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Emma Heijdeman (author, affiliation: AUC), eheijdeman@gmail.com

Erin Russell (supervisor, affiliation: AUC), erin.russell@utoronto.ca

Prof. Dr. André van der Braak (reader, affiliation: VU), a.vander.braak@vu.nl

Dr. Allard den Dulk (tutor)

28 May 2021

Major: Humanities

Word count (including footnotes): 11597

INSIDE-OUT POLITICS: BUDDHIST MEDITATION AS ACTIVISM THROUGH BUTLER AND

FOUCAULT

Summary

In accordance with the presence of activism for as long as societies exist, the academic world has seen a

longstanding endeavor to understand the nature and manifestations of political action. Following this

tradition, thinkers like Judith Butler and Michel Foucault have investigated ways in which forms of

‘work’ within the self may also be political work, through notions such as vulnerability, ‘care for the self’,

and parrhesiastic truth-telling. An example of such ‘inner’ work is meditation as understood in the

Buddhist framework of shamatha and vipashyana practice, but despite its relevance in both popular and

academic discourse the connection between it and political action has been explored less than it merits.

Therefore, this paper examines the political dimension of the practice of meditation by analyzing it as a

form of activism through the notions of vulnerability, 'care for the self', and parrhesia. As such, I

elucidate a way in which meditation may be a tool for political disruption as well as how individuals’

subjectivities might be politically potent.

List of Abbreviations

Skt. Sanskrit

OM Open Monitoring

FA Focused Attention

Key Words

Meditation, Butler, Foucault, Political resistance, Activism

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1. Introduction

Although activism has taken place for as long as societies exist, recent times have seen an

intensified and multiplied number of instances and forms of political resistance. This is perhaps due to the

increased connectivity which marks our contemporary world, providing a fertile ground for resistance

movements to the extent that some have gone as far as calling our time ‘the Age of Dissent’ (Bailey). In

accordance with this presence of activism, the academic world has seen a longstanding endeavor to

understand political action, with theories ranging from investigations into the nature of political resistance

and its elements to analyses of specific movements and events such as the Paris Commune or Occupy.

Within this very broad area of research, scholars have focused on the individual and how one might speak

about the subject who resists and disrupts in a political context. Specifically, this includes the question of

how certain types of ‘work’ within the self may also be political work. Examples of theories on this are

Judith Butler's notion of how 'mobilizing' one's 'vulnerability' may constitute political resistance

("Rethinking Vulnerability" 13), or Michel Foucault's analysis of the ancient Greek 'care for the self'

("Technologies of the Self" 19) and 'parrhesia’ (‘truth-telling’) (Fearless Speech 11) as activistic tools.

Another example of such work within the self is the practice of meditation. This seems a relevant

addition to the discussion on the relationship between 'inner' and political work because it is both widely

practiced and extensively researched today, and thus quite present in both popular and academic

discourse. Yet, the connection between this practice and politics has only been discussed to a small

extent, while meditation may in fact have considerable potential for political disruption. The effect of this

is that contemplative practices such as meditation are seen as detached, non-worldly, and isolated with

little benefit beyond the individual. Furthermore, it also implies that the ‘inner dimension of being’ on

which the practice of meditation works is unrelated to politics, which might not necessarily be the case.

This paper, then, will explore the political dimension of the practice of meditation by analyzing it as a

form of activism, firstly by connecting it to Butler’s notion of vulnerability and secondly to Foucault’s

analysis of the care for the self and parrhesia. As such, I attempt to elucidate how meditation may be a

tool for political disruption as well as how individuals’ subjectivities might be politically potent.

1.1. Research Context

This research situates itself within a line of thinkers who have thought about the relationship

between the ‘inner’ world of the individual and the ‘outer’ world of politics. To begin with one of the

main analytical frameworks to be employed in this paper, Butler analyzes the individual’s vulnerability as

integral to political action. She distinguishes two kinds of vulnerability: that of the body, and that of being

subjected to language and names (“Rethinking Vulnerability” 16). For Butler, the very ‘condition of being

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affected’ which constitutes this vulnerability is where the subject’s resistance against and transformation

of the status quo can take place (18). In addition, she speaks of vulnerability as a tool to be ‘mobilized’ in

political acts of resistance (14). This shall be further elaborated upon later, but before doing so it is

insightful to briefly consider Hannah Arendt’s view on the idea of vulnerability. This is because her work

is the background against which Butler develops her thoughts, through commenting on and conversing

with it, as it were. Thereby, Arendt forms the background for the current paper, too. According to this

thinker, then, (political) ‘action’ as one of the three main constituents of the ‘vita activa’ (Arendt 7)1 is

inherently precarious. Indeed, it requires the subject to ‘disclose’ and ‘expose’ themself and their ‘self’,

whereby they step out of ‘the security of an inward realm in which the self is exposed to nothing but

itself’ (qtd. in Gambetti 33). It seems here that Butler further develops this notion of exposure by

questioning its origin and different manifestations, and proposes individuals to always already be exposed

to different power dynamics–even in nonaction. So although his paper itself will not make explicit use of

Arendt’s work, it is through its use of Butler’s theory implicitly in conversation with her thoughts.2

The other analytical pillar of this paper is Foucault’s analysis of the ancient Greek notions of the

‘care for the self’ and parrhesia. He studied these concepts within the context of the 'technologies of the

self' (16), on which his work focused during the later phase of his life. According to Foucault, these

technologies serve as a method for an individual to transform their bodily, mental, and affective

dispositions so as to achieve a certain improved state (18). Thereby, necessarily, these methods may be

seen as forms of resistance against those dispositions of the self which prevent someone from realizing

such a state. In line with this, Richard Flathman views the techniques of the self as forms of self-

‘domination’ which, paradoxically, lead to an individual’s freedom from different forms of oppression

(13). He also analyzes the work of Montaigne and Nietzsche on discipline and freedom as theories of ‘the

self against and for itself’, implying that technologies of the self can also work to resist forms of

domination within the individual themself (37; 65). An interesting conclusion to argue for here is that this

line of reasoning may lead to the (re)politicization of the subject’s inner dimension of being. Building on

thinkers such as Chantal Mouffe, Jacques Rancière, and Slavoj Žižek, Japhy Wilson and Erik

Swyngedouw argued for the necessity of such repoliticization of our actions in light of the ‘post-political

thesis’, but exclusively with regard to the outer, socio-political world (1–22). The question raised here is

1 See d’Entreves (“Hannah Arendt”) for a more detailed explanation of this. 2 Experts may notice that the proposal of meditation as a form of activism, and thereby as ‘action’ in Arendt’s view, is in contradiction with that very principle of action. This proposal thus forms an objection to Arendt’s understanding of action, but it is beyond the scope of this paper to fully unpack this. I therefore leave this issue to be discussed in a future project.

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whether their argument can be expanded to include the subject’s ‘inner actions’ as well. This is indeed

one of the main explorations that will be carried out later.

A last voice from the canon in which this research is situated is Herbert Marcuse, as he stressed

the necessity for a kind of work within the self before any political change could take place. This work for

Marcuse was the development of what he called ‘radical subjectivity’, or a critical kind of ‘self-

consciousness’ (Farr), which was the only possibility to resist and change the dynamics in society (seen

here in a Marxist light). More specifically, developing this self-consciousness would lead to an experience

of the current state of society as ‘intolerable’, resulting in a felt necessity to change it (Marcuse 228).

What is noteworthy about this argument is Marcuse’s insistence on the role of the subject’s reason, self-

reflection, consciousness, and affect in their struggle for liberation. Indeed, this emphasis on an ‘inward

turn’ as the very foundation for political action suggests a rethinking of the way in which the inner

subjective and outer political worlds are related.

