GEOG 352: Day 19Presentations and more Daly and Farley (Ch. 21-25)

Presentation Schedule to DateNAME DATE

Jaylene Nov. 13th

Natasha Nov. 15th

Teunesha Nov. 15th

Deanna Nov. 15th

André Nov. 15th

Pamela Nov, 15th

Jordyn Nov. 20th

Colin Nov. 20th

Erik Nov. 20th

Caitlyn Nov. 22nd

Daniel Nov. 22nd

Housekeeping Items• Any other comments on “Poor No More”?

• Today we will keep plugging away on the last few chapters of Daly, but first we will hear a presentation on her project from Jaylene.

• Thanks to everyone who helped with the Urban Issues Film Fest. It wouldn’t have been a success without you!

• A few of the films were quite relevant to this course. Any comments on any of them?

Tail End of Chapter 21

• At the end of Chapter 21, the authors discuss 3 types of property rights or entitlement rules on the assumption that property is a social institution, the rights of which must be granted by (and limited by) the state:Property rule (defines the extent of freedom to

interfere or to be free from interference)Liability rule (can interfere, but must pay

compensation)Inalienability rule (the right to have or avoid

certain things regardless of property rights).

Chapter 22• Four strategies for achieving sustainable scale: direct

regulation, Pigouvian taxes, Pigouvian subsidies, and tradeable permits. The middle two are named after Arthur Cecil Pigou, an English economist.• Direct regulations (‘command and control’): examples

would include banning CFCs, DDT, or lead gasoline and insisting on Best Available Control Technologies (BACT).• The mechanisms can include fines and penalties of

various kinds. They are relatively effective, cheap and easy to enforce (or were before senior governments slashed their environmental ministries’ staff).• The downside is that they don’t necessarily meet goal of

allocative efficiency. They can be too prescriptive (not good on preserving micro-freedom). Also: once targets are met, there’s no incentive for companies to keep going.

Chapter 22• Pigouvian tax – impose a tax equal to the marginal external cost of

pollution or resource depletion so that a cost-benefit equilibrium is created. This encourages an internalization of externalities, and creates a right to environment for the state on behalf of the public (liability rule). A key concept is targeted revenue neutrality.

• Since the abatement cost is hard to calculate and will vary for each company, one counts on some companies abating and some paying the tax. However, the overall effect is beneficial and it is cheaper to implement. They suggest starting with a low tax and then building up.

• Pigouvian subsidy- instead of “polluter pays,” the polluter is paid to not pollute or to reforest riparian zones. It could involve encouraging switches to alternative technology. However, it assumes a pre-existing right to pollute .

• Cap and trade – setting a quota on resource depletion or pollution and then allowing those having difficulty meeting their targets to buy ‘capacity’ from low polluters (see wrinkles on on p. 433). Involves a property rule.

Chapter 22• This approach has been used somewhat successfully in the

U.S. to reduce SO2 emissions, and in the EU to reduce CO2 emissions. It has also been used with success to regulate fisheries.

• The U.S. relied on shorter seasons for low population fisheries like halibut, but these had all kinds of perverse effects (see p. 436).

• In 1990, Canada created individual quotas for ships and extended the season, and this worked much better. Some leasing and trading was allowed by adopted by the U.S.

• In New Zealand, they determine a total allowable catch (TAC), deduct expected catch for sports fishery, and set aside 20% for the Maori. With the remaining Total Allowable Commercial Catch (TACC), they divide it into Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs), which can be bought, sold and leased. It seems to work well. Initially the government bought and sold ITQs as fish populations fluctuated, but this is no longer necessary.

Chapter 23

• How to achieve a more just distribution of wealth in a society where inequality is at its highest levels since the Greatest Depression? (If Bill Gates invested his wealth in gov’t bonds at 3%, he would make $3 million a day.) And how to reduce the huge ecological footprint of the ultra-wealthy? When do the rights of the present generation (or a small fraction thereof) to the ‘good life’ trample on the rights of future generations to a world with adequate natural capital? Problems of addressing in a ‘democratic’ society where future generations (and people in developing countries) are not represented?

• They review a number of possible mechanisms for achieving greater equality: • caps on income and wealth •minimum income (we already have to a limited degree through welfare, EI, OAP, minimum wages) • distributing the returns of production through ESOPs or worker ownership • distributing the returns to natural capital through ending public subsidies • “sky trusts” (where companies would pay for quotas to deplete or pollute and this would go to a fund to be redistributed to the public or pay for public infrastructure), and • land taxes.

Chapter 24• Will only touch on a few highlights.• Discusses methods for giving a monetary value to

ecosystems and their functions/ services:Market price- estimate economic values for ecosystem

products or services (e.g. storm protection value of mangrove swamps)

Productivity- estimate economic values for same but as they contribute to the production of commercially marketed goods (e.g. timber for finely crafted furniture)

Hedonic pricing- estimate economic value of ecosystem property or services that directly affect the market price of other goods (e.g. how much more houses/ properties are worth that abut green space?)

Travel cost- how far are people willing to travel to visit or use a site?

Chapter 24

Damage cost avoided, replacement cost, and substitute cost- what would the costs of damages be that are associated with ecosystem disruption, what is the replacement cost, or substitution cost? (e.g. Nicholas Stern’s calculations of impacts if we don’t stem climate change, or costs of losing fishery, etc.)

Contingent valuation- ‘willingness to pay’ based on hypothetical scenarios

Contingent choice- based on the hypothetical trade-offs people are willing to make

Benefit transfer- inferring from other situations and sites what something is worth?

• A key issue is to what extent can or should all values (including non-ecological ones) have a price attached to them?

Chapter 24• Another key issue is how to ensure adequate provision of non-

market goods (infrastructure, parks, health care, police and fire services, libraries, etc.). There are a number of options:Turn everything over the private sector and let them charge

what the market will bearPrivate sector but with utility commissions or other regulatory

frameworks (for instance, setting rates)Direct government provision, including sometimes paying

private contractors [or PPPs]Subsidies for positive externalities such as well-managed

farmland (soil management, riparian management, and leaving habitat for birds)

Tax relief for same (e.g. tax breaks for covenants, easements, etc.)

Low or no-interest loans or grants for desirable activities (e.g. energy-efficiency retrofits).

Chapter 24

• A huge issue is to find the right principles/ mechanisms for ameliorating climate change at a global scale. What is appropriate?All countries limit emissions proportionally to some

fixed baseline date?Developed countries pay for past sins by reducing far

more while giving developing countries a free hand?Option 2, but with countries like China (world’s largest

CO2 emitter) and India also having significant responsibilities?

Developed countries pay for past sins by paying developing nations to use alternative technologies?

Developed countries pay for past sins by paying developing nations to preserve carbon sinks, such as rainforests?

Other ideas?