, Photograph by Ken 00s1efbroek, The Star

• ''Before we were good friends"

An account and analysis of displacement in the East Rand Townships of Thokoza and Katlehong.

April 1994

Ackn o wl edge men Is

The Independent Board of Inquiry and Peace Action would lih.e 10 Ih,m"- .111 Iho:>l'

individ uals who took the tim\.' to share thei r experiences w ith liS. We wOllld .,I"'(l iih.L'

to thank all those residents who assisted in the s ta telllen t t"king proccs~ \\'Itholll

these contributions this report would not have been published

A word of thanks to Map Studio for providing" dct<lilcd Ill"P or Tho"-(V,l .1Ild

Katlehong

I BI - Pe~ct' ActJ(l 11

PREFACE: ....... ... .... ....... .................... ........................................ ..... ............ ...... .. ........ 1

2. INTRODUCTIO : ..... ...... ... .... ..... ...... .......... ......... .................... ..................... ... ........ 4

3. REASONS FOR LEAViNG ......... .................... .............. .. ............. ... .. .... .......... .. .... .. 8

4. DEPARTURE ................. ......... ......... ................... .................... ....... . ... ...... .......... 20 . -5. VIC TI MS .......... .. ..... ...... .. .... .. ....... ............. .......................... ...... ..... ............... ... .... . 25

• 6. PERPETRATORS ..... ............. ................................ .................. ... .... .. .................... 27

6. 1 KallchOn}! pcrJlcll'alors ............................................................................... ..... ... ..................... .. ........ 21

7. ROLE AND PERC EPTIONS OF SECURITY FORCES: ........... .... ....................... 28

8. CONSEQUENCES ......... ......................................................................... .... ...... .... 32

9. CONCLUSION : ................. .. ............... .... ...................... ..... .. ........... ....................... 36

~. I In iliali,'cs: ....... ........... .. ...... .... ... ............................... ................................................. ... ...... ... .......... .... J'J

Comp lai nls Ccnlrc .. ... ...... .. ..... ... .. .... ..... ... .............................................. ......... ..... .......................... .. ....... .. -I t I

OpCl'aliuli Bu) da c' Kha)aJ Ph cndcla Em"a "10 relll l'll " .. . ........... ... . ............. ....... ....................... .......... . 11

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I BI - Pe.1ce Action

Preface: .. St<'l ti s tics can never bring to the fore the true horror of the violence on the East Rand .

The tmvnships of Katlehong and Thokoza are comnlOnl y referred to as " War Zones".

Thousands of families have been uprooted, forced to flee from places they once

c<'liled home. The suffering c~uts across the political divide.

This report is an attempl to show the people behind the statistics - how people

liv ing side by side for decades have suddenly turned on each other. How

neighbours once friend s have become bitter enemies. How homes we re occupied ,

burnt, va ndalised and destroyed .

This report will look at the background to violence on the East Rand as well ,l S

analyse the reasons why people left their homes, the alleged perpetrators, the

victims, the role of the security forces and finally by way of conclusion -: What can

be done?

Although we took over 550 s ta tements effecting a pproxi mate ly 4 000 people - th is is

only a frac tion of the people affected . We have been unable to quantify wha t

percentage of the whole this rep resents. The conditions under which the sta tements

were taken were lim ited by logistical problems and the ongoi ng violence in the area .

This was particularly true of Katiehong. O ne of the difficul ties encountered was

illus trated by the difficulty of gaini ng access to those people who were forced to flee

from the township in to the hostel. After protracted nego tiations w ith loca l lead ers of

the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) in Katlehong, Peace Action was given permission to

ga ther informa tion at Kwesine Hostel. Over one hundred s tatements from people

who had sought shelter from violence in Katlehong and Thokoza at Kwesine and

another 100 from res idents who fl ed further into the township or to the Palm Ridge

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IBI - Peace Action

Community Centre. Once access to Kwesine had been arranged, it was necessary to

cross the so-ca lled 'no-mans' land which now form s a buffer zone between the

township and hostels. This area is completely deserted . Burnt out houses and

empty streets bear tes timony to the devastation which the violence has wrought on

the community. The danger of sniper fire from gunmen hiding in the ruins means

thnt only the security forces driving in armoured vehicles nre willing to cross this

area. CoHecting informati on from all the groups involved in the conflict also meant

that it was necessa ry to cross violentl y entrenched boundaries.

Hundreds of East Rand residents took the time to tell the story of their flight. Most

of these s tories were characteri sed by enormous personal devastation . The loss of

friends and relatives as well as homes and property were commonplnce .

Statements were taken in K"tlehong <lnd at the Roman Ca tholic Church in Thokoz<l .

Approxima tely 80 s ta tements were t<lken from residents of Katlehong fleeing the

violence emanating from the hostel.

Statements taken in Thokoza are only from those that fled areas adjacent to the

Mada la, Khutuza and Mshay'azafe hostels in Thokoza and the Bllya futh i and

Kwesine hostels in Ka tlehong. Statements were taken from people who aligned

themselves politically, however the vast majority were from residents who clnimed

to have no political affi liation. Phendllka, Ext 2 and Unit Fin Thokoz;'l were 1110st

effected . In Katlehong areas affected were those bordering the hostels, like Likole

and Mngadi sections. Ramokonopi West, Twala, Radebe, Sali and Silumaview were

also affec ted as well as areas as far north as Moshoeshoe.

There are parallels in the reasons why people fled from their homes in K;'ltiehong

and Thokoza as well as distinct differences. What is clear is that the causes nre

integrally linked.

Commentators have identified ethnicity as a prime cause motivating people to

violent acts . For those that fled into the Katlehong hostels most victims alleged that

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IBI - Pe.]c!? Action

they were targeted because they were Zulu. However, there were some instances

when Sothos, Tswa nas and Xhosas were also attacked . Many of those that fled from

the areas around hostels in both Katlehong and Thokoza attributed political rather

than ethnic reasons fo-' their plight, although Xhosa speaking people were tnrgeted

in areas surrounding the Thokoza hostels . This is illustrated by the diversity of

ethnic groups that fled . Indeed from Thokoza a large number were themselve~ Zulu

Those that fled to the hostels have blamed youths and unruly mobs for their forced

eviction. Supporters of thft"A'frican National Congress (ANC), IFP, the self-defence

units (SDUs), security forces and in many instances unknown attackers have been

accused of perpetrating and exacerbating violence and tensions in the Enst Rand .

This report will a ttempt to examine these accusations .

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IBI - Peace Action

2. Introduction :

Political violence on the East Rand is not a new phenomenon. However, the forced

"colonisation" and the creation of "No-Go Areas" in Katlehong and Thokoz<l is <l

fai rly new development which first came to the fore in May 1993. Although the M"y

ANC march to the whi te town of Alberton to protes t against the ongoing violence in

the area and the subsequent shootings are seen as the trigger to the current W.lve of

violence, conditions of harassment and intimid<ltion had existed previollsly on a

more limited scale for up to th ree years in some areas.

August ]990 saw the start of the violence on the East Rand. This was shortly after the

Inkatha cultural movement announced its intentions to become a fully fledged

political party. It was a lso the s tart of an intensive recruitment c<l mp<lign on the E<lst

Rand . The hostels were targeted as ideal areas for recruitment and the in itial cl ashes

in Thokoza were between hoste l residents from the Khal anyoni Hostel and the Phol.,

Park squatter camp. Several inmates of the Khalanyoni Hostel refu sed to join the IFP

and were attacked. This led to scores of hostel residents seeking refuge in Phol<l

Park. When these refugees attempted to retrieve their belongings inside the hostel

they were attacked again. Subsequently attack and counter att<lck became the norm.

The SAP were perceived by the residents of Phola Park and Thokoz<l's Bei rut section

to be partial to the hostel residents. The violence was characterised by m<lSS impi ,

attilcks on Phola Park and the surrounding area . Counter attacks frolll ANC illigned

Phola Park residents followed a simi la r pattern and it was soon impossible to

determine whether attacks were of a defensive or an aggressive nature. The vio lence

soon spread to Katlehong along similar patterns. The battle for control of territory

has been centra l to the conflict on the East Rand . Squatter camps were hardest hit

and beca me increasingly polarised. Camps became aligned to ei the r IFP or ANC.

This led to a major migration of people from one camp to another depending on

which party gained the upper hand . Eventually in late ]990 - the KhaJanyoni Hostel

was pulled down brick-by-b rick by the residents of Phola Park. Remaining hostel

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IBI . Peace Acti on

residents fled to the hostels in the Phenduka section of Thokoza. The flight of hostel

residents and the destruction of Khalanyoni entrenched opinions within East Rilnd

hostels that they were fighting for their survival.

Following the "tradi t1t>nal" lull in violence over the Christmas period in the East .

Rand, attacks began again in 1991. It should be noted that attackers on both sides of

the political spectrum began to use more sophisticated methods. Attackers now

opera ted in smaller groups, often using cars and combis which improveJ the ir

mobility. Traditional wear>ans were increasingly replaced by the use of firearms.

Attacks on taxi' s, trains, night vigils, funerals and stokvels became the order of the

day. These attacks were aimed at the heart of community life and instilled a

psychosis of fear and mistrust in the community. This pattern continues to date .

