General Assembly: Special Political and Decolonization … · 2007-10-09 · UFRGS Model United...

UFRGS Model United Nations 2007

General Assembly: Special Political and Decolonization Committee (SPECPOL)

By Thiago Borne, Helena Jornada, Felipe Jornada, Luiz Alfredo and Paula Lazzari

Dear Delegates,

We are very pleased to have you participating in another bombastic SPECPOL’s

edition. For the past three years, SPECPOL have always been one of the most successful

UFRGSMUN committees. Hoping to follow the tradition, we have been working on two

very controversial and polemic topics, related to the proliferation and the usage of

nuclear materials. They were selected to allow delegates to learn and debate about very

hot issues that are currently “in” in the international scene, and that are interconnected,

giving the participants a wide and global view regarding such notorious matters.

SPECPOL’s staff is composed by five passionate and crazy students that have been

working together since the end of 2006, to prepare you this very thrilling experience.

Let’s meet them:

Helena Lobato da Jornada, Director, is a fourth year International Relations

Student who adores modelling. This edition of UFRGSMUN will be her 11th Model

United Nations experience, as she had already participated in many national and

international MUNS. UFRGSMUN 2007 is her third as a staff member: in the 2004

edition she was a delegate at SPECPOL, in 2005 she was Director of Public Relations,

and in 2006 UnderSecretaryGeneral for Administrative Affairs. So, this year’s

SPECPOL will be her first experience as an Academic Director.

Thiago Borne Ferreira, Director, was first involved in MUNs in 2005, when he

participated as a delegate at AMUN’s Historical Committee and then as a SOCHUM

delegate in UFRGSMUN 2005 edition. The amazing experiences he had by that year

motivated the International Relations student to join SOCHUM’s staff in UFRGSMUN

2006 as an AssistantDirector. This year, he took a step further in his MUN’s life

accepting the task to join SPECPOL. 2007 is also the year he attended the 10th AMUN

at the Council of the European Union Committee.

Felipe Jornada, AssistantDirector, is a fourth year Physics student and one of

the most versatile members of SPECPOL’s 2007 staff. He attended at UFRGSMUN

2005 as a SCITECH delegate. In the following year, he participated at UFRGSMUN’s

SPECPOL Committee. In 2006 he was also UFRGSMUN’s official webmaster. This

year, besides being an assistant at SPECPOL, he is responsible again for UFRGSMUN’s

website.

Luiz Alfredo Vieira, AssistantDirector, is a fourth year International Relations

student. This year, for the first time, he is part of the UFRGSMUN’s Staff. His first

participation in a Model United Nations was in the UFRGSMUN 2004, as an expert at

the International Law Commission. In UFRGSMUN 2005, he attended as a delegate at

SOCHUM. And in UFRGSMUN 2006, he participated as delegate at SPECPOL. This

year, he attended the 10th AMUN at the Historical Committee.

Paula Lazzari, AssistantDirector, is a second year International Relations

student at UFRGS. In 2007, she became part of the UFRGSMUN Staff. Her first

participation in a Model United Nations was in 2006, as delegate at SPECPOL.

We hope that you enjoy reading this guide and studying for the topics. We are

very anxious to meet you all in November to have exhilarating and invigorating

discussions!

Sincerely yours,

Helena Lobato da Jornada

Director

Thiago Borne Ferreira

Director

Felipe Jornada

AssistantDirector

Luiz Alfredo Mello Vieira

AssistantDirector

Paula Lazzari

AssistantDirector

INTRODUCTION

SPECPOL’s General Background

The Special Political and Decolonization Committee (SPECPOL), also known as

the Fourth Committee, was created in 1993 in accordance with General Assembly

Resolution 47/233, with the main objective of addressing significant political matters,

such as selfdetermination, decolonization and other international security concerns.

SPECPOL originally assessed issues that the First Committee (DISEC) was not able to

handle, but it was given other topics to address and a broader overall scope due to its

success in addressing the Palestine Question, among others.

In its current role, the Fourth Committee can be viewed as the United Nations

Security Council (UNSC) entrance door, since the questions discussed at the Security

Council are often assessed earlier by SPECPOL not only because the committee's

approach is broader in terms of international security, but also because it allows all

United Nations (UN) member states to be heard before the question reaches other UN

instances. This explains the fact that although SPECPOL's resolutions are not binding,

they are still very appealing, since they reflect the opinion of the majority of countries

regarding substantive matters.

This year, the UFRGSMUN SPECPOL staff proposes two topics to be discussed

that are related to nuclear production and nuclear proliferation, which are of paramount

importance to international stability. Delegates who come to SPECPOL will face the

challenge of thoroughly addressing these international security questions in a very

extensive way, since the results of their discussions may affect the development of the

international environment for the years to come.

TOPIC AREA A

International Nuclear Safeguards for Atomic Energy Production

1. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

1.1. From the Discovery of the Nuclear Energy Until the Atoms for Peace Program

The early 1900’s are scientifically considered an important mark for the

understanding of the structure of matter.1 Among many researches conducted, one may

be considered a milestone in the development of nuclear science: the discovery of

radiation by Antoine Becquerel and the Curie couple.2 This new phenomenon promptly

called the attention from the scientific community, inasmuch as a great amount of

energy could be released through this process, even by small amounts of certain

materials, such as radium.3 Some scientists, including Pierre Curie, showed concern

about the use of this new source of energy, and stated it could also be employed on

criminal or on military activities.4

A further step for the understanding of nuclear processes was given by the end of

1938, when Lise Meitner, Otto Hahn and Fritz Strassmann reported fission of uranium

atom by bombarding it with neutrons.5 Again, a large amount of energy – millions of

times greater than what is found in chemical reactions – was reported. Three months

later, Hans von Halban, Frédéric Joliot and Lew Kowarski showed that three other

neutrons were scattered during the fission.6 Depending on the material, the newly

emitted particles could split into other nuclei, so that the reaction could be self

1 The Nuclear Weapon Archive Website. Available at: http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Usa/Med/Dawnage.html. Last accessed: 21 May 2007.2 Nobel Prize Website. Available at: http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/physics/laureates/1903/press.html. Last accessed: 21 May 2007.3 Nobel Prize Website. Available at: http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/chemistry/laureates/1911/press.html. Last accessed: 21 May 2007. 4 Nobel Prize Website. Available at: http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/physics/laureates/1903/pierrecurielecture.pdf. Last accessed: 21 May 2007.5 Nature Website. Available at: http://www.nature.com/physics/lookingback/meitner/index.html. Last accessed: 21 May 2007.6 HALBAN, Hans; JOLIOT, Frédéric; KOWARSKI, Lew. Liberation of neutrons in the nuclear explosion of uranium. Nature, v. 143, n. 939. 1939.

http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Usa/Med/Dawnage.htmlhttp://www.nature.com/physics/looking-back/meitner/index.htmlhttp://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/physics/laureates/1903/pierre-curie-lecture.pdfhttp://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/physics/laureates/1903/pierre-curie-lecture.pdfhttp://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/chemistry/laureates/1911/press.htmlhttp://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/physics/laureates/1903/press.html

sustained. This process, also called chainreaction, is the very idea employed in nuclear

power plants and warfare.

