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Mariana Costa Checa

The (failed) transition from relief to recovery in Haiti

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Introduction:

Prompt humanitarian aid and relief after a crisis are essential to save lives. The path, however,

from saving lives to giving people their lives back, is a complicated one. The earthquake that hit

Haiti’s capital on January 12, 2010 was one of the most devastating natural disasters in the

Western Hemisphere’s history, killing over 220,0001 people. The rapid response of the

international community to provide relief was impressive, and thousands of lives were saved in

the aftermath of the earthquake by ensuring the provision of clean water, food supplies, medical

services and temporary housing. Almost 2 years have gone by since this tragedy, and it is

necessary to ask ourselves the following question: why are so many Haitians still merely

surviving? This essay will examine the reasons why the transition from relief to recovery after

the devastating earthquake has been so challenging in Haiti. Starting with the UNDP theoretical

framework explaining the differences between relief and recovery, the paper will then briefly

explain the impact of the earthquake and analyze the effectiveness of the humanitarian response.

Following, the plans designed for Haiti’s recovery in March 2010 by the Haitian government and

the UN will be contrasted with the actual outcome of events. The essay argues that the failure to

advance from relief to recovery more effectively is due in part to the unwillingness of NGOs and

international organizations to focus on capacity building in the Haitian State so that it can take

the lead role in the reconstruction process; and in part due to the profound and longstanding

weaknesses and lack of leadership of the Haitian State.

Theoretical background: Humanitarian Aid, Relief and Recovery

As defined by the OECD, within the overall definition of official development assistance (ODA),

humanitarian aid is assistance designed to save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain and

protect human dignity during and in the aftermath of emergencies. This includes disaster

prevention and preparedness; the provision of shelter, food, water and sanitation, health

services and other items of assistance for the benefit of affected people and to facilitate the

1 Haiti Earthquake PDNA: Assessment of damage, losses, general and sectorial needs. March 2010

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return to normal lives and livelihoods….reconstruction and transition assistance while the

emergency situation persists. 2

A very thin line can be trimmed between humanitarian aid and full-fledged recovery. Although it

is not a sequential phase between the two stages, early recovery sets the foundations for recovery

by restoring and strengthening the capacities of governments at all levels to manage and lead the

recovery process. As defined by UNDP, early recovery is a multidimensional process of

recovery that begins in a humanitarian setting. It is guided by development principles that seek

to build on humanitarian programs and to catalyze sustainable development opportunities. It

aims to generate self-sustaining, nationally owned, resilient processes for post crisis recovery. It

encompasses the restoration of basic services, livelihoods, shelter, governance, security and rule

of law, environment and social dimensions, including the reintegration of displaced

populations.3

Relief, early recovery and recovery itself are intrinsically linked and often overlap in various

sectors. However, leaving relief efforts behind is a positive signal of gradual advancement. The

transition to recovery often comes after a Post Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA), where on

top of early actions, medium and long-term recovery projects are designed based on the

assessment. The medium and longer term plans should be aligned with a country’s vision of

sustainable development.

The Earthquake

Haiti’s earthquake has been one of the most devastating natural disasters the world has seen.

Hitting the capital city, Port au Prince, the earthquake brought unprecedented disruption,

affecting the nation’s most populous area as well as its economic and administrative center.

According to the PDNA prepared by UNDP just two months after the earthquake, around 1.5

million people, representing 15% of the population, were directly affected. Over 220,000 people

lost their lives and over 300,000 were injured. Around 1.3 million settled in temporary shelters in

the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area.

2 OECD. http://www.oecd.org/document/19/0,3746,en_21571361_39494699_39503763_1_1_1_1,00.html

3 Guidance Note on Early Recovery. IASC Cluster Working Group, October 2007.

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Furthermore, infrastructure in the city was severely impacted, with over 105,000 homes

completely destroyed and more than 208,000 damaged. Over 1,300 establishments were

destroyed or left unusable, as well as most of the Ministry and public administration buildings.4

The PDNA estimated the total value of the damage and losses caused by the earthquake at US$

7.804 billion, equivalent to slightly more than the country’s GDP in 2009. In the 35 years that the

DALA (Damage Assessment & Loss Assessment) method for estimating damage and losses has

been employed, this is the first time the cost of a disaster is so high compared to the size of a

country’s economy.

