George C Marshall

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MASTER O F MILITARY ART AND SCIENCETHESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Na m e of candidate: Ma jor How ard A. OlsenTitle of thesis:o l i t i c i an - - 1 S e~ t em b er1939 to 6 December 1941

Approved by:

@ ILhL ,Thes is Commit tee ChairmanDr. Robert H Berlin, Ph.D.k, k4 m .Member, Gra dua te Fac ultyMajor stkphen D. Coats, M.A.

Member , Graduate Facul tyLieutenant Colonel Gilbert A. Bernabe, Ph.D.

cc ept ed this day of ' 1 1990 by:

,Director , Graduate DegreePhilip J Brookes, Ph.D. Programs

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of thestudent author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S.Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmentalagency. (References to this study should include the foregoings t a t e m e n t . )


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This thesis is dedicated to the memory of General George C Marshallwho proved Politics and Integrity are compatibleA special thanks to my wife and my committee who waded throughso many drafts and provided s o much helpful direction

This thesis was prepared on a Macintosh IIcx@ using Micro soft Word@ and printed on anApple@ LazerWriter 11.)

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter1 .2

3 .4

56

IntroductionGeorge C. Marshall Roots of a PoliticianBurke Wadsworth Schooling of a PoliticianLend Lease Em ergence of a PoliticianExtending the Draft Workmanship of a PoliticianConclusionSelected BibliographyDistribution


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CHAPTER l

This thesis is a historical analysis of the political growth,development, and influence of a former Army Chief of Staff, GeneralGeorge C. Marshall, during the period 1 September 1939 to6 December 1941 These first two years of Gene ral Marshall s tenureas the A rmy s Chief of Staff were critical in rebuilding andmodernizing the A rmy and the Nation s defense establishment priorto the start of World War 11. During this period Gen eral M arshall sprimary efforts centered on securing appropriat ions for equipment,personnel, and training. The se efforts were politica l in naturebecause they involved close association with the executive andlegislative branches of government. It establish es his evolution fromunwilling political participant to one of the most powerful politicalplay ers in the nation s capital.

Th e thesis draw s upon Gen eral Marshall s early life andmilitary career to establish how he gained an appreciation for andinsight into the country s political system. Th e thesis describesMarshall s assignm ent as Gen eral John J. Pershing s, Arm y Chief ofStaff , Aide-de-camp and delineates how this relat ionship providedMa rshall the opportunity to learn first hand W ashington s politicalenterprise, and to observe the Army s Chief of S ta ff s workingrelationship with the President, Congress, and members of theExecutive Branch. It examines how assignments with the NationalGuard, Arm y Reserve, Civilian Conservation Corps, and as postcommander enabled him to form close associations with political1 Raymond Clapper, The Ten Most Powerful People in Washington. LookJanuary 1941. Also, see The Reader's Direst, May 1941, p 45-48. Those listed asthe ten most powerful, in order, are: FDR, John L. Lewis, labor leader; GeneralGeorge C. Marshall, Chief of Staff; William S. Knudsen, overseer American'smilitary-industrial com plex ; Henry Morgenthau. Jr.. Secretary o f Treasury;Harry Hopkins, presidential advisor; Cordell Hull, Secretary of State; ThurmanArnold; Jesse Jones, Secretary of Commerce, and Eleanor Roosevelt.


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The author researched in reverse order. That is , he f irstreviewed the major secondary works on General Marshall beforegoing to primary sources. The secondary sources were mainly thePogue volumes, Professor Stoler 's work, Parrish 's recent monographon Marshall and Roosevelt, and Mrs. Marshall's book. Onlysuperficial review was given to Frye's and Mosley's works. Afterreviewing these secondary sources, the author then reviewed Dr.Larry Bland's marvelous two volume collection of General Marshall 'spersonal papers. Th ese two volum es provided a wealth ofinformation, background, and insight into Marshall 's thinking at thetime events were occurring. Without the benefit and insight ofpersonal diary or autobiography, Bland's efforts provided the bestfountainhead for primary source information. The Marshall Papersalong with selected portions of the Ma rshall Interviews s p r o v i d e dthe author an insight into General Marshall 's thoughts andjustif ications for particular actions during the t ime under study andthe legislative measures reviewed. While reviewing the Mar s h a l lP a p e r s and Marshall Interviews the author also reviewed Marshall 'stestimony before Congressional Committees during the period, payingparticular attention to his testimony relating to the draft and lend-lease.6 Con gressional Com mittee testimony, coupled with floordebate contained in the Congress ional Record provided valuablebriefings. He also carefu lly forged relationships with key officia ls andpresidential advisors who could assist him in dealing with the President. SceHenry Mo rgenthau, Jr.. The M orgenthau Diaries: P an IV. The Story BehindL en d- Le as e, ~ o l l i e r ' s , p 17 (Hereafter referred to as Morgenthau, MorgenthauDiaries.) Also, see Mark A. Stoler, G e o r ~ eC. Marshall: Soldier-Statesman of theb r i c a n Cen tu ry , (Boston: Twayne Pub lishe rs . 1989). p 65 (Hereafterreferred to as Stoler, George C. Marshall.)5 The Marshall Interviews were read with the understanding that theywere conducted sixteen to seventeen years after the period in question.During that gap. General Marshall had been through the most riveting periodof American and world history and had played a major role in nearly everykey military and political event of the period. With that in mind and given hisage and health, the author feels the interviews must be carefully consideredand review in conjunction with other available evidence.6 The author was unable to obtain Marshall 's testimony before the Senateand House Foreign Relation Committee other than references to his testimonyfrom the daily newspapers and Congressional Record


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information regarding Marshall 's thoughts , powerful oratorical skil ls ,and influence over Congressional action.

The author reviewed a number of newspapers, magazines, andperiodicals from the period to obtain a historical frame of referencefor the period.7 He also reviewed a number of secondary sourcesrelated to the period, principal players, or specific events.8 Theseproved invaluable in gaining other viewpoints on Marshall 's actionsin light of the eve nts of the day. In sum, the author first sought abroad perspective of the period and Marshall the man; then, heinvestigated specific portions of the time, people, and events inq u e s t i o n .

Armed with this research, the author framed the thesis to be acombination of historical review and analysis. The thesis providesthe reader with a context in which to understand the events understudy. It also attemp ts to analyze Marshall 's political condu ct,always trying to answer the question: Why did Marshall pursue aparticular political course of action?

A discussion concerning crucial terms used in this study isnecessary. Th e word politician is important to the thesis' basicquestion. Many consider a politician in a negative connotation.

Primary among newspapers, magazines, etc. are The New York Times.Ti m e, Newsweek, Co lliers , Life , Reader s Digest, and Saturday Evening Post.8 Examples of the main sources used are: Langer and Gleason s T h eUnd e c la r e d Wa r , an excellent book covering the period and focusing onpreLend-Lease efforts as well as lend-lease itself. It also provided commentaryon the efforts to institute selective service and extend it one year later.Clifford and Spencer s The First Peacetime Draft was an excellent source ofinformation concerning the history behind the effort to launch a peacetimedraft in this Country. Of all the books on the subject. it provided a clear andunbiased picture of General Marshall s role on selective service. Sherwood sRoosevelt and Hopkins, gave not only a view of Hopkins relationship toMarshall, but also an excellent view of the period and Roosevelt s position andefforts regarding selective service and lend-lease. McJimsey s latter workHarry Hopkins. was useful but provided little that was not covered inSherwood s work. Watson s Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparation wasan excellent source of information on the period and the War Department sperspective concerning selective service and lend-lease. Blum s Years ofUrg ency , from the Morgenthau D iaries and Stimson and Bundy s On ActiveService In Peace and War also provided key perspectives from two of thecrucial players of the period. A recent work by Richard M. Ketchum, T h eBorrowed Years , provides an excellent view of major events in the period.


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Even in this thesis the word suggests manipulation by someone orsome group to bring about a private objective. Th e term military-polit ician is defined by the author to mean one who understands theUnited State's political system and uses that knowledge to effectdecisions in the executive and legislative branches of government.How ever, politician will retain its unsavory reference, if a personuses political skills to bring about personal goals or ambitions.

An other term which may be confusing is the word draft. Adraft is the process by which a country's population is involuntarily

selected into military service for a determined time period. In thiscase, i t refers to those men drafted into service during the period 1September 1940 and beyond. Th e phases Burke-W adsworth Act,

Selective Service Act, conscription, or just selective service areinterchangea ble with draft. A draftee is som eone drafted into theArmy. A guardsman is a me mb er of the Nation al Gua rd and part ofthe group federalized in 1940. Federalization mea ns calling theNational Guard and Reserve Officer Corps into federal service andplacing them under the control of the President and Regular Army.

Related to the draft is the term extension. ,In the sum mer of1941 the question of extending the provisions of the Burke-Wadsworth Act and continuing the National Guard 's and ReserveOfficer Corps ' federalized status was an important polit ical question.In the thesis, the terms extend and extension refer to the effort tocontinue those groups on active duty for an indefinite period of time.

T he word s congressmen, senator, and representative referto those men and women who serve in the legislative branch ofgovernment. A representative is a member of the House ofRepres entatives, a senator is a me mbe r of the United States Senate,and the term congressm en refers to both groups.

Th e term Lend-Lease is another expression which may beconfusing or unknown to the reader. Lend -Lease was a phrasecoined after FD R gave his famo us Arsenal of Dem ocracy Speech on7 December 1940. It characterizes the transfer of goods and

services. generally war-goods, to an ally to aid in a comm on causewith payment being made by a return of the original items or their


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use in the common cause .. 9 In this thesis, Lend-Lease is used todescribe the legislative act passed in March 94 which approvedthe transfer of war-goods to American all ies f ighting Germany and-Japan. Th e term allies refers mainly to Gre at Britain and alsoincludes any country aligning i tself with the United States duringWorld War 11.