In order to understand the conflict between hostel and township, it is necessary to

understand the his tory of hostels over the past decade. While ma ny towns hip

communities were convulsed by widespread mobilisation against apartheid polices,

many hostels remained isolated from the politica l developments of the '80s and

increasingly became bastions of traditionalism often interpreted as conserva ti ve. Tn

some ways this was the result of a failure by political organisations to make

substantial inroads into the hostel community. With the abolition of influ x control

during the mid 1980s, the composition of hostel residents began to change rapidl y .

The hostels became increasingly overcrowded as people came to the urban areas to

seek work. Many of these people were from rural areas in Natal and retained s trong

links there, such as fami lies and property e tc. Political polarisa tion in Nata l has also

impacted on these migrant workers.

There was a history of social and economic interaction between hostel resid ents and

surrounding communities. Pri or to the increased pol iticisa tion of hostels in the 19905

it was common for residents to visit hostels and vice versa . This was illustrnted by

hostel residents frequenting township shebeens, hostel and township football teams

5

IBI - Peace Action

playing one another and residents hawking their wares inside the hostels, Divisive

political activity inevitably eroded such interaction.

There is no single cause to the escalation of the violence in the area despite the view

by some political commentators that the violence augments in relation to import;lnt

political events or announcements. This view is too simplistic and fail s to take into

accounllocal conditions which are very often the ca talys t and engine to upsurges

and the perpetuation of violent acts. It is clear that the causes of the violence in the

East Rand are diverse and cannot always be attributed to events wi thin the wider

political arena. Other factors that must be considered include; the ongoing ta)..i

feuds in the area over routes and the politicisa tion of the local taxi industry which

has led to scores of people losing their lives; the "forced colonis<ltion" by the IF?

and ANC of areas in both Katlehong <lnd Thokoz<I; revenge <lttacks in both

Katlehong and Thokoza; the activities of the lnternai Stability Unit (ISU) - evidence

gathered by the Board and Peace Action gives the d is tinct impression that the ISU

has a clear programme to e liminate members of the sel f-defence units; SDUs

themselves a re also responsible for violent acts and intimidation . The re are

elements within SDUs that are not disciplined and who seem to have their own

agendas and who use their weapons to terrorise the very people they are supposed

to protect. However, the underlying problem remains mutual intolerance and

mistrust which has created a culture that prevents accommodation and comprom ise,

Violence has impacted on already appalling socio-economic condi tions. Squatter

camps are without adequate d ri nking water and proper sanitation. The refugee

problem has not been tackJed adequately, al though there have been a number of

informal efforts which have alleviated the suffering for some. The communities

themselves have borne the brunt of the problem as many people sought

accommodation and relief within the townships themselves. The plight of women

and children in Kwesine Hostel cannot be ignored. They are wi thout adequate food

or medical attention. The residents of Kwesine are vi rtual prisoners as

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IBY . Peace Action

commlUlication routes have been cut and access to the hostel is often only possible

under armed escort .

Unemployment is high and schooling in the area has been seriously disrupted . The

social and moral fae!-ic of the Thokoza / Katiehong community has been shattered.

Dea th is an everyday occurrence that seldom shocks. The sound of gunfire can be

heard day and night . At the height of the violence in July and August 1993, there

were frequent reports of corpses lying untended in the streets, sometimes for as long

as four or five days. ThiS- ongoing violence has led to a complete breakdow n of civil

society. In short Thokoza and Katlehong has become South Africa's nemesis .

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IBI- Peace Action

3. Reasons for leaving

This chapter will focu s on the displaced people of Thokoza and K~tlchong

respectively

Vi olence and intimidation is the root cause as to why people left thei r homes

Residents turned on each other to survive. Some statements reveal how iormer

neighbours/ landlords/ tenants pointed out IFP / ANC supporters to would -be

attackers . However, there are clear distinctions between those that fleJ into the

hostel and those that fled from areas around the hostels.

In Thokoza the harassment and intimidation was systematic and developed over a

period of time. It woul d appear that a politica l programme was adopteJ in

Phenduka by local leadership of the IFP. Phenduka is known locally as the Ztdu

section nnd therefore fertile g round for political recrui tment from the IFP aligned

hostels. From January 1993, residents complained of being forced to allenJ IFP

meetings in the hostel and to join the party . It is clear from the ghost town tha t

remains that they miscalculated their potential for support. Although most residents

were Zulu-speaking, for mnny their allegiances were clear! y not to the I Fr.

The exodus from Phenduka evolved over a period of six months. The s tatements

indicate that those that left firs t were men and teenage boys fearful of the

consequences of not complying to the demands of hostel indunas and local lFP

leadership. These demands included attendance at meetings, joining the IFP, the

payment of protection money, and participation in Self Protection Units (SPUs).

Perhaps the main contributing factor why males left first was the forced patrol s.

Refusal to do so was tantamOllllt to signing your own death warrant. A poign~lnt

example of what people were ordered to do is illustrated below:

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IBI - Peace Action

"Sometimes we pretended to be their followers but they wanted us to kill to make

sure we are members. They wanted us to have IFP cards. I decided to leave because

the IFP wanted us to burn a house, when we got there someone we knew W<1 S inside.

So we fled and t ook~im with us."

This left mainly women, children and the elderly. With the men gone they were not

exempt from intimidation. The flight of the men was perceived by the hostel

residents and their allies <1S a threat beca use they believed that the men had gone for

military training. At one meeting " They said our children were in Phola Park being

trained to kill us here" . Many women were told that un less their sons returned they

would have to leave the area . "They th reatened to shoot us if we didn ' t bring back

our sons." A IllOther described how one Sunday afternoon " A bullet was fired at my

house .. . the following day two men came to my house and threatened that if they do

not get the boys on their return, they will kill us."

Women in terviewed claimed that once their men had left they too were called to

a ttend meetings either at the hostels, the Nazarene Church or indunas' homes. These

meetings were announced through a loudhai ler mounted on a car that patrolled and

by people on bicycles lI s ing megaphones. " Boys came with a loud speaker to say

we must come to the meetings. This happened ma ny times. Sometimes two or three

times a day and in the evenings ."

Meetings were addressed by hostel indunas and local IFP leadership. Some people

claimed they were whipped and forced at gun point to attend . Meetings were often

called with little or no notice. One resident recalled a meeting being announced at

05hOO to commence at 07hOO. Of particular annoyance were the regular·Sunda y

meetings which prevented residents from attending church . Some residents

complained that they were prevented from going to work "They forced LIS to go to

meetings a t the hostel. They stopped us from going to work so that we could go to

the rall y when Catsha Buthelezi was here". Indeed a number of Phenduka residents

9

IBI - Peace Ac tion

complained tha t they were fo rced to attend the mee ti ng addressed by Chief

Mangosuthu Buthelezi when he toured the East Rand on August 11 , 1993 . Some of

the wOlnen interviewed sa id that they refused to attend these meetings or would

pretend that they were going to. Some sent friends or relatives in order to find ou t

what developments were taking place. Young gi rl s we re often taken in to the hostel

a t night allegedly for meetings. A resident from Shabalala Stree t said :"They took

my daughter Nand i who is 12 years old to go and sing in the hostel from 18hOO to

21 hOO . Then they m ust come back alone". Althoug h parents expressed concern ilbollt

their d aughters being taken into the hostel the issue of rape was never r"ised

although it was intima ted . A mother from Mdakane Stree t explained : "They a lways

take girls because the boys a re not there . They came back late at night and when I

ask, they say I must shut · up they wa nt these girls. I know w hat they wa nt. We just

keep quite when they come to fetch the girls." . Matters ra ised at the meetings

includ ed payments by individ ual residents ranging from R 5 to R150 for gllns .1nd

ammunition . One resident from Phenduka de tailed the amounts demanded ; " R20

bail Khumalo gang·the ki lle r bishop, R50 to buy bullets and guns, R50 to sponsor

young men for training as soldiers to fi ght ANC people . R2 to pay transport to

Ulundi .". Collections were made for ba il for IFP members arres ted d uri ng the

violence . This included bai l for Archbishop Mb hekiseni Khumalo and several of his

gang members who are currently awaiting trial on a number of mu rder charges.

Speakers urged those assembled to join the IF? Some s tatements intimated that

fai lure to do so would cu rry disfavour and lead to further intimidation. At one

meeti ng in Mshayazafe "(The ind unas) were talking that we people of the location

mlls t be clear about which side we are following. They told LIS we must join the

IFP .... all those that do not have our (IFP) memberships means they have ANC

membership" . The ANC and Xhosa speakers were particularly malig ned . " We as

Xhosas were the easiest and the first to be victimised . My son was severely assa ulted

by Zul us for being Xhosa ", However, some Xhosa speaking residents stayed for as

long as they could ." The hostel dwelle rs were openly saying they did not want

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Xhosas in Phenduka section. For a long time I hid my identity sleeping from plan' to

place. For me the last straw was when a house belonging to a Xhosa man in my

vicinity was burnt down" .

People were also told where they could and couldn ' t go. One speaker said th.1t: " .1 ... demarcation line would be enforced vigorously. This meant anybody crossing

Buthelezi Street going south should leave the area and go a nd live in Phola Park".