Even though Haiti had been experiencing greater stability in the years prior to the earthquake, the

country was still characterized by weak public institutions and extreme poverty (67% were living

on less than US$ 2 a day before the earthquake). These weaknesses implied even greater

challenges for recovery.5

Relief and Humanitarian Aid

The arrival of humanitarian aid after the earthquake was prompt. The UN, despite suffering

significant losses in their local offices, was operational and contributing to the humanitarian

response within 24 hours. Various UN agencies deployed teams from their headquarters and

regional offices. The International Federation of the Red Cross immediately activated its

emergency response mechanisms, and NGOs already present in Haiti also played an important

part in the immediate response.6

According to the “Inter-agency real-time evaluation in Haiti: 3 months after the earthquake”, by

May 2010, over 1,000 international organizations had provided humanitarian assistance in Haiti.

Furthermore, four months after the disaster 57% of the 1.5 billion US dollar Revised

Humanitarian Appeal had been funded, thousands of wounded people had been provided with

care, the Food Cluster had provided 3.5 million Haitians with food aid, among many other efforts

4 Haiti Earthquake PDNA: Assessment of damage, losses, general and sectorial needs. March 2010. Pg 5.

5 Haiti Earthquake PDNA: Assessment of damage, losses, general and sectorial needs. March 2010. Pg 5.

6 Inter-agency real-time evaluation in Haiti: 3 months after the earthquake. August 31, 2010. Pg 30.

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to meet people’s basic needs for survival.7 Individuals all over the world donated to support

Haiti’s relief efforts and over $5 billion were pledged by countries around the world at the

International Donor’s Conference in March 2010.8

Needs Assessment and Plans of Action

When plans for the reconstruction of Haiti began, a general feeling emerged that this could be an

opportunity for a new start. The PDNA itself was designed to go further than traditional post-

disaster assessments, and lay the foundations for a fresh start in the country’s development

efforts. 9

Along the same lines, the government’s “Action Plan for National Recovery and

Development of Haiti” intended to go beyond a response to the damage caused by the earthquake

and “launch a number of key initiatives to act now while creating the conditions to tackle the

structural causes of Haiti’s under-development”.10

The Action Plan established three periods for Haiti’s recovery. The emergency period, which

would focus on providing basic accommodation, health, educational and economic needs for

those affected by the disaster. The implementation period, which would consist of 18 months to

implement projects targeted at kick-starting the future of Haiti and establishing a framework of

incentives for private investment; and the long term period, in which Haiti’s development should

become a reality. The goal was for Haiti to become a real emerging country by 2030.11

The implementation period, which according to plans should now be coming to an end, is based

in four major areas targeted at enabling the practical reconstruction of Haiti:

• Territorial rebuilding: Reconstruction of the devastated zones and urban renovation, the road

network, regional development hubs and urban renovation.

7 Inter-agency real-time evaluation in Haiti: 3 months after the earthquake. August 31, 2010. Pg 7.

8 http://www.haiticonference.org/

9 Haiti Earthquake PDNA: Assessment of damage, losses, general and sectorial needs. March 2010. Pg. 1

10 Action Plan for National Recovery and Development of Haiti. Immediate key initiatives for the future. March

2010. Pg. 5 11

Action Plan for National Recovery and Development of Haiti. Immediate key initiatives for the future. March

2010. Pg. 9

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• Economic rebuilding: Re-launch of national production, restoration of economic and

financial circuits, access to electricity, etc.

• Social rebuilding: Health, food safety, nutrition, water, sanitation, highly labor-intensive

activities.

• Institutional rebuilding: Democratic institutions, restart of public administration, justice and

security.12

From Plans to Reality

Approaching what should be the end of the implementation period, it is clear that Haiti is still far

from attaining the basis for its reconstruction. The country is still living a mix between relief and

early recovery, with limited progress towards longer-term recovery and sustainable development.

One of the key goals of the PDNA, territorial rebuilding, has failed, hampering progress that

depends on physical reconstruction. Infrastructure rebuilding for the government has not yet

began, so most central Ministries and agencies continue to operate in temporary containers.

