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Forests, food, and fuel in the tropics: the uneven social and ecological consequences of

the emerging political economy of biofuels

Peter Dauvergne and Kate J. Neville

Version Post-Print/Accepted Manuscript

Citation (published version)

Dauvergne, P., & Neville, K.J. 2010. Forests, food, and fuel in the tropics: the uneven social and ecological consequences of the emerging political economy of biofuels. Journal of Peasant Studies, 37(4): 631-660

Publisher’s Statement This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Peasant Studies on September 23, 2010, available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/ 10.1080/03066150.2010.512451.

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Weextendthankstothreeanonymousreviewersfortheirextensiveandinsightfulcomments,aswellastoJunBorras,IanScoones,PhilMcMichael,JohnMcCarthy,andtheparticipantsoftheJPSworkshopon‘Biofuels,LandandAgrarianChange’(hostedbytheInternationalDevelopmentStudiesProgramatSaintMary’sUniversity,16-17October2009)forcommentsonanearlierdraft.WearegratefulforfundingsupportfromtheSocialSciencesandHumanitiesResearchCouncilofCanada.

Forests,food,andfuelinthetropics:theunevensocialandecologicalconsequencesoftheemergingpoliticaleconomyofbiofuelsPeterDauvergneandKateJ.Neville

The global political economyof biofuels emerging since 2007 appears set to intensifyinequalitiesamongthecountriesandruralpeoplesoftheglobalSouth.Lookingthrougha globalpolitical economy lens, this article analyses the consequencesofproliferatingbiofuel alliances among multinational corporations, governments, and domesticproducers.Sincemanymajorbiofuelfeedstocks–suchassugar,oilpalm,andsoy–arealready entrenched in industrial agricultural and forestry production systems, theauthors extrapolate from patterns of production for these crops to bolster theirargument that state capacities, the timing of market entry, existing institutions, andhistorical state-society land tenure relations will particularly affect the potentialconsequencesoffurtherbiofueldevelopment.Althoughtheimpactsofbiofuelsvarybyregion and feedstock, and although some agrarian communities in some countries ofthe global South are poised to benefit, the analysis suggests that already-vulnerablepeople and communities will bear a disproportionate share of the costs of biofueldevelopment, particularly for biofuels from crops already embedded in industrialproduction systems. A core reason, this article argues, is that the emerging biofuelalliances are reinforcing processes and structures that increase pressures on theecological integrity of tropical forests and further wrest control of resources fromsubsistencefarmers,indigenouspeoples,andpeoplewithinsecurelandrights.Eventhedevelopment of so-called ‘sustainable’ biofuels looks set to displace livelihoods andreinforceandextendpreviouswavesofhardshipforsuchmarginalisedpeoples.Keywords: biofuel alliances, global political economy, institutions, state-societyrelations,sustainability

Theglobalpoliticaleconomyofbiofuelshasbeenshiftingdirectionsince2007,asinvestments

inalternativeenergycontinuetogrow,aschainsofproductionandconsumptioncrisscrossand

deepeninnewregions,andasgovernmentsandcorporationsreassesseconomicprospectsand

politicalobstacles.Precedingthe2007foodcrisis,manyanalystssawbiofuelsasapathway

towardmoresustainabledevelopment,withthepotentialtosupportsmall-scalefarmers,

developruraleconomies,andreducegreenhousegases.Thiscautiousoptimismdampened

afterbiofuelswerelinkedtohigherfoodpricesanddeforestation,andasscientificstudiesput

intodoubttheircarbonneutralstatus,especiallythosederivedfromfoodcrops.Inresponse,

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biofuelinvestorsandproducerslaunchednewalliancestoadvancetheindustry.Theeffectsof

thesenewpartnershipsandinterestsextendbeyondtheirimpactsonfoodpricesandsecurity.

Internationally,theemergingeconomicsofthebiofuelindustryarealteringrelationsamong

statesandbetweenstatesandindustry,especiallywithmultinationalcorporations(MNCs).1

Domestically,thesealliancesareaffectinglandtenureandlivelihoodsofdiverseruralgroupsin

waysthatmimicdestructivepatternsalreadycommoninindustrialforestryandagriculture.2

Thispaperexploreshowthisemergingpoliticaleconomyofbiofuelsisshaping

ecologicalchangeinruralcommunitiesintropicalforestregions,throughananalysisof

economicandpoliticalalliancesattheinternationalanddomesticlevels.Wearguethatthe

consequencesofemergingalliancesamongMNCs,governments,anddomesticcorporations

dependinlargepartontheinstitutionalstructuresofthestate,thetimingofentryintothe

biofuelmarket,andonhistoricalstate-societyrelations.Inmanycases,biofueldevelopment

lookssettofurtherwrestcontroloftheland–andproductsoftheland–fromsubsistence

farmers,indigenouspeoples,forest-dependentcommunities,3andpeoplewithinsecureland

rights.4Inlightofpastexperienceswhenintroducingnewtechnologiesandcommercialising

agricultureandforestry,weanticipatethateventhepromotionofso-called‘sustainable’

biofuelsbyemergingeconomiesoftheSouth(primarilylarge-scaleandcorporate-influenced

biofueldevelopment)willreinforceandextendpreviouswavesoflivelihooddisplacement.In

particular,wedrawonevidenceoftheeffectsonagrariancommunitiesoftheproductionof

cropslikesoy,sugarcane,andoilpalm(majorfoodcropsaswellasbiofuelfeedstocks),from

1 For a more detailed analysis of these changes, see Dauvergne and Neville (2009). 2 We use the term ‘livelihoods’ to refer to the activities of subsistence and income generation for individuals and households. See Scoones (2009) for a full discussion of the meaning and implications of livelihood perspectives in the development literature. 3 We use the term ‘forest-dependent’ to indicate communities that rely on forest products and livelihood activities, such as non-timber forest products (NTFPs) including cultivated and gathered seasonal foods and medicines. These communities may be agrarian, but rely to some extent on the forests to complement and buffer against fluctuations in other income-producing and subsistence activities (see Belcher and Schreckenberg 2007 on the effects of commercialisation of NTFPs on communities and especially poor households). In agrarian communities, landless families may have the highest dependence on forests. Santra et al. (2008) document the forest-dependence of farmers in south-west Bengal, noting that, on average, landless families visit the forest 6 days a week, while land-owning families’ visits are closer to 4 days a week; Vedeld et al. (2007) document the equalizing effects on local income distribution of ‘environmental incomes’ from forest products like fuelwood and fodder. 4 Insecure land tenure might be the result of a lack of formal title, but might also be the product of a government’s disregard for formal land rights (see, for example, Broegaard 2005 on perceived insecurity despite formal land tenure in Nicaragua).

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whichweextrapolatetoreflectonwhatweseeasthelikelyunevensocialandecological

trajectoriesoffurtherbiofueldevelopment.

Toguideouranalysis,wetrackfourrelatedquestions.First,whataretheimplicationsof

emergingbiofuelalliancesforstatecontrolover,andbenefitsfrom,industrialdevelopment?

Second,incaseswherestateshaverelativelylittleinfluencewithinthesealliances,towhat

extentcanvoluntarycorporatepoliciestopromotesocialandenvironmentalresponsibility

offsetthelackofregulatoryoversight?Third,whichruralgroupsseemmostlikelytobenefitor

loseoutfromresultingeconomicopportunitiesandoutcomes?Andfourth,whatarethedirect

andindirectconsequencesforforests(andnearbyecosystemsandland)ofanemerging

politicaleconomyofhigherbiofuelproduction?

Ouranalysisproceedsinthreeparts.First,wereviewthechangingglobalarchitectureof

thebiofuelsector.WeoutlinetheincreaseinSouth-Southtradeandinvestment,the

emergenceofpowerfulstatesintheglobalSouth,andthesurgein–andbacklashagainst–

biofueldevelopmentoverthelastdecade.Wealsopresentadditionalillustrativeevidenceof

linksbetweenMNCsanddevelopingcountriestoreinforceourclaimsthatemergingSouthern

statesareactinginwaysthatechothepatternsofresourceexploitationbyNorthernones.

Second,weconsiderwhattheemergingbiofuelindustryimpliesforstates,particularly

theircapacitytoderivenationaleconomicbenefits.Examiningtherecentsurgeinpartnerships

linkingMNCswithlocalfirmsandgovernments,wedrawontheoreticalworkonstatestrength

(Migdal1988,Dauvergne1998a),statesizeanddevelopmentlevels(Krasner1976),timingof

industrialdevelopment(Evans1995),andtheinstitutionalbasisfortechnologyuptakeand

benefits(PelusoandVandergeest2001,AcemogluandRobinson2009),tosuggestlikely

trajectoriesofthesebiofuelalliancesacrosscountries.Basedonpastpatternsofdevelopment

andmultinationalinvestmentinagricultureandforestry,wearguethat,asthebiofuelsector

grows,itwillbecomemoredifficultforstatesandlocalcommunitiestoderivediffusepublic

(insteadofconcentratedprivate)benefitsfromproduction.Previousanalysessuggestthatthis

challengewillbemostpronouncedforstateswithincentivestoactpredatory,ratherthan

developmental(Migdal1988,Evans1995,Bates2008,PetrasandVeltmeyer2007).Further,in

theabsenceofstateregulatoryoversightandcontrol,voluntarycorporateinitiativesseem

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unlikelytoprovidesubstantialenvironmentalandsocialprotection,giventhelimitedsuccessto

dateofcorporatesocialresponsibility(CSR)initiativesinrelatedsectorssuchasagrifoods(as

documentedbyUttingandClapp2008,ClappandFuchs2009).

Third,weevaluatethesubnationaldistributionalconsequencesofbiofueldevelopment.

Groupswithinastate,wefind,maystilltakeonasignificantburdeneveninstatesthatbenefit

intermsofstandardnationaleconomicindicators.Weconsiderthehumanandecologicalcosts

ofbiofuelsthroughalensthatcombinesTaylorandGarcia-Barrios’(1995)frameworkfora

socialanalysisofecologicalchange–modeledafterParayilandTong’s(1998)applicationofthis

framework–withananalysisofhistoricalandcontinuedexclusionbystatesofmarginalrural

groups.Webringwithworkonpeasantdifferentiation(e.g.,Byres2009)tounderstandthe

materialandsocialfactorsthatallowsomegroups,butnotothers,totakeadvantageofthe

opportunitiesfromemergingbiofuelmarkets.Aswithstates’differentialabilitiestocapitalise

onbiofuelsbasedontheirexistinginstitutions,thealready-establishedpoliticalandeconomic

resourcesofgroupswithinthestateprovideunequalopportunitiesforgroupstobenefitfrom

thesenewcommoditymarkets.

Wefocusinparticularontheframingofthedebateoversustainablebiofuels,arguing

thatitisbothpowerfulandmisleading.Therhetoricofsustainabilitycreatesadiscoursethatis

difficultforcriticsofbiofuelstochallenge,asitappealstowidely-acceptednormsandgoalsof

theinternationalcommunity.However,thewaysinwhichproductionistakenuptendsto

excludetheperspectives,interests,andlivelihoodsofmarginalisedcommunities,especially

thosewithinsecurelandtenure.Althoughtheycanbeproducedatasmall,localscale,crops

suchassugar,oilpalm,andsoylendthemselvesreadilytolarge-scaleplantationsandexport-

orientedproduction.Sincethesebiofuelfeedstockshavealreadybeendevelopedinthiswayin

theagriculturalsector,withsubstantialMNCcontrol,thediversionofcropsfromfoodtofuel

productionhaslittlechanceofchangingtheseindustrial-scalesystems(andtheevidenceto

dateindicatesthattheaddedincentivesforproductionareonlyintensifyingthesetrends).