One woman recounted how she had been called to intervene by a neighbours

daughters' boyfriend who was accused by youth, accompanied by a well known . -local warlord, of crossi ng over " from the other side." They said they could not Jet

hint go as he would return to Phola Park and "say things". She desc ri bed how "They

pulled him outside the gate and down the s tree t a while . They hacked hint with

pangas and then shot him."

Extortion became part of daily life. Money was collected by armed YOllth on the

instructions of indunas and local IFP leaders who occasionally accompanied them .

Criminals were a lso used to enforce payment. Money was demanded for a number

of reasons as ou tl ined above . Some bmilies had to pay several times. Going to

work entailed R2 supplements to pass through the "No-Go area" . This toll was

exacted by the lFP aligned taxi operators. Money was demanded for gu ns and

bullets, amounts ranged up to R1S0. Those who claimed that they had already piliJ

were asked to produce receipts (which they never issued). The perpetrators when

questioned said that guns would be bought to protect the community.

This extortion led many people to leave, being unable to pay and fearing the

consequences. Whether or not this was the intended consequence is not clear.

However, what is clear is that their resource base for extortion was whittled away.

Once the boundaries were established it was essential to consolidate their con trol

within the area. Phenduka had to be defended from any possible attacks from ANC

aligned SDUs bent on regaining lost territory. An added problem was the presence

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of security force patrols which inhibited freedom of movement for armed groups. As

well as being forced to join these groups, residents were told to keep their doors <lmi

garden gates unlocked for easy access and escape routes. A man from Dube Street

recalled "We were told not to lock the ga te at night so they could move as they hh.e"

Fililure to c0l11ply ag<lin intimated opposition to the IFP.

For many the above problems were reason enough to leave. Normal life had become

impossible. The socia l infra-structure in Phenduka collapsed. Children could no

longer attend school. Churches could no longer operate freely as thei r congregiltions

were often forced to meetings. Families were torn apart ." After 34 years of liVing in

that place my children cannol visit us as there is a boundary which no one mu .... t

pass. I am really worried about that" . Even the simple task of going shopping could

lead to de.llh . The hostels were used as venues for execution . A woman in M"zibukn

Street alleged that she paid R50 to save the life of her neighbours' son when hostel

residents attempted to kidnap him. Another paid R20 to get out of the hostel "li ve

I lames were raided by armed youths often "ccompanied by indunas. Food and

drink was taken, telephones were used, money and valuables were stolen "nd even

pensioners were robbed on their way back from pay points . One 72 year old

pensioner expl"ined that "The fin"l s traw c"me when I returned back from collecting

my pension pay from the bank. Seven men came to my house demanding R150.

When 1 said I did not have money, they said they knew I was from the bank". They

then threatened to kill her and stole her entire pension.

Failure to attend meetings, payor join the IFP resulted in a number of consequences

First there were verbal threats, - " If you don't join the IFP you must leave the Me,,".

Many people s"id that they received deaths threats. Some were executed ilnd this set

an example for those remaining. A man from Khumalo Street explained why he left

after receiving notice that his house was wanted . "One person from ne"rby got that

same notice and ignored it . She was killed together with her entire family ."

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IBI . Peace Action

However, the bulk of residents remained throughout May and June. It was not until

mid-July-August that the trickle of people leaving the area became a stream. The

indunas and local IFP leadership appeared to have changed their strategy. Refusal to

attend meetings and to pay moneys demanded jeopardised the internal security of

'" hostel controlled Phenduka. It also appears that there was pressure from within the

hostel and from their supporters who lived in backyard shacks to be allocated homes

belonging to residents.

A number of residents started receiving eviction notices both verbal and writlt!n.

Notice periods varied from immediate vacation to seven days. A number of those

interviewed claimed that they had received letters and notes pushed under the door

Letters were ;monymous and written in Zulu. Some were short and to the point . A

woman from Mdakane Street fled her home after receiving this simple note "Can we

have your house?" . This is a measure of all it needed to prompt people to leave. The

Board and Peace Action never saw any of the alleged letters but most people silid

they were so disgusted and upset about receiving these notices that they threw them

away.

Residents with telephones received anonymous calls. "Someone phoned . , asked

who was spe(lking. The person did not identify himself. All he said was, I have

seven days to leave my house if I don't want to get killed. He then dropped the

phone."

One old lady left her home in Tshabalala Street after receiving a call saying" YOll

must go out old lady because you escaped your children". Another resident from

Khumalo Street was told "Because you are ANC you are not needed in this area. We

have IFPs who are in need of that house". One woman described how she had

refused to pay moneys and attend meetings. She had been visited, threatened and

told to leave the house. At 03hOO the following morning she received a call" Are you

still there?". Fearing an imminent attack she left later that day.

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IB I - Peilce Action

The most common and effective method of eviction was personal vis its by armed

youths accompanied on some occasions by indunas, local IFP leadership and

criminal warlord s. Reasons given for eviction varied - some were accused of se ll ing

A Ie cards, fami lies running away, non-attendance a t meetings, failure to join the

IFP, refusa l to pay money etc. However, time and aga in s ta tements revea led thilt the

reitl reason for the eviction was tha t the houses had been allocated to IFP

members / suppor te rs. At one meeting a ttended by the son of one residen t

in terviewed, those ga thered we re told "They (the residents) should take note that

their (IFP) bro thers had been forced to leave. They also wanted their own houses."

O thers interviewed explained " Four young men riding bicycles came at home i1nd

gave us a note and told liS that they wanted to own three houses in our s treet "

., A man came to tell us that we must leave tomorrow as there are three women who

a re coming to s tay here. He said if we d on' t go they will burn the house and kil l liS ."

" I approached (an induna) and told him that because I can' t see my child ren I have

decided to vaca te the house. (The induna) responded that it' s fine and that he was

going to have people in tha t house."

One fami ly from Sabi Stree t were load ing their goods when three men and two

women appeared, entered their house and chose which rooms they were going to

stay in .

As July d rew to a close more and more people started to pack up their belongings

and leave the area . This in itsel f instilled fear in o thers who also left, afraid of what

could happen if they remai ned behind . Those who did remai n became increasingly

vul nerable and were soon subjected to physical attack. One man from Khum .:-do

Stree t descr ibed how armed men broke into his house, poured petrol around the

rooms and over the naked body of his housemate. They then set everything on fire .

The a ttacke rs fl ed back into Madala Hostel whilst the burning man fled to the police

s tation a few hundred metres up the road . One couple returning from at trip to

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151 . Peace Action

Soweto found armed men waiting for them " I heard my husband ta lking to some

people in the house . His voice was so terri fied . They prod uced guns and demanded

the whereabouts of Solomon and Moses (their sons). My husband said we left them

behind. They ins tructed us to lie on the floor ... they looted the house, stole R600 and

smashed everythi ng'r~nother woman recounted why her fa mily left; " We attended

my sis te rs daughters' fune ral. When we came back from the funeral we found Ih<1t

our brother·in · I<lw was murdered so we decided to leave."

A resident from Buthelezi.Street described the condi tions around her house; " My

street was like a ghost town. Almost all my neighbours had gone away. We could

not s leep because of shots fired throughout the night. They would climb on top of

my house and shoot. During the day we had to lock the doors and st<ly inside We

tried to arrilnge tr<lnsport but people were to a fraid to enter our area ." O ther

residen ts were told to leave by the indunas direc tly. One 75 yea r·old woman recalled

how she wa s visited by <In induna <l nd several young men w ho "Told me to leZlve

the house because all the people h<1ve Zl lready gone". She decided to stay and was

visited aga in and questioned as to why she was s till there . She decided to leave.

" Really r cannot say anything <IS they are the bosses of the area".

O n the periphery of Phenduka, in terri tory still contested, members of SDUs

ordered certain residents to evict Zulus stay ing in thei r backya rd shacks. There a re

several examples of those Zulus evicted returning and petrol bombing the em pty

shacks and their former landlords homes.

There are some distinctions in Uni t F and Ext 2. Those w ho li ved on the periphery of

these areas desc ribe how they too were subjected to extortion and forced to a ttend

meeti ngs in the adjacent Katlehong hostels. As in Phend uka, for some th is reason

was enough to leave. " FOllr men came and demanded RSO which they claimed was

for p urchasing bullets. I left because r am unemployed and surely if I d on' t pay the

money they will kill me". The majority, however, fled as a result of armed attacks

15

fB I - Peace Action

launched at night from the hostels into the areas. Some of those interviewed said that

they were warned of these imminent attacks by Unit F residents who attended

meetings within the hostels. With little or no time to arrange the evacuation of their

properties, many residents in these areas los t aU their belongings.

In Katlehong most people fl ed to Kwesine and Buyafuthi hostels between May <lnd

July 1993, although a few people left as early as Ma rch and some as [.lte .:I S

September. The death toll in the townships rose steadily each month throughout th is

period to a peak of 102 in November. Having removed so-called unwanted elements

the focus of violence evolved into a battle for territorial control. This process W<lS

la rgely completed by July . Boundaries were drawn and entrenched . During the

following months the main priority was to defend positions and consolidate control

over these areas.

