General Provisions Art 774-782

8/16/2019 General Provisions Art 774-782

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GENERAL PROVISIONS ARTICLES 774-782

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-49065 April 30, 1947

RITA GARCHITORENA VDA. DE CENTENERA, applicant-appellee;MARIANO GARCHITORENA, movant-appellee,vs.VICENTE SOTTO, H.P. OBIAS and ANA PATAAN, oppositors-appellants.

Lorenzo Sumulong for oppositor and appellant Sotto. Jose M. Peñas for oppositors and appellants Obias and Pataan. Jose Ma. Recto and Jayme Reyes for applicant and appellee Garchitorena. Manly and Reyes for movant and appellee.

PERFECTO, J. :

On June 20, 1940, Mariano Garchitorena file a motion praying that subdivision plan Psu-66063-Amd., marked as Annex E, be approved and that it be decreed that certificatesof title be issued in his name on lots 2, 3, and 4 of the original plan Psu-66063 and uponlots 1, 5, 6, 7, and 8 of the subdivision plan Psu-66063-Amd.

The movant alleged that on May 14, 1931, a decision was rendered by the lower courtgranting Rita Garchitorena as heiress of her father Andres, title over four lots, the same

described in her original application, subject to lien in favor of Mariano Garchitorenaand other creditors, with the exclusion of about 500 hectares belonging to Ramon andJose Alvarez, about 300 hectares of land of the public domain, a portion of 18 hectaresbelonging to Hermogenes P. Obias and another portion of 24 hectares of land of thepublic domain, with the exception of 4 hectares belonging to Januario Alvarez, all saidportions being included in lot number 1. It is also alleged that after said judgment wasmodified by the Supreme Court and some steps have been taken as a result of saidmodification, lots 1, 2, 3, and 4 of land Psu-66063 were adjudicated to MarianoGarchitorena in consideration of the amount of P28,745.93 a deed of sale having beenexecuted to said effect on September 8, 1935, which was approved by the lower courton April 26, 1940, and that Mariano Garchitorena bought the 500 hectares of Ramonand Jose Alvarez on April 27, 1939.

Several persons appeared to oppose the motion, but only three of them came to usappealing against the lower court's order dated June 28, 1941, decreeing the issuanceof certificate of titles in favor of Mariano Garchitorena on lots 2, 3, and 4 of the originalplan Psu-66063, and on lots 5 and 8 of the subdivision plan Psu-66063-Amd., and on lots1, 6, and 7 of the same subdivision plan.

The appellants are H.P. Obias, Ana Pataan and Vicente Sotto.

We will deal separately with their respective contentions.


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OPPOSITION OF H.P. OBIAS

This oppositor contends that the 300 hectares ordered to be excluded from lot number1 as land of public domain, as provided in the lower court's decision of May 14, 1931, infact should measure not only 300 hectares but 961 hectares, 38 ares and 9 centares.

The lower court disposed of the opposition by stating that the decision of May 14, 1931,was amended, and the Supreme Court affirmed it as amended, and that thesubdivision plan Psu-66063-Amd. is in conformity with the terms of said amendeddecision.

Appellant Obias complains in his appeal that the lower court erred in awarding toMariano Garchitorena the title of lots 1, 6, and 7 of subdivision plan Psu-66063-Amd.,belonging originally to Ramon and Jose Alvarez.

No law and no authority has been invoked in support of appellant's contention,although he advances several reasons in support of his theory. The reasons advancedare stated in his brief as follows:

1. Ramon Alvarez did not seek any affirmative relief in his opposition to theapplication for registration of Rita Garchitorena so that what the Court did inrendering its decisions was simply to order its segregation from the plan, and hissupposed successor in interest, Mariano Garchitorena, could not be entitled tothe issuance of a degree of registration in the name of the latter.

2. Because the decision rendered in this case is already final, and hence cannotbe amended.

3. Because the duty of the lower Court in regards to this case is simply to complywith that final judgment so that inasmuch as the dispositive part orders thesegregation from the plan of the portions awarded to Ramon Alvarez, the lowerCourt is in duty-bound to comply with that mandatory order.

4. Because the issuance of a decree of registration in favor of the movant-appellant for the portions awarded to Ramon Alvarez and Jose Alvarez wouldcreate an anomaly, in the sense that interested parties would be prejudicedthereby. There are several persons possessing portions of land within the landadjudicated to Ramon Alvarez and Jose Alvarez. They possessed these portionswith a claim of right of ownership adverse to that of Ramon Alvarez and JoseAlvarez.

We do not find in merit appellant's contention.

Section 38 of the Land Registration Act No. 496, as amended by Act No. 3621, whichtook effect on December 5, 1929, provides:

If the court after hearing finds that the applicant or adverse claimant has title asstated in his application or adverse claim and proper for registration, a decree ofconfirmation and registration shall be entered . . ..

In the case of Garchitorena Vda. de Centenera vs. Obias (58 Phil., 21, 23), the SupremeCourt declared that from the evidence "it conclusively appears that the late JoseAlvarez and his successors had a considerable extent of land in the same place wherethe applicant's land is situated, and taking also into account that the land wassurveyed for purposes of registration, we find that the weight of the evidence indicates


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that the land claimed by the opponent Ramon Alvarez had been included in theapplicant's plan. This land has an area of 500 hectares. According to Ramon Alvarez, itappears that his father, Ibo Alvarez, had held the tract since 1905 and that at the deathof said Ibo Alvarez, Ramon Alvarez and his co-owner, Jose Alvarez entered intopossession and have remained therein since."

From the above, there cannot be any doubt that Ramon and Jose Alvarez have beenfinally declared as the owners of the 500 hectares in question, and such declaration isgood for all purposes, including the issuance of the corresponding certificates of title tosaid owners of their successors in interest, such as buyer Mariano Garchitorena.Appellant's allegation that the decree of registration in favor of Mariano Garchitorenafor the portions awarded to Ramon and Jose Alvarez would prejudice interested partiesis groundless, because all interested parties were given full opportunity to advance andpresent their respective claims since the original application was duly published andthe proceedings for registration, which are in rem in character, were begun, itappearing that the original application included the 500 hectares which were finallyadjudicated to Ramon and Jose Alvarez. Anybody and everybody who had any

legitimate claim to said 500 hectares or any part thereof, if they wanted to, could haveappeared before the court and presented their claims. If they failed to do it at theopportune time, it is now too later for them to complain.

APPEAL OF ANA PATAAN

This appellant complains that the lower court erred in holding that the free patent titlenumber 1406 of said Ana Pataan is null and void ab initio .

The lower court's actions is based upon the fact that when the free patent title number1406 was issued in 1937, the land of 10 hectares covered by it was part of a larger tractwhich was declared private property according to the decision of May 14, 1931, whichwas later affirmed by the Supreme Court, very much earlier than the issuance of thefree patent title in question.

We do not find any error in the lower court's action.

The decision of the Supreme Court declaring the land in question as private propertywas promulgated on March 4, 1933 (Garchitorena vs. Vda. de Centenera vs. Obias, 58Phil., 21), that is more than four years before the issuance of the free patent title inquestion on March 21, 1937.

Upon this conclusion, it will serve no purpose to pass upon the question raised byappellant Pataan as to the court's denial of her motion for reopening, besides the factthat the basis of her contention, that she has not been mentioned in the originalapplication as possessor of the land which she is claiming, appear to be flimsy by thefact that she is the wife of Senen Pandai who was appointed by Jose N. Garchitorena,to take care of the lands in question.APPEAL OF VICENTE SOTTO

This appellant alleges that on March 4, 1931, the Court of First Instance of Manilarendered a judgment ordering Rita Garchitorena Vda. Centenera to pay him theamount of P960.84; that by virtue of a writ of execution issued on March 22, 1932, thelots in question were attached and sold at public auction, the sheriff issuing to


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appellant the deed of sale on August 7, 1934, which was later registered in the office ofthe Register of Deeds of Camarines Sur.

The lower court found upon the evidence that lots 2, 3, and 4 of original plan Psu-66063and lots 5 and 8 of the subdivision plan Psu-66063-Amd. were adjudicated, by virtue ofa decision of the Supreme Court on March 4, 1933, to Rita Garchitorena as heiress of

her father, Andres Garchitorena, the adjudication subject to sections 712 and 713 ofthe Code of Civil Procedure.

Following directives in said decision, Mariano Garchitorena and brothers filed acomplaint in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur against Rita Garchitorena, andsecured a judgment on December 20, 1934, ordering Rita Garchitorena to deliver tothe administrator of the deceased Andres Garchitorena the possession of the landsdecreed to be adjudicated to her in this case, with the declaration that the creditors ofthe intestate of Andres Garchitorena will have the preferent right of retention upon saidlands for costs and other expenses caused by delays, and that the judicial administratorof the intestate was authorized on July 8, 1935, against opposition of appellant VicenteSotto, to sell at public auction the above five lots in order to pay the credits of Mariano,

Flor, and Marcel Garchitorena.Oppositor Vicente Sotto appealed against the order to the Supreme Court, whichaffirmed the appealed order, overruling later on several motions for reconsiderationfiled by said appellant.