In the same year such impacting discoveries were made, Germany invaded

Poland and World War II started. The number of public researches diminished, and

countries started to develop their own nuclear technology secretly. It is argued that,

before the war, some scientists had been trying through propaganda to discourage the

Nazis to develop researches in this field. In 1933, the year Hitler took office as

Germany’s Chancellor, Rutherford ,in spite of his former position, suddenly stated that

“the energy produced by the breaking down of the atom is a very poor thing,”7 .

In the USA, scientists such as Enrico Fermi and Leo Szilard were convinced of

the importance of developing nuclear technology, mainly because this field could have

been studied by the Germans. As a result, they asked Albert Einstein, because of his

popularity and his academic recognition, to write to president Franklin Delano

Roosevelt informing of the importance of atomic energy, and warning about a possible

Nazi research on this topic.8 One year after the letter, president Roosevelt decided to

invest massively in that technology, launching the Manhattan Engineer District, or

Manhattan Project.9 After spending the equivalent of 20 billion dollars,10 two atomic

bombs were developed and delivered at Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

After the humanitarian catastrophe the atomic bomb caused in Japan, many

scientists engaged in the Manhattan Project, including the scientific supervisor, Robert

Oppenheimer, showed public concern about warfare and about a possible nuclear race.

In 1946, the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission (UNAEC) was created to

foster “the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the

least diversion for armaments”.11 Five months after the first meeting, the US

7 The Washington Post Website. Available at: http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/washingtonpost_historical/access/237023812.html?dids=237023812:237023812&FMT=ABS&FMTS=ABS:FT&date=SEP+13%2C+1933&author=&pub=The+Washington+Post&desc=%22Harnessing%22+the+Atom.&pqatl=google . Last accessed: 21 August 2007. 8 Hyper Text Book Website. Available at: http://hypertextbook.com/eworld/einstein.shtml. Last accessed: 21 May 2007.9 Nuclear Files Website. Available at: http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/keyissues/nuclearweapons/history/precoldwar/manhattanproject/. Last accessed: 21 May 2007.10 The Brookings Institution Website. http://www.brookings.edu/FP/PROJECTS/NUCWCOST/MANHATTN.HTM. Last accessed: 21 August 2007.11 United Nations Treaty Collection/Collection des traités des Nations Unies Website. Available at: http://untreaty.un.org/cod/repertory/art26/english/rep_orig_vol2art26_e.pdf. Last accessed: 23 August 2007.

http://untreaty.un.org/cod/repertory/art26/english/rep_orig_vol2-art26_e.pdfhttp://www.brookings.edu/FP/PROJECTS/NUCWCOST/MANHATTN.HTMhttp://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/nuclear-weapons/history/pre-cold-war/manhattan-project/http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/nuclear-weapons/history/pre-cold-war/manhattan-project/http://hypertextbook.com/eworld/einstein.shtmlhttp://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/washingtonpost_historical/access/237023812.html?dids=237023812:237023812&FMT=ABS&FMTS=ABS:FT&date=SEP+13%2C+1933&author=&pub=The+Washington+Post&desc="Harnessing"+the+Atom.&pqatl=googlehttp://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/washingtonpost_historical/access/237023812.html?dids=237023812:237023812&FMT=ABS&FMTS=ABS:FT&date=SEP+13%2C+1933&author=&pub=The+Washington+Post&desc="Harnessing"+the+Atom.&pqatl=googlehttp://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/washingtonpost_historical/access/237023812.html?dids=237023812:237023812&FMT=ABS&FMTS=ABS:FT&date=SEP+13%2C+1933&author=&pub=The+Washington+Post&desc="Harnessing"+the+Atom.&pqatl=google

representative Bernard Baruch, motivated by the ideas spread by the academics,

proposed a plan to avoid nuclear race. According to his document, the UNAEC would

be the exclusive maintainer of nuclear technology for warfare, and it would have a large

intelligence related to extraction, purification and use of uranium and thorium. No other

country would be able to develop atomic bombs, and the US would have to discontinue

their research and share all their information with the commission.12

The plan was rejected by the USSR, and, in 1949, the UNAEC was adjourned

indefinitely.13 In that same year, the Russians made their first successful nuclear test,

marking the start of the nuclear race. By the end of 1950, the USA had approximately

800 warheads, and the soviets were already building their arsenal.14 In 1953, the newly

elected American president Dwight Eisenhower was determined to solve the “fearful

atomic dilemma.”15 In his speech to the United Nations General Assembly entitled

“Atoms for Peace”, he proposed the creation of an atomic energy association to control

the use of nuclear technology, so that “fissionable material would be allocated to serve

the peaceful pursuits of mankind.”16

In 1955, during a summit at Geneva, Eisenhower presented various documents

concerning nuclear safety and disarmament. Two proposals were submitted and rejected

by the Soviets. One of them aimed at bilateral aerial observation, while the other

recommended ground inspections. The main idea was that, after those suggestions were

implemented, no country would be caught by a “devastating surprise attack.”17 Although

the proposals at Geneva were not accepted, the two nations continued to discuss nuclear

safety. Three years later, Eisenhower decided to declare moratorium on all US nuclear

tests, hoping Russia would follow the example. Indeed, a few days after, the Soviets

adopted the same policy. The moratorium extended until 1961, when USSR resumed

testing as a result of the increasing international tension and of the French nuclear

12 The Streit Council Website. Available at http://www.streitcouncil.org/content/pdf_and_doc/The%20Baruch%20Plan.pdf. Last accessed: 23 August 2007.13 DART, Dorothy. Chronicle of International Events. The American Journal of International Law, v. 40, n. 3, 1946, p. 645662.14 BUNDY, McGeorge. Danger and Survival: Choices about the Bomb in the First Fifty Years. New York: Random House, 1988, p. 319325.15 The Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library Website. Available at: http://worldnuclearuniversity.org/html/atoms_for_peace/. Last accessed: 21 May 2007.16 The Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library Website…17 Eisenhower Memorial Homepage Website. Available at http://www.eisenhowermemorial.org/presidentialpapers/firstterm/documents/1523.cfm. Last accessed: 23 August 2007.

http://www.eisenhowermemorial.org/presidential-papers/first-term/documents/1523.cfmhttp://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/atom1.htmhttp://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/atom1.htmhttp://www.streitcouncil.org/content/pdf_and_doc/The Baruch Plan.pdf

program.

From 1955 to 1963, many technical proposals to ban nuclear testing were made,

but they were all rejected. Most of them were vetoed by the Soviets, either because the

available technology was insufficient to detect tests, or because they would not allow

onsite inspections on the terms proposed.18

Despite the lack of international agreements, Eisenhower decided to initiate a

series of bilateral interactions within his “Atoms for Peace” program. With the help of

the Congress, he created the Atomic Energy Act, under which a series of bilateral

agreements to share nuclear knowledge were made. The USA cooperated with nuclear

reactors, while the other part had to allow safeguard inspections, so that that technology

was used peacefully. By the end of 1959, the USA was cooperating with 42 countries. A

similar program was developed by the USSR.19

1.2. The Implementation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its

Safeguard Regime

Although the countries could not reach a common ground to stall nuclear race, it

was, then, clear that a multilateral program could be implemented for nuclear

safeguards.20 In 1955, a convention took place in Geneva gathering a large number of

scientists and counting with more than 1500 delegates. It was seen as an important mark

to the opening of nuclear technology after the great secrecy with which researches were

conducted during the early postwar days. Two years after the meeting, the International

Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), based on Eisenhower's suggestion to stimulate the

peaceful use of nuclear technology, was created, after long discussions between East and