Furthermore, the absence of formal land registration in Haiti has made housing reconstruction

difficult, with conflicts emerging to determine who owns what land. As result, almost two years

after the disaster, 600,000 people are still living in temporary camps around the Port au Prince

area. With half of the rubble caused by the earthquake still on the streets, it is difficult to

envision the end of this supposedly temporary relief period13

. Unemployment continues to be

rampant, institutional rebuilding has been very limited and social services continue to be

provided, in their majority, by non-state agencies. The road network is still down, causing work

with local governments outside Port au Prince to be more difficult.

Have humanitarian and early recovery actions hampered the transition to recovery? Or where

reconstruction plans too ambitions for a country with the limitations Haiti faces?

12

Action Plan for National Recovery and Development of Haiti. Immediate key initiatives for the future. March

2010. Pg. 10 13

http://www.beta.undp.org/undp/en/home/presscenter/pressreleases/2011/10/12/haitians-clear-half-of-quake-

rubble.html

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Critics of the humanitarian relief efforts argue that the international community has not done

enough to support good governance and effective leadership in Haiti. Certainly, the massive

influx of non-governmental and international actors made coordination difficult, and local and

national authorities were often left behind in the delivery of services and assistance.14

It is

estimated that over 20,000 NGOs operate in Haiti, being the largest number of NGOs per capita

in the world. These agencies have focused on service delivery, rather than on strengthening the

government’s capacity to deliver those services. The result is that today, 80% of basic services in

Haiti are provided by actors other than the Haitian State.15

Non-governmental organizations

require funding for their survival, and therefore need rapid results. This is in part why they chose

to work independently instead of coordinating their efforts with a bureaucratic and inefficient

government. Also, being involved in activities such as rebuilding schools or hospitals is often

more visible (and therefore better for fundraising) than focusing in activities such as the training

of government officials. Working to build capacity in the government is a longer-term

commitment that many NGOs and international organizations are currently not willing to afford

in Haiti.

Undeniably, the efforts of relief and aid agencies are saving thousands of lives daily. However,

the way in which their actions are coordinated is also undermining one of the central bases for

Haiti’s reconstruction: institutional rebuilding. As Charles T. Call explains in ‘Building States to

Build Peace?, international peace-building undermines state-building when it bypasses state

institutions. “Not only can international state-like authorities leave state institutions artificial

or bereft of legitimacy and capacity, but they can also foster dependency, distort democratic

processes and create disincentives for compromise”16

. For sustainable progress in a country, its

must be its own government and private sector providing services. In Haiti, the overwhelming

presence and entrenchment of foreign agencies is making the emergence of local service

providers almost impossible. Inputs for relief are often brought from the Dominican Republic,

negatively impacting the internal market in Haiti and hampering entrepreneurship. According to

a survey done by Oxfam, a number of clinics, schools, and small businesses have already gone

bankrupt due to competition from external organizations providing these services. To transition

14

Haitian Prime Minister Speech at Columbia University (November 22, 2011) 15

https://nacla.org/node/6501 16

Building States to Build Peace? A Critical Analysis. Charles T. Call. Pg. 64. Journal of Peacebuilding &

Development, Vol. 4, NO. 2, 2008

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to longer-term recovery, international NGOs and international aid agencies need to do more to

incorporate these service providers into the reconstruction process.17

Weak donor coordination has been another factor shaping relief and early recovery in Haiti. The

lack of proper coordination mechanisms to avoid duplication and unite efforts has been an issue

in Haiti for many years, and the massive influx of organizations after the earthquake exacerbated

the problem much more. Experiences from past disasters have shown that coordination is crucial

for effective relief and reconstruction. In Aceh, for example, after the destruction caused by the

Tsunami in 2005, the establishment of a multi-donor trust fund was key for efficient relief

efforts. In Haiti, the number of organizations present has been unprecedented, posing particular

challenges for such a weak pre-existing structure. The establishment of the Interim Haiti

Recovery Commission18

and the Haiti Reconstruction Fund19

tried to secure adequate

coordination mechanisms, particularly by ensuring all projects are aligned with the Action Plan

for National Recovery and Development of Haiti, and by preventing corruption in fund

management. The Commission, however, experienced harsh criticism due to its slow operations

and lack of local vision. Currently, a new political crisis is taking place given that the