It becomes clear here that a fruitful conversation could take place between Butler and Foucault’s

theories on the subject in political resistance and the practice of meditation, because meditation can be

unpacked through the former thinker’s notion of vulnerability and the latter’s analysis of the ‘care for the

self’ and parrhesia. This may result in a novel understanding of this practice as a form of activism. The

most thorough analysis here would take as its object the practices of one-pointed concentration and

analytical meditation, and their respective attainments shamatha (Skt. ‘calm abiding’) and vipashyana

(Skt. ‘clear insight’). This is because due to their Buddhist origin, these ideas are very well defined;

people have been practicing and meticulously debating these concepts and their underlying philosophy for

more than two millennia. This stands in stark contrast to the myriad of different forms of spiritual

practices which have developed in our culture ever since Buddhism gradually took root in what is called

‘the West’ during the 19th and 20th centuries. Even the meditative and contemplative techniques often

propounded and employed by the Buddhism-based mindfulness movement are often unclear, conceptually

or in their instruction (Guillaume et al. 152). Some of these techniques are indeed even based on an

incorrect understanding of the original Buddhist instruction, leading to a faulty ‘translation’ into secular

terms.3 So where contemporary popular forms of meditation are sometimes vague and dubious in their

3 This was most impressively pointed out by Guillaume and his colleagues, who explained that vipashyana is not the same as the widely instructed ‘Open Monitoring’ (OM) meditation (Lutz et al.), contrary to what the advocates of the mindfulness movement often claim (163). In fact, they pointed out, the OM-model is based on a very subtle misunderstanding of what in Buddhism is said to be the object of meditation in vipashyana, whereby the instruction of OM meditation becomes impracticable not only logically, but also psychologically; the brain itself cannot perform the given task (161–162).

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practice, the training in shamatha and vipashyana is very precise. In addition, the practices of one-pointed

concentration and analytical meditation as methods to attain shamatha and vipashyana are often at the

basis of many of these secularized practices in the first place. To then carry out the discussion as alluded

to earlier, it would seem most effective to stay close to the source, ‘where the water is clearest’, as they

say.

As was said, however, meditation has not yet been much explored as a politically disruptive

practice, even though a closer examination may reveal otherwise. This paper, then, takes the practice of

meditation as understood within the Buddhist shamatha/vipashyana framework and explores the ways in

which it may be seen as a form of activism. The approach to this objective is twofold: firstly, I shall

explore how Butler’s notion of vulnerability in political resistance may be connected to the practice of

meditation, and secondly how this practice may be seen as a form of ‘care for the self’ and parrhesia as

analyzed by Foucault. In this way, I argue for an understanding of meditation as a tool to inspire political

transformation, contrary to the prevalent view that it is an isolated and non-worldly practice with little

benefit beyond the individual.

1.2. Methodology

To carry out the research objective as stated above, this project will start by laying a theoretical

foundation on how shamatha and vipashyana and their respective approaches are defined. As these ideas

find their origin in Buddhism, it is necessary to turn to source material from this tradition. This research

will therefore at this stage mostly rely on primary sources from meditation teachers of the Buddhist

tradition, including seminars and commentaries on classical Buddhist scriptures. This will allow the

current project to also include the philosophical foundations on which the practice of meditation is based

in Buddhism, which will be valuable when later connecting it to Butler and Foucault’s theories. However,

as this research involves an exchange between both the Buddhist and the Western academic traditions

(between ‘Eastern’ and ‘Western’ lineages of knowledge, as it were4), it is also useful to include the

perspective of recent Western scholarly research into the practice of meditation. This will contribute to a

more complete perspective on how shamatha and vipashyana may be understood nowadays. In essence,

this means taking into account that the separation between ‘Eastern’ and ‘Western’ epistemologies has

4 Naturally, it must be recognized that the East/West dichotomy is problematic due to the conceptual dualisms and colonial history which have shaped it. For a lack of better terminology, however, this paper shall continue to use these terms with the utmost caution, in no way intending to perpetuate these oppressive relations. In addition, this paper acknowledges the inherent issues regarding the use of a Western lens to analyze an Eastern system of thought, and shall proceed with sensitivity to differing epistemologies.

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started to blur, with each tradition merging aspects of its knowledge with the other’s. Acknowledging this

will help to accommodate a more thorough and fruitful discussion between the two (‘un’)sides.

As for the theories on resistance and the subject through which shamatha and vipashyana

meditation will be analyzed, this research will employ primary sources of the theorists themselves

supplemented by secondary sources to support the understanding and workability of their arguments. The

selection of theorists is based on the impact of their contribution to the academic body of work on the

relationship between subjectivities and political resistance. Due to the scope of this paper, it is

unfortunately impossible to address all other, lesser-known theories on this topic. Therefore, this research

must for the moment stick with the loudest voices, while recognizing and acknowledging the dynamics of

power which enabled these voices to be heard as much as they have been.

A last important point to note here is that some of the theorists have not themselves explicitly

proposed their work as investigating the 'relationship between inner and outer worlds’ with regard to

political action. Rather, I will argue for this perspective on the theories by developing an independent line

of reasoning. This means that this research will–without undermining their integrity–creatively expand,

build on, and work with the selected theories so as to allow for the most fruitful discussion to take place.

In this way, the research objective can be achieved most successfully.

1.3. Impact

As has already been suggested, the proposed research will make a theoretical contribution to the

academic discussion on the relationship between subjectivities and political action through its analysis of

meditation as a form of activism. This opens up an avenue for understanding this practice as crucial to

being in and relating to the political world in an embodied manner. In addition, this paper also connects a

practice of the self which is increasingly relevant yet still widely mystified and misunderstood to domains

of knowledge with which many are familiar. Indeed, these domains of knowledge are themselves

expanded through such connection, which also leads to furthering their own internal debates. From a

more bird's-eye point of view, the proposed research facilitates a discussion between 'Eastern' and

‘Western’ epistemologies, thereby advancing the process of the blurring of their separation which was

mentioned earlier. Beyond scholarly implications, however, this project will also prove to be useful firstly

to practitioners of meditation (to be) by opening up new avenues for understanding and experiencing their

practice. In addition, activists and rebels alike might find useful perspectives in this research, especially

those seeking to complement or expand their activistic practice with an ‘inward turn’ by employing a

technology of the self at once practical and with far-reaching beneficial effects.

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2. Shamatha and Vipashyana

It is firstly important to establish the theoretical groundwork of understanding shamatha and

vipashyana before starting the discussion outlined above. This is especially true because their meaning

might be ambiguous both due to their origin in the Buddhist tradition and philosophy as well as how these

ideas have been influenced as a result of their interaction with the modern, ‘Western’ context. Starting

with the traditional background, then, the first important point to note is that although Buddhism itself has

several distinct philosophical and cultural lineages, the concepts of shamatha and vipashyana are

universally recognized in the tradition (that is to say, in all the schools, Theravada, Mahayana, and

Vajrayana/Dzogchen). This is because according to some of the earliest Buddhist scriptures (the Pali

Canon), Buddha himself expounded on shamatha and vipashyana and how to develop them (Bhikkhu).

Although colloquially the terms shamatha and vipashyana are often used to describe the meditative

practices themselves (‘shamatha/vipashyana meditation’), their actual meaning refers to the states of

mind which are said to be attainable through different meditation methods (Guillaume et al. 161). In other

words, calm abiding and clear insight are the objective of meditation practice, those attainments in which

one trains through the methods of one-pointed concentration and analytical meditation.

Calm abiding, then, is explained to be ‘a one-pointedness of mind on a meditative object.