At its height the conflict spread deep into Katlehong township, howeve r the areilS

most severely affec ted were those immediately bordering the Katlehong hostels of

Kwesine, Buyafuthi and Mazibuko. These sections included Mngadi, Radebe and

Likole . Mngadi section, immedia tely bordering Kwesine hostel, is s till the si te of il

ba ttle for control. However, sections a considerable distance away from the hostel s

were also purged of Zulus and alleged IFPmembers/supporters.

Statements taken from Kwesine show that little or no warning was given to owners

of houses and shacks that were attacked . Many were not at home when their

properties were raised.

Viole t Dunge, an elderl y women living in Kwesi ne hostel d escribed how animosity

against Zul us began to escala te: "In about June (1993) this year, they s tarted by

threa tening us that all Zulus are on the list for burning their houses".

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Sibongile Buthelezi described the escalating violence and her attempt to maintain

her normal routine despite it: "On Friday night we couldn't sleep because there was

shooting all over. We could even see houses and shacks burnt in some of the s treets

next to us. On Saturday morning I woke up to go to a prayer meeting at Radebe

Section. Even when ~e were there we could see fla mes of fire from Mavimbela".

Sibongile's shack was burnt to the ground the same day.

Qubeleni also described the war-like situation: "It was in the middle of the night

when I heard people screcu:ning all over. Just when I went out of my shack to sec

what was happening, my shack caught fi re as well ".

Rumours about imminent attacks on Zul us quickly spread, causing a number of

people to flee from their homes. According to Nomasonto Moloi: "After hearing that

all the Zul us were going to be killed, we went to Thokoza to seek refuge from our

relatives. When we came back to remove our furnitu re, we fo und that our shack was

burnt down".

Those who ignored verbal threats soon realised the consequences. H lengwayini

Madela, a thirty-five year old woman with five chi ld ren explained: " ... After

receiving some threats that all Zulus must vaca te the place, I still stayed until the

shack was burnt and the owner of the house, Josephine, was burnt to death".

Many people were forced from their homes because of an association wi th hostel

residents, Zulus or IFP members. This was enough to mark them as potential

'enemies' . Twenty five year old Neliswe Mlangeni was a vic tim of th is bru tal

process of polarisation. She was seen attending a 'stokvel' (saving society) in

Buyafuthi hostel and was told tha t her shack was on a list of shacks to be burnt.

"Everybody was running away, so we d id".

Santo Nkosi, hea rd a rumour that you ths in her area were planning to kill her after

the funeral of an ANC member killed during violence: "I heard that youths withi n

17

IBI - Peace Ac tion

Ollr section were accllsing me for staying with Zulus. I .. m a Swazi bv birth . Thc)

pl.-!nned to kill me after the ANC funeral." Sonto explained how old associ .. ,tiun:.

were forgotten in the violent confl ict. She was no longer a childhood friend , but

someone who associated with ' Zulus', the 'enemy' "Most of them I grew lip with,

and I don't know why they thought I was IFP".

While some people were told that they were being attacked because they were Zulu,

others were told they had to leave the area because they were IFP members. On the

other hand lulu ethnic identity and political affiliation to the IF? frequentl )

appeared to be interchangeable. Mr Maxinevane Mbatha explained how his .. !tackers

assumed that because he was a Zulu, he was an IFP supporter: '1 was on my way to

work ... (when}A g roup of ANC supporters blocked my way and started shooting at

me. I escaped ... The group was shouting 'Shaya Inkatha'(Kill Inkatha ). They h.nO\N

that J am .. Zulu person" .

Many people were warned by fellow residen ts or relatives that it was not safe for

them to return home . Some were s topped as they entered the township, others

received telephone calls at work. Most of these peoples homes were destroyeJ before

they had the opportunity to save any of their belongings.

Nearly everyone that fled to the hostels explained that their homes were ;)tt;)cked

and destroyed by fire . With nowhere else to go, the hostel became the only refuge .

Township residents in Katlehong also fled the violence emanating from both

Katlehong and Thokoza hostels. The limited number of statements gathered from

this group of people are however concentrated on those that fled from attacks

launched from the Mazibuko and Kwesine hostels. A similar pattern to Thokoza of

extortion, forced attendance at meetings, pressure to join the IFP and ultimatums

were common place. Those who resisted were threatened. Individuals were attacked

and properties destroyed and looted. Attempts by the police to prevent this were

often fruitless. For those from Likole and Mngadi their difficulties were

18

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IBI - Peace Action

compounded by the fight for control of those sections between hostel residents and

"comrades". Inevitably innocent people were targeted due to mistaken ident ity and

rUlllour; one wOlllan described how her boyfriend was gunned down by comrades

having been accused of being an IFP member. She was then herself threatened and .. fled to Palm Ridge. She pointed out that her boyfriend was also on.an IFP list to be

assassinated and it was this that had prompted her boyfriends family to flee the ,Hea

Consequently, as in Thokoza the social fabric of the a rea collapsed as peoples

freedom of movement was curtailed. --

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lSI - Peace Act-ion

4. Departure

Intimidation continued for many up to the d ay of departure. Some families, while

loading the trucks, were forced to leave some of thei r belongings behi nd . Even trllck

drive rs were intim ida ted and money demanded from them a t gun point. Movi ng

was expensive and could not be undertaken without an armed escort . Of the 294

s tatements tha t we took from Thokoza families fleeing Phenduka, Unit F M lI..i r:..t 2 .

38 gave fi g ures on how much they spent on transportation which totalled R 9 480 .

approximately R250 per household . SOin e fami lies wni ted for days to get an escort

from the local South Africa n Defence Force support base, Steenpunt . Often the

soldiers we re in s llch a hurry to get out of the area that families were hardly given

time to load their belongings. On a number of occasions one SADF vehicle had the

task of escorting three or four fam il ies. While the soldiers were at one end of the

convoy, looting was taking plnce at the othe r. One family loaded thei r broken d own

car with belongings and got a truck to tow it . Unfortunately the rope broke and the

convoy carried on leaving the car behind . The family re turned wi th the SADF " We

went back with them only to find that the hos te l dwellers were already helping

themselves to our property. As we arrived we saw the last person w ith our pOls

rushing towards the hostel in front of the SADF. We told the SADF to ca tch them

and they jus t looked at us". Several fam ilies were not able to take all the ir furniture

along and have incurred considerable losses. One woman who fled from Phenduka

said : " My son Buti took me to my daughter's house in Everest. When he returned

back wi th the truck to move the furniture, he found nothing was left in the hOLise .

Even the doors were removed !".

The final humiliation for some was being forced to hand over their house keys as

they loaded the lorries to depart. "When I left my house on August 29, hostel

dwellers demanded my house keys and my house was occupied ." In some ins tances

20

IBI . Peace Action

this happened in front of the police "They took my keys near policemen and they d o

not ask them why they took our keys?".

Those that fled to Kwesine either had their homes burnt while they were out or were

attacked at night. The fled on foot taking whatever belongings they could ca rry.

Many of the refugees at Kwesine lost everything. Florence Vilakazi explained : "I

decided to run away with my kids to Kwesine hostel. After three days we decided

to ask for a police escort to go and remove our furniture . O n reaching home we

found out that the shack was_burnt and everything was totally destroyed . The onh

things we have are the clothes we were wearing when movi ng ou t".

Adolphus Ngema described how he was suddenly rendered homeless: "I was not a t

home .. . when I came back J found that the house was burnt.. .We never received any

threats. We were just suprised to find the house burnt".

It became a liability to leave home for any reason. A number of people lost thei r

homes when they went out to a ttend funeral s, night vigils or visi t friends. Twenty·

five year old Goodness Ndlovu explained how she lost her shack: "On Friday we

went to attend a night vigil...When we came back on Saturday we found that the

house and shacks were all burnt".

Other people escaped out of the back door of their homes as the assai la nts

approached the front of their houses. Khanyisile Ndaba heard people shoot ing in

front of his house . He fled out of the back door and jumped over the fence . As he

turned to look back he saw his home go up in flames.

Mrs Siwaphi Ximba, the mother of six children, outlined the circumstances in which

she left her home: "We were attacked by unknown people. We managed to escape

whilst they were killing our next door neighbours. Mr Mazibuko and his two kids

were killed. We could not take our property with us. Everything was burnt".

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IBI - Peace Action

Some people were warned that an attack on their homes was imminent. According

to Ntombi Mpanya: "On Wednesday afternoon people in the area warned us to leave

our house <'IS the ANC was going to a ttack ou r area . We left the house as well ;"I S our

belongings and we fled to Kwesine hostel. The next morning when we went b,lC h.

home, the house anu ,\11 our belongings had been burnt".

Miriam Xaba, a 29 year old mother of three children, described how she was driven

out of her home in the middle of the night: "In June 1993 when we were s leeping we

were suddenly woken up as the house next door was b urning . About 10 people

attacked my house . They were ANC members as they spoke n Lesotho d ialect of

Xhosa . My husband and I fled Qut the house to Kwesine hostel I'vly hou:;c W,l~ b urnt

down and I lost all my belongings".