The goal of the thesis is to clearly depict General Marshall as apolitician in the sense that he willingly and knowingly participated inpolitical activities to protect and further his efforts to rearm, rebuild,and modernize the Army. It attempts to determine if his politicalactivities were a natural extension of his personality and backgroundor if they resulted from the requirements of the period. The thesisdoes not suggest General Marshall 's polit ical activit ies wereundertaken t o en ha nce - his own stature or se ek personal polit icalambitions. On the contrary, it shows that the typical definition for apo lit i cia nlo does not apply in Marshall 's case. However, i t proves hewas not above using traditional political activities to secure his goalsand accomplish army objectives.

The relevance for the thesis is its examination of the politicalactivities of one of the most significant American military leaders ofthe period. It shows how those activities increased Marshall 'seffectiveness as Army Chief of Staff and enabled him to prepare theArmy for the Second World War. Analyzing why Marshall became apolitical Chief of Staff, despite his personal inclinations to thecontrary, suggests that using the political system to realizemeaningful and proper s trategic objectives is not incongruent withtraditional military leadership values or roles. I t a lso demonstratesthat such activity is necessary if military leaders are to influenceproperly and professionally the formulation and execution ofnational military policy. Accordingly, it supports the author's beliefthat political acumen is a desirable skill for military officers in or9 r's New C o l l m t e DIC ~I- (Springfield, Mass.: G C MerriamCompany, 1973) p 658.o Webster's New Colleeiate Dictionan, defines a politician as someonc whois primarily interested in political of fic es from self ish or other narrow short-run interests. (Springfield , Mass.: G&C Merriam Com pany. 197 3).


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progressing to the highest levels of army leadership. Fai lure toacquire such skill may well result in professional frustration and aninability to bring about political action which will positively impacton military policy affecting national strategic interests.George C. Marshall, Emergence of a Politician,l September1930 to 6 December 1941 is an attempt to i l luminate one minoraspect of General Marshall 's career. Truly historic individuals neverdi m with the passage of time; but rather, they become m oresignificant as the complexity of their personality is revealed, and themag nitude of their achievem ents is manifested. Hop efully, thisthesis will add to the overwhelming evidence that General George CMarshall is truly an historic figure.


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CHAPTER 2

GEORGE C. MAR SHALL--ROOTS OF A POLITICIAN

O n 1 September 1939 Lieutenant Colonel Orlando Ward, ' wasshaken from a sound sleep. As he looked at his bed-side clock hecould barely make out the t ime as 3:50 a.m. Drowsily, Ward listenedas General George C. Marshall, acting Army Chief of Staff and hisboss, told him Germany had invaded Poland. As he hung up thephone, Ward scrambled out of bed, hurriedly dressed, and made hisway to the Chief of S ta ffs office to begin work on what wouldcertainly be a busy day. The crisis in Poland, coupled with GeneralMarshall 's official swearing-in as Army Chief of Staff, would keepColonel Ward, his military assistant, fully engaged throughout theday.2

Two years earlier, German Chancellor Adolf Hitler told a smallgroup of confidants that he planned to settle the Czec and Austrian1 Colonel Ward was later promoted to general and given command of the1st Armored Division. Th e 1st Armored Division fought in Am erica's firstsignificant battle against Germany at Kasserine Pass. American efforts atKasserine were anyth ing but successful. Se e Stephen E A mbrose , E i senhow er -4 Ql d i e r 2 (New York: Simonand Schuster. 1983). p 228-229 .2 Russell A. Guge ler. George Marshall and Orlando Ward, 19 39-1941,Parameters Journal of the US rmv W a r C o l l e o ~ ,Volume XIII, March 1983,p 28. This article suggests Ward played a larger role in developing andinstituting programs and polices during Marshall 's first two years in officethan is the case. Interestingly, in his forward to Mark S. Watson's book. C h i e fof Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations Orlando Ward, then serving as Chiefof the Army's Historical Division. says concerning the purpose of Watson'sbook. More specifically, i t tells of the contributions to national security thatwere made during the prewar period by the Chief of Staff and his immediateassistants. It is doubtful that Watson was terribly interested in thecontributions of Ma rshall's assistants. Mark S. Watson, Chief of Staff: Prew arPlans and Preo aratio ns, (W ashington, D.C.: Historical Division, D epartm ent ofthe Army. 1951) p X. (Here after referred to as Watson. Chief of Staff.) Also,see M arskill. Vol. 2 p 47 General Marshall in a letter to G. Edward MacGirvin.said the following concerning his first day in office. My day of induction intooffice was momentous, with the starting of what appears to be a World War.


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q u e s t i o n . . 3 Those listening warned Hitler that such an invasionwould start a Europ ean war. Hitler dismissed their cou nsel and threemon ths later invaded Austria. He, not his advisors, wa s correct;Fran ce and Eng land did nothing. W ithout opposition, he carefullyproceeded t o extend G erman boundaries, first by threat of force, an dthen by actual invasion. In little mo re than four years, the face ofEurope had changed; the balance of power shifted; and theemergence of the United States as a global superpower had begun.

Fran ce and Englan d no longer were world powers. Am erica,now the hope of the free world, clung to its innocence. For fouryears it desperately tried to find a way to help its former mentorswhile at the same t ime retain i ts independence and forsake super-power responsibi l i ty .

Unfortunately, i ts mil i tary forces were anything but world-class. While Hitler had used his time to create a war machine, thelikes of which the world had never seen, the United States hadcarefully sliced and diced its military, turning it into a third-rateforce.4

General Marshall had been Acting Chief of Staff for nearly fourmonths filling in for Gen eral Craig since May 1939. Marshall hadserved as Deputy Chief of Staff, for nearly a year, prior to assumingCraig s da y t o day resp onsibilities while he was on term inal leave.5Th e Army s Chief of S ta ffs o ffice was not new to General Marshall.Eighteen years e arlier he had been at Gen eral Pershing s side, a s hisAid e-de-c am p, when Pershing was sworn-in as Army Chief of Staff.Perhaps, Marshall, even then, fancied the thought of somedaybecoming the Arm y s Chief of Staff.

Marshall s r ise to prominence i n the Army was anything butnormal. H e decided not t o try and attend the Army s premier officertraining school, W est P oin t because he felt his father s political3 Richard M. Ketchum. Borrowed Years 19 38 -1 94 1 (Ne w York:Random House, 1990). p 32.4 Stoler. Georee C. Marshall, p 69 . America's army ranked 19th in theworld .

The Deputy Chief of Staff was the equivalent of today's Vice Chief ofStaff .


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standing as a Democrat in a very Republican district offered himlittle cha nce of selection. Even at this early age, M arshall was notblind to politics. Rather, he decided to pursue a first-class educationat a school in the foothills of Virginia, Virginia Military Institute(VMI).6

Marshall, following his older brother Stuart 's example, enrolledat the VMI.7 VMI, in its picturesque setting of Lexington, was ideallysuited fo r Marshall. Having never previously excelled academ ically,VMI provided him the opportunity to improve basic academic ski l lswhile at the same time master the essentials of military leadership,which would prove to be his greatest skill . So gifted was he at theart of military science, he was selected to be Cadet First Captain hissenior year. Thou gh clearly without peer in military skills, he onlygraduated in the middle of his class.* Ironically, later in life, hewould be renowned for his supreme intellect.

Marshall completed his studies at VMI in 1903 and graduatedas the Corps of Cadets' First Captain. A designation given to thestudent wh o exemplif ied preeminent mil i tary leadership. Marshallcharacterized his selection saying, I tried very hard was veryexacting and very exact i n all my military duties .. 9 Notwithstandinghis status as First Captain, a commission in the Regular Army was notautomatic. In fact, only those graduating from the M ilitaryAcademy at West Point were tenured commissions, al l others were6 Forrest C. Pogue, Deoree C. Ma h 1s a 1 Education of a Gen eral (New Y ork:The Viking Press, 1963) p 41. (Hereafter referred to as Pog ue , -ion of aG en er at .) In 1890 only 1 0 officers on active duty were graduates of VMI. VMIwas the school which produced the likes of Stonewall Jackson, and the boysoldiers who fought at the Battle of Hay Market during the Civil War.7 Larry I Bland, ed.. The Pavers of Georae Catlett Marshall. Volume 1LBaltimore and London: The Jo hn H opkins Un iversity Press, 1981), p 7(Here after referred to as Marshall Interviews, Vol 1.) Stuart Marshall hadgraduated with a creditable academic record in chemistry in 1894... TheMarshall family, since the time Stuart attended VMI, suffered a severfinancial set back. His father had lost most his savings through a specu lativereal estate venture. Marshall's mother was forced to sell some inheritedproperty to pay the cost of tuition.8 Ibid., p 10. A lso, s ee Pogue, w t i o n o f a G ene ra l, p 39- 57.

Pogue, W o n f a General. p 53-54.


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forced to compete for a handful of commissions opened to all whoqualified. Once again Marshall was exposed to the polit ical worldbecause one had to be nominated by one's state congressionaldelegation in order to take the competitive exam. This t ime, however,his desire to become a Regular Army officer overcame his fear offailing, and he resolved to do whatever was necessary to obtain theright to compete.

