyze

the first

two

axes

in his earlier

work,

and that the

delay

occurredbecause

he had to

under-

take a

shift

so he

could understand

he third.

I

felt

obliged,

he

says,

to

study

the

games

of truth

n

the

relationship

of

self with self

and the

forming

of oneself

as a

subject, taking

as

my

domain

of

referenceand

field of

investi-

gation

what

might

be called 'the

history

of

desiring

man. '50

Along

the same

lines,

Foucault

answers an

interviewer who asks him

whether

in

the

second and third

volumes of the

History of Sexuality

he had

changed

direction.

Yes,

I

have

changed

direction.When I

was

dealing

with

madness

I

set

out from

the

problem

hat it

may

have constituted n

a

certain

social,

political,

and

epistemological

context: the

problem

that madness

poses

for others.

[In

the

History of

Sexuality,

volumes two

and

three]

I

set out

from the

problem

hat sexual

behavior

might pose

for

individuals

hem-

selves

(or

at least

to men

in

Antiquity).

In the

first

case,

I

had

to

find out

how madmen

were

controlled ;

n

the

second,

how

one controls ne-

self ... Here

I

would

like

to show how self

control is

integrated

nto

the

practice

of

controlling

others.

They

are,

in

short,

two

opposite

ways

of

approaching

he same

question:

how

is

an

experience

ormed

in

which the

relationship

to

oneself

and the

relationship

to

others

are

linked

together.

Foucault

conceived his later

work

not as

a

reversalor

rejection

of an

ear-

lier

position,

but

as an

attempt

o

approach

he

same

problematic

n

a new

and

refreshing

manner.To

be

sure,

it

was a

change

in

direction,

a

shift

which

inevitably

became a

self-critique

of

preceding

work.

Yet he

did

not

abandon

the

notion

of

power,

the idea

that humans

are

always

within

a

web of

con-

straints,

but

rather

trove

to

enrich and

go beyond

his

earlierwork

in

orderto

solve some of

the

problems

arising

from

it. Foucault ells us

that

accentuating

the

care

of

the

self

complements

his

previous

endeavors. His late

work

is,

I

believe,

an

attempt

o rethink

and

consequently

resituate he

subject

vis-d-vis

50.

Foucault,

The

History of

Sexuality,

Vol.

2,

5-6.








Neve Gordon

411

power

relations,which,

in

turn,

s

a

rethinking

of

the

capacity

of

power

itself.

So while I

disagree

with the so-called reversal

claim,

I also think that it is

erroneous

to

suggest

that Foucault

considers the

subject

to

be an

artifact

of

power.

Already

in

Discipline

and Punish

he

insinuates that

discipline

is

dependent

on

indiscipline,

while

in The

History of

Sexuality

VolumeOne he

suggests

that

power

is

dependent

on resistance.5

Considering

that the two

subsequent

volumes

of

The

History

of Sexuality

and other

late

writings

com-

plement

Foucault'searlier

work,

and

taking

into account that

during

the

later

period

there is a

strong

accent

on

agency

and that

he

states

clearly

that

power

is

dependent

on

freedom,

it does not make sense to continue

reading

Foucault

as

if he

considers the

subject

as

a mere effect.

A

coherentaccount of Foucault

must thereforemake room

for

both the notion

of

power

and a certain

degree

of

agency.

The

ontological reading

presented

here

can

reveal,

I

believe,

the

manner

by

which some kind of

balance between the two

may

be attained.

IV.

Power

and

Agency

The late Foucault's

emphasis

of care

alongside

his effort to resituate

agency

vis-a-vis power, point to a tangible, and to my mind worthy,ethical stance

which strives to

identify

a

path

between

the

passivity

characteristicof

rigid

structuralismand the

self-creating

subject. By accentuating

care,

Foucault

enables the

subject

to

assume

responsibility

without

violating

the other's

integrity.

Interestingly,

William

Connolly

reaches

a

similar conclusion.

He

says

that the ethic of

care

acknowledges

he need

to limit its own

self-asser-

tion so that otherfaiths

can

count

for

something

oo.

While I

appreciate

Con-

nolly's

endeavor

to articulatean ethics

that

promotes respect

for the

other,

I

believe

that he bases Foucault's

ethics of

care

on a mistaken

ontological

read-

ing. Connollyclaims thataccording o Foucault Nothing s fundamental....

Thereforealmost

everything

counts for

something.

This

reading,

as

I

understand

t,

is based on Foucault's insistence that

power

is not

merely

a

negative,

but a

constitutive

orce. Wemust

cease

once

and for

all,

he tells

us,

to

describe

the

effects

of

power

in

negative

terms: t

'excludes',

it

'represses',

it

'censors',

it

'abstracts',

t

'masks',

it

'conceals'.

