FORPUBLICATION

INTHECOURTOFAPPEALSFORTHERINCONBANDOFLUISEÑOINDIANS

CaseNo.AP-0205-19

MARVINDONIUSandRINCONMUSHROOMCORPORATIONOFAMERICA,INC.Plaintiffs/Appellants,

vs.

RINCONBANDOFLUISEÑOINDIANS,MELISSAESTES,BOMAZZETTI,STEPHANIESPENCER,STEVESTALLINGS,

LAURIEE.GONZALEZandALFONSOKOLB,SR.,Defendants/Appellees.

RINCONBANDOFLUISEÑOINDIANS Counter-Plaintiffs/Appellees vs.MARVINDONIUSandRINCONMUSHROOMCORPORATIONOFAMERICA,INC. Counter-Defendants/Appellants

OPINION

2

AppealsfromtheRinconTrialCourtIntertribalCourtofSouthernCalifornia1C5C

InCVR-2019-0002

ArguedandSubmittedJanuary23,2020

Pala,California

FiledApril2,2020

Counsel:

AttorneyforAppellantsManuelCorrales,Jr.GilleonLawFirm

17140BernardoCenterDrive,Ste.358SanDiego,CA92128

AttorneysforAppelleesScottCrowell

CrowellLawOffice-TribalAdvocacyGroup1487W.StateRoute89A,Ste.8

Sedona,AZ86336

DeniseTurner-WalshAttorneyGeneral

RinconBandofLuisenoIndiansP.O.Box1425

PaumaValley,CA92061

3

Before:JamesWare,MatthewFletcherandArthurGajarsa,AppellateJudges

OpinionoftheCourtfiledbyJudgeWare

I.INTRODUCTION

ThiscasearisesoutofadisputebetweenAppellants,RinconMushroom

Corporation, Inc., and Marvin Donius (collectively, “RMCA/Donius”) and

Appellees,theRinconBandofLuiseñoIndians,(the“Tribe”)andmembersof

the Tribe’s Business Committee. The Tribe is a federally recognized Indian

tribeundertheMissionIndianReliefActof1891pursuanttowhich it is the

beneficialownerofareservation innorthernSanDiegocounty inCalifornia.

MarvinDoniusisanon-Indianwhoownsapproximatelyfiveacresoflandinfee

simplewithin the geographic boundaries of theTribe’s reservation. Rincon

Mushroom Corporation operated a business on the land and now holds a

promissorynotefromDoniusthatissecuredbyaninterestintheland.United

StateslawallowsanIndiantribetoregulateconductonfeelandifthatconduct

harmsorthreatenstoharmthehealthandwelfareofthetribe.

Basedoneventsandconditionson thesubjectproperty that theTribe

concluded affected the health andwelfare of the Tribe, the Tribe sought to

enforce its Environmental Enforcement Ordinance against RMCA/Donius in

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tribal court. In response, RMCA/Donius filed an action in theUnited States

DistrictCourtfortheSouthernDistrictofCaliforniaseekingadeclarationthat,

asafeeowner,theTribehadnojurisdictionoverhisland-basedactivitiesand

soughttopermanentlyenjointheTribefrominterferingwithhim.Underthe

comitydoctrine,thefederalcourtstayedtheactionandorderedRMCA/Donius

tofirstexhaustitsremediesbeforethetribalcourt. Inproceedingsbeforeit,

thetribaltrialcourtruledthattheTribehadprovedthatRMCA/Doniuswere

engagedinconductontheirlandthatthreatenedthehealthandwelfareofthe

Tribe. Thetribalcourtgranted injunctiverelief in favorof theTribeagainst

RMCA/Donius.

Withthejudgmentbelowbeingfinal,RMCA/Doniusappealthetribaltrial

court’sdecision. ThequestiononappealbeforethisCourt iswhetherunder

applicable law, the Tribe possesses authority to enforce its environmental

ordinanceagainstRMCA/Donius.Basedonthebriefingssubmittedtodateand

oralargumentbeforethisCourt,wenowaffirmin-partandreverse-inpartthe

decisionofthetrialcourt. ThisCourtdeterminesthatwhilethetrialcourt’s

findingsarecorrect,thereliefgranted,however,isoverbroadandmustbecome

focusedontheissuestoberesolved;wethereforevacatethejudgmentgranting

injunctive relief and remand the issue of relief to the trial court for further

considerationconsistentwiththisOpinion.

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II.FACTUALANDPROCEDURALBACKGROUND

TheRinconReservation is approximately 4,026 acres in northern San

Diegocounty.Acasinoandresortaretheprincipalsourcesofrevenueforthe

Tribe. TheTribeseeks toregulatedevelopmentonrealpropertywithin the

Reservation through codes and ordinances, the earliest relevant code and

ordinancehavingbeenenactedin2007.

The RMCA/Donius property is approximately 5 acres within the

geographicboundariesoftheRinconReservationandislocateddirectlyacross

ahighway fromtheTribe’s casinoandresort. Foryears,RMCA/Doniusand

predecessor companies had conducted activities that include the following:

“operating (i) a mushroom farm and other agricultural enterprises; (ii) a

woodenpalletmanufacturingfacility;(iii)afueldepot;(iv)atruckingcompany;

(v)anautostoragefacility;(vi)ajunkyard;and(vii)otherundisclosed‘small

activities.’”(Appellees’ResponseBriefat7.)

Tribalgroundwaterwellsunderneathbothpropertiesarethesourceof

drinking water for both properties. The groundwater from these wells is

limitedinquantityandissusceptibletocontaminationfromsurfacerunoffdue

to the porous soils and shallow depth of the groundwater supply. Surface

runoffistheprimarysourceofrechargetothealluvialaquiferthatsuppliesthe

Tribe’sgroundwater.

6

In2005,Tribalofficialsbecameconcernedaboutwastewaterdisposalon

theRMCA/Doniusproperty.Theyrequestedaninspectionofthepropertyby

theU.S.EnvironmentalProtectionAgency. (TrialExh.102.) The inspection

revealedpotentiallycontaminatingactivities: improperstorageofwasteoil,

undocumentedmaterials in a truck repair area and injectionwells used for

sewage.Additionaltestingandmonitoringwererecommendedtodetermine

theseriousnessofthepotentialforcontamination.1Theinspectiondiscloseda

plumeofcontaminationoriginatingfromtheRMCA/Doniusproperty.In2007,

1TheEPAreportstated:

ThedrinkingwatersupplyfortheTribeshouldbeprotectedbyrequiringbackflowprevention...fromthehosesupplyingwatertothesite. If the drinkingwaterwell on the site is no longer functioning, its cause of failureshouldbedocumentedandthewellproperlydestroyed,sothatthewellboredoesnottransmitsurfacecontaminantstoundergroundsourcesofdrinkingwater.Ifthisis the case, a more permanent source of drinking waste for the site should beobtained,eitheranewwelloralegalhookuptotheTribalpublicwatersystem.Ground Water/Wastewater concerns: EPA will notify business owner of theirobligation to Inventory their (4) injection wells, and will include complianceassistanceinformationwiththatcorrespondence.EPAwillprovidebestmanagementpracticeguidelinesforthestorageofmotorvehiclefluidstothefacilityowner.ThiswillincludegeneralRCRAcomplianceassistance.EPA will recommend that in the course of determining septic system location,capacityanddesign,thattheTribebeprovidedwithadvancenoticeofthepumpingstatesothat theycanbepresent toevaluatetheconditionof the injectionwell(s).EPA recommends that the Tribe contact RCAC aswell, to utilize RCAC’s technicalexpertiseinevaluatingtheconditionofthewastewatersystem.Thesiteshouldbereinspectedforcompliancewithapplicablehousingandhazardousmaterialsregulations.(TrialExh.102at3.)