The judicial administrator, consequently, sold at public auction on September 7, 1935,the lots in question to Mariano Garchitorena, who happened to have appeared as theonly buyer, at the price of P28,745.93. The deed of sale was executed on September 8,1935, and approved by the court on April 26, 1940, against the opposition of appellantVicente Sotto.

On April 27, 1939, Mariano Garchitorena bought the 500 hectares adjudicated by the

Supreme Court to Ramon and Jose Alvarez, comprising lots 1, 6, and 7 of the subdivisionplan Psu-66063-Amd.

From the foregoing undisputed facts, no issue of facts having been raised in any of theappeals in this case, it appears that Rita Garchitorena has never become the owner ofthe lots in question, it appearing that the adjudication made in her favor was subject tothe provisions of sections 712 and 713 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which insubstance means without prejudice to the rights of the creditors of her deceasedfather, Andres Garchitorena.

Although the Civil Code provides that succession takes effect from the time of thedeath of the owner, such provision does not create a succession which, as a matter offact, does not exist, as in the case of what the deceased Andres Garchitorena couldhave left to his daughter Rita.In the contemplation of the law, no succession shall be declared unless and until aliquidation of the assets and debts left by the deceased shall have been made and allhis creditors fully paid. Until a final liquidation is made and all debts are paid, there is noway of determining if his heirs may inherit anything.

Until such a liquidation has been made, the right of heirs to inherit remains to beinchoate. It partakes of the nature of hope. Liquidation is necessary to determine if the


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deceased has left any liquid asset which may be transmitted to his heirs. Before anyliquid asset is determined, all debts and obligations must first be liquidated and paid.

In the instant case it appears that after the lots in question had been sold at publicauction to Mariano Garchitorena at the price of P28,745.93 with which the debt of thedeceased Andres Garchitorena to Mariano, Flor, and Marcel Garchitorena were paid,

no property or asset remained to be adjudicated to his daughter Rita Garchitorena.Consequently, at the public auction in which appellant alleges he bought the lots inquestion from Rita Garchitorena to collect the amount of P960.84, as a matter of factappellant bought nothing, it appearing that what he bought as belonging to RitaGarchitorena did not belong to the latter.

Appellant alleges that he cannot be prejudiced by judgments or orders issued in othercases in which he has not been a party, and said other cases are the petition for landregistration filed by Rita Garchitorena, decided by the Court of First Instance ofCamarines Sur on May 14, 1931, with the modification decreed by the Supreme Courton March 4, 1933 (58 Phil., 21); civil case No. 5782 of the Court of First Instance ofCamarines Sur instituted by Mariano, Flor, and Marcel Garchitorena against Rita

Garchitorena, to recover the lots in question, on the ground that said propertiespertained really to the deceased Andres Garchitorena and should be made availableto answer for the latters debt, and the intestate of Andres Garchitorena, case No. 2881of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, in which proceedings took place endingin the sale of the lots in question to Mariano Garchitorena (SC-G.R. No. 44854).

In the latter case appellant filed on June 4, 1935, an opposition to have the propertiesin question sold to satisfy claims of Mariano, Flor and Marcel Garchitorena against thedeceased Andres Garchitorena. In said opposition appellant alleged:

Comparece Vicente Sotto, por si y en su propia representacion, como terceristaen este asunto, y se opone a la mocion de Mariano Garchitorena y MarcelGarchitorena, de fecha 20 de Mayo de 1935, pidiendo la venta en privado o enpublica subasta de las parcelas de terreno descritas en la misma, por elfundamento de que el infrascrito es el unico y absoluto dueñode dichasparcelas de terreno.

1. En los asuntos R.G. Nos. 36385 y 36547, titulados Rita Garchitorena Vda. deCentenera contra Hermogenes P. Obias, et al., y Rita Garchitorena Vda. deCentenera contra El Director de Terrenos y otros, respectivamente, el TribunalSupremo decreto, en decision de Marzo 4, 1933, que todas las parcelas deterreno descritas en la mencionada mocion fuesen registradas a nombre de RitaGarchitorena (Gac. Of., Vol. XXXII, No. 18, de Febrero 10, 1934.)

2. En el asunto No. 38722 del Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Manila,

promovido por Vicente Sotto contra Rita Garchitorena Vda. de Centenera, sedicto con fecha 31 de Mayo de 1931 sentencia en favor del demandante ycontra la demandada; y, habiendose quedado firme y ejecutoria dichasentencia, las parcelas de terreno en cuestion, que son las mismas descritas enla mocion de que se trata en el presente asunto, fueron vendidas en publicasubasta por el Sheriff Provincial de Camarines Sur, y adquiridas por elcompareciente el 7 de Julio de 1933 en que se verifico dicha venta en publicasubasta.


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3. El dia 1.º de Septiembre de 1933 se expedio por el Sheriff de Camarines Sur enfavor del comprador Vicente Sotto el correspondiente Certificado de Venta,sobre dichas parcelas de terreno, y dicho certificado de venta fue anotado enel Registro de la Propriedad de Camarines Sur correspondiente el 20 deSeptiembre de 1933; y

4. No habiendose ejercitado por las ejecutadas en el citado asunto su derechode retracto, dentro del plazo legal, el 6 de Agosto de 1934, elcitado SherifffProvincial de Camarines Sur expedio en favor de Vicente Sotto el certificado deVenta absoluta, el cual fue igualmente anotado en el Registro de la Propriedadde Camarines Sur correspondiente en la misma fecha, y una copia del cual seacompaña a este asunto y se marca como Exhibito "A-T" del infrascritotercerista.

De los hechos que preceden como se ve, resulta que el aqui tercerista, VicenteSotto, adquirio las parcelas de terreno en cuestion en virtud de compra enpublica subasta, anunciada y llevada a cabo por el Sheriff Provincial deCamarines Sur el 7 de Julio de 1933, o sea mucho antes de que este Juzgado

dictara el 20 de Diciembre de 1934 su sentencia en el asunto No. 5782, tituladoMarian de Garchitorena, Flor Garchitorena y Marcel Garchitorena contra RitaGarchitorena Vda. de Centenera y Jose N. Garchitorena en su capacidad deadministrador judicial del abintestato del finado Andres Garchitorena.

Appellant's contentions were overruled by the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur.Appellant appealed to the Supreme Court, which, on December 5, 1938 (G.R. No.44854), overruling again appellant's contentions, among others, stated:

Claiming to have acquired title to the land in question by reason of a sheriff'ssale made in his favor, the appellant, after obtaining a permission to intervene,filed a written opposition to the aforesaid motion of Mariano de Garchitorena,Flor Garchitorena and Marcel Garchitorena. The court below rejected thisopposition, on the ground that, although the sheriff's sale was made prior to therendition of the judgment in civil case No. 5782, it could not prevail against thesaid judgment, in view of the fact, that, prior to the sale, a notice of lispendens was filed in connection with that case.

In support of this appeal, it is now contended that the notice of lis pendens couldnot prejudice the right of the appellant to the land in question because suchnotice could only affect land registered under Act No. 496. Appellant furtherrelies on section 194 of the Administrative Code, as amended, which in partprovides that "any registration made under this section shall be understood to bewithout prejudice to a third party with better right." The point thus raised is set atrest by the decisions of this court in Atkins, Kroll & Company vs. Domingo, 46 Phil.,362, and Felino vs. Sanz, 44 Phil., 691. In the latter case, this court held that "atransferee pendente lite of real property in litigation is bound by a judgmentagainst his predecessor in interest and is a proper but not an indispensable part."

Appellant also claims that he could not be affected by the judgment renderedin civil case No. 5782, because it was fraudulently obtained. This contention iswithout merit. The judgment in question must be presumed to be legal and valid,


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unless shown by conclusive evidence to have obtained through fraud. No suchevidence exists in this case.

The questions raised in the above opposition are substantially the same as those raisedin the supplementary opposition filed by appellant in the case at bar.

When Mariano Garchitorena filed on February 24, 1940, a motion for the approval ofthe sale in his favor of the lots in question, appellant filed an opposition, dated March11, 1940, reiterating his alleged rights by virtue of the levy and sale on execution in hisfavor. The opposition was overruled by an order dated April 26, 1940, in which the salein favor of Mariano Garchitorena was approved. Appellant did not appeal against saidorder.

The decision of the Supreme Court of December 5, 1938, in case G.R. No. 44854 and theunappealed order of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur dated April 26, 1940,and special proceeding No. 2881 had finally settled the questions raised by theappellant.

