Future Electric Utility Regulatory Incentives and ...
Transcript of Future Electric Utility Regulatory Incentives and ...
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Future Electric Utility Regulation Advisory
Group Meeting
March27,2014
RegulatoryIncentivesandDisincentivesforUtilityInvestmentsinGridModernization
LegislativeEnergyHorizonInstituteTrainingOctober12,2017Washington,DC
SteveKihm,CFA– Seventhwave
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Lisa Schwartz, Berkeley Lab, is the project manager andtechnical editor. U.S. Department of Energy provided funding.
https://emp.lbl.gov/publications/regulatory-incentives-and
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Seventhwave delivers trusted expertise for bold energy leadership. Weadvance powerful strategies for real energy impacts through engineering,education and research.
MISSIONTo inspire real and lasting change that advances economic andenvironmental sustainability.
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AnalyticalTriumvirate
• Beecher:Traditionalregulation,ifproperlyapplied,canprovideincentivesforgridmodernization
• Lehr:Traditionalregulation,includingitslitigiousprocesses,isnotconducivetomakingatransitiontoamoderngrid
• Kihm:Incentivesvarybasedoncircumstances—tounderstandwhetherincentivesordisincentivesexistweneedtounderstandshareholdervalue
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A Brief Summary ofCo-Author Perspectives
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Janice Beecher, PhD
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JanBeecher(institutionalperspective)
“Peoplecallforanewparadigm,[saying]thatthecurrentregulatorymodeldoesn’tfitwithmodernizationSoyouhearthatweneed‘incentiveregulation.’Butfrommyperspective,[regulation]isalwaysaboutincentives.Thedichotomybetweentraditionalandincentiveregulationisfalse.”
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JanBeecher(institutionalperspective)
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“Ataminimum,prudenceshouldbedefinedintermsofenforceablestandardsandgenerallyacceptedutilitypractices,bothofwhichcanbesubstantiallystrengthenedinlightoftechnologicaladvancesandopportunitiesaswellasdynamicsupplyanddemandconditions.”
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JanBeecher(institutionalperspective)
“Thegrantingofanexclusivefranchisetoamonopolybythestatehasstringsattached.”
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“Theregulatorycompactisnotsetinstone.Itisalivingandevolvingcharter.”
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JanBeecher(institutionalperspective)
“Motivatingutilitiestowardevolvingsocialendsshouldnotautomaticallybeviewedasoutsideofthescopeoftheparadigmorbeyondthemodelandthemeansalreadyavailabletoeconomicregulators.”
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JanBeecher(institutionalperspective)
“Meaningfulregulatoryreformdoesnotnecessarilyrequireparadigmaticchange.Withoutadoubt,whatmighthavebeenconsideredprudentevenadecadeagowouldnotbeconsideredprudenttoday,letaloneforautilityofthefuture.”
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JanBeecher(institutionalperspective)
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“Forgridmodernization,weneedanewprudenceratherthananewparadigm.”
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JanBeecher(institutionalperspective)
“Toneglectthepowerofeconomicregulationtolimit,channel,andmoldthebehaviorofregulatedfirmsistoneglecttheverypurposeof‘regulationinthepublicinterest’...Inthehandsofcapableregulators,andguidedbyclearrequirements,thetraditionalmodelactuallyprovidesverypowerfulperformanceincentives.”
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Ron Lehr, JD
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RonLehr(formerChair,ColoradoPUC)
“Newinformationfromapplicationsofnewcommunicationstechnologiesenablesconsumerstobecomeenergyproducersandtotakemoreresponsibilityfortheirenergyuse.Buttraditionalregulationdoesn’tincentutilitiestosupportincreasedconsumersovereignty.”
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RonLehr(formerChair,ColoradoPUC)
“Return-on-equityincentivesencourageutilitiestoinvestincapitalprojects.Theylackequivalentincentivesforoperationsandcustomerengagement– operatingexpensesratherthancapitalexpenses.Onlyprovidingincentivestoinvestcapitalstandsinthewayofinnovation.”
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RonLehr(formerChair,ColoradoPUC)
“Avarietyoffactorsstandinthewayofcreatingwelltargetedandwellalignedutilityincentives,includinglitigatedprocesses,poorcommunications,relationshipsthatdonotbuildtrust,andlackofconsensusaboutoutcomes.”
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“ Regulationcangetusthere,butitwillbealongroadifwejusttrytolitigateourwaythere.”
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RonLehr(formerChair,ColoradoPUC)
“Amongthesealternativesareregulatoryoptionsthatputrelativelylessregulatorytimeandeffortintoaddressingthequestion‘didwepaytherightamountforwhatwegot’andmoreregulatorytimeandeffortintoanticipatingthefuture,asking‘whatdowewant,andhowdowepayforthat’?”
