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Forest Management Transparency, Governance and the Law Case studies from the Congo Basin Prepared for the Ministerial Conference on Africa Forest Law Enforcement and Governance (AFLEG) YAOUNDE, OCTOBER 13-16, 2003 Edited by CED, Cameroun - Rainforest Foundation, UK & Forests Monitor, UK October 2003

Transcript of Forest Management Transparency, Governance and … · The Centre pour l’Environnement et ......

FFoorreesstt MMaannaaggeemmeenntt Transparency, Governance and the Law

Case studies from the Congo Basin

Prepared for the Ministerial Conference on Africa Forest Law Enforcement and Governance (AFLEG)YAOUNDE, OCTOBER 13-16, 2003

Edited by CED, Cameroun - Rainforest Foundation, UK & Forests Monitor, UK October 2003

Edited by The Center for Environment and Development the Rainforest Foundation & Forests Monitor October 2003

The Centre pour l’Environnement et le Dévelopement the Rainforest Foundation & Forests Monitor thank

- Translator : Valerie L. NTJAM- Authors :

•Centre International d’Appui au Développement Durable (CIAD), CAMEROUN•Observatoire Congolais des Droits de l’Homme (OCDH), CONGO/BZV•Comité Consultatif des ONG de Conservation et de l’Environnement (CCOCE), CONGO/BZV •Comité de Liaison des ONG du Congo (CLONG-CONGO), CONGO •Réseau des Associations Autochtones Pygmées (RAPY), RDC•Héritiers de la Justice, Association pour les Droits humains et la Résolution pacifique des conflits,BUKAVU/RDC

•Association de Lutte contre l’exploitation non contrôlée des forêts équatoriales, BRAINFOREST,GABON

•Fédération des Associations, GIC, Agriculteurs, Pisciculteurs, et Eleveurs du Cameroun (FAGAP),CAMEROUN

• Groupe de Travail Forêts/Conseil Provincial des ONG de Développement de Kinshasa(GTF/CRONGO), CONGO/KIN

•Education pour la Défense de l’Environnement et la Nature (EDEN), GABON•Projet Conservation et Utilisation Rationnelle des Ecosystemes Forestiers de Guinée Equatoriale(CUREF), GUINEE EQUATORIALE

Note

The case studies included in this report were originallywritten in French. Due to limitation of time, the editedversions as they appear, in both the French and theEnglish language versions have not been checked andapproved by the authors. Where there is a differencebetween the French and English versions concerning thesense or possible interpretation of the text, the Frenchversion should be considered definitive.The Center for Environment and Development, TheRainforest Foundation and Forests Monitor do notnecessarily share the views expressed in the case studies.

FFoorreesstt MMaannaaggeemmeenntt Transparency, Governance and the Law

Case studies from the Congo Basin

Prepared for the Ministerial Conference on Africa Forest Law Enforcement and Governance (AFLEG)YAOUNDE, OCTOBER 13-16, 2003

Table of contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4Summary of recommendations to AFLEG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5List of acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6

Part I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7Chapter 1. Forestry law and the marginalisation of pygmy populations . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7Chapter 2. Land ownership in Cameroon: Legal opportunitiesand constraints of the Baka pygmies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11Chapter 3. Forest Governance and pygmy people Access of pygmy indigenes to land :the case of pygmies rejected from the Kahuzi-Biega National Park, South-Kivu,Eastern DRC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15

Part II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .22Chapter 4. Partnership and Governance : the government, logging companies,and road building in the Republic of Congo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .22Chapter 5. War-related forest destruction and rehabilitation: the caseof the South-Kivu Province in the Democratic Republic of Congo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27

Part III . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .31Chapter 6. Recovery of penalties in the Congolese forest sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..31Chapter 7. Forest exploitation in the Republic of Congo :the case of the Tamann Industrie Limited in the Mayombe forest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .45Chapter 8. Implementation of the Congolese forestry code:the case of provisions relating to local communities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .51

Part IV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .55Chapter 9. Law, Transparency, Responsibility and Rights of Citizensin Cameroonian Forests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .55Chapitre 10. Illegal exploitation of Gaboon Resin in Gabon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .62

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .66

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Table of contents

This study is aimed at presenting some of the concerns of representatives of the civil societyof Central Africa about the forestry law and its implementation in the region. It containsvarious topics ranging from land laws to governance through the production of non-timber

forest products (NTFPs), violent conflicts and deforestation, with examples drawn fromCameroon, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Gabon . The main concerns outlined hereinclude issues of transparency, governance and the respect of the rights of forest communities inCentral Africa. This clarion call from the civil society of this part of Africa is complemented byrecommendations aimed at improving forest management and the conditions of forest peoples.

Part one lays emphasis on problems linked to the rights of natives and the sustainablemanagement of forest resources. Chapter I (CED) shows how provisions of the law aimed atensuring the rights and interests of local communities in forest management are ineffective in thecase of pygmy populations, because of the cultural peculiarities of such communities.Chapter II (CIAD) explains how the issue of land laws is important in forestry laws andgovernance. Chapter III (RAPY) raises the problem of governance of protected areas andsuggests that the exploitation of the Congo Basin should take into consideration the rights of thepeople living around such forests.

Part two shows how illegal activities, poor governance and violent conflicts contribute to thedegradation of the environment.Chapter IV (CLONG) focuses on agreements between logging companies and the Governmentof Congo and illustrates the importance of discouraging African governments from grantingfacilities that enable logging companies to evade taxes.Chapter V (Heritiers de la Justice) establishes the link between violent conflicts and thedegradation of the environment and suggests that stricter laws be applied in order to avoid thedegradation of protected areas during violent conflicts.

Part three focuses on issues of transparency and the weaknesses of the forestry code.Chapter VI (CCOCE) draws the attention of international organisations engaged in the AFLEGprocess to the risk of seeing the IMF/WB structural adjustment programmes reducinggovernments’ means in their effort to implement forestry laws, as is the case in the Republic ofCongo where such programmes have caused the reduction of workers in the forestryadministration. Then, in Chapter VII, (OCDH) proposes that AFLEG should take intoconsideration the fact that forestry operations must respect the national labour code as well asforestry rules and regulations. Atrocious working conditions and poor infrastructure play amajor role in corruption and poor management of forest resources. Chapter VIII(GTF/CRONGD) discusses the innovations and shortcomings of the new Forestry Code of theDemocratic Republic of Congo, and focuses on the problem of double standards in laws.

Part four concentrates on the specific problems of local communities.Chapter IX (CED) attempts, almost ten years after the enactment of the forestry law in 1994, arapid assessment of its implementation building on the requirements of transparent managementof forest resources. Lastly, Chapter X (EDEN) presents non-timber forest products and proposesthat AFLEG should reflect on the issue of illegal exploitation of non-timber forest products in thesame way as that of timber products.

Summary

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The following recommendations are based upon:• Congo Basin NGOs’ discussions and declaration at

the January 2003 AFLEG preparatory meeting inYaoundé;

• Case studies prepared by civil society groups withinthe context of the AFLEG process.

On transparency in forest management, NGOsrecommend :• A publicly accessible, centralised database/register

system in the Congo Basin sub-region for violationsof forestry laws should be set up, and should serveto monitor industrial forest companies’ activitiesthroughout the region, and to provide an overviewof sanctions at the sub-regional level.

• The establishment of an independent observer forthe control of forest activities in all the States of thesub-region, with a view to enhancing forestmonitoring so as to prevent the relocation of themost destructive companies to countries wherecontrols are less stringent.

• Governments of Congo Basin States should allow,upon request, free public access to all nonconfidential forestry sector documents, including:

❍ Lists of companies involved in infractions ofthe forestry law, sanctions imposed, andstatus of sanctions

❍ Details of conventions signed by the Stateand concessions allocated to loggingcompanies

❍ The forestry law and regulations.

On legislative reform and forest peoples’ rights,NGOs recommend that the Congo Basin States :

• Ratify international legal instruments on theprotection of biodiversity and the rights ofindigenous peoples, including ILO convention 169.

• Recognise pygmy peoples’ land rights, including inprotected areas and forest concessions.

• Enact legal provisions that recognise pygmypeoples’ traditional rights to exploit forest products.

• Prohibit the industrial logging of species of highcultural, therapeutic or nutritional value for forestpeoples.

• Acknowledge the importance of the role of the civilsociety, and the creation of the conditions for itsindependence, in order to allow civil society groupsto contribute to the reinforcement of the rule of lawin the forestry sector.

• Improve the political and legal framework for theinvolvement of civil society organisations operatingin the forestry sector, especially through systematicaccess to information, greater popular participationand improved conditions for accessing the courts inorder to refer matters of forest management-relatedcrimes and offences.

On good governance, NGOs recommend that:

• Sanctions against offenders of forest laws should beimmediately implemented.

• The immediate withdrawal of authorisations ofcompanies guilty of repeat offences.

• Fair compensation should be paid to “pygmies” forloss of, or expulsion from, their lands because ofprotected areas or logging concessions.

• Wildlife poaching control units should beestablished in forest concessions.

• There should be strict enforcement of the ban on allminerals and other raw material from conflictareas.

• Indigenous and other forest peoples should beinvolved in the process of creation andmanagement of national parks and other naturaland forest reserves.

• That there needs to be a commitment toimprovement of the capacities of theadministrations in charge of Forests and Wildlife,including staff, budgets and equipment.

• There should be Conclusion, between G8 andCongo Basin countries, of agreements aiming atcombating illegal logging and providing timedelimited obligations for producers and consumerscountries to halt the trade in products from illegalforestry operations.

To the G8 countries, NGOs recommend :

• Prohibition of the importation of illegally sourcedtimber or timber from conflict areas to G8 countries

• Prohibition of access to public funds or any otherpublic support for companies guilty of illegallogging, applicable also to parent, subsidiary andrelated companies.

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Summary of Recommendations to the AFLEG Ministerial Conference

List of AcronymsAFLEG: African Forests Law Enforcement and Governance APR: Rwandan Patriotic ArmyARB: Timber Salvage AuthorisationCCOCE: Consultative Committee of Conservation and Environmental NGOsCED : Centre for the Environment and DevelopmentCENAREST : National Scientific and Technical Research Centre CFAF: Franc of the Central African Financial CommunityCIAD: Centre International d’Appui au Développement DurableCLONG : Congo NGOs Liaison CommitteeDRC: Democratic Republic of CongoEDEN : Education for the Defence of the Environment and NatureFAR : Rwandan Armed ForcesFMU : Forest Management UnitFPR: Rwandan Patriotic FrontGTF: Working Group on ForestsICCN: Congolese Institute for Nature Conservation ILO: International Labour OrganisationIPHAMETRA: Institute of Pharmacopoeia and Traditional MedicineMINEF: Ministry of the Environment and ForestryNGO : Non-Governmental OrganisationNTFP : Non-Timber Forest ProductOCDH: Congolese Observatory for Human RightsOHADA: Organisation for the Harmonisation of Business Law in AfricaPNKB: Kahuzi-Biega National ParkPNV: Virunga National ParkPSFE: Forest-Environment Sector ProgrammeRAPY: Network of Native Pygmy AssociationsRCD or CDR : Congo Democratic RepublicSFH: Société Forestière HazimUNHCR: United Nations High Commission for RefugeesUTA : Union transport Africa

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Chapter 1

FOREST MANAGEMENT TRANSPARENCY, GOVERNANCE AND THE LAW : CASE STUDIES FROM THE CONGO BASIN

CENTRE FOR ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT (CED)SSAAMMUUEELL NNGGUUIIFFFFOO

Forestry law and the marginalisation ofpygmy populations

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With a population generally estimated to number about 100,000 persons inCameroon, pygmies constitute the best known and the most vulnerable of Africa’sforest peoples. Their lifestyle is closely linked to the forest, from which they

obtain their food (meat, fruits, tree bark, roots, etc.) and the traditional medicinalproducts for which they are known to be great experts. The forest is their natural habitatin which they continue, for the most part, to be nomadic.

Cameroon’s 1993 Forestry Policy provided for greater involvement of local communities inforest management. The 1994 Forestry Law and its implementation instruments laid downthe modalities for involving communities in the management of both geographical space(especially community forests and community hunting territories) and financial resourcesdrawn from industrial timber exploitation (forest royalties).

However, a closer analysis shows that the provisions of the law aiming to mainstream therights and interests of local communities in forest management are ineffective in thecase of “pygmies”, because of the cultural peculiarities of these communities.

1. Negation of the customary rights of natives

Cameroon has a system of double legal standards, with a statute law of colonial origin,presented as “modern”, which coexists with a multitude of unwritten laws referred to as“customary”, of a pre-colonial origin. According to modern law, the State is owner of theland and the entire forestry resource (Article 6 of the 1994 Forestry Law, Article 1 of 6,July 1974 Ordinance, concerning land rules and regulations), while the various customarylaws recognise community ownership. The law and jurisprudence, both of which grantprecedence of modern law over customary law, settled the coexistence of the two typesof laws.

By virtue of the implementation of the notion of “no man’s land”, which was unknown inthe customary laws of forest-dwelling people, the State claimed all the land on whichindividuals were incapable of showing proof of ownership in accordance with modern law(i.e. land titles).

2. Logging and pygmy rights and livelihoods

As practised today, industrial-scale forest exploitation contributes to the marginalisationof forest-dwelling people in the management of this vital resource.

Such communities are largely omitted from all stages of the process ;

- The granting of concessions is the preserve of the forestry administration, and theprocedure ignores all the marginal communities. The determination of surface areas opento exploitation takes into consideration neither the hunting areas nor the migration zonesof “pygmies”. Only economic profitability criteria are considered when determiningproduction forests, thus ignoring any social consideration. It can be noted, for instance,that most of the production forests in east Cameroon cover primary forests, where theBaka take refuge to flee industrial-scale forest exploitation. It is also been observed that“pygmies” have been excluded by the Bantus from dispute settlements or informationmeetings, as provided for by the forestry law, during which the forest exploiter takes

Part 1

note of the grievances of people living in andaround the exploitation zone.

- Laying down of exploitation modalities, suchas the exploitable species, and thedesignation of ‘buffer zones’ aroundexploitation areas.

Industrial-scale timber exploitation has anegative effect on the “pygmy” populations,both directly through the destruction offorest resources on which they rely, andindirectly by creating access to the forest,with all the consequences that the intrusionof new actors may cause in the social andecological systems of the forest;

1. Alteration of the foundations ofpygmy life: Many species of highcommercial value as timber, suchas moabi and bubinga, also have aneconomic and cultural importanceto “pygmy” communities. Felling ofsuch species by logging companiescontributes in altering thefoundations of “pygmy” life, andcontributes to the destruction oftheir culture.

2. Forest exploitation opens access tothe forest: forest tracks haveopened the forest to poachers whomay carry out game collection on amassive scale. By so doing, theycontribute to growing scarcity ofwildlife resources, which directlyimpact on the diet and thereforequality of life of ‘pygmies’.

3. Community forestry

Since the enactment of the forestry law on20th January 1994, village communities livingon or around State land have had the right toobtain community forests. As defined in thelaw, a community forest is a piece of Stateforest land, free from any forest exploitationlicence, and having a surface area of at most5,000 ha, on which the State grants amanagement concession to a villagecommunity. The State retains ownership ofthe land, but entrusts the management of theforestry resources to the village communityconcerned for 25 years, on a renewable basis.The community forest agreement signed

between the State and the community isaccompanied by a simple forest managementplan that should govern all activities carriedout in the designated area. The forestryadministration has the power to monitor themanagement of the community forest and tosanction communities not working inaccordance with the simple managementplan. Such sanctions may include automaticexecution of the work contained in themanagement plan at the expense of thecommunity, or the termination of themanagement agreement (Art. 38(2) of thelaw).

Forest products of any nature resulting fromthe exploitation of the community forestbelong entirely to the community (Art. 37(3)and 67(2) of the law). Exploitation may beleft either in the hands of trustees, or sub-contracted (Art. 54 of the law).

Under the existing provisions, “pygmy”communities would find it very difficult toobtain a community forest, for the followingreasons:• One of the prerequisites for obtaining acommunity forest is the legalisation of aninstitution representing ‘the community'.Generally, “pygmy” communities do not havethe level of education or social organisationneeded to enable them to fulfil thisrequirement.

• The community forest application dossier iscomplex and comprises many technicalelements (maps and simple managementplans, for instance), which no “pygmy”communities have the capacity to produceunaided.

• The community forest may be designatedonly in areas where the community enjoyscustomary land rights. Generally, “pygmies”who have been re-settled along forest roadsand tracks do not enjoy any customary landrights, as such rights are reserved to theBantus who ‘host’ them. The law does notprovide for the designation of communityforests in the ‘Permanent Forest’, wherepygmies mostly enjoy ‘customary rights’. Thisis therefore a de facto exclusion of pygmiesfrom benefiting from the 1994 Law’sinnovation concerning community forests.

• The maximum surface area of community

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Forestry law and the marginalisation of pygmy populations

Many speciesof highcommercialvalue (e.g.Moabi,Bubinga, etc.)also have aculturalimportanceto pygmycommunities.

forests and community hunting areas(5,000 ha) is not adapted to “pygmies”,whose hunting and gathering way of lifegenerally extends over a much greatersurface areas.

4. User Rights

According to the 1994 law, “user orcustomary right […] shall be thatrecognised to the local people to exploitall forestry, wildlife and fisheries productswith the exception of protected species,for personal use”. However, it is clear that the actualmodalities for exercising user rights aredetrimental to pygmy populations.

i. Rights concentrated in non-permanent national forests: Although the1994 law guarantees the user rights oflocal peoples both in permanent (Art.26(1) and Art. 30(2)) and in non-permanent forests (Art. 36 and 38(2)), noimplementation instrument has yet beenpromulgated to establish the modalitiesfor the exercise of such rights inpermanent forests. There are howevermany limitations to communities’ userrights in most of the permanent forests(which include protected areas andproduction forests). For instance, pygmycommunities living in protected areassuffer from major restrictions in regard tohunting. Furthermore, they may obtainneither a community forest nor acommunity hunting area within the‘permanent forest estate’.

ii. Rights limited to ’personalconsumption’: According to the law,communities are free to collect non-protected forestry products without anauthorisation. However, such productsmust be exclusively destined for ‘nonprofit-making’, personal, use. It istherefore forbidden to sell them. Suchprovisions are in stark contrast to thereality of forest community economies,where the sale of various productsobtained from the forest (within thecontext of exercising user rights), such asfirewood, game, okok (Gnetum africanus),njansang (Ricinodendron heudelotii),honey, medicinal plants, cane andbamboo, are amongst the most common

forms of economic activitiy. “Pygmies” aregenerally hunter-gatherers, and the sale ofthe product obtained from their activitiesconstitutes their main, and often only,source of income. The prohibition of saleof such products collected in the exerciseof their user rights therefore deprivesthem of income, or forces them to operateillegally.

5. Precarious rights.

According to the Forestry Law, Ministriesin charge of forestry, wildlife andfisheries, may, for reasons of public utilityand after consultation with the peopleconcerned, temporarily or definitelysuspend user rights, if the need arises(Art. 8(2)). In practice, despite theconsultation provided for, government

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Forestry law and the marginalisation of pygmy populations

officials cited by the law are in fact the onlyones to decide on the need to suspend userrights. Because they are vulnerable, “pygmy”communities are often the main victims of suchmeasures. For example, with the establishmentof the Campo National Park, a strict andsudden restriction of the user rights of“pygmy” communities was implemented in theregion, which appeared to be accompanied bya significant degradation of “pygmy” livingconditions.

6. Conclusions and recommendations

“Pygmy” communities are an important andintegral part of the cultural and humanheritage of the Congo Basin. In Cameroon,“pygmy” customary rights concerning themanagement of space and resources are amongthose that have been sacrificed in the name ofmodernism, through the imposition of ‘modernlaw’ over ‘customary law’. The frailty of“pygmy” communities existence, compoundedby their strong dependence on an intact forestecosystem, should have justified specialattention by the law in their favour.

