Geopolitical Implications of the Melting Arctic Ice Cap ...determine the geopolitical effects of the...
Transcript of Geopolitical Implications of the Melting Arctic Ice Cap ...determine the geopolitical effects of the...
GeopoliticalImplicationsoftheMeltingArcticIceCap:
AreStatesDoomedtoConflictorConvincedtoCooperate?
JaimieKent
IllinoisStateUniversity
FacultyMentor:
Dr.MichaeleneCox
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INTRODUCTION
While the impact of climate change is widespread, the Arctic region is particularly
vulnerableasitsaveragetemperaturehasrisenattwicetherateoftherestoftheworld(Hassol
2004). Currently,aglacial landmass intheArcticdividescircumpolarstates:TheU.S.,Russia,
Canada,NorwayandDenmark.Whatwasonceageographicrestraintontradeandseapassage
hasbecomeaspaceofterritorialdisputeamongcircumpolarnations.WiththemeltingofArctic
sea ice, navigation is becoming easier and resource exploitation is becoming all the more
possible.Infact,itisestimatedthattheArcticishometomorethantwenty-fivepercentofthe
world’soilandgasreserves(Isted2009).
AlthoughtheIntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange(IPCC)warnsthattherearefew
adaptationoptions available tomitigate the alreadymeltingArctic ice shelf, states canwork
together to tackle theworsteffectsofclimatechange (MeyerandPachauri2014). Since the
1970s,glacierlossandthermalexpansionoftheoceanaccountforseventy-fivepercentofthe
globalsealevelrise(Stockeretal.2013,11).Thus,asthemeltingicecapopensuptheArctic
region for resource exploitation and competition, it also brings with it the devastating
environmental effects of sea level risewhich no circumpolar nation is immune to. Figure 1
(below)showsArcticseaicelossfromtheyears1900to2000(c)whilealsoindicatingarisein
sea level from 1900 to 2010 (d). Although climate change poses a credible threat to state
interests, it also provides a platform that creates a space for mutually held concern and
consequently,fornegotiationanddiplomacy.
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Figure1.ArcticIceLossandGlobalSeaLevelRise1
Examininghowclimatechangeaffectspolicyprovidesacrucialstepindeterminingnot
onlywhatisatstakeinregionsliketheArctic,buthowstatescanworktogethertocombatits
worst impacts. Ultimately, the more that is understood with regard to the geopolitical
environment in the Arctic, the more states can work together to address and mitigate
preventableconflict.Acomparativepolicyanalysisforallstateswithclaimsintheregionwillhelp
determinethegeopoliticaleffectsofthemeltingArcticicecap.Therefore,PartIofthispaper
analyzesArcticpolicy inallrelevantstates, lookingfirstatthehistoricalcontextofthestate’s
claimintheArcticandthenatitspoliciesfrom1970tothepresent.PartIIsynthesizesthepolicy
implicationsinthestatesunderstudy,providinganoverallassessmentofthecurrentgeopolitical
landscapeintheArcticaswellasimplicationsforfuturepolicy.Atheoreticalframeworkisapplied
to trends in Arctic policy showing a shift from the structural-realist perspective to liberal
institutionalismwithanincreasingpropensitytowardgreentheory.Beforedelvingintoindividual
policy,itisimportanttounderstandhowArcticterritoryiscurrentlydividedamongcircumpolar
1 DataSource:Meyer,L.A.andR.K.Pachauri.2014.“ClimateChange2014:SynthesisReport.ContributionofWorkingGroupsI,IIandIIItotheFifthAssessmentReportoftheIntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange.”IPCC:Geneva,Switzerland.151.
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states. Figure 2 illustrates the territorial borders in and around the Arctic ice cap which is
necessary in determining land claims and sea routes in the region as defined by the UN
ConventionontheLawoftheSea(UNCLOS).2
Figure2.StateswithClaimsintheArctic3
PartI.ArcticPolicyinCircumpolarStates
UNITEDSTATES
SincethepurchaseoftheAlaskanTerritoryfromRussiain1867,U.S.policyintheArctic
hasbeenmixed. Whileeconomicandnationalsecurity interestsdominatedU.S.policy inthe
19thandmuchofthe20thcenturies,environmentalandtechnologicaladvancementscoupled
withgrowinginterdependencehavealteredpolicyobjectivesintherecentpast(U.S.Department
ofState2015).Further,coordinatingpolicyhasproventobeanissueovertheyearsbecauseno
2TheUNConventionontheLawoftheSeacameintoeffectonDecember10,1982.Russia,Canada,NorwayandDenmarkhaveall ratified the UNCLOS treaty. Although the United States is not a party to the treaty, it does recognize it as customaryinternationallaw.
