Game of Great Societies: Democratic Competitiveness and Social Expenditure in Health and Education
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Game of Great Societies How Does Democratic Competitiveness Influence Health and Education Expenditure? Sidney Li · Dhara Singh · Darius Stewart Introduction Variables Multivariate Regression Results Political Competitiveness and the Polity IV Findings Study Relevance and Further Research This project examines the effect of democratic competitiveness on social expenditures in education and public health. This study delves into the relationship between democratic regimes and health and education expenditures, an extension of Evelyne Huber, Thomas Mustillo and John D. Stephens’s research on the effect of different regime types on social expenditures in Latin America. Our research is also broadened by data from countries around the world instead of just Latin America as in the Huber et al. study. We reason that parties in politically competitive democracies must have greater appeal to the general public, namely the elderly and the poor through social expenditure. Huber et al. found that authoritarian regimes spend more than democracies on social security and social welfare. To further investigate their second finding that democratic regimes spend more on education and health, this study will analyze what characteristics of democracies produce this fiscal phenomenon. DISCUSSION The data show that democratic competitiveness increases government spending on health and education. Our reasoning for these results is that when a democracy is more competitive, it is harder for groups to get into power, so to win they need to appeal to the general public. Voters want the people in power to govern in a way that directly benefits them, so they vote for candidate(s) who(se) changes help them. Since the countries we examined are developing countries or had a strong history of government involvement, social expenditures are politically important. For parties to appeal to their constituencies in the more competitive systems, they must focus on increasing government spending on social services, particularly health and education. PREDICTIONS • Measure the effect that the competitiveness of a democracy has on social security and social welfare spending • Examine how the age of a democratic regime affects social spending • Test how different forms of democracy affect social spending • Incorporate statistically significant measures of poverty, economic strength, and fiscal capability as controls This study offers important lessons for democratic regimes, illustrating how competitive party systems can forge stronger foundations for upward mobility. Also, it indicates that the people have greater influence over political decisions in competitive democracies. Further research in this area should focus on the following factors: Our study supports the hypothesis that political competitiveness is a strong determinant in the amount a country spends on social expenditures, such as health care and education. Although our results were consistent with our hypothesis, there are a few things that could have been done to strengthen our experiment. The Gini coefficients (a measure of income inequality) could have been a control that affected our results, but we were unable to find enough data to test this intuition. We also only looked at K-12 graduation rates, but college graduation rates may have had a greater impact, because college students would likely have the right to vote. Also, our results could be strengthened by an alternative measure to the quality of democracy other than the Polity IV index, which has very little annual variance. Conclusion Mean of Polity quality of democracy with 1 Standard Deviation Mean of political competiveness with 1 Standard Deviation Education 4.75 5.27 Public Health 1.40 1.50 Political Competitiveness vs. Education Spending Quality of Democracy vs. Education Spending Political Competiveness vs. Public Health Spending Quality of Democracy vs. Public Health Spending This chart shows the predicted value for both dependent variables when the Polity quality of democracy and political competiveness are both moved one standard deviation above their mean. Political competiveness has a much greater impact on both dependent variables values than the Polity quality of democracy does. We can observe a larger impact of political competitiveness on education than public health. These graphs plot political competitiveness against the two dependent variables and the Polity quality of democracy against the two dependent variables. The larger regression coefficients in the political competitiveness graphs indicate a stronger relationship between political competitiveness and the variables. Political competitiveness is thus a better indicator of health and education spending than level of democracy. Independent Variable Political Competitiveness Dependent Variables Education Spending (% GDP) Public Health Spending (% GDP) Control Variables Economic Competitiveness GDP per capita growth Urbanization Social development Senior population National Debt Quality of democracy Hypothesis: The more competitive a democracy is, the higher the levels of education and public health spending. Literacy Research Methodology We ensured that our countries came from a wide range of economic and social conditions, including both OECD members, developing countries, and former colonies. We chose to measure democratic competitiveness (our independent variable) by creating our own index based on a sum of three indices. Two of these were the Economist Intelligence Unit’s political culture and political participation indices, which measured the interactions between parties, the government, and the citizenry. Our third aggregated index was the inverse of the Database of Political Institution’s (DPI) Herfindahl index, measuring the effective number of opposition parties. During regression analysis, we used multicollinearity among variables to narrow our controls. No significant heteroskedasticity was detected. This map shows the political competitiveness of all of the countries that were studied. It is measured using the scale that was created for this project, which measures political culture, number of effective political parties and the political participation. Map of Democratic Competitiveness Bibliography Huber, E., Mustillo, T., & Stephens, J. D. (2008, April). Politics and social spending in Latin America. The Journal of Politics.
description
We investigate the influence of governing political parties and competitive legislatures on social expenditure, attempting a prediction of the latter given a change in political landscape.
