Field Artillery January-February 2003 25

In a short time, the term “contempo-rary operational environment”(COE) has become a buzzword that

many misunderstand. The COE is theenvironment in which the new opposingforce (OPFOR) operates. Fortunately,the FM 7-100 series of manuals thatexplains the COE and the OPFOR fight-ing in that environment have been signedand should be distributed to the fieldsometime during the 2d Quarter of FY03.(See the figure.)

So what is the COE? Instead of refer-ring to the book definition in FM 7-100,one can look out the window or turn onthe news. The world we live in is theCOE, and we hear and read about real-world threats daily. The mission of theOPFORs at the Combat Training Cen-ters (CTCs) is to emulate these real-world threats: be a plausible, flexibleforce using a composite of actual world-wide forces. The concept of the COEextends into the year 2020.

COE OPFOR. The COE OPFOR isnonlinear and doesn’t adhere to a tem-plate. He no longer focuses on destroy-ing friendly maneuver forces by over-whelming them with a mass of echelonedformations or attacking from the marchwith a rigid timeline.

This OPFOR is more dispersed—doesnot need to mass his artillery to producemass effects. Commanders and theirstaffs cannot afford to be fixated on oldideas, such as OPFOR “phases of fire”and the “advanced guard” formation.

As far as equipment is concerned, theCOE OPFOR can use any piece of equip-ment that is either fielded in at least onecountry or available for export. The COEOPFOR can use equipment that is not yetfielded if it is available on the worldexport market.

However, there is a caveat. TheOPFOR’s force structure and equipmentmust reflect the type of enemy the train-ing unit would face to accomplish itsassigned mission. The CTCs maintainthe philosophy “Train as you will fight.”

Because the training unit’s missiondrives the CTC scenario and the OPFOR’s

equipment, units must identify trainingobjectives for each exercise or rotationearly. The OPFOR will alter its forcepackage, as required, to present a spar-ring partner for the friendly force’s tough,realistic training.

The COE OPFOR’s equipment is likelyto be better than any single potentialthreat nation in the world because theOPFOR can use equipment that is not yetfielded. And given that the COE projectsout to 2020, it compels units to train forthe next war.

The COE OPFOR’s perspective is newon the CTC battlefields and motivatesmuch of what he does. The OPFOR stud-ies history and sees the US as a verystrong opponent but one who can’t takecasualties. This is based on Americanexperiences in Somalia and Vietnam.

According to the OPFOR perspective,America wants a casualty-free fix forlong-term problems followed by a rapidredeployment of forces. The OPFOR isin his home region and will fight for thelong term. Therefore, the OPFOR wantsto inflict casualties then flee to fightanother day. As US casualties build,America will lose interest in the region.

Fires TTP to Defeat the

COE OPFORBy Major W. Wayne Ingalls, MI

This leads to another essential tenet ofthe COE OPFOR: information warfare.Because America is seen as casualty-averse, one major reason for inflictingcasualties on US forces is to publicizethe event and cause a change in policy(withdrawal from the region). Casualtiesfor US troops in Afghanistan have beenexceptionally light, but it may have beena far different media story were it not forthe Northern Alliance’s fighting theTaliban and al Qaeda and absorbing mostof the casualties.

In a similar fashion, reports of civiliancasualties may influence US policy and,therefore, are the premise of someOPFOR tactics, techniques and proce-dures (TTPs)—such as positioning com-bat systems and forces in urban and pro-tected areas. Some media estimates claimthat US and anti-Taliban fighters causedas many as 3,600 civilian casualties todate in Afghanistan.1

The new FM 7-100-based OPFOR wasin effect at one CTC before the finaledition of the doctrinal manuals wassigned. In Battle Command TrainingProgram (BCTP) Warfighter exercises,the COE OPFOR has fought nearly adozen divisions and corps. The CombatManeuver Training Center (CMTC) inHohenfels, Germany, formally adoptedCOE-based scenarios in April 2002, andthe National Training Center (NTC) atFort Irwin, California, did so in May2002. Both these “dirt” CTCs had con-ducted several COE-transition rotationsbefore formal implementation.

The Joint Readiness Training Center(JRTC) at Fort Polk, Louisiana, long hasbeen the most COE-like of the CTCs. Infact, the JRTC assessed that its battle-field already represented 80 percent ofthe variables described in the COE.2

• FM 7-100 OPFOR Doctrinal Frame-work and Strategy

• FM 7-100.1 OPFOR Operations

• FM 7-100.2 OPFOR Tactics

• FM 7-100.3 OPFOR Paramilitary andNonmilitary Organizations and Tactics

The field manual series 7-100 (final drafts)discuss the contemporary operational envi-ronment (COE) and the opposing force(OPFOR) fighting in that environment. Read-ers can request access of the manuals onlineat the Reimer Digital Library at http://www.leavenworth.army.mil/threats/index/.

