REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINESSANDIGANBAYAN

QUEZON CITY

PEOPLE OFPHILIPPINES,

Criminal Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238For: Plunder

Present:CABOTAJE-TANG, P.J.,Chairperson,FERNANDEZ,! SJ., J. andFERNANDEZ, B, J.

JUAN PONCE ENRILE, et at,Accused.

Promulgated:

f'k5o~ -z./~~ AJ[------------------------------------------------------------------------------J[ ~

RESOLUTION

This resolves accused Jessica Lucila G. Reyes's MotionforReconsideration (of the Resolution dated 14 September 2017)dated September 29,2017.2

In seeking a reconsideration of the Court's Resolutionpromulgatedon September14,2017, whichdeniedher mn

I J. Sarah Jane T. Fernandez is a signatory to the assailed Resolution.2 pp. 31-56, Vol. XV, Record

RESOLUTIONPeople vs. Enrile, et al.Criminal Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238

to recuse the Chairperson of the Third,. accused Reyespresents the followingarguments:

1. Contrary to the Court's declaration, the filing of themotion to recuse is not an afterthought because she filed an"Exception dated 21 March 2016," interposing her objectionsto the Court's findings against her in its Resolution denyingaccused Napoles's petition for bail. Allegedly, there was nooccasion for her to file a motion to recuse the Chairpersonsince the Court's Resolution, where it made findings of herguilt, only involved the denial of the bail application of her co-accused Janet LimNapoles;

2. Almost all of her motions were denied by the Courtmostly on grounds which were not even advanced by theprosecution or based on the record;

3. The Chairperson purportedly made prematurefindings and "went beyond the confines of the bail applicationof accused Napoles" when she made findings of herparticipation in the same offense of plunder before the onset ofthe trial,. According to accused Reyes, the Court's disclaimerthat it is not passing judgment on the culpability or non-culpability of the other accused is belied by the very findingson accused Reyes's participation;

4. The Chairperson's bias and partiality are validcauses for her inhibition because the Resolutions dated March2, 2016, January 3, 2017 and May 8, 2017, do not onlyconstitute reversible errors but indicate arbitrariness andprejudice "that are so gross in nature and degree as to defeatthe attributes of the cold neutrality that an impartial judgemust possess and to which every accused is entitled as amatter of right;"

5. Although the members of the Third Division of thisCourt act as a collegial body, the Resolution denying accusedNapoles's petition for bail and Resolution denying her motionto quash are allegedly not products of the collectiveassessment of the entire membershipof the Third DiVin

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RESOLUTIONPeople vs. Enrile, et al.Criminal Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238

She claims that J. Samuel Martires penned a SeparateOpinion in the Resolution denying accused Napoles's petitionfor bail where he stated that the findings against accusedReyes are premature; J. Martires dissented in the Resolutiondenying her motion to quash; and the assailed Resolution"indubitably shows that it was not collegialbut personally anddirectly prepared by the Honorable Chairperson herself, as itmentions her relationships with Senator Enrile as her"kababayan" and Atty. Estelito Mendoza as her former mentorfrom whom she has learned much, gained much and grownmuch'" and,

6. Her motion to recuse was not filed to "correct thegrievous errors tainting the Resolutions dated 2 March 2016,3 January 2017 and 8 May 2017" but is a remedy to "secureher constitutionally-guaranteed right to due process of lawand a fair and impartial trial." She points out that the saidResolutions are the subject of a petition for certiorari whichshe filed with the Supreme Court on July 10, 2017. This iscontrary to the Court's declaration that she could haveelevated the denial of her motion to quash to the SupremeCourt if, indeed, she believes that the Court's Resolutions areerroneous.

