Federalism, the geographic location of groups,and conflict

February 27, 201110534 words, including notes, tables, and references

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1 Introduction

Federalism and regional autonomy frequently appear among the proposed reme-

dies for societal conflict (e.g., Nordlinger, 1972; Rabushka and Shepsle, 1972; Co-

hen, 1997; Congleton, 2000; Gurr, 2000; Bermeo, 2002; McGarry and O’Leary,

2005). Such arrangements would grant disgruntled minorities at the national

level autonomy to run their affairs at the regional level. As scholars of fed-

eralism have noted for some time, however, such arrangements are quite del-

icate (e.g., Riker, 1964; Lemco, 1991; Watts, 1998; Filippov, Ordeshook and

Shvetsova, 2004; Bednar, 2008), and many federal systems have collapsed (see,

e.g., Watts, 1998; Stepan, 1999). Hence, recent research has focused more heav-

ily on the question what types of federal arrangements are more conflict prone

and what characteristics may make them more stable (e.g. Bunce, 2003a; Hale,

2004; Bunce and Watts, 2005; Bakke and Wibbels, 2006; Brancati, 2006; Bran-

cati, 2009). At the center of this debate is the question whether ethnofederalism,

i.e., a federal system where regional borders follow as closely as possible settle-

ment patterns of minorities, is advisable or not.

Assessing whether particular makeups of federal units lead to more or less

conflict is, however, a difficult endeavor. First of all, detailed information on

the composition of federal units and the geographic location of ethnic groups is,

especially in conflict-prone regions, difficult to come by.1 Second, the general

makeup of the country is likely to influence the presence or absence of federalism

and the type of federalism chosen.2 This aspect has been largely ignored in

the literature so far. Hence, we propose to assess in this paper whether federal

arrangements in which subunits are designed so that nation-wide minorities may

be in a majority in lower level units, are more conflict prone. More specficially,

we argue that conflict-proness increases with larger shares of minority controlled

subunits, but decreases when this share approximates 1. To demonstrate this

we rely on detailed information on the ethnic make-up of subnational units in

all federal states and control for possible endogeneity biases in our empirical

analyses.

In the next section we briefly review the literature on federalism, especially as

it pertains to this institution’s potential to mitigate societal conflicts. In section

three we discuss and present data on the ethnic makeup of federal countries.

Preliminary analyses presented in this section suggest that the ethnic makeup of

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countries affects the presence and type of federal arrangements. In section four

we assess whether particular types of ethnic makeups make conflict onset more

likely in federal countries than in others. Section five concludes and charts future

research.

2 The debate on federalism

Whether federalist arrangements or regional autonomy might prove an appro-

priate institutional means to mitigate societal conflicts is an increasingly hotly

debated question (see the excellent reviews in Sambanis and Milanovic, 2004; Lake

and Rothchild, 2005; Sambanis, 2005; Bakke and Wibbels, 2006). Gladly, this

literature relies more and more often on the general literature on federal arrange-

ments that highlights the latter’s inherent instability (e.g., Riker, 1964; Lemco,

1991; Watts, 1998; Filippov, Ordeshook and Shvetsova, 2004; Bednar, 2008).

When seeing the potential benefits of federal arrangements in this larger context,

very quickly the question arises under what conditions federal arrangements are

adopted. This problem of endogeneity of federal arrangements, which is already

well problematized in Riker’s (1964) incisive work (but since then often forgot-

ten), makes the results discussed in the literature on the effects of federalism (e.g.,

Cohen, 1997; Saideman, Lanoue, Michael and Stanton, 2002) rather questionable.

Rodden (2006) also highlights this problem in his survey chapter on federalism

(see also Rodden, 2004, 493f).

While there exist many case-based descriptive studies, systematic evidence, es-

pecially evidence obtained from theoretically guided research, is rare. Commonly

it is assumed (e.g., Panizza, 1999) that large territories and/or populations or

diverse populations make the adoption of a federal system more likely (see also

Diaz-Cayeros, 2004; Elkins and Sides, 2007).

The idea that federalism is used to “hold together” diverse populations, or

letting them “come together” (Stepan, 1999), is closely related to the notion of

ethnofederalism. The debate over whether such federal systems, where federal

borders follow closely settlement patterns of minorities, increase societal conflict

or help mitigate it, is a longstanding one in political science. Lipset (1963, 81)

argues against federal units corresponding to the settlement of ethnic groups

and is supported in this by, among others, Nordlinger (1972) (see also Ghai,

2002; McGarry and O’Leary, 2005). More recently Snyder (2000, 199ff) very

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forcefully argued against ethnofederalism, especially in the light of the experiences

after the fall of the iron curtain.3 His argument relies on the conception that

ethnofederal arrangements were not forced on the communist regimes, but were

used for strategic reasons by the communist leadership, and where they were

adopted, a breakup was programmed.4

More recently scholars have attempted to figure out under what conditions

ethnofederal arrangements are more conflict prone. Hale (2004), for instance,

suggests that the existence of a core ethnic region may lead to the collapse of

states and/or civil war.5 Brancati (2006), on the other hand, argues that regional

parties are detrimental to the stability of federal systems. Obviously, ethnofed-

eral systems are likely to create structures fostering the development of regional

parties. Bakke and Wibbels (2006) look in their study of federal arrangements at

fiscal decentralization, inequality, and the ethnic makeup of federal units and find

interesting interaction effects when trying to explain conflicts. According to their

study ethnic heterogeneity, when combined with high income inequality, leads to

more conflict, and the effect of fiscal decentralization depends on the economic

development of the ethnic regions.

While not directly addressing the question of types of federal arrangements,

Sambanis and Milanovic’s (2004) theory on the demand for sovereignty, and their

proposed empirical investigation also suggests a close relationship between the

makeup of subnational units and demands for secession (see also Saideman, 1998;

Saideman and Ayres, 2000). Closely related is Roeder’s (2007) argument that

segmental states lead to nationalism and secession. Even though Roeder (2007)

distinguishes segmental states from federal units, the logic, namely that giving

institutional means to minority groups may foster and harden identities appears

also, for instance, in the work by Horowitz (1985).

Bunce (2003b), based on her work on the breakup of ethnofederal states in

Central and Eastern Europe, suggests that nationalist mobilization failed to lead

to conflict in all cases (see also Bunce and Watts, 2005). Subsequently Bunce

(2003a) proposes as explanation, derived from a comparison of a small number

of cases, the bargaining style in ethnofederal states.