Whatever the object may be … if the mind can remain upon its object one-pointedly, spontaneously and

without effort, and for as long a period of time as the meditator likes, it is approaching the attainment of

meditative stabilization [shamatha]’ (Geshe Lhundup Sopa qtd. in Powers 86). The ‘object’ of meditation

mentioned here is traditionally advised to be one of ‘virtuous’ nature, such as the ‘nature of the mind,

impermanence, emptiness of phenomena, [or] love and compassion’ (Guillaume et al. 155). The

advantage of this is that the object ‘makes the mind peaceful, because it is incompatible with agitated

states of mind like anger, jealousy, and so on’ (154n15). However, it is also said that it is useful for a

beginning meditator to use more 'neutral', acutely present, and simple objects like the breath or bodily

sensations, because this will allow the meditator's mind to stabilize before moving on to more subtle

objects like the ones mentioned above (155). It is important to emphasize here that the term 'one-pointed

concentration' does not mean 'thinking prohibited'. It rather refers to a certain stability of awareness that

enables the meditator to let mental risings come and go without getting caught up in them. As meditation

teacher Chögyam Trungpa put it: ‘Whether your thoughts are good or bad, exciting or boring, blissful or

miserable, you let them be. You don’t accept some and reject others. You have a sense of greater space

that encompasses any thought that may arise’ (67). This is then the ‘steady mind’ which is the result of

the method of one-pointed concentration (67).

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In the Western academic context, this same method is often called ‘Focused Attention meditation’

(FA) as part of a model developed by Lutz et al., which states that meditation consists of two main

techniques: FA and ‘Open Monitoring meditation’ (OM) (163). Although FA does indeed correspond to

the traditional Buddhist method of one-pointed concentration as training in shamatha, OM does not

correspond to the training in vipashyana contrary to what advocates of the mindfulness movement often

claim (Guillaume et al. 163). This shall be explained further later. For now, what remains to be said is that

in Buddhism the final attainment of calm abiding (cultivated after persistently and diligently training in

one-pointed concentration) is said in the Mahayana tradition to produce ‘feelings of physical lightness,

mental clarity, and great bliss’ (Gendün Lodrö qtd. in Powers 90). Similarly, the Theravada tradition

describes different variations of joy to constitute the attainment of shamatha (Gethin 181).

The attainment of vipashyana refers to the clear insight into the ‘nature of the object of

observation’ which can arise when the mind is thus settled into ‘one stream of attention and evenness’

(Powers 91; Takpo Tashi Namgyal qtd. in Powers 86). To put it differently, since–thanks to the

attainment of calm abiding–the mind is no longer endlessly scattered and distracted by its own thoughts,

judgments, and perceptions, it is able to 'perceive the nature of the object immeasurably more clearly than

it is usually perceived' (Guillaume et al. 156). For the meditator, this involves a shift from merely placing

one’s awareness on an object undistractedly to analyzing the object’s ontology (how it is) (Powers 91). In

doing so, according to Buddhism (and especially the Mahayana school, though the Theravada tradition to

a certain extent as well), the meditator will recognize that although the object appears to the mind, it is

devoid of any ‘inherent’, fixed existence due to its impermanence and dependence on other phenomena

(91). For the most advanced practitioners, however, this realization does not disrupt the one-pointed

awareness but instead enhances it, creating a ‘combination of stability and analysis in a single

consciousness’ (91). Until they are able to accomplish this ‘union’ (Guillaume et al. 156), practitioners

are advised to train in both shamatha and vipashyana separately by ‘alternating’ the methods of one-

pointed awareness and analytical meditation (Powers 91).

To avoid any confusion, one additional point about vipashyana must be made clear. As was said

earlier, if one takes a closer look at the Buddhist scriptures it becomes apparent that vipashyana is not the

same as Open Monitoring meditation as opposed to what is often claimed (Guillaume et al. 106-161). OM

meditation, often defined in terms of ‘choiceless awareness’ (Brewer et al., emphasis added) or being

‘attentive moment by moment to anything that occurs in experience without focusing on any explicit

object’ (Lutz et al. qtd. in Guillaume et al. 161, emphasis added), is based on the misunderstanding of

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some of the most ‘advanced’ meditative practices which are part of the Dzogchen and Mahamudra

teachings of Buddhism (164). In these practices, as Guillaume et al. put it, ‘the main meditation object is

the mind … because in these practices “the mind observes the mind,” the object can here, for practical

reasons, be interpreted as being subject [the meditator] and not object, although it actually is’ (164). They

add that ‘The meditator tries to merge the subject observing and the object observed’ (164n68), which is

why it is easy to think that no object is involved at all (164). However, the authors quote meditation

teacher Lama Thubten Yeshe, saying that ‘Mind without an object is like an old man without a stick: it

cannot stand. Mind and object of mind are completely interdependent. You cannot say there is just

nothingness. Mind cannot exist without an object; there is no such consciousness’ (165). This drives

home the point that the instructions for OM meditation, or ‘choiceless awareness’ (i.e., without object), do

not hold and are not the same as the training in vipashyana.

It is important here to emphasize the extent to which these practices and their attainments have

Buddhist philosophy of mind as an integral part of their exposition. This point will be especially critical

as we move towards a discussion of calm abiding and clear insight through the lenses of Butler and

Foucault’s theories on the subject in resistance. This is because all of these epistemic approaches regard

resistance as a means to attain a form of liberation from a form of oppression, a process to which the mind

is central according to Buddhism (and thus inextricably connected to its philosophy of mind). Although

some aspects of this philosophy have been indirectly implied in the above section on shamatha and

vipashyana, the Buddhist understanding of the mind will be made more explicit throughout the next

sections.

3. Butler, vulnerability in resistance, and meditation

A good starting point for analyzing shamatha and vipashyana and their respective training

through Butler's notion of the 'mobilization' of vulnerability in resistance is the following claim:

‘political resistance relies fundamentally on the mobilization of vulnerability, which means that

vulnerability can be a way of being exposed and agentic at the same time. Such … forms of

resistance are structured very differently than the idea of a political subject that establishes its

agency by vanquishing its vulnerability—this is the masculinist ideal we surely ought to continue

to oppose.’ (“Rethinking Vulnerability” 24)

With regard to meditation, this passage promptly raises a set of different questions: (1) in what way can

the practice of meditation as outlined in this paper be considered a form of ‘political resistance’; (2) how

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is the meditating subject vulnerable, or in what way might meditation be seen as a ‘mobilization of

vulnerability’; (3) and how could a meditator be ‘exposed and agentic at the same time’? The following

sections will address these questions in order by first elaborating on the concepts touched upon by Butler

in this excerpt, to then connect these points to the practice of meditation.

3.1. In what way can the practice of meditation as outlined in this paper be considered a form of ‘political

resistance’?

Naturally, the point of departure here is what Butler means by ‘political’ (understood as the

adjective form of the noun ‘politics’, differing from Chantal Mouffe’s conceptualization of ‘the political’

as a noun (1)). As Chambers and Carver point out, Butler herself has never outlined a self-contained

thesis about politics, yet her works most often seem to have different ‘places’ in political theory, where

‘she will turn up unexpectedly, then disappear and emerge elsewhere’ (7). But despite this lack of a clear

definition of what Butler understands ‘politics’ and ‘political’ to mean, Chambers and Carver do observe

that she roughly regards politics as something which ‘make[s] trouble’, as they put it in a wordplay on

Butler’s most famous work Gender Trouble (9). This stands in contrast to the common conceptions of

politics as ‘the production of consensus’, the ‘mere administration of affairs’ (9), or a kind of technocratic

decision-making performed by governing institutions (Mouffe 2). Indeed, for Butler, ‘doing’ politics is to

‘disturb by interrupting the given order’, and is thus an inherently conflictual process (Chambers and

Carver 9, emphasis original). It is important to note here that Butler's understanding of politics

emphasizes its sociality; ‘the order’ is ‘given’ by social actors and factors, or, as it was formulated earlier,

by ‘outer’ as opposed to ‘inner’ dynamics. It is then particularly striking that a practice so individual as

meditation can still be considered political, as shall be shown. For this, it is necessary to turn to the

Buddhist philosophy of mind which forms the underlying logic of shamatha and vipashyana and their

respective training.