Commission’s mandate expired in October 2011, but 120 projects submitted remain open. This

has brought further uncertainty to the reconstruction process, and although the new Prime

Minister has set up a task to evaluate the creation of a new agency, the current vacuum will

further delay recovery.20

The international community has also delayed recovery by failing to comply with their financial

commitments towards reconstruction, and by not prioritizing capacity building of the

government when challenging funds. In March 2010, in the International Donor Conference in

New York to discuss funding for the reconstruction of Haiti, $2.1bn was pledged for Haiti in

2010. By late 2010, however, according to the UN Office of the Special Envoy to Haiti, only

17

From Relief to Recovery. Supporting good governance in post-earthquake Haiti. Oxfam. Pg. 12 18

http://www.cirh.ht/ 19

http://www.haitireconstructionfund.org/hrf/home 20

http://www.haitian-truth.org/absent-haiti-quake-panel-slows-reconstruction/

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42.3 per cent of funds pledged for 2010 by the top 30 donors had been disbursed. 21

Furthermore,

from the funding that has been disbursed since the earthquake, 60% has gone to structures

outside the Haitian government.22

This situation, which is one of the main criticisms of Haitian

politicians to the IHRC, reflects that the priority of donors, at least in terms of funding, is still not

strengthening the Haitian State. As the current Prime Minister of Haiti explains, this ratio would

make sense in a post-conflict situation, but not in a post-disaster one, where rebuilding the State

is crucial for long lasting recovery.23

In spite the negative impact certain actions of the international community have had in

transitioning to recovery and sustainable development, the most significant underlying reason for

Haiti’s slow progress is poor governance. Since its origins as an independent republic, the

Haitian government has been incapable of delivering basic services to its citizens. Corruption,

violence and abuse have been common among the ruling elite, and Haitian citizens have become

dependent on help from abroad to receive basic services essential for survival. The Haitian Civil

Service is extremely weak, with compressed salaries that make it difficult to attract the most

capable people to government. The government of Haiti must undergo a serious pay and

employment reform to increase capacity by introducing policies such as merit hiring and

promotion, but a reform like this requires strong political leadership that the new administration

has yet to prove.

The earthquake demonstrated not only the weaknesses of Haiti’s physical infrastructure but also

the more fundamental weaknesses of its institutions.24

Haiti has been a focus of humanitarian and

development assistance for the past two decades (more than 6.9 million received between 1990

and 2008), and ironically has also been the only country in the region experiencing a long-term

decline in GDP per capita. If aid has had such poor results in Haiti, why would this time be

different? With the great disruption brought by the earthquake, where 20% of civil servants

died25

, it was predictable that Haiti’s weak public administration would not be able to cope with

21

Report of the United Nations in Haiti 2010: Situation, Challenges and Outlook. December 2010. 22

Haitian Prime Minister Speech at Columbia University (November 22, 2011) 23

Haitian Prime Minister Speech at Columbia University (November 22, 2011) 24

Building a More Resilient Haitian State. RAND National Security Research Division. Pg. 1 25

Haiti Earthquake PDNA: Assessment of damage, losses, general and sectorial needs. March 2010. Pg. 5

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and much less lead reconstruction efforts. Indeed, the government is often neglected by other

actors because it has failed to address vital issues promptly. The legal complications delaying

the repair of houses and the removal of rubble, for example, have not been solved. Likewise, the

government has not implemented the emergency reforms needed to tackle land registration issues

currently delaying reconstruction. Effectively addressing key issues like this is not only about the

capacity of governmental institutions, but also about political will and strong leadership. These

attributes have not characterized the Haitian leadership since the disaster occurred, making

advancements even more difficult.

This lack of capacity in the government has meant that even when agencies have tried to transfer

responsibilities to the Haitian State, certain key efforts have failed. The United Nations

Development Program (UNDP) attempted to hand over responsibility for running the Early

Recovery Cluster – the co-ordination structure responsible for supporting return and resettlement

and the provision of basic services and livelihoods – to the Haitian government in May 2010.

