Gaither v Stop and Shop Supermarket Co LLC

Gaither v. Stop & Shop Supermarket Co. LLC, --- F.Supp.3d ---- (2015)

2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 1

2015 WL 93842Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.

United States District Court,D. Connecticut.

Hollie GAITHER, Plaintiff,v.

STOP & SHOP SUPERMARKETCO. LLC, Defendant.

Civil No. 3:13cv658 (JBA). | Signed Jan. 7, 2015.

SynopsisBackground: Part-time cashier at supermarket filed statecourt suit against her employer alleging violation ofConnecticut Fair Employment Practices Act (CFEPA) basedon its alleged failure to grant her a reasonable leave of absenceor to make a reasonable effort to transfer her to a suitabletemporary position in order to accommodate her disabilityresulting from pregnancy, and wrongful termination becauseof her pregnancy. Following removal, employer moved forsummary judgment.

Holdings: The District Court, Janet Bond Arterton, J., heldthat:

[1] termination of pregnant employee violated CFEPA; but

[2] genuine issue of material fact as to whether employeewas effectively denied a transfer, in violation of CFEPA,precluded summary judgment on transfer claim;

[3] plaintiff sufficiently mitigated her damages by applyingfor other jobs; but

[4] genuine issue of material fact precluded summaryjudgment on claim for emotional distress damages underCFEPA.

Motion denied.

West Headnotes (12)

[1] Civil Rights

Pregnancy; Maternity

Although there are similarities betweenpregnancy discrimination provisions of Title VIIand Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act(CFEPA), CFEPA contemplates broader reliefthan its federal counterpart. Civil Rights Act of1964, 701 et seq., 42 U.S.C.A. 2000e et seq.;C.G.S.A. 46a60(a)(1).

Cases that cite this headnote

[2] Civil RightsPregnancy; Maternity

Under Title VII, pregnancy discrimination isdefined as a form of gender-based discriminationand prohibited on this basis. Civil Rights Act of1964, 701(k), 42 U.S.C.A. 2000e(k).



The Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA) doesnot require employers to extend any benefits topregnant women that they do not already provideto other disabled employees, but rather providesthat women as capable of doing their jobs as theirmale counterparts may not be forced to choosebetween having a child and having a job. CivilRights Act of 1964, 701(k), 42 U.S.C.A. 2000e(k).



A Title VII plaintiff alleging pregnancydiscrimination must prove that she was treatedless favorably than a nonpregnant employeeunder identical circumstances and that herpregnancy was the reason she was treated lessfavorably. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 701(k), 42U.S.C.A. 2000e(k).


[5] Civil Rights

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Pregnancy; Maternity

Despite employer's contention that therewas no effective difference between offeringeight month pregnant supermarket clerk leaveof absence, and terminating her with theunderstanding that she could be rehired whenshe was no longer subject to lifting restrictionsimposed as a result of her pregnancy, terminationof the part-time employee violated ConnecticutFair Employment Practices Act (CFEPA), sinceemployer provided only a non-binding vaguestatement that it was looking forward to havingcashier back if there were openings at a later date,which was not the same as a leave of absencewith placement in an equivalent position, asrequired by the statute. C.G.S.A. 46a60(a)(7)(A, B).


[6] Federal Civil ProcedureEmployees and Employment

Discrimination, Actions Involving

Genuine issue of material fact as to whetheremployer's actions, in keeping pregnantsupermarket cashier in an assignment witha written job description that required herto lift in excess of her medical restrictionsand demanding that she exceed her liftingrestrictions, effectively denied cashier a transfer,precluded summary judgment on cashier's claimagainst employer for violation of ConnecticutFair Employment Practices Act (CFEPA).C.G.S.A. 46a60(a)(7).


[7] Civil RightsEmployment Practices

Civil RightsEmployment Practices

An award of front pay under Connecticut FairEmployment Practices Act (CFEPA) is a form ofequitable relief, which is a matter for trial judge'sequitable discretion. C.G.S.A. 46a60(a)(7).



Because failure to mitigate is an affirmativedefense to a claim for violation of ConnecticutFair Employment Practices Act (CFEPA), anemployer seeking to avoid a lost wages awardunder the Act bears burden of demonstrating thatplaintiff failed to satisfy the duty to mitigate.C.G.S.A. 46a60(a)(7).



While a discharged employee must usereasonable diligence in finding other suitableemployment in order to satisfy duty to mitigate,for purposes of recovering lost wages underConnecticut Fair Employment Practices Act(CFEPA), it need not be comparable toemployee's previous positions. C.G.S.A. 46a60(a)(7).