According to the first two of the basic premises (‘Four Noble Truths’) of Buddhist doctrine, the

current state of most people’s minds causes a considerable amount of inconvenience and difficulty for

themselves and their surroundings (Powers 65-67). Traditionally, it is said that the mind in its ordinary

state is characterized by ‘ignorance’ (67), a misrecognition of one’s self and outer phenomena as having a

real, independent, and essential existence (71). This perception gives rise to an attachment to things which

one experiences as pleasant, and likewise an aversion or rejection of things that one finds unpleasant (C.

Anderson 296). As such, individuals find themselves conditioned in a state of constant 'dissatisfaction'

and unrest (Powers 65-66), making an effort to alter their circumstances to gain happiness and eliminate

suffering. However, since those circumstances are themselves conditioned by other circumstances and

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therefore subject to change, they are inherently unable to be the basis for durable happiness and absence

of suffering (67). In addition, due to the principle of cause and effect,5 the acts which constitute the effort

to find happiness and eliminate suffering have results which in turn reproduce attachment and aversion

and their resulting actions in an individual (67). The mind, and the individual, are thus said to always be

agitated and scattered, never at ease, and never happy in a fundamental, non-fleeting way. This, then, is

traditionally said to be the ‘given order’ of the mind.

In this light, it becomes clear that the Buddhist conception of the mind (and human condition) is

central to an analysis of shamatha and vipashyana through political resistance as understood by Butler.

Resistance (understood as ‘disturbing the given order’) connected to shamatha and vipashyana can be

said to consist of making an effort to change the conditioning to which one’s mind is currently subjected

according to the Buddhist framework. So where the ‘given order’ is a general state of turbulence of

thoughts and mental risings in one’s mind, one ‘disturbs’ by applying the method of repeatedly placing

one's attention on an object, countering the turmoil, and calming the mind. And where the 'given order' is

a flawed perception of reality leading to all kinds of gross and subtle forms of unease, resistance involves

questioning the nature of all those factors involved: the self, one’s body, outer phenomena, and even

consciousness itself. The final attainments of shamatha and vipashyana, then, can be understood as the

culmination of successful resistance; the states of 'liberation' towards which the disturbing act strives.

The remaining question to then be discussed is the origin of the mind’s ‘given order’, because for

Butler the ‘order’ is ‘given’ by social influences, thus allowing the act of ‘disturbing’ to be considered

political. In one sense, questioning the origins of the mind’s functioning is questioning how the self is

constituted, and therefore sticking to Butler’s view on this matter means acknowledging the way in which

she understands the self to be always already social. Indeed, for her ‘we are constituted in relationality:

implicated, beholden, derived, sustained by a social world that is beyond us and before us’ (Giving An

Account of Oneself 64). This implies that for Butler, the unsettled and unclear condition of the mind

(which is at least a part of our constitution, if not entirely) is necessarily caused by this relationality,

whereby ‘disturbing’ such conditions through the practice of meditation becomes a political matter.

Mariotti also sees meditation in this light, proposing it to be a way to ‘reclaim the authority of [one’s]

own experience’ which is usually dominated by societally imposed perceptions, modes of being, and

configurations of one’s subjectivity (489). In this sense, meditation can be seen as activism.

5 Said to be one of the governing principles of reality in Buddhist metaphysics, also called karma (Skt. ‘action’) (Bronkhorst 415).

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However, the social constructivist claim that society and its dominating influences on the human

mind and experience are the first and only driving force in shaping individuals' subjectivities would be

questioned by Buddhist scholars. This is because in Buddhism, although one’s socialization certainly

plays a big role in constituting one’s subjectivity, factors such as habitual tendencies and the results of

past actions also contribute to our identities, experience, and perception (Sarao 18). As these factors are

believed to sometimes endure throughout lifetimes6 a person's subjectivity may have already been shaped

to a certain extent prior to any social influences they might encounter. Disrupting the given order of the

mind might then become an individual, existential venture rather than a political one, influencing the

extent to which meditation understood within the Buddhist framework can be called a literal political act.

In this case then, one might rather wish to speak of a metaphorical ‘inner politics’ involving internal

power dynamics. As was said, one may here see the ordinary mind with its flawed perceptions and

habitual tendencies as dominating order and the practice of meditation as an act of resistance aiming for a

transformation of or liberation from this mind (much in line with Flathman’s argument of ‘the self against

and for itself’, as touched upon earlier). This is not to say, however, that Buddhists would entirely deny

the sociality of one’s identity, way of being, and perception: the ‘inner’ world is not seen to be

independent from the ‘outer’. Therefore, one’s subjectivity can still be ‘a site of political contestation’ (E.

Anderson et al.) and the practice of meditation a method for political intervention.

3.2. How is the meditating subject vulnerable, or in what way might meditation be seen as a practice of

the ‘mobilization of vulnerability’?

In her theory on vulnerability in political resistance, Butler proposes that vulnerability is a

fundamental aspect of the human condition, and it consists of two dimensions: linguistically, a

vulnerability of being ‘called names’ to which we become subjected, and physically, a vulnerability of the

body through ‘its dependency on other bodies and networks of support’ (“Rethinking Vulnerability” 16).

To investigate the question of how the meditating subject is vulnerable, then, means analyzing their

vulnerability in both these dimensions.

3.2.1. The meditating subject and ‘name-calling’

According to Butler, ‘linguistic vulnerability … has to do with our exposure to name-calling and

discursive categories’ (“Rethinking Vulnerability” 16). These names and categories influence our own

and others’ ideas of who we are and what we can be (and thus also who and what we ‘enact’ (18)). In this

sense, ‘speech acts … act on us. There is a distinct performative effect of having been named’ (16). Here,

6 For example, Powers writes that in Tibetan Buddhism, ‘The false conception of self is deeply ingrained, and every sentient being has cultivated it not only in the present lifetime, but for countless past lives’ (73).

Heijdeman 13

it is clear that although name-calling is done both by the subject themself and their social environment,

the subject has been called a name ‘prior to any possibility of forming or enacting a speech act’ themself

(18). This then again implies that individuals are always already socially ‘interpellated’ into whatever self

they realize (18).

Butler’s idea of linguistic vulnerability and name-calling yields an insightful perspective on

meditation as an activistic practice, both in the metaphorical ‘inner’ and literal ‘outer’ sense. The starting

point for the former is a reading of the Buddhist view of the self. According to this view, contrary to what

most people believe, the self is in fact merely a label of a singular, permanent ‘I’ put onto the various

interdependent parts of one’s subjectivity (traditionally called ‘aggregates’7). The belief in this label to be

true (i.e., signifying what is actually the case) leads to a misapprehension that the self is an essential

entity, independent and uncompounded (Rigpa Shedra, “Self”). This in turn results in an enactment or

performance of that self, further solidifying the belief in it to be true. In this manner, the self as

understood in Buddhism can be seen as akin to a ‘name’ in Butler’s theory. The only difference here is

that this name is not merely a result of social dynamics of power but also an individual’s (inner) habitual

belief. If this belief is understood in the same way as Flathman sees certain inner dispositions to be forms

of domination within the individual themself, then we may again speak of a kind of inner politics. The

practice of meditation (which deconstructs and transforms the dominating false mode of perception) can

then be seen as an act of ‘inner activism’.