3ImageSource:“FrozenConflict:DenmarkClaimstheNorthPole.”TheEconomist.December20,2014.Printedwithpermissionfrom:IBRU,DurhamUniversity:MinistryofForeignAffairsofDenmark.
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onegovernmentalagencyhasdirectaccesstoalloftherelevantinformationregardingU.S.Arctic
territory (Conley2013). In fact, theU.S.DepartmentsofDefense,Homeland Security, State,
InteriorCommerce,EnergyandTransportationallhavejurisdictionovervariousdealingsinthe
Arctic alongwith other agencies such asNASA and theNational Science Foundation (Conley
2013).
PresidentNixon’s1971NationalSecurityDecisionMemorandum(NSDM-144)onArctic
PolicywasthefirsttomentiontheU.S.responsibilitytowardminimizingadverseenvironmental
effects in the region. While only two pages long, environmental objectives were briefly
summarized and couched between national security concerns and the preservation of the
freedom of the sea. Similarly, President Reagan’s 1983 National Security Decision Directive
(NSDD-90) stated that the U.S. has “critical interests in the Arctic region relating directly to
national defense, resource and energy development, scientific inquiry and environmental
protection”(1).Itwasnotuntilthe1994PresidentialDecisionDirective(PDD/NSC-26)underthe
ClintonadministrationthatArcticPolicybegantotakeasharpturntowardcooperationamong
circumpolarcountries.ArcticpolicyunderClintonwasmarkedbytheendoftheColdWarwhich
welcomed a “new atmosphere of openness and cooperation with Russia” creating
“unprecedented opportunities for collaboration among all Arctic nations on environmental
protection, environmentally sustainable development, concerns of indigenous peoples and
scientific research” (2). Subsequently, GeorgeW. Bush’s 2009 National Security Presidential
Directive (NSPD-66) specificallymentioned climate change.While still reflecting security and
economic interests in the region, theNSPD-66maintained that it is necessary to strengthen
institutionsinordertoencouragecooperationamongArcticnations.Aparticularemphasison
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the“establishmentandongoingworkoftheArcticCouncil”andtotheInternationalMaritime
Organization(IMO)to“appropriatenewinternationalarrangementsorenhancementstoexisting
arrangements”reflectedthechangingdynamicintheArcticundertheBushadministration(3).
AlthoughPresidentBarackObamahasnotissuedpresidentialdirectivesonArcticpolicy
likehispredecessors,hehasimplementedastrategycognizantofthechangingArcticlandscape
(National Strategy for the Arctic Region 2013). The following excerpt from Obama’s Arctic
strategyreporthighlightstheneedtonotonlybalanceeconomicandenvironmentalinterests,
buttoworkmultilaterallyinsafeguardingpeaceandsecurityintheregion:
We will proactively coordinate regional development. Our economic development and
environmental stewardship must go hand-in-hand. The unique Arctic environment will
requireacommitmentby theUnitedStates tomake judicious, coordinated infrastructure
investment decisions, informed by science. To meet this challenge, we will need bold,
innovative thinking that embraces and generates new and creative public-private and
multinationalcooperativemodels(2013,11).
TheshiftinU.S.Arcticpolicytowardsworkinginconcertwithotherstakeholdersintheregion
servedasaprecursortotheU.S.chairmanshipoftheArcticCouncilfrom2015-2017.TheU.S.
mottoof“OneArctic:SharedOpportunities,ChallengesandResponsibilities”reflectsthetrend
inU.S. leadership towardengagementwithothernationswhile servingasactingchairof the
Arctic Council (U.S. Department of State 2015). Although the United States is beginning to
acknowledgeotherArcticactors, it is important tonote thatU.S.policyhasnotbeendeeply
rootedinahistoricalrelationshipwiththeregionasitiswithotherstates-particularly,Russia.