Althoughbiofuelsdifferintheirecology,productiondemands,andmarket

opportunities,wenonethelessseeparallelprocessesofencroachmentofagriculturallandsand

plantationsintonaturalforestsbyproducersofmultiplefeedstocks,includingsugarcane,oil

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palm,soy,andJatrophacurcas.5Consequently,weextendthegeneralbiofuel‘trilemma’of

foodsecurity,energy,andbiodiversity(astermedbyTilmanetal.2009)toincludeconcerns

aboutforest-dependentcommunities;wealsocontestsomerecentliteraturethatis

encouragingmoreopentradeasastrategytoenhancethepotentialforbiofuelstobring

equitabledevelopmenttopoorregions.

Inourconclusions,wereflectonthepotentialofbiofuelsasapathwaytomore

ecologicallyandsociallysustainabledevelopment.Investmentinbiofuelsiscertainlyproviding

someeconomicopportunitiesinsomedevelopingcountrieswiththepotentialtocatalyse

furtherdevelopmentinsomeruralareas.Globally,biofuelsalsohavethepotentialtohelpin

thesearchforsolutionstoclimatechangeandenergysecurity.6Wecaution,however,thatthe

opportunitiesareuneven,withsomestatesabletobenefitfarmorethanothers.Moreover,in

countriesthatcancapitaliseonbiofuels,evensmall-scaleproductionneedstoconsidervery

carefullytheeffectsonvulnerableforestcommunitiesandpeoplewithinsecurelandrights,

andtheconsequentdisplacementoflivelihoodandsubsistencepressuresontosurrounding

naturalforests.

TheemergingSouth-Southpoliticaleconomyofbiofuels

Ourpreviousresearch(DauvergneandNeville2009)foundthatbiofuelinvestmentandtrade

amongdevelopingcountriesisrepeatingearlierbiofuelrelationsbetweenNorthernand

Southerncountries.IncreasinglypowerfulSoutherncountriesareprovidingincentivestotheir

lessdevelopedcounterpartstoproducebiofuels,withvaryingenvironmentalandeconomic

repercussions.ThisSouth-Southpoliticaleconomyofbiofuelsispartofalargerpolitical

5 There are significant differences in what McCarthy (2009, 19) terms ‘commodity-specific factors’ of different biofuel feedstocks, where ecological characteristics vary by crop type and have implications for the ways in, and scale at which, they are grown, harvested, and processed. Moreover, regional and local differences exist in the environmental and social conditions in which these feedstocks are produced. Nevertheless, a growing number of studies indicate that in spite of these differences – across biofuel types and production locations – there are similar and considerable environmental and human costs, as well as opportunities, from biofuel development (see, for example, Hunsberger in this volume, for Jatropha in Kenya; Vel in this volume, for Jatropha in Indonesia; Wilkinson and Herrera in this volume, for sugarcane and soy in Brazil; Pye in this volume, for oil palm in Indonesia; and Franco et al. in this volume, for sugarcane and Jatropha in Mozambique). 6 Note, however, that there is some doubt that biofuels can achieve greenhouse gas emission reductions (see, for instance, Righelato and Spracklen (2007), and Pimentel and Patzek (2005) for discussions of various feedstocks) and that biofuels are replacing, rather than supplementing, fossil fuels.

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economyoftheenvironment,inwhichmorepowerfuleconomiesaredeepeningrelationships

withMNCs.Thischangingglobaleconomicarchitecture,wefound,isaddingtoalready

unsustainableresourceexploitationandenvironmentaldegradationinmanydeveloping

countries.

Inthissection,webrieflysummarisetheseearlierfindings,explainingthebiofuel

industry,describingthesurgeofinterestinandrecentbacklashagainstbiofuels,andoutlining

theeconomicandpoliticalindicatorsofchangingSouth-Southbiofuelrelations.Thetrendsin

biofuelsarenew,andthustosomeextentstilluncertain.Wecandraw,however,onwell-

documentedpatternsofexploitationinrelatedindustries,suchassoyinLatinAmericaandoil

palminSoutheastAsia,toreflectonwhatoutcomeswemightexpectfromfurther

developmentofbiofuels.Ourargumentrestsinpartontheproliferationofpartnershipsamong

developingcountryinvestors,developingcountrybiofuelproducers,MNCsfromtheNorthand

South,anddomesticfirmsinthesedevelopingcountries,andsowepresentadditionalevidence

ofagrowingnumberofthesetransnationalpartnerships.Manyofthesealliancesareinearly

stages,andsoitremainstobeseeniftherewillbefollowthrough,buttheinitialcommitments

suggestnewsetsofinvestmentpartnerswithintheglobalfinancialsystem.

a.Thebiofuelcontext

Bioethanolandbiodieselarenon-petroleumbasedliquidfuels,derivedlargelyfromplantsand

plantoils.Dividedintocategoriesbasedonthesources,or‘feedstocks’,fromwhichtheyderive,

biofuelshavedifferingimpactsoncarbonemissions,foodcrops,andtheenvironment.‘First-

generation’fuelsareproducedfromfoodcrops,includingpalmoil,rapeseed,sugarcane,and

corn.Incontrast,thesourcesof‘second-generation’fuelsarenon-foodcrops,likeswitchgrass

andJatrophacurcas,ortheresidualinediblepartsoffoodcrops,suchasthehusksandstemsof

corn.‘Third-generation’biofuelsarederivedfromalgae.Whilefirst-generationbiofuelsarein

full-scaleproduction,second-andthird-generationonesarenotyetcommerciallyviableata

globalscale,althoughresearchanddevelopmentareprogressing.

Sourcesusedforbiofuelsvarybygeographiclocation,andlargelymapontopre-existing

agriculturalproductioninthoseregions:corn-basedbiofuelsaredominantintheUnitedStates

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(US),sugarcaneinBrazil,rapeseedintheEuropeanUnion(EU),andoilpalminIndonesiaand

Malaysia.Biofuelsdifferintheinputsneededforproduction,and,consequently,theirtotalnet

energyandcarbonbalances.Thesevaluesdependongeographicfactors,agriculturalmethods,

theextentandtypeoflanduseconversionundertaken,alongwiththepesticides,fertilisers,

andtechnologyinvolvedintheirproduction(McCarthy2009).Thepotentialofbiofuelsto

mitigateclimatechange,andcontributetopositiveoverallchangedependonthesefactors,as

wellasonthepoliciesinplacetodevelopthem.

b.Biofuelpromotion:thesurgeandbacklash

Interestinbiofuelsasanalternativeenergysourcesurgedinthelate1990s,especiallyintheUS

andEU.Althoughbiofuelresearchanddevelopmenthadbeenunderwaythroughoutthe

twentiethcentury,particularlyinBrazil,aconfluenceofconcernsinthe1990soverclimate

change,energysecurity,anddecliningoilreservessparkedgreaterinterestinthepotentialfor

biofuelstocontributetocleandevelopment.Brazilquicklyemergedasagloballeaderinthe

sector,asithadalreadyinvestedconsiderablyinbiofuels,particularlythroughtheBrazilian

AlcoholProgram(Proalcool)inthe1970s.7

Supportforbiofuelsrangedacrossindustrialandenvironmentalgroups,with

agriculturalinterestsandmanyclimatechangeactivistsexpressingsupport.IntheUnited

Kingdom,forexample,amongthosesharingenthusiasmforbiofuelsintheearly2000swere

farmers,EUofficials,nationalandmunicipalgovernmentrepresentatives,theRoyalSocietyfor

theProtectionofBirds,FriendsoftheEarth,andGreenpeace.Agricultural,oil,andautomotive

lobbiesandcorporations,includingcornproducersintheUS,rapeseedproducersinGermany,

andMNCslikeArcherDanielsMidland(ADM)wereintriguedbythepossibilityofnewandvast

markets(Accenture2007,KurdusiewiczandWandesforde-Smith2008).Manygovernments

werekeenonthepotentialofbiofuelstomeetclimatechangecommitmentsandreduce

dependenceonforeignoil.Andnumerousenvironmentalactivistssupportedtheideaof

developingbiofuelsasanalternativeenergysource.7 See Moreira et al. (2005, 28-30) for a history of Brazil’s early investment in biofuels, including the quadrupling of sugar production from 1975 to 1986. Low oil prices in the late 1980s and early 1990s combined with the removal of government subsidies slowed the biofuel sector, but it was able to capitalise on its early progress when global interest surged.

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Cautionaryvoiceswereheardatthetime,withgroupsincludingtheWWFandBirdlife

Internationalraisingconcernsthatdevelopingbiofuelswouldthreatenbiodiversityby

stimulatinglanduseconversion;somecalledforlifecycleanalysestoassessthetrade-offsof

water,soil,andenergyuse(e.g.,Pimentel2003,Punteretal.2004).Whilesupportwasbyno

meansuniversalorunqualified,therewasnonethelessconsiderableoptimismthatbiofuels

couldsimultaneouslypromoteecological,economic,andsocialgoals.Eventhosewith

reservationsabouttheunintendedeffectsofproduction–suchasthere-directionoffood

cropstofuel,ortheuseofgeneticallymodifiedcropstoincreaseyields–werereluctantto

coordinateresistanceagainsteffortstopromotealternativeenergy,particularlysincethe

promiseoflater-generationbiofuels,withseeminglyfewernegativesideeffects,couldnotbe

realisedwithoutsupportforthesectorinitsearlystages.

Thisoptimismandforwardmomentumcontinuedthrough2006.TheEUandtheUS

enactedpoliciestodevelopbiofuels,suchasthe2003BiofuelDirectiveintheEU.Bythen

analystswereanticipatingthatbiofuelimportsintotheEUwouldgrowasEuropeancountries

strovetomeettheirnewcommitments,sincetheavailabilityoflandlimitedtheprojected

abilityofmanymemberstatestobeself-sufficientinbiofuelsupply(Ringwald2006,5-6).

Thesedynamicschangedsuddenlyin2007,asspikesinfoodpricesledtoaglobalcrisis.

BiofuelsgarneredintensemediacoverageasthefoodcrisissparkedriotsinHaiti,Yemen,

Zimbabwe,andothercountries.Thesedemonstrations,called‘foodriots’bysomeand‘fuel

riots’byothers,putaspotlightontheconvergenceofmultiplepressuresonagriculturaland

financialsystems,withpurchasingpowerandfoodavailabilityaffectedbyfactors,including:the

risingpricesofstaplecrops,suchasrice,wheat,andcorn;growingpopulationsandincreased

incomesinemergingeconomies,suchasChinaandIndia;andmarketspeculationinfood

commoditiesfollowingthecollapseofhousingmarkets.

Duringthistimeuncertaintyalsobegantoincreasearoundtheenvironmentalbenefits

ofbiofuelsasmorescientistsraiseddoubtsaboutthenetcarbonfootprintofmanybiofuels.

ThejournalScience,forexample,publishedtwoinfluentialarticlesin2008indicatingthat

severalbiofuels–particularlythosederivedfromfoodcropsintheUS,Brazil,andSoutheast

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Asia–incurredevenhigherenvironmentalcoststhantraditionalfossilfuels,creatingacarbon

debtratherthanacarbonsaving(ScharlemannandLaurance2008,Fargioneetal.2008).

Internationalorganisationsandgovernmentsrespondedtothecritiquesinvariousways,

withsomeundertakingtheirownanalysesoftheimpactofbiofuelsonfoodprices.These

yieldedwidelydivergentfindings.Estimatesoftheinfluenceofbiofuelsonfoodpricesranged,

forexample,fromalowof2-3percentbytheUSadministration(AP2008)toahighof75

percentinaninternalWorldBankdraftreportleakedtotheGuardiannewspaper(Chakrabortty

2008).Inresponsetotheseconvergingdoubtsaboutbiofuels,theEUmoderateditsearly

enthusiasmforbiofuelsbypostponingdeadlinesfordecisionsonrenewableenergyguidelines.