Mnny landlords found themselves In an extremely difficult position as violence

escalated. Some became victims of a violent process of polarisntion where an)

association with 'the enemy' was grounds for attack. Many had rented out shacks tn

people of a number of different political affiliations and ethnic backg rounds t<{)\\

they were subject to attack because they had rented their shacks to ' Zulus' or ' II· P·

members. Bongani Ndlovu said that the ' comr.:ldes' held a meelmg to pliln the

elimination of homeowners who were 'being useful to the lFP'.

A nwnber of statements revealed that some landlords tried to protect their tenants

from attack. Njongo Langa 's landlord tried to protect her: "On Sunday they came to

ask what nation are the people in that yard . The o\vner said Ihey were all SW,l LI

They didn' t believe the owner and came back. .. On Monday I went to work "nu on

the wny back from work I met someone who told me I mustn' t go bnck 10 1Tl) shad .

because it is already burnt".

Nomathemba lost her father because he had allegedly harboured IFP supporters in

backyard shacks: "In July 1993 my father was burned alive by youth accusing him of

being a Zulu ... When we returned from the cemetery we found the house burned

22

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1 BI . Peace Action

down. Everything was burned down in the house". Nomatheillba explained the

reason for the a ttack: "My fa ther had people living in the backyard and 11105t were

IFP members. He \ .... as then identified as a member (of the IFP)" .

Genera lly attackers w~e armed wi th a varie ty of weapons including pangas, home­

made guns, kni ves, pistols and au toma tic wea pons. Someti mes during the process

of ' eviction' people were shot or stabbed . Mashi ki ne Mba th a, a forty year old

woman described w hat happened when her home ', ..... as a ttacked : "They came in and

stabbed a ma n in the hOl!;C,! Mr Mpa nza ... they sa id they were going to burn us .

There were three people, armed wi th guns and pangils. They s,lid they wan t to kil !

uS beca use we a re Zul us".

Z:lmekile, a young woman Wi U1 six chi ld ren described how she was widowed

during her ' evicti on': "A young gangster came at night. 1 escaped and ran away . My

husband tried to flee, but as he ran he was shot dead . In the morning I re turned and

found the shack burn t and my husband dead outside".

Some people lost relatives in the most horr ific ci rcumstances. Carol went to vis it her

mother outside the city <lnd retu rned to find that her shack had been burnt to the

ground :" My sis ter's dead body was ins ide the burnt house. She is s till at the

government mortua ry" .

Nonhlanh ln. Buthelezi explained how dea th threa ts forced her to flee he r home with

a small baby: "Some boys came and threa tened us because we are Zulus. They said

tha t no-one around their place should be a Zul u . I s tayed . They came back and said

that if I don' t go they will kill my husband. We left straight away"

A number of Ka tlehong residents tha t fled from the areas around the hostels also

returned to find thei r homes b~ rnt and thei r properties looted . One resident received

a message at work that his house had been attacked . He rushed to the township but

was unable to get near his house because of the fighting . He then went to the

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IBI - Peace Action

Katlehong SAP and conferred with Sergeant Mokoena who had come under firt'

with his men when they tried to extinguish the fire at his home. The sergeant W<l S

covered in dust and clearly frightened. Mokoena reffered him to the lSU who

escorted him to his house "approaching the area we saw hostel dwellers shollt ing at

us and telling us to leave as they wanted those houses and didn' t want any ANC

around". He recovered wha t goods he could and fled . Many others hired transport ,

organised escorts and left their sections for safer areas. Some tried to elicit the help of

the Wits Vaal Peace Secretariat but they too came under attack and people were then

forced to rely on the securi ty forces for assistance.

Individuals also fled when their houses came under a ttack from hostel residents

One woman described how two armed men broke into the house and threatened to

kill her. However, their greed got the better of them "One of them said ' Befort:'

killing her let me take the TV'. They then both held it and went out . It was then that I

managed to get a chance to escape." She ran across the road to a neighbours house

where she wa tched her attackers torch her house.

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IBI - Peace Action

5. Victims

In Thokoza, nearly all the victims were long-term residents of the township. Some

residents said they hadJived in their homes for more than 30 years. A 66 yeM old

widow said : " I feel shocked because 1 left my favourite house that my husband built

for me". The majority of those interviewed were women , many of whOin were

pensioners. All those that fled from their homes in Thokoza lived adjacent to the IFP

"controlled " hostels . . -Of those that fled to the hostels in Katiebong, the vast majority were Zulu-speaking .

Some of the those interviewed in Kwesine had owned houses in Katlehong for a

number of years, however the majority(60'%) were shack dwellers whose families

hailed from Natal. Indeed many of those interviewed expressed the d esire to return

to their home areas. Refugees in Kwesine also came from disparate sections of the

township which were in the main ANC supporting areas, as well as from the

contested areas of Unit F and Ext 2 in Thokoza. The people who fled to Kwesine

hostel constitute a particuInrly marginnlised and disempowered grouping. Most of

the refugees are women and children. Many of the women lived in considerable

poverty before they became refugees.

Another factor that made these women so vulnerable to attack, was their overt 'Zulu '

identity. These women were conspicuous by their dress, language and demeanour.

Lindiwe Sithole, described how she was targeted : "One day we just saw some young

boys heading towards our direction. They came straight in to my shack because it 's

easy to recognise that I am Zulu as I have cut my ears .. .! then ran into the house".

Because many of these women came to the city as adult migrants, most were never

fully integra ted into the township community. Their repeated assertion in statements

that they would like to return ' home' to Natal is indicative of this. Although these

women's relationship with the township community did not appear to be

25

I Bl • Peace Action

antagoIUstic until the outbreak of violence, most of their friendship <lnd f~mil)

networks were located in and around the hostels, thus facilita ting access when they

were forced to flee. Few were formally employed and mos t relied on men in the

hostels to provide for them. Some made their living by making and selling beer or

hawking vegetables.

There were also those victims who fled from the violence eman<lting from the

ho::.td::.. Of the 80 st.1tcments t .. )..en only two lived in bilc)..yard shac)..::. Ne.lrl, ,111

were long·term residents of Katlehong whose families lived in the vicinity These

victims fled into the rd .. tive sJ.fety of Vosloorus and other section::. uf Kiltlehong, .lS

well as the Palm Ridge Community Centre.

The violence did not discrimin~He . Women, children ilnd the handic:-.ppeJ were not

spilred. The young J.nd disilbleJ were p<lrticul:-.rly vulnerable to attack, unilblc even

to flee from their assailants . Seven year old Dudu Dhlmnini is blind. She was left

alone in <l sh<lck by her mother. When attackers torched the shack, she was trapped

and severely burnt. Neighbours managed to save Dudu's life, although she will

spend many months in hospital. A d isabled woman from Thok07 .• 1 desc ribed huw

she pleaded with a group of men who threatened her because she had nol vile.lled

her home. " Those people who said everybody must leave the area were alw,lYs

checking the hOllse . 'Are you still here girl, because we the children of the ZUlli, we

want your place? Why does YOllr family not fetch you?' I said' You see I am a

cripple. I don't know how to move. I am waiting for trea tment, I can't do anything.'

They said to me, , We have given you two weeks al ready. After these h.vo days we

are going to kill you.' I cried and cried, 'Please forgive me. I will try and call my

family to come and assist me.''' Fortunately she was ab le to move before the

deadline.

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IBI . Peace Actiun

6. Perpetrators

rndividuals who were named as perpetrators have had their names handed over to

the SAP for further inY,is tigation . As these investigations have not been concluded,

we are witholding their names at this time.

In Phenduka, Unit F and Ext 2 the perpetrators came from the nearby hostels in

Thokoza and Katlehong (See map). In Phenduka statements a lso implicate local

residents who had aligned "themselves to the TFP, these included criminal elements.

In Unit F and Ext 2 the re appears to have some limited support for hoste l actions.

These people were targeted by ANC aligned Thokoza SO Us and fled to Kwesine and

Buyafuthi hostels. It is only in Phenduka that the s tatements have implicated by

name, indunas and local IFP leadership.

6.1 Katiehong perpetrators

At Kwesine nearly all refugees could not identify their attackers, although a common

feilture of a number of reports was a reference to the youth. The assailants were

often referred to as 'boys'. A substantial number of refugees described their a ttackers

as a ' mob'. A small number labelled their attackers as ANC members /supporte rs.

However those that fled from areas around the hos tels blamed the IFP as instigators.

A few also blamed ANC "comrades".

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IBI- Peace Action

7. Role and perceptions of Security Forces:

The killings, intimidation and forced evictions in Katlehong and Thokoza was ,1

supreme test for the SA P and SADF, Some of those interviewed alleged direct

involvement of the security forces. We believe, however that their failure to act

rather than their actions allowed for the s ituation to deteriorate rapidly and

perpetrators to act with impunity. This compounded negative perceptions of

pa rticularly the SAP and most notably the Internal Stability Unit.

In Phenduka widespread int imidation took place in broad daylight. Loudhailers

wi thin earshot of the Thokoza Police Station called for the expuls ion of non- IF?

members from the area. People were shot dead and houses burnt and looted within

<1 stones throw of the Thokoza Police Station and within lkm of the Alrode ISU

I lead quarte rs. This base has a security post with a view of the area. The security

forces prima ry role became une of escorting residents out of confl ict areas rJthl'r th,ln

protecting them in their homes. There were frequent complaints that the police

would d isappear when the intimidation began. Residents repeatedly asked why the

securi ty forces were not protecting them in thei r homes but were prepared to escort

them out of the area w ithout even asking why they were fleeing and taking the

relevant details. Some res idents in Phenduka and Unit F complained that often they

were refused escorts. In Unit F one family was told that they could not get a police

escort because they were told "your boys are responsible for shooting policemen".