For all the foregoing, finding no merit in the appeals of appellants H.P. Obias, Ana

Pataan, and Vicente Sotto, the order of the lower court dated June 28, 1941, isaffirmed, with costs against appellants.

Moran, C.J., Paras, Pablo, Bengzon, Briones, Padilla, and Tuason, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

HILADO, J., concurring and dissenting:

I concur in the disposition of the case as regards the parcels of land decreed by thisCourt in G.R. Nos. 36385 and 35547 in favor of Rita Garchitorena, and dissent from theremainder of the majority decision which affects the parcels covered by theoppositions of the herein opponents-appellants.These latter parcels, whose registration in the majority decision also decrees in favor ofmovant-appellee Mariano Garchitorena, were never applied for in an application forregistration, nor the subject of a like petition on the part of any opponent in the originalregistration cases which, after having been appealed to this court, were docketed anddisposed of herein under G.R. Nos. 36385 and 36547 ( see 58 Phil., 21). Those cases wereinstituted, prosecuted and decided under Act No. 496. The judgment of this Courtdisposing of said cases and promulgated on March 4, 1933, and elevated to theauthority of res judicata seven years before the motion now under consideration wasfiled in the court below, and more than fourteen years ago today, upheld theoppositions filed by the Director of Lands, Hermogenes P. Obias (18 hectares), Ramonand Jose Alvares (500 hectares), and Januario Alferes (24 hectares), and ordered theamendment of the Plan Psu-66063 "so as to exclude the portions of land pertaining tosaid opponents." No affirmative relief was granted said opponents in the sense ofdecreeing the registration in their favor of the parcels of land respectively covered bytheir oppositions.

Before the amendment of sections 34, 37, and 38 of Act No. 496 by sections 1, 2, and 3of Act No. 3621, the court has no jurisdiction to decree in the same proceeding the


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registration in favor of the opponent, even though it should find that, as between theapplicant and the opponent, the land belonged to the latter. In Tecson vs.Corporacion de los PP. Dominicos (19 Phil., 79, 80), this Court, inter alia , said:

. . . this court has held heretofore that the jurisdiction of the Land Court extendsno further than the inscription of the land described in its final decree and the

enforcement of that decree, and that, even though the land described in thepetition be found by the court, as between the petitioner and the oppositor, tobe the property of the opponent, such land can not be inscribed in his name,the Land Court having, as we have said, no jurisdiction or power to do so. Itnaturally and necessarily follows that the opponent, if he desires the land ofwhich he claims ownership to be registered in accordance with law, must begina new proceeding in the Land Court for that purpose.

In this consisted at the time, the difference between registration proceedings under ActNo. 496 and those under Chapter VI of Act No. 926. (Sec. 64, latter Act.)

On December 5, 1929, section 34 of Act No. 496, it is true, was amended by section 1 ofAct No. 3621, so that the second sentence thereof thereafter reads as follows:

. . . The answer (or opposition, as it is often called) shall state all the objections tothe application, and shall set forth the interest claimed by the party filing thesame and apply for the remedy desired, and shall be signed and sworn to byhim or by some person in his behalf.

Section 37 of Act No. 496 was also amended by section 2 of Act No. 3621, so that itpartly read as follows:

SEC. 37. xxx xxx xxx

. . . in a case where there is an adverse claim, the court shall determine theconflicting interests of the applicant and the adverse claimant, and after takingevidence shall dismiss the application if neither of them succeeds in showing thathe has proper title for registration, or shall enter a decree awarding the landapplied for, or any part thereof, to the person entitled thereto . . ..

But even after the amendment, the underscored portion of the above-quotedprovisions clearly contemplate that in order for the opponent to obtain from the court adecree of registration, he must apply for the same remedy.

It is likewise true that the same amending act reformed section 38 of Act No. 496 so thatsaid section thereafter read thus:

SEC. 38. If the court after hearing finds that the applicant or adverse claimanthas title as stated in his application or adverse claim and proper for registration,a decree of confirmation and registration shall be entered.

There can be no dispute that in the original registration cases under consideration, nopositive decree of registration was prayed for by any opponent, as categoricallyrequired by section 34 of Act No. 496, as amended; and certainly none has beendecreed by the abovementioned final judgment of this Court, which was beyond itspower to amend, much less than of the lower court, when the latter in granting themotion under consideration attempted to do so. It seems to me evident, therefore, thateven if the opponents themselves had sought such an amendment, it could not have


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been legally made at such a late date for the simple reason that they had not appliedfor a decree of registration in their opposition as required in said provision, andfurthermore, because the judgment of this Court had long before become final andirrevocable. If the opponents themselves could not legally have achieved such an end,how could their successor-in-interest, the movant-appellee?

What could be the purpose of Act No. 3621, section 1, amending Act No. 496, section34, in providing that the opponent shall "apply for the remedy desired"? It is topresumed that this phrase was there used for a purpose — it would be an insult to theintelligence of the lawmaker to understand the contrary. What could be that purpose?To my mind, it could only be to establish a basis for the court's jurisdiction to decreeregistration in favor of the opponent and a condition precedent for the exercisethereof. The law undoubtedly aimed at duly apprising the applicant and any otheradverse claimants that such opponent was asserting a right to the registration and waspraying for that remedy, so that such applicant and other adverse claimants could dulymeet the pretensions of said opponent and protect their rights and interestaccordingly. Under the provision, if the opponent applied for a positive registration in his

favor as the remedy that he desired, in case he should prove title in himself proper forregistration, the court would have jurisdiction to grant him that remedy. To say now thateven if he should not apply for the remedy the court could still grant it to him, would betantamount to declaring the quoted phrase utterly useless and devoid of meaning.

In Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Tombis Triño (50 Phil., 708), this Court said:

In a cadastral proceeding, a court has no jurisdiction to decree a lot to one whohas put in no claim to it. The written declaration claiming certain describedproperty is the very basis of jurisdiction to render a judgment. . . .

While the present case is not concerned with a cadastral proceeding, it involves theregistration of land like such a proceeding and, as is well-known, a claim in a cadastralproceeding, which is denominated "answer" is for the express purpose of securing theregistration of the land covered thereby in the name of the claimant. That "answer" isthe pleading which the claimant files in view of and against the petition or applicationof the Director of Lands which starts the case, in much the same way as an oppositionor adverse claim in an ordinary registration case is in answer to the application of theapplicant which commences the latter proceeding. Hence, in my opinion, the doctrineabove-quoted from the Triño case is perfectly applicable herein.

It is likewise true that after Act No. 3621, more specifically on November 17, 1931, ActNo. 3901 was enacted, amending section 29 of Act No. 496 so as to read in part asfollows:

SEC. 29. After the filing of the application and before that issuance of the decree

of title by the Chief of the General Land Registration Office the land thereindescribed may be dealt with and instruments relating thereto shall be recordedin the office of the register of deeds at any time before the issuance of thedecree of title, in the same manner as if no application had been made. Theinterested party may, however, present such instruments to the Court of FirstInstance instead of presenting them to the office of the register of deeds,together with a motion that the same be considered in relation withthe application , and the court, after notice to the parties, shall order such land


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registered subject to the incumbrance created by said instruments, or order thedecree of registration issued in the name of the buyer or of the person to whomthe property has been conveyed by said instruments. If such motion is madeafter the decision has become final, the court shall require the interested party,before granting his motion, to pay the fees which the register of deeds would

collect in accordance with section one hundred and fourteen of this Act, asamended, if such instruments had been presented for registration in the office ofthe register of deeds after registration of the original certificate of title. If theorder of the court abovementioned is received by the Chief of the LandRegistration Office after issuance of the decree of title, such order shall forthwithbe forwarded by said officer to the register of deeds concerned, for compliancetherewith. If the proceedings upon the application end in the issuance of adecree of title, the property included therein shall, as soon as said decree hasbeen registered in the office of the register of deeds, as provided in section forty-one, become registered land under this Act, . . .. (Emphasis supplied.)

Of course, under the provision just quoted it was proper for the lower court to decree

the registration in favor of movant-appellee of the parcels of land whose registrationwas ordered in favor of Rita Garchitorena, as original applicant, in G.R. Nos. 36385 and36547, but "the court shall require the interested party, before granting his motion, topay the fees which the register of deeds would collect in accordance with section onehundred and fourteen of this Act, as amended, if such instruments had been presentedfor registration of the original certificate of title."

It is clear from the section last above-quoted that its provision are confined tothe application which starts the registration proceedings. The phrase "after the filing ofthe application" in its first sentence can not refer but to that which the applicant files,and this is the selfsame application which is alluded to in the remainder of the section. Ifso, the provisions of said section do not apply to the opposition filed by the opponent.