Transcript of Game of Great Societies: Democratic Competitiveness and Social Expenditure in Health and Education
Game of Great Societies How Does Democratic Competitiveness Influence Health and Education Expenditure?
Sidney Li · Dhara Singh · Darius Stewart
Introduction
Variables
Multivariate Regression Results
Political Competitiveness and the Polity IV
Findings
Study Relevance and Further Research
This project examines the effect of democratic competitiveness on social expenditures in education and public health. This study delves into the relationship between democratic regimes and health and education expenditures, an extension of Evelyne Huber, Thomas Mustillo and John D. Stephens’s research on the effect of different regime types on social expenditures in Latin America. Our research is also broadened by data from countries around the world instead of just Latin America as in the Huber et al. study. We reason that parties in politically competitive democracies must have greater appeal to the general public, namely the elderly and the poor through social expenditure. Huber et al. found that authoritarian regimes spend more than democracies on social security and social welfare. To further investigate their second finding that democratic regimes spend more on education and health, this study will analyze what characteristics of democracies produce this fiscal phenomenon.
DISCUSSION The data show that democratic competitiveness increases government spending on health and education. Our reasoning for these results is that when a democracy is more competitive, it is harder for groups to get into power, so to win they need to appeal to the general public. Voters want the people in power to govern in a way that directly benefits them, so they vote for candidate(s) who(se) changes help them. Since the countries we examined are developing countries or had a strong history of government involvement, social expenditures are politically important. For parties to appeal to their constituencies in the more competitive systems, they must focus on increasing government spending on social services, particularly health and education. PREDICTIONS
• Measure the effect that the competitiveness of a democracy has on social security and social welfare spending
• Examine how the age of a democratic regime affects social spending • Test how different forms of democracy affect social spending • Incorporate statistically significant measures of poverty, economic strength, and fiscal
capability as controls
This study offers important lessons for democratic regimes, illustrating how competitive party systems can forge stronger foundations for upward mobility. Also, it indicates that the people have greater influence over political decisions in competitive democracies. Further research in this area should focus on the following factors:
Our study supports the hypothesis that political competitiveness is a strong determinant in the amount a country spends on social expenditures, such as health care and education. Although our results were consistent with our hypothesis, there are a few things that could have been done to strengthen our experiment. The Gini coefficients (a measure of income inequality) could have been a control that affected our results, but we were unable to find enough data to test this intuition. We also only looked at K-12 graduation rates, but college graduation rates may have had a greater impact, because college students would likely have the right to vote. Also, our results could be strengthened by an alternative measure to the quality of democracy other than the Polity IV index, which has very little annual variance.
Conclusion
Mean of Polity quality of democracy with 1 Standard Deviation
Mean of political competiveness with 1 Standard Deviation
Education 4.75 5.27
Public Health 1.40 1.50
Political Competitiveness vs. Education Spending Quality of Democracy vs. Education Spending
Political Competiveness vs. Public Health Spending Quality of Democracy vs. Public Health Spending
This chart shows the predicted value for both dependent variables when the Polity quality of democracy and political competiveness are both moved one standard deviation above their mean. Political competiveness has a much greater impact on both dependent variables values than the Polity quality of democracy does. We can observe a larger impact of political competitiveness on education than public health.
These graphs plot political competitiveness against the two dependent variables and the Polity quality of democracy against the two dependent variables. The larger regression coefficients in the political competitiveness graphs indicate a stronger relationship between political competitiveness and the variables. Political competitiveness is thus a better indicator of health and education spending than level of democracy.
Independent Variable Political Competitiveness
Dependent Variables Education Spending (% GDP)
Public Health Spending (% GDP) Control Variables
Economic Competitiveness GDP per capita growth Urbanization
Social development Senior population National Debt Quality of democracy
Hypothesis: The more competitive a democracy is, the higher the levels of education and public health spending.
Literacy
Research Methodology
We ensured that our countries came from a wide range of economic and social conditions, including both OECD members, developing countries, and former colonies. We chose to measure democratic competitiveness (our independent variable) by creating our own index based on a sum of three indices. Two of these were the Economist Intelligence Unit’s political culture and political participation indices, which measured the interactions between parties, the government, and the citizenry. Our third aggregated index was the inverse of the Database of Political Institution’s (DPI) Herfindahl index, measuring the effective number of opposition parties. During regression analysis, we used multicollinearity among variables to narrow our controls. No significant heteroskedasticity was detected.
This map shows the political competitiveness of all of the countries that were studied. It is measured using the scale that was created for this project, which measures political culture, number of effective political parties and the political participation.
Map of Democratic Competitiveness
Bibliography
Huber, E., Mustillo, T., & Stephens, J. D. (2008, April). Politics and social spending in Latin America. The Journal of Politics.