Others were refused because it was too dangerous. Some escorts allegedly

demanded payment in either cash or kind. One woman explained why she was

unable to get an escort. "We went to the SA OF. They wanted RSO for service, We

were penniless, so we could not respond". A man staying in Shabalala Street said: " I

went to Thokoza Police Sation for an escort . They wanted a tip. I had to buy beer frll­

them while we were packing." This was a complaint that came from both sides of

the political spectrum which was levelled at both the SAP and the SADF. One

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woman from Unit F claimed that "One of my neighbours told me two police went

into my house and came out with two plastic bags of books each".

In Unit F and Ext 2 residents complained that their only defence from the hostel

attacks, the SDUs, were>cither arrested or chased out of the area . With their defence

gone these residents became vulnerable to attack . "Members of the SADF used to

come at night with the ir hippos full of white soldiers, chasing awa y members of the

SOU so that hostel dwel lers can get a chance to come and loot our belongings".

These attacks were often not.jH~_erted by the security forces and gave rise to the

perceptions of partiality . Perceptions of the SAP and the SADF have played ,1n

important role in determining which force, if any, could be trusted . "We cannot trust

the security forces to prolect us, more pa rticularly the ISU. Even when the police

patrol there are killings and abductions by the hostel people". Both the ISU and the

SADF were approached by residents to escort them, however statements revea l a

preference for the SADF, regarded by many residents as less partial. Indeed,

residents in Katlehong and Thokoza along with the local ANC and civic leadership3

have repeatedly called for the removal of the ISU. Conversely, the local lFP

leadership in both Katlehong and Thokoza have repeatedly expressed their desire

for the removal of the SADF, particularly black soldiers, and the retention of the (SU.

In early February 1994, the ISU was withdrawn from Katlehong, Thokoza and

Vosloorus and replaced by the SADF.

Thokoza police sta tion came in for particular criticism. The police station has been

accused of being both a forum for the Police and Prisons Civil Right Union (Popcru)

(perceived by many as an ANC aligned police union) and an IFP base. Residents of

I' henduka alleged that when they approached the Thokoza SAP to lay charges of

intimidation and forced eviction, they were told that nothing could be done or that

they should refer their complaints to local indunas (the very people who they held

responsible for evicting them) . One woman from Mdakane Street was told to leave

by an induna for not attending the meeting "Immediately I informed the Town

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IBI - Peace Action

Council and I was told that they could not help me, rather I should go to the Red

Cross . Then because the Red Cross could not help me I went to the Thokoza Police

and they said they can't heip because no-one was hurt in the house. The police told

me I should go to the hostel indunas". She went to the hostel and could not find the

relevant induna so she left a message for him. He came to her house the following

day and again she was told to vacate her house.

In most cases dockets were not opened and complaints were not taken seriously

One woman found certain goods looted from her home in a neighbours hOllse three

doors down in the same street. She laid a charge at Thokoza SAP. The "guilty"

woman was arrested but released uncharged two days later. No explan.:ltion wa~

given. This not only reflects an unprofessional attitude of the officers invol ved but

highlights the lack of training and resources which is acu tely evident in ThokoL.:l .

The net result of the <lbove is that fewer and fewer crin"les are being reported to th~

local police st<ltion .

The Thokoza Police Station is understaffed and lacks equipment. Often when

residents phone the police station for help they are told that there are no vehicles

available. Communication is a problem, residents complain of not having calls

answered and the lines to the police station are frequently out of order.

Katlehong residents fleeing into or away from the hostels have also criticised both

the SAP and SADF. Violet Dunge, a refugee in Kwesine hostel tried to see"­

assistance from the police: "One of the days our house was burnt. I took the mailer

to the police. The police promised to pay us a visit to keep liS secured . But the

police never came. Thus forcing us to run away ... "

Alfred Ngobese, a school care taker, also called the police for assistance .: "On the 21 st

of May, I went to Katlehong police station to report that people are threatening to

burn my house (on the school premises). The reason was that I was a Zulu ... On

Sund<lY the 23rd at about 1 pm, they (the assa ilants) came while I was in church . I

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181 . Peace Action

managed to see them in time. I then ran away to get the police. The police decl ined

to arrest the transgressors on the basis tha t there were very few of them (police). AI

abou t 7pm on Sunday, the 'comrades' attacked and burned my house . My relative

Sash Xaba, 34 years"Old , was killed on the spot. I rushed to a nearby house to call the

police. The police came and extinguished the fire . Sash was dead already . My five

roomed house was completely destroyed by fire . All the furniture was destroyed "

Brigadier Zirk Gouws of the SA P Community Relat ions Division has accepted th.:lt . -lack of resources and tra ining has contributed to the SAP's problems when dea ling

with policing matters on the East Rand (as well as other areas in the PWV). He also

accepted that individual contraven tion of police regulations may have occurred but

was unable to comment on specific cases.

He said tha t the Witwatersrand is in dire need of 14 000 extra police personnel lie

said resources also need to be channelled into tra ining and investigation. He

admi tted tha t of the thousands of serious crimes, particu larly l11urder cases were

repor ted, but few were ever solved . Brigadier Gouws said the work load of each

detective negated his/ her abi li ty to investiga te ind ividual cases effec tively.

However, he pointed out tha t unless the lamentable s tate of police community

relations were addressed this s ituation would not improve.

• Brigadier Couws said that the SAP is attempting to communicate with community

structures in the implementation of effective community policing and the

introduction of reactive units available in other areas. These tasks face a myriad of

problems and Brigadier Couws has described it as a massive challenge.

31

IBl- Peace Ac tion

8. Consequences.

Thokoza and Katlehong are often described as "war zones". This analogy tends to

gloss over the true horror of human misery and desperation reflected in nearl y all

the statements that we ga thered . Statements taken at the Roman Catholic Church 111

Thokoza's " Beirut " section came from predominately older women who had lived

in their homes for up to 30 years . We arrived to find only a handful of people bu t

word spread and within a short time the church was filled . The BO<lrd and Peilce

Action vvere assisted by community people to gather information . As light bded

we re lied on candles and worked late into the night. Some of the women wept <'I S

they recounted their stories. Most however remained s tony faced, desensitised by

months of torment. For many it appeared to be a relief to let others sh<lre this pain

The vast majority of people that fled from Phenduka, Unit F and Ext 2 ma n .. ,sed to

find temporary accommodi'ltion wi th in safe <l reas of Thokoza . Most people h<'l\,v

been too afraid to return to thei r homes. Some who returned under police escorl

found their homes destroyed. Few wanted to re turn to their houses and most shook

their heads in disbelief when asked whether they would return in the near future .

People fled to the Palm Ridge Community Centre wi th the few possessions they

could carry. The refugees were main! y women and children as the men had

remained behind to defend their homes. A Palm Ridge Crisis Comm ittee was

formed and battled wi th the local authorities to permit the refugees to remain in the

hall. In July, mid-winter refugees were forced to s tay outside with no protec tion

from the elements until 17hOO.

The Palm Ridge Crisis Committee struggled to obtain much needed resources Stich

as food and clothing and those local residents who assisted must be commended for

their efforts. Over the months the Crisis Committee has managed to assist fam ilies to

relocate to relatives outside of the East Rand. Seven months later there are

32

IBI - Peace Action

approximate 60 people s till sleeping rough in the community hall and the

Committee is continuing its efforts to find permanent homes outside the area

Families were torn ~art as individuals sought sanctuary in variolls locations. Some

of those interviewed expressed their distress at not knowing where family 111en1bers

were or whether they were dead or alive . Gladys Mbatha explained : "People were

attacki ng each other and my house was burned down. Ever since that day I d on' t

know where the rest of my jamil y is".

The psychological consequences of these experiences are immeasurable, and it is

impossible to effectively address these emotional scars in light of the continuing

violence. The sou nd of gunfire is often ignored as people go about their daily

business. Despite the ever present gunfire some measure of normal life does exist in

Thokoza and Katlehong.

Financia l and material losses have compounded an already desperate situntion . We

h<1ve estimated the loss and damage of property runs into tens of millions of Rnnds.

Many people lost e.verythi ng and described down to the last detail what was looted,

destroyed or left behind. Many of the council homes had been improved over the

years and statements detailed extensions, burglar proofing and erection of garden

wa lls. Several women expressed concern about the pets they were forced to

abandon . These inclusions in the statements reflect the extent of wha t people had

lost.

One woman explained how she handed over her keys to a complete stranger in the

hope that this would avert the possible destruction of her home . "The day I left

there were a lot of people standing around . One man said to me 'Mama, give me the

keys I will stay and look after your home' I do not know who he is". This reflects the

length to which some people went to try and protect their property .