Current forest management practices inCameroon may, in the long run, lead to the

destruction of these peoples’ livelihoods.Urgent and vigorous measures need to be takenin order to ensure that forest exploitation andconservation policies are not detrimental tothe pygmies of the Congo basin:

1. There is a need for recognition withinCameroon’s forest zoning plan of “pygmies’”customary land rights, including in concessionsand protected areas. In protected areas,“pygmy” communities should be involved in lawenforcement and other monitoring operations,in collaboration with the administration;2. The logging of species with high cultural,therapeutic or nutritional value for forestdependent peoples should be prohibited;3. The government should increase sanctionsagainst illegal loggers;4. The regulations concerning communityforestry should be adapted to take account ofthe particular context of “pygmy”communities; 5. Definitions of acceptable user rights shouldbe adapted to to encompass pygmy modes ofproduction, in order to enable them earn theirliving legally through the sale of traditionallygathered products in the forest.

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Forestry law and the marginalisation of pygmy populations

1. Introduction

The so-called "pygmy" people are the most ancient inhabitants of the forest. Theydepend on the forest for their livelihood. Current forest management practices do nottake their rights into account but give preference to industrial forest exploitation andconservation through the protected areas system. Such exploitation and conservationactivities jeopardise the interests of "pygmy" populations and significantly limit theiraccess to land and other resources. It appears that in the interests of transparent andsustainable management from a social point of view, the various forest administrations ofthe Congo Basin should pay greater attention to the rights and needs of forest dependentpeople. From this point of view, the problem of land security for the "pygmies" remains amajor issue.

2. The Baka of Lomie, Cameroon

A long time ago, the “pygmies” of the Lomie area lived in the heart of the EquatorialForest. History holds it that they were the first inhabitants of the forests of CentralAfrica. In Cameroon and in Lomie in particular, they are known as the Baka A few yearsafter independence, the budding State of Cameroon adopted a national integrationpolicy. One of its measures was to encourage the Baka to live along roadsides so thatthey could settle down and be modernised. They were therefore asked, through thenational integration policy, to leave their natural habitat, the forest, most of which hastoday become State property.

Due to this situation, the Baka people now suffer harm in their day-to-day relations withthe Bantus (in the area of Lomie, the Nzime people), who only regard them as’refugees’. This is compounded by the fact that Baka villages are often considered by theBantus as ‘camps’, i.e. a precarious and temporary settlement.

The enactment of the 1994 Forestry Law, which grants a few benefits (forest royalties,community forests) to the communities neighbouring the forest, strengthened theposition of the Bantus in their refusal to recognise the rights of the Baka people on theplots of land they have been occupying for several years. It should be noted that thisstems especially from the fact that the law has not clearly defined the notion of‘community’: Is it a family, a village neighbourhood or the village itself? As such, theterms ‘camp’ and ‘community’ continue to deprive the Baka people from enjoying theirrights to own land.

3. The legal provisions

The following section considers the main existing legal provisions as these relate to thesituation of “pygmy” people.

a) The Constitution of 18 January 1996The 1996 Constitution of Cameroon stipulates in its preamble that:" The State shall ensure the protection of minorities and preserve the rights of natives inaccordance with the law".

This is an important step in trying to uphold the main principles of human rights andfreedoms. Generally, these principles favour all citizens including the Baka. Likewise,

Chapter 2

FOREST MANAGEMENT TRANSPARENCY, GOVERNANCE AND THE LAW : CASE STUDIES FROM THE CONGO BASIN

INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR SUPPORT TO SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (CIAD)EELLIIAASS DDJJOOHH

Land ownership in Cameroon : Legal opportunitiesand constraints of the Baka “pygmies”

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Part 1

they establish equality of all people inrights and duties and recognise the needfor their protection by the State. The textprovides that the State shall henceforthensure the protection of minorities andnatives, which implies that the interests ofthe Baka people will be safeguarded.

The preamble also recognises the right forall to settle in any place and to movefreely, provided that they do not violatethe legal prescriptions relating to publicorder, security and tranquillity. However,whilst the Constitution of Cameroon is anexample of ‘pluralism’, this cannot be saidof other specific laws.

b) Land law in Cameroon:Ordinance No. 74-1 of 6 January 1974 tolay down land regulationsSince 1974, land ownership in Cameroonhas been governed by modern law and issubject to the holding of a land title. Ourfocus here shall be on two aspects:

1. For which land in Cameroon cantitles be obtained, and;

2. Who can obtain them?

1. According to the law, individualsand private corporate bodies can onlyobtain land ownership titles on some partsof State land. For lands for which a titlehas never been granted, title may only beissued under certain conditions, namely:- That the land was occupied prior to 5August 1974;- That it is granted by the State as aconcession where the land was notoccupied before this date.

This law is disadvantageous to the Baka,who cannot meet the first conditionbecause most of the land they occupiedbefore this date happens to be Stateprivate property, thereby giving the Statethe right to issue land titles for it.Concerning the second condition, theprocedure for the final attribution of aconcession is very long and rathercomplex, and would be beyond the meansof all Baka communities.

2. As for the question to know“who may be issued a land title inCameroon?” the law states that a title canbe obtained by a village, an individual

from the village, a native of the village orany other person of Camerooniannationality who ‘developed’ (‘mise envaleur’) the land prior to 5 August 1974.

This answer is also disadvantageous to theBaka. Firstly, as mentioned earlier, Bakavillages are considered as ‘camps’.Secondly, it is difficult for the Baka toprove that the land has actually been‘developed’, as their principal activities(hunting, fishing, gathering, etc.) do notleave any direct trace on nature. As forthe requirement of Camerooniannationality, it is still difficult for the Bakapeople to prove that they areCameroonians since most of them do nothave identification documents (birthcertificates, national identity cards, etc.),which also excludes them from theelectoral process.

In general, then, the land tenure system asset out in the 1974 law is of no advantageto the Baka, particularly when it comes toland ownership.

c) Establishment of chiefdoms(Decree No. 77/245 of 15 July 1977)The chiefdom is an institution recognisedby law as a type of traditional authority.Directly or indirectly, it allows theinhabitants of a village to exercise certaincustomary rights on their land. To thiseffect, the law provides that the chiefdomshall be set up on a territorial basis. It maybe a neighbourhood or a village in therural area. In the specific case of ‘third classchiefdoms’, that are probably mostapplicable to Baka settlements, we canonly deplore the fact that the landsoccupied by these people continue to beconsidered as temporary ‘camps’ and notvillages, as the law prescribes.

d) Protection of land ownershiprightCameroon operates under a dual legalsystem: modern jurisdictions that applythe statute law (Law No. 99/157 of 28 July1999) and jurisdictions that use customarylaw (Decree No. 69/DF/544 of 19December 1999). Considering that statutelaw has priority over customary law,especially in land ownership matters, we

FOREST MANAGEMENT TRANSPARENCY, GOVERNANCE AND THE LAW : CASE STUDIES FROM THE CONGO BASIN

As to thequestion “whomay be issued aland title inCameroon?” thelaw states that:a title can beobtained by avillage, anindividual fromthe village, anative of thevillage or anyother person ofCamerooniannationality whowould have‘developed’ theland prior to5th August1974.

12

Land ownership in Cameroon : Legal opportunities and

constraints of the Baka pygmies

can conclude that the protection of theland ownership right of the Baka peopleremains all the more weak.

4. Problems faced by the Baka inobtaining community forests – a casestudy of the village of Payo

Payo is a small “pygmy” village establishedin 1972 by Catholic sisters. This area wasgiven to them by the late Bantuparamount chief named Mabia around1970. It is about ten kilometres from thetown of Lomie. Because it is located alongthe road linking the Lomie subdivision andthe district of Messok, it is increasinglyvisited by foreigners, as well as“pygmies”. The population of about 200people, which consist almost exclusivelyBaka, is growing so fast that Payo iscurrently one of the most populous“pygmy” villages in the East province.

The communities’ decisions are almostalways made after consultation and,ultimately, by women, whose opinioncounts a great deal. The people aredivided into four main families(clans) commonly called "yé". Thetraditional organisation consists ofa chief who represents the wholecommunity, who is assisted bynotables who are clan heads andrespectively represent their "yé"family. Daily activities arehunting, picking and lately,farming (mainly food crops).Faced with financial difficulties,they are often obliged to work forthe Bantus to meet theirsubsistence needs. Payo has onlyone well, that was built by theLomie rural council, and noprimary school and no healthcentre.

Just as with all other “pygmy”communities, Payo inhabitants arefaced with land problems. As thevillage is located between twoneighbourhoods of a Bantuvillage, Doumzoh, it has beenautomatically annexed by theBantu chief, who views Payo notas an autonomous village, butrather as his property. Several

“pygmy” farms and even some of theirhouses are considered as private propertyby the Bantu chief. Land is distributedwithout any consent from the “pygmies”.This situation encourages the illegalexploitation of the Payo forest by small-holders who act in connivance with theBantu chief. In addition, this situation hashindered the Baka community’scommitment to the process of setting uptheir own community forest. Theneighbouring Bantus view the Baka as aminority group that is incapable ofmanaging a community forest, and areopposed to their efforts towards

autonomy1.

5. Recommendations

• The notion of “community” or “village”should be clearly defined in law;

• Community forests for the Baka peopleshould be considered as concessionsrequiring land titles issued on behalf ofthe community;

• The conditions for the creation ofchiefdoms should be clearly set out

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Land ownership in Cameroon : Legal opportunities and

constraints of the Baka pygmies

(number of inhabitants, surface area,etc.) by the administration subsequent tomeaningful consultation with, amongothers, Baka communities;

• Special provisions should be adopted forthe Baka, particularly when it comes toobtaining a land title on a portion of

State land that was not ‘occupied’ or‘‘developed’ prior to 5th August 1974, inaccordance with the current definitions’;

• The forestry law should provide foradditional special measures for the Bakapeople, as well as forest royalties.

FOREST MANAGEMENT TRANSPARENCY, GOVERNANCE AND THE LAW : CASE STUDIES FROM THE CONGO BASIN14

Land ownership in Cameroon : Legal opportunities and constraints

of the Baka pygmies

1. Foreword

The Congo basin is the world’s second largest forest expanse after the Amazon. Thisimmense forest spans several central African countries and abounds with naturalresources. However, in spite of the potential of the region based on its rich and variedfauna and flora, the exploitation of mineral resources and timber exploitation, thepeoples of the countries concerned, especially indigenous pygmy populations, remainvery poor. The problem here lies with the management of these forests and theirresources. The forestry laws in force in these countries do not encourage theparticipation of local communities in the management of forest resources and, as aconsequence, do not allow for a fair distribution of benefits from forest exploitation. Itfollows that the local people, especially the pygmies, cannot engage in ‘self-reliantpoverty alleviation’. The situation of the pygmies of eastern Democratic Republic ofCongo (DRC) is a case in point.

In the DRC, the key principle of the law concerning land tenure is that the soil and sub-soil belong to the State. Traditional authority over land is therefore not recognised bythe law. Such authority exists only in principle; it is just “tolerated”. According to thelaw, the Congolese State is not accountable to local and indigenous communitiesregarding the manner in which it intends to use land. However, without priorconsultation or equitable compensation, it ejected entire communities from their landin order to facilitate the exploitation of timber concessions and the establishment ofprotected areas, pasture lands and farms by private individuals, companies or theState.

In this regard, the AFLEG process is very timely; we hope that it will offer thepossibility to correct errors made in the past in forest management by furthering theenactment, in Central African countries, of forestry laws that duly incorporate therights and interests of local and indigenous communities, so as to ensure efficient andsustainable use of the abundant forest resources of the Congo basin.

2. Introduction

It is generally agreed that pygmies were the first inhabitants of forested Central Africa,including in what is now the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Ironically, these firstinhabitants of the DRC are also the “landless” people of the country. Their habitat, theforest, has been invaded over the centuries by an ever-increasing number of farmers,cattle-herders and forest exploiters who violate the rights of the pygmy indigenes.Unfortunately, insufficient attention has been given to these peoples’ right of access toland, and there has been a lack of consideration and protection they deserve as the‘first citizens’ of the country. The accord, which they have every right to expect fromthe Congolese State, has not been forthcoming. On the contrary, the State has insteadcompounded the uncertainty and instability over pygmies’ land ownership, thusexacerbating their already precarious situation.

Either the successive land laws have always been detrimental to the pygmy indigenes

Chapter 3

FOREST MANAGEMENT TRANSPARENCY, GOVERNANCE AND THE LAW : CASE STUDIES FROM THE CONGO BASIN

NETWORK OF PYGMY INDIGENOUS ASSOCIATIONS (RAPY)AADDOOLLPPHHIINNEE MMUULLEEYY,, AADDRRIIEENN SSIINNAAFFAASSII && PPAACCIIFFIIQQUUEE MM

Forest Governance and pygmy people Access of pygmyindigenes to land : the case of pygmies rejected from theKahuzi-Biega National Park, South-Kivu, Eastern DRC

The laws onland tenure andforestmanagement inDRC have someflaws andshortcomingsespecially withregard to therights andinterests oflocal andindigenouscommunities.

15

Part 1

who, by their culture, happen to benomadic people, hunters and fruitcollectors, or the provisions that canprotect them have never beenimplemented. This is the case withpygmies whose property was damagedand who were expelled from their forestduring the creation of the Kahuzi-BiegaNational Park (PNKB), in the South KivuProvince of Eastern DRC.

Not having received any compensation fortheir brutal expulsion, and since they nolonger have access to the forest in whichthey lived, Batwa (or Bambuti) pygmies,uprooted as they were, now exist insqualid living conditions. They arecrippled by abject poverty, which isexacerbated by discrimination, rejectionand marginalisation by other groups. Inthe Bantu villages in which they tookrefuge during their forced expulsion fromKBNP, they do not have access to land,which is already becoming scarce due tothe population growth of hostcommunities.

This paper raises the problem of landaccess for pygmies. It examines thespecific case of those pygmies whoseproperty was damaged and who wereexpropriated by the Congolese Institutefor the Conservation of Nature (ICCN) andthe Kahuzi-Biega National Parkauthorities, and who were victims of apoor forest management policy. We willstart by dealing with the situation ofpygmies before and after the creation ofthe PNKB, as well as the social, economicand cultural consequences of the creationand extension of the park. Then, we willlook at the often-underestimated meritsof the traditional pygmy methods offorest exploitation that are ‘environmentfriendly’. After that, we will examine thelegal land tenure in the DRC, particularlyconcerning rural lands occupied by “localcommunities” (among which are thepygmies), trying to highlight thoseprovisions that may constitute legalprotection of the rights of “localcommunities,” including the pygmies. We

end this paper by making a series ofrecommendations to the variousstakeholders, in which we emphasise thedeep concerns of the indigenous pygmycommunities about the problem of accessto the peripheral area around the PNKB.

3. Situation of pygmies after thecreation of the park

Concerned with protecting largemammals, especially gorillas, in easternDRC, the colonial authorities created theKahuzi-Biega Integral Game and ForestReserve over an area of around 75,000 hain the Mounts Kahuzi and Biega region in1937. The status of an Integral Reservegave absolute protection to the region’swildlife, thereby prohibiting theexploitation of resources except forscientific research purposes. On 30November 1970, the reserve wasupgraded to a National Park by OrdinanceNo. 70/316 of the President of theRepublic. At the same time, some of itsboundaries were changed and thisreduced the surface area of the park to60,000 hectares. This change ofboundaries led to some confusion that hascontinued until today, particularly in thesouthern part of the former area of thepark.

This park is located on the east of Congobetween 27°33’ and 28°40’ longitude eastand between 1°36’ and 2°37’ latitudesouth. It harbours many animal species,notably 13 species of primates, 9antelope species, more than 400 birdspecies, and thousands of plant species.The pygmies who hitherto lived in thisarea were living in harmony with thiswildlife and, despite popular belief, caredstrongly for its protection. Eloquent proofof this coexistence with wildlife was theabundance of plant and animal life in theforest at the time of the park’sestablishment in 1970, after centuries ofoccupation and exploitation of the forestby pygmies.

The setting up of the park marked the

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Forest Governance and pygmy people Access of pygmy indigenes to land : the case of

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start of the process to evacuate thepeople who found themselves within theboundaries defined by the Ordinance tocreate the park. Although theexpropriation of these indigenous peoplesin 1970 was done in the most brutalmanner, it went on without anyresistance from the pygmies because theygreatly feared coercive measures. Itshould however be noted that they actedagainst their wish, even though theyreceived no compensation or assistancewhatsoever, that would have helped themsettle elsewhere. Abandoned to theirfate, they were forced to become vassalsor slaves in other areas. Consequently,most of them settled in Bantu villagesfound on the fringes of the park, wherethey constitute a minority. Others settledalong the Bunyakiri-Kalonge road in theKalehe and Kabare area. Some of themremained in the area of the PNKB, withthe hope that they would one day returnto their hills.

4. The extension of the PNKB in 1975 –impacts on the pygmies

In 1950, the surface area of the reservewas reduced to 60,000 hectares.However, by Ordinance No. 75/238 of 22July 1975, the National Park wasestablished, covering an area of some600,000 hectares, thus linking the gorillapopulation of the highlands with lowlandforests.

i. Cultural impact

According to the pygmy tradition, land isnot only a functional property capable ofproviding its owner with economicbenefits. To them, land is also sacredbecause it provides food and shelter forthe living, and shelter for the ancestorswith whom it is associated. It isimportant to try to recognise andunderstand the particular and mostlyspiritual relationship that the peoplehave with the land, a fundamentalelement of their very existence and thebasis of all their beliefs, customs and

traditional values. For pygmies, the landis not simply an object of possession andproduction. The very essence of therelationship pygmies have with theirmotherland, their land, is pregnant withmeaning. Moreover, land is not propertythat can be owned. Rather, it is a naturalelement that everybody should use freely.They have continued to highlight therelationship that exists between themand the land. They did this with theimmediate aim of encouraging non-pygmies and leaders to understand thespiritual, social, cultural, economic andpolitical importance they attach to theirland as far as the survival and vitality ofpygmy communities are concerned. Theyhave explained that understanding suchstrong attachment to their land requiresrethinking the conceptual framework andacknowledging the existing culturaldifferences.

The pygmies considered their evictionfrom the forest as expropriation and adeliberate attempt to estrange themfrom their traditional values. As a result,it was increasingly difficult to preservetheir culture and perform their rites intheir new environment. This sparked anidentity crisis, as the pygmies couldbarely adapt to the culture of their hostcommunities while preserving their own.Hence, seeds of persistent ethnicdiscrimination were sown by people ofother ethnic groups who did notunderstand pygmy rituals. Consequently,the pygmy culture was gradually eroded.

ii. Socio-economic impacta) After the expulsion: a catastrophicsituationAs well as disrupting their culture, thedestruction of property and expropriation(without compensation) of pygmies fromtheir natural habitat completely changedtheir socio-economic situation. After theexpropriation, they had to forget abouttheir normal hunting and harvesting andtheir nomadic lifestyle, in order to adaptto a new way of life. It is estimated thatby 1975, 980 pygmy families (that is to

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Forest Governance and pygmy people Access of pygmy indigenes to land : the case of

pygmies rejected from the Kahuzi-Biega National Park, South-Kivu, Eastern DRC

say, more than 6,000 people) had beenejected in the eastern highland forestedpart of the park alone. Since they nolonger had forests in which to hunt,harvest and collect fruits and otherproducts, the expropriated pygmies whowere ejected from the PNKB were forcedto become sedentary and take up farmingin order to survive. But farmers need landto cultivate crops. Yet, the pygmies whowere driven from their land withoutcompensation had no land of their own,and could not access land in their alreadyoverpopulated host communities. With noaccess to the forest or to farmland, it isclear that the pygmies who live on thefringes of the PNKB are bound to misery,wandering and begging.

Consequently: - Landless pygmies feel they have lost thequality of fully-fledged “persons”, as theyno longer have anything to offer theirneighbours in exchange and trade. Theirlives now depend on their neighbours,likea parasite.- They suffer more discrimination thanever before and they are exploited bytheir neighbours, who consider them ascheap labour fit only for degrading jobs.- Their children cannot go to school likeother children because of lack of means.Their youth and future are thereforecompromised. - The pygmies expropriated around thePNKB cannot access medical treatment inthe event of illness (which is frequent)not only because they lack money to getbasic healthcare but also because they nolonger have access to most of the plantsused in their traditional medicine,knowledge of which is declining . Thisexplains why the mortality rate amongpygmies is higher than that of otherethnic groups.- They are poorly dressed and find itdifficult to maintain a good degree ofcleanliness and hygiene since they lackthe necessary products (soap, bodylotions etc)- They have a poor diet, if ever they find

anything at all to eat. Many pygmychildren, and even adults, suffer frommalnutrition, something that was hithertoalmost unheard of among pygmies.- They live in squalid housing conditions.