Clearly there are many arguments appearing in the literature whether and

under what circumstances ethnofederal arrangements might work. In the present

paper our focus will be on the following two main arguments. First, as for in-

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stance Bunce (2007) argues, ethnofederal arrangements strenghten ethnic identi-

ties, since at the subnational level ethnic collaboration is not required (see also

Breton, 1964; Rothchild and Roeder, 2005). Second, as most prominently put

forward by Horowitz (1985), federal arrangements which follow ethnic lines, may

allow for easier mobilization and thus foster violent conflict (see also Cornell,

2002; Roeder, 2007). Against these two arguments other authors oppose the

claim that ethnofederal arrangements allow to appease ethnic groups that are

nationally a minority (e.g. Stepan, 1999; Bermeo, 2002). These arguments do,

however, not distinguish between different types of ethnofederal arrangements.

We propose to assess this by looking closely at the territorial arrangements. More

precisely, we agree with the critics of ethnofederal arrangements that they may

harden ethnic divisions, but argue that this depends on the share of federal units

controlled by national-minorities. If this share is small, ethnic divisions are likely

harden, but violent conflict less likely due to the lacking ressources. On the other

hand if this share is very high, ethnic groups are dispersed across several federal

units, making institutional mobilization efforts more difficult (see for instance

Kymlicka, 1998). Consequently, between these two extremes, i.e. when the share

of minority controlled federal units is about half, conflicts are most likely. This is

due to the fact that this may be the result of two ethnic groups being separated in

two federal units (e.g., Soudan or Czechoslowakia) or the national majority faces

a series of minorities with their own federal units, multiplying as a consequence

the likelihood of violent conflict.

To assess whether our claim is correct we propose to consider the federal design

in terms of subunits as an endogenous policy choice and assess the effect of this

design while taking into account its endogenous character. Before attempting to

address these problems, we need to know, however, what we consider as federal

arrangements.

3 Federalism and the makeup of subunits

When defining countries as federal scholars often refer to Riker’s (1964, 11) rightly

famous definition suggesting that ”[a] constitution is federal if (1) two levels of

government rule the same land and people, (2) each level has at least one area of

action in which it is autonomous, and (3) there is some guarantee (even though

merely a statement in the constitution) of the autonomy of each government

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in its own sphere.” It is clear, however, that this definition is difficult to op-

erationalize, and thus it can hardly surprise that scholars often differ in their

lists of federal countries. Bednar (2008, 21) convincingly argues that definitions

relying both on structural features and “federal practices” are not very useful

when attempting to assess the effect of federal arrangements. She pleads for a

strictly structural definition with three necessary components, namely geopoliti-

cal division, independence, and direct governance. With the element geopolitical

divisions she requires that territorial units are “constitutionally recognized and

may not unilaterally be abolished” (Bednar, 2008, 21) and thus rules out non-

territorial arrangements as those advocated, for instance, by Bauer (1907). With

independence it is assured that different levels of governments have “independent

bases of authority,” while direct governance assures that “each citizen is [directly]

governed by at least two authorities” (Bednar, 2008, 21). This clearcut and crisp

definition, which, despite its similarity with Riker’s (1964) one, strengthens the

importance of constitutional recognition of federal units, allows to cut through

the maze of different types of federal arrangements and competing lists of federal

countries.

Based on these criteria, Bednar (2008) identifies 26 entities having fulfilled

all three of them at least for some time between 1990 and 2000 and thus can be

classified as federal. The list of countries Bednar (2008) proposes comes very close

to the list appearing in McGarry (2002). What McGarry (2002, 2005) provides

in addition is a classification of the federal countries as national or multinational

federations,6 as well as start and end dates of the federal arrangements. Similarly,

Roeder (2009) provides a distinction between federations and ethnofederations

that we also include. We provide in table 1 the list of countries we consider

federal.

Table 1 about here

Table 1 lists these countries and adds two pieces of information. First, we

provide information on the time period for which Bednar (2008, 26) and McGarry

(2002) consider these countries as federal. Second, from McGarry (2002) we also

employ as a first indication for the ethnic make-up of federal units the distinction

between national and multinational federations.7

As table 1 illustrates, there are very few contradictions between the two sets

of authors. Omitting small differences in timing (e.g., Belgium becoming federal

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in 1993 or 19948) the only contradictions concern Burma, St. Kitts-Nevis, and

Micronesia. The first two countries are coded by McGarry (2002) as federal but

are considered as quasi-federal, respectively unitary by Bednar (2008, 26), while

for Micronesia the exact opposite is the case.9

Having at hand a list of federal countries a first question to address is what

distinguishes these countries in terms of the overall ethnic makeup from other

countries. First, if we just consider the ethnic composition of federal and unitary

states we find on the basis of Fearon’s (2002) dataset that the ethnic fractional-

ization is practically identical in federal and unitary states, namely on average

0.485 compared to 0.476 (F-statistic 0.017, statistically not significant). When

we distinguish between the two types of federations proposed by McGarry (2002)

we find average ethnic fractionalization indices of 0.381 and 0.601 for the na-

tional and multinational federations. Despite the marked difference, and even

when compared to the averages for unitary states, we fail to find a statistically

significant relationship.

Figure 1 about here

Slightly different is the result if we look at the overall number of groups per

country as reported in Fearon’s (2002) dataset. We find on average 5.144 groups

in the 160 countries for which he provides this information. When distinguish-

ing between federal and non-federal countries we find hardly any differences. In

federal states there are on average 5.412 groups present, while this number is

only slightly lower in unitary states, namely 5.112 (F-statistic 0.111, statistically

not significant). When we distinguish, however, between the two types of federal

systems, namely national and multinational, differences become more marked. In

national federations we find 3.556 groups on average, while this number increases

to 7.500 in multinational federations (F-statistic 2.811 (p=0.063)). These differ-

ences mask to some degree the distribution of the number of groups depicted in

figure 1. This figure suggests that unitary states have a very wide spectrum of

numbers of groups, while national federations are very much concentrated on the

left side of the graph, and, not surprisingly, multinational federations more on

the right side of the graph. Interesting to note is, however, the pattern that the

highest number of groups appears in unitary countries.