Part-time cashier at supermarket who had beenterminated in violation of Connecticut FairEmployment Practices Act (CFEPA) based onpregnancy satisfied her duty to mitigate, asrequired to recover lost wages under the Act,even though she did not apply for positions atother supermarkets, since she had applied for 10to 15 jobs with other types of employers everyweek. C.G.S.A. 46a60(a)(7).



Proximate cause of damages under ConnecticutFair Employment Practices Act (CFEPA) isordinarily a question of fact and is for a jury todecide. C.G.S.A. 46a60(a)(7).


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[12] Federal Civil ProcedureEmployees and Employment

Discrimination, Actions Involving

Genuine issue of material fact as to whethertermination of pregnant supermarket clerk inviolation of Connecticut Fair EmploymentPractices Act (CFEPA) had proximately causedemotional distress to the employee precludedsummary judgment on employee's claim againsther employer for damages under the Act.C.G.S.A. 46a60(a)(7).


Attorneys and Law Firms

Emanuele Robert Cicchiello, Michael John Reilly, Cicchiello& Cicchiello, LLP, Hartford, CT, for Plaintiff.

Glenn William Dowd, Howard Fetner, Day Pitney LLP, NewHaven, CT, for Defendant.

RULING ON DEFENDANT'S MOTIONFOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

JANET BOND ARTERTON, District Judge.

*1 Defendant Stop & Shop Supermarket Co. LLC (Stop& Shop) moves [Doc. # 30] for summary judgment onPlaintiff Hollie Gaither's claims under the Connecticut FairEmployment Practices Act (CFEPA) for failure to granther a reasonable leave of absence or to make a reasonableeffort to transfer her to a suitable temporary position in orderto accommodate her disability resulting from pregnancy and

wrongful termination because of her pregnancy. 1 For thereasons that follow, Defendant's motion is denied.

I. FactsPlaintiff began working at a Stop & Shop supermarket inGlastonbury, Connecticut in October 2011 as a part-timefloral clerk, cashier, bagger, and self-scan monitor, workingapproximately 15 to 25 hours per week. (Gaither Dep., Ex. 4to Def.'s Loc. R. 56(a)1 Stmt. [Doc. # 32] at 7476.) As a part-time employee, Ms. Gaither was not entitled to benefits, suchas health insurance or paid leave. (Id. at 18485.) In January

2012, Ms. Gaither became pregnant and immediately notifiedJim Fusco and Lynn Nelson, assistant store managers, whoboth responded by congratulating her. (Id. at 8387.) Plaintiffcontinued her normal duties while pregnant, however, in June2012, she started to suffer from extreme back pain as a resultof her pregnancy and her doctor restricted her from liftingobjects greater than fifteen pounds. (Id. at 93, 109, 14748.) Ms. Gaither presented Ms. Nelson with a note from herobstetrician, dated June 4, 2012 (Ex. 11 to Def.'s 56(a)1),noting the weight restriction (Gaither Dep. at 112).

Prior to this date, Plaintiff had not had any problems with Ms.Nelson, but afterwards Ms. Nelson would on an almost dailybasis assign her tasks that required her to exceed her liftingrestriction. When Ms. Gaither would remind Ms. Nelson ofthe lifting restriction, Ms. Nelson would respond by sayingthat [w]e have a business to run or you need to do it, thisis the job, you have to do your job or she would just ignorePlaintiff, making a huff noise and storm away. (Id. at 32,28, 11920.)

In July 2012, the final month of Ms. Gaither's pregnancy,her back pain became even more severe and she had to callout sick for several days. (Id. at 15152.) On July 28, 2012,Ms. Gaither presented Ms. Nelson with a doctor's note fromtwo days prior that memorialized her appointment (Ex. A toPl.'s Loc. R. 56(a)2 Stmt. [Doc. # 38] ), but did not containany further medical restrictions or diagnosis. Ms. Nelsonresponded, I don't care what you're going through, whattype of pain, we have a business to run, and you have ajob to do. (Gaither Dep. at 156.) Ms. Nelson, Ms. Gaither,and the store manager, Bill Haberern, then had a meeting inMr. Haberern's office in which Ms. Nelson explained Ms.Gaither's lifting restriction. Mr. Haberern had apparently beenunaware of the lifting restriction previously and upon learningof it, he said that Ms. Gaither should have been terminatedas soon as she submitted the doctor's note with the restrictionand explained to Ms. Gaither that she would now have to beterminated. (Gaither Dep. at 16465.) Ms. Gaither askedif she could instead take medical leave, but Mr. Haberernexplained that she was not eligible under company policybecause she had not worked for the company for a year. Mr.Haberern said that she was welcome to return to the companywhen she was ready, but Ms. Gaither contends that she wastold that she would need to apply for her position again andthere was no guarantee that there would be an open positionor that she would be rehired. (Nelson Dep., Ex. 7 to Def.'s56(a)1 at 6062; Gaither Dep. at 174.)