Economically, the damage was evengreater as pygmies lost the land, which isviewed by Africans as the first wealth. Assuch, they continue to suffer theconsequences of that loss because thehost villages make sure those pygmieswho are lucky enough to be leased landhave no rights over it. With this, cases oftheir unconditional expulsion for no goodreason abound. The pygmy population hasbecome poorer as they were living onsmall resources, derived from hunting,harvesting and works of art. But, pygmiesno longer have the possibility of obtainingthe products from the forest that hasbecome the Kahuzi-Biega National Park(PNKB). It follows that the pygmypopulation who suddenly foundthemselves in a very differentenvironment where they cannot carry outtheir main activities (hunting andharvesting), an environment where theydo not find their usual medicinal plants,are exposed to great danger, which hasled to great loss of human life. There is avery real danger that, if nothing is done,the pygmy population could becomeextinct.

b) Expropriation of PygmiesThe expropriation that followed thecreation and extension of the PNKB wascarried out in flagrant violation of therelevant laws. We would like to focusparticularly on the expropriation thattook place following the extension of thepark in 1975. The administrative phase ofthe procedure for expropriation requiresthat public authorities start by carryingout investigations and by meeting withthe people concerned by the plannedexpropriation. In the case at hand, thepygmies who were living in the areasconcerned with the extension of the parkwere never consulted, as the law

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Forest Governance and pygmy people Access of pygmy indigenes to land : the case of

pygmies rejected from the Kahuzi-Biega National Park, South-Kivu, Eastern DRC

demands, nor were any priorinvestigations carried out. As a matter offact, everything was done without theirknowledge and they received nocompensation, though the law is veryclear on this point.

According to Article 21 of the TransitionConstitution Act (ACT), compensationshall be ‘just and equitable’, that is tosay, enough to cover all the damagesuffered because of expropriation. Itfollows therefore that, for the indigenouspygmy people who, by nature, livenomadic lives, depend on hunting andharvesting which all necessitate largeareas of forest, the just and equitablecompensation should have been toallocate them another forest or an areathat meets their basic needs, and, aboveall, that allows them to preserve theirtraditional and cultural values which arebased on the forest. From the foregoing,it can be concluded that the non-respectof the legal instruments that uphold therights of pygmies on the land affected byexpropriation measures caused them a lotof demographic, cultural, social,economic and other harm.

It is necessary to maintain localcommunities on the land they occupy,given the sacred relationship existingbetween them and the land. Shoulddisplacement become necessary(expropriation for public interest) theinternational community recommendsthat the people concerned should begiven compensation, preferably in kind.This is recognised in Articles 15 and 16 ofConvention 169 of the InternationalLabour Organisation, concerningindigenous and tribal peoples, adopted in1989. The convention states that;

Article 15“The rights of the people concerning thenatural resources pertaining to theirlands shall be specially safeguarded.These rights include the right of thesepeoples to participate in the use,

management and conservation of theseresources.

Article 16Subject to the following paragraphs ofthis article, the peoples concerned shallnot be removed from the lands that theyoccupy.

1. Where the relocation of thesepeoples is considered necessary as anexceptional measure, such relocationshall take place only with their free andinformed consent. Where their consentcannot be obtained, such relocation shalltake place only following appropriateprocedures established by national lawsand regulations, including publicinquiries where appropriate, whichprovide the opportunity for effectiverepresentation of the peoples concerned.

2. Whenever possible, thesepeoples shall have the right to return totheir traditional lands, as soon as thegrounds for relocation cease to exist.

3. Where such a return is notpossible, as determined by agreement or,in the absence of such agreement,through appropriate procedures, thesepeoples shall be provided in all possiblecases with lands of quality and legalstatus at least equal to that of the landspreviously occupied by them, suitable toprovide for their present needs andfuture development. Where the peoplesconcerned express a preference forcompensation in money or in kind, theyshall be so compensated underappropriate guarantee.

4. Persons thus relocated shall befully compensated for any resulting lossor injury”.

5. Conclusions and Recommendations

The law on land tenure and the forestmanagement in the DRC has flaws andshortcomings with regard to the rightsand interests of local and indigenouscommunities. Pygmies have the right topreserve and strengthen the special,spiritual and material relationship linking

FOREST MANAGEMENT TRANSPARENCY, GOVERNANCE AND THE LAW : CASE STUDIES FROM THE CONGO BASIN

It is necessaryto maintainlocalcommunities onthe land theyoccupy, giventhe sacredrelationshipexistingbetween themand the land.

19

Forest Governance and pygmy people Access of pygmy indigenes to land : the case of

pygmies rejected from the Kahuzi-Biega National Park, South-Kivu, Eastern DRC

them to their land, their territory andother resources that they own, occupy orexploit traditionally, and to make suresuch resources and land are preserved forfuture generations. To achieve soundmanagement of the environment andforests, it is necessary to involveindigenous peoples for whom forestsconstitute a natural habitat.

The authors believe that: • Given that the pygmies are

generally recognised as first occupants ofthe DRC; Considering that damage ofpygmy property and their expulsion fromthe PNKB were inequitable (not tomention being in contravention of thelaws in force, as the ICCN / PNKBofficials themselves admit)

• Noting that the legal provisionsthat protect pygmy victims were notimplemented, as the legal expropriationprocedure was not followed;

• Considering that the case ofPNKB is not the only case of illegalexpropriation of pygmy lands in CentralAfrica;

• Desirous to ensure the moral,material and psychological rehabilitationof these expropriated pygmies;

On behalf of the pygmies of CentralAfrica we recommend:

i For Congo and the other CentralAfrican States

- That the Congolese State compensatethe pygmies ejected from the PNKB in ajust and equitable manner by allocatingthem other land;- That the Government of Congo grantsdamages to all pygmies for the wrongdone to them following theirexpropriation and uprooting, with a viewto ensuring their proper development;- That the Democratic Republic of Congoand the other Central African Statesinvolve and integrate pygmy peoples’ inthe process of establishing and managingnational parks and natural or forestreserves;

- That Congo and the other CentralAfrican States take into account theaspirations and interests of pygmyindigenous populations when reviewingand/or drawing up national laws (forestryand land) and guarantee the strictapplication of the laws that protectpygmy populations;- That Congo and the other CentralAfrican States ratify international legalinstruments relating to the rights ofindigenous peoples., who are alwaysvictims of the vagueness and ambiguity ofour laws, suggest that In the case ofexpropriation of land for public use, theState should, when arranging just andequitable compensation, consider notonly the economic benefits that pygmycommunities derive from their land, butalso, and especially the relationship thatexists between them and that land aswell as the need to preserve theirculture.

ii. For NGOs and InternationalInstitutions

- That they support the action ofindigenous pygmy associations of CentralAfrica concerned with the protection ofthe rights of pygmies with a view torehabilitating them, and ensuring theirself-reliance and harmonious integration;- That they encourage the Central AfricanStates concerned to ratify theinternational legal instruments whichprotect the rights of indigenous pygmies,while respecting those already containedin national laws of the different Statesand implementing their provisions.

iii. For indigenous organisations- That they carry out more sensitisationand education campaigns for indigenouspygmies on the land and Forestry Laws inforce in their respective countries.- That they work in synergy at the levelof the Central African sub-region toincrease their strength and be moreefficient.

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Forest Governance and pygmy people Access of pygmy indigenes to land : the case of

pygmies rejected from the Kahuzi-Biega National Park, South-Kivu, Eastern DRC

iv. Recommendations for AFLEG- Given that most of the forests of theCongo basin are inhabited, and that manycommunities depend on forest resourcesfor their subsistence, exploitation ofthese forests must take the rights andinterests of these inhabitants intoaccount. AFLEG must therefore ensurethat the “legality” of forestry regulationsis coherent with international andnational standards of human and peoples’rights. AFLEG should especially require allAfrican Governments to ratifyinternational legal instruments on the

rights of indigenous peoples, includingILO 169.

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Chapter 4

FOREST MANAGEMENT TRANSPARENCY, GOVERNANCE AND THE LAW : CASE STUDIES FROM THE CONGO BASIN

CONGO NGOS LIAISON COMMITTEE (CLONG)CCYYRRIIAAQQUUEE YYAABBOOUUNNAA

Partnership and Governance : the government, loggingcompanies, and road building in the Republic of Congo

22

Part 2

1. Introduction

Within the context of the development of road infrastructure in the northern areas of thecountry, the Government of the Republic of Congo signed a partnership agreement with agroup of forest exploiters working in this zone. If partnership means coming together tocarry out a common interest endeavour, the specific case of the partnership agreementbetween the Government of Congo and signatory logging companies raises a fewquestions. As (good) governance presupposes "rigorous State management", the deliberatecircumvention of national instruments by the very people responsible for enforcing themis a case of bad governance.

The partnership agreement was signed on 8 September 2001 by five ministers and ninelogging companies including:

For government (2001 term of office):- the Minister for the Economy, Finance and Budget- the Minister for Territorial Administration and Regional Development- the Minister for Equipment, Public Works, Building, Town planning and Housing in chargeof Land Reform- the Minister for Internal Affairs, Security and Territorial Administration- the Minister for Forestry Economy in charge of Fishing and Fishery resources.

For logging companies:- Congolaise industrielle des bois (CIB)- Industrie forestière de Ouesso (IFO) - Société arabe libyenne (Socalib)- Industrielle de transformation des bois de la Likouala (ITBL)

- Mokabi SA- Thanry - Congo- Cristal- Likouala timber- Bois et placages de Lopola (BPL)

This case study focuses particularly on thepartnership agreement and its lack ofcoherence with the national instruments inforce, as well as the impacts of itsimplementation.

2. Analysis of legal instrumentsi. Provisions of the partnership agreement

a) The original spirit of the agreement The partnership agreement signed betweenthe Government of Congo and forestexploiters operating in the northern area ofthe country was originally an initiative ofthe President of the Republic of Congo, andwas aimed at ensuring greater involvementof businessmen whose activities would also

FOREST MANAGEMENT TRANSPARENCY, GOVERNANCE AND THE LAW : CASE STUDIES FROM THE CONGO BASIN 23

Patnership and Governance : the government, logging companies,

and road building in the Republic of Congo

contribute to the development of this partof the country. To achieve this ambition,the partnership agreement was perceivedas a legal framework that woulddetermine the role each stakeholderwould play in carrying out earmarkedprojects.

b) The terms of the agreementThe terms of the partnership agreementshow several discrepancies both in theagreement itself and between theagreement and the forestry regulations inforce in Congo (see Table 1):- The agreement provides that thegovernment may take any legal action incompliance with the laws and regulationsin force, but in its chapter on applicabletaxes, the agreement disregards the lawand provides for tax exemption.- In the preamble, the group of loggingcompanies agrees to take an active part inthe partnership. Yet, further on, it shiftsthe responsibility for funding to theGovernment.- The road projects were to be carried outaccording to forest roads’ standards,whereas on the list of road infrastructurein the Ministry in charge of Public Works,this type of roads is not classified underany recognised category.- In the event of dispute, the documentprovides that only the Act of theOrganisation for the Harmonisation ofBusiness Law in Africa (OHADA) shall beapplicable, whereas the logging companieswere established under national laws.

ii. Provisions of the Law on the ForestryCode The Law on the Forestry Code is the mainlegal framework for the management offorest resources in the Republic of Congo.Adopted by the National TransitionCouncil, which was the legislative bodybefore the setting-up of the currentgoverning bodies, and after endorsementby the Supreme Court, it was promulgatedby the President of the Republic on 20November 2000, number 16-2000. The lawprovides, among other things, for the levelof income that the Government of Congoshould expect from the forest resourcesexploited throughout its territory. Sinceprivatisation in the forestry sector hadbeen achieved (Article 80 of the Forestry

Code), the law in question defines thelegal framework for forest exploitationactivity and sets the limits beyond whichthe activity becomes illegal.

iii. Provisions of related instruments At the time of signing the agreement, theLaw on the Forestry Code that waspromulgated in November 2000 hadrendered all previous instruments onforest resource management null and void.Specific aspects of the day-to-daymanagement of forests were governed byMinisterial circulars. The mainimplementation instruments of this newlaw (16 Decrees and Orders) were onlypublished on 31 December 2002.

4- Provisions of company managementagreements

In all management agreements signedbetween the government and loggingcompanies, the latter undertake tofinance specific projects for the forestryadministration, the people and regional orlocal governments of areas in which theyoperate.

Most management and processingagreements have been, or are beingupdated, especially since the publicationon 31 December 2002 of newimplementation instruments of the Law onthe Forestry Code that includes new fiscalprovisions. The company CongolaiseIndustrielle des Bois (CIB), for instance,updated its management agreement inlate November 2001.

As such, the companies resolve tocontribute, especially financially, to alldevelopment works initiated by thegovernment through their supervisoryministry. The management and processingagreement therefore predisposescompanies to a well-understoodpartnership, provided it is well negotiatedby government authorities.

A reading of the contradictions betweenthe Law on the Forestry Code and theagreement under review (as summarised inTable 1) shows many discrepancies, whichallow subtle understandings to ‘slip

FOREST MANAGEMENT TRANSPARENCY, GOVERNANCE AND THE LAW : CASE STUDIES FROM THE CONGO BASIN24

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7 9

FOREST MANAGEMENT TRANSPARENCY, GOVERNANCE AND THE LAW : CASE STUDIES FROM THE CONGO BASIN 25

Patnership and Governance : the government, logging companies,

and road building in the Republic of Congo

through the net’ of the Law and itsimplementation instruments. Since the aimof forestry companies is to make profit,the agreement, which was amended by theforestry companies, but accepted andsigned by the authorities, serves thecompanies’ interests more than those ofthe government. Judging from the way itwas negotiated and signed, the partnershipagreement is a cause for concern to thewider Congolese government, consideringespecially Article 7, which leaves room formuch abuse.

To justify the initiation and signing of theagreement, the government states that itsobjective was to open up the northernregions of the country through theconstruction of road infrastructures.Because the "meagre" resources of theState were not enough to translate thisambition into reality, the support oflogging companies operating in the regionwas solicited within the framework of a so-called ”State-private sector” partnership(see paragraph 1.a of the study).

Such argument is however difficult tosustain, as it is the prime duty of the Stateto construct roads. It is worth noting herethat the roads constructed by the ministryfor public worksand those byforestexploitationcompanies donot have the same characteristics. Theagreement clearly provides that such roadsare "forest standard roads", yet in thenomenclature of roads, the highwaysdepartment cannot recognise this type ofroad. This abnormality, presents anothertechnical problem to implementation.

Logging companies are not established inorder to construct roads. For the purposeof carrying out their activities, they opentemporary roads for transportation of theirproducts. (Though it is true that such roadscan afterwards serve other purposes, theirgoal is to ensure transportation of forestproducts, and only that.) It is clear thatwithin the context of a well-understoodpartnership and through well-negotiatedinstruments, agreements and protocols,such companies can support government

action, as provided for in the contractspecifications included in the managementand processing agreements. However,logging companies should not take theplace of the government.

Lastly, concerning the financial aspects,nothing can make one expect a realbalance between the potential cost of aquality road and the volume of taxes thegovernment would collect from a dozenlogging companies during the two years ofimplementation of the agreement.

5. Losses or gains

Taxes are the mainstay of the Congoleseeconomy and the forestry sector is thesecond source of revenue for the country,after oil. It is therefore crucial that thegovernment's efforts focus on the effectivecollection of all taxes provided for by theinstruments in force. For example, thefees collected by the government over thepast three years stand as shown below inTable 2:

Table 2:Net annual average of fiscalresources collected by Congo during thelast three years (FCFA)

(*At the time of the study, the 2002 reportof the Ministry in charge of forests wasnot yet available.)

Yet, this does not tie in with the terms ofthe partnership agreement. In article 7 ofthe partnership agreement for instance,logging companies are exempted frompaying more than seven taxes to theservices in charge of forestry, and thisrepresents only part of an open list.

6. Conclusion

The government of the Republic of Congohas deliberately signed a partnershipagreement and protocols from which itdoes not benefit. Not only do thesedocuments compromise the nationalforestry regulation in force and create a

1999 2000 2001 Annual average Projection 2002 (*)

783.463.310 1.164.741.531 1.001.526.972 983.243.934 +983.243.934

Patnership and Governance : the government, logging companies,

and road building in the Republic of Congo

FOREST MANAGEMENT TRANSPARENCY, GOVERNANCE AND THE LAW : CASE STUDIES FROM THE CONGO BASIN26

dangerous precedent, but they also costthe Congolese Public Treasury a great dealin lost revenue. Similarly, due to specifictechnical requirements in roadconstruction standards, the Congolesegovernment loses in that it is applyingweakly defined ‘forestry standards’ on oneof the sections of the Trans-Africanhighway that was agreed upon by all thecountries of the Central African sub-region. In due course, it will be necessaryto carry out further studies and expensiveadditional works in order to bring this roadup to national and/or internationalstandards. Forced to respect thecommitment it undertook, the Congolesegovernment cannot rescind the signaturesof the five ministers who endorsed thepartnership agreement. Consequently, theCongolese forestry sector and economy asa whole will be penalised for the twoyears of works on the planned road

projects.

7. Recommendations for AFLEG

One of the objectives of the AFLEGprocess is to ensure that African countriesdraw maximum revenues from theexploitation of their forests. But, of whatuse is it if governments grant facilities toforest companies, exempting them fromcontributing to State revenues? AFLEGshould strongly encourage Africangovernments to stop singing suchagreements with logging companies.

Though governments are turning a blindeye, it is all the more necessary tocontinue to hammer out this notion,through mechanisms such as the AFLEGprocess or other institutions. In thespecific case considered here, in the eventthat the partnership agreement is renewedfor reasons of non-completion of thespecified road projects, it would beadvisable to renegotiate the terms of theagreement in order to respect the forestryinstruments in force.

A review of the legality of this agreementshould be undertaken and, regardingfuture agreements, in order to drawmaximum benefit from its resources and apartnership with logging companies or anyother economic operator, and to avoid anydiscrepancy between legislative andregulatory texts in force and futureagreements with a third party, thegovernment of Congo should resolutelyboard the train of good governance.

Chapter 5

FOREST MANAGEMENT TRANSPARENCY, GOVERNANCE AND THE LAW : CASE STUDIES FROM THE CONGO BASIN

HERITIERS DE LA JUSTICE

FFAATTUUMMAA NNGGOONNGGOO KKIILLOONNGGOO && RROOGGEERR MMUUCCHHUUBBAA BBUUHHEERREEKKOO

War-related forest destruction and rehabilitation :the case of the South-Kivu Province in theDemocratic Republic of Congo

27

Part 2

1. Introduction

The wars and armed conflicts which have been raging in the Great Lakes region for thepast decade have not only impacted on the life and physical integrity of human beings,but also on their environment. The consequence for the Democratic Republic of Congo(DRC) has been the destruction of its wildlife and flora to the extent that today we talkof an ‘ecocide’, meaning the extermination of the ecosystem. The East of the DRC hasbeen worst hit, especially the provinces of North- and South-Kivu, considered to be thegateway of all the wars that have damaged the country. This case study bears on thebackground of wars, the impact of the wars on nature conservation, the areas affectedand the consequences, as well as the responsibilities of the various actors. Lastly, itpresents proposals for rehabilitating this rich biodiversity that has been destroyed and thepossibility to repair all the injustices caused.

2. Background

On 6 April 1994, the day Juvenal Habyarimana, former President of Rwanda, was killedand the Rwandan Patriotic Front (FPR) took power, 4 million Rwandans pourred into theCongolese territory, especially the two provinces of North- and South-Kivu. Following theintervention of the international community, numerous refugee camps were establishedunder the auspices of the UN High Commission for Refugees (UN-HCR). Unfortunately,some of the camps were built on the fringes of protected areas. To crown it all, in 1996,Rwanda invaded the DRC, starting with South-Kivu. A rebel movement, the Alliance ofDemocratic Forces for Liberation (AFDL) was set up, with the support of the sameaggressors. Among other targets of the aggressors were the refugee camps. The conflictthat started in the East progressed to the West, crossing almost all the natural reserves ofthe DRC. It is worth noting that some refugees remained in these natural reserves up to1998. In the meantime, Rwandan refugees, the Interahamwe militias and former RAF(Rwandan Armed Forces) soldiers are still camped in the forests. According to UN-HCRsources, they are estimated to number around 48 000 people.