Table 2 about here

As noted above, some authors claim that the concentration of groups in par-

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ticular areas lead to higher probabilities of conflict outbreak in general (e.g.,

Toft, 2003) and more particularly in ethnofederal countries (Saideman, Lanoue,

Michael and Stanton, 2002; Hale, 2004). For this reason we depict in table 2 for

each federal country the information on group concentration as collected in the

“minorities at risk” project (Gurr, 1993), as well as the number of groups accord-

ing to Fearon (2002).10 In the country tables we provide in the web-appendix we

also indicate for all minorities at risk in the federal countries considered here their

group concentration, as well as information on their relative group size stemming

from Fearon (2002) and Elkins and Sides (2007).

What is immediately transparent from this table is that in all multinational

federations with “minorities at risk,” some of the latter are concentrated in a

region or form a majority in the region (codes 3 respectively 2 in table 2). In

national federations, however, having regionally concentrated “minorities at risk”

is rare, with Venezuela and Brazil being the exceptions to the rule. Hence,

following Toft’s (2003) argument we would expect multinational federations and

federations with federal units populated mostly by a national minority to be much

more conflict-prone.

Taking this cursory evidence as indication that multinational federations (or

ethnofederalism) is something to avoid, is, however, a step too far. What many

defenders of federal arrangements in general and multinational federations in

particular argue is that even though multinational federations may lead to conflict

or state collapse, the necessary counterfactual would be to look at what would

have happened if the country had not been federal (e.g., McGarry and O’Leary,

2005). This obviously suggests (again) that federal arrangements are chosen in

particular situations to address a set of problems. Hence, empirical analyses

trying to assess the effect of federalism and its specific form need to take into

account the endogenous nature of these institutional choices. Given the important

role the number of ethnic groups and “minorities at risk” appear to play when

comparing federal and non-federal systems, we will employ these variables in our

strategy to address the endogenous nature of federalism. In addition we also

include the colonial-tradition, and more precisely the British, Dutch, French and

US-tradition as instrumental variable.11 The data for this variable stems from

the “Quality of Government” data (Teorell, Holmberg and Rothstein, 2008) and

are based on Hadenius and Teorell’s (2007) work.

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4 The geographic location of groups and its ef-

fect on conflict

To assess the effect of the ethnic makeup of federal countries we employ as start-

ing point Fearon and Laitin’s (2003) analysis of the conditions leading to civil

war, but focus only on the onset of ethnic civil wars as coded by these authors.

We first analyze the effect of federal arrangements.12 In table 3 we report first

report a simple analysis which replicates Fearon and Laitin’s (2003) analysis but

estimate it as a probit model and add a federalism indicator.13 The coefficient

for federalism suggests that such arrangements marginally decrease the probabil-

ity of ethnic conflict onset. To assess whether this indicator suffers from endo-

geneity bias different strategies are possible (e.g., Wilde, 2000; Monfardini and

Radice, 2008; Freedman and Sekhon, 2010). For simplicity’s sake we estimate a

bivariate probit in which the federalism indicator appears in one equation as de-

pendent and in anoter as independent variable. A test of the hypotheses that the

correlation between the two error terms of the bivariate probit model is different

from zero is equivalent to a test of endogeneity (see Wilde, 2000). To predict the

presence of federalism we as instruments the number of ethnic groups, “minori-

ties at risk” and the colonial tradition. In this approach it is assumed that these

instrumental variables are exogenous and can be used to predict the presence of

federal arrangements. Our analyses presented in the previous section seem to

suggest that the ethnic makeup of a society is clearly linked to these presumably

exogenous variables. Following Acemoglu (2005) we include all other exogenous

variables also in this auxiliary regression. As a consequence, also other variables

associated with the presence of federalism are used in this auxiliary regression,

as for instance those employed by Panizza (1999), Elkins and Sides (2007) and

Diaz-Cayeros (2004).14

Table 3 about here

The results of the bivariate probit model suggest a rather reduced effect for

the presence of federalism on the onset of ethnic civil wars. The estimated coeffi-

cient remains statistically insignificant. At the same time the correlation between

the two error terms (ρ) is small and cannot be distinguished from zero on statis-

tical grounds, suggesting that with the instrumental variables employed we find

no evidence for endogeneity. After having assessed the effect of federalism we

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now turn to our main independent variable. We measure the degree to which a

federal arrangement follows the ideas of ethnofederalism by using the proportion

of federal units in which a national minority forms the majority group in the

population.15 We enter this variable also squared to allow for the hypothesized

curvilinear effect. The estimated coefficients reported for model 3 suggest con-

trary to our hypothesized effect that federal states with either a small or a large

share of minority controlled units are most conflict prone. The two estimated

coefficients are, however, far from reaching statistical significance. Suspecting

again possible endogeneity bias we instrument this variable with the number of

ethnic groups and “minorities at risk” as well as the number of federal units.

Clearly as the number of federal units increases, the likelihood that one is domi-

nated by a national minority increases, hence this variable is a useful instrument.

Adding in model 4 the residual of this auxiliary regression suggests a moderate

problem of endogeneity (a likelihood ratio test generates a p-value close to 0.1).

Given this we replace in model 5 the proportion of federal units dominated by a

national minority (as well as its square) by its predicted values from the auxiliary

regression.16 The results suggest that increasing this proportion has a positive

(though statistically not significant) effect on the onset of civil wars civil wars,

but decreases when this share exceeds approximately three quarters.

While this first analysis already suggests that if ethnofederal arrangements

have an effect it is more likely to increase the likelihood of conflict onset, the

analysis also has an important shortcoming. More precisely, since in considering

the effect of the proportion of minority controlled federal units we also include

all unitary states, for which this main independent variable is 0. Hence, even

when controlling for the presence of a federal arrangement, the coefficient for

our main independent variable conflates both the effect of federal arrangements

per se and the effect of the ethnic makeup of the federal units. A quick way to

resolve this problem is presented in Aleman and Treisman (2005) and Bakke and

Wibbels (2006), which basically consists of only considering federal states. The

problem with this solution is obviously that federal institutions are often chosen

with particular goals in mind. Hence, instead of having an endogeneity problem,

focusing only on federal states creates a potential selection bias problem.

To address these two problems, we use in what follows a Heckman (1976) se-

lection model in a probit model (see Dubin and Rivers, 1990), where the selection

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corresponds to the choice (and maintenance) of a federal system. The results for

this second approach to assess the effect of ethnofederal arrangements appear in

table 4.