Eventuallegislation,adoptedinApril2009,requiredthatemissionssavingsandsustainability

criteriamustbemetbeforebiofuelscouldbecountedtowardrenewableenergytargets.

WhilemorecautiousinterestinbiofuelswithinEuropeloweredmarketgrowth

projections,itdidnotstifleallgrowthinthesector.Newpartnershipsformedtosupportthe

industry,withmanyseeingagrowingconsumerbaseforenergyintheemergingeconomiesof

theSouthasacriticalsourceofdemand.

c.GrowingSouth-Southinvestments

Evidenceofchangingrelationshipsintheworldeconomycomesinseveralforms.First,wecan

identifymacro-scalepatternsofeconomicgrowthinasubsetofdevelopingcountries,revealing

adivergenceamongcountriesintheglobalSouthandaconvergencebetweensomeofthese

developingcountriesandthoseoftheNorth.Second,wecantrackaggregatedpatternsof

investmentwithindevelopingcountries,showingthatthesourcesofforeigndirectinvestment

(FDI)nowincludemoredevelopingcountries.Third,wecanexamineparticularinvestmentsto

chartwhichcompaniesandcountriesareinvolvedinresourcedevelopmentandpartnerships.

Consequently,inourpreviousstudy(DauvergneandNeville2009),welinkedthegrowing

economicpowerofcountrieslikeBrazilandIndiawithdataontheincreaseinSouth-South

trade,notingthatforbiofuelstheseemergingeconomieswerejoiningdevelopedcountriesas

coreinvestorsintheglobalSouth.Inconjunctionwithreportsofnewbusinessventuresfor

biofuelsinvolvingsomeofthesedevelopingcountryleaders,MNCs,andthegovernmentsand

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localfirmsofotherdevelopingcountries,weinferredthatsomeSoutherncountriesaretaking

onrolesinindustrialbiofueldevelopmentthathavebeentraditionallyheldbyNorthern

countries.

Drawingonphraseslike‘South-Southcooperation’and‘sustainabledevelopment’,

developingcountryleadershavecarvedoutanicheandattemptedtobuildacomparative

advantageinthesector,particularlyintermsofpromotinginvestmentin,andresource

extractionfrom,otherdevelopingcountries.However,aswelookedintothebiofuelalliances,it

becameclearthattheseleadershavenotsupplanteddevelopedcountryinvestorsthroughthis

framing,butratherhavejoinedandpartneredwiththem,withdemandfromdeveloping

countryconsumerssupplementingdemandfromtheNorth.

Tocapturemoregeneral,large-scalepatternsofeconomicgrowth,analystshave

highlightedanumberofemergingeconomies.KnowninvariousgroupingsasBRICand

BRICSAM,amongotheracronyms,theseincludeBrazil,Russia,India,China,SouthAfrica,the

ASEAN(AssociationofSoutheastAsianNations)states,andMexico;othercorecountriesin

internationalandregionalcontextsincludeTurkey,Egypt,Iran,andNigeria(Cooperetal.2007).

South-SouthFDIandtradeamongdevelopingcountrieshavesurgeddramatically,withtrade

increasingfromUS$577billionin1995tooverUS$2trillionin2006,withtradeamongSouthern

countriesoutpacingtradebetweendevelopinganddevelopedcountries(Sumner2008,

Supachai2008).Tradeagreementsamongdevelopingcountrieshavealsoproliferated;Brazil,

forexample,hasestablishednineseparateregionaltradeagreementswithinMercosur

(AntkiewiczandWhalley2006).8Brazil,takinganactiveroleinfurtheringtheserelationships,is

engagingincooperativeinitiativeswithotherdevelopingcountries(suchasIndiaandSouth

Africa)to,initspresident’swords,‘enhancepoliticaldialogueandeconomiclinkswiththeArab

World,Africa,andAsia’(LuladaSilva2007).

WhileSouth-Southtradehassubstantiallyincreased,thenewtradeandinvestment

relationshipsarenotlimitedtotieswithintheglobalSouth.Emergingeconomieshavetaken

strategicactiontoimprovetheirpoliticalandeconomicpositionsintheinternationalarena.

MNCshavealsoestablishedheadquartersintheBRICSAMcountries(Cooperetal.2007,681),8 Martin (2008) and Campbell (2008), for example, examine South-South linkages, particularly between Asian and African countries.

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and,inthebiofuelsector,developedanddevelopingcountrieshaveformedpoliticalalliances.

DespiteearlyjockeyingfordominanceoverbiofuelmarketsbetweenBrazilandtheUS–the

primaryproducersofbioethanol–anddespitecontinuingcompetition,atleastfornowthetwo

countriesseemtohaveputasidetheirdifferencestopromotebiofuels.

Initially,Brazildidclaimthatitssugarcane-basedbiofuelswereeconomicallyand

ecologicallysuperiortoAmericanmaize-basedfuels.Theabsenceofgovernmentsubsidiesfor

bioethanolproductioncontributedtotheclaimedsuperiorityofBrazilianbiofuels,as,without

USimporttaxes,in2006USbioethanolcost$1.03/gallonwhileBrazilianbioethanolcost

$0.81/gallon(Moreiraetal.2005,29,Goldemberg2007).BrazilianPresidentLuladaSilva’s

statementataJune2008meetingattheFoodandAgricultureOrganizationistypicalofthe

rhetoricatthattime:‘cornethanolcanobviouslyonlycompetewithsugarcaneethanolwhenit

isshotupwithsubsidiesandshieldedbehindtariffbarriers’andfurtherthat‘somepeople

compareethanoltocholesterol…thereisgoodethanolandbadethanol’(LuladaSilva2008).

Sincethen,however,thediscoursehasshifted.Acollaborativeinitiativebetweenthe

twocountrieswasannouncedinlate2008,withtheUSDepartmentofStatereportingthat

‘ninepartnernations[are]tobenefitfromUS-Brazilbiofuelscollaboration’(USDS2008).South-

SouthrelationshipshavenotreplacedNorth-Southones,butinsteadhaveledtoanincreasing

numberof‘North-South-South’linkages,in‘triangular’projects.Theselinkageshavetangled

governmentsoftheNorthandSouthwiththeprivatesector,inpartnershipsthatspanthe

globe.Growingevidencesuggeststhatbiofuelsarefollowingthesametrajectoryasother,

related,agriculturalandforestryindustries.

EvidenceofnewSouth-Southdynamicsisfoundintheincreasingnumberof

partnershipsandinvestmentsthatinvolvedevelopingcountrygovernmentsandcorporations

acrossmultiplecountries.MauritiancompanieshavefundedbiofuelinitiativesinMozambique

andabioethanolprojectinthePhilippineshasinvolvedanIndianengineeringcompany.Biofuel

developmentinAsiaandAfricafollowssimilarinternationalpaths,withtheIndiaStateTrading

CorporationconsideringlandpurchasesinIndonesiaandSuriname;SouthKoreanand

SingaporeancompaniesexpressinginterestinotherAsiancountries’feedstockproduction;a

NigerianbiofuelrefinerydevelopedbyaconsortiumcomprisingtheAfricanDevelopmentBank,

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astateuniversityofthePhilippines,andseveralNigerianbanks;andparticipantsin

Mozambique’sbiofueldevelopmentincludingPetrobras(Brazil),ENI(Italy),EnergemResources

(Canada),andtheCentralAfricanMiningandExplorationCompany.Morerecently,andalong

similarlines,theMalaysiancompanySimeDarbyplanstoinvestinoilpalmandrubber

plantationsinLiberia,andChinesefirmsareinvestinginoilpalmplantationsintheDemocratic

RepublicoftheCongo.

d.TheecologicalimplicationsoftheSouth-Southpoliticaleconomyofbiofuels

Manyofthenewalliancesrevealthegrowingeconomicandpoliticalstrengthofsome

developingcountries–suchasBrazilandIndonesia–ascorporationsandgovernmentsfrom

theseplacesextendtradeandfinancialrelationsinboththeNorthandSouth.However,despite

theemergenceofnewpowerfulplayers,thepatternsofenvironmentaldegradationandsocial

dislocationassociatedwithindustrialresourceproductionandextractiondonotappeartohave

changed,nordoestheinfluenceofMNCsintheseactivitiesappeartobediminishing.Beyond

theSouth-Southinvestmentsandtradeinbiofuels,MNCsareactiveinbothfinancingand

advocatingfortheindustry.Notably,agriculturalandchemicalcompaniesjoinedforcesto

promotebiofuelsintheUS,withArcherDanielsMidland,DuPont,Deere&Co.,andMonsanto

establishingtheAllianceforAbundantFoodandEnergyin2008.

Theenvironmentalimpactsoftheoilpalmindustryoffersomeindicationofthe

potentialharmbiofuelproductioncouldcause.Inpart,thisreflectsmoregeneraltrendsin

industrialproductionofagriculturalandforestrycrops;moreover,oilpalmiscurrentlyonlya

minorsourceofbiofuelfeedstock,butispoisedtobecomeamajorsourceinthenearfuture.

AlthoughcurrentlytheUSandBrazilproduceover70percentoftheworld’sbioethanol,and

theEUover60percentofbiodiesel(Forge2007,2,Davis2007),forbiodieselthisappearssetto

changeasIndonesiaandMalaysia,amongothercountries,increaseoilpalm-basedproduction

offuel.

Palmoilisusedextensivelyinthefoodsector,foreverythingfromdeep-fryingto

margarinetoprocessedcereals.Pesticidesandfertilisersusedinoilpalmplantationscan

damagetheenvironment,buttheecologicalimpactofdisplacingagriculturalactivitiesand

13

standingforestsoftenovershadowsthis(Donald2004).Inplacesliketheouterislandsof

Indonesia,whichhasahistoryofweakregulationoftheforestindustry(Dauvergne1997,2001,

Smithetal.2003,PinKohandWilcove2007),plantationcrops,likeoilpalmandrubber,are

typicallyplantedonlandthatcompaniesfirstclearedbyburningdowna‘degraded’forest.

Often,thisisanold-growthforestthatloggershavecombedoverseveraltimestotruckoutthe

mostvaluabletimber.Burningisacheapclearingmethodandaddsvaluablenutrientstothe

soil.Butitalsoreleasessignificantgreenhousegases,especiallyasfirescommonlyrageout-of-

controlandengulfvastareas,includingsettingonfireundergroundpeatmoss.Overthelast

fewdecades,forestfiresinIndonesiahavefrequentlyspreadasmotheringhazeoverMalaysia

andSingapore,contributingnotonlytoseverehealthproblemsforlocals,butalsoreleasing

millionsoftonnesofcarbonintotheatmosphere(see,forinstance,Dauvergne’s1998banalysis

offiresthatsweptacrossthecountry,destroyinghundredsofthousandsofhectaresofforest).

Whetheroilpalmisplanteddirectlyonnewlyclearedlandorsupplantsrubberproductionthat

firstreplacedtheforests,itcontributesto,oratleastfailstomediate,theenvironmental

damagecausedbysuchdeforestation.

Economicgrowthandnewchannelstoparticipateintheglobaleconomydoprovide

somebenefitsforpoorpeople.Investmentsfrommorepowerfuldevelopingcountriesintoless-

powerfulonesmayalsore-shapethedynamicsofglobaleconomicandpoliticalpowerinways

thatpromotegreaterequity.Nevertheless,newtechnologiesandindustriesruntheriskof

encouragingproducersandelitestoseizeshort-termprofitsoverlong-terminvestmentsin

environmentallyandsocially-sustainablepractices.Biofuelproductioninparticularseems

pronetodrivinguplandandfoodprices,whilecreatingincentivesforincreasedlanduse

conversionanddeforestation.Suchchangesseemtoaffectpoorercountries

disproportionately,shiftingthecostsofresource-basedindustriesontothemostvulnerable

countriesandcommunities.Addingtoalready-existingpressuresonthreatenedecosystems,

thisunderminesthepotentialofbiofuelstosupportbotheconomicandenvironmentalwell-

being.