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RUSSIANFEDERATION
TheArcticregionhasbeenasymbolofbothheroismandprideinRussianculturesince
theearly18thcenturywhenRussialedthefirstscientificexpeditionintheregionandbecame
the first country to navigate the Northeast Passage (Breyfogle and Dunifon 2012). Arctic
explorationservedaspropagandafor thestatethroughoutthe19thand20thcenturythrough
“literature,Newspapers,journals,filmandculturalactivities”tocreate“acommonlanguageof
Arctic assimilation (Josephson 2014, 31). Under Soviet rule, policy in the Arctic focused on
industrialization efforts to “modernize [Arctic] inhabitants, control and reshape nature, and
extractnaturalandmineralresources(Josephson2014,2).TheColdWarsawSovietRussiamove
fromexplorationandscientificpracticeintheArctictolarge-scalemilitarybuild-upandstrategic
defense initiatives (Breyfogle and Dunifon 2012). Due to its deeply ingrained importance in
historyandculture,itisnosurprisethatRussiahasbeenthemostvocalandpredominantplayer
intheArctic.
Althoughtherewasabuild-upofRussianice-breakertechnologiesforoilexploitationin
the1990s,policy in the regiondidnotgainmomentumuntil 2001when theRussiancabinet
approvedadraftdocumenttitled,“FoundationsoftheStatePolicyoftheRussianFederationin
theArctic” (Heininen, Sergunin and Yarovoy 2014). This document outlined Russia’s national
interests in the region including natural resource extraction, transportation, preservation of
indigenousculture,theenvironment,industrialization,andmilitarystrategy(Heininen,Sergunin
andYarovoy2014).In2008,PresidentMedvedevexpandedonthe“FoundationsoftheState
Policyof theRussianFederation in theArctic” tooutlineRussian interestsuntil 2020. While
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Medvedev’supdatedstrategyincludedclimatechangeconcernsandacallforcooperationand
peaceintheregion,itsmilitaryundertonespaintedadifferentpicture:
[T]hesphereofnationalsecurityrequirestheprotectionanddefenseofthenationalboundary
oftheRussianFederation,includingthepreservationofabasicfightingcapabilityofgeneral
purposeunitsof theArmedForcesof theRussianFederation,aswell asother troopsand
militaryformationsinthatregion(3).
Naturally,Medvedev’s new strategy in the Arcticwas notwell received by the international
community.ItwasnotuntilPutinupdatedthedocumentin2013thatinternationalcooperation
andenvironmentalconcernsgainedmomentuminRussianpolicy.Althoughthenewdocument
underPutinstillstressedRussia’sneedformilitarystrategyanddefenseofArcticterritory,itdid
outlinean“impressivelistofpriorityareasforcooperationwithpotentialinternationalpartners”
(Heininen,SerguninandYarovoy2014,18).
Russia’s long history with the Arctic is evidenced in its traditional policies to uphold
territorial integrity in the region. Althoughalways active in the regionwhether for resource
exploitationorscientificpurposes,Russianpolicywasvirtuallynonexistentuntiltheturnofthe
21stcentury.WhileRussia’spolicystillreflectsamilitary-basedstrategy,thereisasignofmoving
towardmorepeacefulandcooperativeefforts. Whethertheseeffortsholdweightinpractice
remainstobeseen,butpolicyonpaperisundoubtedlyafirststepinfosteringacollaborative
andinclusivepoliticalenvironmentintheregion.Theneedforreconcilingactionwithpolitical
rhetoric is not unique to Russian policy. In fact, Canada faces many of the same issues as
explainedingreaterdetailbelow.
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CANADA
Canada’s claims in the Arctic stem from its 1870 purchase of Rupert’s Land and the
NorthwestTerritoriesfromtheHudsonBayCompanyfollowinganOrder-in-Councildeclaration
ofitsbordersin1880(GovernmentofCanada2013).BecauseofitsInuitpopulationintheNorth,
theArctichasremainedamainpolicyconcernofCanadathroughoutthepastcentury.Whilethe
20thcenturysawagreatnumberofCanadianexpeditionstotheArctic,the1970sbroughtashift
in Canadian policy to protect its sovereignty in the region. Since the 1970s, Canada has
maintaineda strongArcticmilitarypresence, symbolicof itsobjectives toprotect indigenous
populationsandsecurecontroloveritsterritorialresources(GovernmentofCanada2013).