The writer does not mean to be technical at all, but merely acts upon the principle thatthis Court has to exercise its jurisdiction and powers by authority of law. Where the law-making body has seen fit to confine the provision to the application, it is not for thisCourt to say that it would be more practical to extend it to the opposition. Where thelaw is clear, the duty of the court is merely to apply it. Construction would be out ofplace and, if attempted, would be no more nor less than judicial legislation. It would be

just as obnoxious to our system of government for the courts to legislate in the matter oftheir own jurisdiction as it would be for the legislature to render judgment upon purely

judicial questions.

I am forced to the conclusion that movant-appellee (a) must pay the fees above-mentioned pursuant to section 29 of Act No. 496, as amended, as a condition

precedent to the registration in his name of the parcels of land adjudicated to RitaGarchitorena, and (b) must file a separate proceeding for the registration of theparcels of land covered by the said oppositions or any of them, in the regular mannerand following the regular procedure.

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G.R. No. L-770 April 27, 1948

ANGEL T. LIMJOCO, petitioner,vs.INTESTATE ESTATE OF PEDRO O. FRAGRANTE, deceased, respondent.

Angel Limjoco, Jr. and Delfin L. Gonzales for petitioner.Bienvenido A. Tan for respondent.

HILADO, J. :

Under date of May 21, 1946, the Public Service Commission, through Deputy

Commissioner Fidel Ibañez, rendered its decision in case No. 4572 of Pedro O. Fragante,as applicant for a certificate of public convenience to install, maintain and operate anice plant in San Juan, Rizal, whereby said commission held that the evidence thereinshowed that the public interest and convenience will be promoted in a proper andsuitable manner "by authorizing the operation and maintenance of another ice plant oftwo and one-half (2-½) tons in the municipality of San Juan; that the original applicantPedro O. Fragante was a Filipino Citizen at the time of his death; and that his intestateestate is financially capable of maintaining the proposed service". The commission,therefore, overruled the opposition filed in the case and ordered "that under theprovisions of section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended a certificate ofpublic convenience be issued to the Intestate Estate of the deceased Pedro Fragante,authorizing said Intestate Estate through its Special or Judicial Administrator, appointedby the proper court of competent jurisdiction, to maintain and operate an ice plantwith a daily productive capacity of two and one-half (2-1/2) tons in the Municipality ofSan Juan and to sell the ice produced from said plant in the said Municipality of SanJuan and in the Municipality of Mandaluyong, Rizal, and in Quezon City", subject to theconditions therein set forth in detail (petitioner's brief, pp. 33-34).

Petitioner makes four assignments of error in his brief as follows:

1. The decision of the Public Service Commission is not in accordance with law.

2. The decision of the Public Service Commission is not reasonably supported byevidence.

3. The Public Service Commission erred in not giving petitioner and the Ice andCold Storage Industries of the Philippines, Inc., as existing operators, a reasonableopportunity to meet the increased demand.


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4. The decision of the Public Service Commission is an unwarranted departurefrom its announced policy with respect to the establishment and operation of iceplant. (Pp. 1-2, petitioner's brief.)

In his argument petitioner contends that it was error on the part of the commission to

allow the substitution of the legal representative of the estate of Pedro O. Fragante forthe latter as party applicant in the case then pending before the commission, and insubsequently granting to said estate the certificate applied for, which is said to be incontravention of law.

If Pedro O. Fragante had not died, there can be no question that he would have hadthe right to prosecute his application before the commission to its final conclusion. Noone would have denied him that right. As declared by the commission in its decision, hehad invested in the ice plant in question P 35,000, and from what the commission saidregarding his other properties and business, he would certainly have been financiallyable to maintain and operate said plant had he not died. His transportation businessalone was netting him about P1,440 a month. He was a Filipino citizen and continued tobe such till his demise. The commission declared in its decision, in view of the evidencebefore it, that his estate was financially able to maintain and operate the ice plant. Theaforesaid right of Pedro O. Fragante to prosecute said application to its conclusion wasone which by its nature did not lapse through his death. Hence, it constitutes a part ofthe assets of his estate, for which a right was property despite the possibility that in theend the commission might have denied application, although under the facts of thecase, the commission granted the application in view of the financial ability of theestate to maintain and operate the ice plant. Petitioner, in his memorandum of March19, 1947, admits (page 3) that the certificate of public convenience once granted "as arule, should descend to his estate as an asset". Such certificate would certainly beproperty, and the right to acquire such a certificate, by complying with the requisites of

the law, belonged to the decedent in his lifetime, and survived to his estate and judicialadministrator after his death.

If Pedro O. Fragrante had in his lifetime secured an option to buy a piece of land andduring the life of the option he died, if the option had been given him in the ordinarycourse of business and not out of special consideration for his person, there would beno doubt that said option and the right to exercise it would have survived to his estateand legal representatives. In such a case there would also be the possibility of failure toacquire the property should he or his estate or legal representative fail to comply withthe conditions of the option. In the case at bar Pedro O. Fragrante's undoubted right toapply for and acquire the desired certificate of public convenience — the evidence

established that the public needed the ice plant — was under the law conditioned onlyupon the requisite citizenship and economic ability to maintain and operate theservice. Of course, such right to acquire or obtain such certificate of publicconvenience was subject to failure to secure its objective through nonfulfillment of thelegal conditions, but the situation here is no different from the legal standpoint from thatof the option in the illustration just given.


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Rule 88, section 2, provides that the executor or administrator may bring or defendactions, among other cases, for the protection of the property or rights of thedeceased which survive, and it says that such actions may be brought or defended "inthe right of the deceased".

Rule 82, section 1, paragraph ( a ), mentions among the duties of the executor oradministrator, the making of an inventory of all goods, chattels, rights , credits, andestate of the deceased which shall come to his possession or knowledge, or to thepossession of any other person for him.

In his commentaries on the Rules of Court (Volume II, 2nd ed., pages 366, 367) thepresent chief Justice of this Court draws the following conclusion from the decisionscited by him:

Therefore, unless otherwise expressly provided by law, any action affecting theproperty or rights (emphasis supplied) of a deceased person which may bebrought by or against him if he were alive, may likewise be instituted andprosecuted by or against the administrator, unless the action is for recovery ofmoney, debt or interest thereon, or unless, by its very nature, it cannot survive,because death extinguishes the right . . . .

It is true that a proceeding upon the application for a certificate of public conveniencebefore the Public Service Commission is not an "action". But the foregoing provisionsand citations go to prove that the decedent's rights which by their nature are notextinguished by death go to make up a part and parcel of the assets of his estatewhich, being placed under the control and management of the executor oradministrator, can not be exercised but by him in representation of the estate for thebenefit of the creditors, devisees or legatees, if any, and the heirs of the decedent. And

if the right involved happens to consist in the prosecution of an unfinished proceedingupon an application for a certificate of public convenience of the deceased beforethe Public Service Commission, it is but logical that the legal representative beempowered and entitled in behalf of the estate to make the right effective in thatproceeding.

Manresa (Vol. III, 6th ed., p. 11) says that No. 10 of article 334 and article 336 of the CivilCode, respectively, consider as immovable and movable things rights which are notmaterial. The same eminent commentator says in the cited volume (p. 45) that article336 of the Civil Code has been deficiently drafted in that it is not sufficiently expressiveof all incorporeal rights which are also property for juridical purposes.

Corpus Juris (Vol. 50, p. 737) states that in the broad sense of the term, propertyincludes, among other things, "an option", and "the certificate of the railroadcommission permitting the operation of a bus line", and on page 748 of the samevolume we read:

However, these terms (real property, as estate or interest) have also beendeclared to include every species of title, inchoate or complete, and


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embrace rights which lie in contract, whether executory or executed. (Emphasissupplied.)

Another important question raised by petitioner is whether the estate of Pedro O.Fragrante is a "person" within the meaning of the Public Service Act.

Words and Phrases, First Series, (Vol. 6, p, 5325), states the following doctrine in the jurisdiction of the State of Indiana:

As the estate of the decedent is in law regarded as a person, a forgerycommitted after the death of the man whose name purports to be signed to theinstrument may be prosecuted as with the intent to defraud the estate. Billings vs .State, 107 Ind., 54, 55, 6 N. E. 914, 7 N. E. 763, 57 Am. Rep. 77.