Table 4 about here

In the first column of table 4 we report the results of the first Heckman model

that estimates simultaneously a selection equation, namely whether a country is

federal, and an outcome equation assessing whether these federal countries expe-

rience in particular years the onset of an ethnic civil war. In terms of explanatory

variables we proceed as above and use the number of ethnic groups and “minori-

ties at risk” as well as the colonial tradition as main variables explaining the

presence of a federal arrangement, but also including the remaining explanatory

variables of Fearon and Laitin (2003). For the outcome equation we use again

this latter set of independent variables but add our main explanatory variable,

namely the proportion of federal units controlled by a national minority and its

square. Not surprisingly the estimation results suggest that an increasing number

of ethnic groups increases the probability that a country has a federal arrange-

ment. Similarly, federalism is more prevalent in former Dutch, French and British

colonies. Controlling for this selection mechanisms, the estimation results for the

outcome equation suggest that increasing the proportion of minority controlled

federal units increases again in a curvilinear fashion the probability of an ethnic

conflict onset. This effect fails to reach statistical significance, however.

Given that with the more simpler approach presented above we also found

initially such a statistically non-significant effect among all country-years used

by Fearon and Laitin (2003), we need again to worry about possible endogeneity

bias. For this reason we estimate again an auxiliary regression model to predict

the proportion of minority controlled federal units. Given that this regression

might again be subject to selection bias if we focus only on federal countries,

we estimate this auxiliary regression with a classic Heckman (1976) model (see

table 5 in appendix). The residuals from the outcome equation and their square

appear as additional explantory variables in the second Heckman probit model

in table 4. While most of the estimated coefficients remain stable compared to

the previous model, the effect of the proportion of minority controlled federal

units decreases dramatically and the coefficient for the variables related to the

residuals are large and statistically significant. Hence, with our instruments we

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can be sure that there is a problem of endogeneity. Consequently, we provide in

the last two columns of table 4 the results of a model where we use the predicted

values of the auxiliary regression to replace the proportion of minority controlled

federal units and its square. Doing so results in coefficients which again support a

curvilinear effect of the share of minority controlled federal units.17 The strongest

effect can be found for federal states with approximately 60 percent of the federal

units being controlled by minorities. States with larger or smaller shares are less

conflict-prine. Hence, we can conclude from this analysis that if there is an effect

among federal states of the proportion of minority controlled federal units, then it

is much more likely to be a positive one, since only few states have a larger share

of minority controlled units than 60 percent. Consequently, scholars like Horowitz

(1985) seem closer to the mark in their assessment of the effect of ethnofederal

arrangements.

5 Conclusion

If federal arrangements are chosen to allow diverse populations to “come together”

or to be “held together,” (Stepan, 1999) two things follow quite directly. First,

the stability of federal arrangements and the latter’s conflit-proness are likely to

be related to the “ethnic map” of the country. Second, if trying to assess the

effect of different federal arrangements like ethnofederalism and the like, we also

need to consider what brought about these particular arrangements.

In trying to offer elements pertaining to the first point, we have also offered

ways in which to address the second point. Using very detailed information

on the ethnic makeup of federal countries we assessed through a rather crude

indicator the effect of different types of ethnic makeups of federal units on civil

war onset. Once we control for the endogenous nature of federal arrangements we

find that larger shares of federal units dominated by a national minority increase

considerably the likelihood of ethnic civil war onset in federal countries.

This result has to be interpreted with some caution, and future research has

to demonstrate its robustness. First of all, it would be useful to build into our

empirical model more detailed information on the geographic location of groups.

Group concentration, ethnic core regions etc. might be measured more precisely

groups by using Geographic Information Systems (GIS) data gleaned from the

Atlas of Soviet geographers (Bruk, 1964) (see Weidmann, Rd and Cederman, 2010

12

Forthcoming). Even with more and better data, however, the most daunting

endeavor still seems to get a theoretical handle on the question why and possibly

how and what type of federal arrangements might mitigate societal conflicts.

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Appendix

Below we report first in table 5 the results of the auxiliary regressions and then

in detail for each country the type of data we collected to determine the makeup

of federal units according to groups. The federal units were determined on the

basis of information from the CIA World Factbook (https://www.cia.gov/cia/

publications/factbook/geos/ (accessed July 21, 2006)) and the Administra-

tive Divisions of Countries (“Statoids”) (http://www.statoids.com/ accessed

July 21, 2006)). To identify groups we relied on Fearon (2002) and the “minori-

ties at risk” data (Gurr, 1993) as reported in Elkins and Sides (2007). For the

group sizes we relied on data from European Values Study Group and Association

(2006) as well as other surveys (as noted in the tables), which we also used to

complement the list of groups if appropriate. When possible we use Census data

at the level of the federal units. We first present in table 6, however, a summary

of the information provided in the tables per country.

Below we summarize the information on the group composition of each fed-

eral country studied in this paper (Table 6). In a web-appendix we report in

detail for each country the type of data we collected to determine the makeup

of federal units according to groups. The federal units were determined on the

basis of information from the CIA World Factbook (https://www.cia.gov/cia/

publications/factbook/geos/ (accessed July 21, 2006)) and the Administra-

tive Divisions of Countries (“Statoids”) (http://www.statoids.com/ accessed

July 21, 2006)). To identify groups we relied on Fearon (2002) and the “minori-

ties at risk” data (Gurr, 1993) as reported in Elkins and Sides (2007). For the

group sizes we relied on data from European Values Study Group and Association

(2006) as well as other surveys (as noted in the tables), which we also used to

complement the list of groups if appropriate. When possible we use Census data

at the level of the federal units.

Table 5 about here

Table 6 about here

14

Tables and Figures

Table 1: Federal countriesCountry Bednar (2008, 26)18 McGarry (2002) Roeder (2009, 205)19

national federations federationsArgentina - 1853- 1853-Australia - 1901- 1901-Austria - 1920- 1918-1938, 1945-Brazil - 1891- 1891-1934, 1946-Germany - 1949- 1867-1938, 1949-Mexico - 1917- 1917-Venezuela - 1960- 1864-United Arab Emirates - 1971- 1971-USA - 1789- 1789

multinational federations ethnofederationsBelgium 1994- 1993- 1980-Bosnia 1995- 1995- 1995-Burma 1948- 1948-1962Cameroon 1961-1972 1961-1972Canada - 1867- 1867-Czechoslovakia 1990-1992 1968-1992 1969-1992Ethiopia 1995-2000 1992- 1952-1962India - 1950- 1953-Malaya 1957-1963 ?Malaysia - 1963- 1963-1965Mali 1960 F: 1960Nigeria 1998-2000 1960- 1960-Pakistan 1990-1999 1947-1971 1947-Russia 1992-2000 1993- 1991-St. Kitts-Nevis 1983- F 1983-South Africa 1993-2000 1996- A: 1972-1994Soviet Union 1990-1991 1918-1991 1922-1991Switzerland - 1848- F: 1848-West Indies Federation 1958-1962 ?Yugoslavia (former) 1990-1991 1953-1992 1945-1992Yugoslavia 1992-2000 1992- 1992-