Following the Spanish-American War, Elihu Root, a corporatelawyer from New York City, was named Secretary of War. Althoughhe possessed no formal background in military matters, Root setabout to reorganize the War Department and the Army's GeneralStaff. Late in 1900 Root asked Congress to increase the size of theArmy. The proposed bill also started the reformation of the GeneralStaff by limiting the term of service for officers who would serve onthe General Staff in the future. In 190 3 Cong ress passed Root's billwhich instituted massive restructuring of the General Staff byabolishing the position of Commanding General of the Army andrepla cing it with th e position of C hief of Staff.10 Later that year healso introduced the Militia Act of 1903, legislation which formallyestablished the Army's officer education system. Marshall benefitedthroughout his career from all of Root's sweeping changes, especiallyfrom the 190 1 bill which increased the Army's o fficer rank s bynearly 837 lieutenants. W ith this increase in the siz e of the Arm y'sofficer corps, Marshall now could realize the fulfillment of his dreamof becoming an Army officer. First, however, he would have to winthe right to compete fo r one of the 142 slots open,l2 and to do thathe needed a political nomination.1 0 Watson, m e f of a 56. General Nelson A. Miles, the serving Chiefof Staff was so opposed to the reforms that the bill was postponed for one yearduring which time he retired. Also, see Philip C. Jessup, Elihu Root New York:Dodd, Mead and Company, 1939). p 248 258.1 Bland. Marshall Pavers. Vol. p 10. Also, see Stoler, Georee C. Marshal,p 12-13, and Pogue, Education of a General, p 59-60, and Thomas Parrish,R o o s e v e l t h a l l - - P a n n e r s In Politics and War New York: W. Morrow.1989). p 79. Hereafter referred to as Parrish, m v e l t and Marshall.)1 2 Bland, Marshall Pavers. Vol. 1, p 10-11. 837 officer slots were available.West Point graduates and men from within the ranks had 1st and 2nd priority.They filled 695 slots. Competition for the remaining 142 slots was fierce; over1 2


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The selection process consisted o f . being nominated andsuccessfully passing the exam. As had been the case fou r yearsearlier, the Pennsylvania delegation was solid Republican. This time,however, Marshall and his father knew exactly what to do toovercome this political dilemma. Though his parents were initiallyopposed to the idea of young George going into the Army,l3 theydecided to fully sustain his strong desire to embark on an Armyc a r e e r .

Marshall's father first wrote to General Shipp, VMI'sSuperintendent, seeking assurances that George possessed the skillsneeded to be a successful candidate. After all, he surely did not wantto risk his political influence on a failed cause. In a letter, 21January 1901, to Shipp, George Sr. asked, Now my object in writingis to ask of you a letter simply giving me your opinion as to George'sfitness. W hether he possesses those qualifications, so essential to themaking of an officer that would be a credit to the Institute ... I4Ship p said that young M arshall was, as well qualified for officer ofinfantry as any man who has been turned out here. Continuing heasserted with comp lete confidence that if commissioned in theArmy (George Jr.) will in all respects, soon take his stand muchabov e the average West Point graduate. l5 With such strongassurances, Marshall 's father set about to vigorously campaign forthe support of every influential person he knew.16

Marshall 's father asked several people to write letters ofrecommendation on behalf of his son. Mr. John Wise, a VMI graduate10.000 men applied for the 142 slots. All applicants except West Point graduateshad to take the competitive exam.l 3 Pogue, Education of a G e a 63. At this time the army was thoughtto be the place where only those without other caree r options served. Havingbeen a very successful businessman, Marshall 's father undoubtedly hadhigher aspirations for his youngest son.l Letter George C. Marshall, Sr. to Brigadier General Scott Shipp, 21January 1901 Marshall Paoers. Vol. 1 p 10.l 5 Pogue, Edu cation of a GeneraL p 63.'6 Letter George C. Marshall, Sr. to Brigadier General Scott Shipp, 21January 1901 Marshall Paaers. Vol. 1, p 10. In the same letter to Shipp said, Ihave many warm and influential friends of the Administration and quitc closeones at that. They will do for me all that it is possible to do. Even so far asmaking it a personal demand. On that score I am fully satisfied and assured-- ...

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who fought at the famous battle of Hay Market and helped PresidentMcKinley win the nomination in 1886, was one of those who~ a r s h a l i ' s a ther en trea ted to personal ly write the Pres ident. In hisletter , he cited Marshall 's ancestry which included the famous JohnM arshall.17 Gen eral Shipp was also buttonholed to send a letter toPresident M cKinley, which h e did on 1 4 February 1901.18

George Sr. intended to take young Marshall to Washington,along with the letters of endorsement, and personally present themto the President.19 How ever, fate had young Marshall making thetrip by himself. In April 190 1 Marshall m ade his way to the nation'scapital to engage in his first personal lobbying effort. As he wouldlearn some 40 years later , this personal touch proved very effectivein gaining his way. He first met with the recently appointed attorneygeneral, Philander C. Knox, a friend of his fathers. Next he talked hisway into a house party being hosted by John A. Hull, Chairman of theHou se M ilitary Affairs Com mittee. Marshall convinced Mrs. Hull thati t was absolutely necessary that he meet with her husband thatnight. Convinced, she escorted young M arshall to her husband 'sstudy to meet with the Congressman.20 The next day he used similarbravado to gain an audience with President William McKinley.Concerning the incident, Marshall later said,

I had no appointment of any kind. The office was on thesecond floor. think the President's bedroo m, as knewit in Mr. [Franklin] Roosevelt 's day, must have been MrMcKinley's office. Th e old colored man (the head usher)asked me if I had an appointm ent and I told him didn't.H e said would never get in, that there wasn't anypossibility.' I sat there and watched people, some ten orfifteen, g o in by appointment, stay ten minutes, and beexcused. Finally a man and his daughter went in withthis old colored man escorting them. I attached myself tothe tail of the procession and gained the President's

1 7 Ibid.. see note 1 p 11.8 Ibid., see note 2 p 1 1 In his letter to the President, General Shipp said,Marshall is fully the equal of the best.

Pogue. Education o f a Genex d, p 6420 Ibid. Also, see Bland, Marshall P a ~ e rs .Vol. 1 p 11

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office. The old colored man frowned at me on his way out,but I stood pat. After the people had met the President,they also went out, leaving me standing there. Mr.McKinley in a very nice manner asked what I wanted andI stated my case. I don't recall what he said, but fromthat I think flowed my appointment or rather myauthority to appear for examination.21

Little did George Marshall realize that his first meeting at the WhiteHouse would be but one of many in years to come. W hetherMarshall's lobbying efforts resulted in his nomination is a topic ofdebate among his biographers. Pogue, principal among them, feels ithad little to do with the end result. He believes Marshall's father'sefforts with Senator Quay were far more persuasive.22 Marshall,himself, felt his meetings with the President and others inWashington, resulted in his appointment.23 Regardless, the totalityof the experience was not lost on Marshall. He had had a valuableinsight into the Nation's political system and learned first hand thepower of political influence and personal lobbying.24 Marshall drewupon this experience later as Army Chief of Staff. On 17 June 1901,his name was among those on the list of nominees to take theexamination. On 23 September 1901, he took the examination andattained an average of 76 percent on the five basic subjects. On 8October 1901, the examining board at Governors Island, New York ina memorandum to the War Department said, . . .the board considershim as having passed, and as well qualified for the position of a

Ibid., p 64 65. In September 1901 President McKinley was assassinated.Thereafter, security arrangements for the President were substantiallyincreased. Marshall s timing again proved fortuitous, for had the events beena mere six months later he would not have been able to see the President.2 2 Ibid.. p 65.23 Ibid.24 Interest ingly, Marshall s experience was not shared by West Pointgraduates. With Regular Army appointments virtually assured each cadetupon graduation, contacts with politicians were limited to their experience insecuring their original appointment to the Academy. Marshall with thisexperience laid a foundation of political sensitivity which the average WestPoint Cadet would not have the opportunity to gain.


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com mission ed officer in the United Sta tes Army.25 Eigh t monthslater, on 3 February 1902, Marshall obtained his goal and wascommissioned a second lieutenant in the United States Army.

Elihu Root s sweeping reforms continued to impac t Marshall searly career when he was selected to attend one of the formal officertraining schoo ls established by the 190 3 Dick Act.26 In 1906Marshall w as selected to attend the A rmy s Schoo l of the Line at FortLeavenworth, Kansas. While there, his academic prowess wasunleased. Being o ne of the junior officers in the course, he wasdetermined t o resolve the difference in rank by surpassing m oresenior officers academically, which he did by being one of the selectfew designated to attend the more advanced course the followingyear.27

Th e second year of in struction greatly benefited M arshall scareer. Beyond the obvious intellectual opportun ities, M arsha llreceived a number of advantages from his prominent class standing.Gen eral Bell, th e Army s Chief of Staff and former com man dant of thecollege, took notice of M arshall s supe rb academic perform ance andrecommended he spend the summer, between school terms,25 Memorandum from Examining Board to War Department, 8 October 1901.see ll Pavers. Vol L p 18. On two subjective areas. physique and moralcharac ter antecedents, he scored 100 percent. Because M arshall had not yetturned 21 years of age, the board recommend his commissioning be delayeduntil after 31 December 1901.26 The D ick Bill or Dick Militia Act adopted in 1903 created a formaleducation system. See Watson, Chief of Strtff, p 57. Also, see Pogue, Edu cation ofGeneral, p 62 and 94 Blan d, Marshall Paver s Vol. 1, p 36, and Jessup, Elihum 258-70. Marshall was stationed at Fort Reno at the time he was selectedfor the college at Fort Leavenwon h. To be selected. he had competed with twoother officers assigned to Fort Reno; each year he had finished first in thecompetition but fail to be detailed to the college because he was junior ingrade. Finally, the third year he was selected because no one else signed up toattend the college. The army s education system was not considered anecessity for advancem ent by the officers of the day. Had Genera l Bell. theArmy s Chief of S taff, no t been the form er comm andant, th is aspect ofMarshall s career would have been far less remarkable.27 Those selected for the second year of instruction were taken from thcupp er 50 percen t of those attending the basic course. Marshall finished thefirst year ranked first in the class with a 96.78 percentage. On his clas sstanding report he was cited as being well suited for several positions none ofw hich in clu ded com mander. S ee P ogue, -on of a G en eral, p 99 andBland, m a l l Pavers. Vol. L p 37.