The Supreme Court of Indiana in the decision cited above had before it a case offorgery committed after the death of one Morgan for the purpose of defrauding hisestate. The objection was urged that the information did not aver that the forgery wascommitted with the intent to defraud any person. The Court, per Elliott, J., disposed ofthis objection as follows:

. . . The reason advanced in support of this proposition is that the law does notregard the estate of a decedent as a person. This intention (contention) cannotprevail. The estate of the decedent is a person in legal contemplation. "The word"person" says Mr. Abbot, "in its legal signification, is a generic term, and includesartificial as well as natural persons," 2 Abb. Dict. 271; Douglas vs . Pacific, etc. Co.,4 Cal. 304; Planters', etc., Bank vs . Andrews, 8 Port. (Ala.) 404. It said in anotherwork that 'persons are of two kinds: natural and artificial. A natural person is ahuman being. Artificial persons include (1) a collection or succession of naturalpersons forming a corporation; (2) a collection of property to which the lawattributes the capacity of having rights and duties. The latter class of artificialpersons is recognized only to a limited extent in our law. "Examples are the estateof a bankrupt or deceased person." 2 Rapalje & L. Law Dict. 954. Our own casesinferentially recognize the correctness of the definition given by the authors fromwhom we have quoted, for they declare that it is sufficient, in pleading a claimagainst a decedent's estate, to designate the defendant as the estate of thedeceased person, naming him. Ginn vs. Collins , 43 Ind. 271. Unless we accept thisdefinition as correct, there would be a failure of justice in cases where, as here,the forgery is committed after the death of a person whose name is forged; andthis is a result to be avoided if it can be done consistent with principle. We

perceive no difficulty in avoiding such a result; for, to our minds, it seemsreasonable that the estate of a decedent should be regarded as an artificialperson. It is the creation of law for the purpose of enabling a disposition of theassets to be properly made, and, although natural persons as heirs, devises, orcreditors, have an interest in the property, the artificial creature is a distinct legalentity. The interest which natural persons have in it is not complete until there hasbeen a due administration; and one who forges the name of the decedent toan instrument purporting to be a promissory note must be regarded as having


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intended to defraud the estate of the decedent, and not the natural personshaving diverse interests in it, since ha cannot be presumed to have known whothose persons were, or what was the nature of their respective interest. Thefraudulent intent is against the artificial person, — the estate — and not thenatural persons who have direct or contingent interest in it. (107 Ind. 54, 55, 6 N.E.

914-915.)In the instant case there would also be a failure of justice unless the estate of Pedro O.Fragrante is considered a "person", for quashing of the proceedings for no other reasonthan his death would entail prejudicial results to his investment amounting to P35,000.00as found by the commission, not counting the expenses and disbursements which theproceeding can be presumed to have occasioned him during his lifetime, let alonethose defrayed by the estate thereafter. In this jurisdiction there are ample precedentsto show that the estate of a deceased person is also considered as having legalpersonality independent of their heirs. Among the most recent cases may bementioned that of " Estate of Mota vs. Concepcion , 56 Phil., 712, 717, wherein theprincipal plaintiff was the estate of the deceased Lazaro Mota, and this Court gave

judgment in favor of said estate along with the other plaintiffs in these words:

. . . the judgment appealed from must be affirmed so far as it holds thatdefendants Concepcion and Whitaker are indebted to he plaintiffs in theamount of P245,804.69 . . . .

Under the regime of the Civil Code and before the enactment of the Code of CivilProcedure, the heirs of a deceased person were considered in contemplation of law asthe continuation of his personality by virtue of the provision of article 661 of the firstCode that the heirs succeed to all the rights and obligations of the decedent by themere fact of his death. It was so held by this Court in Barrios vs. Dolor , 2 Phil., 44, 46.

However, after the enactment of the Code of Civil Procedure, article 661 of the CivilCode was abrogated, as held in Suiliong & Co. vs. Chio-Taysan , 12 Phil., 13, 22. In thatcase, as well as in many others decided by this Court after the innovations introducedby the Code of Civil Procedure in the matter of estates of deceased persons, it hasbeen the constant doctrine that it is the estate or the mass of property, rights and assetsleft by the decedent, instead of the heirs directly, that becomes vested and chargedwith his rights and obligations which survive after his demise.

The heirs were formerly considered as the continuation of the decedent's personalitysimply by legal fiction, for they might not have been flesh and blood — the reason wasone in the nature of a legal exigency derived from the principle that the heirs

succeeded to the rights and obligations of the decedent. Under the present legalsystem, such rights and obligations as survive after death have to be exercised andfulfilled only by the estate of the deceased. And if the same legal fiction were notindulged, there would be no juridical basis for the estate, represented by the executoror administrator, to exercise those rights and to fulfill those obligations of the deceased.The reason and purpose for indulging the fiction is identical and the same in both cases.This is why according to the Supreme Court of Indiana in Billings vs . State, supra , citing 2Rapalje & L. Dictionary, 954, among the artificial persons recognized by law figures "a


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collection of property to which the law attributes the capacity of having rights andduties", as for instance, the estate of a bankrupt or deceased person.

Petitioner raises the decisive question of whether or not the estate of Pedro O.Fragrante can be considered a "citizen of the Philippines" within the meaning of section

16 of the Public Service Act, as amended, particularly the proviso thereof expressly andcategorically limiting the power of the commission to issue certificates of publicconvenience or certificates of public convenience and necessity "only to citizens of thePhilippines or of the United States or to corporations, copartnerships, associations, or

joint-stock companies constituted and organized under the laws of the Philippines", andthe further proviso that sixty per centum of the stock or paid-up capital of such entitiesmust belong entirely to citizens of the Philippines or of the United States.

Within the Philosophy of the present legal system, the underlying reason for the legalfiction by which, for certain purposes, the estate of the deceased person is considereda "person" is the avoidance of injustice or prejudice resulting from the impossibility ofexercising such legal rights and fulfilling such legal obligations of the decedent assurvived after his death unless the fiction is indulged. Substantially the same reason isassigned to support the same rule in the jurisdiction of the State of Indiana, asannounced in Billings vs . State, supra , when the Supreme Court of said State said:

. . . It seems reasonable that the estate of a decedent should be regarded as anartificial person. it is the creation of law for the purpose of enabling a dispositionof the assets to be properly made . . . .

Within the framework and principles of the constitution itself, to cite just one example,under the bill of rights it seems clear that while the civil rights guaranteed therein in themajority of cases relate to natural persons, the term "person" used in section 1 (1) and

(2) must be deemed to include artificial or juridical persons, for otherwise these latterwould be without the constitutional guarantee against being deprived of propertywithout due process of law, or the immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures.We take it that it was the intendment of the framers to include artificial or juridical, noless than natural, persons in these constitutional immunities and in others of similarnature. Among these artificial or juridical persons figure estates of deceased persons.Hence, we hold that within the framework of the Constitution, the estate of Pedro O.Fragrante should be considered an artificial or juridical person for the purposes of thesettlement and distribution of his estate which, of course, include the exercise duringthe judicial administration thereof of those rights and the fulfillment of those obligationsof his which survived after his death. One of those rights was the one involved in his

pending application before the Public Service Commission in the instant case,consisting in the prosecution of said application to its final conclusion. As stated above,an injustice would ensue from the opposite course.

How about the point of citizenship? If by legal fiction his personality is consideredextended so that any debts or obligations left by, and surviving, him may be paid, andany surviving rights may be exercised for the benefit of his creditors and heirs,respectively, we find no sound and cogent reason for denying the application of the


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same fiction to his citizenship, and for not considering it as likewise extended for thepurposes of the aforesaid unfinished proceeding before the Public Service Commission.The outcome of said proceeding, if successful, would in the end inure to the benefit ofthe same creditors and the heirs. Even in that event petitioner could not allege anyprejudice in the legal sense, any more than he could have done if Fragrante had lived

longer and obtained the desired certificate. The fiction of such extension of hiscitizenship is grounded upon the same principle, and motivated by the same reason, asthe fiction of the extension of personality. The fiction is made necessary to avoid theinjustice of subjecting his estate, creditors and heirs, solely by reason of his death to theloss of the investment amounting to P35,000, which he has already made in the iceplant, not counting the other expenses occasioned by the instant proceeding, from thePublic Service Commission of this Court.

We can perceive no valid reason for holding that within the intent of the constitution(Article IV), its provisions on Philippine citizenship exclude the legal principle of extensionabove adverted to. If for reasons already stated our law indulges the fiction ofextension of personality, if for such reasons the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante should beconsidered an artificial or juridical person herein, we can find no justification for refusingto declare a like fiction as to the extension of his citizenship for the purposes of thisproceeding.

Pedro O. Fragrante was a Filipino citizen, and as such, if he had lived, in view of theevidence of record, he would have obtained from the commission the certificate forwhich he was applying. The situation has suffered but one change, and that is, hisdeath. His estate was that of a Filipino citizen. And its economic ability to appropriatelyand adequately operate and maintain the service of an ice plant was the same that itreceived from the decedent himself. In the absence of a contrary showing, which doesnot exist here, his heirs may be assumed to be also Filipino citizens; and if they are not,

there is the simple expedient of revoking the certificate or enjoining them from inheritingit.

Upon the whole, we are of the opinion that for the purposes of the prosecution of saidcase No. 4572 of the Public Service Commission to its final conclusion, both thepersonality and citizenship of Pedro O. Fragrante must be deemed extended, within themeaning and intent of the Public Service Act, as amended, in harmony with theconstitution: it is so adjudged and decreed.