The prosecution opposes the subject motion claimingthat the allegations therein are mere rehash of accusedReyes's earlier arguments which had been considered andexhaustively passed upon by the Court in its assailedResolution. The prosecution argues that accused Reyes hadnot cited any law or jurisprudence preventing her from filing amotion for inhibition in the absence of an adverse ruling.Thus, she cannot claim that she could not have filed a motionfor inhibition after receipt of the Court's Resolution denying

RESOLUTIONPeople vs. Enrile, et al.Criminal Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238

Resolution only involved accused Napoles. According to theprosecution, accused Reyes should have immediately filed amotion to recuse the Chairperson when the case was raffled tothe Third Division since she only adopted the grounds reliedupon by accused Enrile that included the so-calledsubconscious forces or elements that allegedly affect thedisposition of the Chairperson. It also argues that the assailedResolution, which cited matters personal to the Chairperson,was concurred in by the other members of the Third Divisionmaking it a collegial act. Finally, it argues that accusedReyes's argument that the Court denied almost all of hermotions on reasons not advanced by the prosecution onlyprove that the Court had all along been fair, objective andindependent in disposing matters brought before it.3

After a re-examination of accused Reyes's arguments, theCourt finds her motion for reconsideration devoid of merit.

I. The recorded eventsundisputably show that thefiling of the motion to recuseis an afterthought.

A reVIew of the record of this case yields the followingfacts:

1. Accused Reyes received a copy of the Court'sResolution promulgated on October 16, 2015, which denied~ccused Napoles's petition for bail, on October 21, 2015;'---;

pp. 456-460, Vol. XV, Record, / /

'p.604,VoI.IX,Reooro if ~

RESOLUTIONPeople vs. Enrile, et al.Criminal Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238

2. Accused Napoles filed a motion for reconsiderationthereof which was denied by the Court in its Resolutionpromulgated on March 2,2016;5

3. Accused Reyes received a copy of the Court'sResolution promulgated on March 2,2010 on March 9,2016;6

4. Thereafter, or on March 22, 2016, she filed an"Exception" interposing her objections and submitting herexceptions to the Court's findings of alleged culpability againsther in denying accused Napoles's petition for bail;7

5. On June 22, 2016, she filed a motion to quashwhich was denied by the Court in its Resolution promulgatedon January 3,2017;8

6, Then on January 18, 2017, she filed a motion forreconsideration thereof which was denied by the Court in itsResolution promulgated on May 8,2017;9

7. She received a copy of the said Court's Resolutionon May 11,2017;10

8. On May 30, 2017, she filed a Motion for Bail AdCautelam which the Court treated as an application for bail; 11

and

9. Barely a week after, or on June 9, 201 7, she filedthe motion to recuse, or after the Court denied her motion toquash and her motion for reconsideration thereof.

The above circumstances plainlyaccused Reyes's act of filing the motion

demonstrate that

to recuse W/75 pp. 531-547, Vol. X, Record6 p. 620, Vol. X, Record7 pp. 620-640, Vol. X, Record8 pp. 29-66, Vol. XIII, Record9 pp. 74-165, Vol XIII, Record10 pp. 826-826, Vol. XIII, Record11 pp. 582-588, 592, Vol. XIV, Record

RESOLUTIONPeople vs. Enrile, et al.Criminal Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238

afterthought. She filed the same motion only after the Courtadversely ruled on her previous motions.

II. Contrary to accused Reyes'sclaim, the Court'sResolutions promulgated onMarch 2, 2016, January 3,2017, May 8, 2017 and theassailed Resolution areproducts of the collectiveassessment of the entiremembership of the ThirdDivision.

Section l(b), Rule VIII of the Sandiganbayan RevisedInternal Rules provides:

(b) In Division - The unanimous vote of three(3) Justices in a Division shall be necessary for therendition of a judgment or final order. In the event aunanimous vote is not obtained, the Presiding Justiceshall designate by raffle and on rotation basis two (2)Justices from all the other members of theSandiganbayan to sit temporarily with them, forming aSpecial Division of five (5) Justices, and the vote of amajority of such Special Division shall be necessary forthe renditionofa judgment or fmal or/7

RESOLUTIONPeople vs. Enrile, et al.Criminal Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238

The following are extant from the records showingcompliance with the above internal rules in the issuance of theResolutions cited by accused Reyes:

