Genral Terms Following Special Terms

7/31/2019 Genral Terms Following Special Terms

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GENERAL TERMS FOLLOWING SPECIAL TERMS

(EJUSDEM GENERIS)

While general words or expressions in a stature are, as a rule, accorded their full,natural and generic sense, they will not be given such meaning if they are used

in association with specific words or phrases.

The general rule is that where a general word or phrase follows an enumerationof particular and specific words of the same class or where the latter follow theformer, the general word or phrase os to be construed to include, or to be re-stricted to, persons, things or cases akin to, resembling, or of the same kind orclass as those specifically mentioned.

La Razon Social "Go Tiaoco y Hermanos" vs. Union Insurance Society of Canton Ltd.

Facts:

A cargo of rice belonging to the Go Tiaoco Brothers, was transported in the early days

of May, 1915, on the steamship Hondagua from the port of Saigon to Cebu. On discharging

the rice from one of the compartments in the after hold, upon arrival at Cebu, it was

discovered that 1,473 sacks had been damaged by sea water. The loss so resulting to the

owners of rice, after proper deduction had been made for the portion saved, was P3,875. The

policy of insurance, covering the shipment, was signed upon a form long in use among

companies engaged in maritime insurance. It purports to insure the cargo from the following

among other risks: "Perils . . . of the seas, men, of war, fire, enemies, pirates, rovers, thieves,

.jettisons, . . . barratry of the master and mariners, and of all other perils, losses, and

misfortunes that have or shall come to the hurt, detriment, or damage of the said goods and

merchandise or any part thereof." It was found out that the drain pipe which served as a

discharge from the water closet passed down through the compartment where the rice in

question was stowed and thence out to sea through the wall of the compartment, which was

a part of the wall of the ship. The joint or elbow where the pipe changed its direction was of

cast iron; and in course of time it had become corroded and abraded until a longitudinal

opening had appeared in the pipe about one inch in length. This hole had been in existence

before the voyage was begun, and an attempt had been made to repair it by filling with

cement and bolting over it a strip of iron. The effect of loading the boat was to submerge the

vent, or orifice, of the pipe until it was about 18 inches or 2 feet below the level of the sea. As

a consequence the sea water rose in the pipe. Navigation under these conditions resulted in

the washing out of the cement-filling from the action of the sea water, thus permitting thecontinued flow of the salt water into the compartment of rice. An action on a policy of marine

insurance issued by the Union Insurance Society of Canton, Ltd., upon the cargo of rice

belonging to the Go Tiaoco Brothers was filed. The trial court found that the inflow of the sea

water during the voyage was due to a defect in one of the drain pipes of the ship and

concluded that the loss was not covered by the policy of insurance. Judgment was

accordingly entered in favor of Union Insurance and Go Tiaoco Brothers appealed.

Issue 1:

Whether perils of the sea includes entrance of water into the ships hold through a

defective pipe.

Held 1:

NO. It is determined that the words "all other perils, losses, and misfortunes" are to


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be interpreted as covering risks which are of like kind (ejusdem generis) with the particular

risks which are enumerated in the preceding part of the same clause of the contract.

According to the ordinary rules of construction these words must be interpreted with

reference to the words which immediately precede them. They were no doubt inserted in

order to prevent disputes founded on nice distinctions. Their office is to cover in terms

whatever may be within the spirit of the cases previously enumerated, and so they have a

It is a general rule of statutory construction that where general words follow anenumeration of persons or things, by words of a particular and specific meaning,such general words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to beheld as applying only to persons or things of the same general kind or class asthose specifically mentioned. But this rule must be discarded where the legisla-tive intention is plain to the contrary.

This rule is commonly called the ejusdem generis rule, because it teaches usthat broad and comprehensive expressions in an act, such as and all others, orclass with those specially named in the preceeding words. It is very frequentlyused and applied in the interpretation of statues.