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*2 Ms. Gaither asked Mr. Haberern to draft a lettermemorializing her termination. (Gaither Dep. at 174.) In aletter dated July 30, 2012, Mr. Haberern wrote:

Hollie Gaither has been employed byStop and Shop Supermarkets sinceOctober 21, 2011. Her employmenthas been terminated as of this pastSunday, July 29th, 2012, as sheis presently unable to fulfill therequirements of her job descriptionrelative to lifting. We are lookingforward to having Hollie back, whenshe is back to 100%.

(Haberern Ltr., July 30, 2012, Ex. 17 to Def.'s 56(a)1.)

Two weeks later, on August 12, 2012, Ms. Gaither gave birthand was medically able to resume work thereafter. However,she never reapplied to work at Stop & Shop explaining thatshe did not feel that she was welcome to return given that Mr.Haberern had fired her rather than providing her with a leaveof absence as she requested. (Pl.'s Resps. to Def.'s Interrogs.,Ex. 18 to Def.'s 56(a)1 at 78; Gaither Dep. at 176, 18284.)

After losing her job, Plaintiff was unable to afford her rent andwas evicted from her apartment shortly after she gave birth.(Gaither Dep. at 4344.) Although Ms. Gaither would havebeen without income even if she had been granted the unpaidleave of absence that she requested, she contends that hertermination caused her eviction, because an employee of herlandlord said that because the landlord did not know how longit would take Ms. Gaither to find another job, the landlordwould have to evict her for nonpayment of the rent whereasif she was just on leave he could have worked with her.(Id. at 20203, 205.) After being evicted, Ms. Gaither and herhusband became homeless and moved to South Carolina tostay with his family for a time. However, in January 2013,the family told Ms. Gaither and her husband that they had toleave and they wound up living in a homeless shelter. (Id. at20809.)

II. Discussion 2

Although pregnancy discrimination claims are generallyanalyzed under the McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973) framework,the McDonnell Douglas framework does not apply where,for example, a plaintiff is able to produce direct evidenceof discrimination. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S.

506, 511, 122 S.Ct. 992, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002). Here,there is no factual dispute that Plaintiff was terminatedbecause of her pregnancy-related medical restrictions and theprimary question is a legal one: whether this termination wasprohibited under CFEPA. Cf. Craine v. Trinity Coll., 259Conn. 625, 637, 791 A.2d 518 (2002) ([The McDonnellDouglas ] methodology is intended to provide guidanceto fact finders who are faced with the difficult task ofdetermining intent in complicated discrimination cases. Itmust not, however, cloud the fact that it is the plaintiff'sultimate burden to prove that the defendant intentionallydiscriminated against her because of her sex.).

Defendant contends that this termination was notdiscriminatory under CFEPA because Plaintiff's liftingrestriction rendered her unable to perform the essentialfunctions of her job and terminating a woman'semployment because she is unable to perform essentialjob functions as a result of pregnancy complications does

not constitute pregnancy discrimination 3 and [t]here isno evidence suggesting that Stop & Shop treated Plaintiffdifferently from any non-pregnant employees with similarphysical limitations. (Def.'s Mem. Supp. [Doc. # 31] at 912.)

*3 [1] Defendant's exclusive reference to Title VII casesin support of its arguments is misplaced here because, whilethe Connecticut Supreme Court has often looked to federalemployment discrimination law for guidance in enforcingour own antidiscrimination statute, it has also recognizedthat, under certain circumstances, federal law defines thebeginning and not the end of our approach to the subject.State v. Comm'n On Human Rights & Opportunities, 211Conn. 464, 470, 559 A.2d 1120 (1989) (internal quotationmarks omitted). Thus, while in many instances there aresimilarities between Title VII and the Connecticut law, ...the state statute contemplates broader relief than its federalcounterpart. Graham v. State of N.Y., Dep't of Civil Serv.,907 F.2d 324, 327 (2d Cir.1990) (interpreting Title VIIand distinguishing Connecticut law); see also Murphy v.Robert Burgess & Norwalk Econ. Opportunity Now, Inc., No.3:96CV01987 (AHN), 1997 WL 529610, at *4 (D.Conn. July16, 1997) (CFEPA is, in many respects, stronger than thefederal act, and ... the difference between the state and federalacts was purposeful and is meaningful.).

[2] Under Title VII, pregnancy discrimination is definedas a form of gender-based discrimination and prohibitedon this basis. See O'Bar v. Borough of Naugatuck, No.