3. Impact of the wars on the forests

This section presents sites that were seriously affected by the above-mentioned wars.

The Kahuzi-Biega National Park (PKNB)ThePKNB was established by law No. 70-316 of 30 November 1970. As early as1934, thearea had been recognised by the Belgian colonial masters as an integral and zoologicalforest reserve. Because of its rich and rare biodiversity, it was classified as a WorldHeritage Site in 1980, managed by the Congolese Institute for the Conservation of Nature(ICCN). Before being extended, its original surface area was 75,000 hectares .

FOREST MANAGEMENT TRANSPARENCY, GOVERNANCE AND THE LAW : CASE STUDIES FROM THE CONGO BASIN28

War-related forest destruction and rehabilitation : the case of the

South-Kivu Province in the Democratic Republic of Congo

In 1996, the Park was invaded by Rwandanfighters and refugees, to the extend thatthe ICCN has declared that it currentlycontrols less than 10% of the forest, whichhas been classified as an ‘endangered’World Heritage site.

More than 90% of the Park is occupied byarmed gangs including the Maï-Maï, formerRwandan fighters as well as rebel forces(RCD) and their allies of the RwandanPatriotic Army (APR).

The whole PNKB area, which had beenextended to 600,000 hectares in 1975 bythe regime of President Mobutu, wastotally reoccupied by the populationwhich built 64 villages in the Park inflagrant violation of the law. However, itis important to note that , during theprocess of extension of PNKB, thepopulation did not receive anycompensation With the wars, they tookadvantage of the lack of any governmentauthority to recover the land that hadbeen taken away from them.

The Kahuzi-Biega National Park covers theterritories of Shabunga, Mwenga andWalikale in North-Kivu. It was aroundWalikale that the Ugandans extensivelyexploited timber. Between the highaltitude and the low altitude areas, therewas a corridor that enabled animals tomove into the dense forest. This strategicarea was also occupied by armed gangs.

In May 20002 , the former governor of theSouth-Kivu province, Norbert BashengeziKantintima, cancelled some of thecontracts for temporary occupation of thePark. However, this cancellation did nottake effect, as the occupants consideredthat the governor was not qualified topass such an order, Today, the case is stillpending at the Bukavu High Court .

The Virunga National Park (PNV)The Virunga National Park suffered asimilar fate to the PNKB, especially withthe presence of refugee camps near theprotected areas, including Rumango(880,000 refugees), Sake (210,000),Kikumba (250,000), Kahindo (100,000) andKatale (220,000). Humanitarian bodiesdistributed food to the refugees but nofirewood. The refugees claimed that theUnited Nations High Commission forRefugees (UN-HCR) had purchased land inthe Park for them; within a few weeks,the refugees had already wiped out morethan 7 square kilometres of forest insidethe Park.

Most of the refugees went back to Rwandaduring the 1996 war, while the rest wentfurther inside the Park. Armed gangs alsosettled there, especially the Maï-Maï,former Rwandan fighters, theInterahamwe, DRC soldiers and Ugandanforces.

Individual concessions

In South-Kivu, individual concessions ofteninclude many hectares of wooded areas,as trees epitomise wealth; hence thenumerous long-term contracts. With theabove mentioned wars, many concessionsbelonging to individuals were seriouslyaffected, including:

- the concession of the Maristesbrothers in Nyangezi in theWalungu territory

- the concession of Mushera inNgweshe, about 22 kilometresfrom Bukavu in the sameterritory

- the concessions of varioustraditional rulers, etc.

Forest reserves

South-Kivu is home to numerous forest

FOREST MANAGEMENT TRANSPARENCY, GOVERNANCE AND THE LAW : CASE STUDIES FROM THE CONGO BASIN

The greatestvictim of thisdestruction isthe State ofCongo andespecially thepeople ofSouth-Kivu wholive on theriches of theseareas but whonow pay theprice of thewars andattendanteddestruction oftheir richbiodiversity.

29

War-related forest destruction and rehabilitation : the case of the

South-Kivu Province in the Democratic Republic of Congo

reserves including the reserves of Ulindi(Walungu), Lolemba, Ngoma and Kifumbwe(Fizi), Mokanga, Kasombe, Mikelo and Itula(Shabunda), Mushwere (Kabare), Kawiwira(Uvira), Nyamusisi (Idjwi), Numbi andMulagiza, Kasirusiru and Ikonzi (Kalehe), aswell as Chumes island found in Lake Kivu.

These reserves were not spared by thethroes of war. Some of them were ‘de-classified’ by political and traditionalleaders, who handed them over to theirfriends and relatives. The mostendangered ones include the Nyamusireserves of Idjwi, which are currentlyillegally occupied by the population.

4.Consequences

The greatest victim of this destruction isthe State of Congo and especially thepeople of South-Kivu who live on the richesof these areas but who now pay the priceof the wars and attendant destruction oftheir rich biodiversity.

Impoverishment of the peopleThe development programme launched bythe Congolese Institute for theConservation of Nature (ICCN) in favour ofthe local people of the protected areas hasdeclined, plunging thousands of peoplewho benefited from the programme intoabject poverty. Forest exploitationcompanies that employed the local peoplehave wound up or were completely lootedby armed gangs, thereby causing theirformer employees to be laid-off. The lossfor the tourism industry, evaluated atthousands of dollars, affected the localpopulations who derived much benefitfrom this activity.

Displacement of the PygmiesThe pygmy population, whose life is closelylinked to the forest, was obliged to leavethe areas surrounding the park and theforest because of fighting between armed

gangs (see also Chapter 3).

Slaughter of protected speciesThe destruction of wildlife and flora isstaggering. In 2003, it is estimated thatthere are 130 gorillas, including 86 thatare observable and monitored daily by theICCN, whereas there are only 3 traces ofelephants observed The ICCN gatheredelephant and gorilla skulls found in thepark in an ‘ecocide museum’. Thisslaughter was extended to other animalspecies. Many other animals are no longervisible, and it is feared that they havebeen exterminated, or they have fled tomore welcoming forests. Many of theanimals were exported illegally to Rwanda,Burundi and Uganda, and others were heldcaptive in private holdings in Bukavu andits environs.

Flora speciesThe most affected species include thebamboo, the PNKB variety of which is theArundinaria alpina. It occupies 37% of thehigh altitude areas of the PNKB.. Bamboois the most important food item of gorillas.Before 1996, it was estimated that 6% ofthe bamboo surface area was destroyedannually by local populations, but thissituation has been seriously compoundedby repeated wars.

5. Responsibilities / Conclusions

The responsibility for forest destruction isshared at both the national andinternational levels. Since the injusticesuffered is real and the responsibilitiesclearly identified, fair and equitablereparations should be paid; given that theinjustice is material and moral in nature,all those responsible should bear theirshare of the responsibility.

At the national levelThe province of South-Kivu is administeredby a rebel movement called the Congolese

War-related forest destruction and rehabilitation : the case of the

South-Kivu Province in the Democratic Republic of Congo

FOREST MANAGEMENT TRANSPARENCY, GOVERNANCE AND THE LAW : CASE STUDIES FROM THE CONGO BASIN30

Movement for Democracy (RCD) that isbacked by Rwanda both at the militaryand decision-making level. In return, theMovement allows its sponsors to illegallyexploit the wealth of the DemocraticRepublic of Congo. The armed gangs thatchose to operate in parks and forests alsoresort to illegal exploitation andunrestrained consumption of wildlife andflora species.

Miners and poachers have opened quarriesin the park and other forest reserves anddo not hesitate to fell trees for miningpurposes. They are accomplice to armedgangs, farmers, traders and other itinerantpeople. Measures should be taken toseverely sanction all miners and poachers.They should be disarmed and all marketsand sales’ points for ivory and smokedmeat closed.

At the international levelBecause of their presence and militarysupport to the rebels, the aggressors ofthe DRC, i.e. Rwanda, Uganda andBurundi, are responsible for thedestruction of the forests. A great part ofthe timber illegally exploited by the

Ugandan-Thai company called Dara-Forestin Walikale was destined for Uganda. Theabove-mentioned countries should committhemselves to compensate the injusticecaused to the Congolese people.

6. Recommendations for AFLEG

- Local people should be involvedin rehabilitation activities, both at thedesign and execution phases.

- The government resulting fromthe national reconciliation dialogue shouldurgently make an assessment of thesituation of forests in South-Kivu andadopt legal reforms in order to strengthenavailable institutional mechanisms, takinginto account the need for rehabilitation

- More emphasis should be laid onthe interrelation between refugee campsand the destruction of protected areas.

- Stringent laws on the exportationof minerals from conflict areas should beenforced

- Western countries should be heldaccountable for the importation ofminerals and other raw materials fromconflict areas.

Chapter 6

FOREST MANAGEMENT TRANSPARENCY, GOVERNANCE AND THE LAW : CASE STUDIES FROM THE CONGO BASIN

ADVISORY COMMITTEE OF CONSERVATION AND ENVIRONMENTAL NGOS (CCOCE)DDOOMMIINNIIQQUUEE NNSSOOSSSSOO

Recovery of penalties in the Congoleseforest sector

31

Part 3

1. Introduction: The problem

The bad governance observed in the forestry sector is characterized by:- illegal activities, especially non-respect of contract provisions contained in specialspecifications concerning the rights of local people;- lax and even confused application of forestry regulations with regards to thedetermination of offences and recovery of penalties by civil servants.

In addition, corruption and impunity leads to the wastage of forest resources, loss ofState revenue, and an aggravation of poverty and the precarious living conditions of localand indigenous peoples.

To ensure the sustainability of forests, the Forestry Code of Congo-Brazzaville (Law No.16-2000 of 20 November 2000), stipulates in one of its provisions that the government’sForestry services shall draw up and implement national, regional, and local developmentplans so that activities authorized in national forests are carried out in such a manner asto avoid forest destruction and ensure long lasting and sustainable use of the resource(Art. 45).

The Forestry Code institutes a body of forestry workers whose duty is to identifyviolations of the law and of its implementing instruments within their jurisdiction (Art.111). Staff of this and other services, especially judicial police officers, determineviolations of the law in State forests and are supposed to prepare reports about them.

Staff of the service are supposed to take an oath and have the right to request theassistance of the forces of law and order. They may access any home before 5 a.m. andafter 7 p.m. (Arts. 114 and 113), and seize forest products held or being sold illegally(Art. 122). Some of the sworn officials of the service having the rank of Regional Directorhave the authority to decide and to impose a penalty on the authors of violations of thelaw (Arts. 134 and135). The law also authorizes members of the service to bring before apublic prosecutor any suspect whose offence they cannot handle because of its gravity orwhen a culprit does not pay an agreed penalty within the prescribed deadline.

The aim of this study is to identify the strengths and weaknesses, and assess theobjectivity and transparency, of the recovery operations of the Forestry Department, andto indicate the needs for strengthening of the operational capacities of prosecution andcollection services and of judicial authorities.

2-Penalties

i) General penalties:The law on wildlife provides for two categories of offences: contraventions and crimes.Under this law, contraventions are violations that, according to the penal code, arepunished with small fines or with a short imprisonment term (2 months at most).According to the same law, crimes are offences liable to more substantial penalty, that is,

a fine and/or an imprisonment term withthe fine varying from CFA F 10,000 to CFA F5,000,000.

By contrast, the Forestry Code does notmake this distinction and considers that alloffences are punishable with the fines andimprisonment terms stated below.

ii). Penalties for a range of offencesLaw No. 16-2000 establishes a range ofactivities that are likely to have a negativeimpact on the forest and its resources.Such activities and the fine for each ofthem are listed in the chapter on offencesand penalties, and they range from grazingof cattle (fine of CFA F 3000-5000 percattle head) to the non-respect of theforest development plan (fine of CFA F 5million-20 million) and from CFA F 20million - 50 million for non-execution ofthe investment programme for one year. Toensure proper implementation, aprescription deadline of five years is set forcivil actions (Art. 132).

iii) Execution of sentences:- Measures to ensure the execution

of sentences:The following provisions of the Congolese

forestry code can facilitate the executionof sentences. These include:

- Imprisonment for debt (Art. 171);- Sentencing of fathers, mothers,

and guardians for offences committed byminors or wards living with them and notmarried. Masters and principals are alsoheld responsible for violations committedby their agents (Art. 168);

- Awarding 30% of the fines,transactions, restitutions, damages,proceeds of public auction sale or sale bymutual agreement of various products orobjects seized on behalf of the forestryservice and proceeds deriving from lawsuitswon, to staff of the forestry service and allthose who have taken part in prosecution.

- Monitoring, follow-up andevaluation mechanisms:

To carry out monitoring and/or self-monitoring, follow-up and evaluation, theForestry Department has set up a GeneralInspectorate of Forestry. This institution issubdivided into 3 sub-inspectorates,namely, the Inspectorate of Forests, theInspectorate of Wildlife and Protectedareas, and the Legal Inspectorate forfinancial control and auditing. As will beillustrated below when considering the datacollected from penalties, this institutionhas played a decisive and key role infighting forest offences.

3. Efficiency of the penalty collectionmechanisms

Information gathered for the purposes ofthis study in the Brazzaville Forestryservice and the Kouilou Regional Forestryservice in Pointe-Noire shows that theapplication of the former prosecutionmechanism (former law No. 32/82 of7/7/82 instituting the Forestry Code) stillin force (law No. 20/11/2000) has beenonly moderately efficient.

i) The data collected Data was collected through interviews anda study of:

- The dispute registers of theBrazzaville Forestry service andthe Kouilou Regional Forestryservice;

- The annual progress reports of thevarious institutions of the GeneralDepartment of Forestry (theBrazzaville Forestry service andthe Kouilou Regional service);

- The records of the GeneralInspectorate of Forestry;

- The records of the Ministry incharge of forestry.

According to the data gathered, 22categories of forest offences wereestablished in 2002 (see Table 1) and givethe possibility for 69 types of fines. Theseoffences include illegal felling in Stateforests (2 penalties), lateness in executing

FOREST MANAGEMENT TRANSPARENCY, GOVERNANCE AND THE LAW : CASE STUDIES FROM THE CONGO BASIN32

Recovery of penalties in the Congolese forest sector

FOREST MANAGEMENT TRANSPARENCY, GOVERNANCE AND THE LAW : CASE STUDIES FROM THE CONGO BASIN 33

Recovery of penalties in the Congolese forest sector

contract clauses (6), failing to forward thebalance sheet of the 2001 financial year(24), felling of timber above theauthorized quota (3), non-maintenance ofthe forest tracks bordering ForestManagement Units (1), felling of timberwithin a protected area (1), trafficking ofmarks and numbers (1), failing to forwardroad and site maps to the regional office(6), poorly kept site documents (2),obstruction of control by forestry staff (2),and subcontracting of licence to thirdparties (1).

The fines imposed by the ForestryDepartment amounted to CFA F317,300,000, whereas fines collectedamounted to only CFA F 99,350,000,representing 31.31% of the fines imposed.At the level of the Kouilou RegionalForestry service in Pointe-Noire, finesamounted to CFA F 203,596,738 witheffective recovery of CFA F 162,000,005representing a recovery rate of about 80%.The penalties presented here are those for2002. There is little data available for the

Order Category of violation Frequency Defaulting forestry companies Location of the violation zone

1 Logging in the Sate forest 2 EFGC, STCPA, Bois FEU Doumanga

2 Felling beyond outside the authorized limitscoupe 1 STPCPA, BOIS,IFO FEU Igoumina (FMU south II

3 Felling below minimumbelow minimum 1 IFO FEU Igoumina

exploitation diameter

4 Lateness in executing contract clauses 6 IFO, LT, SOCALIB, THANRY CONGO,

SOBDI, COFOBOIS

5 False declaration about size of headquarters 1 SOCALIB FMU West

6 No transit checkpoint 2 MOKABI, BPL FMU Mokabi and FMU Lopola

7 Insulting Affronting forestry agentsofficials 1 LT, ITBL, CRISTAL, COFIBOIS FMU South, FMU

8 Non transmission of 2001 balance sheet 24 MUKABI, BPL, THANRY ?

QUATOR Congo STCPA BOIS UF, Sud UFA UFA Enyellé, UFA

TRABEC MOUNGONDO,

BISSON et Cie, FORALAC, MAN

9 No development plan 1 CRISTAL FMU West, FMU south, FMU South 1, FMU South 1

10 No industrial processing factory 1 CRISTAL FMU Centre, FMU

11 Felling above quota 3 CIB FMU Pokola

12 Unauthorized felling in VMA 1 CIB FMU KabpKabo

13 Un-maintained forest track 1 CIB FMU Kabo-Pokola

14 Ffelling within a protected area (464 feetstumps) 1 MANFATAI FMU

15 Felling above quota authorized in VMA 2 FORALAC FMU

16 Non execution of contract clauses 7 MOKABI, CIBN, BPL, CIB, UFA Centre, UFA Sud 1

TMAN INDUSTRIE, ESBO, IFO

17 No explanatory map 2 KIMBAKALA FORALAC FMU South 2, FMU South 1

18 Non transmission of waybills to regional office 6 QUATOR, KIMBAKALA FORALAC, FMU South 2, FMU South 1, FMU South 2

MANFATAI, COFIBOIS, SFGC

19 Trafficking of marks and numbers 1 FORALAC FMU south South 2

20 Poorly kept site documents 2 KIMBAKALA, COFIBOIS FMU South 1, FMU South 2

21 Obstructing control by forestry agents 2 COFIBOIS FMU South 2

22 Subcontracting of licence to third parties 1 COFIBOIS FMU South 2

Source: Dispute register of the Forestry Department (2002)

CIB: frequency total number of of offences : 4 SOCALIB: frequency of offence: 2

FORALAC: frequency of offence: 2

Table 1: Forestry law violations, Congo-Brazzaville, 2002

FOREST MANAGEMENT TRANSPARENCY, GOVERNANCE AND THE LAW : CASE STUDIES FROM THE CONGO BASIN34

Tabl

e 2:

For

estr

y pe

nalt

ies

impo

sed

by t

he F

ores

try

Dep

artm

ent

in 2

002

Rec

ords

No

Set

tlem

ent

Pen

altie

s D

efau

lting

P

enal

ties

Unr

ecov

ered

R

ate

of r

ecov

ery

For

estr

y R

ecov

ery

in f

avou

r

and

date

reco

rds

and

date

com

pani

esef

fect

ivel

y re

cove

red

pena

lties

allo

wan

ces

of t

he S

tate

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EF

/02

01/2

3/04

/02

EF

GC

EF

GC

15.0

00.0

00-

100

4.50

0.00

010

.500

.000

002/

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F/0

202

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403.

500.

000

IFO

003/

2002

003/

21/0

3/02

45.0

00.0

00E

FG

C/S

AA

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.000

.000

-10

01.

050.

000

2.45

0.00

0

001/

04/0

3/02

004/

04/0

6/02

5.00

0.00

0S

OC

ALI

B-

0.10

012

.500

.000

32.5

00.0

00

004/

2002

005/

06/0

6/02

500.

000

MO

KA

BI

500.

000

100

150.

000

350.

000

005/

2002

006/

06/0

6/02

1.00

0.00

0B

PL

1.70

0.00

010

030

0.00

070

0.00

0

006/

2002

007/

06/0

6/02

500.

000

BP

L50

0.00

010

015

0.00

035

0.00

0

008/

05/0

7/02

008/

06/0

6/02

2.00

0.00

0S

OC

ALI

B-

2.00

0.00

00

-

009/

07/0

5/02

009/

06/0

6/02

500.

000

IFO

500.

000

-10

015

0.00

035

0.00

0

010/

2002

010/

06/0

6/02

500.

000

SO

BO

DI

-50

0.00

00

--

012/

0200

201

1/06

/06/

021.

000.

000

CO

FIB

OIS

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000.

000

0-

-

011/

02/0

201

2/21

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021.

000.

000

LT-

1.

000.