However, the government employees in charge lacked the necessary capacity, equipment, and

facilitation skills to do the job. As a result, the transfer of responsibilities failed and UNDP had

to resume its leadership. Situations like this have emerged due to the weaknesses of Haiti’s civil

service and the failure of the international community to focus on real institutional strengthening

during the early recovery period.

Haiti’s political situation has also been a major reason for the State’s failure to lead a more

effective reconstruction process. Holding elections in the midst of an emergency situation was

an unprecedented challenge, which resulted in many months of instability. Not until very

recently has Haiti consolidated its governmental leadership, and some positive signals are being

felt. For the first time since the earthquake can the leadership in the government at least express

with such strength its priorities, which include education, the reconstruction process and job

creation. The current administration has also expressed its commitment to ensure that

multilateral organizations prioritize training and transfer of responsibilities to the government in

all projects.

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In conclusion, Haiti’s limited progress to leave behind the relief and early recovery phase almost

two years after the earthquake is due in part to the way in which foreign assistance has been

implemented, and also due to the weaknesses of the Haitian government. Both reasons are

intrinsically linked. Regarding the question of whether things could have been done better during

the relief period, it is fair to say that considering the chaos brought about by the earthquake and

the limited capacity of the Haitian government, relief agencies were very successful in saving

lives in an emergency situation. The main criticism to be made to foreign assistance is that not

enough focus has been given to build capacity on the State, which has hampered the transition

from relief to recovery and sustainable development. In part due to the intrinsic nature of aid, it

is fair to say that foreign assistance has failed at preparing the Haitian government to lead and to

give it the space to do so.

The Future of Haiti

For the sustainable recovery of Haiti, building capacity in the government is currently the most

important task. The only way in which Haiti will advance towards development is by

consolidating the government’s capability to provide basic services and opportunities to its

citizens. To do so, national and international actors will need to redouble their efforts to

strengthen the state’s capacity, policies, and accountability at local and national levels. As recent

report states, “neither a “republic of NGOs” nor a “shadow” trustee government composed of

donors and international financial institutions will provide sustainable solutions for the Haitian

people”.26

Coupled with this effort, the current Haitian administration must take a strong

leadership over the reconstruction process, and firmly lead the implementation of the most

necessary reforms to allow for recovery (eg. Land reform). It must also strengthen its

commitment to reform Haiti’s civil service, as this step is crucial to build a government with the

necessary capacity to serve its citizens. Furthermore, the international community must truly

commit to work in a coordinated manner, under the Haitian lead. Finally, a crucial change

needed for Haiti’s progress is to promote greater accountability of all actors in Haiti – including

governmental, non-governmental and international agencies. All Haitian citizens, governments,

aid workers and international agencies deserve it.

26

From Relief to Recovery. Supporting good governance in post-earthquake Haiti. Oxfam. Pg. 4

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References:

Action Plan for National Recovery and Development of Haiti. Immediate key initiatives

for the future. March 2010.

Building a More Resilient Haitian State. RAND National Security Research Division.

2010

Building States to Build Peace? A Critical Analysis. Charles T. Call. Journal of

Peacebuilding & Development, Vol. 4, NO. 2, 2008

From Relief to Recovery. Supporting good governance in post-earthquake Haiti. January

2011. Oxfam.

Guidance Note on Early Recovery. IASC Cluster Working Group, October 2007.

Haiti Earthquake PDNA: Assessment of damage, losses, general and sectorial needs.

March 2010.

Inter-agency real-time evaluation in Haiti: 3 months after the earthquake. August 31,

2010.

Report of the United Nations in Haiti 2010: Situation, Challenges and Outlook.

December 2010.

http://www.oecd.org/document/19/0,3746,en_21571361_39494699_39503763_1_1_1_1,

00.html

http://www.haiticonference.org/

http://www.cirh.ht/

http://www.haitireconstructionfund.org/hrf/home

http://www.haitian-truth.org/absent-haiti-quake-panel-slows-reconstruction/

https://nacla.org/node/6501

http://www.beta.undp.org/undp/en/home/presscenter/pressreleases/2011/10/12/haitians-

clear-half-of-quake-rubble.html