Atthemacro-level,biofueldevelopmentdependsonthedynamicsoftheglobalpolitical

economy.Investments,marketspeculation,andconsumerdemandhavedriventhechangesin

14

conventionalenergyandinbiofuelprices,andthepatternsofpoliticalandcorporate

interactionsareinfluencingthefurtherexpansionofthesector.Withalready-highlevelsof

MNCinvolvementinproductionofcropslikesoybeansandplantationslikeoilpalm–andwith

soyandoilpalmrepresentingtwogrowingsourcesofbiofuelfeedstocks–weanticipatesimilar

futurepatternsinbiofuelsasforsoybeansandoilpalminthepast.Inthenextsection,we

examinetherelationshipsamongstatesandcorporateactors,toassesswhichstatesarelikely

tobenefitfromthecontinuedindustrialisationofbiofuelproduction.

Emergingalliancesofforests,food,andfuel

Thedynamicsandimpactsoftheglobalbiofuelindustryarestillemerging.Earlypatterns

nonethelessprovideuswithevidenceofthedirectioninwhichitiscurrentlymoving.The

politicaleconomyliteratureonthepatternsofinternationaltraderelationshipsforthe

developmentofnewtechnology,particularlyintheconstructionofcomparativeadvantagesin

production,alsoprovidessomeindicationofthetrajectoryofthebiofuelsectoratthestate

level.Moreover,althoughbiofuelsarearelativelynewtechnologyontheinternationalstage,

theprimaryandemerginglarge-scalefeedstocks–notablyrapeseed,sugar,soy,corn,andoil

palm–arealreadyinproductioninindustrialisedagriculturalandagroforestrysystems,and

thustheirdevelopmentpatternsoffervaluableinsightsintothelikelyeconomicdynamicsof

evenmoreproduction.9

a.Theintersectionofglobalandagrarianpoliticaleconomy

Agrarianpoliticaleconomyapproachesfocusonexplainingagrarianchangethroughthelenses

ofclassstruggles,peasantdifferentiation,scaleandintegrationofproduction,andeconomic

transitions(Borras2009).10Ouranalysisaims,inpart,toadddynamicinternationaland

institutionaldimensionstotheseclass-basedstructuralanalyses.Itsupplementsagrarian

politicaleconomyresearchbyfocusingontheimpactofstaterelationswithMNCsandother9 Similarly, in the specific case of Brazil, Novo et al. (in this volume) find that sugarcane-based biofuel production is usefully understood ‘in the context of the dynamics of other agricultural sectors’, including dairy farming and beef production. 10 For recent discussions of agrarian political economy, see, for example, Bernstein (2009) and Akram-Lodhi (2007). For other work adopting an agrarian political economy framework for analysis, see Martins (2002), Gropas (2006), and Saikia (2008).

15

states,andtheroleofcomparativeadvantagesinproduction,alongwithrelationsbetween

capitalholdersandlabourers.11

Theeconomicandsocialdifferentiationofthepeasantry–ofparticularconcernto

scholarsworkinginthetraditionofagrarianpoliticaleconomy(Borras2009)–interactswith,

andisaffectedby,theopportunitiesstatesseizeintheinternationalarena;theseopportunities

are,inturn,mediatedbystateinstitutionsandstate-societyrelations.Integratingclassrelations

andprocessesofunevenaccumulationintoglobalpoliticaleconomyanalyseshelpstoexplain

how‘theexploitationoftheruralpoor[is]intensifiedthroughlinkedcredit,labourand

commoditymarkets’(daCorta2008,2),particularlyastheenergysectorintersectswiththe

internationalfoodregimedescribedbyMcMichael(2009).

Usingcontextualisedanalysesofstate-societyandstate-corporaterelationships,and

comparingexisting,relatedsectors,wecandevelopusefulexplanationsofthepatterns

observedinthecaseofbiofuels.Thepoliticaldynamicswithinbiofuelalliances,discussedinthe

previoussection,illustratetheneedtoconsidera‘pluralityofauthoritydomains’(Aminand

Palan2001,568),inwhichstates,MNCs,localcommunities,andactivistnetworksareengaged

inmaterial,discursive,andsymbolicstrugglesoverpower.AsdescribedbyAminandPalan

(2001),thiscritical,or‘non-rationalist’,globalpoliticaleconomyassumesthatstatesystemsare

historicallysituatedandtransitory,state-marketrelationsareaformofpowerstruggle,and

institutionsreproduceandreinforcetruthandrationality.

Adoptingforthemomenttheframeworkofaunitarystate,weobservevariationinthe

timingandoutcomesofentryofstatesintothebiofuelmarket,withBrazil,India,andIndonesia

representingmajordevelopingcountryleadersinsugarcane,Jatropha,andoilpalm,

respectively.Theseleaderswerealreadyemergingpriortothesurgeininterestinbiofuels.A

seriesofinteractingcharacteristicsseemtocontributetotheirsuccess,particularlytheir

bureaucraticcapacityinagriculturalandforestryproduction,thetimingoftheiradoptionof

biofueltechnologyandinvestmentinbiofuelresearchanddevelopment,andthesizeoftheir

domesticmarkets.

11 This is, in many ways, similar to the approach taken in work on the concept of a ‘food regime’, which considers local food production and distinct food commodity crops in the context of the global political economy. See McMichael (2009) for a genealogy of the food regime analytic approach.

16

b.Statesize,developmentlevels,andtiming

Krasner(1976)arguesthatwhileallstatesbenefitintermsofnationalincomesfromopen

trade,smallstatestendtogainhigherrelativebenefitsfromsucharrangementsbecausea

higherproportionoftheireconomiesliewithintheinternationalsystem.Headdsthecaveat,

though,thattheyarethereforemorevulnerabletofluctuationsininternationalmarkets,and

havelesspoliticalpowergiventheybearhighercostsfromamarketclosure.InKrasner’s

account,smalldevelopedstatescanmorereadilybufferthesocialinstabilityofopentradethan

smalldevelopingones,becauseskilledlabourismoreeasilyshiftedintoothersectorsthan

unskilledlabour.Largestates,withproportionallylargerdomesticmarkets,havelessneedto

buffertheireconomiesfromtheinternationalmarket,althoughlarge,developedstatesdohave

theadvantageoverlarge,undevelopedonesofbeingabletoinvestinresearchand

developmenttooffsetthelossoftechnologicaladvantagesastradingpartnersgainnew

technologythroughmarketexchanges.

Krasner’sargumenttransfershelpfullytounderstandingbiofuelsandotheragro-

forestrycommoditymarkets,wheremoreinsulatedeconomies(withlargerdomesticconsumer

bases)buffertheuncertaintyofinternationalbiofuelmarkets.Whiletheinternationalmarket

maybehighlyvolatile,internalmarketsinlargecountriesmaybemorestable,particularlyfor

commoditieswithmultipleuses:sugarcane,soy,andpalmoil,forexample,arenotonlyofuse

forbiofuelproductionbutalsoinfoodproduction,and,currently,muchoftheconsumptionof

biofuelsisdomestic.Countrieswithsmalldomesticmarketsrelymoreoninternationaltrade,

andmayalsohavealessflexibleprocessinginfrastructuretoallowproducerstoshiftquickly

frombiofuelstofoodcommodities.Consequently,Brazil,India,andIndonesia,forinstance,

maybebetterpositionedthroughtheirexistinglevelsofdevelopmentandsizeoftheir

domesticmarketstotaketherisksofearlyentryintothebiofuelsector.

Moreover,internationally,BrazilandIndiaalreadyhaveprominentrolesindeveloping

andpromotingbiofuels.Morerecententrants,representingvariousdegreesofinvestmentand

interestinbiofuels,includeIndonesia,Malaysia,Cambodia,Mozambique,Tanzania,andthe

DemocraticRepublicofCongo(DRC).Fromatimingperspective,theirlateentryaffords

17

producersinthesestatesaccesstoalready-availablebiofueltechnologyandpotentialinvestors.

Asnoted,somemayhavetheabilitytoextendalready-establishedfoodcropproductioninto

thefuelsector,asMathewsandGoldsztein(2009)documentforsoyinArgentinawherethe

highlydevelopedexistingagriculturalsectorcanbeextendedandadaptedtonewprocessed

outputsandwheretheexistenceofmultiplemarketsforthecropsbuffersagainstprice

fluctuationsforanysinglecommodity.

However,althoughtheremaybelatecomeradvantagesforsomestates,theselate

joinersarenowparticipatinginasectordominatedbyMNCsandintegratedintomass-scale

productionsystems,where,forinstance,overUS$1billioninFDIwaspouredintosugarethanol

productioninfiveAfricanstatesbetween2007and2009(Richardsoninthisvolume),with

corporateinvolvementincludingBritish,Brazilian,andFrenchcompanies,and,equally,theUS-

basedCargillisaleadexporterofrawsugarandsoybeansfromBrazil(Holt-Giménezand

Shattuck2009).Thisoperationalenvironmentmaybedifficulttonavigateforcountriesthatdo

nothavealreadywellestablishedindustrial-scaleproductionoffeedstockcrops.Consequently,

fromastate-controlperspective,Brazil,India,andArgentinahavesignificantadvantagesover

theirless-developedSoutherncounterparts,withlargedomesticmarketsandeitherhaving

alreadyestablishedastrongstateroleindevelopingbiofuelspriortothesurgeintheindustry

orhavingalternateestablishedmarketsforthecrops.Additionally,thecapacitytoadoptnew

technologiesandpromotenewindustrialsectorsisinfluencednotonlybysize,timing,andthe

developmentlevelsofstates,butalsobythebureaucraticstructuresalreadyinplace.12

c.Graftingnewcommoditiestoexistingmarkets:statestrength,institutions,andtechnology

adoption

Internationalmarketopportunitiesinteractwithnationalinstitutions,statecapacities,and

state-societyrelationsinwaysthatproducedifferentoutcomesacrosscountries.Migdal(1988,

277)identifiestheinteractionbetweenstatesandsocietiesasakeydeterminantofstate

12 A caveat should be added, though, that at the state level, immediate economic gains may not translate into long-term benefits. Richardson (in this volume) cautions (in the context of biofuels from sugarcane in least developed countries in southern Africa) ‘in terms of countries trading their way out of poverty, then, while static gains may immediately result for the national GDP [gross domestic product], the more beneficial – and pro-poor – dynamic gains may ultimately be sacrificed’.

18

strengthandgovernancecapacity,expressingdoubtaboutthepossibilityofchangingthe

structuralrelationsbetweenstatesandsocieties(tocreateastrongstatewiththecapacityto

controlsocietalbehaviour,forinstance)through‘newpolicies,managementtechniques,

administrativetinkerings,[or]morecommittedbureaucrats’.Similarly,Putnam(1993)cautions

thatinstitutionalreformalonecannotproducepoliticalchange,asbureaucraticandgovernance

structuresinteractwithsocialandpoliticalrelationshipsalreadyinplace,producingdistinct

outcomes.Thissuggeststhatananalysisofonlystateinstitutions–oronlysocietalandwithin-

stateclassrelations–isunlikelytoexplainfullythedifferenttrajectoriesofbiofuel

developmentacrossstates.Theinteractionbetweeninstitutionsandsocietalorganisationand

relationsiscriticalforanunderstandingoftheabilityofstates,atthenationallevel,totake

advantageofeconomicopportunities,suchasthedevelopmentofbiofuels.