000

0

--

07/2

002

013/

24/0

6/02

1.00

0.00

0T

HA

NR

Yco

ngo

-1.

000.

000

0-

-

003/

2002

014/

12/0

7/02

1.00

0.00

0LT

-1.

000.

000

0-

-

003/

2002

015/

12/0

7/02

1.00

0.00

0IT

BL

-1.

000.

000

0-

-

003/

2002

016/

12/0

7/02

1.00

0.00

0C

RIS

TAL

-1.

000.

000

0-

-

003/

2002

017/

12/0

7/02

1.00

0.00

0M

OK

AB

I-

1.00

0.00

00

--

003/

2002

/01

8/12

/07/

0250

0.00

0B

PL

-50

0.00

00

--

003/

2002

019/

12/0

7/02

500.

000

TH

AN

RY

Con

go-

500.

000

0-

-

005/

2002

02

0/12

/07/

021.

000.

000

ST

CP

A-

1.00

0.00

00

--

005/

2002

021/

12/0

7/02

400.

000

SF

GC

-40

0.00

00

--

005/

2002

022/

12/0

7/02

200.

000

MO

UN

GO

ND

OV

-20

0.00

00

--

007/

2002

023/

12/0

7/02

500.

000

- F

OR

ALA

C-

500.

000

0-

-

007/

2002

024/

12/0

7/02

500.

000

TR

AB

EC

-1.

000.

000

0-

-

Recovery of penalties in the Congolese forest sector

FOREST MANAGEMENT TRANSPARENCY, GOVERNANCE AND THE LAW : CASE STUDIES FROM THE CONGO BASIN 35

007/

2002

025/

12/0

7/02

1.00

0.00

0Q

UA

TO

R-

1.00

0.00

00

--

007/

2002

026/

12/0

7/02

1.00

0.00

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AN

FAIT

AI

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000.

000

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2002

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7/02

1.00

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OF

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1.00

0.00

00

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2002

028/

12/0

7/02

1.00

0.00

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ISS

ON

ET

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1.70

0.00

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100

300.

000

700.

000

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2002

029/

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7/02

200.

000

ES

BO

-20

0.00

00

--

008/

2002

030/

12/0

7/02

1.00

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1.00

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031/

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1.00

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1.00

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05/0

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7/02

1.00

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000.

000

-10

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0.00

070

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0

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05/0

7/02

033/

12/0

7/02

200.

000

AF

RIW

OO

D20

0.00

00

100

60.0

0014

0.00

0

006/

2002

034/

17/0

21.

000.

000

CIT

B20

0.00

00

--

006/

2002

035/

17/0

7/02

200.

000

CIB

N20

0.00

00

--

006/

2002

036/

17/0

7/02

200.

000

MA

V C

ON

GO

-20

0.00

00

--

0062

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17/0

7/02

200.

000

SO

BO

DI

-20

0.00

00

--

014/

2002

03

8/22

/07/

02

500.

000

CR

ISTA

L5.

000.

000

100

1.50

0.00

0

013/

22/0

7/02

039/

02/0

8/02

1.50

0.00

0M

OK

AB

I-

1.50

0.00

00.

--

015/

30/0

7/02

040/

02/0

8/02

1.00

0.00

0C

IBN

-1.

000.

000

0-

-

016/

31/0

7/02

041/

02/0

8/02

1.50

0.00

0B

PL

-1.

000.

000

0-

-

017/

31/0

7/02

042/

02/0

7/02

1.50

0.00

0C

IB-

1.50

0.00

00

--

019/

24/0

8/02

043/

26/0

8/02

1.00

0.00

0TA

MA

N I

ND

US

TR

IE-

1.00

0.00

00

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009/

29/0

8/02

044/

05/0

9/02

1.50

0.00

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1.50

0.00

00

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20/1

1/01

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000.

000

SO

CA

LIB

2.80

0.00

01.

200.

000

70-

2.30

0.00

0

020/

15/1

1/02

500.

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AF

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350.

000

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000

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350.

000

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000.

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29/1

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30/1

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0.00

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27/0

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000.

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MA

N F

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21.0

00.0

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9.00

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02/1

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000.

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1.00

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9/10

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0.00

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1.00

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--

22/2

9/10

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051/

02/1

2/02

1.00

0.00

0C

IB-

1.00

0.00

00

--

Recovery of penalties in the Congolese forest sector

FOREST MANAGEMENT TRANSPARENCY, GOVERNANCE AND THE LAW : CASE STUDIES FROM THE CONGO BASIN36

Recovery of penalties in the Congolese forest sector

So

urc

e :

Dis

pute

reg

iste

r of

the

For

ests

Dep

artm

ent

(200

2)

28/1

7/11

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052/

26/1

2/02

1.00

0.00

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OR

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1.00

0.00

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31/1

7/11

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053/

26/1

2/02

250.

000

KIM

BA

KA

LA-

250.

000

0-

-

32/1

7/11

/02

054/

26/1

2/02

250.

000

-/-

-25

0.00

00

--

35/1

6/11

/02

055/

26/1

2/02

500.

000

MA

N F

AI

TAI.

-50

0.00

00

--

37/1

6/11

/02

057/

26/1

2/02

250.

000

KIM

BA

KA

LA-

250.

000

0-

-

38/2

0/11

/02

058/

26/1

2/02

10.0

00.0

00C

OF

IBO

IS-

10.0

00.0

000

--

39/2

0/11

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059/

26/1

2/02

250.

000

/-/

-25

0.00

00

--

42/2

0/11

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060/

26/1

2/02

250.

000

QU

AT

OR

-25

0.00

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--

43/2

0/12

/02

061/

26/1

2/02

250.

000

/-/

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0.00

00

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44/1

8/11

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062/

26/1

2/02

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000

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GC

-7.

500.

000

0-

-

44/1

8/12

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063/

04/0

1/03

7.50

0.00

0S

TC

PP

AB

OIS

-2.

000.

000

0-

-

41/2

0/12

/02

064/

04/0

1/03

2.00

0.00

0C

OF

IBO

IS-

2.00

0.00

00

--

40/2

0/12

/02

065/

04/1

2/02

250.

000

/-/

-25

0.00

0

26/1

7/11

/02

066/

16/0

1/03

1.50

0.00

0F

OR

ALA

C-

1.50

0.00

00

--

29/1

7/11

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067/

16/0

1/03

500.

000

-/-

-50

0.00

00

--

27/1

8/11

/02

173/

03/0

2/03

25.0

00.0

00-

/--

25.0

00.0

000

--

TO

TAL

317.

300.

000

99.3

50.0

0021

7.95

0.00

02.

7860

.000

71.4

90.0

00

FOREST MANAGEMENT TRANSPARENCY, GOVERNANCE AND THE LAW : CASE STUDIES FROM THE CONGO BASIN 37

Recovery of penalties in the Congolese forest sector

previous years except for 2001, whereinformation was gathered from the reportof the General Inspectorate of Forestry.With regard to the Kouilou RegionalForestry service, one known fine was thatof a CFA F 150 million penalty for fellingwithin a protected area.

ii) The means available to recoveryagents.

Penalty recovery means: Chapter threeand sub chapters 3-1, 3.12, 3.1-1-1, 1-1-2-3, of the Forestry Code set out thepenalty recovery mechanisms and enablethe various corps, especially workers offorestry services, to carry out the actionsexpected of them in order to ensuresustainable management of forests. Intheory, these mechanisms should besufficiently dissuasive, and would increaseGovernment revenue needed forinvestments in forest areas, in view ofimproving the living conditions of ruraland indigenous communities.Unfortunately, the situation on the groundis characterized by many shortcomings.

Weaknesses of forest workers inprosecution and penalty recoveryoperations: Weakness in the prosecutionof offences and collection of penalties isevident from the very few prosecutionactions actually pursued; 26 offencesestablished in 2001, and only 70 in 2002.Furthermore, the amounts of moneycollected each financial year were verylimited: only 99,350,000 CFAF out of only317,300,000 CFAF in 2002 (see Table 2).

Limited number of judicial procedures andmatters brought before the courts: Not asingle case of offence committed in theforestry sector has been brought beforethe competent judicial bodies. Anexamination of the dispute registers showsthat so far no matters have been broughtbefore the courts. However, all competentauthorities namely, the General Inspectorof Forestry, the Inspector of Forests, and

the Director of Forests, are agreed thatthere has been an increase in forestoffences.

Inadequate action by competent services:An examination of administrative records,especially the 2000 and 2001 ForestDepartment annual reports and thedispute registers, reveals the following:- Limited number of control andmonitoring missions carried out in forestexploitation sites. The GeneralInspectorate of Forestry and the GeneralDirectorate of Forestry carried out most ofthe field missions, and prepared thereports;- Very few reports were written by sworn-in-workers of the services in charge of thecontrol and management of state forest,especially the General Inspectorate ofForestry (24 reports only), the GeneralDepartment of Forestry (44 reports), andthe Kouilou Regional service (42 reports).Based on these reports, there were 67settlements for penalties amounting toCFAF 317,300,00 (dispute register of theBrazzaville Forestry service) and a littleless than CFAF 203,596,738 (disputeregister of the Kouilou service) in 2002.

The 2001 report of the GeneralInspectorate of Forestry states that: “itsaction was characterized by aninsufficient number of field missions whichare the cornerstone of the institution.However, the few field missions carriedout paid close attention to theprosecution aspect and produced morethan 20 reports establishing offences forpenalties worth CFAF 20,000,000 againstcompanies guilty of such offences”.According to the same report,shortcomings in the management of Stateforests were noted during the fieldmissions. These include:- Poor implementation of the law andregulations governing the management offorest and wildlife resources, particularlywithin control brigades and stations;- Little knowledge of the key provisions of

the legislative and regulatory texts in forceby both economic operators and theForestry Department, as evidenced by theuncontrolled issuance of exploitationpermits for lumber and special products,and in the collection of taxes not providedfor by the law;- Lack of professionalism during fieldmissions;- Absence of rigour and discipline inhandling seized timber that has beendeclared State property.

- Non-transmission of cases to courts oflaw: In all the dispute registers examined,it was noticed that not a single case ofnon-payment of penalties within deadlineshad been referred to the courts. This isclear negligence of the provisions of thelaw. As a consequence, the penalties (CFAF217,950,000) that were not collected as of31 December 2002 may lapse and thiswould be a great loss to the State.

4. Reasons for lack of collection of fines

Here, we may point mainly to someimpediments and administrativebottlenecks, negligence and eveninadequate staff and financial and materialresources, and probably the abusive use ofsettlement procedures.

i ’Social impediments’These impediments relate especially to theworking conditions of forest workersresponsible for prosecution and recoveringpenalties. These mainly include very lowsalaries and huge unpaid salary arrears.

The average monthly salary of a forestworker stands at CFA F 30,000 and has notchanged for around ten years3 . Theallowances of 10% on disputes that wereinstituted by the old Forestry Code (LawNo. 32/82 of 7/07/82) had not been paidto workers of the sector for close to 11years, and this helps to explain the thegeneral lack of interest in the collection of

forestry fines. This is often manifestedthrough negative behaviours referred to as“field commissions”.One paragraph of the2000 Forest Department annual report(page 15) reveals the following informationconcerning forestry allowances: “a draftorder on the sharing of proceeds fromforestry and hunting cases for the year1991 is being finalised” (emphasis added).

ii. Administrative bottlenecks:These include pressure and influenceexerted by some personalities of theadministrative and even political spheres.Such pressure weakens the properimplementation of the law and regulationsand affects the professional ethics of theworkers of the prosecution and penaltyrecovery services. It also leads to fraudand significant loss of revenue fromsettlement because of what we referred toabove as “field commissions”.

During discussions with workers of theForestry Department, some problemsrelating to administrative bottlenecks werenoted, and included:- The current conflict between the Ministryof the Economy, Finance and the Budgetand the Ministry in charge of Forestryarising from differing interpretations of theForestry Code. The Ministry of Financeintends to take over the collection offorestry taxes and fines from the forestryadministration. Inter-ministerial documentswere even signed, especially that of 27December 2002, to set the maximumamount of forestry allowances to be paidback to workers of the forestry services atCFA F 30,000,000 for the year 2002. Thisinstrument is the source of manycontroversies and, were it to be applied, itis to be feared that there will be manydangers for the effectiveness of penaltyrecovery in 2003.- The case mentioned in the Department’s2001 annual report, relating to fraudulentfelling of timber within two protectedareas, was authorised by a senior officialof the forestry administration with

FOREST MANAGEMENT TRANSPARENCY, GOVERNANCE AND THE LAW : CASE STUDIES FROM THE CONGO BASIN

The averagemonthly salaryof a forestworker standsat CFA F 30,000and has notchanged foraround tenyears now.

38

Recovery of penalties in the Congolese forest sector

FOREST MANAGEMENT TRANSPARENCY, GOVERNANCE AND THE LAW : CASE STUDIES FROM THE CONGO BASIN 39

Recovery of penalties in the Congolese forest sector

acquaintances in the party at fault.

iii. Inadequate personnel:The State forest is estimated to cover a surface area of 20,323,405 hectares. Regionaloffices and forestry brigades were set up to manage them and they continue to do sotoday. There is a need for sufficient and qualified personnel to carry out management,prosecution and penalties recovery activities. Unfortunately, our study of the humanresources documents of the Department of Administrative and Financial Affairs revealsthat there is crying need for workers. There are around 319 forestry workers as against310 workers at the central (administrative) services and 48 staff from other services suchas education, agriculture and computer sciences, giving a total of 677 staff.

The ratio between forestry workers and staff from other services points to a ratheranachronistic situation. Given the surface area of forests to be managed, it is reallyimpossible to talk of efficiency with regard to the prosecution and penalty recoveryservices. This situation is due to the fact that there have been no recruitments since1986 (the Republic of Congo having been placed under the IMJF/World Bank EnhancedStructural Adjustment Programme). In effect, each year, staff size reduces as a result ofdeath or retirement.

iv. Inadequate financial and material means.To tackle the problem of inadequate financial and material means, the ForestryDepartment endowed itself with a financial mechanism referred to as the “NaturalResources Development Fund” (FARN) in 1974. Under the new forestry code, FARN hasbeen transformed into the Forestry Fund, which becomes operational in 2003.

In spite of the existence of this fund, it is to be noted that most of the missions assignedto the forestry sector are not performed as expected because the contribution of thatsector to the State budget remains below expectation. The 2001 annual report of theInspectorate of Forestry notes that “The action of the General Inspectorate of Forests for2001 has, for want of the necessary support requested, been characterized by a verylimited number of field missions, which constitute the cornerstone of the institution’sactivities, etc.”

v. Settlements and their utilisation:Article 134 of Law No. 16-2000 institutes use of ‘settlements’ and authorises competentauthorities (the Minister in charge of Forestry, the Director General and the RegionalDirector of Forestry) to use this when appropriate. A study of the dispute registers of theDepartment of Forestry and of the Kouilou Regional Service of Forestry shows that not asingle case was referred to the courts even in case of a repeat or serious offence such aslogging within a protected area. It can be concluded that there has been a systematicrecourse to ‘settlement’. As a result, the judicial authority called upon to intervene inforestry matters has been prevented from performing its duties. In addition, the paltrypenalties imposed on defaulting companies have not been dissuasive.

5. Improving the recovery of penalties

The authors of this study believe there is a need to ensure objectivity and greatertransparency of penalty recovery operations in the Congolese forestry sector. There isalso a need for strengthening of the operational capacities of the prosecution and

FOREST MANAGEMENT TRANSPARENCY, GOVERNANCE AND THE LAW : CASE STUDIES FROM THE CONGO BASIN40

Recovery of penalties in the Congolese forest sector

recovery services of the ForestryDepartment through the implementationand improvement of recovery, follow-up,and supervision procedures.

To this end, actions should be undertakenat the level of competent services andstakeholders including training and otheractivities geared towards the improvementof recovery operations. Below are somespecific suggestions as to how this canhappen.

i. Improving penalty recovery throughreform or strengthening of the forestryservicesThe above shortcomings of the competentservices as well as other services involvedcalls for an improvement of the penaltyrecovery mechanisms and services of theCongolese forestry sector.

Improvement of recovery can be done intwo ways namely, through theenhancement of the capacities and meansof the Forestry Department and itsbranches (regional offices and theirbrigades) and involvement of otherstakeholders recognized by the law(including Law No. 16-2000, Law No.48-83,Law No 003/91).

The following solutions are envisaged: - Building the operational capacities of theForestry Department and of regional andother offices of the forestry sector. Thereis need to carry out a structural reform inthe handling of legal affairs by setting up alegal affairs service having two bureaux atthe level of the central service(Department of Forestry and Departmentof Wildlife and Protected Areas) and at theregional level (regional services). Thebureaux should have the followingfunctions:- Prosecution Bureau;- Penalty Recovery and Follow-up andDisputes Such a bureau to be responsiblefor relations with judicial services andother competent services.

The attributions and organisation of theservice could be as follows:a) Purpose:- follow-up the transmission of reports

drawn up by competent services especiallythe forestry services and others;- gather, process, analyse, update, andpreserve data relating to cases;- organize and structure data relating tocases;- generate a litigations data base;- assist legal affairs services and regionallegal affairs bureaux;- study reports and files relating to casesand update registers;- perform other tasks falling within itscompetence.

b) Attributions of the bureaux:

i. Prosecution Bureau:- gather, process, analyse, update andpreserve information relating to datacontained in reports;- study the annual reports of the Ministryin Charge of Forestry, those of the variouscentral and regional services as well as theGeneral Inspectorate of Forestry;- prepare and manage registers for thefollow-up of reports and sales by mutualagreement of objects seized andconfiscated by the courts;- create a data base;- perform other tasks falling within itscompetence.

ii. Penalty Recovery and Follow-up andDisputes Bureau responsible for relationswith judicial services and othercompetent services- gather, process, analyse, update andpreserve information relating to forestryand/or hunting penalties;- study the annual reports of the Ministryof Forestry, forestry and wildlife servicesand regional forestry services;- prepare and manage registers of disputes, reports and settlements, courtjudgements relating to forestry and

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wildlife matters, bills to be cashed, ‘formsof transmission’ to the courts of cases ofnon respect of transaction deadlines andfollow up the judgements;- organize and structure settlement data;- create a data base;- propose mechanisms necessary toimprove disputes management .

iii. Strengthening the resources ofcentral and regional forestry and wildlifeservices and brigadesAs mentioned above, the human, financialand material resources available to theprosecution and penalty recovery servicesare largely insufficient. This constitutes amajor obstacle to field activities andconsequently makes the recovery offorestry and hunting penalties lessefficient.

Strengthening the operational means ofthe various bodies responsible for penaltyrecovery will thus logically lead to animprovement of performances. This meansthat with regard to financial and materialresources, the following measures shouldbe taken:- earmark transportation and financialresources (two vehicles per regionalservice and one vehicle per brigade everytwo years). In addition, off- road bicyclesand adequate finances should be madeavailable.- empower the personnel recruited byconservation projects and forestconcessions as part of the Surveillance andAnti-poaching Units (USLAB). The casestudy carried out by VenantTCHOUKOMAKOUA and Grégoire JIOGUEwithin the framework of ECOFAC, and theongoing negotiations between theGovernment and the World Bank and theIMF as part of the Emergency andEconomic Revival Credit (CURE)programme, are viable alternatives forsolving the problem.

iv. Involvement of conservation andenvironmental NGOs and Associations

It has been noted that workers of forestryservices have, until now, not been veryinterested in the recovery of forestrypenalties, hence the low level of recovery.Campaigns to sensitise forestry companiesto take this concern into account appearto be a welcome solution. The Minister ofthe Forestry Economy and theEnvironment with whom we had aninterview on 6 February 2003 has alsosupported this idea.

The Minister expressed his desire to seeNGOs and Associations supportGovernment action within the context ofthe programme of conservation of forestsand protected areas. In a welcome act of‘transparency’, the minister provided theauthors and other NGOs with the texts of16 implementation instruments of theforestry code.

v. Involvement of local and indigenouscommunitiesSensitisation of local and indigenouscommunities, or in short, the generalpublic, about forestry penalties and theirrecovery could also be envisaged throughseminars, training workshops, filmprojections, commented pictures andposters. However, such programmes wouldrequire resources that are not presentlyavailable.

vi. Direct involvement of financialservicesThe Lands and Stamp Duty Service shouldbe involved in the recovery of fines arisingfrom sentences pronounced in applicationof Paragraph 2 of Article 170 of theForestry Code. This will help avoidfrustration, quarrels and conflicts ofcompetence. It is to be noted howeverthat the above service and the ForestryDepartment have always worked incollaboration especially with regard toforestry and hunting penalties.