1. The Resolution promulgated on October 15, 2015,denying accused Napoles's petition for bail penned by theChairperson was concurred in by the two (2) members of theThird Division except that J. Samuel R. Martires penned aseparate opinion discussing his basis for the denial of thepetition for bail.12 Accused Napoles filed a motion forreconsideration thereof. This was denied by the Court in itsResolution promulgated on March 2, 2016, again penned bythe Chairperson and concurred in by the two (2) members ofthe Division, including J. Martires; 13

2. The Resolution promulgated on January 3, 2017,denying accused Reyes's motion to quash, was decided by aspecial division of five (5) Justices in view of the dissentingopinion of J. Martires. Four (4) members of the SpecialDivision of Five (5) Justices voted for the denial of accusedReyes's motion to quash.14 Accused Reyes filed a motion forreconsideration which was denied by the Court in itsResolution promulgated on May 8, 2017. This time, the votewas unanimous. All five (5) members of the said SpecialDivision voted to deny the said motion for reconsideration;15and

3. The assailed Resolution denying accused Reyes'smotion to recuse the Chairperson was likewise a unanimousresolution. The fact that the said Resolution mentionsaccused Enrile as the Chairperson's kababayan and Atty.Estelito Mendoza as her mentor does not in any way denigratethe collegial nature of the assailed Resolution of the ThirdDivision of this cO/7

12 pp. 113-243, Vol. IX, Record13 pp. 531-547, Vol. X, Record14 pp. 29-66, Vol. XIII, Record15 pp. 654-697, Vol. XIII, Record

RESOLUTIONPeople vs. Enrile, et al.Criminal Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238

Also, the Court did not state that accused Reyes did notquestion the Court's denial of her motion to quash before theSupreme Court. It merely stated that as the prosecutioncorrectly points out, the proper remedy to question theerroneous ruling of the Court is to question them before theSupreme Court and not to file a motion for inhibition.

III. The arguments presented byaccused Reyes are mererehash of the issues sheraised in her motion torecuse the Chairperson.

As the prosecution correctly points out, accused Reyes'sarguments are mere rehash of the issues she raised in hermanifestation and motion to recuse the Chairperson. Thesearguments have been thoroughly considered and exhaustivelypassed upon by the Court in its Resolution sought to bereconsidered, to wit:16

11. There is no just or validground to warrant thegrant of the inhibitionprayed for.

Accused Enrile's and Reyes's motions to recusethe Chairperson are undeniably anchored on the secondparagraph of the afore-quoted Rule. Thus, the decisiveissue is whether there is a just or valid reason for77

16 pp. 12-16,20-22, Resolution promulgated on September 14,2015; pp. 423-427, 431-433, Record, Vol.

XV; citation' omitted 4 ~

RESOLUTIONPeople vs. Enrile, et al.Criminal Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238

Chairperson to inhibit herself from further participatingin this case.

After a rational and logical assessment of thecircumstances in this case, the Court finds that there isno just or valid reason for the Chairperson to recuseherself from further hearing the case at bar.

First. As a general rule, repeated rulings againsta litigant, no matter how erroneous and vigorously andconsistently expressed, are not a basis fordisqualification of a judge on grounds of bias andprejudice. Extrinsic evidence is required to establishbias, bad faith, malice or corrupt purpose, in addition tothe palpable error which may be inferred from thedecision or order itself.

Here, the accused-movants anchor their motionfor the recusation of the Chairperson on the allegedadverse and erroneous Resolutions which she penned.These Resolutions denied (1) accused Enrile's motion todismiss/quash Information; (2) accused Reyes's motionto quash and; (3) accused Napoles's petition for bail.According to accused Enrile, the Court inappropriatelyincluded the alleged repeated receipt by him and/ oraccused Reyes of commissions, kickbacks or rebates aspart of the combination or series of overt criminal actsconstituting plunder in its Resolution promulgated onApril 27,2017.