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instructing the Pennsylvania National Guard. At the time Marshallwas less than enth usiastic abo ut the assignm ent. In a 7 July 1907letter to the Army's Ad jutant Gen eral he asked that, the orderdirecting me to attend the encampment of the 2d Brigade, NationalGuard of this state e revoked . . . 28 Fortunately for Marshall and theArmy his request was denied and he began what was to be a longand extremely profi table relat ionship with the ci t izen-army whichimbeded in him a firm belief in the nation's civilian-soldier system ofdefense. H is initial impressions of the Gua rd were favorable. In hisreport to the senior instructor at the Guard's summer camp, CaptainCharles Rhodes, he wrote, My criticisms and suggestions weresolicited and followed out to a flattering deg ree My tour of dutywith the 3d Brigade was made as pleasant and enjoyable as workcan be was treated with every possible consideration and kindnessby the Brigade Com man der nd his officers. 29 Th e PennsylvaniaNational Guard was equally impressed with Marshall 's instruction,word of which reach General Bell, thus vindicating Marshall's

Marshall 's success with the Guard, coupled with his academicstanding during his second year at Leavenworth, earned him aposition on the school's faculty.31 During his tenure at FortLeavenworth, Marshall continued to instruct the National Guard eachsummer. Th e National Guard's Comm anding Gen eral specificallyasked for Marshall. Marshall responded to these assignmen tspositively because he saw the guardsmen as eager students and the28 Letter, George C. Marshall to the Army Adjutant General, 7 July 1907.See Marshall Pape rs Vol. 1 p 38. Personal considerations comp elled Marshallto make this request.29 Repon, George C. Marshall to Captain Charles D. Rhodes, 28 July 1907.See Marshall Pavers Vol. 1 p 38-39.30 Marshall's association with General Bell was to last a number of years.He served with him in 1916, again working with civilians serving in thePlattsburg offic er training camps in the W estern United States. In 1917Marshall was Bell 's Aide-de-camp.Po gu e, -on o f a G en eral. p 1 02 -1 03 . M arsh all w as an u nan im ou schoic e of the academ ic board. Also, see Bland. wa rsh all Paoers. V ol. 1 p 47.S toler, George C. M a rs h a , p 23.


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Guard itself as a valuable component of the Nation's defense. In a 27July 1907 letter to the Secretary of War, Colonel F. W. Stillwell wrote

We wish also to part icularly express our appreciat ion forthe zeal, the energy, the intelligence, and the manyhelpful suggestions of Lieutenant Geo rge C. Ma rshall wh owas detai led to this regiment, and whose presence andfaithful work with and among us was very beneficial toevery off icer and enlis ted man of this command; so muchs that if it be possible and in accord with your and hiscircumstances at the t ime, we would respectfully requestthat he be detai led to this regiment again at our nextannual encampment .32There are also indications that during his association with theGuard, Marshall developed a web of relationships with Guard

members who would soon be influential in business and government.One such example was M. W. Clement who later became president ofthe Pennsylva nia Railroad. Clement said of Marshall and his fellowinstructors, A new world in military affairs opened itself to them inds of the m ilitia men. 33 Along with these new found friends inthe Guard, Marshall, while at Leavenworth, also became friends oracquainted with a number of s tudents who would play prominentroles in the Army over the next twenty years.34

Over the next six years, Marshall 's outstanding service with theGuard played in his future assignments. In 1911 Governor Draper ofMassachusetts asked Secretary of War Henry Stimson to assignMarshall to instruct Massachusetts ' National Guard. Naturally,Marshall preferred remaining with the Regular Army; however, heaccepted the detail and again excelled in this unique training3 2 See M a r s h a l ~ a o e r s . Vol. 1 p 42 Also, see General Marshall's speechgiven on 13 October 1939, to the annual banquet of the National GuardAssociation of Pennsylvania. itsha1 Papers. V ol. 1 p 4 4 and 57.33 Pogue, Education of a General, p 102-103.34 Officers such as McAuIey Palmer, LTC Hunter Liggett, and LieutenantDouglas MacAnhur.


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en viro nm en t.35 In 1916, while serving on General Bell 's staff inCalifornia, Marshall again was asked to train civilians in military art.

In 1915, after Germany sunk the Lus i t an i a a group of wealthyand prominent young men, all members of the Harvard Club in NewYork City, petitioned the W hite Hou se swea ring to support thegovernment in any measures, however ser ious, to secure reparat ionsand guarantees 36 for the Lus i tan ia . Anxious to gain some action andall being old enough to serve in the military, they came upon theidea of training them selves for military service.37 Naturally, theybelieved, given their education and background, they were ideal lysuited fo r som e kind of officer training. With the backing andencouragement of General Leonard Wood, commander of the Army'sEastern Department, they set up an officer's training site atPlattsburg, New York, to train hundreds of young businessmen inofficership. Soon, under the auspices of the Military Training CampsAssociation, MTCA, the Plattsburg Movement was copied at locationsthroughou t the country.38 Wh ile serving as Bell 's aide, Marshall wasasked to oversee several civilian training camps for wealthy and welleducated volunteers at si tes throughout the Western United States.In describing one such experiences Marshall said, They were all thehot bloods of San Francisco. I saw more Rolls Royces and other finecars around there than had eve r seen collected ... 39 Ironically,Marshall, in his first year as Chief of Staff, was confronted by theMTCA's founders with a proposal for the country's first peacetimedraft, and a year later an initiative to reestablish the PlattsburgCamp.4035 B l and , Masha l l Pa~e r s .Vol. L p 57. Also, see 15 May 1911 letter fromMajor General Charles B. Dougheny. Commanding General, PennsylvaniaNational Guard, to Captain Charles D. Rhodes. Office of the Chief of Staff of theArmy. In this letter General Dougheny asks that Marshall 's assignment bechanged so that he can serve instead with the Pennsylvania Guard.36 Clifford and Spencer, Jr.. The First Peacetime DraQ, p 15.37 Ibid.. p 15.38 Ibid., p 15.39 Pogue, m a t i o n of a G- p 136.

Forrest C. Pogue, Ordeal and Hope 939 94 New York: The VikingPress, 1974 . p 103. (Hereafter referred to as Pogu e, Ord eal and Hopc.) Also, seeClifford and Spencer. tPeace p 117-118.1 9


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Marshall 's last formal association with citizen-soldiers came in19 33 41 when then A rmy Chief of Staff Douglas M acArthur selectedhim to be the senior instructor of the Illinois National Guard. ColonelRobert McCormick, publisher of the Chicago Tribune, had been mostcritical of the Illinois National Guard's training program. T he IllinoisGuard Commander, Major General Keehn, an active Democrat andattorney for the Hearst publishing empire, asked General MacArthurto assign an officer who could significantly improve the Guard'sreadine ss.42 Marshall was the officer hand-picked by MacArthur tofix things in Illinois. According to the Army's Adjutant Gen eral, theChief of Staff personally picked Marshall for the billet. Responding toGeneral Keehn's request, MacArthur wrote, Suggest LieutenantColonel Geo rge C. Marshall. He has no superio r amon g InfantryColonels. 43 Although he personally queried the Chief of Staff seekingto change the assignment, the request was disapproved.

On 13 November 1933, he wrote G eneral Pershing, concerningwhat he thought was a most fateful time in his career saying,

General MacArthur wrote me in a very sympathetic manner, but itwas 'back to staff duty' for me. I seem fated. 44 D isap poi nte dprofessionally by the assignment, Marshall felt his last chance forpromotion to general and assignment as Army Chief of Staff was nowgone with this, still another, assignment away from troops. For thefirst few months Marshall could not shake the depression he felt forbeing assigned to a back-water billet. Mrs. Marshall, commenting onher husband's initial respo nse to the assignment said Those first4 1 From 1915 until 1933 Marshall served in a number of assignmentsoverseas in Europe and China. He also commanded a number of statesideg a r r i s o n s .4 2 Letter Major General James F McKinley to Colonel George C Marshall, 3October 1933. See w a l l Paoers. Vol. 1 p 398. The Hearst company ownedthe rival daily newspaper in Chicago.4 3 Ibid., see note 3 399 Some believe MacAnhur picked Marshall forthe Chicago assignment with the sole motive of taking him out of contentionfor general officer. With M acA nhu r being a March man and Marshall tiedto General Pershing, there seemed understandable differences between thetwo men. However. M acAn hur denied such a motive. See Pogue, Education of aGeneral p 401. note 34.44 Letter Colonel George C. Marshall to General John J. Pershing, 13November 1933. See Marshall Pavers. Vol. 1, p 406 407.


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months in Chicago I shall never forget. George had a grey, drawnlook which I had never seen before, and have seldom seen since. ByChristmas, however, his enthusiasm had returned ... 45 As Marshallwarmed to the assignment he gained valuable insight into a sectionof the cou ntry which became a hotbed of isolationism in the 1930 s.Colone l M cCormick s new spaper was an outspoken critic of theRoos evelt Administration s New Deal; and it would play a veryimportant role, later in the decade, in the debates concerningAm erica s participation in the war in Europe.46

Marshall s exten sive time w ith the Illinois National Guardproved crucial in his training to be a political Chief of Staff. W hilethe rest of the A rmy s O fficer Corp s was serving the m ajority of theircareer with troops or in key staff positions, Marshall was learninghow Guardsmen felt about the Regu lar Army. Th is insight provedpriceless in two ways. It helped him to ap preciate guardsmen sattitudes for military service; which was va luable in 194 0 when theNational Guard s federalization becam e on e of the m ajor publicdebates facing Marshall as Chief of Staff. It also gave him theopportunity to meet and befriend many key business and politicalleaders. For example, in Chicago he reestablished relationship withCharles G. Dawes, whom he had met while serving as GeneralPershing s Aide -de-ca mp in W ashington. Daw es, a prom inent Illinoisbanker, introdu ced Marshall to several of the area s bus iness andprofessional leaders. Th ese contacts becam e friends and associateswho provided key support to Marshall after he became Chief ofStaff.475 Katherine Tupper Marshall. T o e e t h e r s o f an Armv W i k N ewYork: Tupper and Lo ve, Inc.. 1947), p 18. Hereafter referred to as KatherineMarshall, Torrether. See Letter from Mrs. Elizabeth C. Marshall to Mrs. ThomasB. Coles, 5-6 Septem ber 1 927 , M a r s h a l l e m . V ol. 1 p 314 . Mrs. Elizabeth K.