Statestrength,involvingthe‘abilityofstateleaderstousetheagenciesofthestateto

getpeopleinthesocietytodowhattheywantthemtodo’(Migdal1988,xiii),involvesthe

dominanceofcentralstatesoverlocalstrongmenincontroloftheappropriationandextraction

ofresources,alongwiththeabilityofthestatetopenetratesocietyandregulatesocial

relationships.Statesaremorelikelytobeabletotakeadvantageofinternationalmarket

opportunitieswhentheyhavethecapacitytoregulatedomesticproduction.Wemight,

therefore,anticipatethatstrongstates(withestablishedbureaucraticandcoercivecapacities)

willbeabletobenefitfrombiofuelsmorereadilythanweakorfragmentedstates.Dauvergne

(1998a)qualifiesMigdal’sanalyticframework,however,suggestingthatstatesmayhave

differentialstrengthandcontrolacrosssectors;forexample,statesmayhavecontrolover

someaspectsofgovernance,inspiteoflosingcontroltolocalstrongmenintheforestrysector.

Consequently,stateswithstrengthintheagriculturalorforestrysectors(dependingonthe

commoditycrop)shouldbeexpectedtobenefit(atthenationallevel,althoughnotconsistently

attheindividualfarmerlevel)fromexpandingglobalbiofueldemand,whilestateswithoutsuch

sectoralcontrolmaystruggletoaccruethesebenefits.

AswiththerelationshipsEvans(1995)describesintheinformationtechnologysector,

wheretheinfluenceoflocalfirmsinpartnershipswithMNCsdiminishesovertime,wesuggest

that–ratherthantheequitablepartnershipsenvisionedinoptimisticappraisalsofbiofuel

19

development–thesealliancesarelikelytoincreaseMNCcontroloverthebiofuelsector.In

Evans’model,thecapacityofstatestoregulateprivatesectorpartnershipsisinitiallystrong,

buttendstoweakenovertimeaslocalfirmstradeupprotectionbythestateinexchangefor

greateraccesstothetechnologyandcapitaloftheirmultinationalpartners.Whilemanyofthe

corporateandstatealliancesforbiofuelsarenew,wemightanticipatesimilarpatternsgiven

theextentoftransnationalcorporatecontrolovertheagrifoodandforestrysectors.This

corporatecontrolisdocumentedacrossagriculturalcrops,with,forexampleHolt-Giménezand

Shattuck(2009)reportingthatADMandCargillcontrol75%oftheglobalgraintrade,and

McMichael(2009)notingthesesamefirms’rolesintheproductionofcorninMexico.Theshift

frompublictoprivateownershipandcontrolhasalsobeenobservedinIndonesia,with

McCarthyandCramb(2009)documentingthatby2006,79%ofoilpalmproductionwasfrom

privateestates(comparedtopredominantlystate-ledproductioninthe1980s).Evansidentifies

embeddedautonomyasaguardagainstthelossofstatecontrol,wherestrongnetworks

amonggovernmentofficialsandprivatesectorindustrialists–combinedwithcorporate

coherenceandstateindependencefrompatrimonialrelations–leadtotheabilityofstatesto

maintainregulatorycontroloverthesedomestic-internationalpartnerships.This

embeddednessdoesnotguardagainstinequalitieswithinthestate,butdoesmakestate-level

benefitsfromindustrialactivitiesmorelikely.

Evansdescribesnetworksofstate-societyrelationsthatoperateasinstitutionsthat

shapethetrajectoryofeconomicdevelopment.Similarly,VandergeestandPeluso(2006a,

2006b)demonstratetheroleexistinginstitutionscanplayintheconstitutionofforestry

regimes,byexamininghowthecharacteristicsofprofessionalforestryempires‘werespecificto

particularcoloniesandtechnicallyuncolonisedregions’(2006b,359),basedontheinteraction

betweencolonialandlocalsystems.Peluso(1996)providesspecificexamplesofthese

interactions,outliningthedifferingsocialandeconomicrelationsofDayakcommunitieswith

durianversusrubbercultivation,wheretheformerhasanextensivesetofsocialexpectations

andtraditionsassociatedwithownershipandsharedpropertyrights,whilethelatterhasno

suchhistory.Peluso(1996,537)explainsthat‘notallspecieshaveequalsignificanceinthe

economyorsocialfabric’ofthesociety.Institutionsoflandownershiprightsinteractwiththe

20

kindsofproductionstrategiesneededfordifferentbiofuelfeedstocks,andshapeeconomic

opportunitiesandoutcomes.

Sugar,forinstance,iscostlytoestablish,andthusiseconomicallymostefficientatlarge

plantation-scales(Richardsoninthisvolume),whileJatrophacanmorereadilybeproduced

throughoutgrowerschemesasitislesscapitalintensive(Arndtetal.2009).Consequently,

biodieselfromJatrophaismorelikely(thoughnotcertain)tobemorepro-poorthanbioethanol

fromsugar,asitcanmoreeasilybeproducedbysmall-scalefarmers(Arndtetal.2009).13

AcemogluandRobinson(2009,679)arguethat‘institutionsareapowerfulandautonomous

force,notsimplyanadaptationtopreexisting(orautonomouslyevolved)technological

conditions.Theyshape–asmuchastheyareshapedby–thetechnologicaltrajectoryof

societies’.Socialinstitutionsofpropertyrights,forexample,helptoexplainpatternsof

technologydevelopment,wealthaccumulation,andgenerationally-repeatedeconomic

inequality;theyintersectwithpoliticalecologytocontributeto‘thestrikinglydivergent

trajectoriesofmodernnationsinanagewheretechnologyislargelyglobalandisavailablefor

thosewhowishtoadoptit’(AcemogluandRobinson2009,679).Giventheglobalopportunities

forbiofuelsfromanumberoffeedstockcrops,theseinstitutionalargumentsprovideinsights

intothedifferentbenefitsrealisedbydifferentdevelopingstates.

d.Benefitingfrombiofuels:decentralisation,embeddedautonomy,andpredation

Decentralisationandstatefragmentationhavesomesimilarities,althoughtheformerisnot

necessarilyasignalofthelatter.McCarthy(2007,97)arguesthat‘participationthrough

decentralisationhasbecomeapolicytooltomakethestatemoreresponsiveandmore

adaptabletoregionalandlocalneeds’.WhilethismightseemclosetoMigdal’s(1988)politics

ofaccommodation,wherebystatescedecontroltolocalstrongmenforfearofbeing

overthrownandlackingthecoerciveoradministrativecapacitytomaintaincontrol,McCarthy

suggeststhatdecentralisationcanactuallymakestates‘morelocallylegitimate’(2007,97).

13 However, the potential for small-scale production does not necessitate its production at small scales: Jatropha can also be produced as a large-scale monocrop (see Achten et al. 2010 for a discussion of the potential benefits and concerns of this feedstock), and may in some places be emerging as a crop for wealthy rather than poor farmers (see Ariza-Montobbio et al. in this volume for an analysis of Jatropha production in India).

21

Ratherthanreducingstateoversight,decentralisationcanmakecentralstate

governancemorestable.Thetrajectoryofincreasedlegitimacyratherthanusurpedcontrol

connectstoEvans’modelofembeddedautonomy,wheresituationswithsemi-autonomous

governmentswithclosenetworktiestocapital-holdingelitesaremorereadilyincorporated

intoalegitimacy-enhancingdecentralisation,wherestateswithoutsuchsocialties–orwith

socialtiesabsentprofessionalisedbureaucracies–aremorelikelytoendupfragmented.

Wherestate-societybargainsoflegitimacybasedondecentralisationorembedded

autonomyhavenotbeenstruck,oraredisruptedbypoliticalinstabilityorothershocks,states

mayfaceincentivestoactaspredatorsofthefinancialrewardsofcitizens’activities,and

citizensmightturntoself-protectionfromthestate(seeBates2008).Ratherthanstates

accumulatingnationalrewardsfromindustrialproductionandtrade,thebenefits–ifrealisedat

all–willbetakenbyprivateproducers.

Consequently,whilesomedevelopingcountrygovernments–suchasBrazil,India,and

Malaysia–mightbenefitsignificantlyfromtheeconomicopportunitiesfrombiofuels,late-entry

stateswithlesscoherent,autonomousbureaucraciesandwithweaktiesbetweenthestateand

domesticelitesaremorevulnerabletoMNCinterests,asthe‘newallianceoflocal

entrepreneursandtransnationalcorporationsmakeithardertosustaintheoldalliance

betweenlocalcapitalandthestate’(Evans1995,16).Statesconfrontingpoliticalinstabilitymay

likewiselosecontrolofstate-levelbenefits,astheyturntoshort-termpredationattheexpense

oflonger-termgains.Thislossofcontrolinthepartnershipsdistancesstatesfromtheprocess

ofgoverningtheseindustries,therebycompromisingtheirability,asastate,toreapthe

rewardsofbiofuel-driveneconomicgrowth.

Additionally,corporatecontrolofindustrialdevelopmentcanhavesignificantsocialand

environmentalimplications,asstateslosethepowertoupholdstandards.Sincesoyandoil

palmaretwomajororincipientbiofuelfeedstocksindevelopingcountries–notablyBrazil,

Indonesia,andMalaysia–wecanlooktoexistingcontrolofthesesectorstoprovideclues

aboutthelikelyoutcomesofcorporatecontroloverthebiofuelsector.

e.CorporatepowerintheagrifoodsectorandthebufferingcapacityofCSR

22

ClappandFuchs(2009),examiningthepoliticalorganisationofwhattheycallthe‘agrifood’

system,revealahighconcentrationofcorporatecontrolovertheprocessesofagriculturaland

foodproductionanddistribution.Globally,thetoptenfoodretailerscontrolnearlyone-quarter

ofthefoodretailmarket.Thetoptenseedcompaniescontrolhalfoftheagrifoodseedmarket.

Andthetoptenpestcompaniescontrol84percentoftheirmarket.

Holt-Giménez(2007)identifiesasimilarpatternofincreasingconcentrationofpowerin

thebiofuelindustry,documentingan800percentincreaseinventurecapitalinthissectorfrom

2004-2007,mostlybyMNCs.Inrelatedagriculturalandenergyindustries,henotesthatCargill

andArcherDanielsMidland(ADM)control65percentoftheglobalgraintrade,whileMonsanto

andSyngentacontrolone-quarterofthegenetechindustry.Holt-Giménez(2007)arguesthat

MNCsareconsolidatingcontrolwithinthevaluechainofproductionandthatalready

‘capitalizationandconcentrationofpowerwithinthebiofuelindustryisextreme’.Hefurther

maintainsthattheseactivitiesareforcingsmalllandholdersoutofmarketsandoffland,and

thatalthoughwecouldimaginethatlandholdersmightbeabletoconsolidateactivitiesrather

thanexitthemarket,theincreasingconcentrationofcorporatepowerrunscountertothe

maintenanceofsmall-scaleproduction.

Ascorporatecontrolincreasesandstateregulatorycapacitydecreasesinmany

industries,corporationshaverespondedtocivilsocietypressureforequitableandsustainable

practicesbydevelopingcorporatesocialresponsibilityinitiatives.Structuresareinplace,for

example,formulti-stakeholderprogramsforsustainabilityinsoyandpalmoil,includingthe

RoundtableonSustainablePalmOil(RSPO2009)andtheRoundTableonResponsibleSoy

(RTRS2009).14Theseinitiativesfocusontheenvironmentalandsocialimpactsoftheindustries.

However,accordingtoanalysescompiledbyUttingandClapp(2008),ingeneral,

private-sectorvoluntaryprogramshavenotprovenparticularlyeffectiveinregulatingactivities

acrosstransnationalcorporations.OversightandimplementationofCSRhavetendedtobe

weak,particularlyintheabsenceofsanctionsfornon-compliance(Ibid,27).Inaddition,onlya

smallpercentageofMNCs,affiliates,andsuppliershaveadoptedCSRprinciples(Ibid,11).

14 The Round Table on Responsible Soy Association involves multiple stakeholders at the international level; specific regional initiatives also exist, such as the efforts of Dutch corporations to promote sustainable soy through the Task Force Sustainable Soy (TFSS 2009).