West, as an autonomous organization. According to its statute, the Agency's work is

focused on three pillars: “nuclear verification and security, safety and technology

transfer.”21

Even though the Agency was not directly linked to the UN, it was decided in its

18 FEDERATION OF AMERICAN SCIENTISTS Website. Available at: http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/offdocs/ike/index.html. Last accessed 23 August 2007.19 FISCHER, David .History of the International Atomic Energy Agency: The First Forty Years. Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency, 1997.20 SHENIMAN, Lawrence. The International Atomic Energy Agency and World Nuclear Order. Washington DC: RFF Press, 1987.21 INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (IAEA) Website. Available at http://www.iaea.org/About/history.html. Last accessed 23 August 2007.

http://www.iaea.org/About/history.htmlhttp://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/offdocs/ike/index.html

statute that it should report directly to the General Assembly and to the Security

Council. The Agency would be financed by the Member States, which would also be

invited to donate fissionable material.22 The IAEA, also known as the "Atoms for Peace

Agency" was established with the main objective of fostering and controlling the pacific

uses of atomic energy and nuclear development. 23 The IAEA exercises its power on the

matter of nuclear verification through its safeguards system, which is based on

safeguards agreements that are basically the accordance of a country or a group of

countries with the IAEA for the inspection of the country’s nuclear facilities.

Although the agreements vary in its substance – and its development illustrates

the advances that the safeguards regime has suffered –, the main scope of the IAEA’s

safeguards regime is to verify if the countries under the Agency’s system24 are not

diverting the use of its nuclear material and plants from pacific purposes – such as

energy, industry or medicine – to military buildup, such as the development of nuclear

armaments and explosives. The System is based on continuous confidence building

measures,25 and the verification process is based especially on visits, inspections and

evaluations, depending on the country’s nuclear status. The Agency developed distinct

modalities of “onsite inspections and visits under comprehensive safeguards

agreements”.26 They can be ad hoc – made to verify a State’s initial report of nuclear

material – special or routine inspections – limited to those locations within a nuclear

facility27 –, or even safeguards visits – that may be made to declared facilities at

appropriate times during the lifecycle to verify the safeguards’ relevant design

information.28

In the beginning of the Agency’s work, the implementation of safeguards was

not open to discussion, especially because of the countries involved in the issues, such

as the United States, the Soviet Union and the European Countries. Until the beginning

of the 1960’s, the IAEA’s safeguards regime struggled to be recognized in a mistrustful

world divided by ideology. Countries were not satisfied with the fact that their national

22 FISCHER, History of the International Atomic Energy Agency…23 SMITH, Daryl. The Nuclear Safeguards Program. Los Alamos Science Winter/Spring 1983.24 IAEA Website. IAEA Safeguards Overview: Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols. Available at: http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Factsheets/English/sg_overview.html. Last accessed: 17 August 2007.25 IAEA Safeguards Overview…26 IAEA Safeguards Overview…27 IAEA Safeguards Overview…28 IAEA Safeguards Overview…

http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Factsheets/English/sg_overview.html

nuclear programs were target of inspectors, who would know their most precious

technological secrets.29 In a time where espionage was a strategic instrument, it is not

surprising that the inspections were not totally accepted. But the increasing fear of the

misuse of nuclear technology made the Agency’s safeguard system to be taken seriously,

as a very important control tool.

The verification of a zero power research reactor’s design in Norway, in 196230,

was the Agency’s first safeguards inspection. In the same year, the IAEA concluded

agreements to apply safeguards to research reactors in several other countries, such as

Pakistan and Yugoslavia and in what was then called “the Congo, Leopoldville”, later

Zaire and now the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In 1963 the first revision of the

safeguards regime was introduced, with the purpose of applying the safeguards to all

sizes of nuclear reactors, reprocessing and fuel fabrication plants.31 This new system

was called INFCIRC/66 and it was successfully applied until the implementation of the

NPT regime. This system suffered successive expansions and proved, at the time, to be a

very effective control device. The IAEA’s ability to apply safeguards was in clear

expansion, which was confirmed by the USSR’s accession to the IAEA – still in 1963 –,

transforming the Agency’s safeguards system into a much more comprehensive one.32

Therefore the safeguard’s system was evolving to become a much more complex

and dynamic regime. In this sense, the most important document to complete this

evolution was signed in 1968. The Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) safeguards system, or

the INFCIRC/153 type agreements made all declared nonnuclear weapon States to

place all its nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards “and to conclude a comprehensive

safeguards agreement with the Agency”33 , “18 months before acceding to the NPT. On

all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the

territory of the State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control

anywhere…”.34 One must bear in mind that the NPT treaty identifies only five countries

(United States, Russian Federation, China, United Kingdom and France) as nuclear

29 FISCHER, History of the International Atomic Energy Agency…30 FISCHER, History of the International Atomic Energy Agency…31 FISCHER, History of the International Atomic Energy Agency…32 FISCHER, History of the International Atomic Energy Agency…33 INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY. IAEA Safeguards: Stemming the Spread of Nuclear Weapons. IAEA Bulletin, Vol. 43, No. 4, 2001.34 INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY. IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition, International nuclear verification series no. 3.

weapon States.35

When the NPT36 was established, in 1968, the IAEA created a “safeguard

standard suitable for application to simple nuclear activities and to complex nuclear full

cycles.”37 The signatory States, when the treaty is enforced, are obliged to declare all

their nuclear material and facilities, as well as constantly update that information. It is

important to notice that States only need to declare their material and facilities that are

under the safeguards system, which, with the development of new technologies, can

exclude some innovative fissile material from any kind of surveillance.

Under the NPT, one can see a clear evolution on the development of other

measures to strengthen the safeguards syste, the most representative ones are the

regional measures. One can first start with the European Community for Atomic Energy

(EURATOM) – whose original treaty from 1957 established the European Commission

as the responsible body for controlling the use of fissile material in the continent.38 The

European nuclear safeguards system was developed to ensure the European continent

the proper use of nuclear materials, and certify that the nuclear production of the

continent is in accordance with the international community.

Although it is a very specific system, eventually, it got in conflict with the

IAEA’s safeguards structure. Before the five EURATOM’s nonnuclear weapon States

had signed the NPT, the IAEA negotiated directly with the community, which used the

safeguards established in its original treaty instead of those of the Agency.39 The same

happened with countries like Brazil and Argentina, which under the Tlatelolco Treaty,

and before signing the NPT, were able to produce and test small atomic bombs.40

Because of the uncertainty of those treaties that were not under the NPT, it became

patent that negotiating safeguards with non NPT countries was quite ambiguous and

posed problems of legitimacy to the NPT safeguards system.

Obviously, given that since its establishment the NPT proved to have some gaps,

35 It is important to notice that the precedent regime, the INFCIRC/66 system was not completely abandoned, since its safeguards were still applied for the States that had not adhered to the NPT, for example: India, Israel and Pakistan.36 It is essential to understand that the same NPT that was adopted in 1968 is still in force in the present days.37 IAEA Safeguards: Stemming the Spread…38 EUROPEAN COMMISSION. Nuclear Safeguards, Europe remains vigilant, 2005. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/energy/nuclear/safeguards/index_en.htm. Last accessed : 24 August 2007.39 FISCHER, History of the International Atomic Energy Agency…40 FISCHER, History of the International Atomic Energy Agency…

http://ec.europa.eu/energy/nuclear/safeguards/index_en.htm

as time passed it became necessary to revise this regime to strengthen the IAEA

safeguards system. The main event that made this need clear was the discovery, in the

beginning of the 1990’s, of a clandestine nuclear program in Iraq – a State that was an

NPT signatory. This event made the Agency ask for collaboration from the United

Nations Security Council to support its inspections and measures, because under the

INFCIRC/153 the verifying resources of the Agency proved to be insufficient.