DuringtheColdWarEra,CanadianArcticpolicywasmarkedbysecuritycooperationwith
theUnitedStateswhere“Canadiansovereigntyinterestswerede-prioritizedinfavorofissuesof
NorthAmericansecurity”(Dolata2009,2).TheendoftheColdWarbroughtnewconcernsto
Canada’s Arctic policy as Inuit populations became political stakeholders and environmental
concerns to preserve their land became priority. Thus, throughout the 1990s social and
environmentalconcernsledtotheinclusionofnon-stateandtransnationalactorsinArcticpolicy
formation(Dolata2009).
Yet,undertheleadershipofStephenHarper,Canadianforeignpolicytookavisibleturn
backtomilitarystrategyandsovereigntyissueswhichlessenedtheroleofoutsideactors.Inhis
“CanadaFirstDefenseStrategy”(CFDS)of2008,Harperoutlinedapathtowardtheconstruction
ofarmedice-breakersandthefundingofpatrolshipsandradar/satellitetechnologiesforArctic
securitypurposes.In2009Harperlaunched“Canada’sNorthernStrategy”(CNS)whichfocused
Arcticpolicyonexercisingsovereignty,promotingsocialandeconomicdevelopment,protecting
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environmentalheritageandimproving“devolvingNortherngovernance”(2).AlthoughtheCNS
hasandcurrentlyreflectsCanada’ssecurityconcernsintheArctic,itdoesacknowledgetheneed
formultilateralpolicyintheregion:
Cooperation,diplomacyandinternationallawhavealwaysbeenCanada’spreferredapproach
intheArctic.Asinternationalinterestintheregionincreases,effectiveCanadianstewardship
ofoursovereignterritoryandtheactivepromotionofCanadianinterestsinternationallyare
moreimportantthaneverbefore(33).
Onthewhole,CanadianpolicyintheArctichasbeenmixedsince1970.MovingonfromCold
WarErasecuritycompetition,theCanadiangovernmentturnedtowardenvironmentalandsocial
issuesonlytoreturntosovereignty,militaryandeconomicobjectivesintherecentpast.While
Harpercalledforcooperationintheregion,theallocationoffundsformilitarybuild-upinthe
Arcticcontradictedhiscallsforpeaceandstability.TherecentelectionofJustinTrudeaumay
changeCanada’sforeignpolicyobjectivesintheArcticashehasbeenknowntofavoradiplomatic
approachoverastrongmilitarypresenceintheregion(Wade2015). Fortunately,asCanada,
RussiaandtheU.S.continuetostrugglewithadiplomaticapproachtoArcticpolicy,Norwayand
DenmarkofferagreatdealofleadershipandoptimisminmovingtowardamoreinclusiveArctic
politics.
NORWAY
Withover half of its territory beingnorthof theArctic Circle, it is not surprising that
NorwayhasbeenactiveinArcticpolicyforsometime.NorwayhasalonghistoryintheArctic
mostlyinthewayofscientificresearch.Since1928,theNorwegiangovernmenthasdedicated
funding to theNorwegian Polar Institute (NPI) for research purposes (NPI 2014). Although it
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defined its Arctic borders along with the other Arctic nations during the 1970s with the
ratificationofUNCLOS,ithasfocusedmuchofitsArcticpolicyoncooperationwithothernations.
Itwasnotuntiltheearly2000sthatNorwaybegantolegallydefineitsintentionsintheArctic
withregardtoothercircumpolarstates.Since2006,NorwegianpolicyintheArctichasfocused
itsoverallgoaloncreating“sustainablegrowthanddevelopmentintheHighNorthaccordingto
threeoverarchingprinciples:presence,activityandknowledge”(HighNorthStrategy2006).
NorwegianpolicyintheArctichasbeensoft-powerbasedfromthestart.Thecooperative
natureandknowledge-sharingaspectof itspolicy isexplicitly stated theprioritiesof itsHigh
NorthStrategy(2006):
• ExerciseauthorityintheHighNorthinacredible,consistentandpredictableway
• Beattheforefrontofinternationaleffortstodevelopknowledgeinandabouttheregion
• BethebeststewardoftheenvironmentandnaturalresourcesintheHighNorth
• Provideasuitableframeworkforfurtherdevelopmentofpetroleumactivities
• Safeguard the livelihoods, traditions and cultures of indigenous peoples and develop
people-to-peoplecooperation
• StrengthencooperationwithRussia(1).