Marshall died while writing t is letter on 6 September 1927 . In 1930 hemarried Mrs. Katherine Tupper Brown. In this thesis Mrs. Marshall alwaysrefers to his second wife, Katherine.4 6 Clifford and Spencer, The First Peace Time Draft, p 66 144. Also , se eParrish, Ro os ev elt and Marshall, p 69.4 7 Stoler, Sjeoree C. Marshall, p 60.


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s o atypic al of most sen ior Army o fficers of the period. Perh aps thecontinued funding cuts prompted most Army officers to blame localcivilians for Congressional actions.50

Marshall 's exposure with civilians continued through hisassociation with the Civilian Conservation Corps (C.C.C.). Sho rtly aftertaking office in 1933, Roosevelt organized the EmergencyConservation Wo rk, better known as the C.C.C., Civilian ConservationCorps, to be used in forestry, flood control, and anti-erosion projects.The program was designed to employ and train young males, asegment of the population especially hard hit by the Depression.The Army was given the responsibility to house, feed, clothe, andentertain over 250,000 C.C.C. volunteers. Marshall, as postcommander at Fort Screven and Fort Moultrie, supervised 21 campsand nearly 4,000 men enrolled in C.C.C. As one assistant put it,

Marshall ate, breathed , and digested th e many C.C.C. problems. 51Unlike many officers, Marshall thrived on his association with

the C.C.C. camps. Co lonel Law rence Halstead, acting Chief of Infan try,reflecting the view of many officers, wrote, This work is onerousand probably distasteful to the Army ... 52 Marshall, building on hisextensive service with the National Guard and civilians in general,saw nothing but potentia l in the C.C.C. camps. He saw the Armylearning how to train and care for a large mobilized force. He sawmoney formerly cut, being retained so the Army could accomplishtheir new C.C.C. mission.53 He saw nothing but opp ortun ity and tookfull adva ntage of it. Throug hout the sum mer of 193 3, Marshall's5 0 In 1932, President Hoover signed the Omnibus Economy Bill whichstipulated that all military officers were required to take unpaid furloughstotaling thirty days. all leaves were prohibited, and salary increases associatedwith promotions or length of service were prohibited. See Bland. Marsha l lmers. Vol. L p 390 note 2; and Memorandum Colonel Marshall to GeneralHammon, 13 April 1934, p 425-428.Bland. arshall Vol 1 p 392-393. Also. see Robert E. Sherwood,Roosevelt and Hookins--An Intimate Histow (New York: Harper Brothers,1949. . p 52-63. (Hereafter referred to as Shenvood, Poosevelt and hop kin^.)5 Bland, Marshall Paoers. Vol. t p 393.5 3 Sherwood, Roosevelt and Marshall, p 76. Also, see Bland, Marshallbuers. Vol. 93.


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letters where full of details concern ing th e C.C.C. camps.54 As was thecas e with the National Guard, the C.C.C. association enab led M arshallto add to his list of influential contacts. On e Such association waswith Senator James F. Byrn es of South Carolina. Byrne s would play asignificant role in Marshall 's legislative battles during his first twoyears as Arm y Chief of Staff.55 T he C.C.C. association stayed withMarshal1 throughout his career and gave him a unique sensit ivity tothe thoughts and opinions of the comm on American. Few of hispeers in the Army ever developed such an appreciation for thosethat they protected. On the battlefields of Europe it probably did notmatter; however, in the hallways of Congress, such an insight wasi nva l ua b l e .

M arshall continued his association with the C.C.C. afte r he waspromoted and placed in command of the Seventh Infantry Regimentand Vanco uver Barracks. Undoubtedly his support and success withC.C.C. cam ps caug ht the eye of Hany Hopkins, head of the WorksProgress Administration (WPA) in Washington, which had overallresponsibility for the C.C.C. program. Mr. Hopkins later provedpivotal in Marshall 's selection to be Chief of Staff.56

Ano ther person, wh o had profound influence on Marshall 'scareer and eventual selection as Chief of Staff, was his mentorGeneral John J. Pershing. Though the relationship between these twomen eventually neared that of father-son, their first meeting wasany thing but cordial.57 They met in World War I; after a rocky5 4 See Letter Colonel Marshall to Major General Edward L. King. 26 May1933; Letter Colonel Marshall to Brigadier General Leigh R. Gignilliat. 3 June1933; Letter Colone Marshall to General John J. Pershing. 11 July 1933.em. Vol. L p 394-398.55 Letter Colonel Marshall to Senator James F. B yrnes, 17 November 1933.See m u e r s ol. L p 407. Senator Bymes became Chairman of thepowerful Senate Appropriations Committee and served in that position duringMarshall's first two years as Chief of Staff. Also, see John William Pan in,Assistant President for the Home Front: James F. Byrnes and World War 11(Pd.D. diss.. University of Florida, 1977).56 Stoler, George C. Marshall, 65-66. Also, see She mo od, Roosevelt andMarshali. p 11.57 On 3 October 1917. General Pershing visited the 1st Infantry Divisionheadquarters at Gondreco urt, France. On this occasion, after listening toGeneral Sibert, Division Com mander, and another junior officer critique a

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introduction, Pershing selected Ma rshall to serve on his A.E.F. staffwhere Marshall s planning a nd adm inistrat ive bri l l iance becam eapparent. After distinguishing himself in plan ning the St. M ihiel andM eu se- Ar go nn e offensives,58 Pershing asked him to become one ofh i s Aides-de-camp.demonstration, Marshall recalled the experience years later, He just gaveeverybody hell, and he was very severe with General Siben n front of all theofficers. Among other things, he said that we didn't show any signs of muchtraining; we had not justified the time we had had here; nd generally he justsacrificed us. He didn't give General Sibert a chance to talk at all So I decidedit was about time for me to make my sacrifice play went up and started to talkto General Pershing, who dismissed the Division's chief of staff rathercontemptuously and was off e shrugged his shoulders and turned away fromme, and I put my hand on his arm and practically forced him to talk. (Theother officers in the room where startled at such a display. But as one ofMarshall's assistants later said about Marshall temper, his eyes flashed and hctalked so rapidly and vehemently no one else could get in a word. Heoverwhelmed his opponent by a torrent of facts. ) Holding Pershing's armMarshall said, There's something to be said here, and I think I should say itbecause I've been here longest. When Marshall recounted the episode to hisbibliographer. Dr. Pogue, he could not recall exactly what he said to Pershing,but others said he told Pershing that since he had been there the longest, heshould have been asked the questions. Whatever he said, it obviously had amodifying effect because Pershing responded by saying, You must appreciatethe troubles we have. Marshall. as he later said, I thought I had gotten in itup to my neck; I might as well not t y to float but t splash a little bit. Heresponded by telling Pershing, Yes, General, but we have them every day andmany a day, and we have to solve every one of them by night. Pershing,without further comment, left the headquarters. Most, including GeneralSibert. who witnessed this display of emotions, believed Marshall's career wasfinished. But rather than hurt, it caught the eye of the most popular andpowerful general in the Army. Then after, whenever Pershing visited thedivision, he would get me off away from the others and talk to me about theconditions of affairs. See Bland, Marshall Paoers. Vol. 1 p 121-122. Also, seePogue, ducationof151-153, and Frank E. Vandiver. Black Jack--

College Station and London: TexasA&M University Press, 1977). p 797-798.5 8 After the A.E.F. Chief of Staff, Hugh Drum. gave Marshall theassignment to plan the offensive, Marshall realizing the complexity of thetask. said, This appalling proposition rather disturbed my equilibrium, thenext few hours were the most trying mental ordeal. Knowing his reputationand future depended on the success of his plan, he prepared what he latercalled ...my best contribution to the war. Marshall planned the movement ofeleven French and Italian divisions with two corps headquarters from thefront and replaced them with fifteen U.S. divisions and three corpsheadquarters. a movement of 220,000 troops out of the line and 600.000 into i t(400,000 from Saint Mihiel) with 3.000 guns and 900,000 tons of supplies andammunition Marshall's planning was a logistical feat of unprecedented


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For the next five years (1920-1924), Marshall served asGeneral Pershing's Aide-de-camp both during the post war periodand more importantly during the period 1921 to 1924 when heserved as Pershing's senior Aide while Pershing was Army Chief ofStaff. Of all his pre-chief of staff positions, none prepared him betterfor the political arena than his service with Pershing.