With regard to meditation as an outwardly activistic practice, it seems to be a practical tool to

reconnect with one's vulnerability to name-calling and recognize the names which one might have already

been called. Indeed, through this introspective practice which aims to increase clarity about what is, the

individual may be able to distinguish the way in which they have been conditioned into enacting certain

identity categories and modes of being, which are, as goes without saying, much politically charged. But

regardless of whether the activism is practiced with regard to ‘inner’ or ‘outer’ politics, meditation can be

understood as a mobilization of one’s linguistic vulnerability. That is to say, in reconnecting to and

starting to embody the present moment (which cannot be fixed by labels, as it is always taking place in

the ever-changing ‘now’), the individual returns to the state which both precedes names and constitutes

the very possibility of being named (albeit mistakenly). As such, the meditating subject embodies (and

thus mobilizes) entirely the linguistic vulnerability of the human condition as suggested by Butler.

7 Consisting of form, feeling, perception, formations, and consciousness (Rigpa Shedra, “Five Skandhas”).

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3.2.2. The meditating subject and bodily vulnerability

Butler proposes that bodies are vulnerable because no body can exist without relying on ‘other

bodies and networks of support’, or in other words, ‘those relations in which it lives and thrives’

(“Rethinking Vulnerability” 16). Because of this, she holds that ‘it is not altogether right to conceive of

individual bodies as completely distinct from one another’, leading her to conclude that ‘the body … is

defined by the relations that make its own life and action possible’ (16). This idea of vulnerability and

how it constitutes the body can also be recognized in the Buddhist emphasis on the ontological

interdependence of all phenomena as alluded to earlier, including the human body (C. Anderson 23). This

interdependence of phenomena leads to the notion of emptiness8 (especially apparent in the Mahayana

and Vajrayana schools of Buddhism9), meaning that although an object might appear, there is nothing that

can be pinned down as the ‘thing in itself’. That which we thus label ‘body’ is in fact a mere appearance

enabled by a collection of other factors (which are themselves dependent on other phenomena, and so on)

(Khyentse 15; 24). These other factors, then, are the ‘relations that make [the body’s] own life and action

possible’ (Butler, “Rethinking Vulnerability” 16). Understanding this provides a useful avenue for

recognizing how the meditating individual is vulnerable on a bodily level.

As was described before, the individual in meditation becomes aware of their experience just as it

is, without changing anything about it. In this way, the individual connects with reality prior to its ‘given

names’, which label a collection of interdependent factors under one signifier such as ‘body’. This implies

that in becoming present–in which there is only ontological interdependence–the meditator starts to

consciously embody that interdependence, and thereby a vulnerability similar to that which Butler

describes. Buddhists might even say that this involves a certain struggle or ‘coming to terms’ with that

vulnerability because according to them most people tend to subconsciously prefer viewing themselves

and their bodies as independent and therefore unchanging (Khyentse 16–17). However, regardless of a

person’s initial reaction to recognizing their body’s vulnerability to change and ‘being affected’ (Butler,

“Rethinking Vulnerability” 18), it becomes evident that in meditation they start to embody it more fully

and consciously. Seen in this way, meditation is a mobilization of bodily vulnerability.

8 Not to be confused with the ‘negation of existence’, as Khyentse puts it (66). He stresses that ‘in order to negate something, you have to acknowledge that there is something to negate in the first place’ (66). This means that the notion of ‘Emptiness doesn’t cancel out our daily experience’, in which things do in fact appear (66). 9The Vaibhashika and Sautantrika schools of the Basic Vehicle tradition (under which Theravada Buddhism is classified, as opposed to Mahayana (Great Vehicle) and Vajrayana (Diamond Vehicle)) still hold the notion of the ‘partless particle’ (partless implying independent) which forms the principal basis for all of the phenomenal world (Rigpa Shedra, “Partless Particle”). This has been elaborately refuted by scholars such as Vasubandhu and Nagarjuna, who argued that even the most basic atoms possess different parts and pointed out that the partless particle forms a logical impossibility (“Partless Particle”).

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Some Buddhist teachers have also elucidated how the bodily dimension of meditation itself (the

posture10) reflects vulnerability in a metaphorical sense. As meditation teacher Chögyam Trungpa put it,

‘When you sit upright but relaxed in the posture of meditation, your heart is naked. Your entire being is

exposed—to yourself, first of all, but to others as well’ (Shambhala 45). Likewise, he said: ‘When you

slouch, you are trying to hide your heart, trying to protect it by slumping over’ (45). This illustrates how

the body itself is seen as manifesting the fundamental vulnerability, or ‘nakedness’, which the subject

becomes in meditation. Indeed, in discussing the meditation posture in Buddhism, Gómez writes that

‘Insofar as the meditator assumes bodily postures that are considered to be those of the Buddha himself

… the act of meditation is, in a manner of speaking, the actualization of the goal of meditation: to become

like the Buddha’ (520). ‘The Buddha’ is thus understood to be those individuals wholly embodying, or

being their vulnerability,11 and the posture is seen as a physical actualization (mobilization) of that

embodiment.

A final point to make is that although this section and the previous have discussed linguistic and

bodily vulnerability through the example of meditation as one-pointed awareness leading to shamatha,

this vulnerability also applies to the practice of analytical meditation leading to vipashyana. This is

because both practices are constituted of the meditator’s presence of awareness, and thus involve the

mobilization of vulnerability which Butler suggests; in applying both methods, the meditator is

fundamentally exposed. In addition, as was said previously, shamatha and vipashyana are not mutually

exclusive. On the contrary, the former is a prerequisite for the latter and each enhances the other.

Linguistic and bodily vulnerability are thus characteristic of both shamatha and vipashyana and their

respective methods.

3.3. How could a meditator be ‘exposed and agentic at the same time’?

To start, it is useful to recall that for Butler vulnerability is such an essential part of political

resistance that ‘without being able to think about vulnerability, we cannot think about resistance’

(“Rethinking Vulnerability” 27). Since vulnerability is so integral to resistance, then, it must necessarily

be connected to agency, for resistance necessitates agency. Indeed, Butler writes that ‘vulnerability can be

a way of being … agentic’ (24), and in this way vulnerability (or exposure) in fact constitutes the agentic

10 Commonly advised as an upright but relaxed sitting position, with the hands on the knees or in the lap, ‘eyes neither open nor closed’ (Gómez 520-521). 11 As Zen teacher Suzuki Roshi said: ‘The state of mind that exists when you sit in the right posture is, itself, enlightenment’ (qtd. in Mariotti 479). Likewise, Buddha, or awakening, is ‘when you are called back to yourself, in the present moment’ (Suzuki qtd. in Mariotti 479).

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act of political resistance. This relationship between exposure and agency may then be connected to

meditation as follows in the next paragraph.

It has been shown that the practice of meditation as training in shamatha and vipashyana is a

method that enables an individual to embody their vulnerability. This vulnerability involves a presence

with whatever is, without conditioning oneself or other things to be in any other way. In this way, the

practitioner may reconnect to a sense of the very possibility of being conditioned, or being called names,

which is a state prior to any form of inner conditioning or outer name-calling. As such, one is able to

recognize that the names are indeed merely names and the conditions merely conditions, and thus creates

an opening within oneself to question and cut through the realness and naturalness of these names and

conditions. It is this questioning and deconstructing which forms the act of resistance, and it applies to the

politics of dominant subjectivities originating from both ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ drivers. Meditation, then, can

be seen as a form of activism insofar as it opens up a space for transformation by virtue of being an

embodiment of vulnerability, and is thus a way of being ‘exposed and agentic at the same time’.