Further,theHighNorthStrategyismarkedbyitsemphasisondialogueandaninformation-based
approachtodevelopmentintheregion.Oftheseventy-four-pagedocument,onlyfivepagesare
dedicatedtopetroleumandmaritimeresourcesintheregionwhiletheothersixty-ninepages
range from the environment and indigenous populations to research and cooperation-based
strategieswithothernations.A2009extensionoftheHighNorthStrategydetailedevenfurther
stepstocounteracttheimpactsofclimatechangeinwhichtheNorwegiangovernmentstressed
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itscommitmentto“takeenvironmentalandclimateconsiderationsintoaccountineverything
[they]do”(HighNorthStrategy2009).Moreover,thelatestdevelopmentinNorway’sHighNorth
Strategycamein2014inanticipationoftheParisClimateConferenceof2015.Similartoprevious
policypriorities,thelatestdocumentoutlinedtheimportanceof“internationalcooperation,the
development of a knowledge-based business sector, knowledge development, infrastructure,
emergency preparedness and environmental protection” (NorwayArctic Policy 2014, 3). It is
evidentthatNorwayisontheprogressiveendofsustainabledevelopmentintheregionwiththe
environmenthavingbeenoneofitstopprioritiessince2006.TurningnowtoDenmark,itisclear
thatNorwayisnotaloneinitsprioritizationoftheclimateandcooperationinArcticpolicy.
DENMARK
Sincethe1300swhenDenmarkfirstsettledGreenland,theArctichasplayedanimportant
role inDenmark’spolicyagenda.Until theColdWar,Denmark’sclaimsandpolicytowardthe
ArcticcenteredonintegratingGreenlandintoitseconomyandculturethroughindustrialization
(Sørensen2007). During theColdWar,Greenland servedasa strategicbase, cuttingoff the
NorthwestPassagetoSovietshipsboundfortheAtlantic.Denmark’spolicyduringtheColdWar
ErawasthereforefocusedonmilitarystrategywiththeUnitedStatesincounteractingRussian
controloftheregion(Sørensen2007).The1980sand1990ssawclimateresearchinGreenland
emerge firstasa resultof “geopolitical, strategicandpatronage factors” followedbyamove
towardamorecooperativeandknowledge-sharingapproach(Martin2013,64).LikeNorway,
Denmark’spolicytowardtheArcticdidnotgainmomentumuntiltheearly2000sasaresultof
thechangingArcticlandscapeandenvironmentalconcerns.Onceasiteformilitaryandstrategic
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geopoliticalcontrol,theArctichasincreasinglybecomeanimportantfixtureinDenmark’sforeign
policy.
In 2008, Denmark’s foreign minister Per Stig Møller called all circumpolar states to
Ilulissate,Greenlandtocreateacohesiveenvironmentalplan for theArctic region (Hvidtand
Mouritzen2009).InwhatcametobeknownastheIlulissateDeclaration,Danishpolicyinthe
regionbecamemarkedbyitsabilitytobringotherstakeholderstothetableindiscussingmatters
ofmutualconcern.Denmark’sreleaseofitsStrategyfortheArctic2011-2020furtheroutlined
itsgoalofaninclusive-basedapproachtoArcticmanagement:
The rising strategic interest and activity in the Arctic region necessitates a continued
prioritisingofawell-functioninginternationallegalframeworkforpeacefulcooperation,a
specialneedforenhancedmaritimesafety,andpersistentfocusonmaintainingtheArcticas
aregioncharacterisedbypeaceandcooperation(13).
The 59-page document not only provided a detailed summary of bilateral and multilateral
relationswitheachcircumpolarnationbutsought to foster“newbilateral collaborationsand
dialoguesonopportunitiesandchallengesintheregion”(55).Althoughthedocumentexplained
thatitisinDenmark’sinteresttosafeguarditsterritoryandresources,themainemphasiswas
on managing climate change and protecting the environment through multilateral action.