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vii. Involvement of an IndependentObserverThe low level of penalty recovery (seeTable 2) could also be offset by involvingan Independent Observer, which is of greatimportance and interest in view of thecountry’s credibility vis-à-vis internationalfinancial institutions and programmes,including the HIPC initiative. However,such a commitment with this mechanismpresupposes proper definition ofresponsibilities in its implementation. Inthis light, the role of an IndependentObserver could be as follows:- to contribute to the dissemination ofinformation on penalty recovery andsupervision at the local, national andinternational levels, in order to improvetransparency;

- to facilitate the development of acomputerized system for the follow-up ofdisputes and field missions relating tofinancial auditing and other managementactions.

The objectives of the independentobservation would be as follows:- ensure the fairness and transparency ofmonitoring and penalty recoveryoperations carried out by the forestrydepartment and the Lands and Stamp DutyService;- build the operational capacities offorestry workers through theimplementation and improvement ofprocedures;- analyse the monitoring and recoverymodalities through the role of the variousstakeholders and use a specific referencesystem for offences and penalties that wasestablished in conformity with the lawsand regulations in force;- help to ensure implementation of therecommendations and decisions ofmonitoring and recovery missions that shallbe carried out by the various services ofthe Forestry Department with the supportof the independent observer.

The overall mandate of an independent

observer could be as follows:- participation of the independent observeras a member of all the control andrecovery missions;- free and unconditional access to checkall documents relating to control andpenalty recovery;- presence of the independent observerduring hearings of offenders beforedrafting of reports;- independent observer’s access to thevarious titles for the removal of timberand/or wildlife products;- participation of the independent observerin meetings for the granting of permits andthe validation of reports.- The right of the independent Observer topublish its reports.

viii. Improvement of penalty recoverythrough sensitisation and education ofpenalty recovery workers and peopleliable to penalties It has already been noted that fines leviedfor breach of forestry regulations are notsufficiently dissuasive, which explains therepeat offences and non-respect of the lawand regulations in force. In addition, thenegligence of some forestry workerscontributes to the promotion of suchreprehensible behaviour.

Hence, there is a need to organize moresensitisation and education campaigns forthe above-mentioned stakeholders.Activities to be carried out during suchcampaigns could be those defined underthe sub-heading on the involvement ofconservation and environmental NGOs andAssociations.

ix. Improving the salaries and allowancespaid to prosecution and penalty recoveryagentsStaff competent to prosecute forestryoffences and to recover the requiredpenalties are exposed to what we may call‘latent or active corruption. Also, althoughthe Forestry law in force gives anindication of the benefits accruing to

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prosecution agents, the salary situation ofcivil servants is a problem yet to besolved. We strongly suggest the followingsolutions:- raising the index point from today’s 160to 210 as decided during the sovereignnational conference;- Promoting workers to higher scales with afinancial supplement, which would requirethat the current situation should bereviewed by an administrative instrument;- Revocation of the roughly 28% cut in thesalaries of some civil servants.

This proposal would be in line with stepstaken by the Government and internationalinstitutions (World Bank and IMF) throughsuch initiatives as the Emergency andEconomic Revival Credit (CURE) and theHeavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative(HIPC).

x. Improving the procedure for assessingthe settlementArticles 134, 135, and 136 of Law No. 16-2000 (the Forestry Code) indicate therange within which the authoritiescompetent to strike a settlement shouldconform, but are unfortunately silentabout the criteria to be used to calculatethe fines. Consequently, we propose thefollowing formula:Fine = X + Y + Z + Q where:X = the market price of the product;Y = fees attendant to the exploitationpermit / contract or licence;Z = the State’s shortfall, that is (X + Y)plus a 130% surcharge;Q = expenses incurred to track down andarrest the offender.

6. Conclusions and recommendations

i. Main conclusions

The Forestry Department has a legal andregulatory framework that was recentlysupplemented with 16 implementationinstruments published on 31 December

2002. This almost complete framework forthe sustainable management of forestryand wildlife resources contains provisionsthat involve all stakeholders (State, NGOsand Associations, local and indigenouscommunities and the private sector).Provisions relating to prosecution andpenalty recovery are sufficiently detailedand provide for some benefits, especiallythe proceeds of cases (30%), which shall beshared among forestry workers and anyother person having participated inprosecution (Art. 172).

Unfortunately, penalty recovery remains aproblem. There is need to develop newmechanisms in order to ensure that thisactivity contributes to a raising of Staterevenue which is needed to develop thehinterland where local and indigenouspeoples live in abject poverty and inextremely precarious conditions.

ii. Main recommendations:

Law and institutions: The followingrecommendations are made:

1. The setting up within thecentral services (Forestry and WildlifeDepartments) and the regional services ofa legal affairs service which should havetwo bureaux, one for prosecution and onefor the recovery and follow-up of penaltiesand legal matters.

2. Instituting nine registers (maindisputes, reports, settlements, reports ofsales by mutual agreement of objectsseized, reports of cases referred to thecourts, etc.).

3. Strengthening the human,financial and material resources of theGeneral Inspectorate of Forestry and thoseof the central and regional services andbrigades.

4. Reviewing the salaries and eventhe financial and material benefits ofworkers of the forestry administration as ameans of fighting corrupt practices.

5. Increasing the staff strength ofthe service in charge of forestry which at

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Recovery of penalties in the Congolese forest sector

present stands at barely 319 forestryworkers. In this way, absorption into thecivil service of the commissioned forestrystaff working in protected areas and inSurveillance and Anti-poaching Units(USLAB) may be the immediate solution.Staff recruitment may be envisaged withinthe context of the Emergency andEconomic Revival Credit for whichnegotiations are currently underway withthe World Bank.

6. Involving conservation andenvironmental NGOs and Associations inthe sensitisation of timber companies andlocal and indigenous communities onillegal practices of forest resourceexploitation.

7. Defining the criteria forcalculating fines for settlement.

8. The relevant implementationinstruments as applicable from 2003onwards should contribute to ensuring thesustainable management of forests.However, they are somewhat complex forthe uninitiated, and are generally poorknown understood by the relevantstakeholders. Consequently, it is necessary

to disseminate them among NGOs, theprivate forestry and industrial sector, andthe public in general, in order for them tobe effective.

Conservation and use of forest ecosystems:The following recommendations are made:

9. Establishment of an IndependentObserver of forest law enforcement.

10. Better involvement of NGOsand Associations.

11. Involvement, sensitisation, andtraining of local and indigenouscommunities.

12. Sensitisation of defaultinglogging and hunting companies liable toforestry penalties.

1. Introduction

As part of its programme aimed at protecting the environment and forest peoples, OCDHundertook to report on a case of forest exploitation in the Mayombe forest, moreprecisely in the Niari region, situated in the southeast of the Republic of Congo. Thereport brings to the fore the problem of lack of transparency in the region, of disrespectfor the law and for human rights abuse. The case under review, which is not the onlyone, reflects a practice that is generalised in the logging sector in Congo.

It is not by chance for instance that the logging company Hazim-Cristal, charged forillegal logging by the Government of Cameroon. Hazim-Cristal distinguished itself throughillegal logging, especially in Forest Management Units 10 030 and 10 029 in Cameroon,which has been well documented (see, for example, the July 2002 issue of the newspaper“Bubinga”) .This company has now moved from that country to establish itself in Congowhere recent satellite photographs have shown that it may well be exploiting beyond thelimits of its concession there too.

Although informed of the fact, the Congolese authorities did not yet deign to take theappropriate sanctions against the Group.

Just like oil, which is the main source of revenue for the Congolese State budget,excessive logging has negative impacts on the rights of the people who are supposed toenjoy the resulting economic and financial benefits. In addition, the part played bytimber and oil in the origin of recurrent wars in Congo is proof of the need of transparentmanagement of these resources.

2. Logging by Tamann Industrie Limited in the Mayombe forest

Tamann is a company under Congolese law and founded by Chinese entrepreneurs. Thelogging activity is governed by an agreement signed between the government andTamann. The agreement was signed on the basis of a transfer of concessions that hadhitherto belonged to small-scale Congolese logging companies. But the terms of theagreement are known neither to the inhabitants of the localities concerned, nor to theworkers of the company, as the agreement has never been made public. As a result,Tamann officials import manpower from Malaysia and the Philippines, considered to bethe cheapest in the whole world, instead of recruiting local peoples in Congo. Theimportation of such cheap manpower is undertaken before the watchful eyes of theCongolese authorities. It is Malaysian workers, for the most part, who are responsible forevacuating the timber day and night from logging sites to the port of Pointe-Noire.

3. An impressive lorry fleet and timber yard managed without transparency

With the arrival of Tamann Industrie Limited, State authorities announced the installationof an industrial-scale sawmill at Makabana. A year after, only a timber yard and a garageare evidence of intense activity. Logs are transported to Pointe-Noire by impressiveconvoys of trailers, to be loaded in ships and conveyed to where they will be processed.Congo is experiencing a green gold boom, but at what cost?

Chapter 7

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Part 3

CONGOLESE OBSERVATORY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (OCDH)RROOCCHH EEUULLOOGGEE NN’’ZZOOBBOO

Forest exploitation in the Republic of Congo :The case of Tamann Industrie Limited in theMayombe forest

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Forest exploitation in the Republic of Congo :

The case of Tamann Industrie Limited in the Mayombe forest

Mila-Mila is the main control post of theNiari Regional Department of Forestry. It issituated at the crossroads of the majorlogging zones (Makabana, Divenie andMossendjo) towards Pointe-Noire. Tamannhas a timber yard of 20 hectares there5.

In Makabana, just as in Mila-Mila, the logsthat are packed in endless heaps in yardsbefore being transported to the Pointe-Noire seaport, through Hinda, seem toecho the sound of felling of huge treetrunks of the Ingolo forests at Sibiti,Mossendjo (to the north-east) and Divenie(to the north-west). The inhabitants of theNiari region cannot remember havingexperienced such a concentration of trucksloaded with logs on their roads before thecoming of the Tamann logging company.The fleet of lorries is, indeed, impressivelorry fleet; the Union Transport Africa(UTA) garage showed some thirty forty-tontrailers when the authors of this studyvisited it, and, at the lowest estimate, atleast 150 Mercedes trailers are involved inthe logging business. When added todumper trucks, the unloading machinesand the four-wheel drive cars, one canhave an idea of the means deployed forlogging.

In less than a month, the Mila-Mila park,whose dimensions were not disclosed by itshead, Mr. Ling, has filled up with timberfrom Mossendjo and Divenie. In theabsence of a sawmill, it can be feared thatthe intensive exploitation would notguarantee the presence of Tamann inMakabana for very long. This thereforesuggests that there is little guarantee thatpeople living around the operations willever be able to gain employment with thecompany.

4. Violation of the law and corruption

The Forestry Code of Congo limits thequantity of timber produced each year. Forinstance, Sobodi, sub-contactor of Tamann,has a licence of 70,000 hectares inDivenie. Its direct or indirect beneficiary issupposed to exploit at most 40,000 cubicmeters of timber annually. In 2002,Tamann, is believed to have producedbetween 100,000 to 130,000 cubic metersof timber. In addition, only 40% wassupposed to be exported and the restprocessed locally. This however, has notbeen the case.

During its establishment in Congo, Tamannhad promised to set up a sawmill in Mila-Mila, in accordance with the law thatstipulates that a logging company may notexport more than 40% of production asunprocessed timber. However, there is stillno such sawmill, and the timber felled inthe Niari region barely makes a stop-overin Mila-Mila, then on to a yard at Hinda,before being conveyed directly into shipsat the Pointe-Noire seaport in the form oflogs.

Logging activities by Tamann appear tobreach various aspects of the law,apparently with the knowledge of localofficials. According to workers interviewedon-site, the company fells trees withoutrespecting the norms and withoutdistinction of species. When such facts arereported to the authorities, no actionfollows, although no official of theForestry Economy Department or the Sub-

Abong Mbang - Lomie road reconstruction. In Cameroon also, road are suffering.

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Divisional Office would state clearly thatthe allowable annual cut (VAM) of timberis respected by Tamann in such sites.

There are numerous means of collusionbetween the State and the loggingcompanies engaged in forest exploitationin Congo by which companies evadesanctions and taxes. Amongst these arethe purchase for State officials of four-wheel drive Toyota cars, computers, andthe carrying out of renovation works atRegional Forestry Department offices. Itcould be argued that the State does nothave the means or any economic operatorto carry out such works, and that theState could not turn down the services ofa benefactor; but at what cost are suchrepairs done?

In the case of Tamann, followingaccusations of complicity andmaladministration, the ForestryAdministration acknowledged themalpractices of logging companies. Assuch, in the final release of the budgetarysession of the Divisional Council held inDolisie from 26 May to 1 June 2003,divisional councillors condemned “… thecriminal practices of logging companiesand the prospect of an ecological disaster…”. They were worried about the rate ofexploitation of the logging companies,which not only do not respect the termsspecific in their contracts, but alsodamage the environment. The Councilstated that: “logging companies,especially Tamann and Man Fai Tai, freelyexploit timber in our division withouttaking into consideration the contractspecifications. As such, if nothing is done,after a few years, the forest zone of theNiari region will become a desert. Toremedy a situation that does not benefitour division in any way, the Council firmlyrecommended that the logging companiesshould strictly respect the laws andregulations of the Republic in exercisingtheir functions”. Consequently, theCouncil set up a seven-man Commission ofEnquiry on logging in the Division.Unfortunately, the practice in Congo is

that Commissions of Enquiry never releasetheir reports publicly.

5. Violations of the rights of workers

Logging companies are known for poorpayment of their workers. Working hoursare so restrictive and poorly calculatedthat the employees feel as though theyare being ‘squeezed like lemons’.Officially, work begins at 7 a.m. and endsat 5 p.m., with a break from 11 a.m. to 1p.m. In reality, work ends between 8 and10 p.m. and up to midnight for those atthe garage, although often only eighthours of work are recorded.

Considering the length of the working day,and that the working week excludes onlySunday, it is unsurprising that the workersof this company have the feeling of being‘enslaved’. Life is reduced to ‘work-bed-work’, which is devastating for family life,and is the cause many resignations. InMakabana, Tamann employees have beennicknamed “bangamba” (slaves). Oneworker interviewed complained that “it isas if we were back in the colonial days”.

In addition, trade unionism is almost non-existent. Mr. Joseph Koumba, theSecretary General of the Niari RegionForestry Workers Trade Union, points outthat Tamann impedes trade union liberty.In February 2003, it’s the companyunlawfully dismissed four workers on thegrounds that they had been elected tradeunion delegates (in accordance with thepre-electoral Memorandum ofUnderstanding provided for by the forestrycollective agreement). The dismissal tookplace with the knowledge of regionalauthorities, notably the Makabana Sub-divisional Officer, Mr. Jean FrançoisNgembo and the regional director oflabour, Mr. Remi Bawawana. TamannLimited did not respond to the petitionsent to them by the Forest Workers TradeUnion after the dismissal.

The company has a “monitoring” system,and we were told that the company does

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not hesitate to remind employees of their‘vigilance’. Employees have been told thatthe company does not want to hear anycomplaint from them about their workingconditions, let alone about their rights.The company apparently has a dismissiveattitude towards visiting officials of theLabour Inspectorate, arguing that thecompany only wishes to deal with the “bigfish” of the administration. Trade Unionrepresentatives are chosen by thecompany management, not by workers.

Workers report that they have beenpressurised to sign worksheets withouthaving the possibility of seeing whatexactly was recorded on them. One truckdriver stated to us that “it is because jobsare rare after the war; there are very fewenterprises. We are obliged to stay onwith such enterprises in order to meetfamily obligations, otherwise I would haveresigned. It is a prison which in additionpays poorly”.

The situation of truck drivers isparticularly bad. In order to obtain a livingwage, they have to multiply the number ofjourneys driven. We were informed of onedriver who, without an assistant, madeeighteen trips to Hinda in one month,without any sleep - for which he receivedpayment of around CFAF 400,000). Thiscompared with payment of close to onemillion francs that had been earned forsimilar work with a previous employer.

6. Laxity of the authorities in monitoringthe activities of Tamann IndustrieLimited

The monitoring of the activities of TamannIndustrie Limited appears to be little morethan a mere formality. The main controlpost of the Niari Regional Department ofForestry in Mila-Mila, for instance, servesas the registration office. It wasdiscovered that workers of the forestryadministration posted there rarely leavetheir offices to inspect parked vehicles,nor compare the loading declaration withthe actual goods on board timber trucks.

They often fail to verify if the waybillsubmitted to them by the truckers is inconformity with the declared loads. Thedrivers themselves confided to us that thetrucks transport between 70 to 120 cubicmeters per load. A few days of observationat Mila-Mila suggested that the authorisedallowable annual cut is being greatly andsystematically exceeded.

In addition, while most of the activitiestake place in the Niari region, Tamannpays its taxes in Pointe-Noire where, up toJune 2003, certificates of origin wereissued.

Apart from their laxity in controllingtimber exploitation and the way workersare treated, the Congolese governmenthas failed to ensure that the companymeets it obligations to process timberlocally, so as to create added value andjobs for local people.

For many years Tamann collected timberfrom the forest on the basis of contractswith small-scale logging companies, whichare holders of small licences granted for aduration of seven years, with a well statedallowable annual cut (VMA) for the periodcovered by the licence. The Forestry Codedoes not however provide for renting orleasing of a licence to third parties. Thisraises the issue of the legality of theactivities carried out by Tamann before itsigned a logging agreement with theCongolese government in December 2002.

Tamann’s partners, who own the licencesconcerned, include: Sociéte des Bois deDivenie (Sobodi - 70,000 hectares),Afriwood (35,000 hectares), KoumbaBernard (17,000 hectares), Ingolo, Sibiti),Société Industrielle des Bois du Niari (Sibn,former Sibom) in Mossendjo, Boplac inMbouyi, Société Forestière Goma Gastonet Compagnie (Sfgc). These are Congolesewho were unable to exploit the licencesgranted them, but the fact remains thatthe ‘leasing’ of their licences is illegal. Inprinciple, when a licence is not exploited,it is supposed to be returned to the State.

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Forest exploitation in the Republic of Congo :The case of Tamann Industrie Limited in the Mayombe forest

There do not appear to have been propercontrols to ensure that the allowableannual cut, as prescribed by the Forestrycode, has been respected by Tamann . Theauthorities in Gabon noticed throughsatellite surveillance that Tamann hadlogged beyond limits in the area ofDivenie and that tree fellers had enteredGabonese territory.

7. Degradation of the forest, roadinfrastructure and the environment

The intensive and rapid exploitation of theforest by Tamann is particularly worrying,as the forests’ ecology has already beenweakened by past exploitation. Thecompany’s exploitation of immature treesraises doubts about the ability of theforest to recover.

Another source of worry is the damagecaused to bridges and roads by the veryheavy weights of the company’s lorries.Roads used by UTA and Tamann lorrieshave been widened but road maintenanceremains poor. Both the Makabana-Mila-Milaroad and the Divenie road, which werepreviously at least partially covered withlaterite, have been stripped, leavinglayers of dust of up to 30 centimetresdeep in the dry season.

The rainy season brings so much mud thatonly heavy-duty trucks can ply through.For the 63.5 km separating Dolisie andMila-Mila, the road that has not beenmaintained since 1997 has become aquagmire. As such, in February 2003, theparliamentarians of the districts ofKibangou (Damien Boussoukou Boumba)and Divenie (Claude Etienne Massimba)had to make several diversions of morethan 170 km to reach their respectiveconstituencies, despite the fact that theywere riding in four-wheel drive cars, notaffordable by their constitutents or thelocal public transport companies. It isreported that Tamann may in future usethe Itsotso-Leboulou-Kibangou road forlogs from Mossendjo. The fear is that once

operational, this portion of the road wouldsuffer the same fate as the former.