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a “preliminary aquifer vulnerability analysis”was conductedbyBikisWater

Consultants (“BWC”). BWC identified “high risk zones” and “moderate risk

zones”withintheReservationthatmightbesusceptibletocontamination.2

Laterin2007,awildfirethatsweptacrossSouthernCaliforniaengulfed

theRMCA/Doniuspropertyanddestroyedthebuildingsontheproperty.The

fire also damaged or destroyed cars and trailers that were stored on the

propertyaswellasoildrumsandcompressedgastanks.A3,000gallonabove-

grounddieselstoragetankonthepropertyexplodedduringthefire.Although

theTribe’scasinowasnotburned, thewildfirespreaddownwindtoanarea

thatthreatenedtoinvolvethecasino.Tribalofficialsbelievedthatconditions

on theRMCA/Doniusproperty contributed significantly to the spreadof the

wildfire. RMCA/Donius did not restore or repair the fire damage to their

propertyimmediately.Duringthetrial,RMCA/Donius’expertwitnesstestified

thatthereisareasonableprobabilitythatduringthe2007-2008rainyseason,

metalcontentsfromashdebrisleachedintothegroundwater.(Tr.at622.)

In2008,RMCA/Doniusresumedcommercialactivitiesontheproperty.

RincontribalofficialsnotifiedRMCA/Doniusthatbecausetheirpropertywas

withintheRinconReservationandbecausetheyhadrepeatedlybeennotified

2(TrialExh.105.)

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ofpotentiallyhazardousandunsafeconditionsontheproperty,Triballanduse

jurisdictionwasbeingassertedovertheirproperty;thetribalofficialsciteda

June 11, 1989, version of the Tribe’s land-use Ordinance. (Trial Exh. 112.)

RMCA/Doniusweregivenatimeperiodtoprovideinformationaboutlessees

andsub-lessees;watersupplytotheproperty;thesepticsystem;wastewater

disposal; above and below ground storage tanks, storage drums, and storm

waterrunoff;injectionwells;clean-upfromthefire;andcurrentandproposed

activitiesontheproperty. (Id.) TribalofficialsprovidedRMCA/Doniuswith

photographs of a variety of contaminants and at least two conduits for

contaminationintotheunconfinedaquiferbeneaththesite.(TrialExh.114.)

An EPA “PollutionReport” dated onMarch 20, 2008, documented the

stateofthepropertyatthattime:

EPAmaintainsaninterestincoordinatingoversightofavoluntarycleanup of this site with the Rincon Tribal authorities. Theproperty owner and Rincon Mushroom Corporation haveindividuallyexpressedtheirdesiretocooperatewiththeEPAandaddress all site concerns. Failure to complete burn ash/debrisremoval and conduct an environmental assessment of identifiedareasofconcernmayresultinanEPAremovalprogramaction.Theoverarching issueappears tobea lackofappropriate regulatoryjurisdictiononthisland.Thesiteappearstobeunregulatedfromthe standpoint of basic fire codes, land use, building codes andothermattersassociatedwithmunicipalgovernment.Theissueisalso relevant to oversight of property remediation and re-development.(TrialExh.at4.)

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In or around February 2009 two large wooden billboard signs were

erected on the RMCA/Donius Property. The Tribe’s Sign Ordinance as of

February1,2009,provided,interalia:

[A]llsignserectedontheRinconReservationmustreceiveCouncilapproval before they are constructed/erected. All requests forCouncil approvalmust be submitted inwriting to the ExecutiveAssistantoftheTribalCouncilandmustmeetthecriteriasetforthintheOrdinance.”3

RMCA/Donius refused to submit an application for thebillboards. On

April17,2009,theTribefiledacomplaintforviolationoftheSignOrdinancein

thetribalcourtagainstDoniusandMushroomExpress,Inc.,histhencompany,

(the “Billboard Sign case”).4 Thedefendants filed a “SpecialAppearance” in

whichtheyobjectedtothesubjectmatterandpersonaljurisdictionbythetribal

court.TheTribesubmittedabriefinsupportofjurisdiction,citingMontanav.

UnitedStates,450U.S.544,565(1981). (SeeTrialExh.12.) Thetrial judge

foundthatthetribalcourthadbothsubjectmatterandpersonal jurisdiction

overthedefendantsandorderedthemtofileananswer.Whenthedefendants

failedtodoso,thetribalcourtenteredadefaultjudgmentimposinga$5,000

fineonthedefendantsandorderedthemtocorrectthesignordinanceviolation

3(SeeRinconBriefinSupportofJurisdictionat4.)4RinconBandofLuisenoIndiansv.MarvinDoniusandMushroomExpressInc.,No.02972009.

10

withintendays.Ifdefendantsfailedtofollowtimelythemandateofthecourt’s

order,thejudgmentauthorizedtheTribetoremovethebillboards.5

ThedefendantsdidnotappealthedefaultjudgmentintheBillboardSign

case.6In2009,however,RMCAfiledmultiplecivilcomplaintsintheSuperior

CourtoftheStateofCaliforniaandintheUnitedStatesDistrictCourtforthe

SouthernDistrictofCaliforniaagainstthemembersoftheRinconTribalCouncil

intheirindividualandofficialcapacities7andSDG&E8(the“October2009civil

actions”). RMCAcollaterallyattackedthedefault judgmentbythetribaltrial

courtandsoughtdeclaratoryandinjunctivereliefpreventingtheTribalCouncil

fromenforcingtheTribalordinancesagainstRMCAandthesubjectproperty.

RMCA also alleged tort claims for interference with contracts and business

relations and civil RICO causes of action. RMCA alleged that the Tribe had

implemented a plan to force RMCA to sell the property to the Tribe by

interferingwith its efforts to have SanDiego Gas& Electric re-energize the

property,orderingaclean-upcontractortoleavethepropertyandbymaking

false claims to various entities that the property was under the exclusive

5InJuly2009TribalrepresentativesenteredtheRMCA/Doniuspropertyandremovedthebillboards.(DocketItemNo.28at4.) 6BecausetheOrdinanceunderwhichthedefaultjudgmentwasentereddidnotcomplywiththesecondMontanaexception,wesetasidethedefaultjudgmentnuncprotunc.7ThedefendantswereBoMazzetti,JohnGilbertParada,StephanieSpencer,CharlieKolb,andDickWatenpaugh.8 RMCAv.Mazzetti,CaseNo.09-CV-2330.

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jurisdictionoftheTribe.SDG&Efiledacross-claimagainsttheTribe.Allofthe

statecourtactionsweredismissed.

TheRinconTribemovedtodismissthetwoOctober2009federalcivil

actionsontheground,interalia,thatRMCAhadnotexhaustedremediesbefore

the Rincon tribal court. The district judge granted themotions to dismiss,

ruling that under the doctrine of comity, the non-Indian plaintiffs had to

exhausttribalcourtremediesbeforeseekingtohaveafederalcourtenjointhe

tribalproceedings. RMCAappealedthedismissalstotheNinthCircuit.9 The

NinthCircuitaffirmedthedistrictcourt’sexhaustionorderbutinstructedthe

lowercourttostaythecasependingexhaustion.Thedistrictcourtcomplied

andthemattersmovedbacktothetribalcourtforexhaustion.10

Coincidentallywiththereturnofthecasestothetribalcourt,in2014,

theTribeamendeditsEnvironmentalEnforcementOrdinancebyestablishing

9(See3:09-cv-2330,DocketItemNo.56.)10ThedistrictcourtstayedtheactionsanddirectedthepartiestoproceedbeforethetribalcourtandtosubmitstatusreportsonRMCA’sexhaustionofremediesbeforethetribalcourt.OnJune15,2015,thepartiessubmittedajointstatusreportinformingthedistrictcourtthatonDecember5,2014,RMCAhadsubmittedaproposedplantotheRinconEnvironmentalDepartmentthatsetsforththeactivitytobeconductedontheproperty.OnJune1,2015,theRinconEnvironmentalDepartmenthaddeniedtherequesttoapprovetheproposedplan,buthadindicatedthatthesubmissionofcertaininformationandclarificationcouldcauseittoapprovetheproposedplan.Consequentlythepartiesjointlyrequestedthedistrictcourttofurtherstaytheproceedingspendingreviewofadditionalinformation.Basedonthejointstatus report, the district court administratively closed its casewithout prejudice to anyparty tomovetoreopenandwithoutprejudice toresolutionofanystatuteof limitationsissueassociatedwiththefilingofthecomplaint.(See3:09-cv-2330,DocketItemNo.82.)

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“catastrophicconsequences”asthestandardfortribaljurisdictiontomatch

languagenowbeingusedbytheSupremeCourt’sinterpretationsofthe

Montanacase.SeePlainsCommerceBankv.LongFamilyLandandCattleCo.,

554U.S.316,341(2008).