The new measures, used to fortify the safeguards and to grant the Agency further

authority for inspections,41 are based on an Additional Protocol42 that obliges the State to

“provide the IAEA with broader information covering all aspects of its nuclear fuel

cyclerelated activities, including research and development and uranium mining.”43

Countries under this new legal policies must make available every kind of information

regarding their nuclear activities.

At the same time, with the end of the Cold War, there was an obvious change

towards disarmament from both nuclear superpowers of the period (USA and USSR –

now Russian Federation). This transformation on the geopolitical sphere was essential

for the consolidation of the NPT safeguards system since the Treaty became permanent.

As it is stated in the History of the IAEA:

"The IAEA and its safeguards have thus been major beneficiaries of the end of the Cold War. By providing a bridge between the superpowers from the early 1960s (and, in a sense, since 1955, when the Soviet Union joined the Washington talks) until the termination of the Cold War in the late 1980s, and by pioneering the use of institutionalized onsite inspections, they helped in a modest way to bring about that termination."44

Nevertheless, the dynamics of the international arena are constantly challenging

the Agency’s safeguards regime. Bearing that in mind, this system must be constantly

revised, as it is done by the Review Conferences of the Treaty on the NonProliferation

of Nuclear Weapons that happen every five years. The last one happened in 2005, yet

many advances must be made.

2. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

41 IAEA Website. The Safeguards System of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Available at: www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/safeg_system.pdf. Last accessed: 24 August 2007.42 INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY. Model Protocol Additional to the agreement(s) between state(s) and the international atomic energy agency for the application of safeguards. Available at: www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/1998/infcirc540corrected.pdf. Last accessed: 24 August 2007.43 IAEA Safeguards: Stemming the Spread…44 FISCHER, History of the International Atomic Energy Agency…

http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/1998/infcirc540corrected.pdfhttp://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/safeg_system.pdf

2.1. The Importance of Nuclear Energy

“Nuclear power will help provide the electricity that our growing economy needs without increasing emissions. This is truly an

environmentally responsible source of energy.”45

Michael Burgess

The international community must face the fact that a growing world population

with both rising standards of living and volatile rising expectations will demand a great

amount of power in the years ahead.46 No doubt a large sum of this energy will come

from fossil fuels over the next few decades, particularly in terms of oil for the

transportation and power fields. But, in spite of forecasts of large reserves, these natural

resources are limited. There is also a limit to nature’s ability to absorb all the pollution

that would result should we try to burn up all these fuels over the next years.

Fortunately, we have discovered alternative sources of power, such as nuclear energy.

“At least 30 countries have active nuclear power reactors. However, there are

scores of other major facilities containing nuclear material in over 70 countries that are

‘safeguarded’ under IAEA agreements with governments”.47 Most of these nations use

nuclear technologies for “a wide variety of peaceful purposes.”48 As stated in the

Program for Promoting Nuclear NonProliferation (PPNN) Briefing Book49, nuclear

technology for peaceful purposes is traditionally divided into five principal areas:

mining and processing of nuclear raw materials; the production of enriched uranium;

the fabrication of nuclear fuel elements; the design, construction and operation of

nuclear reactors; and fuel reprocessing. Apart from the use of nuclear energy to produce

electricity from power reactors, it has also been used extensively in agriculture,

medicine, industry, biology and hydrology.

According to the last IAEA Annual Report, 2005 was a year of rising

45 Brainy Quote Website. Available at: http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/quotes/m/michaelbur288596.html. Last accessed: 7 April 2007.46 U.S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION/DIVISION OF TECHNICAL INFORMATION. Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy: a Collection of Speeches by Glenn T. Seaborg Chairman United States Atomic Energy Commission. Oak Ridge: USAEC Division of Technical Information Extension, 1970.47 IAEA Safeguards: Stemming the Spread…48 IAEA Safeguards: Stemming the Spread…49 BAILEY, Emily; GUTHRIE, Richard; HOWLETT, Darryl; SIMPSON, John. Programme for Promoting Nuclear NonProliferation Briefing Book Volume I: the Evolution of the Nuclear NonProliferation Regime (Sixth Edition). Southampton: The Mountbatten Centre for International Studies, 2000.

http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/quotes/m/michaelbur288596.html

expectations for nuclear energy, driven by “nuclear power’s performance record; the

growing need for energy around the world coupled with rising oil and natural gas prices;

environmental constraints on the use of fossil fuels; concerns about energy supply

security in a number of countries; and expansion plans for nuclear power in some

States.”50 By the end of the same year, there were about 443 nuclear power reactors

operating in the world, with a total net capacity of 369.6 GW(e),51 supplying about 16%

of the world’s electricity,52 27 power plants more were under construction,53 which

enhances the idea that nuclear power can make a major contribution to meeting energy

needs and sustaining the world’s development in the 21st century.

2.2. International Security Agenda

International security environment has changed greatly since the end of the Cold

War. With the successful implementation of nuclear arms control treaties, the risk of a

largescale nuclear confrontation has been drastically reduced. Communication and

cooperation between old adversaries have improved fundamentally, and are partly

replacing deterrence as the basis for security.54 “Between actors on the two sides of the

Cold War divide, the relationship has, in most cases, radically changed to one of a

pronounced community of interests and even values. The concept of common and

comprehensive security is gradually and in some regions actually becoming a reality.”55

However, since 11 September 2001 security issues “have been propelled back to the top

of the international agenda, and nuclear issues with them.”56 Because of the concern

about transnational, massimpact terrorism, criminals or other irresponsible people or

groups putting their hands on nuclear, biological and chemical weapons,

50 INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY. IAEA Annual Report for 2005. Available at: http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Reports/Anrep2005/index.html. Last accessed: 24 August 2007.51 INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (IAEA). Operating Experience with Nuclear Power Stations in Member States in 2005. Available at: wwwpub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1280_web.pdf. Last accessed: 28 August 2007.52 INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY. Nuclear Technology Review 2006. Available at: www.iaea.org/OurWork/ST/NE/Pess/assets/ntr2006.pdf. 24 August 2007.53 Operating Experience with Nuclear Power Stations…54 ANTHONY, Ian; ROTFELD, Adam Daniel. A Future Arms Control Agenda Proceedings of Nobel Symposium 118, 1999. Stockholm: SIPRI; New York: Oxford University Press, 2001. p.30.55 ANTHONY; ROTFELD, A Future Arms Control Agenda, p. 30.56 STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE (SIPRI). Transparency in Nuclear Warheads and Materials The Political and Technical Dimensions. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003. Preface.