23

AlthoughsomelegalmechanismshaveemergedtotrytoholdMNCsmoreaccountableinthe

areasofenvironmentalandsocialjustice,thesecorporationshavehighlyskilledlegaladvisors

anddefenseteams(Ibid,119).

GivenUttingandClapp’sanalysis,alongwitharticlesbyothercontributingauthorsin

theireditedbook,theextensionoftheroundtablemodeltobiofuels–with,forexample,the

initiationoftheRoundtableonSustainableBiofuelsin2007–anditscontinuanceinbiofuel

feedstocksectors(soyandoilpalm)wouldseemtoholdonlymodestpotentialtoadvance

moreequitableandecologicallysoundoutcomesforthebiofuelsector.Consumerpressuresfor

sustainablebiofuelsmightalsoinfluenceMNCstobehavemoresustainably.YetstrongMNC

controloftheindustrywithoutstrongstateoversightwouldnotsuggestthisoptimistic

outcomeislikely.Inlightofthealready-concentratedpowerofMNCsintheagrifoodsector,

andthelimitationsofvoluntarisminsustainabilityinitiatives,public-privateandlocal-

multinationalalliancesforbiofuelproductionseemfarmorelikelytofurtherentrench

corporatecontroloftheprocessesofproductionanddistribution,andleadtofurther

environmentaldegradationandsocialinequities.

Atastatelevel,then,emergingeconomieswithestablishedlinkstotheglobalmarket

andsupportiveeconomicinstitutionsmaybenefiteconomicallyfromgrowthinthebiofuel

sector;however,thesebenefitsdonotextendtoalldevelopingcountrieswithfeedstock

productionpotential,particularlythoseenteringthemarketlate,withweakbureaucratic

structures,andwithfewchannelsforsocietalintereststoinfluencegovernancedecisions.

Embeddedautonomy,inEvans’account,focusesonsocietalelites(althoughhenotesthe

broadersocialwelfarebenefitsofstateswithbroadersocialties);forsuccessfuldevelopmental

states,thisraisesthequestionofthedistributionalconsequencesofsuchstate-encouraged

industrialactivity.PetrasandVeltmeyer(2007,372)pointoutthatthe‘capitaliststate...

necessarilyoperatesintheinterestsofcapital’,ratherthantheinterestsofsocietyasawhole.

Inadditiontotherisinginequalitiesamongdevelopingstates,wemustalsoconsiderthe

dynamicswithintheemergingeconomiesthatappeartobewinnersontheglobalbiofuelstage.

Withinthestate–forestpeoples,landtenure,andplantation-basedbiofuelproduction

24

Inadditiontostate-levelvariationandinequalities,intrastatedynamicsarealsoshapingthe

socialandenvironmentalimpactsoftheemergingglobalbiofuelindustry.Discussionsof

sustainabilityforbiofuelstendtofocusontheconsequencesforsmall-scalelandholders,food

security,andnetcarbonemissionsacrossbiofuelfeedstocks.Evenwhenincludingbiodiversity

protectionandlanduseconversion,discussionsdonottendtohighlighttheroleoflandtenure,

non-agriculturalforestcommunities,ortheindirectdeforestationresultingfromdisplacing

communitiesontomarginallands.Asaresult,evenifgovernmentsandlocalcompaniescan

securemeaningfulrolesinallianceswithmultinationalcorporations,andevenifMNCstakeCSR

seriously,thepotentialimpactsofso-calledsustainablebiofuelproductionarestillconcerning.

Inlightofouranalysisofstatesize,timing,bureaucraticstrength,andinternational

marketaccessforagriculturalcommodities,wemightanticipatethatcountrieslikeBrazilwill

achieveatleastsomeoftheproposedbenefitsofbiofueldevelopment.Attheaggregatelevel

thisdoesseemtobeoccurring.Arndtetal.(2009)presentprojectedbenefitsfrombiofuel

investmentinMozambiqueindicatingthecurrenttrajectorywillleadtoanincreaseof0.6%in

annualnationaleconomicgrowthanda6%reductioninpovertyovera12-yearperiod.National

economicgrowthandcorporateprofits,ofcourse,donottranslatedirectlyoreasilyto

equitabledevelopmentwithinacountry,especiallyamongdiversesocialgroups.The

distributionofbenefitsdependsinlargepartonsub-nationalpoliticaldynamics.Inthissection

weassessstate-societalrelations,focusingondifferentiatingsub-nationalcommunities,toshed

furtherlightonwhichgroupsareespeciallyvulnerabletoexpandingbiofuelproduction.

Makingacasefortheneedtoembedanalysiswithinspecifichistoricalcontexts,Taylor

andGarcia-Barrios(1995)arguethat‘globalizedanduniformitarianaggregateanalyses’are

insufficientforassessingthedynamicsofenvironmentalchangeindevelopingcountries.They

considerhowlocalconditionsintersectwithprocessesinthebroaderpoliticaleconomy.In

particular,theyhighlightthestructuresandpoliciesthatinfluencepatternsofdiscrimination

againsttheruralpoor,suchaseducationalopportunitiesandlandtenuresystems.Wefocus

ouranalysisonthelatter.

TaylorandGarcia-Barrios’modelgivesparticularweighttohistoricalpatternsincausal

explanations;specifically,itaimstointegrateregional-specificstudiesintogeneralisedcausal

25

patterns.Tobetterassesstheimpactofthebiofuelindustryonruralpopulations,weusethis

local-globalframeworktoexplorehowpatternsoflandexclusionandconflictinglandrights

claimsintersectwithincreasingpressureonlandfromagriculturalandforestry-basedbiofuel

feedstocks.Weconsequentlyconsider‘theeconomicdimensionsofenvironmental

degradation’(TaylorandGarcia-Barrios1995,24),aswellasthesocialdimensionsofthese

dynamics.Webeginbyassessingtheecologicaltrade-offsofproducingbiofuelfeedstock,then

turntoreflectonlikelysocio-ecologicalimplicationsandoutcomesofincreasingbiofuel

production,inlightofdifferentiatedgroupsofruralagrarianandforestcommunities.

a.Ecologicalimpacts:carbon,biodiversity,andbiofueltrade-offs

Usingbiofuelsasastrategytomitigateclimatechangeandpromotedevelopmentrunsup

againstothereffortstolinkclimatechangemitigationwithdevelopment,suchasprogramslike

reducingemissionsfromdeforestationandforestdegradationplusconservationindeveloping

countries(REDD-plus).REDD-plusinitiatives,spearheadedbycountrieslikePapuaNewGuinea

undertheUNFrameworkConventiononClimateChange(UNFCCC),compensatedeveloping

countriesfinanciallyforsequesteringcarbon.Inrelationtobiofuels,though,Kirschbaum(2003)

stressesthedifficultyofsimultaneouslymanagingaforestforbothcarbonstorageandfuel,

arguingthatstoringcarbonintemporarysinksisunlikelytohavemuchvalueformitigating

climatechange.Hehighlightsthecomplexityofthetrade-offsinvolvedinforestplantations,

notingthelowercapacityofyoungerplantationforeststocontrolerosion,bufferwind,stabilise

slopes,andstorecarbonthanoldernaturalforests(althoughhealsopointsoutthehigherrisk

offorestfiresinolderstands).Healsostressestheimportanceofmanagementforthepotential

ofplantationstostorecarbon.

Similarly,Gibbsetal.(2008)emphasisethelocation-specificimpactsofplantationcrops,

where,forexample,expandingbiofuelfeedstockplantationsintodegradedoralready-

cultivatedareasprovidecarbonsavings,yetdevelopingtheminareasthatonceheldtropical

forestsprovides‘nomeaningfulcarbonbenefits’,andinfactwilllikelyleadtonetcarbon

emissions.Theyraiseconcernsabouttheriskofexpandingagriculturallands,notingthatthe

pasttwodecadeshavealreadyseentropicalforestsclearedforsoyandoilpalmproduction.

26

Reaffirmingtheseconcerns,Danielsenetal.(2009)pointoutthatoilpalmhasalreadyreplaced

over13millionhectaresoftropicalforests(eitherdirectlyorindirectly),largelyinSoutheast

Asia,whileNorrisetal.(2010)concludethatagriculturalexpansionlargelycausedthelossof10

millionhectaresofforestinWestAfricaoverthelastcentury.AnanalysisbyDeFriesetal.

(2010)indicatesalinkbetweenforestlossandtheinternationaldemandforagricultural

productsinthe2000-2005period,whichsuggeststhatinternationalagriculturaltrademay

exacerbatedeforestationpressuresindevelopingcountries,andTrivedietal.(2009)warnthat

theinteractingpressuresofdeforestation,biodiversityandecosystemserviceloss,andclimate

changecouldleadtothelossofhalfoftheAmazonianforestareaby2030.Danielsenetal.

(2009)notetheironythateffortstomeetKyotoProtocolcarbonreductioncommitments

throughbiofuelsmayactuallyspeedupclimatechangethroughcarbonreleasesfromforest

conversion,andmayadditionallyundermineotherenvironmentalcommitments,includingthe

ConventiononBiologicalDiversity.

Turningfromthemoreecologicaltosocialimpacts(althoughweacknowledgethat

theseareinterrelated,particularlygivenboththesocialcausesandtheimpactson

communitiesofenvironmentaldegradation),weobserveequallycomplextrade-offswherethe

benefitsandcostsofbiofuelproductionvaryacrossplaces,biofuelfeedstockcroptypes,and

socialgroups.

b.Socialandeconomicimpacts:historiesofdisplacement

1)State-societyrelations

Biofuelproductionhascontributedtolanduseandlandtenureconflictsinsomeruralareas.15

Onewaytoexaminesuchconflictsoverlanduseistocomparestateversuscommunitycontrol

ofproductionsystems.Inananalysisofcommunityforestryand‘domesticforests’,Michonet

al.(2007)describetheknowledgebylocalfarmersofforestmanagement.Theyadvocatefor

moreequitablerelationsbetweenforestagency‘experts’andfarmersmanagingforest

resourcesontheirownland.Recognizingandrespectingcommunityexpertise,Michonetal.

15 See McMichael (in this volume) for an analysis of the meaning and consequences of this ‘global land grab’ and of the intensification of ‘a long-term process of appropriation of resources by powerful states and firms’.

27

optimisticallyargue,wouldhelppromotesustainablecoexistenceofpeopleandnature(and

helptoavoidatrade-offbetweendevelopmentandconservation).

Theiranalysisisbasedonstatesandsocietyastherelevantdivideinforest

management.Thismaynotreveal,however,thefullpictureofcompetingknowledgesand

practicesinlocalecosystemgovernance.State-societyandrural-urbandichotomiesareoften

insufficientfordescribingtheinterestsofgroupswithinacountry.Mitchell’s(1991)critiqueof

thestate-societydivideishelpfulforstructuringamorecomplexunderstandingofpower

relations,particularlyinthecontextofemergingalliancesoflocalfirms,governments,and

MNCs.Thesealliancesblurthelinebetweenstatesandcertaineconomicgroupswithinthe

state;sustainabilityinitiativesthatinvolvecivilsocietyalsoillustratethedivideswithin‘society’,

associalgroupingsoftendonotrepresentall–orevenmost–peoples’interests.