T-90

Tan

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January-February 2003 Field Artillery26

Essentially, the COE at the JRTCwill increase the emphasis on infor-mation operations, criminal elementson the battlefield and an improvedOPFOR force structure that has moreanti-tank and air defense systemsand more modern equipment. TheJRTC is conducting COE-transitionrotations with the new doctrineimplemented for the Stryker BrigadeCombat Team rotation in March.

The OPFOR’s equipment and tac-tics at the CTCs have changed to re-flect the COE.

OPFOR Equipment. In manyways, the availability of technologi-cally advanced equipment is just a partof the environment. This equipment islisted in the OPFOR Worldwide Equip-ment Guide (WEG) online at the Train-ing and Doctrine Command (TRADOC)Threat Support Directorate’s website:http://leav-www.army.mil/threats/prod-ucts/Products.htm. Essentially, the guideis a catalog from which the OPFOR can“buy” the equipment it needs for thespecific training mission.

The following are sample pieces ofequipment from the catalog available tothe BCTP OPFOR and, if noted, avail-able to the dirt CTC OPFORs.

9A52-2 Smerch. This is a 300-mmmultiple rocket launcher (MRL) with a90-kilometer range. Fragmentary high-explosive (HE) munitions, dual-purposeimproved conventional munitions(DPICM) and sensor-fuzed warheadsfit on an inertially course-correctedrocket with time-fuze adjustment. Theseprovide greatly improved accuracy withan error of 0.019 percent of the range(171 meters at 90 kilometers). In addi-tion to the BCTP, the OPFORs at the NTCand CMTC use these long shooters.

T-90 Tank. This main battle tank hasthe TShU-1-7 Shtora-1 optronic coun-termeasures system designed to disruptthe laser target designation andrangefinders of incoming anti-tankguided missiles (ATGMs). The T-90also has a laser-warning package thattells the tank crew when it is beinglased. Shtora-1 is an electro-optical jam-mer that jams the enemy’s semiauto-matic command to line-of-sight(SACLOS) ATGMs, laser rangefindersand target designators. At this point,only the BCTP OPFOR has used theT-90s, but there have been discussionsabout upgrading the dirt CTCs OPFORtank fleets to T-90s.

IL-220U Artillery-Locating Radar.This Ukrainian-made phased-array ra-

dar can detect Army tactical missilesystem (ATACMS) launches at 55 kilo-meters, multiple-launch rocket system(MLRS) launches at up to 40 kilome-ters, tube artillery firing at up to 20kilometers and mortars at up to 30 kilo-meters. In addition to BCTP, the capa-bilities of this system will be replicatedat the CMTC and the NTC, giving theOPFORs target acquisition capabilitiescomparable to our Q-37 Firefinder.

BL-904 Artillery-Locating Radar. ThisChinese-made radar has not completedfielding, even in the Peoples Republicof China, but it is available for export.Therefore, the OPFOR can use it. Theradar essentially is the Chinese equiva-lent of our Q-36 Firefinder that candetect MLRS firing at approximately30 kilometers.

G-6 Rhino Howitzer. This is a SouthAfrican self-propelled (wheeled) 155-mm howitzer with a range of up to 39kilometers (base bleed). Only the BCTPOPFOR has used this system; however,the dirt CTCs are using other long-range tube systems.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). Avariety of UAVs are available, eitherwith a pre-programmed flight path al-lowing approximately 150 kilometersof reconnaissance depth or a true re-motely piloted vehicle (RPV) with anapproximate reconnaissance depth of50 kilometers. In the near future, theOPFOR at the dirt CTCs will have ac-cess to simulated UAVs.

According to FM 100-12 Army The-ater Missile Defense Operations pub-lished in March 2000, “Threat expertsproject more than 50 UAV developercountries and 75 UAV user countries by2005.” Some of these countries includeRussia, China, France, South Africa,Iraq and Iran.

SA-18 Grouse. This is a Russian-mademan-portable air defense system

(MANPADS) that intelligence ana-lysts at the TRADOC Deputy Chiefof Staff for Intelligence (DCSINT)have assessed to be about 90 percentas effective as a Stinger.3 Overall,there is an increased number ofMANPADS that are more lethal. Allthe CTCs use this system.