Applying the rule in statutory construction which is known as ejusdem generis,that us where general words follow an enumeration of persons or things, bywords follow an enumeration of persons or things, by words of a particular, andspecific meaning, such general words are not to be construed in their widest ex-tent, but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of the same kind or

class as those specifically mentioned.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. HON. EUTROPIO MIGRINIO AND TROADIO TECSON

G.R. No. 89483, August 30, 1990

FACTS : The New Armed Forces of the Philippines Anti-Graft Board was created tp investigate the

unexplained and corrupt practices of AFP personnel, both retired and in active service. The Board

shall be primarily charged with the task of investigating cases of alleged violations of the Anti-Graft

and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019, as amended) and shall make the necessary recom-

mendation to appropriate government agencies and instrumentalities with respect to the action to be

taken thereon based on its findings.

Acting on information received by the Board, which indicated the acquisition of wealth beyond his

lawful income, private respondent Lt. Col. Troadio Tecson (ret.) was required by the board to submit

his explanation/ comment together with his supporting evidence. The board proceeded with its inves-

tigation and submitted its resolution, dated June 30, 1988, recommending that private respondent be

prosecuted and tried for violation of Rep. Act. No. 3019, as amended, and Rep. Act No. 1379 , as

amended.

The Case was set for preliminary investigation by the PCGG, after the denial of respondents motion

to dismiss and motion for reconsideration by the petitioner PCGG.

On March 13, 1989, private respondent filed a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction

with the Regional Trial Court in Pasig, Metro Manila. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss and op-


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posed the application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction on the principal ground that

the RTC had no jurisdiction over the Board.

On June 23, 1989, respondent judge denied petitioners motion to dismiss. On June 26, 1989, respon-

dent judge granted the application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, enjoining peti-

tioners from investigating or prosecuting private respondents under Rep. Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379

upon the filing of a bond in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (Php 20, 000.00)

Hence, the instant petition forcertiorari , prohibition and ormandamus to review the orders ofthe RTC of Pasig, Metro Manila.

In his pleadings, private respondents pivotal point is that he is not one of the subordinates contem-

plated in Executive Orders 1,2, 14 and 14-A as the alleged illegal acts being imputed to him, that of

alleged amassing wealth beyond his legal means while Finance Officer of the Philippine Constabu-

lary, are acts of his own alone, not connected with his being a crony, business associate, etc. or subor-

dinate as the petition does not allege so. Hence, the PCGG has no jurisdiction to investigate him.

Issue: Whether or not private respondent may be investigated and caused to be prosecuted by theBoard, an agency of the PCGG for violation of Rep. Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379.

Held: According to petitioners, the PCGG has the power to investigate and cause the prosecution of

private respondent because he is a subordinate of former President Marcos. They cite the PCGGs

jurisdiction over.

(a.) The recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his

immediate family relatives, subordinates and close associates, whether located in the Philippines or

abroad, including the takeover or sequestration of all business enterprises and entities owned or con-

trolled by them, during his administration, directly or through nominee, by taking undue advantage of

their public office and/ or using their powers, authority, influence, connection or relationship.

Undoubtedly, the alleged unlawful accumulation of wealth was done during the administration of

President Marcos. However, what has to be inquired into is whether or not private respondent acted as

a subordinate of Pres. Marcos within the contemplation of E.O. No. 1, the law creating the PCGG,

when he allegedly unlawfully acquired the properties.

A close reading of E.O. No. 1 express the urgent need to recover the ill-gotten wealth amassed by for-

mer President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, and close associates both here

and abroad.

E.O. No. 2 freezes all assets and properties in the Philippines in which former President Marcos, and

/ or his wife , Mr.s Imelda Marcos, their close relatives, subordinates, business associates, dummies,

agents, or nominees have any interest or participation

Applying the rule in statuotry construction known as ejusdem generis that is where generalwords follow an enumeration of persons or things by words of a particular and specific meaning,

such general words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as applying only

to persons or things of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned

The term subordinate as used in E.O. Nos. 1 and 2 would refer to one who enjoys a close associa-

tion or relation with former Pres. Marcos and/ or his wife, similar to the immediate family member,relative and close associate in E.O. No. 1 and the close relative, business associate, dummy agent, or

nominee in E.O. No. 2


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The PCGG is enjoined from proceeding with the investigation and prosecution of private respondent

in I.S. No. 37 without prejudice to his investigation and prosecution by the appropriate prosecuting

agency.