Theideaofsocietaldisaggregation,andespeciallypeasantdifferentiation,hasarobust

placeintheagrarianpoliticaleconomyliterature,withByres(2009),forexample,tracingthe

historyofthestratificationofpeasantcommunitiesindifferentnationalsettings.Asdefinedby

Wright(2006,144),classexploitationinvolvesnotonlyasymmetricaccesstoproductive

resources(whichhedescribesas‘nonexploitativeeconomicoppression’),butalsothe

appropriationoftheproductsofthelabouroftheexploitedbythosewhocontrolthe

resources.Specifically,thelinkbetweenpropertyrelationsandexploitationisbasedonongoing

interactionsanddependsontheeffortsoftheexploited.Wrightrevealsmultipledimensionsof

classrelations,alongcontinuumsofauthority,skilllevels,ownershipofmeansofproduction,

andtheengagementofpaidlabour.Suchdistinctionsmakeitdifficulttoundertakeasimple

classanalysisbasedon‘proletariat’and‘bourgeoisie’,butreflectimportantsubtledifferences

amonggroupsofsmall-holderandsubsistence-levelruralpeople.Byres(2009,35)identifies

peasantsthroughtheirtiestotheland,coercedrelinquishingofrents,and‘servile’positionin

domesticproductionsystems,wherepeasantshaveasimilarstructuralpositioninthe

economy,butheemphasises‘itiscrucialtonotethatthesepeasantriesaresocially

differentiated’.

DaCorta(2008)similarlynotesthestructuralpositionofpeasants,highlightingtheir

assets-basedvulnerability,inwhichtheyoftenfaceresourcetrade-offs,andthesacrificeof

28

long-termstabilitytosolveshort-termproblems.Theseeconomicdilemmasare,accordingto

daCorta(2008,6),rootedin‘deeplyunequalsocialrelations’,andhaveasomewhatpath-

dependenttrajectory,inwhichthosewithsomematerialandsocialadvantagesbenefitfrom,

andcanmanufactureopportunitiesfor,accumulationduringtimesofeconomicchangesand

crises.Thesedynamicshavebeenseeninthepastwiththeintroductionofnewtechnologies

andpractices;forinstance,Scott(1987)documentstheimpactsofcombinesanddouble-

croppingonthematerialandsocialconditionsofdifferentpeasantgroupsinavillagein

Malaysia.Shiftsinglobalmarketsandopportunities–suchasthesurgeininterestinbiofuels–

thereforeintersectwithlocalsocialrelations,tendingtoyieldthegreatestbenefitstomore

privilegedgroupsandfurtherentrenchingthevulnerabilityofpoorpeople.

Thus,forunderstandingthepotentialconsequencesofbiofuels,dividesamongand

withinsocialgroupsareasrelevantasdividesbetweenthestateandsociety.Mitchell(1991,

77)arguesthattheboundarybetweenthestateandsocietyis‘elusive,porous,andmobile’,

indicatingtheimportanceofassessingthepatternsoforganisationandcontrol–andexclusion

–thatemergeindifferentconfigurationsofpowerrelations.Disaggregatingmorehighly

commercialisedagrarianhouseholdsfrompredominantlysubsistence-levelfarmers,andmore

agrarianfrommoreforest-dependentpeople,16providesusefulinsightsintotheimpactsof

biofuels;italsoillustratesthevariableeconomicbenefitslikelytoaccruetodifferentpeople

evenincountrieswitheffectivegovernments.Developingbiofuels,forexample,maywell

benefitsomeimpoverishedruralgroups,whilefurtherharmingothers.

2)Landtenureconflictsandsocio-ecologicalimpactsofhistoricalpatternsofexclusion

Atthestatelevel,benefitsaccruedfrombiofuelsdepend,tosomeextent,ontheinteraction

amongexistinggovernanceinstitutions,andonrelationshipsamongproducers,industrialists,

andthestate.Theseinstitutionsandnetworksenablesomestatestoadoptnewtechnologies

andenterglobalmarkets.Inthesameway,atthesubnationallevel,theexistingpatternsof

wealth,land,andpowerdistributioninfluencetheabilityofdifferentgroupstoshareinthe

benefitsofnewopportunities.Biofuelshavebeenpresentedasawaytoprovideeconomic16 Noting, as in footnote 3, that these categories are not strictly delineated; for instance, landless households may be more dependent on forest products than land-holding households, as Santra et al. (2008) document.

29

developmenttosmall-scalefarmers.However,historicallegaciesoflandtenureandcontrol

influencethelikelihoodthatruralcommunitiescantakeadvantageoftheseopportunities.The

displacementofcommunitiesforextractiveindustrialactivitiesandforconservationhavebeen

observedinthepast;AdamsandHutton(2007)describethedisplacementofpeopleinEthiopia

andBotswanatoestablishprotectedareas;andMeher(2009)examinesthedisplacementof

tribalpeopleinIndiaforminingprojects.Itisnotastretch,therefore,toconsiderthepotential

displacementofsubsistencefarmers,indigenouscommunities,andothermarginalisedgroups

forbiofueldevelopment.

Landtenureconflictsinvolvenotonlycurrentsocietalrelationships,butemergeoutof

historicalstrugglesforcontrol.Michonetal.(2007)provideadviceforincorporatingcommunity

forestryintostateforestrypractices,requiringstatestonotonlyrecognisetheknowledgeof

localcommunities,butalsotheirrightstothelandandproductsoftheland.However,there

aresubstantialbarrierstoovercomingthesehistories;whileMichonetal.’ssuggestionmaybe

anadvisablestrategytoimproveforestmanagement,itwouldrequiremajorchangesinstate

controloflandresourcesandstaterelationswithmarginalisedsocialgroups.Beyond

accountingforhistoricalstaterelationswithdifferentgroups,Shah’s(2005)workonthe

historicaldisplacementandadaptationoftheindigenousadivasipeopleinIndiaunderscores

theimportanceofconsideringsocietal–andespeciallypeasant–differentiationandrelations.

Shah(2005)analysestheadivasipeoples’geographicandsocialdisruptionbycolonialintrusion,

findingthatmarginalisationisnotonlyaproductofexclusionbythestate,butisalso

perpetuatedandreinforcedbyothersocietalgroups.

Formanyruralhouseholds,landtenureisbynomeanssecure;thuseffortstointegrate

evensmall-scalelandownersintoproductionsystemsstillexcludemanyruralpeople.These

marginalisedpeopletendtohavecomplexrelationshipswiththestateandwiththeecosystems

onwhichtheydepend.Lawloretal.(2009,6-7),forexample,notethatinsomecountries

clearingaforestcanbeawaytoestablishpropertyrightsanddemonstrate‘productivity’.

Althoughthismaybeoneavenueforsecuringlandtenure,inthetropicsitusuallydoesnot

promoteenvironmentalorlong-termeconomicsustainability,becausesuchpropertyrights

30

regimesprovideincentivestodevelopagricultureandplantationsattheexpenseofpreviously

biologically-richforests.

Beyondthelossofforestsfromincentivestoclearlandtosecuretenure,displacingand

resettlingcommunitiesintonewareasalsotendstoincreasepressureonforests.Tropp(2003,

213),forexample,findsthatthedisplacementofindigenouspeopleintheSouthAfricanregion

ofTranskeiancontributedtomoreconflictoverlandandincreasedtheintensityofforest

resourceusebythetransplantedcommunities,astheyconstructednewsettlements.

Moreover,thepatternsofresettlementestablishedduringcolonialtimesinfluencedindigenous

communities’relationswiththestateinthepost-colonialera,providingthebasisforboth

extensivestateinterventionandcompetingnarrativesbyindigenouspeopleonconservation

anddevelopment.

Alongwiththeincreasedsegmentationofruralcommunitiesresultingfromuneven

effectsonforest-basedandagriculturalhouseholds,theremaybeunevenimpactswithin

agrariancommunities.First,theremaybelayeredlevelsofownershipof(andaccessto)land

andforestresourcesthatdonotcorrespondtoofficialpropertyrights,whichcorporate

managementofbiofuelfeedstockproductioncandamage.Forinstance,Rocheleauand

Edmunds(1997,1351)describethegendereddynamicsofpropertyrightsovertrees,

particularlyinAfrica,whichinvolve‘nestedandoverlappingrights’.Theserightsmaybe

negotiablewithinthecommunity,anddifficulttomanagewhenexternalownershipand

productionregimesarefixedratherthanflexible.17Thelackoftenurehasprovendetrimental

forpoorhouseholds’participationinothersustainabledevelopmentinitiatives,too.Boydetal.

(2007),forexample,examineCleanDevelopmentMechanism(CDM)carbonsinkprojectsunder

theUNFCCC,findingthattheprojectstendtoexcludethosewithoutnationallyrecognizedand

sanctionedlandownership–peoplewhotendtobethepoorest.

Second,differentialaccesstolandandcapitalmayinfluencefarmers’abilitiestoinvest

indifferentcrops.Biofuelproductionmayprovideopportunitiesforhigheconomicreturnsfor

somefarmers,as,forexample,McCarthyandZen(2010)reporthappenedwhenthepriceof

17 In the context of biofuels, see Julia and White (in this volume) for an analysis of the impacts of oil palm expansion on a Hibun Dayak community in Indonesia, disaggregated by gender. Additionally, for a more general discussion of gender in agrarian political economy, see Razavi (2009).

31

palmoilwentfrom$570tomorethan$1440permetrictonfrom2007to2008,andas

Richardson(inthisvolume)documentswhentheworldpriceforsugarreacheda30-yearhigh

inAugust2009.However,potentialreturnscanvarywidelyacrossbiofuelfeedstockcrops,and

mayprovepolarisingasland-andcapital-poorcommunitymembersfindthemselvesunableto

capitaliseontheseopportunities.Intermsofvariationacrossfeedstocks,Jatropha,for

example,isestimatedtobetwiceaslandintensiveassugarforbiofuels,butsugaristhree

timesmorecapitalintensive(Arndtetal.2009).Consequently,farmerswithgreaterinitial

accesstocapitalcaninvestinsugarcanecropsthathaveahigherreturnperunitofland,while

thoselackingsuchfundsmaybeexcludedfromtheseopportunities.

Third,theroleofriskinbiofuelproductionisrelevanttothisunevennesswithinagrarian

communities.Despitehighpricesforpalmoilandsugar,McCarthyandZen(2010)and

Richardson(inthisvolume)notethevolatilityofthesecommodityprices.Althoughatvarious

timesreturnsfromsomecropsmaybehigh,farmersmaybefacedwithbearingthecostsof

failedefforts,andthosealreadylivingatthemarginscanfindthemselvesunabletotakesuch

risks.Scott(1976),inTheMoralEconomyofthePeasant,highlightsthetrade-offssubsistence

farmersfacebetweeneconomicreturnsandriskaversion,wherehigherfinancialrewardsare

foregoneinfavouroflessriskyinvestmentsforthosewhohavelittlecapacitytobufferlosses.

Althoughsomeeconometricstudieschallengetheseassumptionsofrisk-aversionbypoor

farmers(see,forinstance,HenrichandMcElreath2002,andRoumasset2008),severalstudies

provideevidencethatlow-incomehouseholdsallocategreaterfinancialandlabourresourcesto

low-risk,low-returncrops(seeVargasHill2009forabriefsurveyandananalysisofUgandan

coffeeproduction).Wegren(2008)demonstratestheimpactofeconomicstatusonrisk-

aversioninRussia,suggestingtheneedforadifferentiatedassessmentofdecisionmaking

basedonrisk-takingtendencies.NelsonandGalvez(2000)assessthesocialimpactsofthe

cocoaindustry,andcautionthat,evenwithfairtradeschemes,agriculturalproductionthat

focusesonasinglecommodityposemanydangers.Asingle-cropfocus,forexample,can

increasetheriskforproducerswhogiveupdiversifiedinvestmentactivities;itcanalso

marginalisethemostvulnerableproducerswithoutliquidassetsandreservefundswhoare

unabletoreducediversityandthereforecannottakeadvantageofmarketopenings.

32

Unlikelypositiveagriculture-industrysynergiesforbiofuels

Manyresearchershavereflectedonpossiblestrategiesformoresustainablebiofuel

production,withsolutionsrangingfromtheuseofalternate(andespeciallynon-food)

feedstocks(e.g.,Regalbuto2009),tofosteringsynergiesbetweenagricultureandindustry(e.g.,

Kay2009),topromotingmoreopenandextensiveNorth-Southtrade(e.g.,Mathews2007).