Decision affirmed, without costs. So ordered.

Moran, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Briones, Padilla and Tuason, JJ., concur.Paras, J., I hereby certify that Mr. Justice Feria voted with the majority.

Separate Opinions


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PERFECTO, J., dissenting:

Commonwealth Act No. 146 reserves to Filipino citizens the right to obtain a certificateof public convenience to operate an ice plant in San Juan, Rizal. The limitation is inaccordance with section 8 of Article XIV of the Constitution which provides

No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of apublic utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or tocorporations or other entities organized under the laws of the Philippines, sixty percentum of the capital of which is owned by citizens of the Philippines, nor suchfranchise, certificate or authorization be exclusive in character or for a longerperiod than fifty years. No franchise granted to any individual, firm orcorporation, except under the condition that it shall be subject to amendment,alteration, or repeal by Congress when the public interest so requires.

The main question in this case is whether the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante fulfills thecitizenship requirement. To our mind, the question can be restated by asking whetherthe heirs of Pedro O. Fragrante fulfill the citizenship requirement of the law.

The estate is an abstract entity. As such, its legal value depends on what it represents. Itis a device by which the law gives a kind of personality and unity to undeterminedtangible persons, the heirs. They inherit and replace the deceased at the very momentof his death. As there are procedural requisites for their identification and determinationthat need time for their compliance, a legal fiction has been devised to representthem. That legal fiction is the estate, a liquid condition in process of solidification.

The estate, therefore, has only a representative value. What the law calls estate is, amatter of fact, intended to designate the heirs of the deceased. The question,therefore, in this case, boils down to the citizenship of the heirs of Fragrante.

There is nothing in the record to show conclusively the citizenship of the heirs ofFragrante. If they are Filipino citizens, the action taken by the Public Service Commissionshould be affirmed. If they are not, it should be reversed.

Petitioner alleges that the estate is just a front or dummy for aliens to go around thecitizenship constitutional provision. It is alleged that Gaw Suy, the special administratorof the estate, is an alien.

We are of the opinion that the citizenship of the heirs of Fragrante should be

determined by the Commission upon evidence that the party should be present. Itshould also determine the dummy question raised by the petitioner.

We are of opinion and so vote that the decision of the Public Service Commission ofMay 21, 1946, be set aside and that the Commission be instructed to receive evidenceof the above factual questions and render a new decision accordingly.

G.R. No. 559 March 14, 1903


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MANUEL BARRIOS Y BARREDO,Plaintiff-Appellant , vs. MARIA PASCUALA DOLOR, ETAL.,Defendants-Appellees .

Simplicio del Rosario, for appellant. Maria Pascuala Dolor, appellee.

MAPA, J. :

The plaintiff has brought an action for the recovery from the defendants, heirs of thelate Don Ciriaco Demonteverde, of one-half of a sugar estate and the stock thereon,which he claims to have purchased from the said Don Ciriaco Demonteverde. Insupport of his contention as to the law of the case he attached to the complaint apublic instrument which appears to have been executed by himself andDemonteverde, February 3, 1883, in which, according to the plaintiff, a stipulation ismade for a contract of partnership for the operation of the said estate, and,furthermore, a community, of ownership is established with respect to the estate in favorof the two parties to this instrument. It does not appear that this instrument has beenrecorded in the registry of property.chanrobles virtual law library

Service of the complaint having been had on the defendants, Doña Maria PascualaDolor raised an incidental issue as a previous question, praying that the instrumentreferred to be ruled out of evidence on the ground that it had not been recorded inthe registry of property, and that it be returned to the plaintiff without leaving in therecord any transcript or copy thereof or extract therefrom, resting this contention uponarticle 389 of the Mortgage Law. This motion was granted by the judge by order of the24th of March, 1898, against which the plaintiff appeals.chanrobles virtual law library

The article cited is literally as follows: "From the time this law goes into operation theordinary and special courts and the Government offices will not admit any documentor instrument by which rights subject to inscription according to this law are constituted,transmitted, acknowledged, modified, or extinguished, unless recorded in the register, ifthe object of the presentation of such document is to enforce, to the prejudice of athird person, a right which should have been recorded ."chanrobles virtual law library

In view of the latter part of this article, the question has been raised in this incidentalissue whether the defendants, as heirs of Don Ciriaco Demonteverde, can and shouldbe regarded as third persons for the purposes of the Mortgage Law, with respect to thecontract executed by Demonteverde and evidenced by the instrument abovementioned.chanrobles virtual law library

The Mortgaged Law itself, in article 27, gives the definition of a third person, which is, "hewho has not taken part in the act or contract recorded." chanrobles virtual law library

According to this parties to a contract are not third persons; consequently,Demonteverde was not a third person with respect to the contract entered into by himand evidenced by the instrument in question. He not being such a third person, neithercan his heirs be so regarded, nor should they be so regarded with respect to the same


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contract, because they are only the judicial continuation of his personality, they havingbeen subrogated, by virtue of the right of succession, to all his rights and obligations, inaccordance with provisions of article 661 of the Civil Code.chanrobles virtual law library

This doctrine, which is a mere consequence of the general principles of law, has

received express sanction, in the decisions of the supreme court of Spain. In its judgment of the 27th of January, 1881, the latter held that acts, both in court and out,consented to by the person who lawfully took part therein, are effective with respect tothe heirs or successors of such parties, who are not be regarded as third persons for thispurpose; and in its judgment of the 28th of January, 1892, it was decided by the samecourt that heirs are nothing more than the continuation of the legal personality of theirdecedent and can not be considered in any degree as third persons within themeaning of article 27 of the Mortgage Law.chanrobles virtual law library

The defendants, therefore, are not third persons with respect to the contract enteredinto by their decedent, Don Ciriaco Demonteverde, in the instrument of February 3,1883, and they therefore can not avail themselves of the prohibition contained in article389 of the Mortgage Law for the purpose of opposing the admission of this instrument asevidence in the case, because not recorded in the registry of property. This prohibitionwas established solely and exclusively in favor of those who, within the meaning of thatlaw, are third persons. Were it otherwise, the position of the defendants would besuperior to that of the person whom they derived their rights, because he, not being athird person, could not set up such an exception. This would certainly be most illogicalfrom a legal point of view, in view of the fact that the heir is, as above stated, a merecontinuation of the civil personality of his decedent.chanrobles virtual law library

The defendants not being third persons, it becomes unnecessary to decide whether theinstrument referred to is or is not subject to inscription in accordance with article 2 of the

Mortgage Law, because, at all events, and however this may be, the mere failure torecord the instrument in the registry of property can not be a bar to its admission asevidence in this case, as the action is not brought against a third person in the sense ofthis word as used in the law referred to.chanrobles virtual law library

Consequently we reverse and annul the order of the court below, overruling the motionmade on behalf of Doña Maria Pascuala Dolor, without special condemnation as tothe costs of either instance. So ordered.chanrobles virtual law library

Arellano, C.J., Cooper, Willard and Ladd, JJ., concur.Torres, J., did not sit in this case.

G.R. No. L-4777 November 11, 1908

SUILIONG & CO., as liquidators of The Yek Tong Lim Fire, Marine, and Insurance Co.,Ltd., plaintiffs-appellees,vs.SILVINA CHIO-TAYSAN, defendant- FRANCISCA JOSE, intervener-appellant.


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Leodegario Azarraga, for appellant.Carlos Ledesma, and Ramon Fernandez, for appellees.

CARSON, J.:

Avelina Caballero, deceased, owned during her lifetime a certain tract of land, whichwas duly inscribed in her name in the land registry of the city of Manila. On March 27,1903, she borrowed from Francisca Jose, the intervener and appellant in this action,1,000 pesos, Mexican currency, and turned over her title deeds to this tract of land tothe lender as security for the loan, but no entry touching the transaction was noted inthe land registry.

Avelina Caballero died on the 5th day of June, 1903, and thereafter Silvina Chio-Taysan, the defendant in this action, instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila anaction, known, under the system of civil procedure in existence prior to the adoption ofthe present code, as an "action for the declaration of heirship" and on the 5th day ofAugust, 1903, the following order declaring her to be the only and exclusive heir ofAvelina Caballero, deceased, was issued in that proceeding:

[United States of America, Philippine Islands. In the Court of First Instance ofManila. Part III.]

It having been proven by both documental and oral evidence introduced in theabove-cited case, that the petitioner Silvina Chio-Taysan y Caballero is thedaughter of Jose Chio-Taysan and Avelina Caballero, who died on the 29th ofApril, 1895, and on the 5th of June, 1903, respectively, without leaving any otherdescendant or having executed any will; and there being no objectionwhatever to the claim of the petitioner, it is hereby declared that the said SilvinaChio-Taysan y Caballero is the legal heir abintestato of her deceased parents,the said Jose Chio-Taysan and Avelina Caballero, in conformity with theprovisions of the Civil Code now in force. Let a certificate of this decision beissued to the interested party and those who may hereafter apply for the same.So ordered.