Accused Reyes, on the other hand, argues that theChairperson made a specific finding of her culpability inthe Court's Resolution promulgated on March 2, 2016,in violation of the doctrine that a person cannot beprejudiced by a ruling rendered in an action in whichhe / she is not a party; the Chairperson applied to herthe Supreme Court's ruling in the Enrile case that theInformation for plunder is valid in its Resolutionspromulgated on January 3,2017 and May 8,2017, butdenied her the opportunity to question the bill ofparticulars in the same Resolution giving rise to aperception of bias. Thus, accused Reyes concludes thatthe Chairperson already prejudged her guilt through the

RESOLUTIONPeople vs. Enrile, et al.Criminal Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238

doubts whether her case will be decided by an impartialtribunal.

To begin with, while the afore-cited Resolutionswere written by the Chairperson, the same were decidedby the Court as a collegial body. It is rudimentary thatin a collegial court, the members act on the basis ofconsensus or majority rule. Thus, the questionedresolutions are not the issuances of the Chairpersonalone but the product of the collectiveassessment of theentire membership of the Third Division of this Court.

Moreover, the argument that the Court'sResolutions are erroneous does not constitute a justand valid ground for the inhibition of the Chairperson.To be sure, an erroneous ruling can be remedied andcorrected. In fact, accused Enrile and Reyes filed theirrespective motions for reconsideration of theResolutions denying their separate motions to quash.The record of this case will also show that the issuesraised by the accused-movants in these subject motionshad been considered and exhaustively passed upon bythe Court in its Resolutions promulgated on January 3,2017 and January 31, 2017. As the prosecutioncorrectly points out, if accused Reyes firmly believedthat the Court's Resolutions are erroneous, then herproper remedy is to question them before the SupremeCourt. The present motion for inhibition is definitely notthe appropriate vehicle to correct the allegederroneousness of the Court's issuances.

Indeed, the Supreme Court teaches that anerroneous ruling is not enough reason to disqualify ajudge:

The fact that Judge Quijano-Padilla ruledadversely against petitioner in the resolution ofthe motion to dismiss, which this Court laterreversed in G.R. No. 160753, is not enoughreason, absent any extrinsic evidence of maliceor bad faith, to conclude that the judge wasbiased and partial against petitioner. As this

RESOLUTIONPeople vs. Enrile, et al.Criminal Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238

remedy of erroneous interlocutory rulings inthe course of a trial is not the outrightdisqualification of a judge, for there is yet tocome a judge with the omniscience to issuerulings that are always infallible. The courtswill close shop if we disqualify judges whoerr, for we all err.

Second. An allegation of prejudgment, withoutmore, constitutes mere conjecture and is not one of the"just and valid reasons" contemplated in the secondparagraph of Rule 137 of the Rules of Court for which ajudge may inhibit himself from hearing the case. TheSupreme Court has repeatedly held that mere suspicionthat a judge is partial to a party is not enough. Bareallegations of partiality and prejudgment will not sufficein the absence of clear and convincing evidence toovercome the presumption that the judge will undertakehis noble role to dispense justice according to law andevidence and without fear or favor. There should beadequate evidence to prove the allegations, and theremust be a showing that the judge had an interest,personal or otherwise, in the prosecution of the case.To be a disqualifying circumstance, the bias andprejudice must be shown to have stemmed from anextrajudicial source and result in an opinion on themerits on some basis other than what the judge learnedfrom his participation in the case.

In its Resolution denying accused Napoles'spetition for bail, the Court narrated the allegedindividual participation of all the accused who arecharged in conspiracy with one another in committingplunder, as testified to by the prosecution witnesses.On the basis thereof, the Court made some findingssimply for the purpose of resolving the said bail petition.The Court was merely called upon to determine whetherthe evidence of guilt adduced by the prosecution isstrong to warrant accused Napoles's continueddetention.

It must be remembered that a grant of bail doesnot

RESOLUTIONPeople vs. Enrile, et al.Criminal Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238

making a final assessment of the evidence after full trialon the merits. The appreciation of evidence in a petitionfor bail is at best preliminary and should not preventthe trial judge from making a final assessment of theevidence before him after full trial.