In

fact,

power

produces;

it

produces

reality;

it

produces

domains of

objects

and rituals

of truth.The individual and

the

knowledge

that

may

be

gained

of

him

belong

to

this

production. 3

While

this

conception

of

power

indeed

51.

Foucault,

Discipline

and

Punish, 290;

Foucault,

The

History of

Sexuality,

Vol.

1,

95.

52.

Connolly,

The

Ethos

of

Pluralization,

40.

The

claim that

nothing

s fundamental

s

taken

directly

from

Foucault,

who in an interviewcalled

Space,

Knowledge,

and

Power,

states:

Nothing

is

fundamental.

That is what

is

interesting

n

the

analysis

of

society

...

In The Fou-

cault

Reader,

ed,

Paul Rabinow

(New

York:

Pantheon,

1984),

247.

53.

Foucault,

Discipline

and

Punish,

194.








412

Foucault's

Subject

entails

that

nothing

is

fundamental,

t

deemphasizes

the

ontological perspec-

tive which

highlights

the subject's agency and the idea that freedom is the

condition

of

possibility

of

power.

By

contrast,

I

have

argued

hat

Foucault's

notion of care of

the self means

relating

to oneself as

free,

and

it is

precisely

this

way

of

relating

to

one's self

-

not

merely

a

notion that

nothing

is

fundamental-which

spurs

a care

for

the other.

Foucault's

example

of the

tyrant

who is a slave

to his

appetites

and

therefore

does

not care for

others is

persuasive.

This

reading

takes

into con-

sideration

Foucault's

writing

from the late

1970s,

first,

by pointing

to

the con-

dition

of

possibility

of

power:

there is

no face to

face confrontation

of

power

and freedom

which is

mutually

exclusive

(freedom

disappears

everywhere power

is exer-

cised),

but a

much more

complicated

interplay.

In this

game

freedom

may

well

appear

as

the

condition

for

the exercise

of

power

(at

the

same

time

its

precondition,

ince

freedom

must exist

for

power

to be

exerted,

and also its

permanent

upport,

ince

withoutthe

possibility

for

recalci-

trance,

power

would be

equivalent

to

a

physical

determination).54

Second,

through

he

analysis

of the care of the self, this readingstresses Fou-

cault's claim

that each

person

has the

possibility

to make his

life into an

euvre. 55

Yet,

to be

tenable,

this

reading

would

have to

indicate

how

agency

can

coexist

with Foucault's

notion

of

power.

Once

more

Heidegger's insights

are

helpful.

In

Being

and

Time,

he

suggests

thatDasein

is

constantly

more'

than

it

factually

is.

Heidegger,

as is well

known,

distinguishes

between

factuality

and

facticity,

where

the former

is some

kind of

inventory,

a list

of contents

of

its

Being.

Dasein

can never

be

fully

defined or

captured

by

factuality.

Fac-

ticity,

on

the other

hand,

has to do with

Heidegger's

depiction

of Dasein as a

thrown

projection,

a

depiction

which

seems to reverberate

n

Foucault's

later

understanding

f the

subject.

As

thrown,

Heidegger

explains,

Dasein

is thrown into the

kind of

Being

we call

'projecting'.

By

projecting

Heidegger

does

not mean

that

Dasein

is an autonomous

being, totally

free to choose

or make

plans

into the

future

in

the sense

of

arranging

ts

Being.

Not

only

is Dasein

invariably

more than it

factually

is,

but Dasein

always

has understood

tself

and

always

will understand

tself

in

terms

of

possibilities.

The

emphasis

here is on

understanding,

where

understanding,

as

potentiality-for-Being,

has itself

54.

Foucault,

The

Subject

and

Power,

221. As noted

earlier,

Foucault

makes a similar

claim

in the

History

of

Sexuality,

Vol.

1,

95-97.

55.

Foucault,

The

History of Sexuality,

Vol.

2,

139.








Neve Gordon

413

possibilities,

which are sketched

out beforehandwithin

the

range

of what is

essentially

disclosable in it. 56We see thatDasein is thrown into the

world,

into an

existing

situation which

already

has

concrete

possibilities.

These are

not

logical

possibilities

as one

might

think

of when

discussing

choices

in

an

abstract

manner;rather,

as David

Couzens

Hoy

points

out,

the

possibilities

that

Heidegger

is

referring

to

come with

limitations. 7

Heidegger

defines

these concrete

possibilities

and limitations

as Dasein's

facticity.

Dasein,

as a

thrown

projection,

s

always

already

determined

by facticity,

he

says.

Yet,

even

though

Dasein

is thrown

into the

world,

into its

facticity,

it

is

thrown

concerfully,

as care.