A.S. CROSSFIELD, Judge.

On March 9, 1904, the registrar of deeds of the city of Manila by virtue of this order

entered the following inscription in the land registry whereby the said Silvina Chio-Taysan is made to appear as the owner of the land in question:

Ninth inscription. — Urban property. — A parcel of land and a house of a strongmaterials, tile roofed, built thereon, marked number eight, situated in CalleLavezares of the district of Binondo, this city, the remaining description of whichappears in the first inscription of this number. — It has no encumbrances. — DoñaAvelina Caballero y Bugnot, of age, widow, of this vicinity, is the owner of this


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property under a title of repurchase, according to the proceeding inscription.Said lady and her husband, Don Jose Chio-Taysan, died on June 5, 1903, andApril 29, 1895, respectively, and neither of them having executed a will, thecorresponding intestate proceedings were instituted, in which an order wasissued on August 5, 1903, by A.S. Crossfield, judge of the third sala of the Court of

First Instance of this city, declaring their daughter, Silvina Chio-Taysan yCaballero, their intestate heir. By virtue thereof, I inscribe, in favor of the saidSilvina Chio-Taysan y Caballero, the right she was acquired over the property ofthis number, under title by intestate inheritance. All the above appears from theprevious records and from the copy of the above judicial order, issued by DonSalvador Chofre, assistant clerk of the Court of First Instance of this city, onAugust 5, 1903, which document was presented to this registry at 8:50 a. m. onthe 25th day of February last, as per record No. 452, page 266, of the 7th volumeof the Diario. And all the above being in accordance with the document abovereferred to, I sign these presents in Manila, on March 9, 1904 — Fees: $7.50, No. 7,Tariff of Fees. — Alberto Barretto.

On the 26th day of May, 1904, the said Silvina Chio-Taysan borrowed the sum of P2,500from the Fire and Marine Insurance and Loan Co., of which the plaintiff is the lawfullyappointed liquidator, and mortgaged the land in question as security for therepayment of the loan.

Thereafter the husband of Silvina Chio-Taysan instituted special proceedings under theprovisions of the present Code of Civil Procedure, for the administration of the estate ofAvelina Caballero, deceased, and on the 16th day of October, 1905, he was, inaccordance with his petition, appointed administrator; and thereupon, submitted assuch administrator, an inventory of the property of the estate, in which was includedthe land in question; and on the 28th of November, 1905, Francisca Jose, the intervener

in this action, submitted her claim to the commissioner appointed in these proceedings,for the sum of 1,000 pesos, Mexican currency, loaned the deceased, as above set out,on the 28th day of March, 1904, which claim was duly approved on the 31st of August,1906.

On the 10th day of October, 1906, the plaintiff in this action filed its complaint againstthe defendant, Silvina Chio-Taysan, praying for judgment for the amount loaned her asabove set out, and the foreclosure of its mortgage upon the land. To this complaint thedefendant, Silvina Chio-Taysan, filed her answer, admitting the facts alleged in thecomplaint and declining to interpose any objection to the prayer of the complaint; buton the 30th of October, 1907, Francisca Jose was permitted to intervene and file her

separate "complaint in intervention" wherein she set out the facts touching the loanmade by her to Avelina Caballero, deceased, and prayed that the court declare themortgage executed by Silvina Chio-Taysan rescinded and of no effect; and further thatit annul the inscription in the land registry of the title of Silvina Chio-Taysan to the land inquestion; and declare this land subject to her claim against the estate of AvelinaCaballero, deceased. lawphil.net


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The trial court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against both the defendantand the intervener in conformity with the prayer of the complaint, and the intervenerbrings that judgment before this court for review upon her bill of exceptions duly signedand certified.

We do not think that the judgment of the trial court can be sustained in so far as itwholly denies relief to the intervener, Francisca Jose. The trial judge denied the reliefprayed for by the intervener, on the ground that her intervention in this action was forthe purpose of the written title deeds on the land, and that, since she admitted that shehad admitted her claim against the estate of Avelina Caballero, deceased, to thecommittee appointed in the administration proceedings, she must be taken to haveabandoned, whatever lien she may have held as security therefor, in accordance withthe provisions of section 708 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

The prayer of her complaint in intervention, however, is merely for the rescission andannulment of the mortgage contract between the loan company and the defendantand of the inscription in the land registry of the title of the defendant, and a declarationthat as a creditor of the estate she has a superior right to that of the plaintiff companyin the proceeds of any sale of the land in question. She does not seek to enforce herclaim and recover her debt in this proceeding, but merely to prevent the plaintiff fromsecuring a judgment in this action which would take out of the estate property whichshe believes to be subject to her claim set up in the administration proceedings. If hercontentions are well founded, and if the estate of the deceased is subject to thepayment of the debts of the deceased in such form that the heirs of the deceasedcould not alienate this land free of the claims of the creditors of the deceased againstthe land, for the payment of their claims against the deceased, the intervener is clearlyentitled to at least so much of the relief she seeks in this action as will have the effect ofpreventing the sale of this land under the plaintiff's foreclosure proceedings, free of the

claims of creditors of the deceased, because, if the plaintiffs in this action werepermitted to foreclosure their mortgage and to recover their debt from the sale of theland in question, it might well be that there would not be sufficient property in theestate to pay the amount of the claim of the intervener against the estate.

Had the transactions above set out in taken place under the system of law in force inthese Islands immediately prior to the 1st day of October, 1901, when the new Code ofCivil Procedure went into effect, there would be no difficulty in determining therespective rights of the various parties to this action. Article 657 of the Civil Codeprovides that Los derechos a la succession de una persona se transmiten desde elmomento de su muerte. (The rights to the succession of another are transmitted from

the moment of his death); and article 661 provides that Los herederos suceden aldifunto por el hecho solo de su muerte en todos sus derechos y obligaciones. (Heirssucceed the deceased by the mere fact of his death, in all rights and obligations).Under these, and co-related provisions of the Civil Code, a sole and exclusive heir (asdefined in article 660 of the Civil Code) became the owner of the property and wascharged with the obligations of the deceased at the moment of his death, uponprecisely the same terms and conditions as the property was held and as theobligations had been incurred by the deceased prior to his death, save only that when


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he accepted the inheritance, "with benefit of an inventory" he was not held liable forthe debts and obligations of the deceased beyond the value of the property whichcame into his hands.

The property of the deceased, both real and personal, became the property of the heir

by the mere fact of death of his prodecessor in interest, and he could deal with it inprecisely the same way in which the deceased could have dealt with it, subject only tothe limitations which by law or by contract were imposed upon the deceased himself.He could alienate or mortgage it with the same freedom as could the deceased in hislifetime; the unsecured debts and other personal obligations of the deceasedbecoming the unsecured debts and personal obligations of the heir for which he washeld personally responsible in precisely the same manner as the deceased, save only,as has been said before, where he availed himself of the privilege of taking the estate"with the benefit of an inventory," in which case the extent of his liability was limited tothe value of the estate which came into his hands, though in other respects itscharacter as a personal liability remained unchanged. Thus death created no new lienin favor of creditors upon the property of the deceased, which was not in existence atthe time of his death; personal debts and obligations of the deceased becoming thepersonal debts and obligations of the heir, to whom the creditor was compelled to lookfor payment, with no new right in or to the property of the decease, in the hands of theheir, which he did not have in or to such property in the hands of the deceased. (Title 3,Book of the Civil Code.)

Spanish procedural law provided an action known as an action for the declaration ofheirship ( declaracion de herederos ) whereby one claiming the status of heir couldhave his right thereto judicially declared, and this judicial declaration of heirship unlessand until set aside or modified in a proper judicial proceeding, was evidence of thefact of heirship which the officials charged with the keeping of the public records,

including the land registry, were bound to accept as a sufficient basis for the formalentry, in the name of the heir, of ownership of the property of the deceased.

It is evident therefore that, unless the provisions of Spanish procedural and substantivelaw, in force when the new Code of Civil Procedure went into effect, have beenrepealed or modified thereby, the defendant in this action, Silvina Chio-Taysan, whowas judicially declared to be the sole and universal heir of Avelina Caballero,deceased, became, by the mere fact of the death of Caballero, the absolute owner ofthe tract of land in question, subject only to such liens thereon as may have existedprior thereto, the personal obligations of the deceased also passing to her at the sametime; that, upon proof of such judicial declaration of heirship, the register of deeds of

the city of Manila properly entered Chio-Taysan in the land registry as the owner of thisland by right of inheritance; and that the Loan Company, of which the plaintiffs are theduly appointed liquidators, was entitled to rely on the properly noted entries in the landregistry and that the company's mortgage deed from Chio-Taysan, in whose name theland is registered, could not be affected by the unrecorded claim of the indebtednessof the intervener, who must look to the heirs for the recovery of her debt.