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“The possible nuclear capabilities of States like Iraq and North Korea have become a focus of both debate and action, because of their potential contribution to further proliferation but also because of these states’ record of regional confrontation. Relations between India and Pakistan have gone trough periods of extreme tension, when actual hostilities seemed only a step away and the risk of escalation to a nuclear exchange could not be ruled out.”57

2.2.1. The Strengthened Nuclear Safeguards System

“Well, I think that the first thing, which is probably the easiest, is to make sure that countries that are parties of the NPT have safeguard

agreements and additional protocols enforced.”58

Mohammad El Baradei

Safeguards are a set of activities by which the IAEA can verify if “a State is

living up to its international commitments not to use nuclear programs for nuclear

weapons purposes.”59 It is based “on assessment of the correctness and completeness of

the State’s declaration to the IAEA concerning nuclear material and nuclearrelated

activities.”60 In other words, the major objectives of safeguards are the maintenance of

an efficient, precise and realtime nuclear material accountancy system at all types of

facilities engaged in the fuel cycle.61 In addition to that the regime assists nuclear

inspectorates to develop and deploy powerful verification systems to check if operators

and States comply with their international obligations.62 To date, the IAEA inspects

nuclear and related facilities under safeguards agreements, like the Nuclear Non

Proliferation Treaty (NPT), with more than 140 Member States.

Over the past decade, the IAEA has taken steps to strengthen its safeguards

system. The measures taken might be considered a radical departure from the Agency’s

traditional safeguards approach, “which focused on verifying that declared nuclear

material at specific facilities or locations in a country had not been diverted for nuclear

weapons.”63 The first safeguards strengthening steps were implemented under the

57 Transparency in Nuclear Warheads and Materials...58 Brainy Quote Website. Available at: http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/quotes/m/mohamedelb228115.html. Last access: 7 April 2007.59 INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY. IAEA Safeguards Overview. Available at: http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Factsheets/English/sg_overview.html. Last accessed: 24 August 2007.60 IAEA Safeguards: Stemming the Spread…61 There are several steps in the nuclear fuel cycle. The front end of the fuel cycle includes uranium mining and milling, conversion, enrichment, and fuel fabrication. Once uranium becomes spent fuel (after being used to produce electricity), the back end of the cycle follows. This may include temporary storage, reprocessing, recycling, and waste disposal.62 EUROPEAN COMMISSION. Nuclear Safeguards. 2002.63 UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE (GAO). Nuclear Nonproliferation: IAEA Has Strengthened Its Safeguards and Nuclear Security Programs, but Weaknesses

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Agency’s existing legal authority upon a comprehensive safeguards agreement at

declared nuclear facilities in the early 1990’s. These measures increased the Agency’s

ability to monitor declared and undeclared activities at nuclear facilities once they

permitted the IAEA to (i) conduct short notice and unannounced inspections; (ii) take

locationspecific environmental samples inside facilities to detect traces of nuclear

material; and (iii) use measurement and surveillance systems that operate unattended

and can be used to transmit data about the status of nuclear materials directly to its

headquarters.64

The second series of steps under strengthened safeguards began in 1997 with

the approval of the Additional Protocol65 by the IAEA’s Board of Governors. The

document is “designed to ‘supplement countries’ safeguards agreements by requiring

countries to provide the IAEA with broader information on and access to nuclear and

nuclearrelated activities”66 and constitutes a “qualitatively new approach to monitoring

and controlling fissile material”.67 According to Schaper (2003),

“The Additional Safeguards Protocol in INFCIRC/540 primarily

addresses the completeness of states’ declarations with the aim of ensuring

the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. It gives IAEA

inspectors the right to obtain from the parties to the Protocol more

information than was previously required about all the parts of their nuclear

fuel cycles, from uranium mines to nuclear waste. It also grants them more

intrusive physical access to locations subject to safeguards as well as

complementary access to undeclared sites. In addition, inspectors have

stronger authority to use new verification techniques, such as collecting

environmental samples for laboratory analysis, for the purpose of assisting

the IAEA in drawing conclusions about the presence or absence of

undeclared material or nuclear activities at a specific location.”68

Once the Additional Protocol broadens the IAEA’s authority and the

requirements under existing comprehensive safeguards agreements, each country must

Need to be Addressed, 2005, p.14. Available at: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0693.pdf. Last accessed: 7 April 2007. 64 GAO, Nuclear Nonproliferation…65 INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY. Model Protocol Additional to the agreement(s) between state(s) and the international atomic energy agency for the application of safeguards. Available at: www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/1998/infcirc540corrected.pdf. Last accessed: 24 August 2007.66 GAO, Nuclear Nonproliferation…67 Transparency in Nuclear Warheads and Materials..., p. 209.68 Transparency in Nuclear Warheads and Materials...

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take certain actions to bring it into force. States are required to submit “expanded

declarations” on nuclear fuel cycle technologies, such as centrifuge enrichment

technology, and exports and imports of such technologies must also be declared, as well

as ongoing research activities.

In brief, under the Additional Protocol, the IAEA has the right to (i) conduct

“complementary access”, which enables the Agency to expand its inspection rights for

the purpose of ensuring the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities; (ii)

collect environmental samples beyond declared nuclear facilities, when deemed

necessary; and (iii) receive more comprehensive information from a country about all

aspects of its nuclear fuel cycle, including information about research and development

on the fuel cycle, the manufacturing and exporting of sensitive and other key nuclear

related equipment, and all buildings on a nuclear site, and compare this information

with information from other sources.69

Numerous initiatives were launched to eliminate and control nuclear weapons

and to prevent proliferation over the six decades following the attacks in Hiroshima and

Nagasaki allied to the IAEA’s initiative to strengthen the safeguards regime. However,

they seem to have had mixed results. On the one hand, almost every State in the world

has adhered to the NPT. The United States and Russia have withdrawn thousands of

nuclear weapons from service; the UK has significantly reduced its arsenal after the end

of the Cold War and France no longer deploys nuclear weapons on surfacetosurface

missiles or as gravity bombs. On the other hand, global stocks of these weapons are still

huge, and more States and even terrorists might acquire them.

It is a fact, however, that many States do not feel a need for nuclear weapons of

their own. In this case, most of them may have assurances of protection through their

alliances and other arrangements, while some others may have responded to political

and diplomatic pressures to renounce nuclear weapons. A small number of countries

may not have had technical capability to develop such kind of technology. Conversely,

when States have perceived threats to their security, like Israel, India and Pakistan, or

have felt ostracized and at risk, like North Korea, Libya and Iran, this may have

weighted heavily on their calculations. “So long as any state has nuclear weapons,

others will want them. So long as any such weapons remain, there is a risk that they will

69 GAO, Nuclear Nonproliferation…

one day be used, designed or trigger an accident. And any such use would be

catastrophic.”70 Even if the basic ideas behind the NPT continue to have strong

international support, the treaty is facing several problems that must be squarely faced.

2.2.2. The Nuclear Terrorism Menace

Current scientific and technological progress and growing quantities of nuclear

material available for warlike uses coming from the global movement for nuclear

weapons reduction, made the access to nuclear explosives devices much easier and

cheaper. As a consequence, the risk of terrorists, rogue nations or other groups

acquiring such equipments with relatively small amounts of money has significantly

risen. After September 11 2001, what seemed to be only a distant and almost unreal

menace turned into a real concern not only for the US, but also for the whole

international community, since the attacks showed how great the organization power of

such terrorist groups can be.