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CIV.3:01CV867(PCD), 2002 WL 32769183, at *4 n. 6(D.Conn. Dec. 3, 2002) (The Pregnancy Discrimination Act,codified at 42 U.S.C. 2000e(k), is not a basis for [a]claim independent of Title VII's prohibition against genderdiscrimination.). Title VII provides:

It shall be an unlawful employmentpractice for an employer ... to failor refuse to hire or to dischargeany individual, or otherwise todiscriminate against any individualwith respect to his compensation,terms, conditions, or privilegesof employment, because of suchindividual's race, color, religion, sex,or national origin.

42 U.S.C. 2000e2(a)(1). Originally, there was no provisionin Title VII specifically protecting pregnant employees, butwith the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 (PDA),42 U.S.C. 2000e(k), Congress amended the definitionof gender-based discrimination under Title VII to includepregnancy:

The terms because of sex or onthe basis of sex include, but are notlimited to, because of or on the basisof pregnancy, childbirth, or relatedmedical conditions; and womenaffected by pregnancy, childbirth, orrelated medical conditions shall betreated the same for all employment-related purposes ... as other persons notso affected but similar in their abilityor inability to work....

42 U.S.C. 2000e(k).

It is well established that the PDA was passed in reactionto the Supreme Court's decision in General Electric Co. v.Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 97 S.Ct. 401, 50 L.Ed.2d 343 (1976),which held that it was not discrimination because of sexfor a company's disability plan to provide coverage during aperiod of disability resulting from nonoccupational causes butto exclude from coverage disability arising from pregnancy.Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. E.E.O.C.,462 U.S. 669, 678, 103 S.Ct. 2622, 77 L.Ed.2d 89 (1983).The Gilbert dissenters argued that the company's plan, whichwas intended to provide employees with protection againstthe risk of uncompensated unemployment caused by physical

disability, discriminated on the basis of sex by giving menprotection for all categories of risk but giving women onlypartial protection. Thus, the dissenters asserted that the statutehad been violated because conditions of employment forfemales were less favorable than for similarly situated males.See Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 155, 97 S.Ct. 401 (Brennan, J.,dissenting).

*4 When Congress passed the PDA, it unambiguouslyexpressed its disapproval of both the holding and thereasoning of the Court in the Gilbert decision, and manyof the bill's proponents expressly agreed with the viewsof the dissenting Justices from Gilbert. Id. at 67879, 103S.Ct. 2622. The second clause of 2000e(k) providing thatpregnant women must be treated the same as non-pregnantworkers who are similar in their ability or inability to work,explains the application of the general principle to womenemployees, Newport News Shipbuilding, 462 U.S. at 679 n.14, 103 S.Ct. 2622. Read in this context, the PDA makesclear that it is discriminatory to treat pregnancy-relatedconditions less favorably than other medical conditionsbecause only women can become pregnant. Id. at 684, 103S.Ct. 2622.

[3] [4] The PDA does not require employers to extendany benefits to pregnant women that they do not alreadyprovide to other disabled employees, California Fed. Sav.& Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 286, 107 S.Ct. 683,93 L.Ed.2d 613 (1987), but rather provides that women ascapable of doing their jobs as their male counterparts maynot be forced to choose between having a child and havinga job, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 204,111 S.Ct. 1196, 113 L.Ed.2d 158 (1991). Thus, a Title VIIplaintiff must prove that she was treated less favorablythan a nonpregnant employee under identical circumstancesand that her pregnancy was the reason she was treated less

favorably. 4 Piraino v. Int'l Orientation Res., Inc., 137F.3d 987, 990 (7th Cir.1998) (internal quotation marks andalterations omitted).

By contrast, under CFEPA, pregnancy discrimination isnot defined as a form of gender discrimination, whichis separately addressed in Conn. Gen.Stat. 46a60(a)(1), but rather CFEPA has specific provisions requiringaccommodation of pregnant employees:

It shall be a discriminatory practicein violation of this section.... For anemployer, by the employer or the

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employer's agent: (A) To terminatea woman's employment because ofher pregnancy; (B) to refuse to grantto that employee a reasonable leaveof absence for disability resultingfrom her pregnancy; ... (D) to fail orrefuse to reinstate the employee toher original job or to an equivalentposition ... upon her signifying herintent to return ...; [or] (E) to fail orrefuse to make a reasonable effort totransfer a pregnant employee to anysuitable temporary position which maybe available in any case in whichan employee gives written notice ofher pregnancy to her employer andthe employer or pregnant employeereasonably believes that continuedemployment in the position held by thepregnant employee may cause injuryto the employee or fetus.