In fact, the, Court expressly declared in itsResolution promulgated on March 2, 2016, that "inresolving the motion for reconsideration of the Court'sResolution promulgated on October 16, 2015, whichdenied accused Napoles's petition for bail, it is notpassing judgment on the culpability or non-culpabilityof accused Senator Enrile, Atty. Reyes, Napoles, Limand de Asis."

Clearly, there was no prejudgment of accusedReyes's guilt. She will have the opportunity to presenther defense and cross-examine the prosecutionwitnesses during trial at which time, their credibilitywould be put to the crucible.

With respect to accused Reyes, the record showsthat she received a copy of the Court's Resolutionpromulgated on October 16, 2015, which deniedaccused Napoles's petition for bail, on October 21,2015. She filed a "Motionfor Bail Ad Cautelarri' on May30, 2017, which was heard on June 5, 2017. Four (4)days later from the said hearing, or on June 9, 2017,she filed the subject motion. Thus, she allowed one (1)year and seven (7) months to pass before she filed thesubject motion, and only after the Court denied hermotion to quash and her motion for reconsiderationthereof.

The above immutable recorded events generate theonly indubitable conclusion that the filing of the presentmotions is a mere afterthought.

Fifth. In the final reckoning, there is really nohard and fast rule when it comes to the inhibition ofjudges. Each case should be treated differently anddecided based on its peculiar circumstances. Theissue of voluntary inhibition is primarily a ma~

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RESOLUTIONPeople vs. Enrile, et aI.Criminal Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238

conscience and sound discretion on the part of thejudge. The discretion given to trial judges is anacknowledgment of the fact that these judges are in abetter position to determine the issue of inhibition asthey are the ones who directly deal with the parties-litigants in their courtrooms.

Applying the above jurisprudence, the Court findsthat the circumstances behind the voluntary inhibitionof former Chief Justice Panganiban differ from thecircumstances attributed to the Chairperson; hence, therecusation sought by accused-movants based on ChiefJustice Panganiban's reason is inapplicable to the caseof the Chairperson.

In the Estrada case, former President JosephEstrada questioned the legitimacy of the presidency offormer President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. Thereinpetitioner Estrada sought the recusation of ChiefJustice Davide and former Chief Justice Panganiban onaccount of their active participation in the swearing inof former President Macapagal-Arroyo. Thus, ChiefJustice Panganiban made the following declarations inrecusing himself from the Estrada case:

To conclude, I am voluntarily inhibitingmyself pro hac vice, not because petitioner hasproven any legal ground therefor, but because Ido not wish to give him or anyone else anyexcuse to cast doubt on the integrity of theseproceedings and of the decision that this Courtmay render in these cases of transcendentalimportance to the nation.

Such circumstance is not present in the case ofthe Chairperson. Again, the accused-movants merelypoint to adverse and alleged erroneous Resolutionspenned by the Chairperson. As earlier discussed, thesedo not constitute a valid or just ground for a voluntaryinhibition. Insofar as the accused-movants' insinuationthat the Chairperson may be partial because she was an

RESOLUTIONPeople vs. Enrile, et al.Criminal Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238

speculation which miserably falls short of the required"clear and convincing evidence" to warrant the grant ofa motion for voluntary inhibition predicated on bias andprejudice.

The record of this case shows that even before accusedReyes filed the present motion for reconsideration, she filed a"Motion to Set Case for Bail Hearings" on September 25,2016.17 This was heard by the Court on September 29,2017.18

If accused Reyes truly doubts the impartiality of theChairperson of this Court, why would she file the said motionto set case for bail hearings? Her action undeniably militatesagainst the verity of her claim of partiality.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES accused Jessica LucilaG. Reyes Motion for Reconsideration (of the Resolution datedSeptember 14) 2017) dated September 29, 2017, for lack ofmerit and for being pro forma.

SO ORDERED.Quezon City, Metro Manila

ITO R. FERNANDEZssociate Justice

17 pp. 441-445, Vol. XV, Record18 p. 447, Vol. XV, Record,