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But both the substantive and procedural law touching rights of succession and theirenforcement, which were in force in these Islands when the new Code of CivilProcedure went into effect, have, to a greater or less degree, been repealed ormodified by its enactment; and we are of opinion that, under the provisions of the newcode, the heir is not a such personally responsible for the debts of the deceased, in

whole or in part; and on the other hand, the property of the deceased comes to himcharged with the debts of the deceased, so that he can not alienate or charge it freeof such debts, until and unless they are extinguished either by payment, prescription, orsatisfaction in one or other of the modes recognized by law.

It must be admitted that we can not point out the specific section of the new Code ofCivil Procedure which in express terms repeals the old law and formally enacts the newdoctrine of succession just laid down; but we think that an examination of the variousprovisions of that code touching the administration of the estates of deceased personleaves no room for doubt that they do so by necessary implication.

The legislators who enacted this code were more especially acquainted with theAmerican and English systems of legislation, and in most of its provisions closely adheredto American precedent. It substantially repeals in toto the proceedings prescribedunder the old law for the administration of estates of deceased persons, and substitutestherefor a system similar to that generally adopted in the United States; most of itsprovisions having been borrowed word for word from the codes of one or other of thevarious States. The substantive law in force in these Islands being in many respects, andespecially in regard to rights of inheritance, wholly different from that in force in thevarious States from which the new system of administration of the estates of deceasedpersons was adopted, many irreconcilable conflicts are to be found between theprovisions of the new and the old law, so that it becomes necessary either to declare agreat part of the provisions of the new Code of Procedure void and no effect, as wholly

inapplicable, or to hold that in such cases the provisions of substantive as well asprocedural law in conflict or inconsistent with the provisions of the new Code ofProcedure are repealed, or amended by the substitution of such other provisions as areclearly necessary as a basis upon which the new provisions of procedural law arepredicated.

An examination more especially of sections 597, 644, 695, 727, 729, 731, 733, and 749 ofthe Code of Civil Procedure, read together with the remaining provisions for theadministration of the estates of deceased persons, clearly indicates that the provisionsof articles 660 and 661 of the Civil Code have been abrogated.

These provisions of the new code clearly demonstrate that theterms heredero and legatario, as defined in the Civil Code (art. 660), are notsynonymous with the words "heir" and "legatee," as used in the new code; the word"heir" in the new code being technically and applicable only to a relative takingproperty of an intestate by virtue of the laws of descent, devisee and legatee beingreserved for all persons whether relatives or not, taking respectively real or personalproperty by virtue of a will; while heredero in the Civil Code was applicable not only toone who would be called an "heir," under the provisions of the new code, but also to


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one, whether relative or not, who took what might be called "a residuary estate under awill" (el que sucede a titulo universal ).

It appears also from an examination of these provisions that the legislature has providedno machinery whereby an absolute right on the part of the heir to succeed by the

mere fact of death to all the rights and property of the deceased may be enforced,without previous payment or provision of the payment of the debts; and on the otherhand, it has provided machinery for the enforcement of the debts and otherobligations of the deceased, not as debts or obligations of the heir, but as debt orobligations of the deceased, to the payment of which the property of the deceasedmay be subjected wherever it be found. Thus section 597 expressly provides that, inthose cases where settlement of an intestate estate may be made without legalproceedings, either by a family council, as known under the Spanish law, or by anagreement in writing executed by all the heirs, the real estate of the deceased remainscharged with liability to creditors of the deceased for two years after the settlement,"notwithstanding any transfers thereof that may have been made;" and we think theinference is clear that the legislator in this section recognizes and affirms the doctrinethat, prior to the date of such settlement, the real estate at least was charged in likemanner with the debts of the deceased. So it will be found that, where the legalproceedings are had looking to the settlement of testate or intestate estates, provisionis made for the recovery of claims against the deceased, not by proceedings directedagainst the heir, but by proceedings looking directly to the subjection of the property ofthe deceased to the payment of such claims; the property both real and personalbeing, in express terms, made chargeable with the payment of these debts, theexecutor or administrator having the right to the possession of the real as well as thepersonal property, to the exclusion of the heirs, so long as may be necessary for thatpurpose (secs. 727 and 729).

For practical purposes it may well be said that in the eye of the law, where there is noremedy to enforce an alleged right when it is invaded, the existence of the right maysafely be denied; and where the law furnishes a remedy whereby one may enforce aclaim, that claim is a right recognized and established by the law. The new Code ofProcedure furnishing no remedy whereby the provisions of article 661 of the of the CivilCode may be enforced, in so far as they impose upon the heredero (heir) the duty ofassuming as a personal obligation all the debts of the deceased, at least to the extentof the value of the property received from the estate; or in so far as they give tothe heredero the reciprocal right to receive the property of the deceased, without suchproperty being specifically subjected to the payment of the debts to the deceased bythe very fact of his deceased, these provisions of article 661 may properly be held to

have been abrogated; and the new code having provided a remedy whereby theproperty of the deceased may always be subjected to the payment of his debts inwhatever hands it may be found, the right of a creditor to a lien upon the property ofthe deceased, for the payment of the debts of the deceased, created by the merefact of his death, may be said to be recognized and created by the provisions of thenew code. (Pavia vs. De la Rosa, 8 Phil. Rep., 70).


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It is evident, therefore, that a judgement in an action for the declaration of heirship infavor of one or more heirs could not entitle such persons to be recognized as the owneror owners of the property of the deceased on the same terms as such property washeld by the deceased, for it passes to the heir, under the new code, burdened with allthe debts of the deceased, his death having created a lien thereon for the benefit of

creditor; and indeed an examination of the proceedings prescribed in the new Codeof Civil Procedure for the administration and distribution of the estates of deceasedpersons leaves no room for doubt that those proceedings are exclusive of all other

judicial proceedings looking to that end, and supersede the judicial proceeding for thedeclaration of heirship, as recognized in the old procedure, at least so far as thatproceeding served as a remedy whereby the right of specific persons to succeed tothe rights and obligations of the deceased as his heirs might be judicially determinedand enforced.

Examining the facts in the case at bar, in the light of the doctrine as to the law ofsuccession as thus modified and amended by the new Code of Civil Procedure, whichwent into effect prior to the death of Avelina Caballero, it is evident that her deathcreated a lien upon her property in favor of the intervener Francisca Jose, for thepayment of the debt contracted by her during her lifetime, and that this lien ought tohave and has priority to any lien created upon this property by the heir of thedeceased; that the judicial declaration of heirship in favor of Silvina Chio-Taysan, couldnot and did not furnish a basis for an entry in the land registry of the name of SilvinaChio-Taysan as the absolute owner of the property of Avelina Caballero; that suchentry, improperly made, could not and did not prejudice the lien of the intervener,Francisca Jose, for the debt due her by the deceased (Mortgage Law, art. 33); andthat the mortgage of the property of the deceased by her heir, Silvina Chio-Taysan,was subject to the prior lien of the intervener, Francisca Jose, for the payment of herdebt.

It is not necessary for us to consider the action of the court below in ordering theforeclosure of the mortgage, in so far as it affects the defendant Silvina Chio-Taysanwho did not appeal; but we think that the intervener, who is seeking to subject theproperty of the deceased to the payment of her debt in the administrationproceedings now pending, is clearly entitled to so much of the relief prayed for as willhave the effect of preventing the application of the proceeds of the sale of this landunder foreclosure proceedings to the payment of debts contracted by the heir untiland unless it shall appear that the residue of the estate of the deceased is sufficient tosatisfy her claim. Such provision for the protection of her rights having been made, theother relief prayed for by her may properly be denied, since a provision subjecting the

land in question to the payment of her claim against the estate of Avelina Caballero,deceased, fully and sufficiently protects her rights in the premises, and her rights havingbeen secured, she has no proper interest in the rescission of the mortgage contractbetween plaintiff and defendant, or the cancellation of the inscription of thedefendant's title as heir in the land registry.

The judgment of the trial court should, therefore, be modified in accordance with theforegoing principles, and the record will be returned to the trial court where judgment


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will be entered modifying the judgment, by providing that the proceeds of the sale ofthe land under the foreclosure proceedings will be deposited with the clerk of thecourt, where it will be retained until the amount of the debt due the intervener andunpaid in the course of the administration of the estate of Avelina Caballero shall havebeen ascertained, whereupon the said funds shall be applied: first, to extinguish the

unpaid residue, if any, of the claim of the intervener; second, to pay the debt due theplaintiff in this action; and finally, the residue, if any, to be paid to the estate of thedeceased; the intervener to have her costs in this action in both instances. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa, and Willard, JJ., concur.Tracey, J., concurs in the result

G.R. No.

General Provisions Art 774-782

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Transcript of General Provisions Art 774-782