Conn. Gen.Stat. 46a60(a)(7). 5

In California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, the Supreme Courtupheld a California law, similar to CFEPA, which providedgreater protection to pregnant women than Title VII byestablish[ing] benefits that employers must, at a minimum,provide to pregnant workers, including maternity leave andguaranteed reinstatement. 479 U.S. at 291, 107 S.Ct. 683; cf.Piraino, 84 F.3d at 274 (The PDA .... does not impose anaffirmative obligation on employers to offer maternity leaveor to take other steps to assist pregnant workers, but it doesrequire the employer to treat the employee as well as it wouldhave if she were not pregnant.).

*5 The Supreme Court noted that when Congress wasdebating the PDA, it was aware of [preexisting] state lawsincluding CFEPA, but did not consider them to be a form ofreverse discrimination against men that would themselvesviolate Title VII. California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 479 U.S.at 287 & n. 24, 107 S.Ct. 683 (citing Conn. Gen.Stat. 46a60(a)(7)). Rather, Congress intended the PDA to be a floorbeneath which pregnancy disability benefits may not drop-nota ceiling above which they may not rise. Id. at 285, 107 S.Ct.683; see also 42 U.S.C. 2000e7.

CFEPA on its face indicates that Connecticut has exercisedthis prerogative to provide pregnant employees with greater

protection than Title VII does. Zamore v. Dyer, 597 F.Supp.923, 928 (D.Conn.1984). Thus, even if Defendant is correctthat [t]here is no evidence suggesting that Stop & Shoptreated Plaintiff differently from any nonpregnant employeeswith similar physical limitations (Def.'s Mem. Supp. at 10),this argument is beside the point because CFEPA requiresemployers to provide certain benefits and protections forpregnant employees, such as a reasonable leave of absencefor disability resulting from her pregnancy, 46a60(a)(7)(B), and a reasonable effort to transfer a pregnant employeeto any suitable temporary position, 46a60(7)(E). Cf. FennMfg. v. Comm'n on Human Rights & Opportunities, No.CIV.CV 92509435, 1994 WL 51143, at *15 (Conn.Super.Ct.Feb. 8, 1994) (The statute thus empowers workers whowish both to work during pregnancy and to avoid maternaland fetal hazards in the workplace to do so by havingreasonable options to continue working elsewhere to avoidthose hazards.).

[5] Defendant acknowledges that it did not formally grantPlaintiff a leave of absence but contends that the resultwas indistinguishable because as a result of her termination,she did not work the last two weeks of her pregnancy, andwith Mr. Haberern's July 30, 2012 letter stating that he waslooking forward to having [Plaintiff] back, when she is backto 100%, Plaintiff's situation would have been no differentif Stop & Shop had called the period between July 28 andAugust 12 a leave of absence instead of a termination with

an invitation to return. 6 (Def.'s Mem. Supp. at 13.) Plaintiffcounters that her termination was not indistinguishablefrom a leave of absence because she was told only thatshe might be rehired in the future if there was a positionavailable. (Pl.'s Opp'n [Doc. # 37] at 1718.) Contrary toDefendant's assertions, termination with only a non-bindingvague statement that the employer was looking forward tohaving [Plaintiff] back is not the equivalent of granting aleave of absence. Defendant's argument is belied by the text ofCFEPA which prohibits an employer from refusing to grantto that employee a reasonable leave of absence, 46a60(a)(7)(B), and explicitly prohibits termination because of anemployee's pregnancy, 46a60(a)(7)(A).

*6 Additionally, under CFEPA an employee on maternityleave is generally entitled to reinstatement to her original jobor to an equivalent position with equivalent pay and benefits,Conn. Gen.Stat. 46a60(a)(7)(D), which is a protection thatwould not be afforded to an employee who is denied suchleave and thus there is plainly a significant difference betweenbeing granted leave under CFEPA and being terminated. See

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Zamore, 597 F.Supp. at 927 (Unlike Title VII, [ 46a60(a)(7)(D) ] explicitly provides that a[n] ... employer mustreinstate an employee to her original or an equivalent positionfollowing maternity leave, if one is granted.).

In Zamore, the court held that an employer did not complywith the statutory requirement of reinstatement under 46a60(a)(7)(D), when the plaintiff was terminated while onmaternity leave and the employer later invited her to applyfor another position because an invitation to apply for apossible job is not the same as the statutorily mandatedplacement in an equivalent position. 597 F.Supp. at 925 n. 1.

Defendant does not discuss any 46a60(a)(7)(B) case lawand simply maintains that there was no effective differencebetween offering Plaintiff leave and terminating her with the

understanding that she could be rehired. 7 (Reply [Doc. # 39]at 4.) Given that Defendant's argument is not supported bythe clear text or statutory framework of the relevant CFEPAprovisions, and because a factfinder could credit Plaintiff'sstatement that she was denied leave and never told that shewas guaranteed to be rehired after termination, Defendantis not entitled to summary judgment on the denial of leaveclaim.