Rule of ejusdem generis merely a tool of statutory construction resorted to whenlegislative intent is uncertain.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. HON VICENTE B. ECHAVEZ, JR., ET AL.G.R. Nos. L-47757-61, January 28, 1980

FACTS: The record shows that on October 25, 1977Fiscal Abundio R. Ello filed with the lower courtseparate informations against sixteen persons charging them with squatting as penalized by Presiden-

tial Decree No. 772

The decree (which took effect on August 20, 1975) provides:

SECTION 1. Any person who, with the use of force, intimidation or threat, or taking advantage of

the absence or tolerance of the landowner, succeeds in occupying or possessing the property of the lat-

ter against his will for residential, commercial or any other purposes, shall be punished by an impris-

onment ranging from six months to one year or a fine of not less than one thousand nor more than five

thousand pesos at the discretion of the court, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

(2nd paragraph is omitted.)

Five of the informations, wherein Ano Dacullo, Geronimp Oroyan, Mario Aparici, Ruperto Cajes and

Modesto Suello were the accused, were raffled to Judge Vicente B. Echaves, Jr. of Branch II. (Crimi-

nal Cases Nos. 1824, 1828,1832, 1833 and 1839, respectively)

Before the accused could be arraigned, Judge Echaves motu proprio issued an omnibus order dated

December 9, 1977 dismissing the five informations on the grounds (1) that it was alleged that the ac-

cused entered the land through "stealth and strategy", whereas under the decree the entry should be ef-

fected "with the use of force, intimidation or threat, or taking advantage of the absence or tolerance of

the landowner", and (2) that under the rule of ejusdem generis the decree does not apply to the culti-

vation of a grazing land.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Because of that order, the fiscal amended the informations by using in lieu of "stealth and strategy"the expression "with threat, and taking advantage of the absence of the ranchowner and/or tolerance

of the said ranchowner". The fiscal asked that the dismissal order be reconsidered and that the amend-

ed informations be admitted.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The lower court denied the motion. It insisted that the phrase "and for other purposes" in the decree

does not include agricultural purposes because its preamble does not mention the Secretary of Agri-

culture and makes reference to the affluent class.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law li-

brary

From the order of dismissal, the fiscal appealed to this Court under Republic Act No. 5440

ISSUE: Whether or not Presidential Decree No. 772, which penalized squatting and similar acts, ap-plies to agricultural lands.


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HELD: While the Supreme Court affirmed the order of dismissal of the trial court, it decalred that therule ofejusdem generis is (of the same kind or species) invoked by the trial court does not ap-

ply to this case. Here, the intent of the decree is unmistakable. It is intended to apply only to urban

communities, particularly to illegal constructions.The rule ofejusdem generis is merely a tool ofstatutory construction which is resorted to when the legislative intent is uncertain.

DECISION AFFIRMED

NOTE: P.D. No. 772 is totally repealed by r.a. nO. 8368

THE FAMILIAR RULE OF EJUSDEM GENERIS

MISAEL P. VERA, as Commissioner of Internal Revenue, and THE FAIR TRADE BOARD, petition-

er, vs. HON. SERAFIN R. CUEVAS, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch IV,INSTITUTE OF EVAPORATED FILLED MILK MANUFACTURERS OF THE PHILIPPINES,

INC., CONSOLIDATED MILK COMPANY (PHIL.) INC., and MILK INDUSTRIES, INC., respon-dents.

FACTS: The controversy arose from the order of defendant, Commissioner of Internal Revenue nowpetitioner herein, requiring plaintiffs private respondents to withdraw from the market all of their

filled milk products which do not bear the inscription required by Section 169 of the Tax Code within

15 days from receipt of the order with the explicit warning that failure of plaintiffs-private respon-

dents to comply with said order will result in the institution of the necessary action against any viola-

tion of the aforesaid order 169 of the Tax Code reads as follows:

Section 169. Inscription to be placed on skimmed milk.All condensed skimmed milk and all milk

in whatever form, from which the fatty part has been removed totally or in part, sold or put on sale in

the Philippines shall be clearly and legibly marked on its immediate containers, and in all the lan-

guage in which such containers are marked, with the words, This milk is not suitable for nourish-

ment for infants less than one year of age, or with other equivalent words.