Denmark’s policy approach to the Arctic is therefore the most progressive in terms of
environmentalmanagement, information-sharing and collaborationwhen compared to other
circumpolarstates. Thesharpturn inDenmark’spolicyfromthetimeoftheColdWartothe
present characterizes a shift in international cooperation in the region, where policy trends
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amongcircumpolarstatesshowaninclinationawayfrommilitarystrategyandrelative-gainsin
favorofinclusivityandsustainablegrowth.
PARTII.UnderstandingArcticPolicyTrends
TheaboveArcticpolicyassessmentsshowatrendtowardliberalinstitutionalismwitha
greentheoryorientationbycircumpolarstates.AstheArcticcommunitymovesonfromCold
War Era strategies, itmoves further away froma structural realist approach to international
relations.ThissectionwillfirstsynthesizeArcticpolicyduringtheColdWarandshowhowitfits
well with the tenants of structural realism. Next, analyzing post Cold War policy and the
development of institutions to manage Arctic relations will show the trend toward liberal
institutionalism. Finally, a lookatenvironmental concernsas theyhavemade theirway into
policywillhighlighttheincreasingroleofgreentheoryasitreflectstheimpactsofclimatechange
occurringintheregion.
COLDWARARCTICSTRATEGYANDSTRUCTURALREALISM
The actions of circumpolar states in the Cold War Era undoubtedly reflect John
Mearsheimer’saccountofoffensiverealism.Mearsheimer’s(2001)offensiverealismisfounded
on five key tenants including an anarchic world order, the possession of offensive military
capabilitiesbygreatpowers,unknownintentionsbyotherstates,survivalastheprimarygoal
andgreatpowers thatare rationalactors.All fiveof theabove tenantswere reflected in the
foreignpoliciesofcircumpolarstatesduringtheColdWar.Duringthistime,stateswerenotonly
concerned with maintaining their sovereignty in the region but with their relative gains for
economicexploitaswell.BeingthattheUnitedStatesandRussiaarebothcircumpolarnations,
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itisnotsurprisingthattheArcticregionreflectedthesecurityconcernsofthesetwogreatpowers
duringtheColdWar.
Asmentionedabove,ArcticpolicyundertheReaganadministrationwasfocusedprimarily
onnationalsecurityconcerns.Further,bothCanadaandDenmarkengagedinmilitaryoperations
with theUnited States in their relativeArctic territories. Russiawas alsoheavily engaged in
militarybuild-upintheregionwhichsymbolizedthebipolarityoftheworldorderatthetime.
MilitarybuildupintheArcticduringtheColdWarepitomizedMearsheimer’s(2001)pointthat
notonlydo“greatpowersfeareachother”buttheybehavesoastoensuretheirsecurityinorder
to achieve hegemony (33). Thus, the focus onmaintaining sovereignty in Arctic policy by all
circumpolarstatesreflectedthismovetowardhegemony. Althoughthebattle forhegemony
wasfoughtmainlybetweentheU.S.andRussiaitisimportanttopointoutthatNorway,Canada
andDenmarkallprioritizedsovereigntyconcernsintheirforeignpoliciesaswell.Yet,asCanada
andDenmarkwerepushingtheseconcerns intheirpolicies,theywerealso lettingtheUnited
Statesusetheirterritoriesforstrategicpurposes.ThisechoeswhatDavideFiammenghi(2011)
referstoas‘bandwagoning’where“neutralstatesbegintoreflectonthecostsoftheirneutrality,
especiallyifonesideshoulddefeattheotherleavingthemwithlittlechoicebutsubmission(133).
AlthoughtheColdWarErabroughtstructuralrealisttendenciestotheforefrontofinternational
relations,recentArcticpolicydoesnotreflectsuchastrongemphasisonrelative-gainsandpower
struggleintheregion.Infact,recentpolicysuggeststhatacooperative-basedstrategyisnow
preferredovereconomicandmilitarycompetitionintheregion.
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MOVINGTOWARDLIBERALINSTITUTIONALISM
Although the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) brought nations
togetherinsofarastheirterritorialboundarieswereconcerned,itwaslimitedinitsscopefortwo
majorreasons.First,theUnitedStatesneverratifiedthedocumentandsecond,itfellshortof
bringing Arctic nations together in generating a dialogue throughout the Cold War Era.