These same facts could also support a wrongful terminationclaim. For example, in Davis v. Manchester Health Ctr., Inc.,88 Conn.App. 60, 64, 867 A.2d 876 (2005), a nurse informedher supervisor that a physically-demanding assignment thatshe had been given presented a risk to her health and thatof her unborn child and requested another less physicallydemanding assignment. The supervisor refused to reassignher, even though such an assignment was available, andthe plaintiff left her shift rather than accept the demandingassignment and was later terminated. Id. Upholding a juryverdict for the plaintiff, the court held that 46a60(a)(7)(A) could be violated when an employee was terminatedfor choosing to leave her shift rather than to remain inan assignment she reasonably believed posed a risk to herhealth and that of her unborn child and that the juryreasonably could have found, therefore, that a direct nexusexisted between the plaintiff's pregnancy and the defendant'stermination of the plaintiff's employment. Id. Here, too a jurycould reasonably determine that Plaintiff's termination wasthe result of Defendant's failure to provide her with pregnancyleave and thus Defendant is not entitled to summary judgmenton the wrongful termination claim.

*7 [6] Defendant contends that the failure to transfer claimfails because there is no evidence suggesting that either Stop& Shop or Plaintiff believed that her continued employmentin her existing positionsfloral clerk and cashiermightcause injury to Plaintiff or her fetus. (Def.'s Mem. Supp. at15.) However, this argument is contradicted by the premiseof Defendant's defense to this case, which is that due to the15pound lifting restriction Plaintiff was not qualified forthe floral clerk or cashier positions at that time. (Id. at 9.)Clearly, if Plaintiff's job required her to exceed a medically-imposed lifting restriction, then continuing in such a positioncould cause injury to the employee or fetus. Conn. Gen.Stat. 46a60(a)(7)(E). Second, Defendant contends that, at thetime of her termination, there was not a suitable positionto which Plaintiff could have been transferred because shedid not believe that she could have continued working.However, at oral argument, Plaintiff clarified that she doesnot claim a failure to transfer on the date of her terminationwhen she instead sought pregnancy leave, but rather claimsa failure to transfer starting on June 5, 2012, when theweight restriction was imposed. Plaintiff acknowledges thatshe never specifically requested a transfer to another position,but she contends that after she advised Ms. Nelson of herlifting restriction, Ms. Nelson nevertheless demanded on analmost daily basis that Plaintiff perform tasks requiring her toexceed this lifting restriction. (Gaither Dep. at 27.) Therefore,a jury could reasonably conclude that by keeping Plaintiffin an assignment with a written job description that requiredher to lift in excess of her medical restriction and demandingthat Plaintiff in fact exceed her lifting restriction, she waseffectively denied a transfer. Thus, Defendant's Motion forSummary Judgment is denied as to the failure to transferclaim.

A. Summary Judgment as to Remedies[7] Finally, Defendant moves for summary judgment on

Plaintiff's claimed remedies. 8 Defendant contends that itsinvitation to Plaintiff to reapply for her position and herfailure to do so precludes an award of damages for back

or front pay. 9 (Def.'s Mem. Supp. at 1617.) However, asdiscussed above, Defendant's offer was not unconditional,and Comm'n on Human Rights & Opportunities v. Truelove& Maclean, Inc., 238 Conn. 337, 349, 680 A.2d 1261 (1996),cited by Defendant, was a failure to reinstate claim under 46a60(a)(7)(D), which is not asserted by Plaintiff here,and in any event held only that the award of back pay wasdiscretionary rather than mandatory, not that the failureto reapply precluded an award of back pay as a matter of

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law. 10 Likewise, as to front pay, the case cited by Defendantmakes clear that [a]n award of front pay is a form ofequitable relief, which is a matter for the trial judge's equitablediscretion, Shaw v. Greenwich Anesthesiology Assocs., P.C.,200 F.Supp.2d 110, 114 (D.Conn.2002) (citing Whittlesey v.Union Carbide Corp., 742 F.2d 724, 728 (2d Cir.1984)), andthus is not appropriately decided at this juncture.

*8 [8] [9] [10] Defendant also asserts as an affirmativedefense (see Def.'s Ans. & Aff. Defenses [Doc. # 14] at6) that Plaintiff failed to mitigate damages because she didnot apply to work at other supermarkets once she moved toSouth Carolina. Because failure to mitigate is an affirmativedefense, an employer seeking to avoid a lost wages awardbears the burden of demonstrating that a plaintiff has failedto satisfy the duty to mitigate. Broadnax v. City of NewHaven, 415 F.3d 265, 268 (2d Cir.2005). While a dischargedemployee must use reasonable diligence in finding othersuitable employment, it need not be comparable to theirprevious positions. Greenway v. Buffalo Hilton Hotel, 143F.3d 47, 53 (2d Cir.1998) (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC,458 U.S. 219, 23132 & n. 15, 102 S.Ct. 3057, 73 L.Ed.2d721 (1982)). It is undisputed that Plaintiff applied to tento [fifteen] jobs every week (Gaither Dep. at 190) and itis not material that Plaintiff did not apply to work at othersupermarkets. Therefore, Defendant has not established it isentitled to summary judgment on this affirmative defense.