Every international or regional treaty or mechanism to prevent the proliferation

of nuclear weapons, including the NPT and the strengthened safeguards system

implemented by the Additional Protocol, seems to be inefficient to stop criminal groups

from acquiring clandestine information, materials or even nuclear weapons, especially

for the US and its allies. Despite these countries’ commitment to use nuclear energy

only for pacific purposes and to submit to international control, the recent discovery of a

black market in nuclear weapons and related technology obliged the nations to accept

the possibility of a deliberated nuclear dispersion. Even the use of a nuclear bomb itself

is not excluded if nuclear materials or information is possessed by terrorist groups.

A recent National Academies report71 and several other extensive studies72

stressed the importance of protecting already existent nuclear weapons from theft, but

concluded that improvised nuclear devices built from stolen or diverted fissile materials

pose a greater threat.

70 WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION COMMISSION (WMDC). Weapons of Terror: Freeing the World of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Arms. Stockholm, 2006, p. 60.71 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL. Making the nation safer: The role of science and technology in countering terrorism. Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2002.72 FALKENRATH, R. A.; NEWMAN R. D.; THAYER B. A. America’s Achilles’ heel: Nuclear, biological, and chemical terrorism and covert attack. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998; FERGUSON C.; POTTER W. C.; SANDS A.; SPECTOR L. S.; WEHLING F. L.; The four faces of nuclearterrorism. Monterey, CA: Monterey Institute – Center For National Security Studies, 2004.

One might say that fissile materials have only two practical uses: in nuclear

weapons or as fuel materials in nuclear reactors. Considering that all nuclear warheads

have fission energy elements that rely on the use of them, “controls on the production,

storage, use and export of fissile materials are accordingly the principal focus of

international efforts to impede the proliferation of nuclear weapons, specifically, of

IAEA safeguards.”73 Most nuclear power reactors in the world use uranium enriched to

some 4% as fuel. Even though it is produced in a technically difficult process, it may

also allow enrichment to levels suitable for use in nuclear weapons, 85% or more. It is a

matter of political will since, technically, any enrichment plant can, thus, be used for the

production of reactor fuel or bombgrade material or both. “The production of highly

enriched uranium (…) [is] regarded as raising the greatest difficulties for anyone

wishing to make nuclear weapons.”74

Fortunately, the technologies necessary to enrich uranium or construct reactors

to produce plutonium are considered to be beyond reach for any terrorist group today

and procurement and construction activities are not easily carried out clandestinely. In

other words, it would be hard for terrorists to construct their own weapons. However,

they can potentially steal them or buy them because of the great amounts available

worldwide, with some being inadequately secured. Keeping fissile materials out of

terrorists’ hands is a great challenge. Siegfried S. Hecker75 presents five reasons why

securing fissile materials is more difficult than generally appreciated.

First, existing inventories of fissile materials are far greater than the amount

required for a nuclear bomb. Although many States have stopped producing weapon

grade plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU), studies report that approximately

1.9 million kilograms of HEU and 1.83 million kilograms of plutonium exist worldwide.

Excluding about 1.4 million kilograms of plutonium which would not be very attractive

to terrorists, since they are found in highly radioactive spent fuel, the remaining 2.3

million kilograms of weaponsusable fissile material must be protected. However, to

truly prevent a terrorist attack, we must be able to account for a few tens of kilograms

out of more than 2 million available worldwide.

Second, fissile materials exist in every imaginable form. Plutonium and uranium

73 Transparency in Nuclear Warheads and Materials…. p. 234.74 Weapons of Terror… p. 60.75 HECKER, Siegfried S. Toward a Comprehensive Safeguards System: Keeping Fissile Materials out of Terrorists' Hands. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, v. 607, 2006.

are highly reactive metals that oxidize rapidly, especially in humid conditions or in the

presence of hydrogen. In addition, plutonium transmutes into other elements over time,

and is constantly created and destroyed during reactor operations. For both reactor and

weapon applications plutonium and uranium can be used in metallic form. For both

reactor and weapon applications they are processed by the same industrial processes.

When tons of plutonium or HEU are processed, large operating losses and inventory

differences are expected. “Moreover, largescale processing without adequate control

and accounting leads to the potential of pant operators covertly diverting small but

significant quantities of these materials.”76

Third, fissile materials exist in many locations, not just in a few storage vaults.

Plutonium and HEU might be found in enrichment and fuel fabrication facilities,

reactors, reprocessing plants and storage facilities. Historically, the security for these

places has not been adequate. And, of course, these materials also exist in transport,

being always secure. Moreover, not only fissile materials exist in many locations within

one’s country, but they also exist in multiple countries.

Fourth, fissile materials are difficult to measure and handle. A “safeguards

system must be able to measure fissile materials accurately.”77 However, monitoring and

accounting of plutonium and HEU might be a hard task, not only because these actions

require expensive costs but also due to these elements’ extraordinary scientific

complexity. Many measurements and analytical capabilities are not available in many

locations that house plutonium or HEU.

Finally, military secrecy hampers safeguards and transparency. Excessive

secrecy and, in particular, compartmentalization impede implementation of a rigorous

safeguard system. Although secrecy is important to protect a state’s nuclear program, it

can impede accounting, the establishment of systemwide inventories and the sharing of

best practices. Besides that, communication might be limited among sites that produce,

use and dispose of fissile materials.

For these five reasons, implementation of a comprehensive safeguards system is

imperative to protect fissile materials worldwide. However, even the strongest

safeguards system seems to fail to prevent theft of weaponusable material by

determined individuals or groups. While the safeguard agreements with more than 130

76 HECKER, Toward a Comprehensive Safeguards System…, p. 124.77 HECKER, Toward a Comprehensive Safeguards System…, p. 124.

states cover about 900 facilities and locations, only 20,000 kilograms of HEU and

5000,000 kilograms of plutonium are covered. Not much compared to the 1.9 million

kilograms that exist worldwide. Nuclear materials in military programs are not subject

to international safeguards. Uneven and incomplete application of domestic and

international safeguards contributes to the inadequacy of these materials’ security

nowadays. The fact is that the stronger the safeguards system become, the harder it is for

the countries to implement them. Adequate security depends not only on correct nuclear

materials protection, control and accounting, but also on operational and safety practices

as well as on rigorous application of domestic safeguards in order to prevent theft or

diversion of weaponusable materials.

3. PREVIOUS INTERNATIONAL ACTION

With the explosion of the first Russian atomic device in 1949 and the first British

one in 1952, it became clear that “the ‘secret’ of creating a fission explosive was no

longer the exclusive monopoly of the US and, perhaps more significantly, that the

necessary scientific knowledge to create such a device could be acquired by the

ingenious efforts of other states.”78 Attempts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons

and technologies date back to these times.

In December 1953, the US President Eisenhower presented his “Atoms for

Peace” project to the 8th session of the United Nations General Assembly and launched

the idea of an international organization responsible for promoting peaceful uses of

nuclear energy and for inhibiting its use for military purposes. In 1957, inspired on these

ideas, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was created. According to its

Statute, the IAEA’s main tasks were: to promote the development and application of

nuclear energy for peaceful purposes throughout the world; to provide materials and

other facilities for the research in this area; to establish and adopt standards of nuclear

safety; and to establish and administer safeguards to ensure that nuclear energy would

not be used for military purposes.79 Although it declared a safeguards system, the

78 MOUNTBATTEN CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (MCIS); CENTER FOR NONPROLIFERATION STUDIES (CNS). The 2007 NPT Briefing Book. Available at: http://cns.miis.edu/research/npt/index.htm. Last accessed: 15 May 2007.79 INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY. Statute of the IAEA. Available at: http://www.iaea.org/About/statute_text.html. Last accessed: 15 May 2007.