OnAugust25,2015,RMCA/Donius filed a complaint in the tribal trial

courtthatrepeatedthesubstanceoftheirallegationsintheOctober2009civil

action11 and theTribe filed violationnotices and a counterclaim reasserting

jurisdictionunder theamendedOrdinance. The trial judgeconsolidated the

two cases12 and ordered a separate trial on the issue of tribal jurisdiction,

followedbyasecondtrialtodecideremedies,ifnecessary.Inanorderdated

May 18, 2017 (“Tribal 2017 Order”), the trial court held that based on the

actions and inactions of RMCA/Donius, the Tribe had established that it

possessesjurisdictionovertheactivitiesofRMCA/Donius.Phasetwowasnot

trieduntil2019.OnApril22,2019,thetrialcourtissuedjudgmentinfavorof

the Tribe and also granted several forms of relief to the Tribe, including

injunctiverelief.RMCA/Doniustimelyappealfromthe2017Orderand2019

Judgment.

11 (DocketItemNo.69–71.) 12 On November 10, 2015, in the Tribal Court, the Rincon Tribe granted a motion toconsolidate federal civil actionNos. 09-CV-2330and10-CV-0591 forpurposesof furtherproceedings.

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III.APPELLATEJURISDICTION

ThisCourt’sjurisdictiontohearthismatterisderivedfromtheArticles

ofAssociationoftheRinconBandandfromreferralofthecasebythefederal

districtcourtforexhaustionunderthedoctrineofcomity.13

IV.STANDARDSOFREVIEW

Asanappellatecourt,wedefertothefindingsoffactofthetrialcourt.

We will not reverse or vacate those findings of fact unless the trial court

committedclearerror.Astoquestionsoflaw,however,weapplythedenovo

standardofreview.GrandCanyonSkywalkDev.,LLCv.‘Sa’NyuWa,Inc.,715

F.3d1196(9thCir.2013).

13 The Rincon Band of Luiseño Indians is organized pursuant to Articles of AssociationapprovedbytheCommissionerofIndianAffairsonMarch15,1960.Section1oftheArticlesestablishes that theRinconTribalBusinessCommittee (called the “Council”) governs theRincon Band and that the Council “shall have jurisdiction over the lands within theboundaries of the Rincon Reservation (the “Reservation”).” Pursuant to Rincon TribalOrdinance3.800.”TheCouncil created thisCourt ofAppeals andpromulgatedRules andProceduresAppellate:

Anypartyaggrievedbyanyfinalorder,orjudgmentoftheRinconTrialCourtmayappealsuchorder,orjudgmenttotheRinconCourtofAppealsbyfilinganoticeofappealwiththeRinconTrialCourtwithinfifteen(15)daysaftersuchorderorjudgmenthasbeenentered.RinconApp.Ct.Rules&Proc.§3.812.

Underthedoctrineofcomity,thedistrictcourtrequiredRMCA/Doniustoexhausttribalcourtremedies.Ataminimum,exhaustionoftribalcourtremediesmeansthattribalappellatecourtsmusthavetheopportunitytoreviewthedeterminationsofthelowertribalcourts.SeeIowaMut.Ins.Co.v.LaPlante,480U.S.9,16-17(1987).

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V.DISCUSSION

A. TribalJurisdiction

Indiantribesarerecognizedasquasidependentnationsandas“distinct,

independentpoliticalcommunities,”qualifiedtoexercisemanyofthepowers

andprerogativesofself-government.Worchesterv.Georgia,31U.S.515,559

(1832). TheUnitedStatesSupremeCourthascharacterized thesovereignty

retained by Indian tribes as having a “unique and limited character” that

centers on the reservation and on tribal members within the reservation.

United States v. Wheeler, 432 U.S. 313, 322-323 (1978). Subject to

congressionaloversight,tribesretainauthoritytogovernreservationlandand

theconductoftheirmembersonthereservation.UnitedStatesv.Mazurie,419

U.S.544,557(1975).Governanceofreservationsbecamemorecomplexwhen

somereservationlandswereconvertedintofeesimpleparcelsandconveyed

tononmembersundertheIndianGeneralAllotmentActof1887,25U.S.C.§331,

etseq.

1. TheMontanaSecondException

InMontanav.UnitedStates,450U.S.544,565(1981),theSupremeCourt

reaffirmed that once reservation land was converted to fee simple and

conveyedtononmembersbyatribe,thetribelosesitsplenaryjurisdictionover

thatpartoftheland.However,theMontanaCourtarticulatedtwoexceptions

15

tothatprinciple. Underthe firstexception,whenanon-Indianenters intoa

consensual commercial relationshipwith a tribe or one of itsmembers, the

tribe is permitted to exercise civil jurisdiction over the non-Indian through

taxation, licensing, or other means. Under the second exception, a tribe is

permittedtoexercisecivilauthorityovertheconductofnon-Indianownersof

feelandswithinthereservation,whenthelandowner’sconductonthefeeland

threatens to have or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the

economicsecurity,orthehealthorwelfareofthetribe.Id.at566.14

Attheoutsetofouranalysis,wedrawattentiontoadifferencebetween

thestandardasarticulatedinMontanaandthatoftheTribe’sOrdinance,asit

ispresentlyworded.Asoriginallyarticulated,thesecondMontanaexception

allowed for tribal jurisdiction over nonmemberswhen nonmember conduct

“threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic

14Theparties’briefsarerepletewithdiscussionofthesecondMontanaexceptionandtheSupremeCourtandotherfederalcasesthathaveappliedtheexception.However,intheirbriefs,thepartiesdonotalwaysaccuratelyrecitethesecondMontanaexception.Forexample,inhisopeningbrief,Doniusargues,“ThelandownersassertthattheTribehasnoregulatoryjurisdictiontoenforceitsenvironmentalordinances,becausetheTribecannotshowtheactivitieswillcauseacatastrophicriskofharmtotheTribeunderestablishedfederallaw,andthattheTribe’seffortstounlawfullyregulatethemispartoftheTribe’sschemetoforcethemtoselltheirpropertytotheTribe.”(CorrectedBriefofAppellantsat1,emphasisadded).ThisargumentisinappositeofthesecondexceptionunderMontana.Onthecontrary,theTribedoesnothavetheburdentoprovethatDonius’activitieswillcauseacatastrophe.TheTribe’sburdenistoshowthatDonius’actionsorinactionshavethepotentialtoimposecatastrophicconsequencesuponthepoliticalintegrity,economicsecurityorhealthandwelfareoftheTribe.

16

security,orthehealthorwelfareofthetribe.”Montana,450U.S.at566.Some

courtshavenowstatedthatthesecondexceptionapplieswhenthereisathreat

of“catastrophicconsequences”toatribe.15In2014,asthiscasewasbeingsent

backtotheRincontribalcourtforexhaustion,theTribeamendedtheordinance

tostatethatitappliedtoconductthathadthepotentialtoimposecatastrophic

consequencesontheTribe.

To contextualize the facts of this case in the universe of theMontana

generalruleandexceptions,itisusefultodescribethepeculiarevolutionofthe

Supreme Court’s analysis on tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers. The

“catastrophicconsequences”languagecodifiedintotriballaworiginatedwith

the2005editionoftheCohenHandbookonFederalIndianLaw,§4.02[3][c],at

232n.220(2005).TheCohenHandbookeditorshadquotedaSupremeCourt

decision thathelda tribemaynot imposea taxonnonmemberactivitieson

nonmember land unless the nonmember activity “actually ‘imperils’ the

politicalintegrityofIndiantribes....”AtkinsonTradingCo.v.Shirley,532U.S.

645,657-58n.12(2001)(quotingMontana,450U.S.at566). TheHandbook

editorsextrapolatedfromthe“imperils”remarkthattribaljurisdictionisnot

15SeePlainsCommerceBankv.LongFamilyLand&CattleCo.,554U.S.316,341(2008)(quotingCOHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW§4.02[3][c][i], at n.75 (NellJessupNewtoned.,2012)).