An interesting concrete perspective of this with respect to meditation as outwardly directed

activism is that of meditation as a method to ‘reclaim and reauthorize [one’s] experience’, which was

briefly touched upon earlier (Mariotti 490). This view proposes that ‘the embodied practice of meditation’

is a practical way to engage in ‘embodied … democracy in everyday life’ (472). The latter notion of

democracy is based on Jacques Rancière’s theory of ‘radical democracy’, which holds that truly

democratic politics are ‘moments’ of ‘interruption’ (476; Rancière qtd. in 476). These moments of

interruption ‘expand the realm of the visible and audible’ by ‘“reconfigur[ing],” “displac[ing],” and

“blur[ring]” the limits between categories’ and ‘dualisms’ imposed on subjects by what Rancière calls the

‘police force’ (476; Rancière qtd. in 476). This concept refers to the forces in society which ‘allocate’

‘ways of doing, ways of being, and ways of saying’ and so covertly but drastically regulate people’s

experience (Rancière qtd. in 476). For Rancière, then, truly democratic moments of interruption happen

on an everyday, individual level, as moments of ‘intellectual emancipation … whereby we learn to trust

our own experience and vernacular wisdom’ rather than being blinded by imposed perceptions (478).

Indeed, Mariotti points out that this intellectual emancipation is a process of getting to ‘know [one]self’,

meaning for Rancière ‘com[ing] back to yourself, to what you know to be unmistakably in you’ (qtd. in

478). He further stresses this by advising that ‘the wrong is in diverging from, leaving one’s path, no

longer paying attention to what one says, forgetting what one is. So follow your path. This principle of

veracity is at the heart of the emancipation experience’ (qtd. in 478, emphasis original). For Mariotti,

then, the practice of meditation is a practical instruction on how to achieve the moments of interruption

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which constitute this intellectual emancipation: it enables us to ‘rework our experience of everyday life at

an elemental level, starting with how you sit, how you breathe, and how you experience your body, but

branching out to how you experience the self in the world’ (481). This is the process of ‘reclaiming

agency’ over one’s experience, perception, and action. It can thus be said that the practice of meditation,

which is embodying vulnerability and exposure, is a fundamental practice of agency; one can only be

truly ‘agentic’ by being ‘exposed’ on the most basic level.

3.4. Understanding meditation as activism through Butler’s notion of vulnerability in resistance

It is clear that unpacking meditation through Butler’s notion of vulnerability may lead to an

understanding of the practice as a form of disruptive activism, and it in fact reveals two realms in which it

is effective: firstly, the subjective structures of domination within the individual themself, and secondly

the outer political world with its respective power dynamics. This shows that in thinking about political

resistance, there is a need to also consider the inner dimension, perhaps more so than Butler’s theory does

at first sight. Meditation, then, proves to be a useful avenue through which to expand, and better

understand, Butler’s conception of vulnerability in political resistance. What has been illustrated, too, is

that vulnerability is indeed a condition to be embraced in activistic practice rather than ‘vanquished’, as

Butler puts it; it allows for a more embodied form of resistance grounded in a ‘vernacular’ way of being.

In this way, meditation may be seen as a method to connect to this vulnerability and the possibility for

transformation that it carries, allowing the activism to sprout from a deeper level of being. This is indeed

both an important and inspiring prospect.

However, this conversation also overlooks a crucial element when it comes to the practice of both

meditation and activism, which is the notion of truth. That is, political resistance necessarily involves

dynamics between different realities (truths) linked to power, and the practice of meditation in the

Buddhist understanding (as a tool to cut through misunderstandings of reality) is inextricably connected

to truth. Yet, Butler does not explicitly acknowledge and unpack this notion in her theory, and thus a

significant aspect of the matter is left undiscussed. It might be of benefit, then, to turn to Foucault and the

ancient Greek concept of parrhesia (‘truth-telling’) which he saw as a crucial practice of the subject in

resistance. For him, this was also related to the aforementioned ‘technologies of the self’, and of these the

specifically politically relevant ‘care of the self’ from the ancient Greek tradition. The following sections

will therefore unpack these notions further and explore how they might be connected to the practice of

meditation to include a consideration of truth in the discussion of meditation as activism.

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4. Foucault, technologies of the self, and meditation

In the later phase of his studies, Michel Foucault let go of his focus on power and its relation to

knowledge and ideas in themselves and instead took the individual’s relationship to power as a starting

point. As such, he turned towards studying the history of ‘technologies of the self’ (“Technologies of the

Self” 19). For Foucault, the technology of the self is a method for ‘an individual [to] act … upon himself’

(19) in order ‘to effect … a certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts,

conduct, and way of being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of happiness,

purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality’ (18). This idea already points to parallels between

technologies of the self and the practice of meditation resulting in calm abiding and clear insight, perhaps

even to seeing the latter as an example of the former. However, in order to put this perspective in the light

of the subject in resistance and connect it to the notion of truth, it is useful to focus on Foucault’s analysis

of one example of a technology of the self related to (political) resistance. It concerns the ancient Greek

concept of ‘care of the self’ and how this relates to the practice of parrhesia, or ‘truth-telling’. In the

sections below, these ideas shall be outlined and used to analyze the practice of meditation as understood

in this paper.

4.1. Meditation as ‘care of the self’

Foucault begins his analysis with the Greek term epimelêsthai sautou, translated as ‘"to take care

of yourself," "the concern with self"’ (“Technologies of the Self” 19). He notes that although the ancient

Greeks regarded the care of the self as essential to the polis as well as ‘one of the main rules for social and

personal conduct and for the art of life’, it is largely overshadowed by the insistence on the ‘Delphic

principle’ of ‘know yourself’ in contemporary perspectives on ancient Greek history and philosophy (19).

However, says Foucault, in reality the texts indicate that it was only through ‘occupy[ing] oneself with

oneself’ that knowing oneself could develop (20). This care for the self, then, can be understood as a

‘contemplation’ about ‘what the soul consists [of]’, the latter referring to the ‘principle of activity’ as

opposed to ‘the soul-as-substance’ (25). As such, contemplating the soul will lead to insight into the right

way to act, especially in a political sense (25). It is important to stress the relevance of this perspective, as

it implies that knowing the truth about oneself (which is the result of the care of the self as ‘contemplating

the soul’) is inextricably related to political action in the world. In this way, the notion of truth is shown

to be crucial to activism.

In order to connect this to meditation, it is first necessary to look in detail at how the practice can

be viewed as a form of ‘care for the self’. The initial point to recall here is that in Buddhism, the practice

of one-pointed awareness and analytical meditation are methods that aim to familiarize the individual

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with a mode of being grounded in the way things actually are rather than a distorted view of reality. Since

the mind is seen as the central principle through which reality is constructed, the focus is put on

investigating what this mind is and how it operates (to which meditation is a means). In this sense,

meditation can be seen as a practice of care for the self, as it is a method through which one ‘occupies

oneself with oneself’ in order to contemplate the state of affairs in one’s mind (or soul12). Through getting

to know this ‘truth’, one may uncover that one’s concepts and perceptions about who one is (and thereby

how things are) were, in fact, untrue. For example, one might recognize that the way in which one has

been conditioned is not as ‘natural’ as one believed it to be. It is in this way that the care for the self

which meditation is results in the Delphic principle of knowing oneself or truth about oneself. However,

the question of how this might be connected to activism still remains. The notion of parrhesia, or truth-

telling, can provide an explanation.