15

Figure 1: Number of groups in different types of federations

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22

unitary

multinational federalsm

national federalism

number of ethnic groups

%

010

2030

4050

16

Table 2: Group concentration and number of groups in federal countries20

Groupcon groups spatial distribution21 Fearon (2002)Country 0 1 2 3 N N

national fedederationsAustria - - - - 0 4Australia 1 0 0 0 1 3Mexico 1 0 2 0 3 4Venezuela 0 0 1 1 2 4Brazil 0 0 0 2 2 3Argentina 0 1 0 1 2 3Germany 0 1 0 0 1 3USA 2 0 1 1 4 4

multinational federationsBelgium - - - - 0 4Bosnia 0 1 1 1 3 3Canada 2 0 0 1 3 6Czechoslovakia 0 0 0 2 2 4Ethiopia 0 0 2 5 7 11India 1 1 3 5 10 12Malaysia 0 1 1 5 7 9Mali 1 1 0 2 4 5Nigeria 0 0 1 4 5 7Russia 2 2 6 17 27 5South Africa 2 1 2 3 8 13Switzerland 1 0 0 1 2 9Yugoslavia 1 0 4 3 8 7

17

Table 3: The effect of federalism and its form on ethnic civil war onset (withrobust standard errors)

1 2 3 4 5probit bivariate probit probit probit probitonset onset federalism onset onset onset

b b b b b b(r.s.e.) (r.s.e.) (r.s.e.) (r.s.e.) (r.s.e.) (r.s.e.)

Federalism -0.299 -0.133 -0.236 -1.140 -1.051(0.165) (0.258) (0.288) (0.445) (0.452)

Proportion of minority -0.361 4.538 3.312federal units / (pred.) (1.078) (2.329) (2.367)

Proportion of minority 0.340 -3.378 -2.154

federal units2 / (pred.)2 (0.995) (2.049) (2.076)Proportion of minority -2.820

federal units (res.) (2.473)Proportion of minority 0.873

federal units (res.)2 (2.781)Prior war -0.389 -0.382 -0.988 -0.389 -0.310 -0.309

(0.149) (0.151) (0.467) (0.151) (0.155) (0.154)Per capita incomet−1 -0.123 -0.130 0.107 -0.126 -0.113 -0.114

(0.030) (0.032) (0.034) (0.032) (0.039) (0.034)log(population)t−1 0.177 0.159 0.394 0.178 0.148 0.146

(0.035) (0.040) (0.123) (0.037) (0.044) (0.041)log(mountainous terrain) 0.064 0.059 0.156 0.063 0.078 0.082

(0.044) (0.044) (0.132) (0.045) (0.047) (0.045)Noncontiguous state 0.179 0.207 0.044 0.180 0.108 0.140

(0.115) (0.120) (0.417) (0.116) (0.127) (0.118)Oil exporter 0.420 0.423 0.098 0.421 0.392 0.400

(0.125) (0.128) (0.409) (0.125) (0.123) (0.119)New state 0.779 0.781 0.521 0.777 0.793 0.791

(0.180) (0.181) (0.202) (0.178) (0.180) (0.181)Instability 0.167 0.183 0.218 0.168 0.153 0.165

(0.106) (0.107) (0.167) (0.106) (0.106) (0.106)Democracy (Polity)t−1 0.011 0.010 0.011 0.011 0.013 0.014

(0.008) (0.025) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)Ethnic fractionalization 0.358 0.322 -0.656 0.361 0.264 0.241

(0.220) (0.230) (0.589) (0.222) (0.247) (0.245)Religious fractionalization 0.653 0.599 2.025 0.654 0.554 0.546

(0.300) (0.309) (0.830) (0.300) (0.316) (0.316)Number of ethnic groups 0.242

(0.109)Number of “minorities at risk” 0.088

(0.057)Dutch colony 0.673

(0.244)US colony 0.062

(0.117)British colony 0.075

(0.101)French colony 0.267

(0.080)constant -4.304 -4.106 -7.223 -4.309 -4.033 -4.014

(0.399) (0.476) (1.374) (0.426) (0.476) (0.465)ρ -0.177

(0.154)log-likelihood -337.890 -335.754 -336.429N 6327 6327 6327 6327 6327

18

Table 4: Explaining ethnic civil war onset in federal countries: Heckman probitselection model (with robust standard errors)

outcome selection outcome selectionb b b b

(r.s.e.) (r.s.e.) (r.s.e.) (r.s.e.)Proportion of minority -0.259 13.143

federal units (4.223) (4.034)Proportion of minority -0.108 -11.218

federal units2 (3.858) (2.661)Proportion of minority -19.978

federal units (res.) (4.553)Proportion of minority -17.989

federal units (res.)2 (3.597)Prior war -1.010 -0.987 -1.927 -0.987

(0.417) (0.468) (0.831) (0.394)Per capita incomet−1 -0.297 0.107 -0.416 0.107

(0.189) (0.034) (0.177) (0.022)log(population)t−1 0.405 0.393 0.862 0.394

(0.413) (0.123) (0.377) (0.088)log(mountainous terrain) 0.414 0.155 0.292 0.156

(0.179) (0.132) (0.175) (0.100)Noncontiguous state 0.274 0.042 0.417 0.045

(0.403) (0.416) (0.508) (0.358)Oil exporter 0.590 0.099 0.347 0.101

(0.315) (0.410) (0.208) (0.376)New state 0.858 0.509 0.682 0.514

(0.403) (0.202) (0.499) (0.178)Instability 0.309 0.221 0.416 0.218

(0.276) (0.167) (0.393) (0.159)Democracy (Polity)t−1 0.010 0.010 0.001 0.011

(0.023) (0.025) (0.045) (0.017)Ethnic fractionalization -0.911 -0.657 -1.285 -0.658

(0.952) (0.588) (1.137) (0.558)Religious fractionalization 1.724 2.023 1.824 2.027

(1.602) (0.828) (2.333) (0.647)Number of ethnic groups 0.243 0.243

(0.109) (0.044)Number of “minorities at risk” 0.088 0.087

(0.059) (0.052)Dutch colony 0.669 0.673

(0.245) (0.218)US colony 0.060 0.062

(0.117) (0.078)British colony 0.074 0.075

(0.101) (0.083)French colony 0.263 0.266

(0.083) (0.070)constant -6.845 -7.203 -15.231 -7.225

(4.203) (1.371) (5.111) (1.096)ρ -0.611 -0.187

(0.231) (0.576)log-likelihood -1112.010 -1107.713

LR-test χ2, 2df 8.590(p=0.014)

n 959 6327 959 6327

19

Table 5: A: Explaining the proportion of minority-majority federal units (auxil-iary regressions)

OLS Heckman (twostep)outcome selection

b b b(s.e.) (s.e.) (s.e.)