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justified unless the jurisdiction “is necessary to avert catastrophic

consequences.” CohenHandbook, supra, § 4.02[3][c], at 232 n. 220. Three

years later, the Supreme Court took that stray remark as support for the

propositionthatthereisan“elevatedthresholdforapplicationofthesecond

Montanaexception...thattribalpowermustbenecessarytoavertcatastrophic

consequences.” Long Family Land, 554 U.S. 326 at 341 (quoting Cohen

Handbook).

Thisevolution in theSupremeCourt’scharacterizationof theMontana

secondexceptionfromthe“threatensorhassomedirecteffect”triggertothe

“catastrophicconsequences”triggerarisesfromanincrediblylimiteduniverse

ofcases.Theoriginalcase,Montana,involvedanonmemberfishinginariver.

Montana,450U.S.at547.Thenextmajorcase,Stratev.A-1Contractors,520

U.S.438(1997),involvedanonmember-on-nonmembertortclaimarisingfrom

a car accident. Id. at 442. The next case was the Atkinson Trading case

involving a tax on a hotel. 532 U.S. at 647. The subsequent case, Plains

Commerce, involved race discrimination against tribal citizen ranchers by a

nonmemberbank.554U.S.at320.Thesecasesinvolveisolatedincidentswith

harmsthat likelywouldnothaveimpactedtribal lands. Noneofthesecases

involveda factpatternsimilartotheoneatbar,which involvesnonmember

activitythatislikelytoimpactcriticaltriballands.

18

However,oneSupremeCourtdecisionwithafactpatternsimilartothe

oneatbarisBrendalev.ConfederatedTribesandBandsoftheYakimaIndian

Nation, 492U.S. 408 (1989), although even its utility is limited because the

Court did not reach amajority opinion. Thatmatter involved consolidated

cases regarding the power of a tribe to impose its zoning ordinance on

nonmember-owned land. Id. at 438 (Stevens, J., lead opinion). The most

relevant of the consolidated cases (docket number 87-1622) involved a

nonmember named Brendale who owned land in fee within an area of the

Yakima [nowYakama] IndianReservation called the “closed area.” Id. The

closed areaof the reservationwasmassive, around807,000 acres, ofwhich

only25,000acreswereheld in fee. Id. Evenon the fee lands,noone lived

permanentlyintheclosedarea,whichwaspristinewilderness.Id.at438-40.

Brendaleowned20acresinthe“heart”oftheclosedarea.Id.at440.Hesought

permissionfromthecountytosubdivideanddevelophislands.Id.TheYakama

IndianNationobjectedbeforethezoningcommission,assertingthatthetribe

possessed jurisdiction over the nonmember parcel. Id. The tribe’s zoning

regulationsprohibiteddevelopmentlikethekindproposedbyBrendale.Id.at

441. The regulations took “care that the closed area remain[ed] an

undevelopedrefugeofculturalandreligioussignificance,aplacewheretribal

members‘maycamp,hunt,fish,andgatherrootsandberriesinthetraditionof

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theirculture.’”Id.(quotingAmendedZoningRegulationsoftheYakimaIndian

Nation, ResolutionNo. 1-98-72, § 23 (1972)). Justice Stevens characterized

Brendale’sproposaltodeveloplandwithinanareathatprohibitedthattypeof

developmentasbringing“apigintoaparlor”:

The question is then whether the Tribe has authority topreventthefewindividualswhoownportionsoftheclosedareainfeefromunderminingitsgeneralplantopreservethecharacter of this unique resource by developing theirisolated parcels without regard to an otherwise commonscheme.Moresimply,thequestioniswhethertheownersofthesmallamountoffeelandmaybringapigintotheparlor.Id.

WhileJusticeStevens’opinionfocusedonthepowerofIndiantribestoexclude

persons from their lands (aquestionnotat issuehere), theStevensopinion

expressly adopted findings of the district court with respect to the second

Montanaexception:

Second,intheMontanacasewewerecarefultopointoutthatthe conduct of thenon-Indianson their fee lands [huntingand fishing] posed no threat to the welfare of the Tribe.[citationtoMontana,450U.S.at566].Insharpcontrast,inthiscasetheDistrictCourtexpressly foundthatBrendale’s“planneddevelopmentofrecreationalhousingplacescriticalassets of the Closed Area in jeopardy. . . . [O]f paramountconcern to this court is the threat to the Closed Area’sculturalandspiritualvalues. Toallowdevelopmentinthisunique and undeveloped area would drastically diminishthose intangible values. That in turn would undoubtedlynegatively affect the general health and welfare of theYakimaNationanditsmembers. ThiscourtmustconcludethereforethattheYakimaNationmayregulatetheusethat

20

Brendale makes of his fee land within the Reservation’sClosedArea.”617F.Supp.[735,]744[(E.D.Wash.1985)].

JusticeStevens,writingforhimselfandJusticeO’Connor,concludedthat

thetribe’sinterestsinzoningthenonmemberlandjustifiedtheexerciseofthat

power:

Inmyview,thefactthataverysmallproportionoftheclosedareaisownedinfeedoesnotdeprivetheTribeoftherighttoensurethatthisareamaintainsitsunadulteratedcharacter.This is particularly so in a case such as this in which thezoning rule at issue is neutrally applied, is necessary toprotectthewelfareoftheTribe,anddoesnotinterferewithanysignificantstateorcountyinterest.Id.at444.

JusticeBlackmun,writingforhimselfandJusticesBrennanandMarshall,

concurredinJusticeStevens’judgment.Id.at448-49(Blackmun,J.,concurring

in87-1622). JusticeBlackmun concluded that finding that the tribedidnot

possess jurisdiction over the Brendale property “would guarantee that

adjoining reservation landswouldbe subject to inconsistent andpotentially

incompatiblezoningpolicies,andforallpracticalpurposeswouldstriptribes

of the power to protect the integrity of trust lands over which they enjoy

unquestionedandexclusiveauthority.”Id.at449(emphasisomitted);seealso

id.at458(“Andhowcananyonedoubtthatatribe’sinabilitytozonesubstantial

tracts of fee land within its own reservation-tracts that are inextricably

intermingledwithreservationtrustlands-woulddestroythetribe’sabilityto

21

engage in the systematic and coordinatedutilizationof land that is thevery

essenceofzoningauthority?”).

Brendale, while of limited utility to the federal courts perhaps, is

instructive to us for contextualizing how the Appellants’ land use choices

impact theRinconReservation. Brendale is theonlyUnitedStatesSupreme

Courtdecisionthataddressesnonmemberconductthatcouldcreateimpacts

that spread from nonmember lands to tribal lands. The Yakama zoning

ordinancefitscomfortablywithintheconstellationofcasesholdinganIndian

tribehadpower toenforce its landuse lawsonnonmember lands. Seee.g.,

Knight v. Shoshone and Arapahoe Indian Tribes ofWind River Reservation,

Wyo.,670F.2d900(10thCir.1982);Hooverv.ColvilleConfederatedTribes,

2002WL34540595(ColvilleCt.App.,Mar.18,2002).

Even so, the Supreme Court’s precedents on the second Montana

exception provide little guidance to this Court. The parties appear to have

realizedthesame,namely, that theSupremeCourtprecedentsareof limited

valuetotheanalysis.TheyinsteadfocusontwoNinthCircuitdecisions,Evans

v.Shoshone-BannockLandUsePolicyComm’n,736F.3d1298(9thCir.2013),

andFMCCorp.v.Shoshone-BannockTribes,2017WL4322393(D.Idaho,Sept.

28,2017),aff’d,942F.3d916(9thCir.2019).RMCA/DoniusemphasizeEvans

asthemostpersuasivecase.EvansaroseontheFortHallReservation,hometo

22

theShoshone-BannockTribes. Id.at1300. Thetribestheretriedtorequire

thatanonmemberonfeelandsseekabuildingpermitfromthetribesbefore

constructingasingleresidencehome.Id.at1301.TheNinthCircuit,applying

thesecondMontanaexceptiontest,concludedthat,sincethereservation“has

longexperiencedgroundwatercontamination,”simplybuildingahousewould

not“meaningfullyexacerbatetheproblem.”Id.at1306.16 Further,theNinth

Circuitconcludedthat“the[t]ribes’generalizedconcernsaboutwastedisposal

andfirehazardsarespeculative,astheydonotfocusonEvans’specificproject.”

Id.