However,althoughtheseinitiativesaddresssomeofthetrade-offsamongfoodsecurity,energy

security,andbiodiversityprotection–thetrilemma,inTilmanetal.’s(2009)description–for

landlessandnon-agrarianruralpeoplesthesedonotsolve,andmayevenexacerbate,the

problemsthatindustrialandglobalisedbiofuelproductioncauseforlandrightsandland

tenure.

Somepoliciesandactionsforrenewableenergyhavethepotentialtobenefitsmall-

scalefarmers,promotesecond-andthird-generationbiofuels,andencouragetheuseof

marginallandsratherthanfood-producingagriculturalfieldsforbiofuelfeedstocks.Replacing

mixedforestswithoilpalmplantations(replacingforestswithplantations,preventingnet

deforestation)andofmarginalcroplandwithJatrophaandswitchgrasses(turningunproductive

areas,ratherthanagriculturalfields,intofeedstockproductionlands),mayreducetheimpact

onfoodcropsandthedirectcarbonfootprintofresultingbiofuels.Althoughplantationforests

rarely,ifever,replicatetheecologicalandbiologicalvalueofnaturalforests,theycanprovide

someecologicalbenefits,whichvarydependingontheextenttowhichtheyaremonocultures,

introduceexoticandinvasivespecies,andhavevariationintheirunderstories(Rudeletal.

2005).

Regalbuto(2009)considersthepotentialforwoodybiomass-basedbiofuels,which

wouldreduceconcernsaboutfoodbeingusedforfuel.Tilmanetal.’s(2009,271)trilemmaof

food,energy,andenvironmentaddressesthetrade-offsbetweenagriculturallandandfood

production,greenhousegasreductions,andbiodiversity.Inresponsetothesechallenges,they

advisethat‘Threestepsshouldbetaken:meaningfulscience-basedenvironmentalsafeguards

shouldbeadopted,arobustbiofuelindustryshouldbeenabled,andthosewhohaveinvested

infirst-generationbiofuelsshouldhaveaviablepathforward’.

33

However,thefailureofsomefairtradesystemstoprotectthelivelihoodsofthemost

vulnerablepeople,asNelsonandGalvez(2000)document,raisesconcernsabouttheabilityof

sustainabilityinitiativesinthebiofuelsectortoprotectenvironmentalandsocialwell-being.

Eventhoughsomesustainabilitypathwaysforbiofuelsconsiderfoodandfuel,manystillleave

outquestionsoflanduseconversionfromintactordiversestandingforests,aswellas

questionsoflandrightsofresidentcommunitiesthatincreasedproductionmaydisplace.The

indirecteffectsofpromotingbiofuelsmaythereforestillprovetobeecologicallyandsocially

destructive,andunderminetheoptimisticprojectionsofcombiningeconomicdevelopment

withsocialequalityandenvironmentalprotection.Suchsustainabilitymeasures,iftheyignore

contentiouslandtenureclaimsandhistoricalpatternsofexclusion,areunlikelytopreventthe

furtherdisplacementofcommunitiesfrommarginallands.

Steward’s(2007)criticalanalysisof‘sustainablesoy’inBrazil,forinstance,pointstothe

differingwaysactorsandstakeholdersinterpretforestuseandsustainablepractices.

ConservationNGOs,agriculturalfirms,andthestatehavedifferentviews,forexample,on

forestvaluesandappropriateusethandolocalsmall-scalefarmers(or‘colonos’).AsTropp

(2003)discoveredinSouthAfrica,Stewardfindsthatcurrentlandusepracticesandrelations

areaproductofthearea’ssettlementhistory,andthelegacyofcolonialcontroloverland.The

dominantstateandmainstreamNGOdiscoursesondevelopment,sheargues,deniestherole

oflocalfarmersinsustainingandpromotingecologicaldiversityandignoresthematrixof

agriculturallandandsecondaryforeststhattheymaintain.Thesefarmers’consequent

exclusionfromdevelopmentplansfurtherentrenchespovertywithinthesecommunities.

Thesedynamicsofdeforestationandenvironmentalprotectionfurtherillustratethe

complexityofdisplacedandmarginalisedpeoples’relationshipswiththeforests,thestate,and

withinsociety.Lawloretal.(2009)highlightthiscomplexityformitigatingclimatechange.

Analyzingthereductionofemissionsfromdeforestationandlanddegradation,theyfind,in

additiontoinsecurepropertyrightsforforestpeople,manyproblemswiththeproposed

emissionsreductionprogramsandpaymentsforavoideddeforestation,includinglimitedpublic

participationinforestandrevenuemanagement,andcorruption.Thesepotentialproblems

34

bothparallelandaugmenttheonesinthebiofuelsector,underminingeffortstopromote

sociallyandenvironmentallysustainablebiofuels.

Competingdiscoursesaroundbiofueldevelopmentnowcontestthemeaningsof

sustainablebiofuels,althoughgenerallythesedebatesareframedintermsoffoodsecurityand

opportunitiesforsmall-scalelandowners,butnotinthebroadercontextoflandrightsand

indigenouspeoples’displacement.Withahistoryofantagonisticrelationsbetweenmanystates

and‘their’indigenouspeoples,thenewalliancesamongpublicandprivateinvestorsand

producersofbiofuels,especiallybetweenMNCsandgovernmentsandlocalfirmsintheglobal

South,thusseempoisedtoreinforcepatternsofexclusionandmarginalisationratherthan

achieveanylastingenvironmentalandsocialgains.

Conclusions

MNCs,asthetrajectoryoftheemergingglobalbiofuelindustryshows,arepoisedtoincrease

theircontroloverthenextfewyearsovertheproductionanddistributionofbiofuels,

particularlyfrommajorfeedstockslikecorn,sugarcane,soy,andoilpalm.Thehistoriesofthe

globalpoliticaleconomiesofrelatedagriculture,energy,andforestrysectorssuggestthisis

likely,especiallygiventheconsolidationofcontrolovertheproductionandexportofthese

feedstockcropsbyagriculturalMNCslikeADM,Cargill,andothers.Ifthebiofuelindustrydoes

followthepathofthesesectors,stateswithweakbureaucraticcapacitylooksettolosecontrol

ofpartnershipsbetweenlocalfirmsandMNCs,furtherentrenchingthepowerofMNCsinthe

agrifood,forestry,andenergysectors.Intheabsenceofstateoversight,voluntarymeasures

seemunlikelytorealisethepositivepotentialofbiofuels,especiallygivenpastfailuresofCSRto

enhancesustainabilityintheagrifoodandforestrysectors.Moreover,evenwhereeconomic

benefitsextendbeyondMNCs,anybenefitswillaccrueunevenlyinruralcommunities,with

small-scalefarmers,peoplewithinsecurelandrights,and–especially–indigenousforest

peopleslargelyleftoutorevenharmed,particularlybyindustrial-scaleandplantation-based

productionoffeedstockcrops.

Ouranalysisoftheroleofbiofuelalliancesandcoalitionscontributestothetheoretical

debatesinglobalandagrarianpoliticaleconomy.First,atthestatelevel,ourfindingssuggest

35

thataggregateeconomicbenefitsfrombiofuelswillmorelikelyaccruetodevelopingcountries

thatenterbiofuelmarketsearlyandthathaveexistingexport-orientedsectorstochannel

biofuelsmoreeffectivelyintotheglobalmarket.Thiswillbemosteasilyaccomplishedwith

cropsalreadyunderlarge-scaleproductioninthosecountries,likeoilpalmandsugar,andcrops

thatareefficientlyproducedthroughplantationorlargemonocropprocesses.Stateswithlarge

internalmarketstobufferagainsttherisksofcompetinginternationallywillalsobenefitmore

easily.So,too,willstateswithstrongadministrativecapacityinagrifood,forestry,andenergy,

asthesestateswillhavemoreopportunitiesandfewerbarrierstotakingadvantageofglobal

opportunitiestodevelopbiofuels.Theseopportunitiesarethenlikelytoreinforcetheeconomic

andpoliticalpowerofemergingeconomiesoftheSouth.

Second,byhighlightingstate-societyrelations,particularlydrawingonrecentworkin

agrarianstate-societyrelations,ouranalysiscontributestounderstandingtheconsequences

withincountriesofdevelopingbiofuels.Weanalysedtheframingofdebatesonsustainable

biofuelsatthedomesticlevel,drawingattentiontomarginalisedcommunitiesthatstateand

corporatenarrativestendtoexclude.Wethenlinkedthepatternsofexclusioninthese

relationstohistoriesofdisplacementandlandtenureconflictinforestryandagriculture,

particularlythroughthedesignationoflandasmarginaloridle.Althoughfoodsecurityisan

importantdimensionofthesedebates,wehavedemonstratedthatthedevelopmentof

commercialbiofuelsraisesequallycriticalconcernsforlandrights,forestaccess,andnon-

agrarianlivelihoods.

Ourfindingsfurtheraddcautionarynotestothesustainabilityofso-calledsustainable

biofuels,aswellasthevalueofmoreopenmarketsforbiofuelsfromtheSouth.Somefield

studiessuggestthatsomefarmersandcommunitiesmaybenefitfromthedevelopmentofnew

anddiversifiedmarketsforagriculturalcommoditiesandfromlocalenergyproduction.Small-

scaleproductionandcooperativeefforts,inwhichfarmersmaintaincontroloftheircropsand

land,couldwellcontributetoeconomicstabilityandimprovedlivelihoods.However,the

increasingcorporatecontrolofindustrial-scalebiofuelproductionanddistributionprocesses

putsintodoubttheabilityofthesectortoachievewidespreadpositiveresultsforthepoor.The

distributionalconsequencesofbiofuelproductionappearsettoleavebehindthosestates–and

36

especiallygroupswithinstates–thatarealreadyatadisadvantageintheinternationalsystem.

Theproductionandconsumptionpatternsofbiofuelswillbenefit,attheinternationallevel,

stateswithexistingexperiencesofsuccessintheglobaleconomy,and,atthedomesticlevel,

groupsalreadyintegratedintocommercialproductionsystems.Statesandruralandindigenous

peoplealreadystrugglingtocopewithglobalisedmarketsandindustrialisedproductionwillbe

leftevenfurtherbehind,withevenwell-intentionedeffortstomitigateclimatechangeand

supportdevelopmentthroughbiofuelslikelytoacceleratedeforestationandfurther

marginalisevulnerablepeopleandecosystems.

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PeterDauvergneisProfessorofPoliticalScience,CanadaResearchChairinGlobalEnvironmentalPolitics,andDirectoroftheLiuInstituteforGlobalIssuesattheUniversityofBritishColumbia.Hehaspublished7books,2monographs,andover50articles.Hisrecentbook,TheShadowsofConsumption(MITPress),wonthe2009GeraldL.YoungAward,presentedbytheSocietyofHumanEcologyforthebestbookauthoredin2008inthefieldofhumanecology.KateJ.NevilleisaPhDstudentintheDepartmentofPoliticalScience,UniversityofBritishColumbia.SheholdsaBachelorofSciencedegreeinBiologyfromQueen’sUniversityandaMaster’sofEnvironmentalSciencefromYaleUniversity.Herlatestpublication(withPeterDauvergne)is‘TheChangingNorth-SouthandSouth-SouthPoliticalEconomyofBiofuels’,ThirdWorldQuarterly30(6)(2009):1087–1102.Correspondingauthor:PeterDauvergne,LiuInstituteforGlobalIssues,UniversityofBritishColumbia,6476NWMarineDrive,Vancouver,BC,V6T1Z2,Canada.Email:peter.dauvergne@ubc.ca.