OPFOR Surrogate Vehicle (OSV).A product upgrade for the BMPsused at the NTC and CMTC, theOSV has a Bradley turret on aVISMOD M113 chassis. It has a 30-mm cannon and fires the AT-5ATGM. OSVs can carry five AT-5missiles and engage armored targets

at a range of 4,000 meters.Expendable Battery-Powered Global

Positioning System (GPS) Jammers.These deny forces the use of GPS. TheGPS jammers’ range is approximately400 to 1,000 square meters, dependingon battery life. The CMTC probablywill use this system.

Expendable Battery-Powered Radio-Frequency Jammers. These deny forcesthe use of a particular frequency range.The radio frequency jammers’ range isapproximately 400 to 1,000 square me-ters, depending on battery life. TheCMTC probably will use this system.

Another significant change to OPFORequipment is the doubling or tripling ofthe quantity of anti-tank systems in theforce with an emphasis on infantry asthe primary tank killers. Also, theOPFOR reconnaissance units will havehand-held thermal viewers with a rangeof 2.5 kilometers.

COE OPFOR Tactics. One of theinnovations the FM 7-100 series dis-cusses is an offensive mission called a

9A52-2 Smerch

IL-220U Artillery-Locating Radar

Field Artillery January-February 2003 27

“Strike.” This mission is “an attack de-signed to destroy a key enemy organi-zation through a synergistic combina-tion of precision fires and ground ma-neuver in a small span of time.”

The effects of a successful Strike aremore than just the loss of a number ofcombat systems. Rather, defeat comesthrough the paralysis that occurs whena key organization is completely devas-tated in a small span of time.

The OPFOR has brigade tacticalgroups (BTGs) and division tacticalgroups (DTGs). The DTG is essentiallya task-organized division-level unit. TheOPFOR’s operational-strategic com-mand (OSC) is a corps- or army-levelorganization. Both the DTG and OSCcan execute Strikes. (Strikes are beyondthe capability of a BTG without aug-mentation.)

Command and control for a Strike isprovided by an integrated fires com-mand (IFC). The IFC commander isroughly equivalent to the old chief ofrocket troops and artillery. Interestingly,one of the command and control op-tions available to the DTG or OSC com-mander is to place the IFC commanderin charge of both fires and maneuverelements involved in a Strike.

As in all OPFOR offensive missions,there is a fixing force, an assault forceand an exploitation force for the Strike.

Fixing Force. In a Strike, this forcefocuses primarily on fixing enemy forcesthat might come to the aid of the targetformation. Maneuver forces, precisionfires, situational obstacles, chemicalweapons and electronic warfare (EW)are well-suited to fix forces.

Assault Force. The assault force in aStrike creates the conditions that allowthe exploitation force to complete thedestruction of the target formation. Oneway the OPFOR does this is by usingreconnaissance fires. This is the inte-gration of reconnaissance, intelligence,surveillance and target acquisition(RISTA) assets with fire control andweapon systems into a closed-loop,automated fires system that detects,identifies and destroys critical targets in

minutes. The assets designated for re-connaissance fires are under the cen-tralized control of the IFC commander.

Reconnaissance fires enable theOPFOR to deliver rotary-wing air, sur-face-to-surface missiles (SSM), cruisemissiles and artillery fires (includingprecision munitions) on enemy targetsvery rapidly. The likely targets for re-connaissance fires are RISTA assets oranything that can detect or prevent asuccessful Strike. In addition, recon-naissance fires may target assets thatspeed recovery after a Strike, such aslogistical and casualty evacuation assets.

Exploitation Force. The exploitationforce in a Strike completes the destruc-tion of the target formation and mostoften will consist of highly lethal groundmaneuver formations and precisionlong-range fires systems. Armored orattack aviation units are ideally suitedto be the core of the exploitation force,but a Strike may be successfully ex-ecuted without maneuver forces. Theexploitation force may be comprisedentirely of long-range fire systems.

OPFOR TTPs. Here are six TTPs theOPFOR uses.

Long Shooters Employed at Near-Maximum Range. The Smerch with its90-kilometer range and other OPFORsystems have a significant range advan-tage over our MLRS, even when MLRSis using extended-range rockets (ER-MLRS). For most of the fight, the bulkof the OPFOR artillery assets fire fromwell outside of standoff range, thus lim-iting their risk to counterfire. The short-er-range systems join the fray only whenengaging important targets, such asthose in an OPFOR Strike mission.

Displacement Time versus ATACMSApproval Time. While the OPFOR longshooters may be outside of ER-MLRSrange, they are not out of ATACMSrange. However, most OPFOR systemscan displace in under three minutes, farshorter than the time it takes to get ap-proval to launch an expensive ATACMS.