TheTribe in this case focusesmoreon theFMCcase.17 TheFMCcase

involvedthesamereservationastheEvansdecision,theFortHallReservation.

FMC, 942 F.3d at 919. That case involved the source for the polluted

reservation groundwater referenced in Evans, the FMC Corporation; FMC

stored“millionsoftonsofhazardouswasteontheReservation....”Id.at935.

TheNinthCircuitheldthatthetribepossessedciviljurisdictionoverFMCon

thebasisoftheelementalphosphorusinthegroundandthephosphinegasin

16 TheCourtdoesnotcommentonwhetheritagreeswiththeNinthCircuit’scharacterizationhere.17Thetribereliedonthedistrictcourt’sopinioninthatmatter.TheNinthCircuithassinceaffirmedthatdecision.WefocusourattentionontheNinthCircuit’sopinion.

23

theair,bothofwhichthecourt foundwere“deadly”andpose“arealriskof

catastrophicconsequences.”Id.at934-39(quotationomitted).

2. TheTribe’sOrdinance

On July 10, 2007, the Tribe enacted a comprehensive environmental

ordinance.TheOrdinanceasitwaswordedinthe2007revision,providedthat

aNoticeofViolationcouldbefiledagainsta“BandMember”orapersonwho

was “not a Band Member (non-member Indian or non-Indian).” (Rincon

EnvironmentalEnforcementCodesection304,DocketItemNo.33(PhaseTwo

Trial Ex. 33).) On February 13, 2013, the Tribe adopted a Fire Hazard

Abatement Ordinance. It empowered the Tribal Fire Chief to apply the

Ordinanceto“non-Indianactivitiesoccurringonnon-Indianownedfeelands”

iftheconductmetthesecondMontanaexception.(Section15.3003,PhaseTwo

TrialExh.36.)

The Ordinance was amended in 2008, 2012, and again, on April 29,

2014, which is the current version. In relevant part, the 2014 Ordinance

provides:

This Ordinance shall apply to activities occurring on non-Indian owned fee lands located within the exteriorboundariesoftheRinconReservationif...(4)[t]heactivitiesincludeconductthatthreatensorhassomedirecteffectonthe political integrity, the economic security, or the healthandwelfareoftheTribe.Foranactivitytoqualify...,itmust

24

beconduct thateither (A) in fact, significantly impacts thepolitical integrity, theeconomicsecurity,or thehealthandwelfare of the Tribe, or (B) has the potential to imposecatastrophic consequences upon the political integrity, theeconomic security, or the health andwelfare of the Tribe.RINCONTRIBALCODE§8.301(b).

Atoralargument,counselfortheTribeacknowledgedthattheOrdinance

isgroundedonMontanaandisintendedtoguidetheTribeincomplyingwith

theSupremeCourt’sprecedents.

The2014OrdinancerequiresthisCourttodetermine,asamatteroflaw,

whethertheAppellants’actionsandinactionsposeacatastrophicthreattothe

tribe.Seesection8.301(b)(4)(B).

3. TheTribalCourt’sFindings

TheRinconTribalCodetiesthesubjectmatterjurisdictionofthetribal

judiciarytoallactionssolongasthereis“anybasisconsistentwiththeinherent

sovereigntyoftheBand,itsArticlesofAssociationandlaws,andfederallaw.”

RINCONTRIBALCODE§3.103.BasedontheplainlanguageoftheOrdinance,the

trial court held that the Tribe had proved that it had jurisdiction over

RMCA/Donius.Thetrialcourt’sholdingcoalescedaroundfourconsequences

derivingfromtheactionsandinactionsofRMCA/Doniusthathad“thepotential

toimposecatastrophicconsequencesuponthepoliticalintegrity,theeconomic

security,orthehealthandwelfareoftheTribe.”(Id.)

25

Thetrialcourtlabeledthefirstfindingas“StewardshipoftheFeeLand;”

itinvolvedthefailureoftheRMCA/Doniustomaintaintheirproperty:

Plaintiffscontendandofferevidencethat,overthelasttwodecades or more, Defendants have not maintained theproperty in question. The property, according to thePlaintiffs, isnotandhasnotbeenwellmaintainedandthishas led to serious consequences, and if not somehowregulatedcan,infact,affectthehealth,welfare,andeconomicsecurityoftheTribe.(Tribal2017Orderat6.)

Thesecondfindinginvolvedthepotentialforcatastrophicfire.Thetrial

courtusedthelabel“FireHazard”todescribethisproblem:

Overthelastfewyears,devastatingfireshavesweptthroughthearea.ItisnotarguedthatDefendantscausedthesefires.However, the condition of the property and poormaintenance of the property in and of itself poses acatastrophicrisktoPlaintiffs.Plaintiffs’rationaleisthatthepropertyislocatedapproximately60feetfromtheHarrah’sRinconCasinowhichisPlaintiffs’primarysourceofincome.At trial a video of explosions, fire embers, and otherthreatening conditions due to the fire were dangerouslyclose to the Tribe’s casino, these coming from theDefendants’ property. In short, due to prior usage, thepropertypresentsasituationwherebyanyfuturefiresinthishighly prone “fire area” can, in fact, have catastrophicconsequencesontheTribe.Id.at6.

Thecourtadded,“ThereisnodoubtintheCourt’smindthatanyfireon

Defendants’ property or passing through Defendants’ property can pose a

catastrophicrisktoPlaintiffs’watersupplyaswellasmisuseofthepropertyas

has been in the past.” (Tribal 2007 Order at 8.) The court further found,

26

“Defendants’useofthepropertyinthepasthasthreatenedtheTribe’ssafety

from fire and its water supply, exacerbating the potential of harm to its

economy.”(Id.) Indeed,therecordsshowthatduringtrial,thethreatoffire

damage arising from Appellants’ property causing damage to the Tribe’s

gaming and resort properties was dramatically demonstrated by video of

burningembersoriginatingfromanexplosiononAppellants’propertycrossing

thestreetandlandingontheroofofthetribalhotel.(Appellees’ResponseBrief

at24;Appellees’SupplementalExcerptsofRecordat791-94.)

The third finding involved pollution of the groundwater. The court

labeledthisconcern“WaterTable”:

PlaintiffscontendtheactivitiesonDefendants’property,ifallowedtocontinueunchecked,bearadistinctpossibilityofdamagingits“pristine”watertable.Evidenceattrialshowedthis,whilepossiblyremote, is a factor to be considered as argued by the Plaintiffs.(Tribal2007Orderat6.)

ThecourtfoundthattheTribe’swaterwas“‘pristine’andtheonlysource

ofwaterithas,[whichit]shareswithDefendants’property.” (Id.at8.) The

courtfurtherfoundthatafire“passingthroughDefendants’propertycanpose

acatastrophicrisktoPlaintiffs’watersupplyaswellasmisuseoftheproperty

as has been in the past.” Id. The tribe’switnesses offered uncontroverted

testimony that there “is one aquifer underneath the entire reservation that

27

providesallthegroundwateranddrinkingwaterforall...ofthewellsonthe

reservation.”(Appellees’SupplementalExcerptsofRecordat55.)

Thecourt’sfinalfindingwasthatthedefendants’refusaltodisclosetheir

intendedusesoftheproperty,coupledwiththefactthatthestateandcounty

have disclaimed jurisdiction over all landswithin the reservation, creates a

“lawlessenclave.”Thecourtidentifiedthispieceas“OtherFactors”:

Plaintiffs additionally contend that Defendants’ use of thepropertyingeneralmustberegulatedfortheprotectionoftheTribe’seconomic,health,andgeneralwell-being,whichisthreatenedbylackofjurisdictionastheCountyandStatehave no civil regulatory jurisdiction over the property.Considering this, the Plaintiffs allegeDefendants’ propertybecomes a “lawless enclave” whereby Defendants can doanything they wish on the property, leaving the Tribehelpless.Plaintiffs’intentionattrialwastoshowwhattheybelievediscontinuedmisuseofDefendants’propertyposespotentialcatastrophicconsequencestotheTribe.Id.at6.18

4. Analysis

RMCA/Doniusargueforreversalofthetrialcourt’sjurisdictionfinding.

Wenowspecificallyaddresseachofthosegroundsinturn,althoughnotinthe

orderpresented.