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Steve Kihm, CFA
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Overview
• Canutilitiesraisecapitalforgridmodernization?Yes
• Doutilitymanagersseevalueforcurrentshareholdersingridmodernizationprojects?Maybe
• Shareholdervalue(stockprice)– risk,returnandscale
• Utilitymanagers,notthecapitalmarkets,decidewhetherinvestmentsshouldbemade
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This is the relevant question.
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Properframingoftheproblem
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CreditSuisseDistributingCashtoShareholders
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Cost of equity for S&P 500
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Long-termROEabovecostofequity
Xcel EnergyBeyond 2019, we assume a system wide normalized 10% average allowed ROE and 0.5% average annual long-term usage growth. We assume a 7.5% cost of equity in our discounted cash flow valuation. This is lower than the 9% rate of return we expect investors will demand of a diversified equity portfolio. A 2.25% long-term inflation outlook underpins our capital cost assumptions. Our cost of capital assumption is 5.9%.
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Long-termROEabovecostofequity
Xcel EnergyBeyond 2019, we assume a system wide normalized 10% average allowed ROE and 0.5% average annual long-term usage growth. We assume a 7.5% cost of equity in our discounted cash flow valuation. This is lower than the 9% rate of return we expect investors will demand of a diversified equity portfolio. A 2.25% long-term inflation outlook underpins our capital cost assumptions. Our cost of capital assumption is 5.9%.
r k
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Whomakesinvestmentdecisions?
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Capitalallocationisaseniormanagementteam’smostfundamentalresponsibility...Theobjectiveofcapitalallocationistobuildlong-termvaluepershare.
Mauboussin,M.,etal.2016.CapitalAllocation:Evidence,AnalyticalMethods,andAssessmentGuidance.CreditSuisse.
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EEIcommentingonlowerFERCROEsfortransmission
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AsEEIexplains,“theseprojectsalsocarrythemostupfrontdevelopmenttime,longerconstructionschedules,andoverallrisk.”However,withoutasufficientROE,electricutilities arelikelytochoose short-term,morelocalprojects,insteadofriskier,morestrategicoptions.(Emphasisadded.)
Kuzika,L.S.2013,June17.EEIUrgesFERCtoReformitsROEMethodology.Energy&EnvironmentalLawAdviser.
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EEIcommentingonlowerFERCROEsfortransmission
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AsEEIexplains,“theseprojectsalsocarrythemostupfrontdevelopmenttime,longerconstructionschedules,andoverallrisk.”However,withoutasufficientROE,electricutilities arelikelytochoose short-term,morelocalprojects,insteadofriskier,morestrategicoptions.(Emphasisadded.)
Kuzika,L.S.2013,June17.EEIUrgesFERCtoReformitsROEMethodology.Energy&EnvironmentalLawAdviser.
This is not saying utilities couldn’t raise capital.It’s saying they won’t want to invest in transmission.
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Returnonequity>costofequity
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r k
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Whenrislessthank
actual dataresults when
r < k
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Profitableinvestment,butbelowtheminimumacceptablelevel
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Kihm, Barrett, & Bell, 2014, ACEEE Summer Study
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Thevalueproposition
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Thevalueproposition
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How does the policy affect the utility’s systematic risk?
How does the policy affect the expected return on equity?
What are the scale differences betweenthe utility’s resource
options?
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Long-termROEabovecostofequity
Xcel EnergyBeyond 2019, we assume a system wide normalized 10% average allowed ROE and 0.5% average annual long-term usage growth. We assume a 7.5% cost of equity in our discounted cash flow valuation. This is lower than the 9% rate of return we expect investors will demand of a diversified equity portfolio. A 2.25% long-term inflation outlook underpins our capital cost assumptions. Our cost of capital assumption is 5.9%.
r k
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Togetthefullpriceimpactyouwouldusesuchamodel
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36
If both cars could be purchased for $15,000, which model would attractmore buyers?
BMW Series 7
Honda Civic
EnergyAnalysisandEnvironmentalImpactsDivision
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Honda Civic
BMW Series 7
37
Now which model would attractmore buyers?
$22,000
$97,000
EnergyAnalysisandEnvironmentalImpactsDivision
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TheValueLineInvestmentSurvey
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2016 2017 2019-21
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TheValueLineInvestmentSurvey
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2016 2017 2019-21
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Highreturnsonequitydon’tattractmorecapital
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Highreturnsonequitydon’tattractmorecapital
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Newinvestorsexpecttoearnaboutthesamereturnonallutilitystocks
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Highreturnscreatevalueforpresent investors
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For every dollar investedAlliant creates more valuefor present shareholders
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Butdonotbenefitnewshareholders(pricing)
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Stocks are priced so thatthose providing new capitalto either company expect toearn about the same return.
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Incentiveexample
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Can we provide an incentive to invest in the two-way flow project?
Here the project with the larger scalewill create more value per-share for investors.
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Returnonequitycansometimesdrivetheresult
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Now the project with the higher returnwill create more value per-share for investors.
Yes, if we set thereturn high enough.
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Butnotalways
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10.5% $14,000,000
Now the project with the lower returnwill create more value per-share for investors
(scale again dominates).