On Highway No. 3, which runs from Dolisieto Gabon through Mila-Mila, Kibangou andLoubeti, there is a bridge on the Niari,constructed in 1949 and intended toreceive at the time a maximum load of 35tonnes. About 400 trucks loaded with logsbelonging to Tamann or its sub-contractorsUTA (Union Transport Africa), Man Fai Taior the Société des Transports Terrestres(STT) ply the road regularly in order toevacuate their timber to the Pointe-Noireseaport, in a convoy of three or fourtrucks. The Niari Bridge, which suffers theconstant movements of timber truckscarrying between 70 and 120 cubic metresof timber has today undergone a worryingdegradation, with large cracks andpotholes having appeared in the concrete.There has also already been visibleimpacts on the bridges on the railwayroutes of Niari and Louesse, less than 10kilometres from Makabana. The need fortruck drivers to load as much as possiblefor better remuneration often leads tooverloading that damages bridges whichhave not been maintained in recent years.There are concerns that the overloading isdamaging not only abutments of bridges,but also the entire structure.

8. Conclusions and Recommendations

The total area now sub-licenced toTamann far exceeds 100,000 hectares, andthus represents a substantial forestresource. However, local people aregaining very little in terms ofemployment, and the only benefit so farhas been a new route to Pointe-Noire. Butwith the bridges on this road constructedhastily and, for the most part, in wood,even this road will not be a lastingbenefit.

With regard to the preceding, OCDHrecommends that the Congolesegovernment should:- Make publicly available the agreements

signed with, and any other concessions

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Forest exploitation in the Republic of Congo :

The case of Tamann Industrie Limited in the Mayombe forest

granted to, Tamann Industrie Limited andsubmit them to legal review;

- Demand that Tamann Industrie Limitedestablishes a timber processing plant inMakabana, so as to guarantee jobs forlocal people;

- Send an inspection mission from theMinistry of Labour to the work site ofTamann Industrie Limited to investigateallegations of serious violations ofworkers’ rights, and sanction defaultersin accordance with existing labour lawsof Congo;

- Require Tamann Industrie Limited toreconstruct the roads and bridgesdamaged as a result of its activity;

- Reinforce forest and tax control andfollow-up of the activities of TamannIndustrie Limited in Congo.

AFLEG should take into consideration the

fact that logging must respect nationallabour laws as well as forestry rules andregulations. It should be acknowledgedthat, under the pretext of humanitarianneeds to improve living conditions,dangerous industries that do not pay wellmay establish and bring about poorworking conditions, corruption, poor forestresource management and problems suchas poaching, etc.

The infrastructure in most parts of theforest zone in the Congo basin is in anextremely pitiful state, and this is anelement of poverty suffered by millions ofpeople living in rural communities. AFLEGshould seek to ensure that loggingcompanies are brought to pay reparationsfor the damages they cause to theinfrastructure they destroy.

Chapter 8

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GROUPE DE TTRAVAIL FORÊTS (GTF/CRONGD)BBIIEENNVVEENNUU NNGGOOYY IISSIIKKIIMMOO

Implementation of the Congolese Forestry Code :The case of provisions relating to local communities

51

Part 3

1. Introduction

On 29 August 2002, the Democratic Republic of Congo enacted law N° 011/20002 of29/08/2002, a new Forestry Code. The new law represents a major reform in forestpolicy in the DRC, as it replaces the former approach that dates as far back as 1949.

Drafting a law is one thing, implementing it is another. This case study lays emphasis onprovisions with the new Code relating to local communities, and attempts to assess howfar it can be implemented at this level. This case study focuses on the functioning of theprovisions related to user- and ownership rights as well as the right to be consulted onmajor decisions regarding forest management. In other words, we shall make a briefanalysis of the content of the code and highlight the key articles that address localcommunities by identifying their strengths and weaknesses. The study draws on fieldworkconducted by the authors in the Mayombe forest of Bas Congo, where the Code wasdiscussed with local communities and NGOs.

2. Background - context of the DRC forest

The forest of DRC covers an estimated surface area of 125 million hectares, representingabout 52% of the national territory. The forest contributes greatly to the Congoleseeconomy and plays a vital ecological role. DRC occupies a strategic position in thisregion, which implies that if the country itself does not ensure good governance of thesector, other internal or external players may do so in one way or the other, with all theresulting loss of earnings that may cause.

The government of DRC is aware of the role played by its forest ecosystem in the balanceof the biosphere both at the national and international levels. This awareness is reflectedin the signing of several conventions by the State of Congo.

What is important to do now is to draw up sustainable forest management policies. Dueto very limited financial resources, however, the country may experience seriousproblems in the management and development of its wildlife and forest resources. In BasCongo alone, an inventory of logging companies compiled by GTF reveals that there areabout 11 operational companies. There are many others in the provinces of Bandundu,Equateur, Katanga, the two Kasais (under government control) as well as the North-Kivu,South Kivu and Maniema provinces, and part of Equateur (under rebel control).

3. Major innovations in the new Forestry Code

The new law brought some notable innovations:

1) The establishment of three categories of forests:- Classified forest;- Protected forest;- Permanent production forest;2) The setting up of a forest cadastral (land tenure) survey at the national and provinciallevels;3) The setting up of Consultative Committees;4) Granting of social benefits to grassroots communities;5) The promotion of a programme of forestry research

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4. Key provisions relating to localcommunities

It should be noted that one of the meritsof the new Congolese Forestry Code is thatit attempts to better harmonise customaryland law with modern law. Though the new code underscores thatCongolese forests are the property of theState, user, ownership and possessionrights have been codified. This isconsiderable progress for what the lawdefines as ‘local communities’.

• a) The concept of localcommunityThe Code defines a ‘local community’ as‘a people traditionally organised on thebasis of custom and united by clan orfamily solidarity relations, which is thebasis of its internal cohesion’. Thiscommunity is also characterised by itsattachment to a specific territory (page 4of the Code).

In the Mayombe forest, this definitionaccords with the actual exercise of localauthority over the forests. It is thereforearound the clan that forestry issues aremanaged, although the State also plays arole.

• b) User, ownership, possessionand consultation rightsSince colonial times the State has claimedownership of forests. Ownership rights oflocal communities have only beenregarded as de facto rights. The new Codeprovides for regulatory provisions on theexercise of these rights. The followinganalyses the Code in respect of theserights.

- User rights

Article 36 stipulates that the forest userrights of the people living within or nearthe forest estate shall be those resultingfrom local customs and traditions,provided they do not violate the laws. Theprovisions allow local people to exploitforest resources in order to meet theirdomestic needs, individually andcollectively. The law underscores that thepeople can exercise their user rights even

in classified forests as long as they respectthe law.

Article 44 states that the people livingnear a forest concession shall continue toexercise their user rights, excludingfarming, if they comply with forestexploitation laws.

In some areas studied in the Mayombeforest, in practice it is possible to carryout farming in some concessions, sinceforest exploiters are only interested in thetimber resource that they exploit.However, in our opinion, for the Code toban farming is a great shortcoming, as itrepresents the livelihood of the villagers.

- Ownership rights

Article 22 underscores that a localcommunity may, upon request, obtain as aforest concession part or all of theprotected areas of the forests thatformerly belonged to them by virtue ofthe custom. It is worth noting that theconditions for granting such concessions tolocal communities must be set out in aPresidential Decree.

Articles 7 and 9 provide for the rights oflocal communities to own the trees foundin a village or its immediate surroundings.Such trees may be transferred to thirdparties.

Article 25 states that the management ofclassified forests, for example, may beentrusted to corporate bodies orassociations that would develop them oruse them for activities of public interest.

- Right to be consulted

Article 29 of the Code provides the publicwith a right to be consulted, and providesfor the setting up of ConsultativeCommittees at the national and provinciallevels. Article 15 also requires thePresident of the Republic to consultneighbouring communities beforeclassifying any forest.

Our studies in the Mayombe forest suggestthat, in practice, small-scale timberdealers and even some industrial logging

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companies, do carry out some form of‘informal consultation’ with localcommunities, even though the State hasgiven the latter all the necessaryauthorisations. Often, they also pay whatis referred to as “customary tax” which ispaid either in kind or in cash.Unfortunately, the so-called “customarytax” is very often insignificant comparedwith the profits made by the companies; ineffect, after having paid taxes to theState, the timber is cut for free.

- Right to enjoyment of social amenities

Article 89 stipulates that loggingcompanies exploiting a given area shouldprovide social amenities for theneighbouring population (construction ofroads, schools, hospitals, etc.). Inpractice, logging companies often fail todo this. Evidently, many of them feel thatsince they pay taxes to the State, it isincumbent upon the State to take care ofsocial amenities and development.

In the Mayombe forest, it is clear thatcommunities are concerned by the factthat very few companies bother aboutdevelopment problems and social benefitsthat the local population should derivefrom the presence of the companies. Theyconsider that logging companies will notimplement new provisions in the Codeunless the State is prepared to mete outexemplary sanctions against thosewho fail to comply.

5. Impediments to theimplementation of the code

The implementation of localcommunities-related provisions ofthe new Congolese Forestry Codefaces a number of obstacles,including but not limited to thefollowing:

• The effective implementation ofmany of the provisions dependson the implementation measuresto be taken in the form ofOrders or Decrees to be signedeither by the President of theRepublic or the Minister incharge of forestry. Such

implementation measures will be many.• There is a tendency of always

transferring exploitation rightsrecognised away from the population,due to their lack of means.

• Will be difficult to implement the Codewhen its provisions are very poorlyknown by the public.

• Logging companies will continue tobelieve that the obligations on them,under Article 89, to provide socialamenities are compensated by the taxesthey pay to the State.

6. Guidelines for a properimplementation of the provisions relatingto local communities

Some concerns relating to the benefitsthat local communities should derive fromtheir forests have been given greaterconsideration in the new Code. Also, thediscrepancy between customary law andmodern law could be reduced byappropriate implementation of the Code.Several local practices deemed informalhave been codified in view of therelationship between the need for therights of local people, conservation andexploitation. Hopefully, this is thebeginning of a solution to the dual natureof the two types of laws, a problem thathas caused many land and forestrydisputes.

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However, for the opportunities representedby the Code to be properly realised, thefollowing should be taken into account:• The good faith of public authorities is

required. The State is perceived asguarantor of the respect of laws; but itsometimes violates them outright andacts as judge in its own case.

• The good faith of logging companies isalso required. At present, they aresometimes thought of as solelyconcerned with the unbridled search forprofit, thus sacrificing the ecologicalbalance and present and future survivalof the population.

• Priority should be given to thepopularisation and dissemination of the

new Forestry Code. NGOs could play avital role at this level. The Code shouldbe published and disseminated in thefour national languages (Kikongo,Swahili, Tshiluba and Lingala).

• The drafting of implementation measuresshould include careful and broadconsultation with civil society.Traditional rulers should be informed andconsulted.

• Exemplary sanctions should be meted outto ensure the best relations amongvarious players and promote socialharmony.

The forest in Cameroon is a national resource. The products found within it (timber,non-timber forest products, game etc.) are used far beyond the forest zone. Astudy conducted in 1995 as part of the National Environment Management Plan on

the use of the biodiversity in Cameroon, shows that the value of all the types of forestproducts used in Cameroon represents several billions of CFA francs.

This study firstly considers the provisions of the 1994 Forestry Law, which was partlyintended to increase ‘transparency’ of the management of the sector. It then considers inmore detail some of the difficulties in the implementation of procedural rights inCameroon, and how this contributes in reinforcing the ‘opaque’ management of forests,and the multiplication of practices contrary to the law.

1. The 1994 Forestry Law - progress in promoting transparency?

The reform of the Forestry Law that started in the early years of structural adjustment inCameroon (around 1988) was aimed, among others, at improving transparency in themanagement of the sector, such as in the granting of exploitation rights, and themonitoring of exploitation, etc.. The idea was to guarantee optimum profitability offorest management for the State.

When compared with previous laws and with other instruments governing access tonatural resources (mines and oil, for instance), the 1994 Forestry Law was undoubtedlyan important step in the promotion of transparency. It clearly spelled out the modalitiesfor granting exploitation titles, and set up a system that, in theory, promoted equality ofopportunities between the various applicants. Important provisions within the lawinclude:

i. Allocation by open invitation to tender, a legal means of accessing the resource: This put an end to granting by mutual agreement that had been the practice in theformer forestry law. The 1994 law imposed allocation by open invitations to tender as thecommon law method of acquiring forest exploitation titles. The finance law imposed aminimum rate for bids (CFA F1,500/ha for concessions and CFAF 2,500/ha for sales ofstanding volume).

ii. Prior publication of selection criteria;Selection criteria for offers are stipulated in an order signed by the Minister of theEnvironment and Forestry, who disseminates them broadly within the forestry sector. Thecriteria insist on technical and financial parameters, and state the modalities ofweighting the technical capacities, previous commitments and the bids of applicants.

iii. Institution of an observer at the commission for the granting of forest exploitationtitles:The inter-ministerial commission for the granting of forest exploitation titles has anIndependent Observer responsible for controlling the regularity of commissiondeliberations and decisions. The Observer drafts a report to the Minister of theEnvironment and Forestry at the end of each commission meeting.

Chapter 9

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However, despite the progressive intentionof these provisions, it is clear that theyhave not functioned properly. Indeed itappears that the existence of the law hasnot brought about fundamental changes inthe malfunctioning of the system andcorrupt practices that prevail in theforestry sector.

2. Continuing ‘opacity’ and impunity

It is clear that ‘opacity’ has continued andhas even worsened in the forestry sector.This assertion can be illustrated with a fewexamples:

a) The principle of invitations to tenderwas not always transparent:In many cases, the rules pertaining to thegranting of concessions did not function asprovided for by the law. For example, asearly as 1996, the Prime Minister grantedfive concessions ‘by mutual understating’,in violation of the 1994 law.

The 1997 round of concession allocationsawarded concessions to the best financialand technical offers in less than half ofcases. In 2000, some worrying facts castdoubts on the confidentiality of bids or, atleast, on the reliability of the biddingsystem. In a context of stiff competitionbetween forestry companies to access theresource, it was notable that bidders

consistently proposed only the minimumamount for concessions situated in regionsthat were among the richest in the wholecountry. It is very unlikely that they wouldhave risked losing rights to such lucrativeconcessions unless they were reasonablysure that they were the only bidders.

In addition, it was noticed that in the early1990s, the Minstry of Forests and theEnvironment (MINEF) had grantednumerous “timber salvage authorisations”,which was tantamount to circumventingthe procedures of open tendering forlogging rights. The timber salvageauthorisations themselves did not respectthe legal requirements, as they did notactually relate to the recovery of timberfelled incidentally during a developmentoperation. Also, each of the authorisationswas for the maximum salvage surface area(1000 hectares). In 2001, the Minister ofthe Environment and Forestry prohibitedthe granting of salvage authorisations, butat least one (ARB 192) is still operatingsome four years after it was granted.

b) The independent observer at thecommission for the allocation of forestexploitation titles has not stoppedirregularities; The Independent Observer atthe commission for the allocation of forestexploitation titles does not have the powerto suspend the findings of the commissionin the event of irregularity. Furthermore,his reports are not made public, and theirregularities noted up till now have neverbeen followed by any decision from theMinister.

c) Forest control remains inadequate;Forest control that is aimed at ensuringthe respect of the law by loggingcompanies is far from optimal in practice.As such, many illegal operations continuewith complete impunity. Four problems canbe raised with regard to forest control:

• Control operations are notsystematic. some companies that arestrongly suspected of illegal logging havenot undergone any real control during the

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past three years. A mission of theIndependent Observer was interruptedaround the Dja Reserve periphery byinstructions from the administrativehierarchy.

• Offences noted in the field donot lead to the drafting of an OfficialStatement of Offence. The drafting of anOfficial Statement of Offence (‘ProcesVerbal) report to notify an offence is notsystematic after forest control operations,although only such a report can grant legalexistence to illegal operations. Suchnegligence on the part of theadministration enables delinquentcompanies to continue to circumvent thelaw. The most glaring case has been thatof Société Forestière Hazim (SFH), whoseillegal operations in FMU 10 030 have costthe State a loss of earnings worth about 25billion CFAF (around US $38 million). Theabsence of a report drafted at the timethe facts concerning SFH were noted mighttoday limit the administration’s chances ofsuccess in its attempt recover it’s the finesdue to it.

• Sanctions are not dissuasive.Where levied, sanctions represent just aminute proportion of profit made by thecompany from the illegal operations, andare often almost insignificant. The bestexample of such a practice concerns thecompany known as Wijma, relating toillegal operations around the sale ofstanding volume No. 09-02-132. Thesurface area exploited illegally was 2,000ha, for an estimated production of 14,000cubic meters, representing a value of US$21,000,000 or CFAF 14,000,000,000. Insettlement of the case, WIJMA ended uppaying 10,000,000 FCFA.

• Sanctions imposed are not alwaysapplied. There is no mechanism forverifying if sanctions imposed by MINEF areactually applied. The Ministry does notpublish the list of amounts actually paid bycompanies in fines and damages. Suchopacity paves the way for numerousfurther malpractices.

It can therefore be seen clearly that the

existence of a law with provisions thatencourage transparency is not enough, if itis not accompanied with political will.. Asdiscussed in the following section, theseproblems are compounded by a lack of‘procedural rights’ in relation to theforestry sector.

3. Shortcomings in procedural rights; thesource of opacity in the forestry sector

Given that the overall objective ofindustrial-scale forest exploitation is to fillState coffers, the entire population ofCameroon has an interest in seeing to theresource being well managed. Therefore,there should logically exist modalities forcivic input to the control of the activitiesof actors of the forestry sector. Suchcontrol could be exerted throughprocedural rights that should include:

• the right to access informationon forest management issues;

• the right for the public toparticipate in making decisions that arelikely to have an impact on theenvironment;

• the right to access independentand impartial justice in the event oflitigation relating to forest management.Each of these is considered in turn, below.

i) Recognition of procedural rights isenshrined in Cameroonian law

Procedural rights are recognised inCameroonian law. The 1996 Constitutionrecognises the right to a ‘healthyenvironment’ for all the inhabitants ofCameroon. It considers environmentalprotection an “obligation for everyone”and imposes on the State to see to “thedefence and promotion of theenvironment”. Such formulation carrieswith it several implications:

• The right to a healthyenvironment has been elevated to thestatus of fundamental human right inCameroon. This is Cameroon’s translationof article 24 of the African Charter onHuman and Peoples’ Rights, which theCameroon Constitution has included as an

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integral part.

• This right generates obligationsand duties for all actors. The Constitutionimposes on all the respect of the right tothe environment. This right has as acorollary the capacity recognised in allinhabitants of the territory to make anypossible defaulters respect the same,including the State. The State is investedwith the role of guarantor of this right,and must assume the responsibility ofdefending the environment, in the interestof all. When applied to the forestry sector,this obligation imposes on the State theguarantee of sustainable management offorest areas and resources.

In practice, however, this right is notalways respected in Cameroon, therebyjeopardising the involvement of thepeople in forest management.

ii) Access to information is still limited

Access to information is one of the pillarsof good environmental governance andcivic participation in forest management.In his or her capacity as holder of the rightto a healthy environment, the citizen hasthe right to be fully informed, in a timelymanner, of any activity that is likely to

cause a lasting and/or substantialmodification to his or her habitat. Acitizen’s access to information on thepossible threats against the forest raises anumber of questions:

• On the nature of the informationto be supplied; how “secret” should becommercial or State ‘secrets’? Whodetermines the nature of information tobe disseminated?

• On the responsibility inproducing and disseminating information;who, between the enterprise that investsand the State that authorises it to do so,should ensure public access toinformation?

• On the practical modalities ofsuch an enterprise; in which language? Bywhich means? With what time limits? etc.

The principle here is freedom of access toinformation. The African Charter onHuman and Peoples’ Rights, which isincorporated within Cameroon’s 1996Constitution, proclaims that “Every manshall have the right to information”.Cameroonian law guarantees the principleof free access to information. The Law onsocial communication, passed in 1990, laysdown this general principle: “Exceptotherwise stated by law, access toadministrative documents shall be free”. It

further specifies the scope of suchfreedom, which is extended to “allfiles, reports, studies, minutes,statistics, guidelines, instructions,circulars, notes, in any case alldocuments governed by statutelaw”.The principle of free access toinformation is confirmed inenvironmental management by the1996 Framework Law on theEnvironment, which authorises justone exception in Cameroon: secretinformation relating to defence ofthe nation.