18ThetrialcourtalsofoundthatRMCA/Donius’responsetotheTribe’sallegationswere“vagueandunresponsivetoTribalconcern.”(Tribal2007Orderat6.)

28

First,RMCA/Doniusarguethatthetrialcourtrefusedtoplacetheburden

ontheTribetoprovethatthesecondMontanaexceptionapplied.(Appellants’

CorrectedBriefat25.)RMCA/Donius’argumentthatthetrialcourtplacedthe

burdenofproofonthemasfeelandownersfindsnosupportintheopinionor

judgment.InitsMay17,2017Order,thetrialcourtnoted,“This[c]ourtiswell

aware[that]theTribehasaheavyburdenofshowingthattheactivityonthe

feelandposesacatastrophicthreattotribalgovernmentasopposedtosimply

aneffectonsurroundinglandandismindfulofallrelatedfactors.”(Tribal2007

Orderat7-8.)Allocationoftheburdenofproofshouldnotbeconfusedwith

thetrialcourt’srepeatedconclusionsthattheAppellants’actionsandinactions

couldleadtocatastrophicconsequences.(Id.at6.)19

Second,RMCA/Donius argue that the injunction that requires them to

submit a business plan effectively shifts the burden of proof away from the

Tribe.

TheTribecannot requireRMCAandDonius to firstprove to theTribethat theactivitiesbeingconductedonthesubjectpropertywill not pose a catastrophic risk to the political integrity, the

19Specifically,thetribalcourtfoundthefollowing:“However,theconditionofthepropertyandpoormaintenanceofthepropertyinandofitselfposesacatastrophicrisktoPlaintiffs.”(Id.)“Inshort,duetopriorusage,thepropertypresentsasituationwherebyanyfuturefiresinthishighlyprone‘firearea’can,infact,havecatastrophicconsequencesontheTribe.”(Id.at 8.) “There is no doubt in the [c]ourt’smind that any fire onDefendants’ property orpassingthroughDefendants’propertycanposeacatastrophicrisktoPlaintiffs’watersupply....”)(Id.)

29

economic security, or the health and welfare of the Tribe, byrequiringthemtosubmitabusinessplanfortheTribe’sapproval,before being allowed to engage in any activities on the subjectproperty. That gives the Tribe complete discretion and controlover the property, contrary to Montana, supra, and casesconstruing it. Itunlawfullyplaces theburdenon thenon-IndianowneroffeelandtoprovetotheTribethatitsactivitieswillnotamounttocatastrophicconsequences.(Appellants’CorrectedBriefat25-26.)

ThisCourt finds thatRMCA/Donius improperly conflate theburdenof

proofthatwasplacedontheTribe,andtheinjunctiveremedythatwasimposed

onthemafterthetrialcourtfoundthattheTribehadmetitsburdenofproof.

Once the tribehasproven that thesecondMontanaexceptionapplies to the

conductofafeelandowner,itwaspermissibleforthetribalcourttoissuean

orderthatplacestheburdenonthefee landownerstoperformactionsorto

stoptheiractionsortoseektribalpermissiontotakesimilaractions.

Third, RMCA/Donius argue that, assuming the burden of proof was

placedontheTribe,itfailedtoprovethatthethreatposedbytheirconductis

sufficienttotriggerjurisdictionunderMontanaanditsprogeny.Wesummarily

rejectRMCA/Donius’argumentforthreereasons.First,itseemstobebasedon

theexpostfactodoctrine.However,thedoctrinedoesnotapplyherebecause

althoughtheOrdinancewasamendedafteradisputehadarisen,itimposeda

moresevereburdenontheTribe,notonRMCA/Donius.Second,theviolation

30

notices,20pleadingsclaimingaviolationoftheOrdinancewerefiledafterthe

Ordinance had been amended. Finally, the judgment was based on the

Ordinanceasamendedin2014.Further,theRinconTribalCodetiesthesubject

matterjurisdictionofthetribaljudiciarytoallactionssolongasthereis“any

basis consistent with the inherent sovereignty of the Band, its Articles of

Associationandlaws,andfederallaw.”RINCONTRIBALCODE§3.103.Basedon

the plain language of the Ordinance, the trial court held that the Tribe had

provedthatithadjurisdictionoverRMCA/Donius.

The trigger point for tribal jurisdiction under § 8.301(b)(4)(B) in this

case is the potential for the defendants’ activities to create catastrophic

consequencesthatcanspreadtotriballands.Toreview,thetrialcourtfound

conclusively(1)thattheAppellantsfailedtomaintaintheirproperty;(2)that

the Appellants’ land constitutes a fire hazard in an area that is unusually

threatened by fire; (3) that the Appellants’ actions and inactions have

contributedtoasignificantthreattothepristinecharacterofthetribe’swater

supply; and (4) that the Appellants’ assertion of immunity from tribal

20TheTribeissuednewNoticesofViolations(NOV)toRMCA/Doniusafterthe2014amendment.Thenewnoticesreferredbacktoearliernotices:“TheviolationsdescribedinthisNoticehavebeenpreviouslydescribedinREDNoticesdatedOctober13,2009andJanuary15,2010,whichwereservedonthepropertyownerofrecordMr.MarvinDonius,whohasnotresponded,anddatedMarch31,2010,whichwasservedonbothRMCAandMr.Donius,neitherofwhichhasresponded.”(TrialExh.161.)

31

jurisdiction, together with local government’s demurrer, creates a lawless

enclavewithinthereservation.

WeconcludethattheAppellants’ landusechoicesonitsownproperty

havethepotentialtocreatecatastrophicimpactsontheRinconBand’slands.

We hold that the RMCA/Donius’ conduct has long created the potential for

catastrophic consequences on the tribe. There are two critical facts that

undergirdourholding.First,theTribeisdependentonasinglewatersource,

the groundwater underneath both the Tribe’s lands and the RMCA/Donius’

lands. Second,theTribeisdependentonamajorsourceofrevenuefromits

gamingoperations,whichare locatedacross thestreet fromthedefendants’

property.Ifeitherofthoseresourcesarethreatenedwithcatastrophicharm,

thentriballawauthorizestheTribetoassertjurisdictionoverthedefendants.

Moreover,insupportoftheirattackontribaljurisdiction,MarvinDonius

testifiedthathebelieved“hecouldusethelandinanyfashionhechose,short

of a nuclear waste dump.” (Tribal 2007 Order at 9.) Thus, on appeal,

RMCA/Donius ask us to disregard the trial court’s concern that the

RMCA/Doniuspropertywasa“lawlessenclave.” First, theyarguethat in its

judgmentthetrialcourtconcludedthatbeinga“lawlessenclave”gavetheTribe

the“righttoregulatetheproperty,despitetherequirementsunderMontana.”

The Court finds that this argument misconstrues the judgment. In the

32

judgment, thetrialcourtstatesthat it foundtheTribe’sefforts“tosafeguard

any potential damage to the Tribe’s economic security, health, welfare, and

safety” to be legitimate “in light of the fact that local government showsno

interestinzoning,regulating,orexercisinganyformofregulationdealingwith

anycontrolovernon-IndianownedfeelandlocatedonIndianreservationsin

SanDiegoCounty.”(Tribal2007Orderat5.)Thus,contrarytoRMCA/Donius’

argument the trial courtdidnot treat the “lawless enclave” characterof the

property as abasis for tribal jurisdictiondespiteMontana. Rather, the trial

court incorporated RMCA/Donius’ conduct on a “lawless enclave” as

supportingitsMontanaanalysis.

We also reject RMCA/Donius’ argument that, underMontana, the fact

thatfeelandonareservationisnotregulatedbylocalandstategovernmental

bodiesisnotapermissiblebasisfortheTribetoassertjurisdictionovertheir

fee land. We acknowledge that there is no discussion in Montana and its

progeny about lack of local governmental regulation as a basis for tribal

jurisdiction.However,thatwasnottheanalysisbythetrialcourt.Thelackof

localandstatehealthandsafetyregulationofmattersnormallyfallinginthe

ambitofsuchregulationisrecitedbythetrialcourtasevidencethatmaybe

consideredwhendecidingwhetherthecircumstancesherewarrantimposition

oftribaljurisdiction.