33

1B I - Peace Ac tion

Most homes in Phenduka are counci l houses and ye t the Thokoza Town COllncil h.lS

failed to assis t. A number of homes a re now illegall y occupied and there have been

allega tions that new stand perm its were issued to some of these people

A substan tial number of people interviewed had lost or fled from houses on which

they were paying a bond . There has been to our knowledge no moratorium on

payments. Each indiviuual case is considered on merit. Apart from agreeing to

certain moratoriums as per individ ual cl ient the major fimmcial institu tions have not

identified any other shorH erm schemes. There has been no progress to address these

people's plight as the banks have been unable to enter the affected areas to il ssess the

damage. Fail ure to pay bonds has consequently placed considerable finilnciil!

pressure on local lending institu tions.

Most of the people we took statements from had bought some household goodoS 011

hire purchase. For those that have lost these goods the re has been nn added burden,

as some of the shops involved have insis ted tha t payments continue .

Perhaps the sad dest consequence is the loss of hope and the belief of many that the)

will never ge t their homes back let alone retribution and compensation.

Violence wracked sections of the townships continue to be characterised by "no-go "

a reas delinea ting territoria l control and by hostels frequently described as armed

fortresses.

Getting from the hostels to work became almost impossible. Townshi p youth

sabotaged railway lines in an effort to contain the hostel residents. Most alternative

forms of transport were si tua ted in anti-IFP areas. Consequently ma ny hostel

residents and those that fled into the hostel lost their jobs as they were unable to get

to work. Serious efforts are now underway to re·open the taxi rou tes and to repair

th e railway line. The s llccess of this will depend on aJiaying the fea rs and suspicions

of both communities. Although agreement may be made at leadership level, the

34

181 . Peace ActIOn

success of any agreement will only be realised with the communities partici pati on

and support .

Food and medica l stfpplies could only enter under armed escort. In Kwesine Hostel

conditions have deteriora ted rapidly . The hostel is overcrowded and is il l·ellul pped

to cope wi th the hundreds of people who have sought refuge there. Single rooms

now house up to eight people. As many as 50 families share two hot plates to

prepnre meals. One sin.k is lIsed for washing clothes, dishes and ba thi ng .

Conditions are squalid and extremely unhygenic. Such overcrowding has put "

serious strain on the inhabitants health. Children are the most vulnerable ri nd e ffo rts

are being made to provide them with basic health care.

Communication is limited to one public telephone which is often out of orde r.

However, hostel leaders communicate by two-way radio. This has added to the

feeling of isola ti on.

35

IBI - Peace Action

9. Conclusion :

The conclusion is divided into three parts. Firstly we will <lddress the C<lu ses il nd

perceived causes of the violence on the East Rand . Secondly we will look at possible

solutions <lnd fin<llly an overview of local and national initiatives to address the

ongoing crisis facing disp laced people. The Board and Pe<lce Action have

approached a number of releva nt individuals from political parties and

organisations on the subject of causes and solutions to the current situat ion of

displaced people . This includes, the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), the AfriGtn

National Congress (AN C), South African Na ti ona l Civics Organisation (Sancn)

Thokoza branch, the Thokoza Local Peace Committee, the Police Reporting Officer

for the Witwatersrand and the South African Police (SA P). All have accepted that till'

underlying socio-economic conditions exacerbated by apartheid have contributed

significantly to the violence.

The IFP highlighted politic<ll intolerance and the poiiticisation of cri mi nal ac ti\'i lies

as central to the current crisis. Spokesperson for the IFP East Rand, Thabang Olam ll11

has criticised the security forces particularly the SADF for their lack of consuit il tion

wi th township and hostel residents on the questions of deployment. Thi s has

engendered an a tmosphere of intimidation. The ANC Thokoza branch has echoed

the IFP's sentiment on the issue of political intolerance. The ANC in the East Rand

has consistently c .. lIed for the removal of the ISU who it accuses of formenting

violence, operating a shoot to kill policy against SOU members and of being pa rtisan

to the IFP. General secretary of the Saneo Thokoza branch, Louis Sibeko has gone

into more detail over the issue of intolerance. He says that some of the local leaders

from both sides of the political spectrum are not genuinely interested in a peaceful

solution. He accuses some of using members of the community to destabilise the

process. Sibeko also accuses the local town council of failing to address the issue of

displaced people. He explained that since the initiati on of a joint administr.1.tion with

Alberton, and the latters subsidisa tion of Thokaza, the local council no longer relied

36

IBI - Peace Action

on council tenants rent to remain financially secure. He blames the lack of political

\vill from all concerned parties at both regional and local level as the fundamental

problem. " It therefore doesn't matter what possible solutions are sugges ted, their

impiementation is doomed to fail." Sibeko explained that many agreements have

been brokered at locnllendership level but have failed to be effectively transmitted

to the g rass roots.

The Thokoza Local Peac~ C_ommittee chairperson, Piroshaw Camay has poinlt!d to

recent political rivalry, the lack of adequate local government administration as well

as inadequate policing as primary contributing factors to the si tua tion.

Police reporting officer for the Witwatersrand, Advocnte Jan Munni k whose brief in

the area has been to address complai nts against the police has pointed to a " largely

ineffective police s tructure ... and a strong ISU presence, which is only accountable to

itself and not the local police s tation" for the breakdown of policing in the are" . This

is starkly illustrated by the fact that first complaints received by the special

investigation unit (SIU) set up under the auspices of the Nalional Peace Accord to

investigate political motivated crime, only received its firs t complaints from

displaced people at the beginning of November, four months after the first people

fled.

• The SAPs Brigadier Gouws said that the fight for territorial and thus political

control was central to understanding causes of violence in Thokoza and Katlehong .

This he said was facilitated by the existence of structures capable of formenting

violence e .g from within the hostels, SDUs, the massive influx and easy accessibility

of arms. He acknowledged that the broader conflict was compounded by insufficient

policing and the almost complete lack of police community relations. On the

question of police abuses he accepted that in these conditions they would occur but

that they were the exception rather than the norm. Like Sibeko he commented on the

37

IBI - Peace Ac tion

quality of local political leadership and intima ted that some were little more th,lI1

"war mongers".

Inkatha representatives have pointed to both a top-d own and g rass roots appro<lCh tu

address the crisis. Humphrey Ndlovu from the IFP regional office suggested Ih<11

Nelson Mandela and Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi address a joint rally to impress

upon local leaders and thei r followers the need to end the violence. He lamented the

fai lure of the SACC initia tive to bring the leaders together . Dlamini felt that

effec tive solutions must be found at the grassroots. He said tha t local leadership

should stop pointing finge rs as to who started the violence . Ins tead they should

consult thei r fo llowers and then meet to discuss existing problems and concrete step ....

tha i could be taken to effectively end the violence . He emphasised that "ny in iti,,1

brokering between the pnrties should exclude the security forces. The loca l ANC

believes that any peace initi.Jtive has to be underpinned by a comprehensive socio­

economic development package for both hostel and township res iden ts. Any

development plan must yield tangible results and represent grass roots ini tiatives.

The ANC added that the removal of the ISU is a pre-requisite before community

polic ing can be established in the area.

Louis Sibeko says the best solution is to make hostel residents feel pnrt of the

community and supports Dlamini 's emphasis on grassroots participati on. H e urges

the SA P to begin investigating each case brought to them thoroug hly and to a rrest

perpetrators where possible. This would also address negative percep tions held by

the community that culprits can act with impunity . This would go a long way to

laying the foundations for community police relations.

The above parties have all agreed that fos tering community policing and

accountability is essential. However, Brigadier Couws argues tha t the police are not

a cause of violence but are present because of the violence. Integral to any solution

must be a settlement on the issue of political conflict. Once agreement is made

individual issues such as territorial dominance, influx of arms and struc tures c"pable

38

IBI . Peace ActiOn

of violence can be addressed . Simultaneously the community must participate in

s tructured policing initiatives such as joint patrols and lay-vis itors schemes.

The local peace committee believes that keeping the political p'arties at the table IS

integral to any solution. Camay has suggested that Thokoza and Katlehong be

declared disaster areas, with an immediate focus on displaced people. lie also

recommends that more resourced areas be made responsible for development and

pointed to the progress of establishing a single local authority incorporating the

fanner white town of Alberton. He also reitera ted the need to address inadequate

policing .

For those people who experienced months of intimidation and violence their

solutions are more simple, less optimistic and less accommodating. "The only

solution is if the hostel ca n be demolished as they are busy killing a lot of people .

Now they a re usi ng taxis to capture our people, putting them in the hostel. They

have no mercy with human beings. They don' t have peace." This sentiment was

echoed time and again. Many felt that there was no solution and wanted to leave the

area permanently.

A number of those that fled into the hostel expressed the desire to esc<lpe the misery

of hostel condi tions and to return to Natal. Sonto Nkosi from Kwesine Hostel

• expressed for many the confusion which surrounded their plight . "We can only

return (home) if the ANC stop killing our people. They kill people simply because

we are Zulus or also IFP, so I don't know ." Hostel refugees also expressed

pessimism about any solutions being reached .

9.1 Initiatives:

Since October 1993 there have been three major local initiatives attempting to

address the issues related to the displacement of East Rand residents.

39

1B1· Peace Action

Complaints Centre

Two complaint centres were estab lished in Thokoza .

The centres were originally established by Advocate Munnik's Complaints

Inves tigation Unit (CTU) to de .. 1 with complaints against the security forces .