One can thus validly believe thatall the information available in thevarious public administrations ofCameroon (including the Ministry of

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the Environment and Forestry) should,under the law, be accessible to citizenswho so request it. At MINEF, such freeaccess should, amongst others, be appliedto all computerised database systems forthe management of forest relatedinformation e.g. SIGIF, to reports of thecontrol missions of the Central ControlUnit, to offences and sanctions, and totransactions entered into between MINEFand private companies. Such informationis supposed to be open to citizens for‘passive access’ (i.e. made available byMINEF) or active access (available onrequest).

At the moment, MINEF makes public thefollowing information:

• A list of valid forest exploitationtitles;

• A list of offences and sanctions.

MINEF does not communicate the followinginformation:

• The status of disputes, such asinformation on the application ofsanctions;

• Detailed production statistics percompany and per licence (necessary fordetecting illegal operations).

The absence of such crucial informationhinders the involvement of citizens inmonitoring the management of theforestry sector.

The situation is no better with regard toaccess to justice.

iii). Access to justice; many impediments

The African Charter on Human andPeoples’ Rights is undoubtedly the primaryregional legal instrument that specificallyprovides for the recognition of a right tojustice. In Article 3, it proclaims “totalequality” of all before the law, andprovides for the right to equal protectionby the law. In addition, it elevates accessto justice to the status of a fundamentalright, stating: “Everybody shall have theright to have his cause heard”. According

to the writers of the Charter, this rightincludes “The right to refer any matterthat violates his fundamental rightsrecognised and guaranteed by existingconventions, laws, regulations and customsto national competent jurisdictions”.

In Cameroon, the right to justice is alsoenshrined in the preamble of theConstitution, which stipulates: “The lawshall ensure to all men the right to havejustice done”. This principle is statedclearly in the Penal Code, which stipulatesthat: “the criminal law shall apply to all”.In the same light, the Civil Code placesobligations on judges referred with a case:“Any judge who refuses to hear a case,under the pretext of silence, obscurity orshortcomings of the law, may be chargedguilty of denial of justice”. Furthermore,the judge is obliged to state the law in aprecise and specific manner whenever acase is brought to him. Lastly, the civilprocedure makes it possible to sanction ajudge in cases of denial of justice: “Thereis denial of justice when judges refuse toanswer petitions or neglect to handlecases as they are and in turn to bejudged”.

In the forestry sector, access to justiceshould be a facility open to all personssubject to be tried against decisions,actions or omissions of all actors in forestmanagement, including the forestryadministration. It is however evident thatthe forestry administration hasprogressively elevated itself de facto andde jure to the status of principal‘manager’ of forestry-related disputes,thereby becoming, in many cases, judge inits own case. The jurisdictional function ofthe administration is thus extended, to thedetriment of the judicial process. Thissituation, which is superimposed on thetraditional rules relating to access tojustice, accentuates the marginalisation ofcitizens in forestry-related cases.

Thus, with the absence of a procedure setforth by the administration, it isimpossible for citizens to take any action

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against illegal forest exploitation. It shouldalso be noted that the transactionsentered into between the State anddelinquent companies generally flout therights of communities, whereas the lawguarantees such rights. For example, the10% of annual forestry royalties that aredue to forest communities are notmentioned in the calculation of pecuniarysanctions inflicted by the State ondelinquent companies. The sanctions arelimited to fines and damages, i.e. only theamounts to be paid to the State treasury.

Guaranteeing access to justice for allcitizens with regard to infringements onforestry law would be a significantprogress in monitoring the respect of thelaw. Difficulties in accessing justicedeprive citizens from enjoying their rightson the following issues:

• Control of the use of forestroyalties. In the event of poor use offorest royalties, the beneficiarycommunities may not take the matter tocourt, because such funds are publicfunds. Only the State may sue to obtainreparation for poor use of public funds.

• Control of illegal logging.Because they are not owners of the forest,local communities may not sue to have

illegal operations stopped.In both cases, the official administrationas a whole has neglected to pursue justicein order to obtain reparation for thecommunities. In the rare cases where theadministration decides to go to court, itdoes not always take the necessaryprecautions to guarantee the chances ofsuccess. This has been the case with thedispute withthe Société Forestière Hazim(SFH), concerning illegal logging in FMUs10 092 and 10 030. Although the facts hadbeen known since 1999, MINEF preferrednot to draft any report against SFH formore than three years. When theadministration finally decided to sue, SFHcontested the facts. The communitieswould have acted with much moreflexibility than the administration, if theyhad the right to sue and ask for the end ofthe illegal operations of SFH.

The shortcomings of the instruments andthe practice in matters of access toinformation contribute to a weakening ofcivil society, and de facto exclude it fromthe management of forest resources. Thelegal provisions to organise the setting upand functioning of the major organisationsof the civil society compound thisweakening.

d. The civil society in Cameroon is stillweak

Organised civil society is relatively youngin Cameron. The law distinguishes ‘NGOs’and ‘associations’.

The establishment of national associationsis governed by the ‘declaration’ system.The law stipulates that associations shallbe set up freely, but shall acquire legalstatus only when their headquarters areregistered at the Divisional Office, againsta receipt. However, associations sufferfrom two constraints that jeopardise boththeir independence and their survival:

Opportunities for financial strangulation ofassociations: According to the law, aregistered association that does not enjoy

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public utility recognition has the right toreceive “neither subventions from publicbodies nor donations and legacies fromprivate individuals”. But such forms ofprohibited funding constitute the mainincome of associations elsewhere. Suchrestriction weakens the civil society.

The ‘Damocles sword’ of dissolution; Theadministration has the power to interruptthe activities of an association throughlegal or administrative means. The lawstipulates “the Minister in charge ofterritorial administration may, on thereasoned proposal of the divisional officer,suspend by order, for a maximum durationof three months, the activities of anyassociation for disturbance of publicorder”.

In one notable case in the past, thisprovision was used, purportedly because of“disturbance of public order”, to threatensuspension of the activities of anorganisation that had spoken publiclyabout the illegal operations of SFH in theLomie region. Three years later, theforestry administration filed in a suitagainst the same company.

Concerning NGOs, a 1999 law organisestheir establishment and functioning. NGOsare governed by the approval system,granted by the Minister in charge ofTerritorial Administration, for a period offive years, renewable (Article 10).

Some problems may be raised here:- The law does not lay down the criteria onthe basis of which such approval may begranted or denied. This may cause theadministration to act arbitrarily and itwould be difficult for the injured NGOs topress for justice on objective grounds.- The approval is renewable every fiveyears. This provision may make it possibleto update the NGO file in Cameroon, byrenewing the approval of only those thatfunction. But it may constitute a means ofpressure from the administration on themost “critical” NGOs, in the absence ofobjective criteria on the basis of which the

approval is granted or renewed.

The law authorises the Minister ofTerritorial Administration to dissolve anNGO “whose activities deviate from itsobjectives” (Article 22), and provides forvery severe sanctions – imprisonment offrom 3 months to 1 year and a fine of fromFCFA 100,000 to 1 million – for leaders ofNGOs operating without an approval (orwho operate pending the approval).

Because of such weakness on the part ofthe civil society, and because ofrestrictions in involving citizens in themanagement of forestry resources, theadministration maintains a monopoly onmonitoring of forest managementoperations. The communities and civilsociety are almost completely oblivious offorest controls, for instance. This promotesimpunity for illegal operations, which isdetrimental to both the public treasuryand communities of the forest zone.

4. Recommendations

1- The Ministry of the Environment andForestry should enable citizens who sorequest to have access to all non-confidential documents. The list ofdefaulters to the forestry law, thesanctions imposed, as well as the statusof disputes, should be published.

2- It is indispensable to recognisecommunities’ and civil societyorganisations’ right to sue in order toobtain sanctions for infringementsagainst the forestry law.

3- The important role of civil societyshould be recognised, and conditions forits independence secured, so it maycontinue to enhance the rule of law inthe forestry sector.

Chapter 10

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Illegal exploitation of Gaboon resin in Gabon

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EDUCATION FOR THE DEFENCE OF THE ENVIRONMENT AND NATURE (EDEN)MMAARRTTHHEE PPRRAAXXÈÈDDEE MMAAPPAANNGGOOUU

1. Introduction

This case study presents an example of illegal exploitation and trade of non-timberforest products (NTFPs). It aims to highlight the need for a sharing of responsibilitiesamong the various ‘stakeholders’. The legal vacuum in law concerning the exploitationand trade of NTFPs indicates a failure of responsibility of the State. The State’s failureto regulate the sector has allowed logging companies to exploit and trade or simplyplunder the forestry wealth that covers the surface area granted them. Theresponsibility of forest product consumers is illustrated by the passive attitude of thecompany Dior, which, although potentially helping to ‘add value’ to forest resources,may also be benefiting from illegal practices by failing to ensure the legality of their rawmaterial supplies.

2. Laws and regulations governing exploitation and trade of NTFPs

Gabon’s Forestry Code is today the only law that lays down modalities for themanagement of resources of the forestry sector. Under the law, only two clauses haveprovisions on Non-Timber Forest Products. The 31st December 2001, version of the lawstipulates that:- “Obtaining a forest exploitation title shall not give right to the exploitation of forestryproducts other than timber. The exploitation of other products such as genetic, wildlife,fisheries, agricultural and mining resources and the canopy shall be subject to distinctinstruments” ;;

- “The objective of the exercise of customary user rights shall be to meet the personaland collective needs of village communities, which include:

The use of trees for construction and the use of dead timber or branches asfirewood;

the collection of secondary forest products such as tree bark, latex, fungi,medicinal or edible plants, stones, lianas;

Small-scale hunting and fishing;Grazing in the savannah, in the clearing,

and the use of branches and leaves asfodder;

Subsistence farming;Grazing and water use rights.

The exercise of customary user rights shallbe free in rural forest estates for themembers of village communities livingtraditionally near such forests and oncondition that they respect the restrictiveregulations for management or protection” .

Thus, the exploitation of NTFPs is clearlygoverned by different provisions from thoseapplying to timber logging. As such, the

Goboon resin - a high value forest product

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holding of a logging licence does not giveright to the exploitation of other products,even when such products are found insidethe concession granted. Furthermore,members of village communitiestraditionally living in or near the forestestate may enjoy the exercise ofcustomary user rights. Such rights enablethem to freely exploit NTFPs, if suchexploitation is aimed at meeting theirneeds.

The exploitation and trade of NTFPs are,at present, not regulated in Gabon. Onlytaxes paid by retail traders in the marketmay be considered as fiscal revenue linkedto the sale of NTFPs, and these areinsignificant. However, the authorsunderstand that NTFPs will be includedwithin implementation instruments thatare currently being drafted. These legalinstruments will regulate the use andexploitation of NTFPs, and lay down theregulatory framework for their exploitationfor commercial purposes.

3. Gaboon : A forest giant

Gaboon (Aucoumea klaineana) is a tree ofthe Burseraceae family. It is referred to asAngouma, Moukoumi and N’Koumi in localGabonese languages. The distribution ofthe Gaboon is limited to the West andCentre of Gabon and to some small areasin Equatorial Guinea, Congo andCameroon. Aucoumea klaineana is one ofthe most abundant species in the forests ofthe Guinea/Congo coastal areas, especiallyin aged secondary forests, on well-drainedsoils.

Its exploitation constitutes the mainactivity of the forest sector in Gabon. It isthe most important commercial timber inGabon and contributes about 90% of annualproduction. Gabon is the world’s leadingproducer of Gaboon timber.

Gaboon is considered as an excellenttimber for veneer or plywood, and equallyproduces good quality sawn wood. Franceis the major importer of Gaboon. Othersinclude Italy, Japan and Israel. The

exportation of Gaboon timber to WesternEurope and Japan is becoming increasinglysignificant for the Gabonese economybecause of declining oil income.

However, according to the findings of theIUCN Regional Workshop for theConservation and Sustainable Managementof Trees project, repeated felling limitsthe regeneration of the species, therebyconstituting a threat to its survival. Thisthreat is compounded by its limiteddistribution and the attendant destructionof the ecosystem. Furthermore, thegenetic reservoir of Gaboon has beenseriously eroded by decades of selectiveharvesting. The FAO considers A. klaineanaa priority species for in situ conservation.

4.Exploitation of Gaboon resin

Illegal exploitation of Gaboon resin in Gabon

A villager working on Okoume’s resin

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Illegal exploitation of Gaboon resin in Gabon

i. The actors: Gaboon resin is exploited mostly by thelocal people who use it essentially for itsmystical-medicinal properties. The resin isgenerally used for manufacturingtraditional torches used during certaininitiation rites (by, amongst others, theBwiti, Njembe, Okuku ethnic groups), forthe purification of water, for thetreatment of abscesses and as aninsecticide and deodorant.

For some years now, certain loggingcompanies have embarked on theexploitation of Gaboon resin. Suchexploitation is illegal, as the law(mentioned above) states that logginglicences do not authorise the exploitationof its by-products.

Gabonese authorities are currentlystudying means of a more “modern”exploitation of the resin, especially withregard to screening for potential usesincluding parasitological, pharmacologicaland other chemical properties. As such,the resin that was hitherto used in rubbermanufacturing or as fuel in torchmanufacturing is today being tested by thecosmetic industry. Dior, the Frenchcosmetics corporation, for instance,already has an interest in Gaboon resin.

ii. Modes of collection of the resin: The rural people of Gabon collect resin bytapping the trees. It takes two to threedays for the tapped tree to produce resin.It has been reported that, in active loggingoperations, resin is collected simply afterthe feeling of Gaboon trunks.

iii. Sale of the Gaboon resin: Gaboon resin is sold locally by the ruralcommunities. For some families, thisactivity is the main source of income. Theresin is collected and transported in small-scale and sold in the village itself, orbought by merchants to be distributed intown. The “native torch” manufacturedfrom Gaboon resin is the main product soldon the local market. It costs between CFAF500 and 20,000.

Field investigations have revealed thatcertain logging companies are also engagedin the production and sale of Gaboon resin.In this case, the resin is collected inindustrial quantities and exported. Thiswas discovered during the execution of aresearch project, the BIODIVALOR-Gabonprogramme, which was jointly initiated byPro-Natura International and IPHAMETRA,representing the Government of Gabon.This programme was funded by the FrenchCooperation. The BIODIVALOR-Gabonprogramme was aimed at studying ways ofvalorising natural products (includingNTFPs such as Gaboon resin) in thechemical and/or agronomic industries.Within the context of the programme, Diorwas asked to test the Gaboon resin todetermine its possible importance for themanufacturing of cosmetic products.Village communities living around theareas where Gaboon is found wereexpected to be the main suppliers of theresin through IPHAMETRA, which wassupposed to distribute the financialbenefits. The earliest resin samples testedshowed impressive anti-protease and anti-inflammatory activities. This led Dior, in2000, to become interested in moreregular supplies of resin and to finalise thedevelopment of a product that would serveas base for body creams and/or nail polish.In order to meet this increasing demand, amission grouping representatives of Pro-Natura International and the FrenchMinistry of Foreign Affairs asked thelogging company Thanry (CompagnieEquatorial des Bois - CEB) to experimentwith the production of Gaboon resin. Theresin produced was to be handed toIPHAMETRA, for onward transmission toDior.

The authors of this study discovered that,with increasing demand from Dior, thequantities transmitted by IPHAMETRA wereno longer sufficient. The company Leroy-Gabon, which exploits a forest concessionof 654,000 hectares in the Lope region (LotNo. 32), was thus contacted to produceand directly supply the Gaboon resin toDior. Testimonies recorded in the fieldindicate that IPHAMETRA has no control of

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Illegal exploitation of Gaboon resin in Gabon

the ‘trade circuit’.

The activity is thought to be illegal, asnoted above, the law clearly stipulatesthat a logging licence authorises onlylogging; the exploitation of all other non-timber forest products is prohibited. LeroyGabon is therefore not authorised toexploit Gaboon resin;

- It also undermines the developmentcontribution to Gabon as Dior hasapparently decided to stop obtainingsupplies from IPHAMETRA, the bodyauthorised to exploit Gaboon resin on anexperimental basis. Furthermore, it isunderstood that Dior has moved from thestage of experimentation to the industrialstage, which presupposes an increase inthe quantity demanded.

iv. Losses and impacts

a. Fiscal losses due to lack ofcontrol of the activity

A kilogram of Gaboon resin costs betweenCFAF 35,000 and 50,000. Whenexploitation was controlled by IPHAMETRA,production was estimated at about 400 kgper year, giving a total potential annualincome of between CFAF 14 to 20 million.With the development of the Gaboon resinmarket, there is the risk that Leroy Gabonwould have an ever-increasing turnover, tothe detriment of the State of Gabon,which does not exercise any control norcollect any tax on the activity (neither atproduction nor at exportation).

b. Losses incurred by local peopleWhen the activity was carried out byIPHAMETRA the resin was collected by thevillage communities living around thecollection zones. This activity thusgenerated some income for the poorestsections of society in Gabon. Today, onlythe logging company enjoys such benefits.

c. Socio-economic impacts ofGaboon resin exploitation by loggingcompaniesSocio-economic impacts: Today, theexploitation and trade of the Gaboon

resin, like most NTFPs, is not controlled.Sales for export such as those carried outby Leroy Gabon or CEB through IPHAMETRAare not taxed. Therefore, nobody at thelocal level benefits, neither the State northe populace. The involvement of bigcompanies in resin exploitation and tradeexcludes the local populations from theactivity, and hence from profits they couldhave made as a result of their proximity tothe Gaboon region. Rough estimates showthat the sale of Gaboon torches aloneproduces a monthly turnover of CFAF40,000 per household.

Environmental impacts: The environmentalimpacts of Gaboon resin exploitation arenot well known. In principle, when suchexploitation is limited to the bark of thetree, it can be carried out sustainably.

5. Conclusions and recommendations

The authors draw several conclusions andrecommendations from the study;

• It was interesting to note that, althoughthe issue of Gaboon resin exploitationposes a real problem, especially to ruralforest communities, none of the personsmet was willing to testify openly.

• Gaboon resin presents a significant socio-economic and financial opportunity. It isnecessary for the Ministry responsible forforest management to set up apermanent institutional and regulatoryframework to enable rational andsustainable exploitation of NTFPs,including Gaboon resin.

• In order to maximise the developmentbenefits of Gaboon resin, exploitationand trade should be organised in a wayto enable the local people to profit fromthe activity.

• There should be further research aimedat improving the impacts of resincollection on the life of trees inparticular and on the environment ingeneral.

The Gaboneselaw clearlystipulates thata logginglicenceauthorises onlylogging; theexploitation ofall other non-timber forestproducts isprohibited. Mr.Leroy Gabon istherefore notauthorised toexploit theGaboon resin...

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1 Even where Baka are applying for community forests, it isgenerally for only very small areas, less than 1,500 hectares(the law allows for up to 5,000 hectares).

2 By order No. 01/029/CAB/GP-SK/2000.

3 Promotions without salary increases in the public servicedate back to 1994 when the CFA F was devalued at 100%.

4 During the meeting of Central African NGOs held in Yaoundein January 2003, as part of the AFLEG process, participantsissued a declaration in which they condemned the‘transhumance’ and unscrupulousness of the Hazim-Cristalgroup that moved from Cameroon to Congo.

5 We were informed that the extensive Mila-Mila yard hadbeen acquired from the Sub-divisional Officer for around fivehundred thousand francs (CFAF 500,000), a very low price.

6 Article 148, chapter two: Exploitation of the forest andwildlife, Section 1: Forest exploitation, Sub-section 3: Generalclauses on the exploitation of timber producing forests.

7 Articles 252 and 253, Part VI: Customary user rights.

Notes

Conception et réalisation graphique : Cré@rt - Cameroun (996 17 35)

Photos credits :Page 9 - Simon Counsell ; Page13 - Simon Waters ; Page 22 - Korinna Horta ; Page26 - Simon Counsell ; page 46 - Simon Counsell ; Page 53 - Cath LongPage 56 - Greenpeace (Belgique) ; Page 58 - Greenpeace (Belgique) ; Page 60 -Greenpeace (Belgique) ; page 62 - Marthe Mapangou ; Page 63 - Marthe Mapangou

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