33

Inaddition,RMCA/DoniusattempttodeprivetheTribeofrelianceonthe

symmetrybetweenthe“catastrophicconsequences”languageofitsOrdinance

andthepresentarticulationsoftheMontanastandard,byarguingthatthatthe

Ordinancewas“fraudulentlyaltered.”(Appellants’CorrectedBriefat33.)As

recited in thebackground, thedisputebetweenRMCA/DoniusandtheTribe

haslastedforoverfifteenyears.Duringthattime,theTribehaspromulgated

ordinancesandamendedvariousversionsofordinances.RMCA/Doniusargue

thattheordinanceunderwhichtheTribe’sjurisdictionshouldbetestedisthe

oneineffectbeforethecurrentversionthattheTribehadadoptedonAugust

14,2012. The2012versiondidnotuse “catastrophic consequences”as the

standard. RMCA/Donius argue that the 2012 version arguably shifted the

burdenofproofaway fromtheTribebecause it requiresa fee landowner to

submitabusinessplaninwhichthefeeownerprovestotheTribe’ssatisfaction

that a proposed use will not threaten tribal health and welfare. The 2014

versionoftheOrdinancedoesnotrequireabusinessplan,butallowsoneatthe

discretionofthefeeowner.Wethereforefindthatthetrialcourtdidnoterr

whenitheldthat,asamatteroflaw,Appellants’actionsandinactionshadthe

potentialtoimposecatastrophicconsequencesonthetribe.Thisholdingmeets

thestandardestablishedbysection8.301(b)(4)(B)oftheOrdinance.

34

Finally, the Court finds that the current case is in equipoise between

Evans and FMC. The RMCA/Donius’ land use activities are far more

consequential thanthemereconstructionofasingle-familyhomeat issuein

Evans.ButRMCA/Donius’activitieshavenotbeenshowntobeaspotentially

“deadly”asthoseofthepolluterinFMC.However,itisalsohelpfultoreview

theuniverseofMontanasecondexceptioncasesforcontext.Themostrelevant

casesarethoseinwhichnonmembersassertedtheprivilegeofbeingexcepted

from tribal jurisdiction while on fee lands surrounded by tribal lands.

RMCA/Donius’ assertion of the privilege of being excepted from tribal

jurisdiction despite potentially leaching contaminants into the tribe’s

groundwater and creating conditions for extensive fire damage places

RMCA/Doniusinthatcategory.Ineachofthesecases,21theultimateoutcome

21ExamplesofnonmemberconductsimilartoRMCA/Donius’include,forexample,Wisconsinv.EPA,266F.3d741(7thCir.2001)(“hugezinc-coppersulfidemine”);BurlingtonN.SantaFeR.R.Co.v.AssiniboineandSiouxTribesofFortPeckReservation,323F.3d767(9thCir.2003)(railroadoperatingonreservationrightofwaythatcarriedhazardouswasteandsubjecttoderailmentsleadingtofatalitiesandtoxicspills);StateofMontanav.EPA,137F.3d1135(9thCir.1998)(“feedlots,dairies,minetailings,autowreckingyardsanddumps,constructionactivitiesandlandfills[;]wastewatertreatmentfacilities,commercialfishpondsandhatcheries,slaughterhouses,hydroelectricfacilitiesandwoodprocessingplants”);CityofAlbuquerquev.Browner,97F.3d415(10thCir.1996)(“wastetreatmentfacilitywhichdumpsintotheriver”);BPAmericaInc.v.YeringtonPaiuteTribe,2018WL6028697(D.Nev.,Nov.15,2018)(abandonedcopperminewithcontaminantsthatcouldseepintothegroundandsurfacewateronthereservation;settlementwithtribereachedleadingtofederalcleanupofmine);St.IsadoreFarmLLCv.Coeurd’AleneTribeofIndians,2013WL4782140(D.Idaho,Sept.5,2013)(alpacafarmwithuntreatedseptagethatcouldseepintothegroundwateronthereservation).

35

ofthedisputebetweenthetribeandnonmembersresultedincourtdecisions

orsettlementsfavoringthetribalinterests.

Here, RMCA/Donius’ own admissions about the facts in their brief

demonstrates the potential catastrophic impacts of their conduct.

RMCA/Donius concede that after amassivewildfire on the reservation and

beyondin2007,“fire-damageddebriswasleftonthepropertyfromOctober

2007untilAugust2008....Therisk-impactdebrisleftonthesubjectproperty

included ash-debris, petroleum, and ash metal.” (Appellants’ Brief at 12.)

RMCA/Doniusalsoconcedethatin2011“theTribe’sexpertengineersfounda

low-leveldieselandmotoroilplumeextendingfromoffthesubjectproperty.”

Id.Inaddition,RMCA/Doniusconcedethatin2015,theTribediscoveredthat

RMCA/Doniushadengagedinunpermittedactivities, including“constructing

mobilehomes,fabricatingorrefurbishingwoodenpallets,parkingcommercial

trucks on the property, parking refrigeration-style trailers on the property,

allowingpeople to live inmobilehomeson thepropertyandparkingmotor

vehiclesontheproperty.”Id.at14.Finally,RMCA/Doniushaveconcededthat

eachoftheseactivitiesisapotentialthreat,butresttheirdefenseontheclaim

thatnoneoftheseactivitieshaveactuallyharmedtheTribe.However,under

Montana,actualharmisnotthetriggerfortribaljurisdiction,potentialharmis.

Thus,wedonot findRMCA/Donius’defensecredible,orconsistentwith the

36

law.Inshort,RMCA/DoniusdemandthisCourttograntthemimmunityfrom

tribaljurisdiction.Giventhelonganddetailedhistoryofpotentialcatastrophe

narrowlyavoidedovertheyears,Appellants’argumentsmustberejected.

B. Remedies Afterphaseone,thetrialcourtconcludedthattherewasabasisunder

the second Montana exception for the Tribe to enforce its environmental

protectionOrdinanceoverRMCA/Donius. Duringthesecondphase,thetrial

court reviewed and affirmed jurisdiction and took evidence on what relief

shouldbe awardedbasedon thepresent conditions onRMCA/Donius’ land.

Thetrialcourtimposedthefollowinginjunctiveremedies:

1. Inordertoproceedwithanydevelopmentorfurtheruseofthe property RMCA/Donius shall provide the Tribewith abusinessplanacceptableperthestandardoftheREEO.

2. Bothpartiesshallmakeagoodfaithefforttoworktogether

to develop this business plan. Per any business planRMCA/Donius shall provideRincon access to the propertyallowing professional experts to conduct any necessary,water,andsurfaceconditionsofthepropertyandanyimpactthebusinessplanmayhaveontheTribeseconomicsafety,health,andgeneralwelfare.

3. If factuallyanyassessmentby theseexpertsconcludesany

contaminationispresentandfurtherinspectionandanalysisarerequired,RMCA/Doniusshallbearallrelatedreasonableexpenses.

37

4. Ifany“cleanup”ofthepropertyisrequiredtheREDshallsetaplan inplacesubject to theCourt’sapprovalandagain ifrequiredRMCA/Doniusshallbearallcosts.

5. As a point of clarity RMCA/Donius shall not conduct any

activityonthepropertywithoutanapprovedbusinessplanbeinginplaceandapproved. Thisincludesallcommercial,residential, or any type of personal or business activity.However,RMCA/Doniusmayremoveexistingitemsfromtheproperty.

6. ShouldRMCA/Doniusviolateanyprovisionsoftheorderor

is not in compliancewith an approved business plan theyshallbesubjecttothe$2,000(twothousanddollar)adayfinepayabletotheRinconTribe.Saidfinesshallremaininplaceuntilsaidviolationiscured.

7. With a 24 hour notice to RMCA/Donius, Rincon or its

representative experts or RED representatives shall beallowedaccesstotheproperty.

Inaddition,thetrialcourtreservedrulingonanawardof“cost”tothe

Tribe.

RMCA/Donius challenge the injunctive relief based on conflict in the

testimonybetween theTribe’s lay andexpertwitnesses and those calledby

RMCA/Donius.Wereviewatrialcourt’srulingonapplicationsforinjunctive

reliefforabuseofdiscretion.SeeWeinbergerv.Romero-Barcelo,456U.S.305,

311-313 (1982). A trial court abuses its discretion when it acts without

reference toanyguidingrulesorprinciples. U.S.v.Hinkson,585F.3d1247,

1263(9thCir.2009)(“[W]ewillaffirmadistrictcourt’sfactualfindingunless

38

thatfindingisillogical,implausible,orwithoutsupportininferencesthatmay

be drawn from the record.”) If some evidence appears in the record that

reasonablysupportsthetrialcourt’sdecisionthereisnoabuseofdiscretion.