However the one set up at the Youth Centre was soon inunda ted with complnints

from residents who have been forced from their homes. Although presently not

functioning, the Thokoza LPC and Katlehong LPC are currently addressing the

logistics of establishing semi·permanent complaint centres. Detec ti ves from the

local SA P, the Special Investiga ting Unit (SrU) and the cru will be available to deal

wi th relevant complaints which residents of the hostels and communities nre not

willing or able to take to Thokoza or Ka tlehong police s tations. In time some of thL'SL'

centres could become fully fledged satellite police sta tions. The SIU has the task of

investigat ing cases of intimidation and displacement. Under the command of

Colonel Kriel, the STU have established a sub-uni t of 12 detectives who a re curren tl y

investigating 341 cases from both Thokoza and Ka tlehong (248 & 93) respectively .

According to Advocate Munnik, "i t transpired from information obtained vi .. loc .. l

structures and organisations, and the SA P, that residents from approximately 1000

houses which were previously occupied by both IFP and ANC supporters, h.,d been

forced out of their homes since approxi ma tely July 1993." It is therefore evident that

the sru has only just begun its work. Colonel Kriel explained that thorough

inves tigations were hampered by lack of evidence. Many people did not know who

their attackers were or could only recall vague de tails related to their eviction.

Another major problem, he conceded, was the residents unwill ingness to co·operate

with the police, as his unit was viewed wi th a certain amount of suspicion . A

number of cases (41 ) have subsequently been "closed" as undetected, as no further

investigation could be made with the absence of fresh information. Kriel hoped that

the least his unit could achieve in many cases was to provide details of damage and

losses incurred by residents for any future programm e established to address

40

IBI - Peace Action

redevelopment &/or compensation. He hoped that this would a t least give some

worth to their task.

From information handed to Advocate Munnik and subseqlrently the SIU, by the

Board and Peace Action, a number of individuals were identified as perpet rators of

various crimes. Colonel Kriel said that of the 341 cases being dealt with, about 10%

said that their houses were occupied illegally. To our knowledge the re have been no

arrests. Kriel said that he could not comment on individual cases, but that the

investigations were not ye t completed .

With the complaints centres not operational and no tangible progress in

investigations, the communities are increasingly impatient. At the end of December

1993, Duma Nkosi, chairperson of the Thokoza ANC branch addressed a meeting for

those who had fled from Phenduka. He questioned the efficacy of the police 's

investigations. "Police say they are aware that some houses which were unoccupied

had been vilnda lised whi le others were illega lly occupied. But more tha n fOllr

months after the owners were kicked out, the police claim they are still

investigating."

Operation Buyela e' Khayal Phende la Emva "to retu rn"

• This is a community initiative with the co-operation of the SADF and SA P. The

project was initiated in late December and is currently in its initial stages. The

purpose of the initiative is to get people back into their homes. Mbongeni Radebe of

the ANCYL said the operation had moved very slowly. As of the 23rd of January, 9S

families had returned to clean yards and houses in Phenduka section under the

protection of the SADF. The operation was marred in early January when two

"returnees" were shot and wounded. The operation, however is endorsed by the

local TFP leadership who have expressed their concern about security and ongoing

violence in the area . Pending the success of the clean-up, the areas of Unit F and

41

IBI - Peace Action

Ext 2 will also be visited . A similar operation was also undertaken in Katlehong's

Mngadi section. However, residents ~ lI eged they were chased from the a rea by

members of the ISU who said tha t houses belonged to the IFP.

Cleaning yards and houses in itself will be major success in the light of

circumstances in Thokoza and K<ltlehong. However, the major hurd le will be for

people to actu<llly return to their homes.

Chapter 5 of the National Peace Accord provides for the facilitation of Socio­

economic Reconstruction and Development (SERD). On the East Rand the services

provide by SERD include limited relief aid for victims of violence, (this is channeled

th rough the Kathorus Relief Aid Forum) ; attemp ts to find homes for displaced

people who do not w ish to return to their homes in Katlehong and Thokoza; and

planning to facilitate the reconstruc tion of homes and the res to ration of sevices ,:lIld

infra -s tructu re " to an acccptil ble level ".

Although comprehensive in its outlook SERD has been unable to bri ng much relie f

to the affected townships. SERD's efforts will continue to be piecemeal unless it hilS

the financial and logistical means to add ress the current crisis.

The Transitional Executive Counci l (TEC) on February 1 announced a package of

measu res designed to comprehensivlcy address the violence on the East Rand . The

proposed plan includes the withdrawal of the ISU and their replacement with the

SADF who are a lready deployed in the area. The TEe have committed themselves to

add ressing the d isplaced. The plan envisages wide reaching socio-economic

programmes aimed at reinsta ting local services, upgrading local government

admi nistration and a focus on the implementation of sound com munity policing.

The TEC agreement has been accepted by all with the notable exception of the IFP ,

The mechanims envisaged to implement the programme have ye t to be nnnollnced .

Peace Ac tion and the Board are encouraged by local initia ti ves and welcome the TEC

decision to address the ongoing violence on the East Rand.

42

IBI - Peace ActIon

The failure of national and local authorities to address the issues pertaining to the

displaced on the East Rand is refelected in the pessimism in so many of those

affected . Progress tpwards meaningful and durable solutions has been painfu lly

slow . For some of those who have property to return to there is some hope of re·

establishing some semblence of their former lives. However, for those whose homes

were destroyed, the future holds no certainties and for the moment looks bleilk For

Inilny the physical and psyschological scars will be permanent. The TEe "Ithough

now verbally committed to finding solutions have yet to implement a

comprehensive plan of action and to communicate what ac tua l steps they in tend to

take in order to rectify the situation .

The National Pa rty government mllst hold ultimate responsibility for the fai lure of

their security forces to prevent the exodus within the townships of Ka tlehong and

Thokoza. The blatant intimidation, murder and forced evictions of thousa nds IS a

damning indictment of this failure and indefensible in the light of resources made

available for thei r own percieved priorities. It has taken six months of indecision and

the introduction of the TEC to afford the crisis a priority status. It is now the joint

responsibility of the out-going government and other members of the TEC to

address the underlying and immediate causes as well as symptoms of th is violence.

This does not mean that a top down approach should be unilaterally imposed ilS th is

• would surely fail. The success of any solution will depend on active and a ll inclusive

local partiCipation as proposed by a number of individuals we have spoken to. The

TEe's peace and reconstruction plan has already been rejected by the nat ionallFP

leadership . At the local level, the plan has also been rejected by the Thokoza branch

of the IFr. The main problem is the replacement of the ISU by the SADF. The loca l

branch has already marched demanding the return of the ISU . Without the

endorsement of the IFP, the proposed plan to achieve stability enabling people to

return to their homes, could easily be scuppered .

43

181- Peace Action

Whatever peace plan is adopted the success of its implementation will depend On It"

ability to withstand those elements that are bent on revenge andlor derailng the

process, Local leadership must have solid practical agreements that are endorsed by

followers and must be committed to rooting out criminal elements within thei r

r,:mks. The failure and lor inability of local leadership to transmit agreements .md

decisions effec tively to their followers is not a unique phenomenon to Thokoza ,1nd

Katlehong. rt is the weak link in the chain of political decision making nnd hns been

acutely visible in this area . Thi s problem is compounded by locnlleaders themselvL':-;

whose agendas have been devoid of engendering peace. Regional and na tion"l

lenders should not be detracted from the central goal of achieving peace and must

themselves be commit ted to agreements and if need be, to compromi se . The pence

structures themselves must be given more teeth to sanction those individuals that f.,d

to honour agreements and pursue an obstructionis t path, It is all well and good

keeping all the parties "at the table", but if the net result is to create a forum for

polarised politica l slangi ng matches, no meaningful solutions will be forthcoming .

Deadlock breaking mechansims preventing a minority from holding the process to

ransom must be found, but genuine concerns of those minorities must be addressed

if they are not to be further marginalised.

The ability of the police force to engender community trust and nctive co-opera ti on,

at a time when their popularity is low, is a vital ingredient in the sustainment nnd

enforcement of local peace agreements. Their task is to crea te a police force of the

people for the people. Communication and co-operation is a two-way street and thi s

will certainly entail give and take on the side of the communities of Ka tlehong and

Thokoza . For many residents however, they are presently not prepared to entertain

ideas of developing a co-operative relationship with a police force they percieve and

experience as impervious to change.

in light of continued political wrangling and the ever encroaching election, it is

conceivable that attention will again shift away from the East Rand and the needs of

44

IBI . Peace Acti on

the displaced . Their plight however, represents an enormous political and

humanitarian challenge and will be a severe test of wi ll fo r the cOlnlnlmities

involved . Whethei<'<'l success or a fa ilure, the efforts at all levels to deal with the cri sis

and to bring together the acutely d ivided communities of Thokoza and Katlehong,

wi ll be a touchstone for crisis resolution in South Africa .

•

45

Collection Number: AG2543 INDEPENDENT BOARD OF INQUIRY (IBI) Records 1989-1996 PUBLISHER: Publisher:- Historical Papers, University of the Witwatersrand Location:- Johannesburg ©2012

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