Fortunately,theArcticCouncilformedin1991andmanagedtobringeverycircumpolarnation
tothetableinopentalksonthefutureoftheregion.Coincidentally,itsformationcamethesame
year as the ColdWar ended, paving a newway forward for Arctic diplomacy and for liberal
institutionalismingeneral.
JenniferSterling-Folker(2013)assertsthatwhileliberal institutionalismviewsstatesas
rational actors, it ismore optimistic than structural realism in that it believes states choose
cooperation through institutions over conflict in their cost-benefit analyses. Moreover,
interdependenceby circumpolarnationshasmade themove to institutionalismall themore
attractive.AsFolker(2013)pointsout,notonlyarestateseconomicallyintertwined,they“have
acommoninterestinpreventingthedepletionofenvironmentalresources”(117).Whenthese
tenantsareappliedtotheforeignpoliciesofcircumpolarnations,Denmark,theU.S.andNorway
haveallshownsignsofmovingtowardmutuallybeneficialenvironmentalarrangements. The
openingofthispaperprovidedabriefsummaryoftheenvironmentalcostsofclimatechangein
the regionwhere Arctic ice loss has contributed to rising sea levels. Because sea ice loss is
threateningthesensitiveecosystemandindigenouspopulationsintheregion,itisclearthatnot
onlyhavecircumpolarstatesallcontributedtotheproblemofclimatechange,buttheyallhave
acommoninterestinmitigatingitsworseeffects.
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In fact,sea ice losspresentsatwo-fold issue. Ontheonehand,statesare inclinedto
cooperate due to mutually held environmental concerns. On the other hand, economic
interdependenceandopportunityareincreasinginimportance.AsseaicelossmakestheArctic
oceanmorenavigable,allstatescanpotentiallybenefitfromnewandshorterdistanceshipping
routesalongtheNortheastPassage.WhiletheU.S.,DenmarkandNorwayhaveallbeenona
promising path toward cooperation, Canada and Russia have only recently shown signs of
prioritizingcooperationintheirforeignpolicies.AxelrodandKeohane(1985)mightsuggestthat
the lackof cooperationon thepartofCanadaandRussia canbeattributed to theperceived
payoffstructureofnegotiationwhere“interestsarenotbasedsimplyuponobjectivefactorsbut
aregroundedupontheactor’sperceptionsoftheirowninterests”(229).Thisobservationalludes
tothepoweroftheleaderindeterminingforeignpolicy.AlthoughCanadatookatoughsecurity
stance in Arctic policy under Stephen Harper’s leadership, Justin Trudeau has an altogether
differentperceptionofCanada’sinterestsintheregion.Trudeau’sleadershipmightverywellbe
thepathtocooperationintheArcticthatliberalinstitutionalismsuggests.Moreover,although
RussianArcticpolicytookahardlinestanceunderMedvedev’sleadership,Putin’srecentforeign
policyarrangementssuggestthatRussiaismovingtowardamoreenvironmentalandcooperative
approachinitsengagementwithothercircumpolaractors.
Whilethecompleterealizationofliberalinstitutionalismhasnotyetbeenachievedinthe
region,itisclearthatstructuralrealismisnolongerthemainmotivatingprinciplebehindArctic
policy.Eventhoughforeignpolicyremainsmixed,thereisaclearcommitmenttomitigatingthe
effects of climate change in the region. TheArctic Council has been at the forefront of this
movementwhichspeaksnotonlytotheincreasingroleofinstitutionsininstillingcooperation,
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buttothe‘greening’ofArcticpolicymorebroadly.TheArcticCouncil’screationofthe2011Task
ForceonShortLivedClimateForcersnotonlyencouragesallcircumpolarnationstoactonbehalf
ofclimatechangebutalsooutlinesthemutuallybeneficialnatureoftheCouncilitself:
TheArcticCouncilcanencouragetheexchangeandsharingofknowledgeanddata;facilitate
collaboration and collective action where needed among Arctic nations; and incentivize
sustainedactionstoreduceemissionsofblackcarbonandmethane.TheArcticCouncilcan
alsofacilitatethepursuitofcommonobjectivesamongArcticnationstoreduceshort-lived
climateforcersincollaborationwithotherinternationalforumsandObservernations(1).