4.2. Meditation as the practice of parrhesia

Foucault analyzed parrhesia as being part of the care for the self in a series of lectures called

Fearless Speech. Although parrhesia is usually translated as ‘free speech’ (Fearless Speech 11), the word

carries a much more elaborate meaning than the translation implies. Very essentially put, parrhesia is a

form of speech which involves, in Foucault’s words: (a) ‘frankness’, understood as the notion that a

person ‘says everything he has in mind: he does not hide anything, but opens his heart and mind

completely to other people through his discourse’13 (12); (b) ‘truth’, because ‘the parrhesiastes [who uses

parrhesia] … says what he knows to be true’ (14, emphasis original); (c) ‘danger’, referring to the ‘risk’

involved in telling the truth (16); (d) ‘criticism’ which constitutes the speech, ‘either towards another or

towards oneself’ (17); and (e) ‘duty’, meaning the felt ‘moral obligation’ to tell the truth (19). As such,

parrhesiastic speech can be recognized as an essentially activistic act, as it involves disclosing certain

truths and resisting others (i.e., causing disruption) within asymmetrical power relations between these

truths and their proponents.

The way in which this then relates to the care of the self is that the latter is constitutive of the

Delphic principle ‘to know oneself’, and in order to truly know oneself one must be honest with oneself,

12 In Buddhism, the principle of mind is closer to the idea of ‘soul’ than the Western academic understanding may imply: rather than being a merely cognitive faculty, it refers to the very basis of one's being. However, the question of whether there is an essential, unchanging aspect to mind (as the concept of ‘soul’ implies) is hotly debated in Buddhist philosophy, especially between the Yogacara and Madhyamaka schools. Since this is a profoundly complex philosophical discussion, it is unfortunately impossible to further unpack it here. 13 The masculine pronoun is used here because ‘Foucault indicated that the oppressed role of women in Greek society generally deprived them of the use of parrhesia (along with aliens, slaves, and children)’, as an editor’s note explained (Fearless Speech 12n4).

Heijdeman 20

or in other words, tell oneself the truth14. If the practice of meditation is then seen as a form of care for the

self through which one comes to know oneself, it means that meditation involves a parrhesiastic act. This

becomes apparent when looking once again at the Buddhist understanding of the kind of ‘work’ which the

practice of meditation does: firstly, in the sense that one-pointed awareness and analytical meditation

involve an attitude which neither rejects nor grasps at mental risings or outer phenomena (thus accepting

everything as it comes), they can be seen as implicating a total frankness of the subject with themself and

their experience, or an ‘opening of their heart and mind’. Secondly, the work which meditation does in

enabling the meditator to uncover the state of affairs in one’s mind (and how this is connected to one's

perception of reality) suggests an acknowledgment and acceptance of that truth, and insofar as this is a

confronting (hurtful) fact to them it involves a certain degree of danger. Indeed, as the stoic Seneca

wrote: ‘Who dares to tell himself the truth? Who, though he is surrounded by a horde of applauding

sycophants, is not for all that his own greatest flatterer?’ (qtd. in Foucault, Fearless Speech 155). In line

with this, meditation can be understood to involve an element of criticism in that it aims to transform the

individual’s given order of the mind which is seen as unfavorable, and a sense of duty if one commits to

this transformation. The practice of meditation thus becomes a form of truth-telling from the individual to

themself, which has a disruptive effect on the given truth-orders within their subjectivity.

Here the notion of inner politics emerges once more, where the individual resists the dominating

order of the mind through the practice of truth-telling. Indeed, Foucault notes that inner parrhesia serves

to achieve a certain ‘self-sovereignty and independence’ (150). This notion also connects to the

previously mentioned understanding of meditation as an ‘empower[ment] with authority’ over one’s

experience, from which one is usually ‘alienated’ (Mariotti 473). However, the inner parrhesia discussed

here also has an outwardly political potency, because the care for the self which constitutes this truth-

telling is a way to critically examine and acknowledge the truth-formations and conditioning within

oneself which have been ingrained through dominant ideological systems of thought. A specific example

of this is gender bias and the way one might have subtle discriminatory perceptions of certain groups of

people. The practice of meditation as a form of parrhesia would here function as a way to truthfully

recognize these biases for what they are and so disrupt their solidity. In this way, meditation as care for

the self (which is a parrhesiastic practice) can also result in real political change. This then is what

Foucault must have meant when he said that ‘The effort of the soul to know itself is the principle on

which just political action can be founded’ (“Technologies of the Self” 25).

14 Although in the lectures Foucault mainly focuses on the practice of parrhesia as ‘disclos[ing] the truth about oneself’ to others (Fearless Speech 143, emphasis original), he also refers to classical texts which signal parrhesia as applicable to this disclosure merely to oneself (e.g. Seneca’s “On the Tranquility of Mind” (157)).

Heijdeman 21

4.3. Understanding meditation as activism through Foucault’s analysis of the care for the self and

parrhesia

The analysis of meditation as a form of care for the self connected to parrhesia has elucidated

that it is a practice that involves an aspect of activistic truth-telling. Just as was the case in the discussion

on Butler’s theory, this can become effective in both the inner and outer political dimensions. Meditation

thus stresses that the care for the self and parrhesia are still very relevant practices when it comes to

political action today, perhaps more so than Foucault originally emphasized in his analysis of the ancient

Greeks. It is also interesting to think about how meditation connects Foucault's exploration of truth in

political resistance to Butler’s notion of vulnerability. Indeed, it seems that the practice of meditation

shows that through becoming vulnerable, one may connect the truth of one’s conditioning, and likewise in

acknowledging this truth one returns to the state of vulnerability which made it possible for this

conditioning to come to be in the first place. Thus, the 'conversation' between Buddhist meditation

practice and Butler and Foucault's theories on the subject in resistance not only expanded the

understanding of meditation but also of those theories themselves.

5. Challenges

So far, this paper has argued for a novel understanding of the practice of meditation resulting in

calm abiding and clear insight as a form of activism, and several objections may be raised. I will here

address those which I see as most persuasive: firstly, the view of meditation as an extension of the

neoliberal capitalist project rather than being a method potentially disruptive to it, and secondly the

perspective that meditation is a purely individualistic, private, and therefore apolitical practice unrelated

to activism. Let us begin with the former.

5.1. Meditation as an extension of the neoliberal capitalist project

This view of meditation, grounded in a Marxist critique of neoliberalism, results from the way in

which the practice is seen to function within the capitalist system of neoliberal governance. This kind of

governance, understood as being ‘based on an entrepreneurial model that emphasizes individual risk and

responsibility’ (Gupta and Ferguson qtd. in Cook 150), turns meditation into a form of ‘labour’ (143).

This labour consists of a kind of ‘work upon the self’ or ‘self-governance’ over one’s own mental

wellbeing and happiness, presented as being entirely the responsibility of the individual themself (142).

Indeed, in neoliberal discourse ‘happiness is attainable by everyone, irrespective of their socioeconomic

circumstances’ (147). This then relegates the government’s responsibility for the wellbeing of its citizens

by creating socioeconomic conditions conducive to it. In this way, ‘Self-governance … becomes a mask

Heijdeman 22

for austerity’ (156) and the individual is encouraged to see their subjectivity as an entrepreneurial

‘project’ with meditative practices as its means (143). Since meditation here is seen simply as a tool to

make individuals ‘productive members of society’ (143), Slavoj Žižek has even gone so far as to say that

‘Western Buddhism … is establishing itself as the hegemonic ideology of global capitalism’ (qtd. in Cook

147). This also goes hand in hand with the commodification of spirituality, where meditation and

mindfulness are just products among many to be consumed (Purser and Loy). It is then no surprise that

recent popular discourse has seen the rise of terms such as ‘McMindfulness’ (Purser and Loy). Buddhists

themselves have also not been oblivious to this, as monk Bikkhu Bodhi said: ‘absent a sharp social

critique, Buddhist practices could easily be used to justify and stabilize the status quo, becoming a

reinforcement of consumer capitalism’ (“American Buddhism: Beyond the Search for Inner Peace”). This

then challenges the understanding of the practice of meditation I have argued for in this paper, since

meditation cannot be a form of activism (inner or outer) if it is an extension of the neoliberal capitalist

project.