Prior war -0.029 0.014 -1.091(0.004) (0.021) (0.103)

Per capita incomet−1 -0.005 -0.015 0.138(0.000) (0.001) (0.008)

log(population)t−1 0.009 0.039 0.613(0.001) (0.007) (0.034)

log(mountainous terrain) -0.008 -0.016 -0.008(0.001) (0.005) (0.027)

Noncontiguous state 0.005 -0.170 0.366(0.004) (0.017) (0.100)

Oil exporter 0.013 0.044 -0.099(0.004) (0.019) (0.106)

New state -0.002 0.097 0.078(0.008) (0.053) (0.214)

Instability 0.005 -0.032 0.277(0.004) (0.017) (0.091)

Democracy (Polity)t−1 -0.000 -0.009 0.013(0.000) (0.001) (0.005)

Ethnic fractionalization 0.025 0.364 1.497(0.005) (0.028) (0.153)

Religious fractionalization 0.029 0.296 2.010(0.006) (0.038) (0.171)

Number of ethnic groups -0.007 -0.017 0.483(0.001) (0.003) (0.022)

Number of “minorities at risk” 0.026 0.019 -0.009(0.001) (0.001) (0.017)

Number of federal units -0.003(0.000)

Federalism 0.243(0.006)

Number of federal units -0.003 -0.001(0.000) (0.001)

Dutch colony 0.674(0.054)

US colony 0.062(0.019)

Britsh colony 0.075(0.024)

French colony 0.266(0.027)

constant -0.066 -0.227 -7.226(0.010) (0.120) (0.329)

Adj R-squared 0.597root mean squared error 0.099ρ 0.003n 6327 959 6327

20

Table 6: A: Federations and Dominant Majorities or Minorities

Federations N Fed. Units N Majo /Mino States

Nationwide DominantGroup

Majo. / Mino. Fedunit

Majo. / Mino group

National Federa-tionsArgentina 24 0 White (85 - 97%) - -Sources: http://www.indec.mecon.gov.ar/ Table: 14.1 Total de hogares y hogares donde al menos una persona sereconoci perteneciente o descendiente de un pueblo indgena. Total del pais segun provinciasAustralia 8 0 Caucasian (84% -

92%)- -

Sources: Census 2001: http://www.abs.gov.au/websitedbs/d3310114.nsf/home/Previous%20Censuses:%20Census%20data

Austria 9 0 Austrians (90 - 93%) - -Sources: Population Estimations 2006: http://www.statistik.at/fachbereich_03/bevoelkerung_tab8.shtml

Brazil 27 17 White (54 - 55%) Acre MulattoAlagoas MulattoAmap MulattoAmazonas MulattoBahia MulattoCear MulattoMaranho MulattoMato Grosso MulattoPar MulattoParaba MulattoPernambuco MulattoPiau MulattoRio Grande do Norte MulattoRondnia MulattoRoraima MulattoSergipe MulattoTocantins Mulatto

Sources: Census 2000: http://www.sidra.ibge.gov.br/ Table 136Germany 16 0 Germans (91% - 95%) - -Sources: Estimations 2004 http://www.statistik-portal.de/Statistik-Portal/de_jb01_jahrtab2.asp

Mexico 32 0 Mestizo (60%) Oaxaca, Chiapas andYucatan

Strong Indigenous Mi-norities -

Sources: Census 2000: Instituto Nacional de Estadistica Geografia e informatica; http://www.inegi.gob.mx/est/

contenidos/espanol/rutinas/ept.asp?t=mlen02\&c=3327;LibraryofCongress

United Arab Emirates 7 0 Ethnic Arabs (87%) - -Sources: Library of Congress: Foreign workers who represent about 70% are not included in the calculation sincethey are not citizens of UAE.United States 51 3 White (67% - 82%) District of Columbia Black

Hawaii AsianNew Mexico Hispanics

Sources: Population Division, U.S. Census Bureau: Annual Estimates of the Population by Race Alone and Hispanicor Latino Origin for the United States and States: July 1, 2004 (SC-EST2004-04). The Census Bureau providesstatistics for non Hispanic or latino origins and Hispanic and latino origins. All ”white” hispano have been classifiedas hispanics. Other groups have been classified according to their group. E.g. Hispanics Asian alone have beenclassified as Asian.Venezuela 25 2 Mestizo (59% - 68%) Delat Amacuro White

Monagas WhiteSources: World Value Survey 2000; http://www.ine.gov.ve/censo/fichascenso/fichacenso.asp

Multinationals Fed-erationsBelgium 13 7 Flemming (58%) Brabant Wallon Wallon (French)

Brussels Wallon (French)Hainaut Wallon (French)Liege Wallon (French)Luxembourg Wallon (French)Namur Wallon (French)Wallonia Wallon (French)

Sources: World Value Survey 1999 and various official internet pagesBosnia 3 1 Bosniak (Muslims)

(44% - 48%)Republika Srpska Serbs

Sources: Estimations because the last census was held in 1991. Brsko District seems to be equally populated byBosniaks and Serbs (about 40% for each group). http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republika_Srpska. http://en.wikipedia.

org/wiki/Bosnia_and_Herzegovina

Burma (Myanmar) 14 7 Burman (68%) Chin State ChinKachin State KachinKayah State KayahKayin State KayinMon State MonRakhine RakhineShan State Shan

Sources: Reported results based on the last census (1983). All States are dominated by a minority group.Cameroon 10 9 Bamilike-Central