On April 16, 1971, the respondent court issued its decision. Perpetually restraining the defendant.

Commissioner of Internal Revenue , his agents, or employers from requiring plaintiffs to print on the

labels of their filled milk products the words: This milk is not suitable for nourishment for infants

less than one year of age or words with equivalent import and declaring as null and void and without

authority in law, the order of said defendant dated September 28, 1961 and the Ruling of the Secretaryof Finance, dated November 12, 1962.

HELD: The lower court did not end in ruling that Section 169of the Tax Code has been repealed byimplication. Section 169 was enacted in 1939, together with section 141 (which imposed a specific

tax on skimmed milk) and section 177 (which penalized the sale skimmed milk without payment of

the specific tax and without the legend required by section 169). However, Section 141 was expressly

repeal of Sections 141 and 177 Section 169 became a merely declaratory provision, without a tax pur-

pose, or penal sanction.

Moreover, it seems apparent that Section 169 of the Tax Code does not apply to filled milk. The use

of the specific and qualifying terms skimmed milk in the headnote and condensed skimmed milkin the text of the cited section, would restrict the scope of the general clause all milk, in whatever

form, from which the fatty part has been removed totally or in part. In other words, the general


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clause is restricted by the specific term skimmed milk under the familiar rule ofejusdem gener-is is that general and unlimited terms and restrained and limited by the particular terms they followin the statute.

Skimmed milk is different from filled milk. According to the Definitions, Standards of Purity, Rules

and Regulations of the Board of Food Inspection, Skimmed milk is milk in whatever form from

which the fatty part has been removed. Filled milk, on the other hand, is any milk whether or not con-densed, evaporated concentrated, powdered, dried, dessicated, to which had been added or which has

been blended or compounded with any fat or oil other than milk fat, so that the resulting product is

an imitation or semblance of milk cream or skimmed milk. The difference therefore, between

skimmed milk and filled milk is that in the former, the fatty part has been removed but is substituted

with refined coconut oil or both. It cannot then be readily or safely assumed that Section 169 applies

both to skimmed milk and filled milk.

The purpose of the rule ejusdem generis is to give effect to both the particular

and general words, by treating the particular and general words, by treating theparticular words as indicating the class and the general words as indicating allthat is embraced in said class, although not specifically named by the particularwords. This is justified on the ground that if the the lawmaking body intended thegeneral terms to be used in their restricted sense, it would not have made anenumeration of particular subjects but would have used only general terms.

The most frequent application of this rule is found where specific and genericterms of the same nature are employed in the same act, the latter following theformer. While in the abstract, general terms are to be given their natural and full

signification, yet where they follow specific words of like nature they rake theirmeaning from the latte, and are presumed to embrace only things or persons ofthe kind designated by them.

The principle of ejusdem generis is based on the proposition that had the legisla-ture intended the general words to be used in their generic and unrestrictedsense, it would not have enumerated the specific words.

The presumption is that usually the minds of the legislators are addressed specif-ically to the particularization, and accordingly the general words, though broadenough to comprehend other fields if they stood alone, should be understood in

contemplation with that which the mind of the legislators are centered.

EJUSDEM GENERIS DEFINED

ejusdem generis (eh-youse-dem generous) adj. Latin for "of the same kind," used to interpret loosely

written statutes. Where a law lists specific classes of persons or things and then refers to them in gen-

eral, the general statements only apply to the same kind of persons or things specifically listed. Exam-

ple: if a law refers to automobiles, trucks, tractors, motorcycles and other motor-powered vehicles,

"vehicles" would not include airplanes, since the list was of land-based transportation.

Genral Terms Following Special Terms

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