Marshall 's f irst exposure with Congressional Comm ittees cam ewhen Pershing was called to testify about the appropriate size forthe peace-time Army. Pershing was in the precarious position ofbeing General of the Armies with a permanent four star rank yetsubordinate to the Chief of Staff, General March, who held onlytemporary four star rank. Pershing and his staff supported a smallpeacetime Army, yet large enough to deal with any emergency andlarge enough to train the civilian militia, the National Guard. Gen eralM arch, P ershing's arch rival,59 m aintained it was impro per to placesuch faith in a civilian militia. He proposed a standing Army ofnearly 500,000. Pershing was called to testify before the Ho useM ilitary Affairs Comm ittee. Th e com bination of Pershing's influenceand the nation's strong desire to decease the Army's size, resulted inCongress passing the 1920 National Defense Act which established anArmy built around a Regular Army core and augmented by theNational Guard in the event of national emergency. Th e measure,along with setting the Army's strength, established the General Staffconfiguration which Marshall would inherit in 1939. Thisproportions, and it succeeded brilliantly. See Stoler. G e o r ~ eC. Marshall, p 40.Also, see Bland, Marshall Pavers. Vol. 1 p 160 and Vandiver, Black Jack,p 944-945.s Ibid.. page 207-208. Prior to departin g fo r Washing ton, D.C.. andbecom ing Chief of Staff. March. the A.E.F. Artillery Training Cam p Comm anderat Valdahon, visited Pershing. After March left, one of Pershing's assistantssaid, That man is going to cause you trouble. I know that. Persh ingremarked, But he is a capab le officer. Ho stilities between the two gener alsbmke out almost as soon as March took over as Army Chief of Staff on May 241918 and began issuing orders to the A.E.F. Com mande r... Also, see DonaldSmythe, The Pershing-March Conflict in World War I, Parameters. Journal ofhe U S Armv W ar Collerre, Volume XI, number 4. December 1981 p 53.Marshall, when asked about the Pershing-March feud said, I had rather notgo into the Pershing-March feud. They had it out, and I'm not an ump ire onsuch things, I leave that to the columnists. M ars ha ll interview^. 11 April1957. p 225-226. 2


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experience provided Marshall his first taste of CongressionalCommit tee .60

I n l 9 2 1 , Pershing became the Army's Chief of Staff, and for thenext three years Marshall saw first hand how the Army Chief of Staffof the Army worked with the Secretary of War, the Congress, and thePresident. Marshall, perhaps with an ey e to one day being Chief ofStaff, scrutinized Pershing's every action eager to learn the nuancesof the position. He watched Pershing interact with the pow erful andinfluential in Washington. He observed and learned how Pershingmade and use fr iendships with important pe0ple.6~ Marshall beganto develop his own network of powerful partners, men such asCh arles Dawes62 and Bernard Baruch, who later on, during his earlyyears as Chief of Staff, provided council and helped the new Chief ofStaff in flue nc e legisla tive action.63 In 1923 , while Pershing was on asix month visit to Europe, Marshall was responsible for preparing theChief of Staffs annual report to the Secretary of War, which askedfor small, but necessary, increases to the regular Army forcestructure and funding for large-scale National Guard maneuvers.64Though the request was denied, it provided Marshall a uniqueopportunity to prepare and testify before Congress and to see theArmy's post-war struggle for resources.6560 Stoler, George C. Marshall, p 47. Also, see Bland, Marshall Pavers. Vol. 1,p 194.6 1 Vandiver, Black Jack, p 1059. See memorandum Colonel Marshall toGeneral John 3. Pershing, 23 December 1920, and Letter Colonel Marshall toColonel John McA. Palmer, 25 February 1921, Marshall Pavers. Vol. 1, p 205-206.6 2 Letter Colonel Marshall to Brigadier General Charles G. Dawes, 7February 1922. M as ha ll Papgrs . Vol. 1. p 210.63 Pogue, Qrdeal and H a , p 24. Also, see Bernard M. Baruch, BARUCH--h e u b l i c New York: Holt. Rinehan and Winston, 1962. . p 277-278.Baruch said of his association with Marshall. I had known him since the time

when he was General Pershing's aide everal times. Marshall asked my helpin his efforts to win Congressional support for his plans.64 Vandiver, Black Jack., p 1064. While Pershing made a six-month tour ofFrance in 1923, George Marshall held the chief of staffs officetogether Marshall knew the chi ef s mind, and everyone in the offic e acccptedhis decis ions .65 Pogue. E d u c a t i o n p 221-222.


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His entire period as Pershing's Aide-de-camp was a significantpreparatory experience for Marshall. Dr. Pogue said of this period inMarshal l ' s career ,

Marshall 's f ive years with Pershing inevitably involvedhim in a miscellany of activities which in retrospect wasdifficult to assign any coherent pattern. From the pointof view of his career, these years were most fruitful interms of exposure to politics and to personalities ofpolitics and business, not only in Washington but in thecourse of his frequent travels through the country withhis chief. He sat in on a number of informal talksbetween Pershing and President Harding ...becameacquainted with Secretary of Commerce HerbertHoover ... eveloped a close relationship during Dawes'year in Washington as Director of the Budget ...while on atrip through Louisiana j oined with the state's GovernorJohn Parker and Bernard Baruch for duck hunting ... Insum Dr. Pogue. said, It was t o be training not only in thepolitical art of the possible but in the temper ofd e m o c r a c y 66

The years as Aide to the Army Chief of Staff were the best possibletraining for the political world he would face as Chief of Staff.Perhaps it was the combination of Marshall 's brilliance in France; theexecution of his aide duties, which were far more involved thantoday;67 and the close personal relationship which emerged at thistime that convinced Pershing that Marshall should one day becomeChief of Staff.68

Ibid., p 220 226.7 Marshall, equally close to ' the chief, found himself increasingly

deluged with draft letters. reports, memoranda. Knowing the keenintelligence of Marshall, his thoroughly professional view. Pershing seldomacted without the younger man's opinion. Vandiver. Black Jack. p 1058 and1064.8 From a number of sources the author has reached the conclusion thatPershing had, sincc Marshall 's tenure as his aide, pushed and furtheredMarshall's career. Throughou t his career he was known as a Pershing Manwhich contributed to his being prevented from general officer rank fo r manyyears. General MacArthur, a March Man and the Chief of Staff, did little tohelp Ma rshall. Bland. -hall Papers. Vol. L p 200. In 1935. General Pershing


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Ironically, in 1939 it was two former Pershing subordinates,Major General Hugh Drum and Brigadier General George C. Marshall,who were the prime challengers to succeed General Malin Craig asthe Army Chief of Staff. Drum , the leading can dida te and highlytalented officer had been Pershing's A E F Chief of Staff.69 M arsha ll,although well known within the Army, was thought to be a dark-horse candidate by the public.70 In 1938, Marshall was assigned tobe Chief, War Plans Division, Army General Staff, the equivalent oftoday's Dep uty Chief of Staff for Ope rations and Plans. Th ree mo nthslater, he was named Craig's Deputy Chief of Staff. Little did Drumrealize that these rapid assignments were part of Pershing'smaneuvers to place Marshall in strong contention to replace Craig in1939.71Another key Marshall supporter was Harry Hopkins, one ofRoose velt's close st advisors. Hop kins met with Ma rshall in an effortto broad en his ow n backg round in m ilitary affairs.72 This was allpart of the President's effort to have Hopkins run for president inpersonally asked President Roosevelt to promote Marshall, but nothing came ofthe request, even though the President personally petit ioned GeneralMacArthur. General Pershing asks very strongly that Colonel George C.Marshall (Infantry) be promoted to Brigadier. Can we put him on the list ofnext promotions? See memorandum President Roosevelt to Secretary of War.24 May 1935. &krshall Pavers. Vol. 1 p 468. Baruch said the following aboutthe day Pershing told him he had recommended Marshall for the Chiefs job, Ihave just done a great thing for our country. I have recommended to F.D.Rthat he appoint Marshall as Chief of Staff. Se e Bar uc h, B A R U C H , p 278.Pers hing knew each of the top officers in the Army personally. He had seenthem perform in the World War. The one man he favored over all others to bcChief of Staff was Marshall. Also, see Vandiver. Black Jack , p 1091.69 The New York Times Ma-azing 28 December 1941, p 7.7 0 Pogue, Q aI and Hop& p 13. Also, see Panish. Roosev elt and Ma rsha ll,p 77-78.

Bland, M p 611; Memorandum General Marshall toGeneral Pershing. 26 September 1938, and Letter General Marshall to GeneralPershing 16 January 1939. m h a l l Pauers. Vol. p 636. 684; Eric Larrabee,*U New York: Harper and Row, 1987). p 106-109; Stoler, c e C. Marshall.p 64-65; Vandiver, Black Jack, p 1091; Russell A. Guge ler, Geo rge Marsh all andOrlando Ward, 1939-1941,molume XIII March 1983, p 29.7 2 Sh ew oo d, Roosevelt and Hovkins. p 11.


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1940.73 Hopkins was imm ediately taken by Marshall 's superbintellect and command of the subject. He quickly saw Marshall assomeone who was able to support Roosevelt 's program and bringmuch needed order to the War Department.74While General Drum, on the other hand, had a much broadersupport base, both in and outside the Army,75 he lacked theconfidence of the President. Often Drum exacerbated his standingwith the President by overtly campaigning or encouraging others tocampaign in his behalf. On one occasion the President remarked,Drum, Drum, I wish he would stop beating his own drum ... 76 In fact

Drum was so confident that one rumor had him visit ing GeneralCraig's quarters at Fort Myer to inspect the house slated for the Chiefof Staff the same Sunday Roosevelt offered the job to Marshall.77

After months of speculation the President called GeneralMarshall to his office on 23 April 1939 and asked him to become thenext Army Chief of Staff.78 Exactly how Marshall cam e from behindand beat out Drum and others for the job has been a matter muchspeculated on. How ever, the influence of Marshall 's men tor and close7 3 Pogue. Qrdeal and Hooe, p 25-26. and Parrish, Roo sevelt and Ma rshall,p 92-93.7 4 Marshall Interviews, 5 April 1957, p 181-182; Sherwood, Roo sevelt andp 11 100-101; n d B lan d, m h a l l P ao ers. V ol. 1 , p 713.75 Pogue, Ed ucation of a General, p 329.7 6 Stoler, Georee C. Marshall, p 6677 Russell A. Gugeler, George Marshall and Orlando Ward, 1939-1941,Parameters. Journal of the U.S. Annv War Colles, Volume XIII, March 1983,p 29 and 42. According to Orlando Ward's diary entry on 7 January 1941, Drumleft Washington thinking he would be CIS. Since that time he has been tryingto supplant Marshall in every way or at least get some kind of good job.78 Parrish, Po ose veit and M arshall, p 97. Also, see Bland, Marshall Pavers,p 712-713. Larrabee. Commander In Chief, p 109. Marshall was called tothe White House on Sunday. April 23. amving a t 3:35 p.m. and stay ing fo rforty minutes in the President's study. Roosevelt had informed no one else, noteven the Secre tary of War. 'It was an interesting interview, Marshall saidlater; it must have been. He told Roosevelt that he would want to speak hismind without hesitation and that this might not always be pleasing. 'Is that allright? Marshall asked. The President naturally said 'yes' and so Marshalladded: 'you said yes p leasan tly but i t may be unpleasant. '