(21%)Adamoua Peulh and Gbaya

Centre BetiEast Meka and GbayaExtreme North Mboum, Mafa and

PeulhNorth Mboum, Guidar, Fali

and MafaNorth West Ring, Ngemba,

Wimbum-Yamba andMomo

21

South Boulou-FangSouth West Ngoe-Oroko

Sources: DHS Survey 2004; http://www.unesco.org/most/dpzognong.htm and http://www.ethnonet-africa.org/data/camer/

genpop.htm

Canada 13 1 English speaker Quebec Quebecois (French)Sources: Ottawa: Statistics Canada - Language Composition of Canada Cat. No. 97F0007XCB2001001Czechoslovakia 2 1 Czech (63%) Slovak Republic SlovaksSources: (Aleman and Treisman, 2005)Ethiopia 11 6 Oromo (35%) Addis Amharra

Amhara AmharraAffar AffarSomali SomalieTigray Tigray (Tigraway)Southern Nations, Na-tionalities and Peoples

Guragie, Sidama andmany small groups

States were Oromo isas strong as any otherminority:Benishangul-Gumaz Amharra (28%);

Oromo (25%) andBeni-Snagul-Gumuz(?%)

Gambela Amharra (18%),Oromo (10%) andGambela (?%)

Dire Dawa Oromo (42%);Amharra (39%)

Sources: DHS Survey 2000; http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/ethiopia/et02_04a.pdf; http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/

Image:Ethiopia_regions_english.png; http://www.csa.gov.et/

India 35 21 Religion: Hindus(81%)

Ethnic (language) andReligious majority:

Language: Hindi(40%)

Jammu and Kashmir Kashmiri and Dogri(in Jammu) / Muslims

Lakshadweep Malayalam / MuslimsPunjab Punjabi / SikhsMeghalaya Khasi / ChristianMizoram Lushai/Mizo / Chris-

tianNagaland Ao, Sema and Konyak

/ ChristianHindi (40%) Ethnic (language) mi-

nority:Assam AssameseDadra and NagarHaveli

Bhili/Nhilodi

Daman and Diu GujaratiGoa KonkaniGujarat GujaratiKarnataka KannadaKerala MalayalamMaharashtra MarathiManipur ManipuriOrissa OriyaPondicherry TamilSikkim NepaliTamil Nadu TamilTripura BengaliWest Bengal Bengali

Sources: Census 2001 Religious Data http://www.censusindia.net/religiondata/index.html; Census 1991 ThreeMain Languages in every State 1991, Table 26 http://www.censusindia.net/cendat/datatable26.html and http://www.

kashmirstudygroup.net/awayforward/mapsexplan/languages.html. The Kashmir, Tamil and Sikh minorities are the mostmilitants, along religious cleavages (Kohli, 2004).Malaya (57-63) 11 1 Malay Penang (Pinang) ChineseMalaysia (1963-1965) 14 4 Malay Penang Chinese

Sabah Kadazan-DusunSarawak IbanSingapore Chinese

Note: August 7, 1965: Singapore is expelled from the Malaysian FederationMalaysia (1966-) 13 3 Malay Penang Chinese

Sabah Kadazan-DusunSarawak Iban

Sources: http://www.statistics.gov.my/english/frameset_census.php?file=pressdemo ; Wikipedia (See Table for Malaysiafor more details). We do not include the 3 Federal Territories of Malaysia; Kuala Lumpur (Capital, 1972), Labuan(Offshore territory, 1984) and Putrajaya (Administrative centre, 1995). All are dominated by Malays and aregoverned by the Ministry of Federal Territory.Mali 8 5 Bambara (34%) Kayes Sarakole, Soninke,

Marka and MalinkeMopti Dogon and PeulhTombouctou SonraiGao SonraiKidal Tamacheck

Sources: DHS Survey 1999 and http://region.segou.net/Donn%E9es%20sur%20le%20Mali.htm

Nigeria 37 24 Hausa-Fulani (23%) Kogi Yoruba, Igbala andIbira

Ekiti YorubaKwara YorubaLagos Yoruba

22

Ogun YorubaOndo YorubaOsun YorubaOyo YorubaTaraba Wurkum, Mumuje

and many smallgroups

Plateau Tera, Hausa, Biromand many smallgroups

Niger NupeAdamawa Many groupes (81%)Bayelsa IjawDelta Igbo, Urhobo and IjawAbia IgboAnambra IgboEbonyi IgboEnugu IgboImo IgboBenue Idoma and TivAkwa Ibom IbidioCross River Ekoi and many small

groupsEdo EdoBorno Bura, Kanuri and

many other groupsSources: DHS Survey 1999Pakistan 8 3 Punjabi (44%) Sindh Sindhis and Urdu

North-West FrontierProvince (NWFP)

Pakhtuns (Pathan)

Baluchistan Brohi, Pakthuns andBaluchi

Sources: (Aleman and Treisman, 2005), World Value Survey 1999 and DHS Survey 1990/1991Russia 88 12 Russian (80%) Chechen Republic Chechens

Chuvashi Republic ChuvashRepublic of Dagestan AvarsRepublic of Ingushetia IngushsKabardino-BalkarianRepublic

Kabardians

Republic of Kalmykia KalmyksKarachaevo-Chercessian Republic

Karachais

Republic of North Os-setia Alania

Osetians

Republic of Sakha(Yakutia)

Yakuty

Republic of Tatarstan TatarsRepublic of Tuva TuviniansAginsky Buryat au-tonomous district

Buriats

Sources: Census 2002; National Composition for regions of the Russian Federation: http://www.perepis2002.ru/ct/

doc/English/4-2.xls

South Africa 9 2 Black African (79%) Northern Cape ColouredWestern Cape Coloured

Sources: South African Census 2001 by Province and Population group: http://www.statssa.gov.za/extract.htm ; DHSSurvey 1998Soviet Union 15 14 Russian (51%) Armenian Republic Armenians

Azerbaydazhan Re-public

Azeris

Belorussian Republic BelarusansEstonian Republic EstoniansGeorgian Republic GeorgiansKazakh Republic KazakhsKirgiz Republic KyrkyzLatvian Republic LatviansLithuanian Republic LithuaniansMoldavian Republic MoldaviansTadzhik Republic TajiksTurkmen Republic TurkmenUkrainian Republic UkrainiansUzbek Republic Uzbeks

Sources: Library of CongressSwitzerland 26 7 German (62% - 65%) Fribourg Romand (French)

Geneva Romand (French)Jura Romand (French)Neuchatel Romand (French)Tessin Ticinese (Italian)Valais Romand (French)Vaud Romand (French)

Sources: Census 2000; http://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/fr/index/themen/bevoelkerung/sprachen__religionen/blank/

kennzahlen0/sprachen.html

Former Yugoslavia(1991)

6 5 Serbs (36%, 1991) Bosnia-Herzegovina Muslims (Bosniaks)

Croatia CroatsMacedonia MacedoniansMontenegro MontenegrinsSlovenia Slovenes

23

Sources: (Woodward, 1995); Table 2: pp 32-35.Yugoslavia (Serbiaand Montenegro)(1992 - 2006)

2 1 Serbs Montenegro Montenegrins

24

Notes1We completely eschew in this paper the problem that ethnic groups or any other groups

are hardly given, but their definition is often part of ongoing conflict processes (e.g., Breton,1964; Rabushka and Shepsle, 1972; Fearon and Laitin, 2000b).