But not just any higher return will do the trick.
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Don’tconfusetheshareholdergroups
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10.5% $14,000,000
New shareholdersprovide all of this
capital
Present shareholderscapture the valuegain as a windfall
New shareholdersearn the cost of equity based on
what they paid for the stock
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Thecurrentstockpriceimpoundsfuturevalue
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Notethatanopportunitytoinvestinaprojectofferingmorethanthecostofcapitalgeneratesanimmediatecapitalgainforinvestors.Thisisawindfallgain,sinceitisrealizedexante.Myers,S.1972.TheApplicationofFinanceTheorytoPublicUtilityRateCases.TheBellJournalofEconomicsandManagementScience.
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Incentivesforgridmodernization?
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It’s all about the detailsThere are no general answers
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Dothesepoliciescreateincentives?
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• Differentratesofreturnandcostsofcapitalfordifferentutilityassets(itdependsonr,k,andI)
• De-riskingcertainresourcetypes(itdependsonr,k,andI)
• Providingratebasetreatmentforcertainexpenseitems(itdependsonr,k,andI)
• Formularates(itdependsonr,k,andI)• Pricecaps(itdependsonr,k,andI)• Earningssharingmechanisms(itdependsonr,k,andI)
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Financialanalysis
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Beware of statements such as
“Utilities have an incentive to...” or “Utilities have a disincentive to...”
Ask: Which utility?Ask: What’s the action in question?
Incentives/disincentives depend on circumstances
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Why Many CorporateManagers Struggle With the Shareholder Value Concept
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EnergyAnalysisandEnvironmentalImpactsDivision 54
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CreditSuisseCapitalAllocation
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Capital allocation is a senior management team’s most fundamental responsibility. The problem is that many CEOs don’t know how to allocate capital effectively. The objective of capital allocation is to build long-term value per share.
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“I happen to have atalent for allocatingcapital.”Warren Buffett
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BuffettonwhyCEOsoftendon’tmaximizeshareholdervalue
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This point can be important because the heads of many companies are not skilled in capital allocation. Their inadequacy is not surprising. Most bosses rise to the top because they have excelled in an area such as marketing, production, engineering, administration or, sometimes, institutional politics.
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BuffettonwhyCEOsoftendon’tmaximizeshareholdervalue
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Once they become CEOs, they face new responsibilities. They now must make capital allocation decisions, a critical job that they may have never tackled and that is not easily mastered. To stretch the point, it’s as if the final step for a highly-talented musician was not to perform at Carnegie Hall but, instead, to be named Chairman of the Federal Reserve.
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CEOswhounderstandshareholdervaluearetheexception
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Thorndike spent eight years working on the book and interviewed all the living CEOs he studied. The CEOs he ended up profiling were Tom Murphy of Capital Cities, Henry Singleton of Teledyne, Bill Anders of General Dynamics, John Malone of TCI, Katharine Graham of The Washington Post Co., Bill Stiritz of Ralston Purina, Dick Smith of General Cinema, and Warren Buffett of Berkshire Hathaway.
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CEOswhounderstandshareholdervaluearetheexception
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Managers don’t understand the counterintuitive concept of value maximization
MauboussinBuffettThorndicke
Managers do understand the concept, but they prefer to act in their own interest (agency theory)
Jensen-Meckling
Managers should not attempt to maximize shareholder value, but should consider all stakeholders (legal argument)
Stout
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AgencyTheory
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Agency theory: Agents (managers) will act in their own interests,which sometimes conflict with those of shareholders (principals).
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LegalAnalysis
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The notion that corporate law requiresdirectors, executives, and employeesto maximize shareholder value simplyisn’t true...The idea is a fable.
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LegalAnalysis
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This does not suggest that shareholder value is not important—it’s just not theonly thing that’s important.
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Implications
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Incentivesforotherutilitytypes
• Municipally-ownedutilities
• Cooperativeutilities
• Bcorporations
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Possibleincentivesfornon-profitutilities
• Noshareholders,sothefocusmustshifttomanagers
• Incentivecompensationisasdesirableinthenonprofitsectorasinthefor-profitworld,but,unlikethelatter,whichbasesincentivepaymentsonorganizationalprofitability,nonprofitsneedtostructuretheirsystemsonotherperformancemeasures.(FrankA.Monti,CPA)
• Whatisessentialisthatthenonprofitclearlyspecify—inadvanceofimplementingtheplan—theperformancemeasuresagainstwhichindividualperformancewillbemeasured. (FrankA.Monti,CPA)
• Seehttp://www.massnonprofit.org/expert.php?artid=2869&catid=18
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Questions?
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Steve KihmPrincipal and Chief [email protected]
For information on Berkeley Lab’s Future ElectricUtility Regulation series please contact:
Lisa SchwartzDeputy Group Leader/Energy Efficiency Team LeaderElectricity Markets and Policy GroupLawrence Berkeley National [email protected] (office)510-926-1091 (cell)