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Statute did not specify how those safeguards should be applied.

It was only in 1961 that the Agency published its first Information Circular,80 the

INFCIRC/26,81 establishing the arrangements of the IAEA safeguards system. It dealt

basically with the inspections on nuclear materials, equipments and facilities, but in a

very partial and limited way. It was mainly due to the countries’ mistrusts regarding

international inspection at that time.

This first arrangement was revised in 1965 and provisionally extended in 1966

and 1968 by the INFCIRC/6682. This new document established a more comprehensive

system, extending the spectrum of nuclear materials, technologies and transfers among

states covered by the Agency’s safeguards. However, because at that time there were no

uranium enrichment plants operating in nonnuclear weapon states, they were not

covered by the INFCIRC/66 safeguards system. INFCIRC/66 is said to have established

the preNPT safeguards regime.

The traditional IAEA safeguards system for the NPT is laid out in INFCIR/153.83

The objective of safeguards under INFCIR/153 is to provide “timely detection of

diversion of significant quantities84 of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities

to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive devices or for

purposes unknown, and deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early detection”85 by

the use of material accountancy and containment and surveillance.

The text is replete with provisions to be implemented in a manner designed “to

avoid hampering” technological development, “to avoid undue interference” in civilian

nuclear energy, and “to reduce to a minimum the possible inconvenience and

disturbance to the State”.86 In other words, INFCIR/153 was written to ensure that

safeguards would not be too intrusive. Hence, it lays out a regime based primarily on

following nuclear material at selected key “strategic points” at declared sites. The IAEA

would gain the right to obtain more information about undeclared sites from the parties

80 Information Circular is the official name of the IAEA information documents.81 INFCIRC/26. Available at: http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/index.html. Last accessed: 17 May 2007.82 INFCIRC/66. Available at: http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/inf66r2.shtml. Las accessed: 17 May 2007.83 INFCIRC/153. Available at: http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc153.pdf. Last accessed: 21 August 2007.84 “Significant quantities” are defined as 8kg of Pu or U233, or 25 kg of U235 contained in HEU.85 INFCIRC/153.86 INFCIRC/153.

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only under the Additional Safeguards Protocol presented in INFCIR/54087.

INFCIR/25488 from 1978 presented some fundamental guidelines for nuclear

transfers to any NNWS for peaceful purposes. Besides that, suppliers had defined an

export trigger list and agreed on common criteria for technology transfers.

The European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) was created in 1957,

and, since then, it rules a particular safeguards system in Europe. Its safeguards are part

of the international nuclear nonproliferation regime. Tripartite agreements concluded

between the Member States, the EURATOM and the IAEA establish that the

Community safeguards must be applied in conjunction with those of the International

Agency.89 An important aspect of the EURATOM safeguards system, in contrast to that

of the IAEA, is that it subjects to inspection all the civilian nuclear installations and

materials in the states parties, including the ones in the United Kingdom and France,

recognized nuclear weapon states.

The Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) “forms the

principal legal foundation of the broader regime of rules and constraints designed to

prevent the spread of nuclear weapons as well as weaponusable fissile material and

bomb making technology.”90 It is also the only global legal instrument through which a

State can commit itself to nonnuclearweapon State status. The treaty was signed on 1

July 1968 and entered into force on 5 March 1970. “The provisions of the Treaty,

particularly article VIII, paragraph 3, envisage a review of the operation of the Treaty

every five years.”91 These review conferences have been convened since 1975. The NPT

might be considered a landmark international treaty since more countries have ratified it

than any other arms limitation and disarmament agreement.

The NPT parties are divided into nuclear weapon states (NWS)92 and non

87 INFCIRC/540. Available at: http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/1997/infcirc540c.pdf. Last accessed: 21 August 2007.88 INFCIRC/254. Available at: http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc254.shtml. Last accessed: 21 August 2007.89 Europa – SCADPlus Website. Available at: http://europa.eu/scadplus/treaties/euratom_en.htm. Last accessed: 23 August 2007.90 ANTHONY; ROTFELD. A Future Arms Control Agenda, p.289.91 United Nations Website. Available at: http://www.un.org/Depts/dda/WMD/treaty/. Last accessed: 21 August 2007.92 As defined in article IX , “a nuclearweapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967”. By this definition, China, France, Russia, the UK and the USA are nuclear weapon states.

nuclear weapon states (NNWS), with a number of basic obligations following them. In

accordance to Article I, the treaty prohibits the transfer by NWS parties of nuclear

weapons or other nuclear explosive devices as well as the assistance, encouragement or

inducement of any NNWS to manufacture or otherwise acquire such weapons or

devices. On the other hand, Article II prohibits NNWS parties from undertaking

manufacturing or otherwise acquiring nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive

devices. These parties are also prohibited from exporting nuclear materials or

equipment to any NNWS unless that material or equipment is subject to the safeguards

arrangements specified in the treaty.

In order to minimize charges of discrimination, Article IV declares that nothing

in the treaty should be interpreted as “affecting inalienable right of all the Parties to the

Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful

purposes.”93 Article V guarantees the sharing of any peaceful benefits from nuclear

explosives while Article VI mandates that all parties “pursue negotiations in good faith

on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and

to nuclear disarmament.”94

A clause in Article X had the effect of postponing any decision on the duration

of the accord for 25 years after its entry into force. In 1995, the NPT Review and

Extension Conference established the indefinite duration of the treaty, as well as other

two decision documents mandating changes in the way NPTrelated issues are to be

addressed in the future. Furthermore, the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference

“sought to strengthen the review process by requiring that Preparatory Committee

(PrepCom) meetings be held in each of three years leading up to the quinquennial

review conferences.”95

The 2000 NPT Review Conference was marked by the common idea between the

parties that cooperation and timely action were needed to prevent further erosion of the

NPT regime. In that way, the Conference ended with the adoption by consensus of a

Final Declaration for the first time since 1985. The text contained an important forward

looking element setting out a number of concrete disarmament goals. The five NWS

committed themselves to pursuing a program of actions on arms control and

93 UNITED NATIONS. Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons, art. IV. Available at: http://www.un.org/events/npt2005/npttreaty.html. Last accessed: 28 August 2007.94 Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons, art. VVI.95 ANTHONY; ROTFELD. A Future Arms Control Agenda, p.290.

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disarmament, and “collectively made an ‘unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the

total elimination of their nuclear arsenal leading to nuclear disarmament to which all

Parties are committed under Article VI’.”96 The Final Declaration also pointedly noted

that, despite their nuclear tests, India and Pakistan do not have the status of a NWS. The

main question now seems to be how far the parties, in particular the NWS parties, will

be willing to go to keep their words.

At last, we must observe the importance of another traditional instrument for the

strengthening of the nonproliferation regime: the NuclearWeaponsFree Zone

(NWFZ). Recognized by the Article VII of the NPT, NWFZs can be understood as

regional arrangements concluded by states in order to completely ban the menace of

nuclear weapons in a determined area. It means the prohibition of developing,

manufacturing, acquiring, stockpiling, possessing, controlling and testing nuclear

weapons within the zone. Another important aspect of these arrangements is the

“negative security assurances”: by signing and ratifying protocols to the NWFZs, the

five NWS bind themselves not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against states

parties to the agreement. The NWFZ treaties also prohibit the transit of nuclear

weapons through the zone.