Id.Thus,atrialcourtdoesnotabuseitsdiscretionwhenanorderissupported

bysomeevidenceevenifthereisconflictingevidence.Harmanv.Apfel,211F.

3d1172,1175(9thCir.2000).

Anawardofinjunctivereliefmustbebasedonafindingthattheparty

awardedinjunctivereliefsatisfiedafour-factortest:“(1)thatithassufferedan

irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary

damages,are inadequate tocompensate for that injury; (3) that,considering

the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in

equityiswarranted;and(4)thatthepublicinterestwouldnotbedisservedby

apermanentinjunction.”N.CheyenneTribev.Norton,503F.3d836,843(9th

Cir.2007)(quotingEbayInc.v.Mercexchange,LLC,547U.S.388(2006)).

Anirreparableinjuryoccurswhentheinjuryisofsuchanaturethatthe

injuredpartycannotbeadequatelycompensatedbydamagesorthedamages

cannotbemeasuredbyanycertainpecuniarystandard.HerbReedEnter,LLC

v.FloridaEnt.Mgmt.,Inc.,736F.3d1239,1249(9thCir.2013).Apartyhasno

adequateremedyatlawwhendamagesareincapableofcalculationortheparty

tobeenjoinedisincapableofrespondingindamages.CottonwoodEnvtl.Law

39

Ctr. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 789 F.3d 1075, 1090 (9th Cir. 2015); Johnson v.

Couturier, 572 F.3d 1067, 1081 (9th Cir. 2009) (Irreparable harm prong

satisfied where the plaintiffs showed that it was likely that the defendants

wouldnothavetheresourcestosatisfyajudgmentintheplaintiffs’favor).

Theshowingthatatribemustmaketoestablishjurisdictionunderthe

secondMontanaexceptionalsosatisfiestheshowingthatitmustmaketobe

entitledtoinjunctiverelief.Conductthatplacesatribeunderthepotentialfor

harmtoitspoliticalintegrity,economicsecurityandhealthorwelfareunder

Montana, constitutes irreparable injury under the principles of equity.

Potentialharmtopoliticalintegrity,economicsecurity,healthandwelfareare

each a type of potential harm for which there is no adequate or certain

pecuniarystandardforcompensatorydamages. Whenweightedagainstone

another, in the faceofapotential forcatastrophicconsequences to the tribe

causedbyafeeowner’sconduct,equitygivesgreaterweighttorequiringthe

feeownertocomplywithatribe’shealthandsafetyregulationsthanitdoesto

afeeowner’sfreedomfromtribalregulation.Withrespecttopublicinterest,

environmentalpreservationisinthepublicinterest. SeeEarthIslandInst.v.

U.S.ForestServ.,351F.3d1291,1308(9thCir.2003);KootenaiTribeofIdaho

v.Veneman,313F.3d1094(9thCir.2002).

40

BasedonevidenceoflackofmaintenanceofthelandbyRMCA/Donius,

renderingitsusceptibletowildfiresandtogroundwatercontamination,anda

lackofregulationbylocalandstategovernment,thetrialcourtdidnotabuse

its discretion in concluding thatRMCA/Donius’ conduct has thepotential to

impose catastrophic consequences upon the political integrity, economic

securityandhealthandwelfareof theTribe,making it appropriate togrant

injunctive relief. It is the essence of equity jurisdiction that a court is only

empoweredtograntreliefnobroaderthannecessarytocuretheeffectsofthe

harmcausedbytheviolation. TheForschnerGrp.,Inc.v.ArrowTradingCo.,

124 F.3d 402, 406 (2d Cir. 1997). We find that the scope of the injunction

exceeds the amount of restraint necessary to protect the Tribe from the

potentialharmpresentedbyRMCA/Donius’conduct.Therefore,wereverse,in

part,andremandthecasetothetrialcourttomoldtheprotuberancesofthe

injunctiontothehollowsofthepotentialharm.

We cite three examples as guidance. First, the injunction prohibits

RMCA/Doniusfrom“anydevelopmentorfurtheruseoftheproperty”untilthey

providetheTribewithabusinessplanacceptableperthestandardoftheREEO.

There was no evidence that all of RMCA/Donius’ development or use

threatened catastrophic consequences. An injunction is overbroad when it

seekstorestrainapartyfromengaginginlegalconduct.Linebackv.Spurlino

41

Materials,LLC,546F.3d491,504(7thCir.2008).Thus,aninjunctionagainst

alldevelopmentoruseofthelandisoverbroad.

Second,RMCA/Doniusareenjoinedtoceaseallactivityontheproperty

untiltheyhaveprovidedtheTribewithabusinessplanacceptabletotheTribe.

Thisbusinessplanrequirementisperhapsdrawnfromanearlierversionofthe

Ordinance.Sincethethreatisgrownoutofactionsorinactionsthatposeafire

hazard,groundwatercontamination,andhealthandsafetyconductthatwould

otherwiseberegulatedbystateandlocalgovernmentalagencies,theinjunction

should speak to those concerns. In addition, we instruct the trial court to

considerwhetherthereisanybasisundertheOrdinancefortheTribetogive

instructionstoSDG&EwithrespecttotheRMCA/Doniusproperty.22

Finally, with respect to the twenty-four hours’ notice requirement,

RMCA/DoniusareenjoinedtoprovidetheTribewithaccesstotheirproperty

topermittheTribetoconductprofessional inspectionsofwaterandsurface

conditions. The injunction does not address the frequency of unilaterally

22OnApril1,2008,theTribenotifiedSanDiegoGas&ElectricnotproceedwithreconnectingpowertotheRMCA/Doniusproperty.(SeePhaseTwoTrialEx.39.)Thepresentstatusofutilities,particularlyofelectricalpowertothepropertyisuncleartothisCourt.TheCourtunderstands that RMCA v. Mazzetti, Case No. 09-CV-2330-WQH-JLB (S.D. Cal.) is stayedpendingexhaustioninthiscase.Intheinterestofjudicialeconomy,initsreconsiderationoftheinjunction,thetrialcourtisdirectedtodetermineifelectricalpowerisnotconnectedatthedirectionoftheTribe,andifso,whetherthesecondMontanaexceptionempowerstheTribetodirectSDG&EtonotreconnectpowertothepropertyundercircumstancesthatmeetwiththeapprovalandstandardsofSDG&E.

42

initiatedtribalinspections.TheOrdinancedoesnotprovidetheTribewiththe

unilateral right to enter and inspection. Conceivably, inspections could be

soughtfromthetribalcourtasaformofemergencyrelief.Thatwouldprovide

alandownerwithaforumtochallengearequestedinspection.

VI.CONCLUSION

The Court finds that the Tribe’s 2014 Ordinance meets the second

Montana exception. Thus, the Court regards an injunction that follows the

OrdinancemorefavorablythanonethatordersRMCA/Doniustodothingsthat

deviatefromtheproceduressetforthintheOrdinance.

Inreversingtheinjunction,weorderthetrialcourttovacateanyorder

findingRMCA/Doniusincontemptbasedonnoncompliancewiththeinjunction

andtovacateanyfineimposedonRMCA/Doniuspursuanttotheinjunction.

Wevacatethe2009defaultjudgmentthatwasenteredundertheversion

oftheOrdinancethatdidnotcomportwiththeMontanastandard.Wevacate

our order requiring Appellants to post a bond to stay enforcement of the

judgmentnuncprotuncandpurgeAppellantsofallcitationsofcontemptbythe

trialcourtforconductthattookplacewhilethisappealwaspending.

///

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Pendingfurtherproceedingsbeforethetrialcourt,theTribeisordered

toremoveitsblockadeoftheRMCA/Doniusproperty.

Eachpartyshallbearitsownappellatecosts.

THEJUDGMENTOFTHETRIBALCOURTISAFFIRMEDINPART,VACATED

INPARTANDREMANDED.