The clue in resolving this problem lies in how and with what goal the individual approaches the practice.

That is to say, it is true that meditation could be used as a tool to fortify the neoliberal system if

individuals practiced it simply to function better within that system. So when someone meditates to

increase their wellbeing and ability to cope with the difficulties of life in neoliberal capitalist society

(such as stress resulting from increased precarity), they are indeed simply working on being the most

‘productive members of society’. Or to put it differently, if the effort is not directed at uprooting

internalized dispositions and perceptions put forward by the system, meditation cannot in any way

function as a method to disrupt that system. However, it has already been pointed out that the practice of

meditation, and especially analytical meditation as training in vipashyana or clear insight, can be used as

a tool to investigate one’s subjectivity and its nature. It therefore allows one to question the ways in which

the system has become part of one’s subjectivity, for example in the form of identity categories or the

acceptance of social inequalities as natural and inevitable. Meditation is thereby a potentially powerful

technique to enable someone to recognize and cut through the many internalized modes of being

propagated by neoliberalism. Disruptive as such, it may certainly be understood as a form of activism.

5.2. Meditation as an individualistic, private, and apolitical practice

The view that meditation is a purely individualistic and private practice has already been touched

upon earlier in this paper, during the discussion on Butler’s understanding of politics. There, it was said

that if the ‘given order’ of the mind does not originate from strictly social (f)actors (but also from

individual determinants such as habitual tendencies), the extent to which meditation can be called

Heijdeman 23

‘political’ is put into question. As such, the practice of meditation does not implicate anything beyond the

individual. A classic illustration of this is that of the Buddhist practitioner who distances themself from

the world to singularly focus on achieving their own enlightenment. According to Buddhist teachers and

academic researchers alike, when this individualism is pushed to the extreme, the practice of meditation

can even become an isolated form of ego-trip in which it unintentionally becomes a means to solidify the

ego contrary to its opposite original intent (see for example Vonk and Visser on ‘spiritual superiority’

(152) and Chögyam Trungpa on ‘spiritual materialism’ (Cutting Through Spiritual Materialism 13)). But

regardless of whether this extremity manifests, the implication of the perspective on meditation as a

purely individualistic practice is that it merely happens in the private realm, whereby its political

dimension is negated. In this way, meditation cannot be read as a form of activism.

The answer to this objection takes as its starting point the interdependence which is revealed by

the practice of meditation (and especially analytical meditation leading up to vipashyana). As was

described earlier, by reconnecting to the present moment and letting go of the labels one usually imposes

on one’s experience, one comes to see that all aspects of one’s subjectivity are fundamentally dependent

on factors beyond themselves. The meditator may thus realize that their very existence is ‘defined by the

relations that make [their] own life and action possible’ (to use Butler’s words once more), which range

from simple things such as nutrition and livelihood to relationships with other people and the socio-

political conditions in which they live. As such, the practice of meditation can in fact propel an individual

out into the world, as it enables them to appreciate that this 'world' made them be who and what they are.

It speaks for itself that this has great political potential: the recognition of how one is conditioned to think,

speak, and act, and the ability to bear this within oneself,15 is the single most important avenue through

which one can drive political change. An excellent example of this is how Buddhist teacher Larry Ward

suggests people to investigate how racial bias and coloniality manifest in their subjectivity, culminating in

what Ward calls ‘racial consciousness’ (America’s Racial Karma). Through meditative practices based on

the shamatha and vipashyana principles, he proposes that individuals may uncover and heal their racial

consciousness and the ‘trauma’ inflicted by it onto ‘victims, perpetrators, and witnesses’ (“America’s

Racial Karma”). This illustrates that although meditation does have the potential to become isolated and

overly individualistic, if practiced authentically and with the right motivation it becomes an effective

method for making a change in the political world. Like this, the practice of meditation does indeed have

an activistic dimension.

15 I owe this phrase and the previous to Ulrike Strasser.

Heijdeman 24

6. Conclusion

If one point is to be taken from the above discussion, it is that the practice of meditation

illustrates a need to think carefully about the relationship between ‘outer’ and ‘inner’ worlds with regard

to activism.16 It is clear that the distinction between these worlds is not as definite as it is often assumed to

be: the principle of interdependence shows that each constitutes the other, implying that true political

action in the world requires work within oneself too. Indeed, one might even say that inner activism is the

very stepping stone for outer activism, similar to what Marcuse thought. His insistence on 'radical

subjectivity' and an inward turn as the starting point for societal transformation seems to have comparable

reasoning as its basis. But what the practice of meditation as seen in the shamatha/vipashyana framework

adds to this narrative is a practical tool to develop a sharper recognition and appreciation of one’s inner

conditioning, the agency to transform, as well as possibly increased clarity about how to act. In addition,

the interdependence which one may come to realize through this practice also opens up the possibility for

genuine care for others and wish to nurture the causes for transformation, which are arguably more

healthy and sustainable affective supports for activistic practice than for instance anger or fear.

It is thus evident that introspective practices such as calm abiding and clear insight meditation are

absolutely relevant–some might even argue unmissable–as methods for driving radical inner and social

transformation. Indeed, if it is true that ‘radical simply means “grasping things at the root”’, as Angela

Davis put it, then the practice of meditation seems to be an excellent tool to accomplish this (qtd. in Ward,

America’s Racial Karma). Of course, it is important here to maintain an attitude of spacious examination

of the instructions of Buddhist meditation practice themselves, in order to prevent ‘Buddhism [to] become

itself like a police logic’ (Mariotti 480). Because ‘even meditation can become alienated from actual

experience’ through a dogmatic adherence to ‘the concepts, theories, desires, and goals associated with

Buddhism’ (480). In this way, the practice of meditation can only achieve the opposite of its original

purpose, which is to illustrate and create an opportunity for emancipation.

If we then return to the initial objective of this paper, it may be said that the analysis of

meditation as a form of activism shows that the individual’s inner subjectivity is a crucial dimension of

political life. It may thus be concluded that in light of their post-political thesis, the project of

16 An issue of course similar to the discussion on the distinction between the private and public spheres of life, which has been scrutinized by thinkers ever since Aristotle and his contemporaries. The private/public distinction, however, is not entirely the same as its inner/outer parallel. Though it may be said that the ‘inner’ world is an aspect of what is called the ‘private’ sphere, it does allude specifically to the experience of the individual (including its subtle mental and affective dimensions) rather than merely referring to the grosser aspects of private life.

Heijdeman 25

repoliticization which Wilson and Swyngedouw prescribe should apply as much to the inner world as it

does to the outer. This might indeed pave the way to an embodied kind of political activity that takes the

individual’s present experience and ‘vernacular wisdom’ as its starting point. It would also open up new

avenues for theoretical explorations of different aspects of subjectivities connected to political action, an

example of which could be contemplative practices in conjunction with Mouffe’s notion of ‘agonistic’

democracy (3), or, importantly, using theories about the subject in resistance from scholars which haven’t

been heard or acknowledged as much as the ones this research was forced to limit itself to. Nonetheless, it

is clear that a close consideration of the individual’s inner dimension as politically relevant brings to light

an exciting prospect: it constitutes an empowerment of political agency to anyone willing to look inward,

become vulnerable, and be honest about what one finds. As such, the ‘Age of Dissent’ may indeed be

upon us.

Heijdeman 26

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