When

asked,

in

January

1984,

about his

conception

of

human

agency,

Foucault

attempted

o

depict

some kind of

balanced

relationship:

I

would

say

that

if

now

I

am

interested,

n

fact,

in

the

way

in

which the

subject

constitutes

himself

in

an active

fashion,

by

the

practices

of

self,

these

practices

are nev-

ertheless

not

something

that the

individual nvents

by

himself.

They

are

pat-

terns that he finds in

his culture and which

are

proposed,

suggested

and

imposed

on him

by

his

culture,

his

society

and

his social

group. 58

he Fou-

cauldian

subject

has

gained agency, yet

at

the same time

it is

always

situated

within a web of

constraints,

and therefore

cannot be

conceived as an

entity

autonomousof

power

relations and

backgroundpractices.

As

seen from his

statements

concerning

freedom,

the

subject

is

no

longer

considered to

be a

product

of

power

relations

in

the

sense that it is identical

with what

power

produces,

an

artifact.The

subject always

maintainsa

difference. Not

only

in

the structural

ense where the

difference is a

consequence

of its

relation and

position

vis-a-vis the other

units within

the

structure,

but

also

in

an

ontologi-

cal

sense where the

subject,

whose

condition of

possibility

is

freedom,

is

never

fully

determined.

Similar to the

depiction

of

Dasein as that

which is

constantlymore thanit factuallyis, Foucaultno longerportrays he subjectas

a mere effect of

power,

nor does

he attributean

essence to

it,

but

rather

implies

a

repositioning

of

the

subject

within a

never settled

location situated

between

passivity

and

activity.

Using

Heidegger's

ontology

to read Foucault's ater

work enables us

to

make room for

agency

without

relinquishing

Foucault'snotion

of

power.

The

idea

that the

subject

can

never be

fully

determinedundermines

he belief that

56. ElsewhereHeidegger says that In its projection[Dasein] reveals itself as something

which has been thrown.

It has been

thrownly

abandoned o the

'world,'

and falls into it

concern-

fully. Being

and

Time,

185 and 458

respectively.

57.

David Couzens

Hoy,

Heidegger

and the

Hermeneutic

Turn,

n

Guigon,

The Cam-

bridge

Companion

o

Heidegger,

179.

58.

Foucault,

The Ethics of the Care of the Self

as a Practiceof

Freedom,

n

Berauer

et

al.,

Final

Foucault,

11.








414

Foucault's

Subject

power,

as both a

constraining

and

constituting

orce,

is

antithetical

o

agency.

Examining

the two

philosophers ogether

also contributes, believe, to our

understanding

f

Heidegger.

While it

is

beyond

the

scope

of this

paper

o

show

the

advantages

f

readingHeidegger

rom Foucault's

vantagepoint,

t

seems to

me thatseveral

of

Heidegger'sphilosophical nsights

gain political

concreteness

when linked to Foucault's

empiricalanalysis.

Foucault's

depiction

and investi-

gation

of

mechanisms

of

power-whether they

be

linguistic

or

physical-are

concretemanifestations f what

Heidegger

calls Dasein's

facticity.

By way

of conclusion it is

important

o note that this

reading inevitably

changes

our

conception

of the relationbetween

ubiquitouspower

and the sub-

ject,

and calls for a reexamination

f the contested

power-truth elationship.

t

also

brings

into relief statements that

appeared

to

be

contradictory.

For

instance,

in

the

History of Sexuality

Volume

One,

Foucault states: one is not

inside

power,

while,

within a few sentences he asserts that resistance can

exist

only

in the

strategic

ield of

power

relations.59 n the

basis

of our

onto-

logical

discussion such ostensible contradictions

an be resolved. Humansare

beings-in-the-world,

beings

that are

always

within an

existing

web of

rela-

tions,

within a context of

backgroundpractices.

Resistance

to a

given

set of

constraints

or modes of

production

can occur

only

in

the ambiance

of

power

and

in

this sense

there

is

no exit from

power.

Power is

already

there,

he

says,

one is never outside

it,

... there

are no

'margins'

or those who break

from the

system

to

gambol

in. 60

rom an

ontological perspective,

however,

humans

are

free,

and this

ontological

freedom

which

can be

construedas the

condition of

possibility

of the

subject

cannot be taken

away by

means

of

power-it

is not a

property

hat

can be

limited,

constrainedor molded

by

the

web of

power

relations.

Rather,

t is the condition of

possibility

of

power

itself.

Foucault,

I

believe,

is

referring

o this

ontological

level when he

says

that one shouldpracticefreedom.

59.

Foucault,

The

History

of

Sexuality,

Vol.

1,

95-96.

60.

Foucault,

Power/Knowledge,

141.

Gordon - Foucault's Subject (1999)

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