Thus, the Arctic Council’s role in facilitating cooperation among Arctic nations cannot be
overstated. Moreover, theobjectivesof theCouncilwith regard to climate change concerns
highlightthesalienceofenvironmentalissuesastheyareincreasinglyprioritizedintheforeign
policiesofcircumpolarstates.
PROPENSITYTOWARDGREENTHEORY
TheforeignpoliciesofNorwayandDenmarkinparticularmarkaturningpointinArctic
strategy as environmental protection gains momentum in the region. According to Robyn
Eckersley(2013),environmentaljusticeentailstherealizationofseveralfactorsincludingconcern
forfuturegenerationsandanimal/plantspecies,participationinthedecision-makingprocessby
allstakeholders,theminimizationandevendistributionofrisk,andredressforunfairlyaffected
populations.CurrentArcticpolicyreflectstheincorporationofalloftheabovefactorstovarying
degreesbycircumpolarstates.Forexample,allcircumpolarstateshavenotonlyacknowledged
environmental concerns in theirArcticpolicies,buthavealso recognized that climatechange
unequallyaffectsindigenouspopulationsintheregion.Norway,Denmark,Russia,theU.S.and
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Canadahaveallgonesofarasto includetheir indigenouspopulations inthedecision-making
process. In fact, indigenous groups in all circumpolar states have a permanentmembership
statusontheArcticCouncil.Further,theaboveexcerptfromtheArcticCouncilTaskForceon
Short-LivedClimateForcersspeakstobothtotheminimizationandevendistributionofriskwith
regardtomitigatingtheadverseaffectsofclimatechange.Asaforumforbothenvironmental
protectionandconcernsfromindigenousgroups,theArcticCouncilprovidesthefoundationfor
greentheorytoflourishinArcticpolicy.
WhilestateslikeDenmarkandNorwayarepavingthewayforenvironmentalconcerns
tobethemainpriority inArcticpolicy,otherstatessuchastheU.S.,CanadaandRussiahave
somecatchinguptodo.Itisimportanttopointoutthatdomesticandhistoricalcontextplaya
largeroleindeterminingthemovetowardgreenerpolicy.JustastheColdWarbroughtwithit
thestructural realist frameworkofArcticpolicy,sotoodocertaindomesticand international
factorscontributetothecurrentyetevolvingpoliciesseentoday.HunoldandDryzek’s(2002)
comparativeanalysisof state context is a solid framework for analyzing suchanevolution in
green policy. Future research might speculate on the domestic factors that are at play in
determiningwhyNorwayandDenmarkareleadersinthegreentheorymovementandwhystates
likeRussia,CanadaandtheU.S.arenotquitethereyet.
CONCLUSION
Theabovecomparativepolicyanalysisshowsthatnotonlyarecircumpolarstatesmore
inclinedtoturntoinstitutionsonArcticmatters,butthattheirArcticpoliciesare‘greener’than
everbefore.WhilethechangingArcticlandscapeopensupnewareasforeconomicexploitation,
it also brings with it an impending climate crisis which is increasingly acknowledged and
19
prioritized incircumpolarstatepolicy. There isnodoubtthatwhilerisingsea levelsthreaten
Arcticcommunities, themelting icecapprovides incentives tocooperateon issuesofmutual
concern.MovingonfromColdWarEramilitarystrategy,theArctichasbecomeanincreasingly
important area of concern that when managed correctly, provides the incentive for liberal
institutionalismandgreentheorytodevelop.Whilethereismuchworktobedoneintheway
ofcooperationandclimatechangemitigation intheregion,circumpolarstatesareshowinga
promising move toward addressing common concerns and working together to protect the
volatileecosystem. Itwillbe interesting to seehowthecontinuouslymelting icecapaffects
policyintheregion.Unfortunately,itisunclearwhethertheopeningofwaterwayswillfurther
encouragestatestocooperateorprovideaturningpointbacktoColdWarErastrategymarked
by military confrontation and security concerns. Perhaps most noteworthy is the drastic
transformationtakingplaceinthephysicalArcticlandscape.Itjustsohappensthatwhilethe
physicallandscapechanges,sotoodoesthepoliticallandscapecontinuetoevolve.Thequestion
hereiswhethercircumpolarstateswillmoveforwardaloneoract inconcertandcontinueto
progresstogether.
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