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friend, General Pershing along with the backing of Harry Hopkins,seemed to have made the difference in President Roosevelt 's mind. 'g

In 1939 George C. Marshall took charge of the Army GeneralStaff, which had not changed in make-up or character since theNational Defense Act in 1920. The Army Chief of Staff, according tothe Act was, ...the imm ediate adv isor to the Secretary of W ar on allmatters relating to the Military Establishment and is charged by theSecretary of War with the planning, development, and execution ofthe military program. In 1936 the Chief of Staff was given theadded responsibility of Commanding General of the Field Forces intime of peace. That responsibility continued until Congress declaredwar and the President named a Commanding General of the FieldForces.80 The Chief of Staff was also, by custom, chief militaryadvisor to congressional committees responsible for mili tary mattersand principal spokesman in conferences with the various branches ofgove r nm e n t . 81 l e hief of Staff reported directly to the Secretaryof War, who in turn represented and reported to the President;however, under Marshall the line between the Chief and the9 Ibid., p 11, 92-93, 97. Also, see Pogue, Education of a Ge neral, p 323-330 ,Pogue, and p 23-25. Larrabee. ommander p 106-109.

Why did Roosevelt pick him? Larrabee in his book suggests there wereseveral reasons but that the choice was not as unobvious as some mightsuggest. First, when seniority is reviewed although Marshall was number 35on the list he was not as junior as one may think at first look. A provisoprevented anyone from serving as CSA who could not complete a full four yearterm before retirement. This eliminated all but four of the 34 ahead ofMarshall. (Rooseve lt did ask for names of possible junior nominees.) The fourahead of Marshall were Hugh Drum, John Dewitt. Frank Rowell, and WalterKrueger; of these. DeWitt was overly identified with logistics, Rowel1 had noenergetic supporters, Krueger was handicapped by his German birth, whichleft Drum. ..It would not be fair to say (a s some of his panisan critics have said)that Marshall was a New Deal general, but it is true that he had a betterunderstanding than most Army officers of the conditions which the Rooseveltadministrations were trying to cope He had personally experienced the NewDeal in the form of the Civilian Conservation C orps Marshall was one of thefew officers who threw himself into the task of running the C.C.C.'s with somesense of the Army's stake t was an exerc ise in triangulation of the kind thatpolitics regularly gives Marshall fell within the angles of favorable judgmentby all three, and the fact that he was endorsed by both Harry Hopkins andJohn J. Pershing said something about him that could not be said of any othcrcandidate, surely not of Hugh DNm...80 Watson. Chief of Staff, p 64.8 Ibid.. p 66.


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President was opened and often used. In July 1939, while Marshallwas acting Chief of Staff, President Roosevelt issued an executiveorder which provided for immediate contact between the WhiteHouse and the Chief of Staff of the Army and Chief of Navalo p e r a t i o n s .

Marshall came to the Chiefs chair with two pressing problems.The first one was how to deal with the personal feud betweenSecretary of War Harry H. Woodring and his Deputy Under Secretaryof W ar Louis Johnson. Th e second concerned how to rebuild anArmy dismantled by twenty years of congressional cutbacks andprepare it for war. His only recourse concerning the Woodring-Johnson dispute was to walk a narrow path between the two.However, concerning the second problem he had prepared his entirecareer fo r just such a challenge.

Mrs. Craig, wife of the serving Chief of Staff Malin Craig, toldMrs. Marshall at their first meeting, I shall never forgiveWashington; they have crucified m y husbandOw 82 Mrs. M arshallrealized that the they Mrs. Craig was re fe m ng to was the Secretaryof War, Harry Woodring and his Deputy Assistant Secretary, LouisJohnson. Th ese two men had been at each other's throats since Mr.Johnson was named by Roosevelt to be the Deputy AssistantSecretary of War in 1938.83

The friction between the two men hurt the Army's ability topresent a united front to a Congress still wary, despite the growing

Marshall. Toeether 448 Pogue. Ordeal and Hone, p 20. Roosevelt named Mr. Woodring, a formergovernor of Kansas Assistant Secretary of War in 1933. When Secretary of WarGeorge H. Dern died in 1936 Woodring became Acting Secretary of War.Roosevelt never intended to retain Woodring, but in 1936 the Democratscarried Kansas and the President name Woodring Secretary of War. Rooseveltlater named Mr. Johnson, a corporate lawyer from West Virginia and formernational commander of the American Legion Assistant Secretary of War. Thetwo men were opp osites in every way. Wo odring was a strong isolationist whofoug ht the President's efforts to aid the allies and rearm the nation. Johnsonwas a strong interventionist who believed America's best defense rested inaiding the allies and building a strong military. W oodring was a ques tionableadministration. Johnson was extremely talented. Roosevelt had promisedJohnson Woodring's job. Despite urgings from his advisors, Roo sevelt refusedto fire Wo odring and move Johnson into the position. The two men foughtover every issue. The War Department came to a vinual stop in the late 1930's.


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suffered fro m continuing congression al neglect. Unfortuna tely, thestructure of the Army did not change with the reduction inmanpower; therefore, the term 'skeleton force' became fashionable.87

By 1939, The U S Army was a threat to nobody; it stoodnineteenth in the world, with a meager total of 174 ,000 men, aheadof Bu lgaria but just behind Portugal. Its 'divisions' we re half und erstrength and dispersed in scattered posts, with virtually noopportunity to t rain as units; joint maneuvers were held only everyforth year and lasted two weeks at the 'ou ts id e quipment , 'modern 'by 1919 standards at the least , was hopelessly obsolete andinadequate . 88 On e article written in 194 0 characterized the task ofrebuilding the Army to be like the, reconstruction of a dinosauraround an u lan and three vertebrae. 89

M ars ha ll ' was not su rprized by the lack of preparedness nor thecountry's seeming indifference to it . He had seen the effects ofunpreparedness fi rst hand during the First World War, and thetremendous price America paid for the country's unwil l ingness toprepare.90 In speech to the Veterans of Foreign Wars on 19 June ,1940, he related what General Pershing experienced in 1924concerning efforts to scale down the Army, I find on my return herethat the War Department seems to be up against the real thing. Thebudget officer insists on reducing our estimates; so that, we shall notbe able to have over 110,000 men. W hat this means I cannotunderstand. I do not know what is going to be done about it , but tomy mind it is v ery d iscouraging. gl Pershing, ever the soldier andnever the politician, was somewhat bewildered by the Nation's quickreaction to the call fo r smaller and less costly Army. Marshall was8 7 W atson, m f f St&, p 25. Ranking was based on size of army in termsof personnel and equipmen t. The n Chief of Staff Doug las Ma cArthur'smentions only 12 modem tanks in his 1933 Annual Report. However, indefense of congressional funding restrictions, the country lacked a creditablethreat; while at the same time, it had been through and was still sufferingfrom the most severe economical crisis in its history. S o naturally, without athreat, the army was expected to suffer along with the rest of the country.8 8 Larrabee, C omm ander In C hieE p 114.8 9 New Yorke r Ma- 26 Oct 1940 p 26.90 Pogue, m a t i o n of a General, p 147.9 1 Bland, Marsha ll P a ~ e r sVol. 2 p 248.


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never so naive. In a May 14 1939 article in The New York TimesM a g a z i n e Marshall observed the following concerning Am erica sm o o d ,

he problem of the United States is a simple one.Potentially we are the strongest military power on earth.Geographically isolated behind a barrier of oceans so faras first-class military powers are concerned, ours is atremendous advantage W e are very apt to misread theEuropean situation because of failure to appreciate the.contrast in distances. Call the Hudson the Rhine, thenRochester becomes Paris, and Buffalo represents London,so far as the flight of a bom ber is concerned. Naturally, aman in Buffalo would experience a strong reaction tothousands of hostile planes just across the Hudson. Th eAmerican today has no such -reactio n because the A tlanticOcean lies between him and Europe.92As Colonel Ward made the final preparations for the very

private swearing-in ceremony, l i t t le did he appreciate GeneralMarshall s years of preparation fo r his tenu re as th e Army s Chief ofStaff. From Marshall s first attempts to gain a commission, h e haddealt with the country s political forces. He had been one of the firstRegular Army officers detailed to train and ev aluate the Nation scivilian-soldiers, and throughout his career he returned to theseunits to update their readiness and his understanding of their uniqueproblems. W hile others tried avoiding the touch of civilian s, hesough t them out. He understood the special tie between the militaryand their civilian hosts had to be strengthened not broken if theCountry s security was to be safeguarded . As a ide to the Army shighest ranking officer, he came in contact with political forces andsaw first hand their importance in shaping the Army. Colonel Wardwa s not aw are of the fa teful crafting of G enera l Marshall s career; butin all fairness to him, no one else, including Marshall himself,appreciated his roots as politician.9 2 The ew York imes Maeazine 4 May 1939


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General Marshall was sworn in at 2:OO noon. He did notreview the troops as is customary at a military change of command.Rather, he quickly traveled t the W hite . ~ o u s e o meet with thenation s politica l leaders.