Dispersion. While the concept of dis-persion is certainly not new to theOPFOR, he now has an improved capa-bility to mass fires without massingsystems. Training units should not ex-pect to see large artillery concentrationsin the form of army group rocket artil-lery (AGRA), army artillery groups(AAGs), division artillery groups(DAGs) or regimental artillery groups(RAGs)—they are artillery formationsof past OPFORs. At all the CTCs, theCOE OPFOR often fights with only one

to three systems at any location on thebattlefield.

Position Systems in Urban/ProtectedSites. This is nothing more than a vari-ant of the famous Iraqi “human shield”tactic. The OPFOR can fire at friendlyforces and then take advantage of thetime it takes for friendlies to get ap-proval to fire into an urban or protectedarea. If the OPFOR has moved, friendlycounterfire could cause collateral dam-age, perhaps casualties, and result innegative media coverage—which maybe the OPFOR’s originally intendedresults. Even if friendly forces destroythe OPFOR weapon, the damage donein terms of international public rela-tions could outweigh the tactical advan-tage of taking out the system.

Streamline Sensor-to-Shooter Links.To get more responsive fires, the OPFORhas cut out layers of bureaucracy in itsshooting system. The OPFOR usuallydoes not have the same concern forpreserving human life that US forcesdo, so he won’t care about collateraldamage or whether or not the soldiercalling in the mission has “eyes on” thetarget.

In many cases, the OPFOR sensor willtalk directly to the shooter. This is par-ticularly true when the sensor has a lasertarget designator and the OPFOR isemploying a lone Krasnopol-capablesystem. (For information about the So-viet-made Krasnopol, see the article“Krasnopol: A Laser-Guided Projec-tile” by Walter L. Williams and MichaelD. Holthus in the September-October2002 edition.)

Friendly Force TTPs. Here is a sum-mary of some of the TTPs that friendlyforces have used successfully againstthe COE OPFOR.

Countering the OPFOR Range Ad-vantage. This is not an entirely newproblem as the OPFOR has used suchsystems as the Chinese WM-80 with an80-kilometer range for years. The COEOPFOR’s emphasis on extreme disper-sion, however, does add to the com-plexity of the problem. Here are someTTPs units can use to counter theOPFOR’s ability to fire beyond the rangeof MLRS rockets.

• First units detect the long-shooters.This, in itself, is problematic. The mostcommon method in Warfighter exer-cises is to detect long-range systems,such as the WM-80 and the Smerch,using a Q-37 radar with a long-rangetape that gives a probability of detec-tion beyond the standard range of 50

OPFOR Surrogate Vehicle (OSV)

January-February 2003 Field Artillery28

kilometers. But this Version 10 radarsoftware is not fully tested and, as such,has not been fielded.

Then units determine if the system ison the high-payoff target list (HPTL) bychecking the attack guidance matrix(AGM) and, if it is, use the target selec-tion standards (TSS) to engage the tar-get. The AGM pre-approves engagingthe target with ATACMS; thereby, unitsavoid the time-consuming approval pro-cess.

• A second method for engaging HPTsbeyond ER-MLRS is by using the Q-37long-range tape to detect the target andthen cueing intelligence assets to trackthe target. Joint surveillance and targetattack radar system (JSTARS) tracksthe movement of the asset, and then aUAV (dynamically re-tasked from anearby location) stays on the target un-til ATACMS, fixed-wing aircraft or at-tack helicopters can engage it.

• A third technique for engaging thesetypes of targets is to destroy them via araid. Systems such as the WM-80 andthe Smerch have a long minimum rangeand cannot engage targets inside thatrange. Artillery and (or) infantry can betransported to inside the minimum rangeof the OPFOR targeted system to de-stroy it in an artillery raid, a combina-tion of indirect and direct fires or bydirect fires alone.

Targets in Restrictive-Fire Areas(RFAs). This is not a new problem ei-ther as various threats, such as NorthVietnam and Kosovo, have hidden be-hind their populace. There are essen-tially two basic TTPs to use in thesesituations.

• Units make the judge advocate gen-eral (JAG) officer part of the targetingteam. As an example, the targeting teamin a maneuver brigade typically con-sists of the brigade executive officer,brigade S3 (or battle captain), brigadeS2 and brigade fire support officer(FSO). To minimize collateral damage,the JAG officer attends all targetingmeetings as the expert on the rules ofengagement (ROE). When a target islocated inside an RFA, he advises thecommander as to whether or not the

commander should engage it with indi-rect fires. Timely and appropriate legalanalyses as to whether or not targets inurban or protected areas can be engagedunder the ROE are critical for militaryoperations in the COE.