[11] Finally, Defendant contends that Plaintiff should beprecluded from recovering for emotional distress because

she has contended in her Damages Analysis (Ex. 23 toDef.'s 56(a)1 at 2) that her emotional distress was basedon her homelessness in early 2003 and she cannot provethat Defendant proximately caused her homelessness beyond

terminating her and her income. 11 (Def.'s Mem. Supp. at 18.)However, proximate cause is ordinarily a question of factand it is for a jury to decide whether Plaintiff's termination

was a substantial factor in the resulting harm. 12 Coburnv. Lenox Homes, Inc., 186 Conn. 370, 38384, 441 A.2d 620(1982).

[12] Plaintiff has adduced sufficient evidence from whicha jury could do so. Asked at her deposition to describe theemotional distress you believe you suffered as a result ofyour issues with Stop & Shop that you described in yourcomplaint, Plaintiff responded that being terminated wasdevastating at the time, because I believed that they weregoing to give me a leave of absence and did not anticipatebeing terminated. (Gaither Dep. at 20809.) Thus, a jurycould reasonably conclude that Plaintiff's emotional distresswas proximately caused by Defendant terminating her whenshe justifiably believed that her employer would grant herleave as required by CFEPA.

III. ConclusionFor the reasons set forth above, Defendant's Motion [Doc. #30] for Summary Judgment is DENIED.

Footnotes

1 The one-count Complaint [Doc. # 1] alleges pregnancy discrimination in violation of Conn. Gen.Stat. 46a60(a)(7)(A), (B), and(E) and was originally filed in state court and removed to federal court by Defendant on the basis of diversity of citizenship.

2 Summary judgment is appropriate where, resolv[ing] all ambiguities and draw[ing] all permissible factual inferences in favor of theparty against whom summary judgment is sought, Holcomb v. Iona Coll., 521 F.3d 130, 137 (2d Cir.2008), the movant shows that

there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A

dispute regarding a material fact is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving

party. Williams v. Utica Coll. of Syracuse Univ., 453 F.3d 112, 116 (2d Cir.2006) (quotation marks omitted). The substantive law

governing the case will identify those facts that are material, and [o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit

under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Bouboulis v. Transp. Workers Union of Am., 442

F.3d 55, 59 (2d Cir.2006) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). When

considering a motion for summary judgment, the Court may consider depositions, documents, affidavits, interrogatory answers, and

other exhibits in the record. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).

3 Although Defendant maintains that Plaintiff was unable to perform the written job description of her job, which required lifting upto 60 pounds as a floral clerk and 25 pounds as a cashier (Exs. 910 to Def.'s 56(a)1), both Ms. Nelson and Mr. Haberern testified

that Ms. Gaither's restriction could be accommodated despite the written job descriptions for her positions and she worked in such

positions with this restriction in place for over a month and a half prior to her termination (Nelson Dep. at 5556; Haberern Dep. at 99).

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4 The Supreme Court recently heard oral argument in Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., where the Fourth Circuit had held that a UPSpolicy limiting light duty work to some employeesthose injured on-the-job, disabled within the meaning of the ADA, or who have

lost their DOT certificationbut not to pregnant workers did not violate the PDA. Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 707 F.3d 437,

445 (4th Cir.2013) cert. granted, U.S. , 134 S.Ct. 2898, 189 L.Ed.2d 853 (2014). Young's job description required her to be

able to lift up to 70 pounds, but she was medically restricted to 20 pounds while pregnant. Id. at 448. Young claimed that the fact that

UPS offered light-duty assignments to some employees, but not pregnant workers constitutes direct evidence of discrimination.

