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Bundesministeriumdes Innern

Annual Report

of the Office forProtection of theConstitution

1999

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IV. Activities of Intelligence Services of Coun-tries in the Near/Middle East

Also, the services of several Near/Middle East countries continue

to pursue intelligence activities in, and against, Germany. Their

intelligence interest covers the classical areas of espionage - poli-

tics, the military, industry, science and technology - and, to a

particular extent, infiltration of, and spying on, organizations or

persons in Germany which/who are in opposition to the govern-

ment of their respective country of origin. In order to achievethese ends, they are also prepared to use force which may even

include acts of (state-sponsored) terrorism. Also, they are inter-

ested in the subject of proliferation.

1. Iranian Intelligence Services

Priority aim: spying onregime opponents

As before, the priority aim of the Iranian Intelligence Service

VEVAK (Ministry for Intelligence and Security) is to combat Ira-

nian dissidents living in Germany. In departure from the violent

approach taken until the mid-1990s - inter alia, attempts on thelives of leading opposition politicians in Western foreign coun-

tries, including Germany 175) - VEVAK activities were, as in the

previous years, focused on the political neutralization of opposi-

tion groups and their anti-regime activities. The "Peoples Muja-

hiddin of Iran" (MEK) and its political arm which is active world-

wide, the "Nationaler Widerstandsrat Iran" (NWRI - "National

Resistance Council of Iran"), continued to be the focus of the

intelligence interest of the Iranian intelligence service.

"Culture Associations" andanti-MEK publications

In its fight against the Iranian opposition-in-exile, VEVAK makes

use of so-called "culture associations". These are cover organi-zations founded as directed by VEVAK and acting in accordance

with Irans interests and wishes. In addition, the Iranian service

initiates anti-MEK publications which in part are published by

former MEK activists and have the aim of persuading the readers

of these publications to turn their backs upon this organization.

Severe harassment as alever

For spying on the MEK, the Iranian intelligence service also re-

cruits supporters of that organization and other Iranian nationals.

Recruitment mostly takes place during visits by exiled Iranians to

Iran. When in that country, they will be approached by VEVAK

and, in instances, under threat of massive harassment againstthemselves or their relatives in Iran, are compelled to co-operate

with the intelligence service.

On 24 November, the trial began in the Berlin Higher Regional

Court of Appeal against a 36-year old Iranian national living in

Germany for a number of years and arrested in Berlin in July. He

was under strong suspicion to have spied, as a supposed MEK

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supporter, on leading functionaries and activities of that organi-

zation in Germany on behalf of the Iranian intelligence service *).

2. Syrian Intelligence Services

Also the Syrian intelligence services continued their intelligence

collection activities in Germany.

Residencies control the

source and informantnetwork

For the development and control of the source and informant

network set up to this end, they run undercover bases estab-

lished at the official and quasi-official missions (legal residen-

cies). The latter include the Syrian Embassy.

The main tasks of the Syrian intelligence service officers operat-

ing from these missions under diplomatic cover are intelligence

collection, and spying on and monitoring of compatriots living in

Germany who are critical of the political system in their home

country. The primary observation sites of Syrian secret services

include the Islamic Centres and mosques whose frequenters are

considered to be among the political opponents. With the help of

sources and informants, the services attempt to gather informa-

tion on the living conditions, contacts and political aims of these

persons so as to induce them, by using the information thus ob-

tained, to abandon their dissident stance.

A case in point concerns a 43-year old Syrian who, after his asy-

lum application had been turned down in August 1995, as a walk-

in volunteered co-operation with the Syrian intelligence service.

Since then, he had maintained intensive intelligence contacts

with the resident of the civilian Syrian intelligence service who

held the cover post of attach in the Consular Division of theSyrian Embassy. In this context, he procured, and delivered to

his handler, personal data on a large number of ethnic Syrians

and Lebanese living in Germany. For this purpose, he increas-

ingly made use of clandestine methods and means.

This intelligence contact ended in May 1999 when he was ar-

rested. In early October, he was sentenced by the Hamburg OLG

(Higher Regional Court of Appeal) to two years' imprisonment

(suspended on probation) on the charge of intelligence activity on

behalf of Syria.

At the instigation of the Foreign Office, the agent controller of theSyrian Embassy left the Federal Republic of Germany on 24

July.

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*)On 19 January 2000, the Berlin Higher Regional Court of Appeal sentenced the accused to18 months imprisonment (suspended on probation) and to a fine of 5,000 DM.