• This TTP is based on mission, en-emy, terrain, troops, time and civil con-siderations (METT-TC). To minimizecollateral damage against targets lo-cated in RFAs, units engage these tar-gets with direct fires vice indirect fires.Units send highly mobile infantry andhuman intelligence (HUMINT) teamsinto the RFAs to engage and destroy thetargets. This requires the infantry andHUMINT to be ready with little noticeto increase the probability of findingand destroying such targets.

UAVs can be helpful but only if theOPFOR target is easily distinguishablefrom the population. For example, aSmerch can’t easily blend into the popu-lation in contrast to a dismounted mor-tar squad.

The Reconnaissance/Counterrecon-naissance Fight. Again, this is not anew problem, but it is more difficultnow with the fielding of the OPFOROSV and hand-held thermal sights. Stud-ies have shown for years that units thatwin the reconnaissance/counterrecon-naissance fight at the CTCs tend to winbattles. Despite the advent of OPFORUAVs, ground reconnaissance remainsthe OPFOR’s primary means of gather-ing intelligence.

Here is what the Center For ArmyLessons Learned (CALL) says: “Groundreconnaissance is the key to the OPFORsituational awareness. They will investup to a battalion for aggressive recon-naissance. Ensure you have an equallyaggressive counter-reconnaissanceplan….Deny the enemy his eyes andyou are on your way to victory.”4

The only way to deny the OPFOR hisground reconnaissance eyes is to kill hisscouts and keep killing them—theOPFOR always will replace dead scouts.Units must plan to win this fight byresourcing the victory. This means us-ing lots of artillery—our scouts can’tkill an OPFOR scout in a BMP or even

Major W. Wayne Ingalls, Military Intelli-gence (MI), is the Chief of the TargetAcquisition Division in the Fire Support andCombined Arms Operations Department(FSCAOD) of the Field Artillery School, FortSill, Oklahoma. Prior to that, he was a G2Officer for III Corps Artillery, also at FortSill. His other assignments include servingas S2 for the 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Divi-sion (Mechanized), Fort Riley, Kansas;Commander of Headquarters and Head-quarters Service Company (HHSC) of the103d Military Intelligence Battalion, and S2of the 2d Battalion, 70th Armor in the 3dInfantry Division (Mechanized), Germany;and S1 and Assistant S3 of the 163d MilitaryIntelligence Battalion, 504th MI Brigade, IIICorps, Fort Hood, Texas. He holds a Mas-ter of Arts in Humanities with a specializa-tion in History from California State Univer-sity.

Endnotes:1. “After the Taliban: Facts and Figures” by The Guardian, United Kingdom, 1 November 2002.This document is online at http://www.guardian.co.uk/afghanistan/story/0,1284,805570,00.html.2. Tony Pietrantonio, Intelligence Planner in the Plans and Exercise Maneuver Control Groupat the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), Fort Polk, Louisiana, presented “The Contem-porary Operational Environment: Assessment and Implementation Time Line” PowerPointbriefing at the JRTC in June of 2002.

3. Author’s note taken during the “COE Replication Requirements (COE OPFOR)” byLieutenant Colonel Jon Cleaves of the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) DeputyChief of Staff for Intelligence (DCSINT) during the 7th Annual Worldwide OPFOR Conferenceat Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, in April 2002.4. “How to Fight at the Combat Training Centers (CTCs): The Contemporary OperationalEnvironment (COE) Handbook,” Handbook 02-xx, Version 1 (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas:Center for Army Lessons Learned). This CALL handbook is online at http://call.army.mil/products/ctc/coe-handbook/coe-toc.htm.

a BRDM with direct fire. This also meansthat “first string” personnel must bealert and fight this fight continually,even during the “fuzz factor” time fromabout 0100 to 0300.

Conclusion. Fort Sill is incorporatingCOE OPFOR instruction into severalcourses. The Pre-Command Course,Captain’s Career Course, Officer BasicCourse and Warrant Officer Advancedand Basic Courses all have instructionon the COE OPFOR doctrine, tacticsand equipment. However, the instruc-tion is only an overview, so graduateswill need additional training in units.

The National Simulation Center at FortLeavenworth, Kansas, will field aCaspian Sea scenario that incorporatesthe COE, probably in the summer of2003. Once installation simulation cen-ters have this scenario, the COE OPFORwill become a reality in Janus training.

With the incorporation of the COEOPFORs at the CTCs and into othertraining methods, US Army trainingbecomes more realistic and relevant. AsFA units fight this OPFOR during train-ing and continue to face COE threatsaround the world, they will refine firesupport TTPs and devise new ones todefeat the COE enemy.