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very much reflections of the things of '15-'16 all overagain. In fact, in som e way s very little-occurred thatdidn't seem to me was a repetition, but what disturbedme most of all was to find the Army, the WarDepartment, and the country in the same shape again--inthe same shape again.3Germany stormed Poland on 1 Septem ber 1939. Franc e and

England quickly declared war on Germany. Shortly after Germany 'sinvasion, congress relaxed several Neutrality Act restrictions, butlittle else was done. On 1 September 1939, Roosevelt, responded tothe invasion by pledging to make every effort to keep the nation outof war.4 Desp ite world-wide indignatio n, no coun try cam e toPoland's aid. Soon, Germany comp leted its conquest and wiselyconsolidated its position. Lack of further military action during thewinter and early spring of 194 0 became known as the Sitzkrieg or

Phony War. 5In the United States, during this period, the public hoped Hitler

wa s pacified and stability returned to the continent. If not, theywere confident, the Maginot-Line, coupled with the mighty Frenchand Britain armies would stop German aggression.6 Regardless,Americans knew they were shielded by the Atlantic Ocean.7 Thensuddenly, just after midnight on 9 April 1940, Sitzkrieg againbecame Blitzkrieg as the German war-machine rolled into Norw ay.On 1 0 May the Germans moved into the European Low C ountries. Bythe end of June, the French Army had been routed; the British Army

Marshal l In terviews 5 April 1957 p 183.4 n e New York i September 1939. p 1 8.5 Clifford and Spencer, T w t 8-9. Also, see Watson,m f f St&, p 104.6 Shenvoo d, Roo sevelt and Hookins, p 136-137. Also, see Ketchum, TheBorrowed Years. p 323.7 In a December 1939 speech to the American Historical Association,Marshall characterized this Country's reaction by saying The possibili tyof conflicting interests between nations diminishes as the distance betweenthem increases nd if the Atlantic Ocean has not guaranteed comp leteimmunity from wars with European Powers, it has made such wars sodifficult nd sudden attack on us seems unlikely. See General George CMarshall. Speech to the American Historical Association, Washington D.C., 28December 1939. See Marshal Paoers Vol. 2 p 123-126.


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driven across the channel; and the Maginot-Line was little more thana tourist sight. Germany was now the master of Europe.8 Concerningthese momentous events , Marshall said, "The German advancecom pletely upset th e 'equilibrium of the Eu ropean co ntinent. Francewas eliminated as a world power and the British Army lost most ofits heavy equipment. To many the invasion of Great Britainapp eared imminent."' Truly, Marshall 's testimony before the Hou seAppropriations Committee on 23 February 1940 had been prophetic.H e had w arned, "...if Euro pe blazes in the late sprin g or summer, wemust put our house in order before the sparks reach the WesternH em is ph er e. "l o As the flames of war grew higher and the threat ofmilitary action on this continent became a real possibility, publicawareness and opinion altered. Describing the change in publicopinion Marshall said,

The precariousness of the situation and its threatto the security of the United States became suddenlyapparent to our people, and the pendulum of publicopinion reversed itself, swinging violently to the otherextreme, in an urgent demand for enormous andimmediate increases.1

8 Just as Marshall had predicted, Europe was again at war. America wasnot anxious to rush to their aid. A national taken in April showed 96 percentof the nation opposed going to war against Germany. See Th e Ga lluppoll--Pub lic Oo inion--193 5-1971 (New York: Random House [I9721 . p 220Department of War, Office of the Chief of Staff, Biennial Reoon of the&Lef of Staff of the United States Armv. Julv 1. 1939 to June 30. 1941 To theBy General George C Marshall. p 3-4. July 1941.Wa shington, D.C.: Governm ent Printing Offic e, 1941. (Referred to hereafter asMarshall. B

10 Ib id .Ibid., twenty-three years earlier America sent Dough Boys to Europe tosav e their fore-fathers' homeland from Germany. After the war, Americatried to influence the terms at Versailles only to be rebuffed by the Europeans.They isolated themselves from the continent warning the British and Frenchthat imposing harsh and repressive measures on the Germans would result inanother war .


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Europe was at war. Now the question became not if America wouldbecome involved, but how, when, and where.12

As the public's attitude changed, so did the congress's. For thefirst time since' the en d of W orld W ar I Marshall sensedcongressional emphasis changing from saving as much money aspossible t o spend ing a s much money as possible.13 In the spring of194 Marshall was deeply involved with increasing appropriat ionsneeded for improving the training, and providing much neededequipment. On 1 April 194 he wrote,

I have been under temfic pressure s ince my return withpresentat ions before the Approp riat ions Com mittee oprotect our appropriat ions in the Senate against heavyeco nom ic slashes feel that if can kee p the Arm ytraining program going, then my most important businessis to see that the money is forthcoming to provideadequate preparedness .14

On 16 April 194 in a letter to his sister, Marshall said

l This shift in popular support did not surprise Marshall. Earlier in theyear he said, I think it's apparent that much of this misfortune in the life ofour democracy could have been avoided by the influence of a better-informedpublic on the decisions of the Congress. See General Geo rge C. Marshall,Spee ch to the Am erican Historical Association. W ashington D.C., 28 Decem ber1939; Marshal Pavers Vol. 2 p 123-126. Also, see General George C. Manhall.Speech to the Com mittee on Community Chess, Washington, D.C., 16 November1939; Marshall Pavers. Vol. p 103; also, see Pogue, Or dea l and Hove, p 18.

Watson, Chief of S taff, p 166. Also, see Bland, M arshall Pavers. Vol 2,p 210. Ironically, after the invasion, many isolationists in congress attemptedto distance themselves from their former positions. On 17 May 1940 SenatorHayden of Arizona, made an elaborate entry into the Subcommittee onAppropriation's record to show that the Comm ittee was anxious and willing toundertake what the War Department wanted, regardless of very recentevents. S ee Congress, Senate. Com mittee on Approp riations, M h c yEstablish men t ADD roVriation~ Bill for 1941, 76th Congress, 3rd session, 17 May1940. p 403. Also. s ee Congress, Senate, Special Comm ittee Investigation theNational Defe nse Program, Resolution authorizinv and directinv aninv estir atio n of the National D efense Program. 77th Congress, 1st session, 15April 1 941, p 164.168, 171. and 177. As Senator Brewster pointed ou t to GeneralMarshall, You come at a very fortunate time. I don't want to reflect on yourpredecessors, but Mr. Hitler helped you out.l Le tter CSA to General Cha rles D. Hemon, 1 April 1940, &i&all Pavers,u 183.


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I am gett ing ready to appear before the Senate on theAppropriations Bill, which was badly cut in the House.Incidentally, last night I had a very. successful talk withSenator Tyding nd he volunteered to take the lead indefending my point of view in the Senate.15Meeting for the first time with Secretary of the Treasury Henry

Morgenthau, on 15 May 1940 Marshall outlined the Army sforecasted financial needs. Morgenthau and Marshall agreed that itwas essential for congress not be stampeded by a myriad of armydeman ds, bu t rather that a d etailed program, outlining the A rmy scourse of action and associated needs, be presented to avoidcon fus ing them.16 Unfortunately, little known to Marshall, as heattempted to gain funding to complete his master force restructuringplan, a small group of New York businessmen were discussing theprospects fo r the Nation s first peacetime d raft. This group sinit iat ive w ould com pletely destroy Marshall s blueprint, but at thesame time provide him a political education well worth thed e s t r u c t i o n .

Th e nation s conversion to defense, was limited to buildingdefense at home, not sending American soldiers to f ight againstGermany. The public and the politicians were neither anxious norwilling to send another World War I sty le A.E.F. to Europe.l7 Though5 Letter CSA to Mrs. John J. Singer. 16 April 1940. Marshall Pa~ers.Vol. 2,

p 199 200. Note how Marshall here is asking senators to do his bidding. Withina year he himself would champion his causes no longer needing others topolitic for him.

Pogue. Qrdeal and H o ~ g 29.Anti-FDR groups were perplexed by these changing political tides. They

were unsure which side of the debate to support. With 1940 being apresidential election year, the President, one third of the Senate, and all theHouse were running for reelection. Before the invasion of Belgium andFrance, Roosevelt was undecided whether he would seek an unprecedentedthird term. After the invasion, however, he felt that if there was to be a war,no one was better suited to lead America through it than he. An election yearplaced added pressures on the elected politicians to cautiously approachsupport for American rearmament and the call to arms of its youth. FDR. nowconcerned about the upcoming election, pushed for increased military war-supplies to Britain, and increased funding for the military. Anti-Roosevellforces were in a contrary. How could they oppose FDR and a middle of the roadposition. If they opposed aid to Britain, given the immediate threat of Gcrman


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the idea of anoth er A.E.F. was hardly acceptable, on e prominentgroup believed the nation should prepare for war by instituting apeacetime draft; something never before accomplished in Americanhistory. In Oc tober 1939 an officer at the Army War College askedGeneral Hugh S. Johnson, the man who had helped run the selectiveservice in World War I about the possibility for peacetimeconscription. Johnson said

If you are asking for my opinion as a mechanicalquestion, I would say yes f you are asking my opinionas a political question as to whether youcould get it through without being chewed up, Iwould say by all means, no. Ge t it ready but keepit in the dark.18

Marshall knew a draft would one day be needed if the Army was toincrease to a full-scale war-time structure. However, as GeneralJohnson said, the political prospects fo r a d raft were, in M arshall sopinion, remote.19

The draft movement grew out of an innocent dinner sponsoredby an obscure organization called the Military Training Campsinvasion, they would be lambasted as appeasers. If, on the other hand, theysupported direct American involvement they would be called warmongers.With the deepest regret, most anti-FDR groups agreed with the President.Interventionist and Internationalists saw the German invasion of the LowCountries as nothing more than vindication for what they had been warn

George C Marshall

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