There are five great NWFZ in the world today, covering Latin America and the

Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco), the South Pacific (Treaty of Rarotonga), Southeast

Asia (Treaty of Bangkok), Africa (Treaty of Pelindaba)97 and Central Asia (Treaty of

Semipalatinsk). Other treaties also establish the demilitarization and denuclearization of

specific territories such as Mongolia98; the Antarctic; the Seabed, the ocean floor and

the subsoil thereof; the outer space; the Moon and other celestial bodies.

Over the past four decades, the NWFZs, together with the NPT, have proved

their substantial contribution to international security.99 While the NPT is a global and

singleform commitment, the NWFZs enable its members to undertake regional

approaches that are difficult to be taken in a global level. They also generate important

regional dialogues, very beneficial for the casetocase security specificities. In

96 ANTHONY; ROTFELD. A Future Arms Control Agenda, p.291.97 Not yet into force.98 Mongolia is the only state recognized by the United Nations as a singlestate NuclearWeaponFree Zone.99 ELBARADEI, Mohamed. NuclearWeaponFree Zones: Pursuing Security, Region by Region. Available at: http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Statements/2005/ebsp2005n005.html. Last accessed: 29 April 2007.

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committing themselves to regional agreements, member states tend to be more

committed with their international community obligations.

4. BLOC POSITIONS

North America: The United States of America has demonstrated a steady

position against the proliferation of WMDs, and it “reserves the right to respond with

overwhelming force [...] to the use of WMD.”100 With the recent terrorist activities,

attention is now being driven to nonStates actors. In order to diminish nuclear terrorist

threats, the United States has been investing in intelligence, as well as bilateral and

multilateral initiatives.

Besides that, the United States has its own policies to hinder NonNuclear

Weapon States from producing WMDs, such as economic sanctions, under the Nuclear

Proliferation Prevention Act101. The United States also defends the ratification of the

IAEA Additional Protocol by all NPT states parties,102 so that the Agency is granted

more rights to inspect nuclear facilities. Although the U.S. signed this Additional

Protocol in 2004, it has not yet taken the necessary measures to implement the protocol

inside the country.103

Southern Asia: Despite having participated in the first drafts for the creation of

the NPT, India is not a signatory of the treaty, and it has declared itself a nuclear

power.104 According to the country, the “treaty only legitimized the continuing

possession and multiplication of nuclear stockpiles by those few states possessing

them,”105 and accuses China of illegally fostering the Pakistani nuclear military

program. The U.S. government imposed economic sanctions on India in 1998, after

100 THE WHITE HOUSE. National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction. Available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/12/WMDStrategy.pdf. Last Accessed: 19 May 2007.101 Foreign Press Centers. Available at: http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/19206.pdf. Last accessed: 23 Aug 2007.102 National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction...103Arms Control Association Website. Available at: http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/IAEAProtocol.asp. Last accessed: 19 May 2007.104 South Asia Analysis Group Website. Available at: http://www.saag.org/%5Cpapers2%5Cpaper117.html. Last accessed: 19 May 2007.105 Embassy of India – Washington DC Website. Available at: http://www.indianembassy.org/policy/CTBT/embassy_non_proliferation.htm. Last Accessed: 19 May 2007.

http://www.indianembassy.org/policy/CTBT/embassy_non_proliferation.htmhttp://www.saag.org/\papers2\paper117.htmlhttp://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/IAEAProtocol.asphttp://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/12/WMDStrategy.pdf

India nuclear tests, which were kept until 2001.106

Some discussion was raised when, in 2005, an AmericanIndian civil nuclear

cooperation program was launched. Being a signatory of the NPT, the United States is

forced not to exchange nuclear technology to NNWS for military proposes. As a result,

the Indian government decided to separate its civil nuclear facilities from its military

ones, the former being, now, under the IAEA’s safeguards.107 There is still no sign,

however, that India will sign the NPT.

Furthermore, Pakistan is not a NPT signatory either, and it has started its nuclear

program shortly after the independence of East Pakistan in 1971. As a result of the

resuming of missile tests by Asian countries in 1998, the United States adopted, once

more, sanction policies. However, this picture changed completely after Pakistan has

shown itself as a great ally on America's War Against Terror.108

Europe: Europe depends heavily on nuclear power; 88% of the French energy

matrix, for example, is based on nuclear energy.109 The continent has a long history of

safeguards and technical cooperation, which started with the establishment of the

European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), in 1957.110 A recent effort to

reduce costs and increase efficiency of inspections was launched with a cooperation

program between EURATOM and the IAEA, creating the New Partnership Approach.111

The European continent is also concerned about a nuclear terrorist threat. In

2005, the European Parliament approved a resolution on the nonproliferation of

WMDs, in which it remembers the danger Cold War fissile materials represent, and

acknowledges, for instance, that the EU “should play a more active role in non

proliferation and disarmament policies.”112 Currently, Europe Union also counters

106 U.S. Department of State Website. Available at: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3454.htm. Last Accessed: 19 May 2007.107 SQUASSONI, Sharon. India’s Nuclear Separation Plan: Issues and Views. Available at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL33292.pdf. Last accessed: 19 May 2007.108 U.S. Department of State Website. Available at: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3453.htm Last Accessed: 19 May 2007.109The EDF Group Website. Available at: http://www.edf.com/12025i/Homefr/EDFEnergies/Nuclearpower.html. Last Accessed: 19 May 2007.110 Europa – SCADPlus Website. Available at: http://europa.eu/scadplus/treaties/euratom_en.htm. Last Accessed: 19 May 2007.111 IAEA Website. Available at http://f40.iaea.org/worldatom/Periodicals/Bulletin/Bull371/chitumbo.html. Last Accessed: 19 May 2007.112 EurLex Website. Available at: http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2006/ce280/ce28020061118en04530463.pdf. Last Accessed: 19 May 2007.

http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2006/ce280/ce28020061118en04530463.pdfhttp://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2006/ce280/ce28020061118en04530463.pdfhttp://f40.iaea.org/worldatom/Periodicals/Bulletin/Bull371/chitumbo.htmlhttp://europa.eu/scadplus/treaties/euratom_en.htmhttp://www.edf.com/12025i/Homefr/EDFEnergies/Nuclearpower.htmlhttp://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3453.htmhttp://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL33292.pdfhttp://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3454.htm

terrorists’ activities by sharing information from Interpol, Europol and the European

Commission with IAEA. 113

Latin America: The largest NuclearWeaponFree Zone was established in 1967

with the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which was signed by all 33 countries in the region.114

Despite the great advance towards nonproliferation, both Argentina and Brazil

developed covert nuclear programs during the seventies. The picture only changed in the

nineties, when both countries resigned their WMD programs and ratified both the

Tlatelolco Treaty and the NPT.115 In 2004, there was an incident involving the IAEA and

Brazil, as the agency’s inspectors claimed not have complete clearance to perform on

site verifications in a Brazilian uranium enrichment plant. Brazil replied that all the

production was destined to peaceful purposes, and that the obstruction aimed only at

preserving Brazilian proprietary technology.

Although both parts have reached a common ground, neither Brazil nor

Argentina is a signatory of the IAEA’s Additional Protocol.116 It is unlikely�

General Assembly: Special Political and Decolonization … · 2007-10-09 · UFRGS Model United...

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