2A nice illustration to this effect appears in Glazer (1983), who shows that in the UnitedStates after 1789 new states were admitted to the Union only once WASPs formed a clearmajority (see also McGarry and O’Leary, 2005).

3The experiences of the Soviet Union and the countries in its sphere of influence are discussedby a series of authors (e.g. Roeder, 1991; Cornell, 2002; Bunce, 2003a; Bunce, 2003b; Hale, 2006).

4This rather pessimistic assessment by Snyder (2000) is closely related to the notion thata peacefully functioning democracy requires an open and free “marketplace of ideas” (see alsoMansfield and Snyder, 2005). In ethnofederalist countries, the “marketplace of ideas,” however,is very likely to be segmented along ethnic lines.

5This point relates to Toft’s (2003) claim that a group’s geographic concentration and desireto control territory is closely linked to the outbreak of violence. Fearon and Laitin (2002) alsofind an effect for the newly constructed concentration measure for groups, argue, however, thatthis has more to do with strategic issues. Interestingly, Saideman, Lanoue, Michael and Stanton(2002) find that group concentration of “minorities at risk” affects positively both protest andrebellion. When separating low from high concentration groups, the authors find that federalismfails to have a statistically significant effect for low concentration groups, but that the negativeeffect on rebellion is statistically significant for high concentration groups (however, this mayin part be due to the different sample sizes instead of any substantive differences). Furtherdown the line, Tir’s (2005) study on the effects of secession highlighting the higher likelihoodof continuing violence after secessions that were violent, is instructive (see also Chapman andRoeder, 2007; Roeder, 2007).

6Unfortunately, these notions are nowhere clearly defined, but they come very close to thenotion of ethnofederalism. Bunce (2003a), however, refers to Azerbaijan, Georgia, Russia, andSerbia-Montenegro as ethnofederalist states. Of these only the later two are considered byMcGarry (2002) as multinational federations. Similarly, the POLITY III indicator classifiesboth Azerbaijan and Georgia as mixed regime (between unitary and federal), while Henisz(2002) codes this country as not federal. For Georgia Beck, Clarke, Groff, Keefer and Walsh(2001) also suggests that the subnational units fail to have sufficient authority.

7The attractiveness of McGarry’s (2002, 2005) distinction between national and multina-tional federations is that it is obviously closely related to the ethnic makeup of the countriesconcerned. Related notions are Aleman and Treisman’s (2005) “ethnically mined” federationsin which one group is a majority within one of the constituent units and a minority within thefederation as a whole. These authors consider nine countries to fall in this category, namely Bel-gium, Canada, Czechoslovakia, India, Nigeria, Pakistan, Soviet Union, Switzerland, Yugoslavia(former).

8We also put in this category the rather large differences in timing when it comes to Nigeriaand Pakistan. In the later case, Bednar (2008) considers this country as federal between 1990and 1999, while McGarry (2002) assumes that the federal experience was limited to 1947-1971.We follow the latter coding decision, despite the fact that Aleman and Treisman’s (2005) codingsuggests that between 1971 and 1990 Pakistan was still federal.

9Griffiths and Nerenberg (2005) consider all these cases as federal, with the exception ofBurma/Myanmar, while Watts (1996) excludes in addition Mirconesia. Given that none of ourdata on ethnic groups and “minorities at risk” nor the data on conflicts we use have Micronesia,St. Kitts-Nevis and and the West Indies Federation as observations, we will no longer considerthese cases in the remainder of the paper. For Burma, however, we follow McGarry (2002) andconsider it as a multinational federation.

25

10Fearon and Laitin (2000a) propose an alternative measure for group concentration, whichis used, for instance by Sambanis and Milanovic (2004). Since this data covers only 101 groupsso far, we refrain from using it here.

11We thank Warren Camber for suggesting these additional instruments.12We fully concur with the view articulated in Achen (2005) and Clarke (2005) that this is

probably not the best strategy. The alternative, however, would be a fully specified theoreticalmodel on the outbreak of civil wars. Such a model is, however, quite clearly still absent in thisliterature.

13We employ the replication data made available by Fearon and Laitin (2003) and thus refrainfrom a discussion of the data.

14We also considered endogeneity test based on Hausman’s (1978) work in the context ofnon-linear models (see Rivers and Vuong, 1988; Bollen, Guilkey and Mroz, 1995) employingeither a linear probability or a probit model in the first stage (see Alvarez and Glasgow, 2000).The substantive implications of these other models are identical to the ones reported in themain text.

15We provide in the appendix information on the sources for this measure.16To correct for the biased standard errors in this model as discussed by Rivers and Vuong

(1988) we Alvarez and Glasgow (2000) and report bootstrapped standard errors (see Efron,1981)

17For this model we provide again bootstrapped standard errors.18- indicates that Bednar (2008, 26) considers the country as federal for the whole period

between 1990 and 2000. We omit from her list the European Union, which she codes as federalfor 1999-2000.

19A indicateds that Roeder (2009, 205) consider the country as having autonomous ethnicregions, while F indicates he considers the country as a federation. Roeder (2009, 205) lists inaddition Indonesia (1949-1950), Tanzania (1964-) and Spain (1978-) as ethnofederations, whichwe omit, given that neither Bednar (2008, 26) nor McGarry (2002) list these cases.

20Austria and Belgium have no “minorities at risk.”21The codes correspond to the following labels: 0 Widely dispersed; 1 Primarily urban or

minority in one region; 2 Majority in one region, others dispersed; 3 Concentrated in one region.

26

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