Id. at 446. The Fourth Circuit rejected this argument, holding that UPS has crafted a pregnancy-blind policy and that Young's

interpretation of the PDA would require employers to provide, for example, accommodation or light duty work to a pregnant worker

whose restrictions arise from her (off-the-job) pregnancy while denying any such accommodation to an employee unable to lift as

a result of an off-the-job injury or illness and would thus imbue the PDA with a preferential treatment mandate that Congress

neither intended nor enacted. Id. at 44648. The Supreme Court is faced with the question under Title VII of [w]hether, and in

what circumstances, an employer that provides work accommodations to nonpregnant employees with work limitations must provide

work accommodations to pregnant employees who are similar in their ability or inability to work ? but Young does not dispute

that [s]o far as the PDA is concerned, an employer is free to accommodate none of its workers, as long as pregnant employees are

treated equally. Young v. UPS, 121226, Pet.'r's Br. at i, 29, 2014 WL 4441528. Because, as discussed above, Plaintiff here does not

challenge the disparate treatment of pregnant and non-pregnant employees but rather challenges only the failure to provide specific

accommodations to her required by state law, the disposition of Young will not affect this case, but it is illustrative of the differing

scope of Title VII and CFEPA.

5 As Plaintiff was not granted pregnancy leave, she does not assert a claim for failure to reinstate under Conn. Gen.Stat. 46a60(a)(7)(D).

6 Although Mr. Haberern testified that he would not have made Ms. Gaither reapply for her position and would have definitely rehiredher if she called him once she was medically cleared to work and that he told Plaintiff as much (Haberern Dep., Ex. 8 to Def.'s 56(a)1

at 8081, 46), there is a dispute of fact on this point with Plaintiff claiming that Mr. Haberern explicitly stated that she would have

to reapply for her position and her rehiring was not guaranteed, which she said was kind of devastating at the time because she

believed that they were going to give me a leave of absence and did not expect him to fire me. (Gaither Dep. at 174, 20809).

7 Plaintiff, for her part, cited only two cases analyzing CFEPA's pregnancy leave provision, both of which she acknowledges arenot directly applicable here. (Pl's Opp'n at 8 n. 2.) In Comm'n of Human Rights & Opportunities v. Truelove & MacLean, Inc.,

No. 115306, 1995 WL 415808, at *8 (Conn.Super.Ct. June 28, 1995) aff'd sub nom. Comm'n on Human Rights & Opportunities

v. Truelove & Maclean, Inc., 238 Conn. 337, 680 A.2d 1261 (1996), the court affirmed a Commission on Human Rights and

Opportunities (CHRO) hearing officer determination that an employer violated CFEPA by failing to grant leave, but this finding

was not addressed on appeal which instead primarily concerned the remedies available for such violations. In Kenney v. Dep't of

Mental Health & Addiction Servs., HHDCV020813589S, 2012 WL 3641824, at *8 (Conn.Super.Ct. July 26, 2012), the court granted

summary judgment to an employer on a failure-to-grant leave claim under CFEPA and the FMLA because the plaintiff had been

offered FMLA leave but failed to complete the required documentation.

8 Some courts have limited the availability of summary judgment motions to foreclosure of specific claims, not remedies, Hamblinv. British Airways PLC, 717 F.Supp.2d 303, 306 (E.D.N.Y.2010), but a 2010 amendment to Rule 56 clarified that a party could move

for summary judgment on part of each claim or defense, Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a), which was intended to make clear ... that summary

judgment may be requested not only as to an entire case but also as to a claim, defense, or part of a claim or defense, Fed.R.Civ.P.

56 advisory committee note (2010), and even before the amendment, the Second Circuit has regularly reviewed grants of partial

summary judgment, eliminating elements of damages before trial, Hamblin, 717 F.Supp.2d at 308 (collecting cases); see also 1156

Moore's Federal PracticeCivil 56.122 (The freedom to use summary judgment procedure to address particular issues or elements

of a claim is an important feature of Rule 56, making it a much more useful case management device.).

9 At oral argument, Plaintiff stated that she is not pursuing damages for lost benefits, which she did not earn as a part-time employee.10 Notably the Truelove plaintiff sought reinstatement to her former position yet could not offer a satisfactory explanation for her not

reapplying. 238 Conn. at 341, 680 A.2d 1261. Here, Plaintiff does not seek reinstatement and has offered a justification for not

reapplying, explaining that she did not feel that she was welcome to return given that Mr. Haberern had fired her rather than providing

her with a leave of absence as she requested. (Pl.'s Resps. to Def.'s Interrogs., at 78; Gaither Dep. at 176, 18284.)

11 In her deposition, Plaintiff did testify that her termination caused her homeless, because even though she would not have been paidduring her maternity leave, she was told that her landlord said that if she was on leave rather than terminated, he could have worked

with her. (Gaither Dep. at 205.) Because this statement is inadmissible hearsay when offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted,

see Fed.R.Evid. 801(c), the Court does not rely on it in denying summary judgment.

12 Further, contrary to Defendant's assertion, the Damages Analysis does not refer to Plaintiff's homelessness as a cause of emotionaldistress but rather refers to it as one of three examples of [e]vidence of egregious' emotional distress, which also included having

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Gaither v Stop and Shop Supermarket Co LLC

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